- Email: [email protected]
The future of organizational privacy
Briefings
The Future of Organizational Privacy Anne Sigismund Huff Departrnent of Business Administration, University of Allinois, Urbana, Illinois 61801, USA
1. The Organization's Need for Privacy Secrecy is a tool of competition given little attention in the academic literature, but widely covered in trade publications [5]. Two of the more obvious uses of secrecy as an important source o f competitive advantage are opposites. On the one hand, secrecy allows an organization to become better prepared for the future than other organizations. For example, new products are kept secret until released in the hope that they will be able to capture substantial share of the market before competitors can develop similar offerings. Alternatively, secrecy may increase relative costs for other organizations, if they overprepare for changes which are not made. For exampie, if product plans are kept secret a competitor may spread re.~ources to include counter-strategies for alternatives which never materialize. It can also be argued that secrecy has an important place in less direetiy competitive relationships between an organization and other actors in its environment. In fact, secrecy can be seen as a part of directly cooperative and even highly dependent relationships. For example, a supplier may be more accommodating in the hope that future (unknown) decisions will further increase benefits. Secrecy may also increase capacity in others, which the organiza. tion can then treat as supplementary resources. Thus, a distributor may maintain additional capacity "in case" of deviation from past requirements. This cushion of excess capacity would be expected to disappear in a more clearly specified setting. Finally, secrecy may protect an organization when it is not prepared to meet the expectations of the environment. For example, a client may be attracted to the organization in the belief that it can provide some specific service. If inability is kept a secret, the organization may never be called upon to actually deliver; it may be able to maintain the relationship on
Privacy is important to organizations in competitive situations and also in other relations. This paper argues that organizational privacy is increasingly vulnerable to the "strategic intelligence systems" of other organizations. Justbeglnning to be widely developed, these systems are capable of correlating small, individually inconsequential, bits of information to predict the capability and strategy of other organizations. As organizations become more interdependent and involved in more frequent contact with other organizations, it is suggested that strategic intelligence systems can be even more effective, since each interaction in the environment creates some evidence about capacity and intention that others can collect and interpret. Thus the complex environment characteristic of most corporations may in itself decrease the chance for organizational privacy. Although regulation may be desirable, information systems oriented toward strategic estimation appear to be especially difficult to regulate. Information policy may instead have to focus on promoting the ability of organizations to operate effectively in information rich but increasingly "transparent" environments. Keywords: Strategic Intelligence Systems, Privacy, Information Regulation, Management Information Systems.
Anne Sigismund Huff is an Assistant Professor of Business Administration at the University of Illinois. She received a BA degree from Barnard College, Columbia University (1970) in Phflosphy, an MA in Sociology (1974) and a Ph.D. in Management (1974) from Northwestern University. This paper is part of a long range effort to investigate the sources of uncertainty for organizational decision-makers.
9 North-Holland Publishing Company Information & Management 2 (1979) 197-201 197
198
Briefings
other grounds, once it is established, despite nondelivery; it may profit before lack of delivery causes the relationship to terminate; it may be able to devel. op the required service in time.
2. Strategic Intelligence Systems This paper develops the argument that the advantages of secrecy are likely to be less and less available to most organizations. The threat to organizational "privacy" is found in new types of information systems maintained by others in the environment. These systems - designed to support top level decision making - are "strategic intelligence systems". They are "inquiring" [1] man-machine systems based on two design principles [6,9]: (a) collection of diverse data related to the goals of the organization, but not limited to short term response to specific .problems; (b) integration, synthesis, and estimation, which coordinate diverse data to support current decisions. This process is likely to require estimation based on unreliable or incomplete information. In practice, these two principles can lead to formidable results. King [7, p. 66] gives as an example Lockheed's successful prediction of a competitor's product strategy - accomplished through an analysis of the past publication record of its technicallytrained decision makers. Kelley [6, p. 79] notes that breakdown in competitors' market share has been successfully estimated by several indirect means, including comparison of the number of employees in each competing firm (data reprinted in industrial directories), computation of the relative amount of competitors' brands stocked at selected sales outlets, and direct monitoring of competitor shipments. These examples are from intelligence systems still in their infancy. As more experience is gained with strategic-level intelligence systems, more sophisticated predictions can be expected.
