- Email: [email protected]
The future quantified
Pergamon
Futures, Vol. 30, No. 4, pp. 305–322, 1998 1998 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved Printed in Great Britain 0016–3287/98 $19.00 + 0.00
PII: S0016–3287(98)00038-X
THE FUTURE QUANTIFIED David Mercer The results reported in this paper demonstrate that the qualitative (group) research and quantitative (individual) survey techniques that have been developed now offer a viable means for mapping current expectations and the possible future directions these will take. Sensible use of these should provide governments, and large organisations in general, with a powerful new set of tools for positively managing the future. In terms of the issues themselves, the group which emerged most strongly from the quantified responses of the individuals are those which might be seen as relating to the ‘green’ environment. On the other hand, our qualitative groups looked upon these key issues as representing matters of survival for humanity as a whole. Such a focus on survival may seem selfish, but it can also be seen as altruistic not concerned with personal survival. It also represents a sound, rational approach to long-term planning, where the respondents focused instead on how governments might positively, and safely, manage all the long-term issues threatening the future of humankind. If we move away from ‘green’ issues, it is also clear that even individuals recognize the globalisation of issues in particular the globalisation of business, the possibility of a global financial crash and the (threat of) domination by Pacific Rim countries. At the opposite end of the spectrum are worries about the significant problems faced by the underclasses—and, in turn, the significant threat these present to society as a whole. In general though, apart from technological issues, the emphasis was—across almost all areas—on survival in the face of events ranging down from catastrophes to mere crises and stresses! 1998 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved
The most frequently reported work ‘on the future’ has been that of individual futurologists—usually reporting their own subjective viewpoints, based upon their readings of other
David Mercer is Senior Lecturer, Open University Business School, Walton Hall, Milton Keynes, MK7 6AA, UK. (Tel.: + 44 1908-232165; fax: + 44 1908-655898; e-mail: [email protected]).
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commentators but not upon direct primary research. The quantified outcomes described in this paper are, on the other hand, the result from the development of progressively more rigorous research techniques for investigating the longer-term future. This was originally as part of the ‘Millennium Project’ and now of ‘The Futures Observatory’, both run by the Open University School of Business (OUBS) in conjunction with the Strategic Planning Society. This overall programme of research has so far lasted more than half a decade. Where previous papers1,2 have looked at the qualitative stages of this research, this paper reports the results of the first fully quantitative stages of the work. Background-expectations theory Although the techniques involved have emerged from experience gained in previous stages,1,2 the key underlying assumptions behind latest stages of the research may be said to have originated with one of the favourite theories of the later monetarists; rational expectations.3 Taking this concept further,4 and applying it in a more general sense, our evidence is that much of society now looks to such ‘expectations’—to set the context for what will actually happen in the future. These expectations are the outcomes which they are persuaded will inevitably happen given certain inputs. Our basic assumption, therefore, is that if enough people put their weight behind the same ‘expectations’, and the inputs are observed to happen, they will adjust their behaviour to take account of what is expected; and, accordingly, the expected outcomes will occur! This process might be described as ‘self-fulfilling expectations’. Overall, then, the research set out to describe the future which will come about as a result of current expectations.2,4 It is based, in the first instance, upon three broad assumptions which have only become viable in recent years: 1. The future of humanity, in the developed nations at least, is no longer generally constrained by significant shortages of resource. This is still a controversial assumption, where much of the developing world suffers from severe shortages and even in the developed world bottlenecks can result in local shortages, but—as may be seen from the detailed findings of research reported elsewhere5–9—it has now become a justified one for much of the activity taking place in the economically advanced countries. 2. Accordingly, that future is now being progressively determined by social decisions, taken not just by a few leaders but by millions of their citizens, taking billions of small decisions as part of their daily lives. Thus, to a large extent our lives are no longer necessarily ruled only by the inflexible logic of the economics of scarcity or the dictates of political ideology, but are more typically decided by our own actions. 3. The general, longer-term, framework within which these specific, individual decisions is taken is largely provided by the individuals’ expectations of what the future holds for them. Every man, and woman, has free will, and now has the power to express this; he or she will ultimately make their own decision. But a major influence on that decision—and often the most important influence—is what they expect the future to be, and hence how it will generally determine the ultimate outcome of their own small decision. In the specific context of this research, this naturally leads to the most important assumption:
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1. If you can measure these ‘expectations’ as to future developments, to a large extent you can establish the most likely form of that future. Even if you can just determine the expectations of the opinion-leaders, as our research did, you can still gauge, with some degree of accuracy, the major elements currently shaping the future.
Prior qualitative research The key research technique used in our prior, qualitative research, was based upon that we have developed for simpler scenario forecasting.10–12 In the context of these ‘simpler scenarios’—simpler in the sense that they are suitable for use by a wider range of organisations—this process comprises five main steps; all taken by the managers wishing to investigate the future of their organisations: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
Decide The Drivers For Change; Bring Drivers Together Into A Viable Framework; Produce Initial (Seven To Nine) Mini-Scenarios; Reduce To Two To Three Scenarios; Write The Scenarios.
The great advantage of such a scenario-based approach is that it widens the view of the future—as we wished to do in this global research—where many other techniques (even including Delphi) tend to narrow it as part of their focusing on ‘key issues’. In this ‘global’ research, however, the first two steps were undertaken exclusively by our participants and the last two exclusively by ourselves. In the case of step 3 there was an overlap. The simplest technique we have come to recommend for usage in such scenario forecasting is based on a combination of the traditional focus group,13,14 with scenario forecasting,15–17 using the now almost universal availability of Post-it Notes. It is a very simple technique which may be used to support any form of planning process. In line with our objectives of simplicity and ease-of-use, it requires only a conference room with a bare wall and copious supplies of 3M Post-it Notes. It was, thus, ideal as the main vehicle for our qualitative research.1,2,18 This involved managers and professionals from some 200 organisations; drawn equally from OUBS MBA students, Strategic Planning Society members and those of the Demos think-tank. The output was a framework of 162 factors, or key events, which were then used as the basis for the quantification questionnaire. Quantification research—method The stage of the research reported here was the first quantification of the project. It used a mail survey. Sample As such, it was based upon a sample of 300 students studying with the Open University Business School (OUBS). We have previously found19,20 that—due to the large numbers of students and the generally representative nature of the organisations, typically multinationals, from which they come—their responses typically give a sound guide to those of
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the management populations in those organisations; though as a sample of individuals they are biased towards UK citizenship. More important, in terms of possible skew, they are typically male members of a wealthier and better educated minority; though, as the research examines their expectations about future developments in general rather than their personal needs and wants, we believe that this may not significantly affect the results. A high response rate, 165 responses (55% of the sample), was achieved—even though the questionnaire was relatively long and complex for a mail survey. Questionnaire Apart from a limited number of general ‘demographic’ questions, the questionnaire comprised 162 questions—one for each of the factors, key events, identified in the qualitative stages of the research. For each of these factors three pieces of information were requested: Probability of Occurrence. The participants were asked whether the event was ‘likely’ (defined as greater than 50%), between 10 and 50% likely, and less than 10% likely. Probable Date. For those events which were likely the students were asked to choose, based in effect on a semantic differential,21 from a range of likely dates (2000, 2010, 2020, 2030, 2050 + ) the one they thought most likely. Importance. For each factor they were asked to rate its importance, to society across the world, in terms of a seven-point (1 to 7, very important) semantic differential22. It should be noted, however, that—for ease of comprehension—these measurements are converted to a ten-point (0–9) scale throughout this paper. Analysis was conducted using SPSS for Windows23 and Microsoft Excel.24 Results The full results, condensed (also for ease of comprehension) into 70 composite categories, are shown in Appendix A. Results of the individual measurements are as follows. Importance of events There was a wide spread of levels of importance, down from an average of 9.0 (on a scale from 0 to 9), understandably recorded by ‘nuclear war’, to 1.8, for the ‘1000 channel superhighway’—which was (no doubt to the chagrin of the media moguls) judged trivial! Not unexpectedly, the events judged to be the most important are those which would have the most direct impact on the whole of humanity; including ‘global war’ (8.8), ‘global water shortage’ (also 8.8) and ‘serious overpopulation’ (8.7). Fortunately, the most catastrophic of these are the least likely to occur (‘nuclear war’, 26% likely, ‘global war’, 25%), though ‘serious overpopulation’ rates a high (79%) probability and must be considered as the greatest threat. Whilst there are great variations in terms of the individual events, if we examine the quartiles separately, shown in Table 1, there are no obvious overall patterns in terms of importance. Validating the general importance of the ‘dimensions’ detected by the earlier
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TABLE 1. Quartile (of 162 factors overall)
Mean importance (on a scale of 0–9)
Mean probability (%)
Mean date
1 2 3 4
7.8 6.7 5.8 4.2
65 67 65 62
2026 2021 2022 2025
qualitative work, only 15 events—of the 162 overall, can be considered to be genuinely unimportant (that is, rating an importance of less than 5). Reverting to an examination of the individual events, the most important are in general those relating to the environment (the first 17 factors fall into this category), as threequarters of the first quartile (of 40 events in this quartile) also do. At the other extreme are the events seen as trivial (including ‘make your own media/TV’, 2.2, ‘domestic robots’, 3.2, ‘global tourism for all’, 3.3, and ‘electronic books common’, 3.7)—some of which may disappoint those promoting them as the key to personal satisfaction. In the same region, however, are a group of events which are clearly not trivial for the whole of humanity (such as ‘moon colony’, 3.5, ‘travel to the planets’, 4.0, ‘supersonic travel normal’, 4.0, and ‘major new religions emerge’, 4.2). The respondents seemingly believed these would have little impact on the wider future of global society (the specific question asked). Probability of occurrence If we look at the results from another direction, however, a clear pattern does emerge in terms of the results by quartile (Table 2). Those events expected to occur earlier in the future are also seen to be more likely to occur. In this context, the most probable events may be those which might be seen as the natural outcome of existing trends, and this extrapolation clearly relates most directly to those in the short term. Top of the list is ‘significant pollution’ (at 93%, in the year 2016, and also a high importance level of 8.2). But this bad news is countered by ‘electric/pollution free cars’ (also at 93% in the year of 2016, and still of a relatively high importance of 6.8); and, best of all for some, ‘cure for aids’ (93% in 2017). As can be seen, however, there is no similar correlation with importance; though this may be hidden by the trend noted above—of individuals downrating the importance of ‘remote’ events. Equally reassuring, at the other end of the scale is the low probability of ‘nuclear war’ (at 26%), ‘global war’ (25%), and ‘end of government’ (23%). TABLE 2. Quartile
