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The global risk continuum (GRC)
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The global risk continuum (GRC) Darren S. McKnight a,∗, John A. Macdonald b, Joseph Pelton c, Chris Kunstadter d, Peter Martinez e, Rohit Arora a, Janelle V. Jenniges f a
Centauri Corporation, United States University of South Carolina, United States c International Association for the Advancement of Space Safety, United States d AXA XL, United States e Secure World Foundation, United States f United States Air Force, United States b
a r t i c l e Keywords: Risk Space debris Asteroid strike Space weather
i n f o
a b s t r a c t Space-related hazards come from both natural and man-made sources; these hazards pose risks based on the likelihood of exposure and consequence of that exposure. The use of satellites in Earth orbit is now essential to the functioning of nation-states and commerce. The loss of these resources increases global risk as both the world population and global reliance on technology increase. Risks from natural cosmic threats from outside the confines of Earth include asteroids (i.e., Near Earth Objects, NEOs), solar flares, and coronal mass ejections (CMEs). Threats from Near-Earth Objects (NEOS) are becoming clearer as our ability to detect and characterize them improves. Space weather, driven largely by solar dynamics, and changes to the Earth’s magnetic field that could decrease the natural protective shielding of Earth against solar storms, likewise threaten our planet. At the same time, the risk to the world’s population from catastrophes originating from human activity, war, pandemics, geophysical phenomena, weather, and other Earth-based risks appear to be increasing. As the global population has increased from 800 million in 1800 to nearly eight billion in 2019, the number of people whose lives might be affected by these low probability and high consequence events has risen significantly. While it is difficult to precisely determine the effect of any of these risks individually, it can be instructive to create a common framework that allows comparison of a diverse set of hazards to evaluate risk awareness, mitigation, and remediation. These hazards span from high probability, moderate consequence events to low probability high consequence scenarios. The Global Risk Continuum (GRC) presents individual scenarios within these threat classes along a single risk scale. As a first step in this analysis, a GRC is created by independently determining the probability for each type of event, and the consequence of each as represented in an estimated economic impact. The risk is then determined by taking the product of these two terms. Assumptions and conversion factors needed to enable this common baseline and preliminary observations of the results are provided. This is a "work in progress" that will require significant cooperation and collaboration to refine over time into a useful tool for policymakers, scientists, and others. The process of establishing ’estimates’ of risk is an iterative process that will evolve and improve over time. This paper describes a thought process and the beginnings of a methodology rather than a complete tool for global risk assessment.
1. Background The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
∗
Corresponding author. E-mail address: [email protected] (D.S. McKnight).
Risk management relies on awareness, calculation, and mitigation of hazards. First, one may not be aware of a particular hazard. Second, the risk from this hazard may be difficult to calculate. Once calculated, the risk may not appear relevant. Finally, an individual may choose to accept the risk rather than actively try to reduce it through a risk management strategy. Fig. 1 presents a simplified risk management process. Fig. 2 depicts the risk management process in more detail [1]. The first phase (“Prepare”) sets the foundation by identifying, characterizing, and assessing the risk.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jsse.2020.01.002 Received 13 October 2019; Received in revised form 12 January 2020; Accepted 22 January 2020 Available online xxx 2468-8967/© 2020 International Association for the Advancement of Space Safety. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Please cite this article as: D.S. McKnight, J.A. Macdonald and J. Pelton et al., The global risk continuum (GRC), Journal of Space Safety Engineering, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jsse.2020.01.002
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Fig. 1. There are many steps where a risk management effort can be derailed.
Fig. 2. Risk management can be implemented before, during, and after exposure to a risk.
Previous attempts by others have helped to guide this process even further [3]. The current paper will build from all these initial efforts. and globally accepted GRC is a daunting task. 2. Technical approach This paper takes an iterative and incremental approach to the creation of the GRC. The scope is limited by the following four constraints (which will be addressed in future efforts): - We do not consider risk perception and acceptance. However, global and cross-domain cultural and organizational variations in risk communications will eventually have to be considered. - All consequences are normalized to U.S. dollars. This will require simplifications and conversion factors (e.g., how much is a human life worth) that will be enhanced in future GRC developments. - Only current risk levels are considered. Predicting future risk levels adds additional uncertainty into already difficult risk characterization calculations. - Risk is based on the immediate effects of an event as opposed to its long-term effects. For example, a war, a pandemic, or a massive coronal mass ejection may create long-term issues for public health and vital infrastructure whose total consequence will take many years to be realized. This paper only considers the immediate effects.
Fig. 3. The risk graphic proposed ranks space hazards on a scale from 1 to 10 based on the product of probability and consequence levels.
