The future of civilization and state religion policy

Futures 42 (2010) 522–531

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The future of civilization and state religion policy Jonathan Fox * Department of Political Studies, Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel

A R T I C L E I N F O

A B S T R A C T

Article history:

This study examines the influence of civilization, as defined by Samuel Huntington, on state religion policy between 1990 and 2002 based on the religion and state (RAS) dataset. While most previous studies of Huntington’s civilizational arguments focus on his predictions regarding conflict, and tend to falsify these predictions, the findings show that there is a clear link between civilization and state religion policy. Overall, state involvement in religion increased between 1990 and 2002 but the pattern of change differed between civilizations with each civilization having its own unique pattern. This is true of both the absolute levels of government involvement in religion and the patterns of change. ß 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Available online 25 January 2010

1. Introduction This study examines the influence of civilization on the religion policy of 175 states using data from the Religion and State (RAS) dataset. This dataset includes information on whether states have official religions, engage on religious discrimination, regulate the majority religion, and legislate religious precepts between 1990 and 2002. The essential questions asked here are: do states belonging to different civilizations have different policies toward religion? Did the patterns of state religion policy change between1990 and 2002 both for specific civilizations and in general? What does this imply for the future of state religion policy both within and across world civilizations?

2. Civilizations In order to address this question, this study uses Samuel Huntington’s [36,37] definition of civilization and his categorization of states into civilizations. Huntington defines a civilization as the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of what distinguishes humans from other species. It is defined by both common language, history, religion, customs, institutions and by the subjective self identification of people [36]. He divides the world into several civilizations, which overlap significantly but not completely with religion [17]. These include the Western, Confucian/Sinic, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American, and ‘possibly’ African civilizations. In his book he discusses a Buddhist civilization but is unclear as to whether this civilization is separate from the Confucian/Sinic civilization.1 For the purposes of this study, the Buddhist civilization is included in the Confucian/Sinic

* Tel.: +972 3 531 8578. E-mail address: [email protected]. 1 The Buddhist civilization appears on his map of ‘‘The World of Civilizations: Post-1990’’. He also infers that there is a Buddhist civilization on page 257 Table 10.1 where he argues that the Chinese-Tibetan conflict is intercivilizational ‘‘since it is clearly a clash between Confucian Han Chinese and Lamaist Buddhist Tibetans.’’ However he states elsewhere that ‘‘Buddhism, although a major religion, has not been the basis of a major civilization.’’ He also includes ‘‘the related cultures of Vietnam and Korea,’’ which are countries with Buddhist majorities, in the Sinic/Confucian civilization [37]. 0016-3287/$ – see front matter ß 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.futures.2010.01.003