firms. Although verification of the suggestion that opportunities for intelligence are expanding awaits further research, and increasing experience with strategic level information systems by organizations, this possibility particularly merits study because it counters an implicit assumption in most writing about organization environments. Most researchers interested in organization-environment relations have assumed that increasing complexity increases the difficulty of making decisions. The alternative possibility, that complexity offers an opportunity for devel. oping rich and reliable information which supports decision-making, is suggested on the basis of examining three aspects of information processing: (1) influences on the amount of date flowing into the organization, (2) influences on the accuracy of data collected, and (3) influences on the interpretability of data. 3.1. Influences on the Flow of Data Between Organizations
The availability of data is in part a function of points of contact between the organization and its environment. It is hypothesized that: H1. Information exchange will tend to increase with the number of interacting organizations. H2. Information exchange will tend to increase with the frequency of contacts at each connecting point. H3. Varied contacts in the environment, with respect to type of organization encountered, wiU tend to increase the amount of data available. (Different types of organizations will have different experiences to relate, thus broadening the organization's view of the environment). H4. Information exchange may even increase with the number of intermediaries (for example, distributors and professional organizations) in complex networks of organizations. Theorists have suggested in this regard that intervening actors themselves become sources. These connections distort some information, but they also amplify information [4].
3. External Influences on Intelligence Production 3.2. Influences on the Accuracy of Data Flow
The possibilities for strategic intelligence also appear to be enhanced by the very nature of the complex environments now characteristic of most major
I t is not sufficient that data from the environment is merely available, intelligence personnel must have
A.S.'Huff / OrganizationalPrivacy 199 some confidence as to its reliability. The following hypotheses relate organization-environment structure to information accuracy. H5. Overlapping contact with sources in the environment will tend to increase confidence in information. To the extent that the environment provides rich connections, intelligence operations are likely to collect information about the same phenomena through different contacts and even more desirable - from different primary sources. Data accuracy can be expected to increase with this opportunity for cross confirmation. H6.Interdependency in the environment set will tend to increase the reliability of information from the environment. Interdependent organizations are likely to have similar needs, and are motivated to develop relationships among themselves for comparing and simplifying information from their mutual environment. To the extent that different organizations do compare the same or similar intelligence, information accuracy can be expected to increase. H7. Dominance of one organization over others, however, is likely to decrease the accuracy of environmental information. This hypothesis rests on the supposition that dominance will tend to increase the use of secrecy and distortion. Similarly, H8. Direct competition will also decrease reliability of information. Here again the payoffs of the relationship are such that competitors are likely to use deliberate distortion and secrecy. -
3.3. Influences in the Interpretability of Data Flow Decision makers can only be expected to use a limited amount of information in any given decision situation. Those involved with environmental intelligence collection therefore need to consider not only the availability and reliability of data, but its inter. pretability as well. The following structural factors are likely to influence this: H9. Overlapping sets of contacts in the environment will tend to increase the interpretability of information. Shared experience is expected to contri. bute to a common "vocabulary" and way of inter. preting events among sources of information. These commonalities ease the interpretation of information at any given point. H10. Quantity of information will increase inter-
pretability. If intelligence depends largely upon the correlation of many small facts, as has been suggested, then the more "puzzle pieces" available, the more likely that intelligence will be able to construct a useful synthesis for policy use. This hypothesis only holds true, however, if adequate resources are available to facilitate interpretation. An upper limit on the amount of data contributing to interpretability might also be expected, but it must be remembered that intelligence systems, exemplified in one variant by national intelligence systems, vastly increase the information processing capacity of the organization because of their emphasis on synthesis and estimation. 4. The Potential Transparency of Complex Environments The preceding observations suggest that construction of an intelligence system is facilitated by organization-environment relations which provide many contact points; frequent and direct interaction; a variety of formal and informal, stable and unstable relations; overlapping contacts with other actors in the set; interdependent relations; decreased competition; and a large quantity of information. These attributes are 'precisely the qualities which have been used to characterize the increasingly complex environments of many modern corporations - the type of environments which many observers feel will face increasing numbers of organization decision-makers [8]. Drawing the threads of the arguments together, it can be suggested that rather than becoming increasingly difficult to understand, complex environments are in fact becoming increasingly transparent. That is, organizations are potentially more and more transparent to other intelligence systems in their environment, whatever the effort to maintain secrecy. The ability to collect and correlate many small bits of information, a primary description of intelligence activity, depends upon significant expenditures of resources. But the general argument might be expected to have some force whatever the level of effort. Given a constant level of intelligence activity, increasingly complex environments are expected to bring better intelligence to the collecting organization.