Mean probability (%)
Mean date
Mean importance
1 2 3 4
85 74 61 34
2017 2021 2024 2031
6.3 6.0 6.3 5.8
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TABLE 3. Issue/event
Importance (0–9)
Possibility (%)
Mean date (AD)
Index (importance × possibility)
Environmental crisis Major global warming effects Fossil fuel shortage Control of personal (car) travel Global water shortage Globalisation of business Global green technology Significant underclass problems Pacific Rim dominates world Safe nuclear energy Serious overpopulation Cures for most diseases Learning new skills Global financial crash
8.1 8.2 7.4 6.6 8.2 6.4 7.5 6.8 7.3 7.4 8.0 7.3 5.9 7.6
86.7 77.1 84.8 88.0 70.4 85.8 73.8 78.7 75.0 70.7 66.5 71.5 86.9 66.5
2017 2023 2027 2015 2023 2015 2028 2015 2028 2029 2029 2028 2013 2019
7.0 6.3 6.3 5.8 5.7 5.5 5.5 5.4 5.4 5.3 5.3 5.2 5.1 5.0
Index of likely importance In order to simplify the rather complex picture which emerges, it is helpful to combine the measures of importance and probability—simply by multiplying these together—to give an index of ‘likely importance’. In addition, Table 3 is based, in the first instance, on a reduction of the original 162 issues/events to a composite 70 factors which best incorporate the range of topics. The results for all of these 70 factors are detailed in Appendix A. The picture is then simplified further, using the 80:20 Rule, by looking at just the top 14 (on the basis of their ‘likely importance’—Table 3). Dates of occurrence Returning to the basic data, if we look at the date patterns (for those respondents who see a greater than 50% chance of the event occurring), the reverse picture—in terms of the likelihood of future events—is seen (Table 4). Again, understandably, the events likely to occur in the nearer future are seen as those much more likely to occur. The largest projects are, perhaps realistically, assigned the longest dates. Examples are ‘planetary colonies’ (2047) and ‘mining asteroids’ (2043); but also ‘no infectious diseases’ (2044) and ‘world government formed’ (2040). Most of these also have relatively low probabilities (though still greater than 40%), but it is possible that this is a reflection of this being a catch-all category; since this box on the questionnaire also took into account the possibility of the event occurring after 2050. TABLE 4. Quartile
Mean date
Mean probability (%)
Mean importance
1 2 3 4
2036 2026 2020 2014
49 63 75 80
6.0 6.5 6.2 5.8
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Once more, the lower end is defined by those projects which are seen to be already under way; for instance ‘redefining/learning new skills’ with a date of 2010 (and a 91% probability), though—interestingly—Germany is expected (with a 58% probability) to dominate the EU by the same year (2010) and ‘changed marriage expectations’ even earlier (at 2008)—though the importance of the latter is (at just 4.2) surprisingly low! Factor analysis When a variety of factor analyses were conducted, using SPSS for Windows, the factors— outside of those relating to technology—developed no overall patterns with obvious significance; the main variable which emerged was the future ‘orientation’ of the participants, how strongly individuals held views about the future in general. In the specific case of the technological aspects, just a few groups consistently emerged as clearly related: Outer Space—including most of the (eight) aspects of travel and colonization of the solar system, but also including ‘brain (computer) implants’, ‘wide use of virtual reality’, and ‘domestic robots’. Personal Contacts—an unexpected category covering ‘cure for AIDS’, ‘contact with aliens’ and ‘changed marriage expectations’! Communications—including most aspects such as ‘all communications mobile’ and ‘telecomms effectively free’, but also ‘much cheaper air travel’ and ‘mandatory control of car travel’ Medical Cures—with ‘no infectious diseases’ and ‘cure for cancer’. A separate category, however, is that of ‘gene manipulation’ and ‘cloning of individuals’ and, less predictable, ‘unlimited computer power’. If the other factors are forced—by progressively removing the topmost factors—into separate categories, based on measurement of importance (the one factor measured across a range of values), it is possible to detect a number of related groupings. The first set—Table 5—are, in general, ones which reflect catastrophic forces which could destabilize—or significantly alter the course—of humanity. As such, they are seen to be important, but less likely to happen. The next set, again shown in Table 6, are those which are less catastrophic but could, also, signal significant developments; with matching probabilities. The next group, Table 7, contains the more likely developments covering the field of social structures. The final group (Table 8), again more likely, reflects the technological developments which might reasonably be expected. TABLE 5. ‘Group’ title
Mean importance
Mean probability (%)
Mean date
Global crash World government Global environment Wars
7.5 6.5 6.5 6.5
62 61 60 66
2024 2026 2027 2022
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TABLE 6. ‘Group’ title
Mean importance
Mean probability (%)
Mean date
Global stresses Regional stresses Communal stresses
6.8 6.2 6.5
62 54 65
2024 2024 2021
TABLE 7. ‘Group’ title
Mean importance
Mean probability (%)
Mean date
Business crises Value crises Social crises Environment crises Personal lifestyles
6.0 6.6 6.3 6.8 6.0
68 74 61 59 68
2018 2019 2024 2026 2021
TABLE 8. ‘Group’ title
Mean importance
Mean probability (%)
Mean date
Science and medicine Cures Communications Space dreams
6.3 5.8 5.2 3.3
79 70 68 63
2018 2027 2025 2031
Although the various members of these groups have widely varying dates, the mean dates for most of these groups is around three decades ahead—as it is overall. Comparison with group potentials In order to be certain of detecting all the factors—including some ‘wild-cards’25—the earlier (‘qualitative’) stage of the work involved a similar number of participants to that in the quantified survey. Accordingly, although it must still be formally judged as qualitative research, it is possible to compare the different sets of results in broad outline. In this context, the key difference between the way the two groups were approached can be summarized in terms of the fact that the individuals were asked to report their own views, while the groups were asked to agree possible futures with other members of the group. It also likely that the dynamics of group work—following the reported patterns experienced in more conventional focus groups26—opened out the overall horizons. Their individual ideas were debated in a generally supportive climate—where this group support allowed the participants to consider ideas which were rejected (presumably as unrealistic) by the individuals. Comparison of results For the purposes of this comparison, the ‘qualitative’ results were ‘quantified’ by two measures. The first was the number of groups, from a total of 16, which included a
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reference to the topic in their list of drivers. The second was the total number of mentions, where a topic was considered sufficiently important for different aspects to be reported separately. The detailed comparison is shown in Appendix B. For many of the 50 composite factors (where such comparison was possible) the two sets of results were similar. For instance, employment was included by 12 groups (with 38 mentions), compared with an individual importance rating of 7.2 (and a probability of 76%), global warming was included by 11 groups (with 20 mentions) against an individual importance rating of 8.3 (and a probability of 80%). At the other extreme, underwater colonies were included by four groups (with five mentions overall), compared with an individual importance rating of 3.7 (and 47% probability); and universal language also by four groups (and with five mentions), against 4.7 (and 43%). There were, however, areas where the two diverged markedly. Thus, in terms of apparent differences in perceived levels of importance, 11 groups included space travel, with 26 mentions, but this was given only a 4.0 importance rating by individuals; though it did have a probability of 70%. Equally, earth-bound travel was included by 12 groups (with 22 mentions) versus an individual importance rating of only 5.3 (though an 83% probability). The globalisation of society was reported by 12 groups (with no less than 38 mentions in one form or another) but only 5.3 on the individual importance scale (and 32% probability), developments in religion were noted by 11 groups (albeit with only 16 mentions overall), against a rating of 4.8 and a probability of 47%. In terms of probability, the individuals rated anarchy only 23% possible, though it was mentioned by all groups (with no less than 68 mentions), and cloning as 41% possible compared with inclusion by nine groups. All of these divergences seemed to reflect underestimates of the importance of these factors by the individuals, who seemed to be less inclined to see the importance of (and likelihood of) events which involved changes in the structures of society, or those that were remote from them (or their organization). Only two aspects, from the list of 50 topics which could be directly compared in this way, seemed to be overestimated by individuals; the cure of cancer was reported by only four groups but rated an 87% probability with individuals, and the move of production to the Third World was mentioned by only two groups against an 84% likelihood as seen by individuals. In these cases it is possible that the groups also developed a more realistic, better-informed view on the basis of their debate. Discussion—the techniques As might be expected, this is a very difficult area to research. In part this is due to the very wide scope; ‘all human life is there’! In part it is a function of the inevitable degree of uncertainty which is a feature of predicting any long-term developments: and, while this is a widely recognized problem, this does not make the work any easier. Accordingly, the views of the future which emerge, and which we document, must be viewed as speculative. It would have been tedious to add this caveat to every prediction, so this caveat will not be repeated. Even so, it must be kept in mind, for it is a fundamental fact of life when one is undertaking long-range planning. On the other hand, one of the major achievements of the research programme overall has been its apparent success in improving the potential accuracy of such forecasting. Only time will tell, for the whole picture is still subject to many possible disjunctions. It