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civilization for two reasons. First, more often then not, this is how Huntington divides the civilizations. Second, there are only 14 states included on the RAS dataset which are coded as Confucian/Sinic, including all eight Buddhist majority states. Separating these categories would result in categories too small for meaningful statistical comparison. Huntington’s ‘‘clash of civilizations’’ (CoC) theory which is the source for this civilizational categorization is perhaps among the most well known of predictions regarding the future. Arguably, it is also among the most controversial. However, most of this controversy centers not on the existence of civilizations but, rather, his predictions that most post-Cold War conflict will be between civilizations and that the Islamic civilization will be particularly violent. This aspect of his theory essentially argues that civilizations will be the primary basis for identity and conflict in the international arena, to the exclusion of all other bases for identity. Many disagree, arguing that states and sub-state groups will be the primary basis for identity and conflict [3,23,29,42,43,51,53,63,65]. Others argue that local identities are becoming less important and that the world is developing a united identity or that international issues like the environment will be of primary importance2 [2,5,20,27,38,62]. Though not as a specific reply to Huntington, others like Ziauddin Sardar argue that identity will be more complicated. On one hand, the parochial groupings which Huntington calls civilizations, in this instance Islam, are in fact universal creeds which recognize no geographical boundaries. On the other hand, the increased access of the masses to authoritative religious texts due to modern factors like increased literacy and the Internet allow individuals to interpret their religious traditions for themselves. This has resulted in the factionalization of religious traditions such as Islam, a trend that is likely to continue into the future [39]. Most quantitative studies on the topic have consistently found that Huntington’s vision for the future turned out to be inaccurate with regard to both domestic and international conflict [11,14,17,30,31,32,33,34,35,52,54,61]. To be fair, quantitative studies of this nature can only assess what has occurred through the present and cannot rule out Huntington’s predictions becoming true in the future. However, it has been nearly two decades since the end of the Cold War and the historical forces Huntington discussed in the early 1990s were in his assessment sufficiently strong to define a new paradigm of international relations. Accordingly it can be argued if Huntington’s interpretation of world politics was correct, his predictions should have by now become true. That being said, few of Huntington’s critics deny that civilizational identities exist and that there are significant differences between civilizations. Rather, most who criticize Huntington’s CoC theory disagree with his prediction that civilization will become the primary basis for identity. Some also argue with the specifics of his assessment of what are the world’s civilizations [57]. Similarly, the quantitative aspect of the debate focuses on the predictions regarding conflict and not the questions of whether civilizations exist and, if so, to what extent are they different from each other. Thus the proposition that civilizations exist and are different from each other is significantly less controversial than other aspects of the CoC theory. Furthermore, while the quantitative studies discussed above show that civilization is not the primary form of conflict or the primary influence on conflict in the post-Cold War era, they do not show civilization does not exist and has no influence. Inter-civilizational conflicts do occur and are a large proportion of conflict, though a minority of it [14,17,54,61]. Also, civilizational and cultural factors do impact on conflict, though less so than other factors [17,32,34,52]. In some cases this means civilizational and cultural differences resulting in less conflict [35,45]. There is an additional literature that both acknowledges the power of culture – often the religious aspects of culture – but also contradicts Huntington’s predictions. This literature discussed how religious and cultural divides can be bridged to create a more peaceful world. Appleby [6] and Gopin [22], among others, argue that religions, which often inspire violence, also include within their traditions the cultural tools to support peace and toleration. They further discuss how the peaceful and tolerant aspects of religion can be emphasized in order to resolve and prevent conflicts.3 Groff [25] similarly argues that improved inter-cultural communication is a better alternative to dealing with cultural diversity than are Huntington’s more pessimistic predictions of inter-cultural violence. Thus, many argue that active efforts by good-willed people can create an alternative future by actively altering past patterns and trends. In this future, inter-cultural and inter-religious interaction will enrich our lives rather then threaten them and perhaps lead to a more unified world culture. This literature raises another significant issue. The majority of the literature on Huntington’s clash of civilizations thesis, though certainly not all of it, focuses on a realist, power–politics perspective. That is, it focuses primarily on political and military power and to a lesser extent economic power. Put differently, even though the clash of civilizations discussion is essentially based on the argument that culture matters, the discussion is less about the nature of those cultures and more about which cultures are more powerful as well as which cultures are likely to be in conflict. Yet, it is precisely the different values and structures inherent in these cultures that determine much of the interaction between cultures [25]. Even aspects of the world system such as the economy which are the purview of realist perspective can be seen differently from the cultural-interaction perspective. For instance Bilgin [10] argues that economic interactions between civilizations both influence culture and are influenced by it. ‘‘Along with military clashes, the rise and decline of civilizations are highly linked to their ability to dominate the engine of the market.’’ Values that deviate from those of the market are diluted and the less dominant cultures often forced to adjust their value systems. However in order to preserve their cultures, some

2 3

For a discussion of these critiques of Huntington’s theories, as well as additional critiques, see [17]. See also [1,12,21,41,49,60].