200
Briefings
In increasingly complex environments, organizations cannot escape from sending out clues to the environment. Restated in the vocabulary of Emery and Trist [4], the "field" of "turbulent" environments is a particularly good medium for transmitting information to other organizations. Each organization "sheds light" on its intentions merely by carrying out routine activities, Every activity, including those which the organization would like to keep secret, generates disturbances in the organization and in the environment. Modern corporate environments, with their rich linking relationships, are thus conductive settings which maximize the likelihood that others will be able to detect and monitor some aspects of activities for which secrecy is desired.
5. The Difficulties of Regulation Regulation of corporate information collection and use has taken tw9 general paths. On the one hand, organizations have been restricted from collecting certain kinds of information (involving, for example, individual religious and sexual preferences). On the other hand, they have been required to present other information: to show good faith in affirmative action employment, for example, or to substantiate denial of individual credit. Regulation aimed at preserving organizational privacy using a similar strategy appears to be limited by two unique characteristics of strategic intelligence systems, as opposed to other information systems. First, intelligence relies primarily on estimation, rather than direct extrapolation. These systems are most often based on the comparison of several kinds of incomplete information rather than more intensive use of a single source or kind of data. In consequence, intelligence systems are well prepared to find substitute information in response to specific restrictions. The availability of substitute "clues" to activities and intentions is vastly greater for the complex organization than it is for the single individual. And, in general, the stakes for discovering such alternatives are much higher. The second regulation limiting characteristic of intelligence systems is their primary association with unique, one-time strategic decisions rather than more routine operating decisions. While specific informa-
tion can be restricted or required in conjunction with unique strategic decisions, as illustrated in SEC requirements, broadly applicable regulation (possible for something like credit ratings) is much more difficult to create for decisions which reflect an organization's unique position at one point in time. As the stakes are high when basic strategic decisions must be made, the pressure on the organization not to comply with regulation is also greater than it is with respect to most operational decisions involving individuals. It is interesting to speculate with Steven Dedijer [3] that regulation of intelligence systems also has the disadvantageous effect of limiting all users' subsequent ability to collect and interpret information from the environment. As environments become more complex, and organizations become more complex, the ability to use incomplete information for estimation should become increasingly important at all levels. Legislation which limits intelligence system operation to protect organizational privacy thus may limit the very skills which will be more and more crucial to organizational ability. Information policy might be better directed to search for ways to promote intelligence capability. It seems likely that counterintelligence is the best defense of the organization whose privacy is threatened by the combined forces of increasingly sophisticated intelligence systems and more complex environments. Considerable differences now exist in the intelligence system capacity of organizations. Without intervention, time may well broaden the gap.