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only takes one American President, waking up one morning so tired of life that he decides to end it all in the most spectacular way possible, to ensure that all bets are off! Even so, it is a fact that almost all important long-term decisions now ultimately emerge— consensually—from literally billions of small decisions made by all members of a population. Further, these decisions are (according to our research) primarily swayed by the expectations of these participants (which we can now ‘measure’), means that the trends we have detected are more credible than many previous predictions of the future. Indeed, the new technique of using the quantitative individual data to plot current expectations, and that of the qualitative work with groups to indicate future directions, gives us the best map of the future. Governments who decide to journey towards that future without consulting such a map may be considered to be unwise, and possibly unfit to govern. The one very clear overall pattern which emerged was that the more remote an event was, either in terms of time (the far future) or social geography (the structural aspects of society), the less certain it is seen to be. On the other hand, it would be incorrect to read into this that such remote events are unlikely to occur, rather that as yet they are less certain as an outcome. In any case, this is a quite reasonable position for the individual to take. It is, after all, the reason a number of more sophisticated organisations use scenario planning—which deliberately explores alternative outcomes in order to allow for future uncertainty—as their preferred approach to the future. The individuals’ diffidence about these remote events may, however, pose a problem for governments; where the key decisions facing them may relate to such long timescales and socially remote goals. It becomes that much more difficult to take the population with them on the planned journey into that future. Remembering that it is the expectations of the population which will determine the ultimate success, this poses a threat to any government brave enough to attempt this—and, hence, one reason at least for the shorttermism embraced by many governments! Based on our research, however, we believe that this problem can be broken down into a number of more manageable parts. Inevitable outcomes The outcomes of some of these issues are, subject to the usual overriding caveat about grossly unpredictable events, completely predictable over the longer-term; though not over the short-term and the timescales for their ultimate occurrence will typically be uncertain. The classic example of such an issue is the colonization of space. The only thing which can stop this is the decline of civilization itself. Otherwise, history— especially that of the colonization of the Americas—tells us that we will continue to push out our frontiers and space is—for the time being at least—the ‘final frontier’. What is more, it no longer requires any significant technological breakthroughs. We may continue to develop ever more efficient technologies for colonizing space, as the new mission objectives for NASA suggest, but we could already achieve this—albeit very expensively—with current technology. Our individual respondents gave these developments low priority, but our groups just as clearly indicated their future importance. In the case of these ‘inevitable outcomes’, which represent a relatively high proportion of the remote events in question, government has no option, except to defer the key decisions (which is too often the option chosen!). The most productive approach
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will, therefore, be to explain the inevitability of the outcome to their electorates who— our research indicates—already understand this. The ‘pensions crisis’ falls into this category. But, if the problems caused by an aging population are balanced by simply raising the age of retirement, this becomes a major opportunity. The legalization of drugs, which was expected by the majority of our respondents, may also remove another ‘threat’; almost at the stroke of a pen. The emergence of the old ‘Third World’ as a major economic and political challenger, and the corresponding (relative) decline of the West, may seem to offer much greater dangers; until this is welcomed as an opportunity for all rather than a threat to some. The same may be just as true of the emergence of supra-national groupings, such as the EU. In terms of ‘management actions’ even governments cannot influence the outcome of such events. Using the research techniques we have developed, however, they will be aware that this is the case; and will be able to direct resources towards ameliorating the impacts, or building upon them, rather than wasting their effort ineffectually trying to stop them happening. Inevitable changes with unknown outcomes Some issues are clearly likely to be impacted by significant changes; but the final outcome is not yet predictable. The classical example here is that relating to the future of political parties. It is abundantly evident, from contemporary examples around the globe as much as from our own research (even with individuals), that the current (Western) system of party politics cannot cope with the demands of modern (or, more accurately, postmodern) society. It is fatally flawed, as the growing importance of single issue politics demonstrates. As yet, though, no clear solution—which meets the needs of the wider population (in terms of effective management of a range of such single issues)—has been forthcoming. In this context, the techniques we have pioneered offer—at the quantified individual level—the possibility of detecting these developments and—at the qualitative group level—some indication of the future directions of change. With this knowledge it should be possible for government to, not least, admit that the changes are taking place and then to most productively steer future developments (in expectations) towards positive outcomes. Into this category fall such issues as the seeming breakdown of the family. In fact, as far as we can detect, new—and possibly stronger—forms are already emerging: and it is the misguided attempts of governments to set the clock back (and adopt ‘family values’, for instance) which are creating the tensions. In this context, one interesting outcome of our on-going research seems to be that the greatest value of the Internet may be its hidden function of keeping family and friends in touch when circumstances disperse them; solving a major problem caused by our newly mobile society. Similarly, the problems of the under-classes, and those posed by (related) crime, are often magnified by inappropriate responses to the new situations. Fortunately, the similar challenges posed by the emergence of more feminine values, and by the portfolios of lifestyles, seem to have already been put behind us with a minimum of discomfort. In the case of these changes, the maps of the future provided by our new techniques will enable governments to best influence the outcomes. The quantitative map will tell where they are starting from, and the qualitative one will show both the direction the future is likely to take and the most productive ways of influencing this.
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Unknown changes There are also those (fortunately few) changes, for example to the structure of the community, where even the nature of the changes is—as yet—ill-defined. We suspect something is happening, but we do not yet know quite what. In these cases the (group) qualitative element of our research may be the most useful; since it offers the best vehicle for exploring the genuinely unknown—that part of environmental analysis, described by Aguilar27 as ‘undirected viewing’, which is most difficult to undertake. As another part of this exploratory process, as well as conditioning individuals to expect change, this may be more widely undertaken as a ‘great debate’; such as we are currently undertaking with Strategic Planning Society members. Thus, for instance, the use of such techniques for exploring the new community, and personal, values which are emerging may offer a more productive approach than that, of something akin to nostalgia, which drives the main alternatives offered by the communitarians. Finally, there are the genuinely ‘wild’ cards—the changes we do not even suspect are likely to happen. These may not, though, all be undetectable. Steinmuller28 describes an important sub-category, which he calls ‘creeping catastrophes’ and which account for a relatively large proportion of the surprises which we encounter, where the problem is that we simply do not see them—even though they are already there for us to see if we look. Again, our group qualitative work2 has, if carried out on a large enough scale, proved successful in surfacing such hidden factors; when they become susceptible to the same approaches as any other factors. Again, therefore, the qualitative and quantitative maps may improve governments’ ability to influence the future—though here it is the former which are likely to be much more important. In fact, in our experience, these ‘creeping catastrophes’—once surfaced—typically prove to be more predictable than most future issues. A typical example is offered by the coming ‘symbiosis with the computer’. This first emerged, from the group work, in terms of the possibility of brain implants. Further investigations showed that the technology behind these is already being developed, but—clearly—the social attitudes necessary to support the widespread adoption of such a radical development will take much longer. These further investigations, however, eventually led us in a different direction; to realize that, even without brain implants, symbiosis is already under way; using the much humbler vehicle of the PC, in front of which most workers now spend their lives! Most organisations, with the exception of just a few of the larger multinationals, will not have the resources to influence future outcomes in the same way as governments. In this case, we would suggest that the most important aspect of our approach for smaller organisations is for their managers to positively separate their long-range planning (based on use of our techniques), which results in ‘robust strategies’ that protect them against future uncertainties, from their traditional corporate strategy processes. When both of these have been developed separately, they are simply compared; and the shorter-term (corporate) strategy then ‘steered’ to compensate for future (robust) needs without impacting short-term performance. Indeed, in our experience to date with a number of organisations, the differences between the two sets of strategy have proved to require only minimal ‘steering’ changes in strategy. This aspect of our work is more fully described in the
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new book, Marketing Strategy: the Challenge of the External Environment,29 which provides the basis for our revised MBA course in the field of long-range marketing/planning. Discussion—the issues The group of issues which emerged most strongly from the quantified responses of the individuals are those which might be seen as relating to the ‘green’ environment. At a first glance, therefore, this represents strong support for the ‘altruistic’ protection, ‘conservation’, of the natural environment; in line with the many similar reports in the popular media. This is where, however, our (qualitative) group work is important—for it provided a very different interpretation. Our groups placed much less stress on this aspect, and were often almost dismissive of it. Instead, they looked upon the key issues as representing maters of survival for humanity as a whole. If, therefore, we accept this interpretation, all of the top 20% of factors—in the quantified results—can be seen to fall into this category. It was made even clearer in the comments of the groups. Those who, for instance, placed emphasis on the colonization of space did not generally stress the pushing back of frontiers, as might have been expected, but saw it primarily in terms of providing the ultimate ‘lifeboat’ for humankind. Thus, even if humanity across the Earth was totally destroyed—by a collision with a comet, say—there would still be colonies in existence which could guarantee the survival of our species. Such a focus on survival may seem selfish, but it—too—can be seen as altruistic; after all, it is not concerned with personal survival. It also represents a sound, rational approach to long-term planning. ‘Robust Strategies’,12,29 which we develop (for our clients) to handle the long-term future of organisations, focus on precisely the same objectives; on survival (here of the organisation rather than the individual), rather than on short-term optimization of performance. This aspect is also highlighted by another interpretation we put on the less intense concentration of groups on the green issues themselves. They focused instead, we decided, on how governments might positively, and safely, manage all the long-term issues threatening the future of humankind. If we move away from ‘green’ issues, it is also clear that even individuals recognize the globalisation of issues. In particular they include the globalisation of business, the possibility of a global financial crash and the (threat of) domination by Pacific Rim countries. At the opposite end of the spectrum are worries about the significant problems faced by the underclasses—and, in turn, the significant threat these present to society as a whole. In general though, apart from technological issues, the emphasis was—across almost all areas—on survival; in the face of events ranging down from catastrophes to mere crises and stresses! Conclusion The techniques we have developed now offer a viable means for mapping current expectations and the possible future directions these will take. Sensible use of these should provide governments, and large organisations in general, with a powerful new set of tools for positively managing the future. The focus, by groups as much as by individuals, on
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a survivable future represents a mature, responsible approach which governments could productively emulate.