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countries such as China are making efforts to decouple their production and marketing from the values propagated by the Western-dominated world economy. More interestingly, if a ‘‘sublime’’ civilization – ‘‘characterized by leisure and/or progressive understanding of arts, sciences and sports, all accompanied by harmonious in group relations as well as tolerance to other civilizations’’ – were to gain sufficient power in the global market it may be able better defend itself against violence from the more ‘‘primitive’’ civilizations. Put differently, in the past ‘‘sublime’’ civilizations have either been destroyed by their more aggressive neighbors or had to become less ‘‘sublime’’ in order to survive. The power of the market in the modern era gives these civilizations a path toward both remaining ‘‘sublime’’ and surviving. If they accomplish they may even influence other civilizations toward becoming more ‘‘sublime.’’ Yet, many like Ziauddin Sardar point out that the current western economic and cultural dominance is a source of inter-cultural tensions [39]. Given all of this, the question of whether civilization impacts on state religion policy is both appropriate and relevant for several reasons. First, the claim that civilization is one influential factor among many is less radical than Huntington’s claim that civilization is the primary influence. It also has support in the quantitative literature. Second, in order to understand the future impact of civilization, it is critical to accurately assess its current impact. Third, much of the interaction between cultures takes place below the level of grand politics inter-cultural violence. Thus, an understanding of how values, such as the proper role of religion in government, differ between cultures can enhance our understanding of inter-cultural relations. 3. State religion policy and civilization The question of whether state religion policies differ between civilizations is particularly relevant. This is because there is a significant overlap between Huntington’s concept of civilization and religion. Several of his civilizations, including the Islamic and Hindu civilizations are defined almost solely on religion. The others, except for the African and Confucian/Sinic civilizations, are largely religiously homogeneous. The Latin American, Slavic-Orthodox, and Western civilizations are all mostly Christian4 but are divided to an extent by religion. The Latin American civilization is primarily Catholic. The SlavicOrthodox civilization is distinguished by ‘‘Byzantine parentage, distinct religion and limited exposure to the Renaissance, Reformation, Enlightenment, and other central Western experiences.’’ Huntington also notes that ‘‘religion is the defining characteristic of civilizations’’ [37]. Based on all of this, the hypothesis that state religion policies will differ between civilizations is a reasonable extension of Huntington’s theory. In fact, it is arguable that if civilization has any influence on state policy, it should be in the arena of religion. To my knowledge no quantitative studies have addressed the issue inter-civilizational differences in state religion policy but one study addresses differences in individual religious behavior and attitudes across civilizations. Norris and Inglehart [50] use the World Values Survey data which is based on surveys in 86 countries taken, in some cases multiple times, between 1981 and 2001. It measures religiosity with questions like how often one attends religious services and whether one believes in God. They find that overall religiosity in the world is increasing but it is dropping in the most developed states. Although the focus of their study is on other issues, they produce a number of findings that show different patterns of religiosity between members of different civilizations. The West, except for the United States, shows a decline in religiosity since the 1960s. This is explained as a consequence of economic development. Post-Communist Europe continues to have low religiosity even after the fall of the Soviet Union. Furthermore religiosity is, also lower in more economically developed countries in the region. This lack of a religious revival in the region indicates that the cause of the secularization of this society is tied to factors other than communist repression. Muslims are more likely than members of other religions to support religion playing a role in society and government. Muslims and non-Muslims also differ on a number of social issues including gender equality, homosexuality, abortion and divorce. However, Muslim attitudes toward democracy are similar to those of members of other religions [50]. 4. Past predictions on religion’s future When examining the future of state religion policy it is important to place this in the context of past predictions of religion’s future. Until the latter part of the 20th century the dominant paradigm on religion in the social sciences was alternatively known as modernization theory to political scientists and secularization theory among sociologists. These theories predicted that the processes inherent in modernization would lead to the decline of religion’s importance in the public sphere. Some extreme versions of this theory predicted that religion would become an epiphenon. Urbanization was expected to undermine the traditional religious community. Mass education and increased literacy would replace the religious monopoly on knowledge. Science would provide explanations for the world around us which would replace religious and superstitious explanations. For example, evolution and the ‘‘big bang’’ now compete with creationism as an explanation for the world’s existence. Religious criteria for moral and proper behavior would be replaced with scientific and rational criteria based on sciences like psychology and secular bureaucratic regulation. The fear of God as

4 Non-Christian minorities living within the territories controlled by these civilizations are considered to belong to other minorities and result in civilizational ‘‘fault lines’’ within these states [37].