6. Conclusion Further research is needed which directs attention to the organizational, versus individual or societal, consequences of information use. This paper sets out a tentative set of hypotheses which, if true, suggest that organizational privacy will diminish both as experience with intelligence systems grows, and as organizational environments become richer mediums for the practice of intelligence assessment. The suggestion that organizational privacy may decrease runs counter to a dominate concern about increasingly complex organizational environments. Organization theorists in general tend to view the external setting of organizations as problematic
A.S. Huff/OrganizationalPn'vacy because increasing complexity is expected to decrease accurate prediction. The questions that need further study revolve, therefore, around (a) whether organizations can turn the complexities which face them to strategic advantage through information system development, and (b) whether information policy can regulate or channel this activity in socially desirable ways. The data is only beginning to be available to answer these two questions, but now is the time to begin the discussion.
Acknowledgements This paper examines the interaction of two ideas - the importance of secrecy in organization affairs, and the possibility that organizational environments are becoming increasingly transparent. Both ideas were first suggested by Profesmr S. Dedijer, University of Lund, Sweden. I am indebted to him, and also to Dick Mason, Bill MeKelvey and Dick Goodman for comments on an earlier paper delivered at the joint national ORSA/TIMS meetings, November 1977, Atlanta, Georgia, USA.
References [1] C. West Churchman, The Design of Inquiring Systems (Basic Books, New York, 1971).
201
[2] Lorna M. Daniells, Business Intelligence and Strategic Planning (Reference List No. 29, Baker Library, Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, Boston, 1979). [3] Steven Dedijer, Social intelligence (Research Policy Program, University of Lund, Sweden, 1975). [4] F.E. Emery and Eric L. Trist, Causal texture of organizational environments, Human Relations 18 (February 1963), 20-26. [5] Anne Sigismund Huff, Business Intelligence: A Selected Bibliography of References to Business Information, Espionage and Security, second edition (Research Policy Program, University of Lund, Sweden, 1976). [6] WRliam T. Kelley, Marketing Intelligence: The Management of Marketing Information (Staples Press, London, 1968). [7] William R. King, Information for strategic planning: an analysis, Information and Management 1 (1978), $9-66. [8] Shirley Terryberry, The evolution of organizational environments, Administrative Science Quarterly 12 (March 1968), 590-613. [9] Harold L. Wilensky, Organizational Intelligence: Knowledge and Policy in Government and Industry (Basic Books, New York, 1967).
The Future of Organizational Privacy Anne Sigismund Huff Departrnent of Business Administration, University of Allinois, Urbana, Illinois 61801, USA
1. The Organization's Need for Privacy Secrecy is a tool of competition given little attention in the academic literature, but widely covered in trade publications [5]. Two of the more obvious uses of secrecy as an important source o f competitive advantage are opposites. On the one hand, secrecy allows an organization to become better prepared for the future than other organizations. For example, new products are kept secret until released in the hope that they will be able to capture substantial share of the market before competitors can develop similar offerings. Alternatively, secrecy may increase relative costs for other organizations, if they overprepare for changes which are not made. For exampie, if product plans are kept secret a competitor may spread re.~ources to include counter-strategies for alternatives which never materialize. It can also be argued that secrecy has an important place in less direetiy competitive relationships between an organization and other actors in its environment. In fact, secrecy can be seen as a part of directly cooperative and even highly dependent relationships. For example, a supplier may be more accommodating in the hope that future (unknown) decisions will further increase benefits. Secrecy may also increase capacity in others, which the organiza. tion can then treat as supplementary resources. Thus, a distributor may maintain additional capacity "in case" of deviation from past requirements. This cushion of excess capacity would be expected to disappear in a more clearly specified setting. Finally, secrecy may protect an organization when it is not prepared to meet the expectations of the environment. For example, a client may be attracted to the organization in the belief that it can provide some specific service. If inability is kept a secret, the organization may never be called upon to actually deliver; it may be able to maintain the relationship on
Privacy is important to organizations in competitive situations and also in other relations. This paper argues that organizational privacy is increasingly vulnerable to the "strategic intelligence systems" of other organizations. Justbeglnning to be widely developed, these systems are capable of correlating small, individually inconsequential, bits of information to predict the capability and strategy of other organizations. As organizations become more interdependent and involved in more frequent contact with other organizations, it is suggested that strategic intelligence systems can be even more effective, since each interaction in the environment creates some evidence about capacity and intention that others can collect and interpret. Thus the complex environment characteristic of most corporations may in itself decrease the chance for organizational privacy. Although regulation may be desirable, information systems oriented toward strategic estimation appear to be especially difficult to regulate. Information policy may instead have to focus on promoting the ability of organizations to operate effectively in information rich but increasingly "transparent" environments. Keywords: Strategic Intelligence Systems, Privacy, Information Regulation, Management Information Systems.