The risk management process ramps up in the “Plan” phase by consideration of dissuading, denying, and/or deterring the risk. If a hazard has been identified or a target is exposed to the hazard, then one may be able to manage the risk by “Acting During” the exposure via interdiction, suppression, and/or mitigation. Finally, one may “Act” after the exposure through remediation, recovery, or reconstitution. In this paper, the authors have examined the risk for a number of diverse space and terrestrial hazards with a focus on awareness in the “Prepare” phase (i.e., identify and characterize). This paper was motivated several years ago when one of the authors provided an outline for a proposed paper to the technical subcommittee of the International Association for the Advancement of Space Safety (IAASS) recognizing a need for examining space risks in a common format. The author drafted a template of a possible framework for consideration, shown in Fig. 3. Another author of this paper developed the concept more fully in a paper describing the Space Risk Scale (SRS) [2].
One fundamental aspect of the GRC is that the probability and consequence values will be calculated independently then multiplied together to quantify risk. People often think they are considering the highest risks when in reality they are only considering the events with the highest consequences. Similarly, some risk assessments focus on events based solely on probability, neglecting the consequences of the events. The authors acknowledge that both probability and consequence for the hazards being examined often have large uncertainties, but that uncertainty should not drive us to inaction. Rather, it should drive us to either reduce the uncertainties or manage the risks, rather than hoping the adverse event will not occur. 2
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3.1. Influenza pandemic
Do not consider risk perception and acceptance. Normalize consequences to US$. Probability will be calculated for one year. Determine probability and consequence independently. Select diverse scenarios: orbital debris, space hazards from the solar system, and terrestrial hazards.
Several publicly-stated probabilities and consequences for influenza pandemics are summarized in Table 2. These diverse estimates provide a wide range of potential outcomes and are plotted on Fig. 5 relative to the other hazards being examined (Table 3). 3.2. Tsunami On average, two damaging tsunamis occur each year throughout the world, however, about every 15 years a highly destructive, ocean-wide tsunami occurs. Earthquakes not associated with tsunamis have historically not been as destructive as ocean-wide tsunamis. As a result, only large-scale tsunamis are scrutinized. Recent events and analyses have been leveraged to complete the table below [17].
Fig. 4. Key aspects of the initial GRC development scope this activity so that it is manageable but not the final solution. Table 1 The initial GRC development examined several widely diverse hazardous events that range from easy to calculate low risk to difficult to determine high risk events. Terrestrial
Space
Influenza Pandemic Tsunami Traffic Fatality in US
Orbital Debris Near-Earth Objects Space Weather
3.3. Traffic fatality in US An easily-calculable hazard (due to the availability of actual occurrence data) is traffic accident deaths in the United States. This risk is included among other low probability, high consequence events for contrast and grounding. It also provides a reasonably simple explanation for the uncertainty addressed in our consideration of the major space and terrestrial events. It is reported that the probability of an American dying in a traffic accident annually is approximately 1.5E-4 (or ~1/6500). However, it is reported that the location with the lowest probability is Washington, DC (3.1E-5 or 1/32,322) and the location with the highest probability is Montana (2.2E-4 or 1/4433) [18]. The consequence of such an event is one life or $3–5 M, as reported earlier. The resulting risk uncertainty is depicted in Fig. 5.
The probability for each hazard is determined on an annual basis at the currently-recognized levels. The intent of using an annual probability is to keep the GRC focused on current risks and not become a brainstorming exercise that attempts to predict trends over decades or centuries. However, some of the annual probabilities are indeed taken as a subset of decadal or longer assessments. Just as with the consequence parameter, the probability is normalized for simplicity and consistency. This focus will hopefully help to motivate immediate risk management efforts. Avoiding long-term predictions or trends also help to minimize uncertainty. Fig. 4 summarizes the major design issues for the initial GRC development.