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a motivation for proper behavior would be replaced with the fear of getting caught by surveillance and forensic technology. In short, science and rationalism was expected to usurp all of religion’s previous social roles.5 By the 1980s and 1990s this set of predictions came under increasing criticism. Many began to argue that those making these predictions had erred and religion was not in a state of demise [17,24,47]. Some argue that while specific religions rise and fall, processes inherent in the religious economy – the entire body of religious institutions and influences on society – result in a consistent level of religious influence on society and a consistent proportion of individuals involved in religion. Though, state intervention in religion can distort the religious economy [58]. Others began to argue that modernization was, in fact, causing a resurgence of religion. That is, all of the predictions made by modernization and secularization theory were in a sense correct but these threats to religion stimulated a response to defend religion which has in may ways caused a revitalization of religion [28,55]. For example, secular political ideologies are seen by many, especially those in the third world, as having failed to produce social justice and economic prosperity. This has resulted in a return to religion as a legitimate basis for government. Also, individuals who have become disillusioned with modernity, perhaps due to failure to succeed in a modern environment, are most likely to join religious movements [60]. Much of the literature on religious fundamentalism describes fundamentalism as a reaction to the threats of modernity that is designed to preserve and revitalize religion [4,6]. While this description of these predictions is a brief one which represents a large and complex literature, it is sufficient to show that there are three sets of contradicting predictions on the long-range influence of religion in society: (1) religion is in a continuous state of decline, (2) religion has a continuing and steady influence; and (3) religion’s influence is increasing. As these trends are expected to continue over long periods of time, a determination of which trend prevailed in the limited segment of time (1990–2002) included in this study can be considered as potentially indicative of long-term trends in state religion policy – a subset of the larger religious economy – which will continue into the future. 5. The religion and state dataset and methodology The religion and state (RAS) dataset includes data on state religion policy for 175 states with yearly codings for 1990 through 2002. It is important to note that this form of data-based analysis can only examine past and current trends, in this case those that existed between 1990 and 2002. However this study uses these trends to extrapolate likely trends in the future. The RAS specifically measures government involvement in religion (GIR) which is defined as any government support for religion, any government interference in religion, or any government restrictions on religion. This study examines four types of GIR included in the RAS dataset. The first is whether a state has an official GIR, and if not what is the official role of religion in the state? States are coded into the following categories:  The state has one or more official religion.  Civil religion: while the state does not officially endorse a religion, one religion serves unofficially as the state’s civil religion.  Cooperation: the state falls short of endorsing a particular religion but certain religions benefit from state support more than others (Such support can be monetary or legal).  Supportive: the state supports all religions more or less equally.  Accommodation: official separation of religion and state with a benevolent or neutral attitude toward religion.  Hostile: the state is hostile to religion in general.6 Second, religious discrimination measures 16 specific types of restrictions placed on minority religious practices, institutions, or organizations which are not placed on those of the majority religions. Each is measured on a scale of 0 to three, resulting in a scale of 0–48.7 Third, religious restrictions measures 11 ways the government can regulate the practices, organizations, and institutions of the majority religion. Each is measured on a scale of 0–3 resulting in a combined scale of 0– 33.8 Finally, religious legislation measures 33 ways in which a government may legislate religious precepts or otherwise support religion through legislation. This variable ranges from 0 to 32 as two component variables measuring support for religious education are mutually exclusive.9

5

For examples of this literature see, among others [9,13,57,64]. For a survey of this literature and its critics see [16,18]. The source variable in the RAS dataset includes more categories. Three categories of hostility to religion were combined into a single category because few states were coded in these categories. Also, two categories of states with official religions were combined because one of them contained only two states. 7 For a full listing of these 16 measures see [18,19]. The scale for each component variable is: 0 = Not significantly restricted for any; 1 = The activity is slightly restricted for some minorities; 2 = The activity is slightly restricted for most or all minorities or sharply restricted for some of them; 3 = The activity is prohibited or sharply restricted for most or all minorities. 8 For a full listing of these 11 measures see [18,19]. The scale for each component variable is: 0 = No restrictions; 1 = Slight restrictions including practical restrictions or the government engages in this activity rarely and on a small scale; 2 = Significant restrictions including practical restrictions or the government engages in this activity occasionally and on a moderate scale; 3 = The activity is illegal or the government engages in this activity often and on a large scale. 9 For a full listing of these 33 measures see Fox [18,19]. 6