Notes and references 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29.
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Mercer, D., A New Qualitative Technique for Exploring the Future, Marketing Education Group (MEG) Conference, Warwick, 1996. Mercer, D., Determining aggregated expectations of the future. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 1997, 55, 155–164. Lucas, R. E., Some international evidence on output–inflation trade-off. American Economic Review, 1973, 63, 326–334. Mercer, D., A general hypothesis of aggregated expectations. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 1997, 55, 145–154. Mercer, D., Predictable futures—the drivers for change. Futures, 1996, 28(9), 829–838. Mercer, D., The foreseeable future. Management Decision, 1996, 34(3), 55–61. Mercer, D., The Foreseeable Future—‘Millennium Project’ Qualitative Results, OR38 (Operational Research Society) Conference, 1996. Mercer, D., The Predictable Future, BAM (British Academy of Management) Conference, 1996 Mercer, D., Predictable futures—the drivers for change, 5. Internationale Sommerakademie des Sekretariats fu¨r Zukunftsforschung, 1996. Mercer, D., Scenarios made easy. Long Range Planning, 1995, 28(4), 81–86. Mercer, D., Simpler scenarios. Management Decision, 1995, 33(4), 32–40. Mercer, D., Robust strategies in a day. Management Decision, 1997, 35(3), 219–223. Krueger, R. A., Focus Groups: A Practical Guide for Applied Research. Sage, London, 1988. Goldman, A. E. and McDonald, S., The Group Depth Interview: Principles and Practice. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1987. Wack, P., Scenarios: uncharted waters ahead. Harvard Business Review, 1985 (September–October) 139–150. Wack, P., Scenarios: shooting the rapids. Harvard Business Review, 1985 (November–December), 139– 150. Schwartz, P., The Art of the Long View. Doubleday, London, 1991. Mercer, D., Scenarios in use, EMAC (European Marketing Academy), 1995. Mercer, D., Marketing practices in the 1990s. Journal of Targeting, Measurement and Analysis for Marketing, 1996, 5(2), 175–181. Mercer, D., Industry scenarios—short termism revealed. Industrial Management and Data Systems, 1996, 96(8), 23–27. Osgood, E. C., Succi G. J. and Tannenbaum P. H., The Measurement of Meaning. Urbana, NY, 1957. Likert, R., A technique for the measurement of attitudes. Archives of Psychology, No. 140 (1932). Norusis, M. J., SPSS for Windows: Base System Users Guide (Release 6.0). SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL, 1993. Microsoft, Microsoft Excel (Version 5.0). Microsoft, Seattle, 1993. Rockfellow, J. D., Wild cards: preparing for the ‘Big One’. The Futurist, 1994, (January–February), 14–19. Krueger, R. A., Focus Groups: A Practical Guide for Applied Research. Sage, London, 1988. Aguilar, F. J., Scanning the Business Environment. Macmillan, London, 1967. Steinmuller, K., The future as wild card, 5. Internationale Sommerkademie des Sekretariats fu¨r Zukunftsforschung—Gelsenkirchen, 1996. Mercer, D, Marketing Strategy: The Challenge of the External Environment. Sage, London, 1998.
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Appendix A Issue/event
Technology Control of personal (car) travel Cures for most diseases Homeworking Computing developments Gene manipulation Better air travel Communications developments Space travel Meteor/comet strikes earth Domestic use of IT Brain implants Global tourism for all Contact with aliens Underwater colonies Space colonies Interplanetary trade Society Significant underclass problems Major pension/welfare crisis Crime endemic New community values New personal values emerge Portfolio of lifestyles Notable rise in feminine values Average lifespan 100 + Spread of fundamentalism Drugs legalized Universal bill of rights Social breakdown Changed marriage expectations Digitization of every medium Resurgence of mass religion
Importance Possibility (0–9) (%)
Mean date (AD)
Index (importance × possibility)
6.6
88.0
2015
5.8
7.3 5.6 5.2 5.9 4.4 4.5
71.5 83.8 82.5 69.5 84.1 78.8
2028 2014 2021 2027 2018 2017
5.2 4.7 4.3 4.1 3.7 3.6
4.1 7.5 3.4 4.4 3.4 6.1 3.7 3.4 3.6
79.3 40.9 77.3 62.2 64.6 35.4 47.0 45.1 37.2
2033 2033 2018 2033 2022 2036 2038 2045 2045
3.3 3.1 2.7 2.7 2.2 2.1 1.7 1.5 1.3
6.8
78.7
2015
5.4
6.2 6.9 6.2 5.6 5.0 5.4
75.6 61.6 69.9 74.1 79.9 70.1
2019 2019 2021 2017 2017 2014
4.7 4.3 4.3 4.2 4.0 3.8
5.8 6.4 5.6 5.7 7.1 4.0
64.6 56.4 60.4 60.4 44.5 74.1
2034 2019 2018 2029 2026 2008
3.7 3.6 3.4 3.4 3.1 3.0
4.4 4.5
64.5 42.4
2018 2028
2.8 1.9 Continued overleaf
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Issue/event
Economics Globalization of business Global financial crash Change from market forces Multinationals dominate Widespread unemployment Global economy Global labour market Environment Environmental crisis Major global warming effects Fossil fuel shortage Global water shortage Global green technology Safe nuclear energy Serious overpopulation Risky nuclear proliferation Mineral resources run out Major global disaster Widespread famine Food for all Major wars Ozone layer disappears Education Learning new skills Global mass education Demise of traditional school Universal language Political Pacific Rim dominates world Decline of nation states Resurgence of nationalism Supra-national government Decline of USA New world order Third World dominates politics New local power European federation Single global culture
Importance Possibility (0–9) (%)
Mean date (AD)
Index (importance × possibility)
6.4 7.6 6.5 6.3 6.0 6.3 5.3
85.8 66.5 60.7 60.1 58.1 53.5 47.6
2015 2019 2020 2023 2022 2032 2027
5.5 5.0 4.0 3.8 3.5 3.4 2.5
8.1 8.2 7.4 8.2 7.5 7.4 8.0 8.1 7.8 7.3 7.9 6.4 8.5 8.3
86.7 77.1 84.8 70.4 73.8 70.7 66.5 61.0 62.8 66.3 60.0 68.3 44.3 36.6
2017 2023 2027 2023 2028 2029 2029 2019 2042 2018 2026 2025 2030 2034
7.0 6.3 6.3 5.7 5.5 5.3 5.3 4.9 4.9 4.8 4.7 4.3 3.8 3.0
5.9 6.0 4.8 4.6
86.9 69.5 74.1 43.3
2013 2028 2022 2035
5.1 4.2 3.6 2.0
7.3 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.1 6.7 6.1
75.0 68.3 63.4 62.8 61.6 55.3 56.7
2028 2024 2019 2028 2021 2032 2031
5.4 4.3 4.0 3.9 3.8 3.7 3.5
5.6 6.0 6.2
62.2 52.7 45.5
2021 2018 2029
3.5 3.2 2.8 Continued opposite
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Issue/event
Importance Possibility (0–9) (%)
Rejection of political parties Russian expansion Full gender equality City states dominate economics
6.2 6.0 5.5 5.2
44.5 45.1 43.0 40.9
Mean date (AD)
Index (importance × possibility)
2031 2024 2035 2024
2.8 2.7 2.4 2.1
Appendix B Issue/event
Groups Mentions Group Impor- Possi- Individual Mean Index tance bility Index date (groups × (0–9) (%) (importance (AD) mentions) × possibility)
Medical advances Genetic engineering Cloning New animals Cancer cure Medical Better travel Energy developments Safe nuclear energy Technology Homeworking Artificial intelligence Virtual reality Robots IT Revolution Space travel Alien contact Asteroid strike Underwater colonies
15
43
6.5
7.5
80
6.0
2028
12
22
2.6
7.8
87
6.8
2023
9 6 4
1.4 0.5 0.2
12 11
15 8 6 94 22 24
2.6 2.6
6.2 4.3 4.2 6.7 5.3 7.5
41 65 87 65 83 80
2.5 2.8 3.6 4.3 4.4 6.0
2039 2022 2023 2022 2017 2028
7
9
0.6
7.7
60
4.6
2028
8 7
95 13 10
1.0 0.7
6.8 5.7 5.3
71 85 83
4.9 4.8 4.4
2022 2012 2026
4.2 3.2 4.7 4.0 6.0 7.5 3.7
90 78 81 71 35 41 47
3.8 2.5 3.8 2.8 2.1 3.1 1.7
2017 2025 2018 2040 2036 2033 2038
7 6 11 6 7 4
9 7 93 26 16 11 5
0.6 0.4 2.9 1.0 0.8 0.2
Continued overleaf
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Issue/event
Space Population growth Life expectancy up Contraception up Declining population Population Food shortage Food substitutes Water shortage Resources Leisure time up Distance learning up Universal language
322
Groups Mentions Group Impor- Possi- Individual Mean Index tance bility Index date (groups × (0–9) (%) (importance (AD) mentions) × possibility)
11
58 17
1.9
2.5 8.7
71 79
1.8 6.8
2019 2030
10
16
1.6
5.8
65
3.8
2034
7 8
14 10
1.0 0.8
7.7 7.7
73 48
5.6 3.7
2030 2029
0.8 0.6
5.2 7.7 7.3 8.8 5.2 5.5 4.7
41 59 65 59 41 76 79
2.1 4.5 4.8 5.2 2.1 4.2 3.7
2024 2025 2030 2027 2024 2017 2018
0.2
4.7
43
2.0
2035
5 6
81 21 15 10 67 16 10
4
5
12 8 6
2.5 1.2 0.6
Futures, Vol. 30, No. 4, pp. 305–322, 1998 1998 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved Printed in Great Britain 0016–3287/98 $19.00 + 0.00
PII: S0016–3287(98)00038-X
THE FUTURE QUANTIFIED David Mercer The results reported in this paper demonstrate that the qualitative (group) research and quantitative (individual) survey techniques that have been developed now offer a viable means for mapping current expectations and the possible future directions these will take. Sensible use of these should provide governments, and large organisations in general, with a powerful new set of tools for positively managing the future. In terms of the issues themselves, the group which emerged most strongly from the quantified responses of the individuals are those which might be seen as relating to the ‘green’ environment. On the other hand, our qualitative groups looked upon these key issues as representing matters of survival for humanity as a whole. Such a focus on survival may seem selfish, but it can also be seen as altruistic not concerned with personal survival. It also represents a sound, rational approach to long-term planning, where the respondents focused instead on how governments might positively, and safely, manage all the long-term issues threatening the future of humankind. If we move away from ‘green’ issues, it is also clear that even individuals recognize the globalisation of issues in particular the globalisation of business, the possibility of a global financial crash and the (threat of) domination by Pacific Rim countries. At the opposite end of the spectrum are worries about the significant problems faced by the underclasses—and, in turn, the significant threat these present to society as a whole. In general though, apart from technological issues, the emphasis was—across almost all areas—on survival in the face of events ranging down from catastrophes to mere crises and stresses! 1998 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved
The most frequently reported work ‘on the future’ has been that of individual futurologists—usually reporting their own subjective viewpoints, based upon their readings of other
David Mercer is Senior Lecturer, Open University Business School, Walton Hall, Milton Keynes, MK7 6AA, UK. (Tel.: + 44 1908-232165; fax: + 44 1908-655898; e-mail: [email protected]).