Anne Sigismund Huff is an Assistant Professor of Business Administration at the University of Illinois. She received a BA degree from Barnard College, Columbia University (1970) in Phflosphy, an MA in Sociology (1974) and a Ph.D. in Management (1974) from Northwestern University. This paper is part of a long range effort to investigate the sources of uncertainty for organizational decision-makers.
9 North-Holland Publishing Company Information & Management 2 (1979) 197-201 197
198
Briefings
other grounds, once it is established, despite nondelivery; it may profit before lack of delivery causes the relationship to terminate; it may be able to devel. op the required service in time.
2. Strategic Intelligence Systems This paper develops the argument that the advantages of secrecy are likely to be less and less available to most organizations. The threat to organizational "privacy" is found in new types of information systems maintained by others in the environment. These systems - designed to support top level decision making - are "strategic intelligence systems". They are "inquiring" [1] man-machine systems based on two design principles [6,9]: (a) collection of diverse data related to the goals of the organization, but not limited to short term response to specific .problems; (b) integration, synthesis, and estimation, which coordinate diverse data to support current decisions. This process is likely to require estimation based on unreliable or incomplete information. In practice, these two principles can lead to formidable results. King [7, p. 66] gives as an example Lockheed's successful prediction of a competitor's product strategy - accomplished through an analysis of the past publication record of its technicallytrained decision makers. Kelley [6, p. 79] notes that breakdown in competitors' market share has been successfully estimated by several indirect means, including comparison of the number of employees in each competing firm (data reprinted in industrial directories), computation of the relative amount of competitors' brands stocked at selected sales outlets, and direct monitoring of competitor shipments. These examples are from intelligence systems still in their infancy. As more experience is gained with strategic-level intelligence systems, more sophisticated predictions can be expected.
firms. Although verification of the suggestion that opportunities for intelligence are expanding awaits further research, and increasing experience with strategic level information systems by organizations, this possibility particularly merits study because it counters an implicit assumption in most writing about organization environments. Most researchers interested in organization-environment relations have assumed that increasing complexity increases the difficulty of making decisions. The alternative possibility, that complexity offers an opportunity for devel. oping rich and reliable information which supports decision-making, is suggested on the basis of examining three aspects of information processing: (1) influences on the amount of date flowing into the organization, (2) influences on the accuracy of data collected, and (3) influences on the interpretability of data. 3.1. Influences on the Flow of Data Between Organizations
The availability of data is in part a function of points of contact between the organization and its environment. It is hypothesized that: H1. Information exchange will tend to increase with the number of interacting organizations. H2. Information exchange will tend to increase with the frequency of contacts at each connecting point. H3. Varied contacts in the environment, with respect to type of organization encountered, wiU tend to increase the amount of data available. (Different types of organizations will have different experiences to relate, thus broadening the organization's view of the environment). H4. Information exchange may even increase with the number of intermediaries (for example, distributors and professional organizations) in complex networks of organizations. Theorists have suggested in this regard that intervening actors themselves become sources. These connections distort some information, but they also amplify information [4].