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This study relies on the Fox [17] coding of states into Huntington’s [36,37] civilizational categories. Each state is places into one of the following categories: Western, Asian, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American, Islamic, and African. The ‘‘Asian’’ category includes states in the Confucian/Sinic, Japanese, and Hindu categories because separately these civilizations include 14, 1, and 3 states respectively. The latter two contain too few states for meaningful statistical comparisons. Combining them into a single category is preferable to the other option of dropping that Hindu states and Japan from the study. While not ideal, this is also theoretically appropriate in the context of Huntington’s concept of civilization because the history and culture of these civilizations, though certainly different from each other, are arguably more similar to each other than to the other civilizations on Huntington’s list. This study performs several tests using these variables. All of the bi-variate analyses use the RAS data from 1990 and 2002, the first and last years available, to assess change over time. For a number of states, data was not available in 1990. In these cases the earliest available year was used.10 The bi-variate tests are intended to assess whether (1) different civilizations have different GIR policies and (2) whether these policies changed over time and, if so, in what direction. The study examines the distribution of codings for the official GIR variable controlling for civilization. This is presented as a simple cross-tabulation, as both variables are categorical variables. The study performs a number of tests on the religious discrimination, religious regulation and religious legislation variables. First, it provides the mean levels of these variables for 1990 and 2002 controlling for civilization. This allows for a testing of differences in average levels of these variables across civilizations and over time. Second, it provides the proportion of states which engage in any religious discrimination, religious regulation and religious legislation. Put differently, it examines how many states score above 0 on these variables. This test is included because the difference between engaging in no GIR and engaging in GIR is a crucial distinction. The difference between this test and the means tests can be described as similar to the distinction between determining whether one is a thief and determining which thief has stolen more. Clearly someone who robs a bank of millions of dollars is a bigger thief than a pickpocket. However, they are both thieves and those who refrain from theft are not. Third, it provides the proportion of states which increased and decreased on these variables. This allows for an assessment of the extent to which any changes in GIR are widespread. A dramatic shift in a small number of states can significantly influence averages but so can smaller shifts in a larger number of states. As each of these possibilities has different implications, this statistic provides important information. The multi-variate analysis uses OLS regressions to examine the impact of civilization on any religious discrimination, religious regulation and religious legislation in 2002.11 These tests measure civilization by creating a ‘‘dummy’’ variable for each civilization which is coded as 1 if a state belongs to a civilization and otherwise as 0. All of the civilizations other than the African civilization are included in the analysis. This is because in cases where a set of dummy variables in which each state is coded as 1 on exactly one of these variables (as is the case with this study), one of these dummy variables must be dropped from the analysis in order to obtain results. This analysis includes the following control variables which were determined by Fox [18,19] to be potentially important predictors of GIR. Religious homogeneity measures the probability that two randomly selected individuals in a state belong to the same religion. Many argue that there is a link between this variable and state religion [46,58]. This study uses a version of this variable collected by McCleary and Barro [46] which is based on demographic statistics from the World Christian Encyclopedia [8]. The polity variable measures whether a state is democratic because democracy is often linked to separation of religion and state. It ranges from 10 to 10 with 10 being the most autocratic and 10 being the most democratic. It is based on the regulation, openness, and competitiveness of executive recruitment, constraints on the executive, and the regulation and competitiveness political participation.12 Stability is based on the polity variable and measures how many years it has been since there has been a change in the polity variable in a given state. Log-per-capita-GDP measures a states economic development.13 Finally the log of the state’s population measures whether large and small states have different religion policies.14 6. Data analysis and discussion Table 1 presents the changes over time and differences between civilizations in official GIR, which, as will be recalled, measures a state’s official policy toward religion. The patterns of official GIR changed somewhat over time with ten states

10 The codings for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Croatia, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Macedonia, Moldova, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan begin in 1991, the codings for Afghanistan begin in 1992, the codings for Eritrea and Slovakia begin in 1993, and the codings for Bosnia begin in 1995. These represent years in which these states became independent or, in some cases, when governments were formed after a period of civil war during which no effective government existed. 11 Official GIR is not included in these tests because, as a categorical variable, it is less suited for this form of analysis. 12 For more details see [40] and the Polity project webpage at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/index.htm. Other studies often use the Freedom House variable (www.freedomhouse.org) to measure democracy but this variable is not appropriate in this case as it measures human and civil rights which are unacceptably covariant with religious discrimination. 13 This variable is taken from the UN Statistical Division website at http://unstats.un.org/unsd/default.htm. I selected this variable over others like the UN’s Human Development Index and birth mortality because it was available for more states. However, the results based on these other measures of economic development are similar to those for log-per-capita-GDP. 14 This variable is taken from the CIA World Factbook at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html.

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Table 1 Official GIR and civilization. Western

Asian

Slavic-Orthodox

Latin American

Islamic

African

All states

1990 Official religions Civil religion Cooperation Supportive Accommodation Hostile

32.4% 14.7% 26.5% 8.8% 14.7% 2.9%

16.7% 16.7% 16.7% 0.0% 16.7% 35.4%

6.3% 37.5% 43.8% 6.3% 0.0% 6.3%

16.0% 44.0% 0.0% 4.0% 24.0% 12.0%

57.4% 12.8% 10.6% 0.0% 12.8% 6.4%

2.9% 11.4% 22.9% 0.0% 54.3% 11.5%

26.2% 20.6% 20.0% 2.9% 22.3% 10.3%

2002 Official religions Civil religion Cooperation Supportive Accommodation Hostile

29.4% 14.7% 32.4% 5.9% 14.7% 2.9%

16.7% 16.7% 16.7% 0.0% 22.2% 27.9%

6.3% 43.8% 50.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

16.0% 44.0% 0.0% 4.0% 24.0% 12.0%

57.4% 12.8% 10.6% 0.0% 10.6% 8.5%

2.9% 11.4% 22.9% 0.0% 60.0% 2.9%

25.1% 20.6% 20.0% 1.7% 23.4% 8.0

N

34

18

16

25

47

35

175

Significance (Chi-squared) for both tests = 0.000.