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commentators but not upon direct primary research. The quantified outcomes described in this paper are, on the other hand, the result from the development of progressively more rigorous research techniques for investigating the longer-term future. This was originally as part of the ‘Millennium Project’ and now of ‘The Futures Observatory’, both run by the Open University School of Business (OUBS) in conjunction with the Strategic Planning Society. This overall programme of research has so far lasted more than half a decade. Where previous papers1,2 have looked at the qualitative stages of this research, this paper reports the results of the first fully quantitative stages of the work. Background-expectations theory Although the techniques involved have emerged from experience gained in previous stages,1,2 the key underlying assumptions behind latest stages of the research may be said to have originated with one of the favourite theories of the later monetarists; rational expectations.3 Taking this concept further,4 and applying it in a more general sense, our evidence is that much of society now looks to such ‘expectations’—to set the context for what will actually happen in the future. These expectations are the outcomes which they are persuaded will inevitably happen given certain inputs. Our basic assumption, therefore, is that if enough people put their weight behind the same ‘expectations’, and the inputs are observed to happen, they will adjust their behaviour to take account of what is expected; and, accordingly, the expected outcomes will occur! This process might be described as ‘self-fulfilling expectations’. Overall, then, the research set out to describe the future which will come about as a result of current expectations.2,4 It is based, in the first instance, upon three broad assumptions which have only become viable in recent years: 1. The future of humanity, in the developed nations at least, is no longer generally constrained by significant shortages of resource. This is still a controversial assumption, where much of the developing world suffers from severe shortages and even in the developed world bottlenecks can result in local shortages, but—as may be seen from the detailed findings of research reported elsewhere5–9—it has now become a justified one for much of the activity taking place in the economically advanced countries. 2. Accordingly, that future is now being progressively determined by social decisions, taken not just by a few leaders but by millions of their citizens, taking billions of small decisions as part of their daily lives. Thus, to a large extent our lives are no longer necessarily ruled only by the inflexible logic of the economics of scarcity or the dictates of political ideology, but are more typically decided by our own actions. 3. The general, longer-term, framework within which these specific, individual decisions is taken is largely provided by the individuals’ expectations of what the future holds for them. Every man, and woman, has free will, and now has the power to express this; he or she will ultimately make their own decision. But a major influence on that decision—and often the most important influence—is what they expect the future to be, and hence how it will generally determine the ultimate outcome of their own small decision. In the specific context of this research, this naturally leads to the most important assumption:
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1. If you can measure these ‘expectations’ as to future developments, to a large extent you can establish the most likely form of that future. Even if you can just determine the expectations of the opinion-leaders, as our research did, you can still gauge, with some degree of accuracy, the major elements currently shaping the future.
Prior qualitative research The key research technique used in our prior, qualitative research, was based upon that we have developed for simpler scenario forecasting.10–12 In the context of these ‘simpler scenarios’—simpler in the sense that they are suitable for use by a wider range of organisations—this process comprises five main steps; all taken by the managers wishing to investigate the future of their organisations: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
Decide The Drivers For Change; Bring Drivers Together Into A Viable Framework; Produce Initial (Seven To Nine) Mini-Scenarios; Reduce To Two To Three Scenarios; Write The Scenarios.
The great advantage of such a scenario-based approach is that it widens the view of the future—as we wished to do in this global research—where many other techniques (even including Delphi) tend to narrow it as part of their focusing on ‘key issues’. In this ‘global’ research, however, the first two steps were undertaken exclusively by our participants and the last two exclusively by ourselves. In the case of step 3 there was an overlap. The simplest technique we have come to recommend for usage in such scenario forecasting is based on a combination of the traditional focus group,13,14 with scenario forecasting,15–17 using the now almost universal availability of Post-it Notes. It is a very simple technique which may be used to support any form of planning process. In line with our objectives of simplicity and ease-of-use, it requires only a conference room with a bare wall and copious supplies of 3M Post-it Notes. It was, thus, ideal as the main vehicle for our qualitative research.1,2,18 This involved managers and professionals from some 200 organisations; drawn equally from OUBS MBA students, Strategic Planning Society members and those of the Demos think-tank. The output was a framework of 162 factors, or key events, which were then used as the basis for the quantification questionnaire. Quantification research—method The stage of the research reported here was the first quantification of the project. It used a mail survey. Sample As such, it was based upon a sample of 300 students studying with the Open University Business School (OUBS). We have previously found19,20 that—due to the large numbers of students and the generally representative nature of the organisations, typically multinationals, from which they come—their responses typically give a sound guide to those of
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the management populations in those organisations; though as a sample of individuals they are biased towards UK citizenship. More important, in terms of possible skew, they are typically male members of a wealthier and better educated minority; though, as the research examines their expectations about future developments in general rather than their personal needs and wants, we believe that this may not significantly affect the results. A high response rate, 165 responses (55% of the sample), was achieved—even though the questionnaire was relatively long and complex for a mail survey. Questionnaire Apart from a limited number of general ‘demographic’ questions, the questionnaire comprised 162 questions—one for each of the factors, key events, identified in the qualitative stages of the research. For each of these factors three pieces of information were requested: Probability of Occurrence. The participants were asked whether the event was ‘likely’ (defined as greater than 50%), between 10 and 50% likely, and less than 10% likely. Probable Date. For those events which were likely the students were asked to choose, based in effect on a semantic differential,21 from a range of likely dates (2000, 2010, 2020, 2030, 2050 + ) the one they thought most likely. Importance. For each factor they were asked to rate its importance, to society across the world, in terms of a seven-point (1 to 7, very important) semantic differential22. It should be noted, however, that—for ease of comprehension—these measurements are converted to a ten-point (0–9) scale throughout this paper. Analysis was conducted using SPSS for Windows23 and Microsoft Excel.24 Results The full results, condensed (also for ease of comprehension) into 70 composite categories, are shown in Appendix A. Results of the individual measurements are as follows. Importance of events There was a wide spread of levels of importance, down from an average of 9.0 (on a scale from 0 to 9), understandably recorded by ‘nuclear war’, to 1.8, for the ‘1000 channel superhighway’—which was (no doubt to the chagrin of the media moguls) judged trivial! Not unexpectedly, the events judged to be the most important are those which would have the most direct impact on the whole of humanity; including ‘global war’ (8.8), ‘global water shortage’ (also 8.8) and ‘serious overpopulation’ (8.7). Fortunately, the most catastrophic of these are the least likely to occur (‘nuclear war’, 26% likely, ‘global war’, 25%), though ‘serious overpopulation’ rates a high (79%) probability and must be considered as the greatest threat. Whilst there are great variations in terms of the individual events, if we examine the quartiles separately, shown in Table 1, there are no obvious overall patterns in terms of importance. Validating the general importance of the ‘dimensions’ detected by the earlier
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TABLE 1. Quartile (of 162 factors overall)
Mean importance (on a scale of 0–9)
Mean probability (%)
Mean date
1 2 3 4
7.8 6.7 5.8 4.2
65 67 65 62
2026 2021 2022 2025
qualitative work, only 15 events—of the 162 overall, can be considered to be genuinely unimportant (that is, rating an importance of less than 5). Reverting to an examination of the individual events, the most important are in general those relating to the environment (the first 17 factors fall into this category), as threequarters of the first quartile (of 40 events in this quartile) also do. At the other extreme are the events seen as trivial (including ‘make your own media/TV’, 2.2, ‘domestic robots’, 3.2, ‘global tourism for all’, 3.3, and ‘electronic books common’, 3.7)—some of which may disappoint those promoting them as the key to personal satisfaction. In the same region, however, are a group of events which are clearly not trivial for the whole of humanity (such as ‘moon colony’, 3.5, ‘travel to the planets’, 4.0, ‘supersonic travel normal’, 4.0, and ‘major new religions emerge’, 4.2). The respondents seemingly believed these would have little impact on the wider future of global society (the specific question asked). Probability of occurrence If we look at the results from another direction, however, a clear pattern does emerge in terms of the results by quartile (Table 2). Those events expected to occur earlier in the future are also seen to be more likely to occur. In this context, the most probable events may be those which might be seen as the natural outcome of existing trends, and this extrapolation clearly relates most directly to those in the short term. Top of the list is ‘significant pollution’ (at 93%, in the year 2016, and also a high importance level of 8.2). But this bad news is countered by ‘electric/pollution free cars’ (also at 93% in the year of 2016, and still of a relatively high importance of 6.8); and, best of all for some, ‘cure for aids’ (93% in 2017). As can be seen, however, there is no similar correlation with importance; though this may be hidden by the trend noted above—of individuals downrating the importance of ‘remote’ events. Equally reassuring, at the other end of the scale is the low probability of ‘nuclear war’ (at 26%), ‘global war’ (25%), and ‘end of government’ (23%). TABLE 2. Quartile
Mean probability (%)
Mean date
Mean importance
1 2 3 4
85 74 61 34
2017 2021 2024 2031
6.3 6.0 6.3 5.8
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TABLE 3. Issue/event
Importance (0–9)
Possibility (%)
Mean date (AD)
Index (importance × possibility)
Environmental crisis Major global warming effects Fossil fuel shortage Control of personal (car) travel Global water shortage Globalisation of business Global green technology Significant underclass problems Pacific Rim dominates world Safe nuclear energy Serious overpopulation Cures for most diseases Learning new skills Global financial crash
8.1 8.2 7.4 6.6 8.2 6.4 7.5 6.8 7.3 7.4 8.0 7.3 5.9 7.6