3. External Influences on Intelligence Production 3.2. Influences on the Accuracy of Data Flow
The possibilities for strategic intelligence also appear to be enhanced by the very nature of the complex environments now characteristic of most major
I t is not sufficient that data from the environment is merely available, intelligence personnel must have
A.S.'Huff / OrganizationalPrivacy 199 some confidence as to its reliability. The following hypotheses relate organization-environment structure to information accuracy. H5. Overlapping contact with sources in the environment will tend to increase confidence in information. To the extent that the environment provides rich connections, intelligence operations are likely to collect information about the same phenomena through different contacts and even more desirable - from different primary sources. Data accuracy can be expected to increase with this opportunity for cross confirmation. H6.Interdependency in the environment set will tend to increase the reliability of information from the environment. Interdependent organizations are likely to have similar needs, and are motivated to develop relationships among themselves for comparing and simplifying information from their mutual environment. To the extent that different organizations do compare the same or similar intelligence, information accuracy can be expected to increase. H7. Dominance of one organization over others, however, is likely to decrease the accuracy of environmental information. This hypothesis rests on the supposition that dominance will tend to increase the use of secrecy and distortion. Similarly, H8. Direct competition will also decrease reliability of information. Here again the payoffs of the relationship are such that competitors are likely to use deliberate distortion and secrecy. -
3.3. Influences in the Interpretability of Data Flow Decision makers can only be expected to use a limited amount of information in any given decision situation. Those involved with environmental intelligence collection therefore need to consider not only the availability and reliability of data, but its inter. pretability as well. The following structural factors are likely to influence this: H9. Overlapping sets of contacts in the environment will tend to increase the interpretability of information. Shared experience is expected to contri. bute to a common "vocabulary" and way of inter. preting events among sources of information. These commonalities ease the interpretation of information at any given point. H10. Quantity of information will increase inter-
pretability. If intelligence depends largely upon the correlation of many small facts, as has been suggested, then the more "puzzle pieces" available, the more likely that intelligence will be able to construct a useful synthesis for policy use. This hypothesis only holds true, however, if adequate resources are available to facilitate interpretation. An upper limit on the amount of data contributing to interpretability might also be expected, but it must be remembered that intelligence systems, exemplified in one variant by national intelligence systems, vastly increase the information processing capacity of the organization because of their emphasis on synthesis and estimation. 4. The Potential Transparency of Complex Environments The preceding observations suggest that construction of an intelligence system is facilitated by organization-environment relations which provide many contact points; frequent and direct interaction; a variety of formal and informal, stable and unstable relations; overlapping contacts with other actors in the set; interdependent relations; decreased competition; and a large quantity of information. These attributes are 'precisely the qualities which have been used to characterize the increasingly complex environments of many modern corporations - the type of environments which many observers feel will face increasing numbers of organization decision-makers [8]. Drawing the threads of the arguments together, it can be suggested that rather than becoming increasingly difficult to understand, complex environments are in fact becoming increasingly transparent. That is, organizations are potentially more and more transparent to other intelligence systems in their environment, whatever the effort to maintain secrecy. The ability to collect and correlate many small bits of information, a primary description of intelligence activity, depends upon significant expenditures of resources. But the general argument might be expected to have some force whatever the level of effort. Given a constant level of intelligence activity, increasingly complex environments are expected to bring better intelligence to the collecting organization.
200
Briefings
In increasingly complex environments, organizations cannot escape from sending out clues to the environment. Restated in the vocabulary of Emery and Trist [4], the "field" of "turbulent" environments is a particularly good medium for transmitting information to other organizations. Each organization "sheds light" on its intentions merely by carrying out routine activities, Every activity, including those which the organization would like to keep secret, generates disturbances in the organization and in the environment. Modern corporate environments, with their rich linking relationships, are thus conductive settings which maximize the likelihood that others will be able to detect and monitor some aspects of activities for which secrecy is desired.