increasing their support for religion between 1990 and 2002 and four decreasing their support. Four African states increased their support for religion. Three Slavic-Orthodox states also increased their support for religion but one decreased it. The changes in the other civilizations were minor. More importantly, each civilization has a distinct pattern of official GIR. These results are discussed below in the context of the results for the other variables. Table 2 presents the changes over time and differences between civilizations in religious discrimination, religious regulation, and religious legislation. Overall each of these variables increased significantly over time. This is mostly consistent across civilizations. This is also consistent across all thee forms of tests for these variables. Average levels increased. The

Table 2 Religious discrimination, regulation, and legislation and civilization. Civilization

Means

% Greater than 0

1990

2002

1.76f 6.89 5.69 2.36d 10.23f 1.71f

1.91f 7.67 8.19a 2.36e 11.13a,f 1.66f

All states

5.00

Religious regulation Western Asian Slavic-Orthodox Latin American Islamic African All states

Religious discrimination Western Asian Slavic-Orthodox Latin American Islamic African

Religious legislation Western Asian Slavic-Orthodox Latin American Islamic African All states a b c d e f

1990

% Which changed between 1990 and 2002 2002

Decrease

Increase

55.9% 77.8% 93.7% 64.0% 89.4% 45.7%

64.7% 83.3% 100.0% 68.0% 91.5% 51.4%

5.9% 11.1% 6.3% 8.0% 8.5% 20.0%

17.6% 55.6% 62.5% 12.0% 29.8% 25.3%

5.57b

69.7%

74.1%

10.3%

20.7%

0.18f 4.22 1.38 2.00 3.64e 1.46

0.24f 4.11 1.75 2.00 5.43c,f 2.09

11.8% 61.1% 37.5% 40.0% 70.2% 37.1%

14.7% 61.1% 56.2% 44.0% 80.9% 57.1%

2.9% 11.1% 0.0% 8.0% 2.1% 5.7%

5.8% 5.6% 18.7% 4.0% 46.8% 34.3%

2.15

2.79c

44.0%

53.7%

4.6%

23.4%

6.15 5.06 3.50f 4.16f 12.21f 3.14f

6.21 5.11d 4.88b,f 4.40f 12.68b,f 3.63b,f

97.1% 100.0% 93.7% 96.0% 97.9% 100.0%

97.1% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

14.7% 22.2% 0.0% 12.0% 6.4% 0.0%

20.6% 22.2% 56.2% 20.0% 34.0% 31.4%

6.54

6.94c

97.7%

99.4%

8.6%

29.7%

Significance (t-test) between marked mean and mean for 1990 <0.05. Significance (t-test) between marked mean and mean for 1990 <0.01. Significance (t-test) between marked mean and mean for 1990 <0.001. Significance (t-test) between marked mean and mean all other groups in the same year <0.05. Significance (t-test) between marked mean and mean all other groups in the same year <0.01. Significance (t-test) between marked mean and mean all other groups in the same year <0.001.

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528 Table 3 Civilizational patterns in 2002.

Western

Asian

Slavic-Orthodox

Latin American

Islamic

African

Official GIR

Religious discrimination

Religious regulation

Religious legislation

29.4% have official religions. Another 53% support religion (official religion, civil religion, and cooperation). 27.9% hostile, rest split between official religion, civil religion, cooperation, and accommodation. Nearly all states civil religion or cooperation.

Second lowest scores but increasing significantly (by 9%).

Lowest scores. Increasing (by 33%).

Second highest scores. Increased slightly

Scores slightly above world average and increasing (by 11%).

Second highest scores. Decreased slightly.

About average mean (excluding Muslim states). Increased slightly.

Second highest mean scores. Highest proportion of states which engage in discrimination. Increasing significantly (by 44%). Significantly below world average. Stable.

Second lowest mean scores, increased by 27%.