86.7 77.1 84.8 88.0 70.4 85.8 73.8 78.7 75.0 70.7 66.5 71.5 86.9 66.5
2017 2023 2027 2015 2023 2015 2028 2015 2028 2029 2029 2028 2013 2019
7.0 6.3 6.3 5.8 5.7 5.5 5.5 5.4 5.4 5.3 5.3 5.2 5.1 5.0
Index of likely importance In order to simplify the rather complex picture which emerges, it is helpful to combine the measures of importance and probability—simply by multiplying these together—to give an index of ‘likely importance’. In addition, Table 3 is based, in the first instance, on a reduction of the original 162 issues/events to a composite 70 factors which best incorporate the range of topics. The results for all of these 70 factors are detailed in Appendix A. The picture is then simplified further, using the 80:20 Rule, by looking at just the top 14 (on the basis of their ‘likely importance’—Table 3). Dates of occurrence Returning to the basic data, if we look at the date patterns (for those respondents who see a greater than 50% chance of the event occurring), the reverse picture—in terms of the likelihood of future events—is seen (Table 4). Again, understandably, the events likely to occur in the nearer future are seen as those much more likely to occur. The largest projects are, perhaps realistically, assigned the longest dates. Examples are ‘planetary colonies’ (2047) and ‘mining asteroids’ (2043); but also ‘no infectious diseases’ (2044) and ‘world government formed’ (2040). Most of these also have relatively low probabilities (though still greater than 40%), but it is possible that this is a reflection of this being a catch-all category; since this box on the questionnaire also took into account the possibility of the event occurring after 2050. TABLE 4. Quartile
Mean date
Mean probability (%)
Mean importance
1 2 3 4
2036 2026 2020 2014
49 63 75 80
6.0 6.5 6.2 5.8
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Once more, the lower end is defined by those projects which are seen to be already under way; for instance ‘redefining/learning new skills’ with a date of 2010 (and a 91% probability), though—interestingly—Germany is expected (with a 58% probability) to dominate the EU by the same year (2010) and ‘changed marriage expectations’ even earlier (at 2008)—though the importance of the latter is (at just 4.2) surprisingly low! Factor analysis When a variety of factor analyses were conducted, using SPSS for Windows, the factors— outside of those relating to technology—developed no overall patterns with obvious significance; the main variable which emerged was the future ‘orientation’ of the participants, how strongly individuals held views about the future in general. In the specific case of the technological aspects, just a few groups consistently emerged as clearly related: Outer Space—including most of the (eight) aspects of travel and colonization of the solar system, but also including ‘brain (computer) implants’, ‘wide use of virtual reality’, and ‘domestic robots’. Personal Contacts—an unexpected category covering ‘cure for AIDS’, ‘contact with aliens’ and ‘changed marriage expectations’! Communications—including most aspects such as ‘all communications mobile’ and ‘telecomms effectively free’, but also ‘much cheaper air travel’ and ‘mandatory control of car travel’ Medical Cures—with ‘no infectious diseases’ and ‘cure for cancer’. A separate category, however, is that of ‘gene manipulation’ and ‘cloning of individuals’ and, less predictable, ‘unlimited computer power’. If the other factors are forced—by progressively removing the topmost factors—into separate categories, based on measurement of importance (the one factor measured across a range of values), it is possible to detect a number of related groupings. The first set—Table 5—are, in general, ones which reflect catastrophic forces which could destabilize—or significantly alter the course—of humanity. As such, they are seen to be important, but less likely to happen. The next set, again shown in Table 6, are those which are less catastrophic but could, also, signal significant developments; with matching probabilities. The next group, Table 7, contains the more likely developments covering the field of social structures. The final group (Table 8), again more likely, reflects the technological developments which might reasonably be expected. TABLE 5. ‘Group’ title
Mean importance
Mean probability (%)
Mean date
Global crash World government Global environment Wars
7.5 6.5 6.5 6.5
62 61 60 66
2024 2026 2027 2022
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TABLE 6. ‘Group’ title
Mean importance
Mean probability (%)
Mean date
Global stresses Regional stresses Communal stresses
6.8 6.2 6.5
62 54 65
2024 2024 2021
TABLE 7. ‘Group’ title
Mean importance
Mean probability (%)
Mean date
Business crises Value crises Social crises Environment crises Personal lifestyles
6.0 6.6 6.3 6.8 6.0
68 74 61 59 68
2018 2019 2024 2026 2021
TABLE 8. ‘Group’ title
Mean importance
Mean probability (%)
Mean date
Science and medicine Cures Communications Space dreams
6.3 5.8 5.2 3.3
79 70 68 63
2018 2027 2025 2031
Although the various members of these groups have widely varying dates, the mean dates for most of these groups is around three decades ahead—as it is overall. Comparison with group potentials In order to be certain of detecting all the factors—including some ‘wild-cards’25—the earlier (‘qualitative’) stage of the work involved a similar number of participants to that in the quantified survey. Accordingly, although it must still be formally judged as qualitative research, it is possible to compare the different sets of results in broad outline. In this context, the key difference between the way the two groups were approached can be summarized in terms of the fact that the individuals were asked to report their own views, while the groups were asked to agree possible futures with other members of the group. It also likely that the dynamics of group work—following the reported patterns experienced in more conventional focus groups26—opened out the overall horizons. Their individual ideas were debated in a generally supportive climate—where this group support allowed the participants to consider ideas which were rejected (presumably as unrealistic) by the individuals. Comparison of results For the purposes of this comparison, the ‘qualitative’ results were ‘quantified’ by two measures. The first was the number of groups, from a total of 16, which included a
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reference to the topic in their list of drivers. The second was the total number of mentions, where a topic was considered sufficiently important for different aspects to be reported separately. The detailed comparison is shown in Appendix B. For many of the 50 composite factors (where such comparison was possible) the two sets of results were similar. For instance, employment was included by 12 groups (with 38 mentions), compared with an individual importance rating of 7.2 (and a probability of 76%), global warming was included by 11 groups (with 20 mentions) against an individual importance rating of 8.3 (and a probability of 80%). At the other extreme, underwater colonies were included by four groups (with five mentions overall), compared with an individual importance rating of 3.7 (and 47% probability); and universal language also by four groups (and with five mentions), against 4.7 (and 43%). There were, however, areas where the two diverged markedly. Thus, in terms of apparent differences in perceived levels of importance, 11 groups included space travel, with 26 mentions, but this was given only a 4.0 importance rating by individuals; though it did have a probability of 70%. Equally, earth-bound travel was included by 12 groups (with 22 mentions) versus an individual importance rating of only 5.3 (though an 83% probability). The globalisation of society was reported by 12 groups (with no less than 38 mentions in one form or another) but only 5.3 on the individual importance scale (and 32% probability), developments in religion were noted by 11 groups (albeit with only 16 mentions overall), against a rating of 4.8 and a probability of 47%. In terms of probability, the individuals rated anarchy only 23% possible, though it was mentioned by all groups (with no less than 68 mentions), and cloning as 41% possible compared with inclusion by nine groups. All of these divergences seemed to reflect underestimates of the importance of these factors by the individuals, who seemed to be less inclined to see the importance of (and likelihood of) events which involved changes in the structures of society, or those that were remote from them (or their organization). Only two aspects, from the list of 50 topics which could be directly compared in this way, seemed to be overestimated by individuals; the cure of cancer was reported by only four groups but rated an 87% probability with individuals, and the move of production to the Third World was mentioned by only two groups against an 84% likelihood as seen by individuals. In these cases it is possible that the groups also developed a more realistic, better-informed view on the basis of their debate. Discussion—the techniques As might be expected, this is a very difficult area to research. In part this is due to the very wide scope; ‘all human life is there’! In part it is a function of the inevitable degree of uncertainty which is a feature of predicting any long-term developments: and, while this is a widely recognized problem, this does not make the work any easier. Accordingly, the views of the future which emerge, and which we document, must be viewed as speculative. It would have been tedious to add this caveat to every prediction, so this caveat will not be repeated. Even so, it must be kept in mind, for it is a fundamental fact of life when one is undertaking long-range planning. On the other hand, one of the major achievements of the research programme overall has been its apparent success in improving the potential accuracy of such forecasting. Only time will tell, for the whole picture is still subject to many possible disjunctions. It
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only takes one American President, waking up one morning so tired of life that he decides to end it all in the most spectacular way possible, to ensure that all bets are off! Even so, it is a fact that almost all important long-term decisions now ultimately emerge— consensually—from literally billions of small decisions made by all members of a population. Further, these decisions are (according to our research) primarily swayed by the expectations of these participants (which we can now ‘measure’), means that the trends we have detected are more credible than many previous predictions of the future. Indeed, the new technique of using the quantitative individual data to plot current expectations, and that of the qualitative work with groups to indicate future directions, gives us the best map of the future. Governments who decide to journey towards that future without consulting such a map may be considered to be unwise, and possibly unfit to govern. The one very clear overall pattern which emerged was that the more remote an event was, either in terms of time (the far future) or social geography (the structural aspects of society), the less certain it is seen to be. On the other hand, it would be incorrect to read into this that such remote events are unlikely to occur, rather that as yet they are less certain as an outcome. In any case, this is a quite reasonable position for the individual to take. It is, after all, the reason a number of more sophisticated organisations use scenario planning—which deliberately explores alternative outcomes in order to allow for future uncertainty—as their preferred approach to the future. The individuals’ diffidence about these remote events may, however, pose a problem for governments; where the key decisions facing them may relate to such long timescales and socially remote goals. It becomes that much more difficult to take the population with them on the planned journey into that future. Remembering that it is the expectations of the population which will determine the ultimate success, this poses a threat to any government brave enough to attempt this—and, hence, one reason at least for the shorttermism embraced by many governments! Based on our research, however, we believe that this problem can be broken down into a number of more manageable parts. Inevitable outcomes The outcomes of some of these issues are, subject to the usual overriding caveat about grossly unpredictable events, completely predictable over the longer-term; though not over the short-term and the timescales for their ultimate occurrence will typically be uncertain. The classic example of such an issue is the colonization of space. The only thing which can stop this is the decline of civilization itself. Otherwise, history— especially that of the colonization of the Americas—tells us that we will continue to push out our frontiers and space is—for the time being at least—the ‘final frontier’. What is more, it no longer requires any significant technological breakthroughs. We may continue to develop ever more efficient technologies for colonizing space, as the new mission objectives for NASA suggest, but we could already achieve this—albeit very expensively—with current technology. Our individual respondents gave these developments low priority, but our groups just as clearly indicated their future importance. In the case of these ‘inevitable outcomes’, which represent a relatively high proportion of the remote events in question, government has no option, except to defer the key decisions (which is too often the option chosen!). The most productive approach