5. The Difficulties of Regulation Regulation of corporate information collection and use has taken tw9 general paths. On the one hand, organizations have been restricted from collecting certain kinds of information (involving, for example, individual religious and sexual preferences). On the other hand, they have been required to present other information: to show good faith in affirmative action employment, for example, or to substantiate denial of individual credit. Regulation aimed at preserving organizational privacy using a similar strategy appears to be limited by two unique characteristics of strategic intelligence systems, as opposed to other information systems. First, intelligence relies primarily on estimation, rather than direct extrapolation. These systems are most often based on the comparison of several kinds of incomplete information rather than more intensive use of a single source or kind of data. In consequence, intelligence systems are well prepared to find substitute information in response to specific restrictions. The availability of substitute "clues" to activities and intentions is vastly greater for the complex organization than it is for the single individual. And, in general, the stakes for discovering such alternatives are much higher. The second regulation limiting characteristic of intelligence systems is their primary association with unique, one-time strategic decisions rather than more routine operating decisions. While specific informa-
tion can be restricted or required in conjunction with unique strategic decisions, as illustrated in SEC requirements, broadly applicable regulation (possible for something like credit ratings) is much more difficult to create for decisions which reflect an organization's unique position at one point in time. As the stakes are high when basic strategic decisions must be made, the pressure on the organization not to comply with regulation is also greater than it is with respect to most operational decisions involving individuals. It is interesting to speculate with Steven Dedijer [3] that regulation of intelligence systems also has the disadvantageous effect of limiting all users' subsequent ability to collect and interpret information from the environment. As environments become more complex, and organizations become more complex, the ability to use incomplete information for estimation should become increasingly important at all levels. Legislation which limits intelligence system operation to protect organizational privacy thus may limit the very skills which will be more and more crucial to organizational ability. Information policy might be better directed to search for ways to promote intelligence capability. It seems likely that counterintelligence is the best defense of the organization whose privacy is threatened by the combined forces of increasingly sophisticated intelligence systems and more complex environments. Considerable differences now exist in the intelligence system capacity of organizations. Without intervention, time may well broaden the gap.
6. Conclusion Further research is needed which directs attention to the organizational, versus individual or societal, consequences of information use. This paper sets out a tentative set of hypotheses which, if true, suggest that organizational privacy will diminish both as experience with intelligence systems grows, and as organizational environments become richer mediums for the practice of intelligence assessment. The suggestion that organizational privacy may decrease runs counter to a dominate concern about increasingly complex organizational environments. Organization theorists in general tend to view the external setting of organizations as problematic
A.S. Huff/OrganizationalPn'vacy because increasing complexity is expected to decrease accurate prediction. The questions that need further study revolve, therefore, around (a) whether organizations can turn the complexities which face them to strategic advantage through information system development, and (b) whether information policy can regulate or channel this activity in socially desirable ways. The data is only beginning to be available to answer these two questions, but now is the time to begin the discussion.
Acknowledgements This paper examines the interaction of two ideas - the importance of secrecy in organization affairs, and the possibility that organizational environments are becoming increasingly transparent. Both ideas were first suggested by Profesmr S. Dedijer, University of Lund, Sweden. I am indebted to him, and also to Dick Mason, Bill MeKelvey and Dick Goodman for comments on an earlier paper delivered at the joint national ORSA/TIMS meetings, November 1977, Atlanta, Georgia, USA.
References [1] C. West Churchman, The Design of Inquiring Systems (Basic Books, New York, 1971).
201
[2] Lorna M. Daniells, Business Intelligence and Strategic Planning (Reference List No. 29, Baker Library, Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, Boston, 1979). [3] Steven Dedijer, Social intelligence (Research Policy Program, University of Lund, Sweden, 1975). [4] F.E. Emery and Eric L. Trist, Causal texture of organizational environments, Human Relations 18 (February 1963), 20-26. [5] Anne Sigismund Huff, Business Intelligence: A Selected Bibliography of References to Business Information, Espionage and Security, second edition (Research Policy Program, University of Lund, Sweden, 1976). [6] WRliam T. Kelley, Marketing Intelligence: The Management of Marketing Information (Staples Press, London, 1968). [7] William R. King, Information for strategic planning: an analysis, Information and Management 1 (1978), $9-66. [8] Shirley Terryberry, The evolution of organizational environments, Administrative Science Quarterly 12 (March 1968), 590-613. [9] Harold L. Wilensky, Organizational Intelligence: Knowledge and Policy in Government and Industry (Basic Books, New York, 1967).