About average mean (excluding Muslim states). Increased significantly (by 39%). Below average mean (excluding Muslim states). Increasing (by 6%). Highest scores about 150% higher than mean for other civilizations). Increased significantly (by 4%). Lowest scores. Increased significantly (by 16%).

60% of states strongly support religion (official or civil religions). 36% accommodation or hostile. 57.4% have official religion. Another 23.4% support religion (civil religion or cooperation).

60% accommodation. 37% support religion (official religion, civil religion, and cooperation).

Below world average. Stable.

Highest mean scores. Second highest proportion of states which engage in discrimination. Increasing significantly (by 9%).

Highest scores. Increased significantly (by 49%).

Lowest scores. Decreased slightly.

Below world average. Increased by 43%.

proportion of states which engaged in these practices increased. Also, the number of states which increased the extent of these practices outnumbered those that decreased the extent of these practices. However, this is not to say that these increases were monolithic. Many states did lower their levels of GIR on these variables. The codings for religious discrimination decreased in 17 states and increased in 55. The codings for religious regulation decreased in 8 states and increased in 41. Finally, the codings for religious legislation decreased in 14 states and increased in 43. Thus there is diversity within a general pattern of increasing GIR. These results, combined with those from Table 1, also show that each civilization has a unique pattern of GIR that is distinct from each of the other civilizations. These patterns are summarized in Table 3. The pattern in the West can be described liberal support. Western states significantly support religion through official GIR in that most states either have an official religion or support some religions more than others. It also has the second highest level of religious legislation. The liberal (in the classic meaning of the term) aspect of the West’s religion policy is that it places relatively few restrictions on religion. This includes both the majority religion (religious regulation) and minority religions (religious discrimination). However, religious regulation and religious discrimination do exist in Western states. The Asian civilizations have the highest level of hostility to religion of any civilization, though this is only true of 27.9% of these states on the official GIR measure and about 50% support religion (coded as official religion, civil religion, or cooperation). Yet the proportion of states coded as hostile stands out as 4.4 times higher than the 6.3% of states from other civilizations which are coded as hostile. They also score the second highest on the religious regulation score. Asian states are about average on religious discrimination and religious legislation. The Slavic-Orthodox civilization is distinct in that all of them support religion but only one has an official religion. When combined with the fact that these states have the second highest score on religious discrimination, this indicates a policy of supporting some religions to the exclusion of others. Most of these states have paternalistic policies of supporting religions considered indigenous to the country but protecting their indigenous culture from religions considered new to the country. US-based Evangelical religions are among those particularly singled out for repression by many of these states. Latin America is unique in that most states either support a single religion (official religion or civil religion) or do not support any religion more than others (supportive, accommodation or hostile). There are no cases of supporting multiple religions or general support for all religion. All of the states which support a single religion support Catholicism but 5 of the 20 Catholic majority states in the region are coded as accommodation or hostile. On all three other measures, Latin America scores below the world average. Thus, other than a significant amount of nominal support for Catholicism, the states in this region engage in relatively low levels of substantive support and interference in religion. The Islamic civilization shows an interesting combination of support and hostility to religion. It is the only civilization in which a clear majority of the states have official religions and even more give Islam preference over other religions. As the extent of religious legislation in these states is about two-and-a-half times the average for all other states, this support for Islam is well beyond nominal support. Also, religious minorities in Muslim states suffer from among the highest levels of religious discrimination. In fact 11 of the 47 states in this civilization make some minority religions illegal including two – the Maldives and Saudi Arabia – which officially ban all minority religions. Yet Islamic states also have the highest average scores on religious regulation.

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Table 4 Multi-variate analysis of the impact of civilization on GIR in 2002.

Western Asian Slavic-Orthodox Latin American Islamic Rel. homogeneity Polity Stability Log-per capita GDP Log-population df Adj-R-squared

Religious discrimination

Religious regulation

Religious legislation

Std. beta

Sig.

Std. beta

Sig.