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will, therefore, be to explain the inevitability of the outcome to their electorates who— our research indicates—already understand this. The ‘pensions crisis’ falls into this category. But, if the problems caused by an aging population are balanced by simply raising the age of retirement, this becomes a major opportunity. The legalization of drugs, which was expected by the majority of our respondents, may also remove another ‘threat’; almost at the stroke of a pen. The emergence of the old ‘Third World’ as a major economic and political challenger, and the corresponding (relative) decline of the West, may seem to offer much greater dangers; until this is welcomed as an opportunity for all rather than a threat to some. The same may be just as true of the emergence of supra-national groupings, such as the EU. In terms of ‘management actions’ even governments cannot influence the outcome of such events. Using the research techniques we have developed, however, they will be aware that this is the case; and will be able to direct resources towards ameliorating the impacts, or building upon them, rather than wasting their effort ineffectually trying to stop them happening. Inevitable changes with unknown outcomes Some issues are clearly likely to be impacted by significant changes; but the final outcome is not yet predictable. The classical example here is that relating to the future of political parties. It is abundantly evident, from contemporary examples around the globe as much as from our own research (even with individuals), that the current (Western) system of party politics cannot cope with the demands of modern (or, more accurately, postmodern) society. It is fatally flawed, as the growing importance of single issue politics demonstrates. As yet, though, no clear solution—which meets the needs of the wider population (in terms of effective management of a range of such single issues)—has been forthcoming. In this context, the techniques we have pioneered offer—at the quantified individual level—the possibility of detecting these developments and—at the qualitative group level—some indication of the future directions of change. With this knowledge it should be possible for government to, not least, admit that the changes are taking place and then to most productively steer future developments (in expectations) towards positive outcomes. Into this category fall such issues as the seeming breakdown of the family. In fact, as far as we can detect, new—and possibly stronger—forms are already emerging: and it is the misguided attempts of governments to set the clock back (and adopt ‘family values’, for instance) which are creating the tensions. In this context, one interesting outcome of our on-going research seems to be that the greatest value of the Internet may be its hidden function of keeping family and friends in touch when circumstances disperse them; solving a major problem caused by our newly mobile society. Similarly, the problems of the under-classes, and those posed by (related) crime, are often magnified by inappropriate responses to the new situations. Fortunately, the similar challenges posed by the emergence of more feminine values, and by the portfolios of lifestyles, seem to have already been put behind us with a minimum of discomfort. In the case of these changes, the maps of the future provided by our new techniques will enable governments to best influence the outcomes. The quantitative map will tell where they are starting from, and the qualitative one will show both the direction the future is likely to take and the most productive ways of influencing this.
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Unknown changes There are also those (fortunately few) changes, for example to the structure of the community, where even the nature of the changes is—as yet—ill-defined. We suspect something is happening, but we do not yet know quite what. In these cases the (group) qualitative element of our research may be the most useful; since it offers the best vehicle for exploring the genuinely unknown—that part of environmental analysis, described by Aguilar27 as ‘undirected viewing’, which is most difficult to undertake. As another part of this exploratory process, as well as conditioning individuals to expect change, this may be more widely undertaken as a ‘great debate’; such as we are currently undertaking with Strategic Planning Society members. Thus, for instance, the use of such techniques for exploring the new community, and personal, values which are emerging may offer a more productive approach than that, of something akin to nostalgia, which drives the main alternatives offered by the communitarians. Finally, there are the genuinely ‘wild’ cards—the changes we do not even suspect are likely to happen. These may not, though, all be undetectable. Steinmuller28 describes an important sub-category, which he calls ‘creeping catastrophes’ and which account for a relatively large proportion of the surprises which we encounter, where the problem is that we simply do not see them—even though they are already there for us to see if we look. Again, our group qualitative work2 has, if carried out on a large enough scale, proved successful in surfacing such hidden factors; when they become susceptible to the same approaches as any other factors. Again, therefore, the qualitative and quantitative maps may improve governments’ ability to influence the future—though here it is the former which are likely to be much more important. In fact, in our experience, these ‘creeping catastrophes’—once surfaced—typically prove to be more predictable than most future issues. A typical example is offered by the coming ‘symbiosis with the computer’. This first emerged, from the group work, in terms of the possibility of brain implants. Further investigations showed that the technology behind these is already being developed, but—clearly—the social attitudes necessary to support the widespread adoption of such a radical development will take much longer. These further investigations, however, eventually led us in a different direction; to realize that, even without brain implants, symbiosis is already under way; using the much humbler vehicle of the PC, in front of which most workers now spend their lives! Most organisations, with the exception of just a few of the larger multinationals, will not have the resources to influence future outcomes in the same way as governments. In this case, we would suggest that the most important aspect of our approach for smaller organisations is for their managers to positively separate their long-range planning (based on use of our techniques), which results in ‘robust strategies’ that protect them against future uncertainties, from their traditional corporate strategy processes. When both of these have been developed separately, they are simply compared; and the shorter-term (corporate) strategy then ‘steered’ to compensate for future (robust) needs without impacting short-term performance. Indeed, in our experience to date with a number of organisations, the differences between the two sets of strategy have proved to require only minimal ‘steering’ changes in strategy. This aspect of our work is more fully described in the
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new book, Marketing Strategy: the Challenge of the External Environment,29 which provides the basis for our revised MBA course in the field of long-range marketing/planning. Discussion—the issues The group of issues which emerged most strongly from the quantified responses of the individuals are those which might be seen as relating to the ‘green’ environment. At a first glance, therefore, this represents strong support for the ‘altruistic’ protection, ‘conservation’, of the natural environment; in line with the many similar reports in the popular media. This is where, however, our (qualitative) group work is important—for it provided a very different interpretation. Our groups placed much less stress on this aspect, and were often almost dismissive of it. Instead, they looked upon the key issues as representing maters of survival for humanity as a whole. If, therefore, we accept this interpretation, all of the top 20% of factors—in the quantified results—can be seen to fall into this category. It was made even clearer in the comments of the groups. Those who, for instance, placed emphasis on the colonization of space did not generally stress the pushing back of frontiers, as might have been expected, but saw it primarily in terms of providing the ultimate ‘lifeboat’ for humankind. Thus, even if humanity across the Earth was totally destroyed—by a collision with a comet, say—there would still be colonies in existence which could guarantee the survival of our species. Such a focus on survival may seem selfish, but it—too—can be seen as altruistic; after all, it is not concerned with personal survival. It also represents a sound, rational approach to long-term planning. ‘Robust Strategies’,12,29 which we develop (for our clients) to handle the long-term future of organisations, focus on precisely the same objectives; on survival (here of the organisation rather than the individual), rather than on short-term optimization of performance. This aspect is also highlighted by another interpretation we put on the less intense concentration of groups on the green issues themselves. They focused instead, we decided, on how governments might positively, and safely, manage all the long-term issues threatening the future of humankind. If we move away from ‘green’ issues, it is also clear that even individuals recognize the globalisation of issues. In particular they include the globalisation of business, the possibility of a global financial crash and the (threat of) domination by Pacific Rim countries. At the opposite end of the spectrum are worries about the significant problems faced by the underclasses—and, in turn, the significant threat these present to society as a whole. In general though, apart from technological issues, the emphasis was—across almost all areas—on survival; in the face of events ranging down from catastrophes to mere crises and stresses! Conclusion The techniques we have developed now offer a viable means for mapping current expectations and the possible future directions these will take. Sensible use of these should provide governments, and large organisations in general, with a powerful new set of tools for positively managing the future. The focus, by groups as much as by individuals, on
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a survivable future represents a mature, responsible approach which governments could productively emulate.