0.072 0.130 0.289 0.043 0.325 0.055 0.480 0.100 0.237 0.215 174 0.451

0.506 0.065 0.000 0.596 0.001 0.438 0.000 0.170 0.006 0.001 174 0.358

0.136 0.071 0.027 0.050 0.214 0.009 0.444 0.018 0.166 0.268 174 0.548

0.247 0.350 0.721 0.570 0.033 0.907 0.000 0.815 0.077 0.000

Std. beta 0.189 0.063 0.030 0.161 0.388 0.310 0.157 0.035 0.357 0.158

Sig. 0.056 0.324 0.635 0.031 0.000 0.000 0.019 0.599 0.000 0.005

This combination of support for Islam, regulation of Islam, and repression of minority religions can be explained by a number of concurrent trends in the Muslim world. Much of the support for Islam is based on a genuine desire to support Islam which is common to Muslim moderates as well as radicals. Strong support for secularism like that which exists in Turkey15 is the exception rather than the rule within the Muslim civilization. Yet some if this support is due specifically to militant Islam. Militant Islamists seek to create theocratic states. Even states like Saudi Arabia, which scores as high or higher than any other state on all of the RAS measures are considered by some Islamists to fall short of the goal of a theocratic state. In some cases, these militants succeed in influencing state policy to be more in line with their goals. However, it is often the case that states support Islam in order to pre-empt these radicals. That is, they support official forms of Islam but, at the same time, repress other expressions of Islam. The combined policy of support and repression is likely intended to neutralize the political challenge that radical Muslim groups can present to a state. That much of the religious regulation coded in the RAS data in Muslim states are limitations of the use of Islam in politics and repression of radical Muslim groups supports this argument.16 Finally, the African civilization is distinct in that is has the lowest overall levels of GIR of any civilization. This is likely at least partially due to the fact that most of these states are weak states which have relatively low abilities to interfere in the lives of their citizens. The multi-variate analysis, presented in Table 4, shows that many of these differences between civilizations remain significant even when controlling for other factors. However, other factors including religious homogeneity, regime, economic development, and population size have an equal or greater impact. Thus, while civilization influences state religion policy, it is clearly not the only influence. 7. Conclusions for future This study produces three important results. First, each world civilization has a distinct pattern of state religion policies which are likely linked to that civilization’s unique culture and history. The differences between civilizations remained stable between 1990 and 2002. Second, there has been an increase in government involvement in religion (GIR) – the extent to which governments support or interfere in religion – between 1990s and 2002. This clearly contradicts the predictions of modernization and secularization theory and implies that those who believe that modernization is leading to a resurgence of religion are correct, at least with respect to GIR. Third, factors other than civilization also influence the extent of GIR. Yet many civilizations are also homogeneous with regard to many of these factors. For instance empirical studies show that Western states tend to be among the most democratic and Muslim states the least democratic [15,40,48]. There are certainly also differences in economic development between civilizations. While these findings are based on a limited time-segment, inductive reasoning and additional evidence tells us that these trends are likely to continue into the future. This is true of the differences between civilizations for at least four reasons. First, these differences between civilizations are consistent throughout the time period analyzed here. Second, they are reflective of long-term cultural and political trends which generally change slowly. Third, the likely cause of the changes in levels of GIR, modernization, is common to all civilizations, though the specific manifestation and timetable of this process does differ across civilizations. Fourth, the changes over time are mostly consistent across civilizations meaning that while specific levels of GIR change over time, the relative differences between civilizations remain more constant.

15

While the current government is less supportive of secularism than past governments, support for secularism remains relatively strong in Turkey. In 2002 23 Muslim majority states restricted religious political parties, 19 restricted religious organizations, and 26 restricted speech, mostly political speech, by clergy. 16

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These conclusions are also supported by other studies. Demographic studies predict that the 80–90% of the world will remain religious through the year 2200 and that the number of religious people in the world will increase [41]. This continuing significance of religion in one part of the religious economy implies that another element of the religious economy – GIR – will also remain significant. This is especially true because survey-based studies confirm the predictions that the number of religious people in the world is increasing and also show that members of different religion have different attitudes toward the proper role of religion in government [50]. Thus, in the arena of religion, it is likely that different values will remain a source of inter-civilizational tension. The increase over time in GIR is also likely to continue into the future. The likely cause of this increase, modernization, is a long-term process which is not likely to disappear in the near future. Also, world trends in other forms of state policy, such as support for democracy, tend to be consistent over long periods of time, though there sometimes are short-term rises and dips [40]. Overall, while Huntington’s predictions regarding the future of world conflict were not correct, his argument that the world includes several distinct civilizations is supported by this study. This aspect of his argument is less discussed and, more importantly, much less often criticized than other aspects of his theory. Yet, all of this is based on the assumption that past trends will continue into the future. It is important to remember that these trends are not set in stone and that interreligious and inter-cultural dialogue can alter many of these trends [6,22,25]. Based on this, further examinations of the differences and similarities across world civilizations as well as the evolving efforts to deal with these issues are important avenues for future research. 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