Notes and references 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29.
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Mercer, D., A New Qualitative Technique for Exploring the Future, Marketing Education Group (MEG) Conference, Warwick, 1996. Mercer, D., Determining aggregated expectations of the future. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 1997, 55, 155–164. Lucas, R. E., Some international evidence on output–inflation trade-off. American Economic Review, 1973, 63, 326–334. Mercer, D., A general hypothesis of aggregated expectations. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 1997, 55, 145–154. Mercer, D., Predictable futures—the drivers for change. Futures, 1996, 28(9), 829–838. Mercer, D., The foreseeable future. Management Decision, 1996, 34(3), 55–61. Mercer, D., The Foreseeable Future—‘Millennium Project’ Qualitative Results, OR38 (Operational Research Society) Conference, 1996. Mercer, D., The Predictable Future, BAM (British Academy of Management) Conference, 1996 Mercer, D., Predictable futures—the drivers for change, 5. Internationale Sommerakademie des Sekretariats fu¨r Zukunftsforschung, 1996. Mercer, D., Scenarios made easy. Long Range Planning, 1995, 28(4), 81–86. Mercer, D., Simpler scenarios. Management Decision, 1995, 33(4), 32–40. Mercer, D., Robust strategies in a day. Management Decision, 1997, 35(3), 219–223. Krueger, R. A., Focus Groups: A Practical Guide for Applied Research. Sage, London, 1988. Goldman, A. E. and McDonald, S., The Group Depth Interview: Principles and Practice. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1987. Wack, P., Scenarios: uncharted waters ahead. Harvard Business Review, 1985 (September–October) 139–150. Wack, P., Scenarios: shooting the rapids. Harvard Business Review, 1985 (November–December), 139– 150. Schwartz, P., The Art of the Long View. Doubleday, London, 1991. Mercer, D., Scenarios in use, EMAC (European Marketing Academy), 1995. Mercer, D., Marketing practices in the 1990s. Journal of Targeting, Measurement and Analysis for Marketing, 1996, 5(2), 175–181. Mercer, D., Industry scenarios—short termism revealed. Industrial Management and Data Systems, 1996, 96(8), 23–27. Osgood, E. C., Succi G. J. and Tannenbaum P. H., The Measurement of Meaning. Urbana, NY, 1957. Likert, R., A technique for the measurement of attitudes. Archives of Psychology, No. 140 (1932). Norusis, M. J., SPSS for Windows: Base System Users Guide (Release 6.0). SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL, 1993. Microsoft, Microsoft Excel (Version 5.0). Microsoft, Seattle, 1993. Rockfellow, J. D., Wild cards: preparing for the ‘Big One’. The Futurist, 1994, (January–February), 14–19. Krueger, R. A., Focus Groups: A Practical Guide for Applied Research. Sage, London, 1988. Aguilar, F. J., Scanning the Business Environment. Macmillan, London, 1967. Steinmuller, K., The future as wild card, 5. Internationale Sommerkademie des Sekretariats fu¨r Zukunftsforschung—Gelsenkirchen, 1996. Mercer, D, Marketing Strategy: The Challenge of the External Environment. Sage, London, 1998.
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Appendix A Issue/event
Technology Control of personal (car) travel Cures for most diseases Homeworking Computing developments Gene manipulation Better air travel Communications developments Space travel Meteor/comet strikes earth Domestic use of IT Brain implants Global tourism for all Contact with aliens Underwater colonies Space colonies Interplanetary trade Society Significant underclass problems Major pension/welfare crisis Crime endemic New community values New personal values emerge Portfolio of lifestyles Notable rise in feminine values Average lifespan 100 + Spread of fundamentalism Drugs legalized Universal bill of rights Social breakdown Changed marriage expectations Digitization of every medium Resurgence of mass religion
Importance Possibility (0–9) (%)
Mean date (AD)
Index (importance × possibility)
6.6
88.0
2015
5.8
7.3 5.6 5.2 5.9 4.4 4.5
71.5 83.8 82.5 69.5 84.1 78.8
2028 2014 2021 2027 2018 2017
5.2 4.7 4.3 4.1 3.7 3.6
4.1 7.5 3.4 4.4 3.4 6.1 3.7 3.4 3.6
79.3 40.9 77.3 62.2 64.6 35.4 47.0 45.1 37.2
2033 2033 2018 2033 2022 2036 2038 2045 2045
3.3 3.1 2.7 2.7 2.2 2.1 1.7 1.5 1.3
6.8
78.7
2015
5.4
6.2 6.9 6.2 5.6 5.0 5.4
75.6 61.6 69.9 74.1 79.9 70.1
2019 2019 2021 2017 2017 2014
4.7 4.3 4.3 4.2 4.0 3.8
5.8 6.4 5.6 5.7 7.1 4.0
64.6 56.4 60.4 60.4 44.5 74.1
2034 2019 2018 2029 2026 2008
3.7 3.6 3.4 3.4 3.1 3.0
4.4 4.5
64.5 42.4
2018 2028
2.8 1.9 Continued overleaf
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Issue/event
Economics Globalization of business Global financial crash Change from market forces Multinationals dominate Widespread unemployment Global economy Global labour market Environment Environmental crisis Major global warming effects Fossil fuel shortage Global water shortage Global green technology Safe nuclear energy Serious overpopulation Risky nuclear proliferation Mineral resources run out Major global disaster Widespread famine Food for all Major wars Ozone layer disappears Education Learning new skills Global mass education Demise of traditional school Universal language Political Pacific Rim dominates world Decline of nation states Resurgence of nationalism Supra-national government Decline of USA New world order Third World dominates politics New local power European federation Single global culture
Importance Possibility (0–9) (%)
Mean date (AD)
Index (importance × possibility)
6.4 7.6 6.5 6.3 6.0 6.3 5.3
85.8 66.5 60.7 60.1 58.1 53.5 47.6
2015 2019 2020 2023 2022 2032 2027
5.5 5.0 4.0 3.8 3.5 3.4 2.5
8.1 8.2 7.4 8.2 7.5 7.4 8.0 8.1 7.8 7.3 7.9 6.4 8.5 8.3
86.7 77.1 84.8 70.4 73.8 70.7 66.5 61.0 62.8 66.3 60.0 68.3 44.3 36.6
2017 2023 2027 2023 2028 2029 2029 2019 2042 2018 2026 2025 2030 2034
7.0 6.3 6.3 5.7 5.5 5.3 5.3 4.9 4.9 4.8 4.7 4.3 3.8 3.0
5.9 6.0 4.8 4.6
86.9 69.5 74.1 43.3
2013 2028 2022 2035
5.1 4.2 3.6 2.0
7.3 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.1 6.7 6.1
75.0 68.3 63.4 62.8 61.6 55.3 56.7
2028 2024 2019 2028 2021 2032 2031
5.4 4.3 4.0 3.9 3.8 3.7 3.5
5.6 6.0 6.2
62.2 52.7 45.5
2021 2018 2029
3.5 3.2 2.8 Continued opposite
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Issue/event
Importance Possibility (0–9) (%)
Rejection of political parties Russian expansion Full gender equality City states dominate economics
6.2 6.0 5.5 5.2
44.5 45.1 43.0 40.9
Mean date (AD)
Index (importance × possibility)
2031 2024 2035 2024
2.8 2.7 2.4 2.1
Appendix B Issue/event
Groups Mentions Group Impor- Possi- Individual Mean Index tance bility Index date (groups × (0–9) (%) (importance (AD) mentions) × possibility)
Medical advances Genetic engineering Cloning New animals Cancer cure Medical Better travel Energy developments Safe nuclear energy Technology Homeworking Artificial intelligence Virtual reality Robots IT Revolution Space travel Alien contact Asteroid strike Underwater colonies
15
43
6.5
7.5
80
6.0
2028
12
22
2.6
7.8
87
6.8
2023
9 6 4
1.4 0.5 0.2
12 11
15 8 6 94 22 24
2.6 2.6
6.2 4.3 4.2 6.7 5.3 7.5
41 65 87 65 83 80
2.5 2.8 3.6 4.3 4.4 6.0
2039 2022 2023 2022 2017 2028
7
9
0.6
7.7
60
4.6
2028
8 7
95 13 10
1.0 0.7
6.8 5.7 5.3
71 85 83
4.9 4.8 4.4
2022 2012 2026
4.2 3.2 4.7 4.0 6.0 7.5 3.7
90 78 81 71 35 41 47
3.8 2.5 3.8 2.8 2.1 3.1 1.7
2017 2025 2018 2040 2036 2033 2038
7 6 11 6 7 4
9 7 93 26 16 11 5
0.6 0.4 2.9 1.0 0.8 0.2
Continued overleaf
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Issue/event
Space Population growth Life expectancy up Contraception up Declining population Population Food shortage Food substitutes Water shortage Resources Leisure time up Distance learning up Universal language
322
Groups Mentions Group Impor- Possi- Individual Mean Index tance bility Index date (groups × (0–9) (%) (importance (AD) mentions) × possibility)
11
58 17
1.9
2.5 8.7
71 79
1.8 6.8
2019 2030
10
16
1.6
5.8
65
3.8
2034
7 8
14 10
1.0 0.8
7.7 7.7
73 48
5.6 3.7
2030 2029
0.8 0.6
5.2 7.7 7.3 8.8 5.2 5.5 4.7
41 59 65 59 41 76 79
2.1 4.5 4.8 5.2 2.1 4.2 3.7
2024 2025 2030 2027 2024 2017 2018
0.2
4.7
43
2.0
2035
5 6
81 21 15 10 67 16 10
4
5
12 8 6
2.5 1.2 0.6