3.4. Orbital debris The probability that a typical operational satellite in low Earth orbit (LEO) will have its mission terminated due to an impact from orbital debris is roughly 1%/yr (i.e., OD1) [7]. The consequence of the loss of one satellite in LEO is estimated to be between $50k to $100 M. The OD1 risk is posed primarily by a population of 500,000–700,000 lethal nontrackable (LNT) debris objects in LEO. As a result, if two operational satellites collide at 700 km (i.e., OD2) or two large rocket bodies (e.g., Russian SL-16) collide at 850 km (i.e., OD3) the LNT produced is added to this existing population and the OD1 number will be recalculated for a subset of LEO orbits. It is considered unlikely that two operational satellites will collide in Earth orbit due to the number of safeguards in place such as selfawareness of positions and supporting space surveillance systems. The probability is conservatively estimated to be 10−8 /yr. In addition, the consequence will be relatively small due to the typically low mass of satellites in LEO. The mass of the satellites in LEO typically range from 1 kg to 1000 kg – we use 400 kg each for a total of 800 kg involved mass in the collision. From previous studies, the number of LNT produced from a hypervelocity collision in space with two payloads is typically about 25–30 per kg of mass involved [8]. As a result, this collision will have 20,000–24,000 LNT distributed across the 700–1000 km altitude range (i.e., likely debris dispersion from collision at 850 km). This addition produces about a 6–10% increase in the LNT population since 20,000–24,000 LNT were added to about 250,000–350,000 LNT likely in this altitude range out of the total 500,000–700,000 LNT. This is shown in Fig. 5 as OD1|OD2 (i.e., OD1 given OD2 occurs). The probability of two SL-16 s colliding at ~850 km has been welldocumented in research papers covering the Massive Collision Monitoring Activity (MCMA) [10]. The probability is estimated at 1/600 per year, and the direct consequences are the liberation of 332,000–415,000 LNT. This larger debris generation is due to the two SL-16 rocket bodies having a combined 16,600 kg of mass involved and the number of
2.1. Risks examined This paper examines a wide range of specific space and terrestrial hazards as depicted in Table 1. The terrestrial hazardous events that are easier to quantify will be covered first to provide a baseline for the risk methodology before scrutinizing the more dynamic and uncertain space hazards. 2.2. Consequence normalization Before examining each hazard, a discussion of consequence normalization is necessary. For the concept of GRC to materialize we must find some means to normalize consequence results; and we will examine other alternatives in future development efforts. However, for this first effort the key factors are the value of a human life, the value of infrastructure, and the value of a satellite. These parameters can and do vary globally from region to region. For the loss of satellites and infrastructure, we consider only replacement cost; not loss of revenue from interrupted services. Estimates of the value of a human life range from about $10K to $20M, based on such factors as age, income, dependents, and others [4,5]. However, for study we use $3–5M based on U.S. launch safety and insurance coverage for natural disasters [6]. The wide range of values for this category is noteworthy but is really part of a larger issue of risk perception and risk acceptance. 3. Risks considered The terrestrial hazardous events followed by the space events are now detailed. 3
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Table 2 Influenza pandemic risk assessments vary widely [15,16]. Title
Probability/Year
2009 Swine Flu Influenza Pandemic 1918 Spanish Flu Global Pneumonia and Influenza
3E-2 1E-2 2E-4 1E-4 1E-5 8E-3
Average
Consequence
Risk ($B/yr)
Lives Lost
$B US
150,000 to 620,000 6 to 85 million 85 to 427 million 100 to 130 million 300 to 400 million 98 to 210 million
5E2 2E4 1E6 4E5 1E6 3E5
to to to to to to
3E3 4E5 2E6 7E5 2E6 6E5
1E1 2E2 5E1 3E1 9E0 6E1
to to to to to to
9E1 3E2 4E2 6E1 2E1 2E2
Fig. 5. The GRC hazards scenarios span a large probability and consequence space; risk contours are provided to depict a means to create a global risk continuum. Table 3 The vast range of consequences from tsunamis leads us to focus on the average occurrence rate (i.e., two per year).
Range Average
Consequences (deaths)
Consequences (damage, $B US)
Consequences Total ($B US)
Probability/yr
Risk ($B/yr) (Probability x consequences)
131 to 300,000 1.5E5
4E-1 to 4E2 2E2
8E-1 to 2E9 8E2
2E-8 to 3E-2 1.5E-2
2E-9 to 6E1 1E1
LNT per kg of mass involved is 20–25 due to this encounter involving two rocket bodies. This LNT added to the 700–1000 km range produces a 95–166% increase in OD1. This is shown in Fig. 5 as OD1|OD3 (i.e., OD1 given OD3 occurs).
However, the consequence of an asteroid strike depends not only on the impact energy from the strike but also where on the Earth it occurs. For the NEO1 scenario, the consequence does not depend as much on the impact location due to massive destruction that it would create. However, the smaller NEO3 scenario has a very large range of potential consequences due to the variability of population density worldwide [10].
3.5. Near-Earth Objects (NEOs) The risks associated with Near Earth Objects (NEOs, e.g., asteroids and meteoroids) striking Earth have been known for some time, and we are increasing our knowledge more rapidly each year. Scientists are scouring the heavens to detect possible threats and to study means to divert incoming impacts by NEOs. There are a number of formulas and historical examples of asteroid impacts (i.e., Tunguska Event) that help to anchor and validate estimates of the probability and consequence of NEO impacts. In this study, three NEO scenarios are examined that create impact energies ranging from 101 to 108 megatons (Mt). The three sizes are selected to (1) span a large range of possibilities and (2) select sizes where variances are smaller between models. Table 4 summarizes data derived from previous risk analyses [3,9]. Table 5.
3.6. Space weather The most significant types of space weather that affect the Earth are variations in the solar wind and coronal mass ejections (CMEs) (i.e., high-speed streams of ions, typically traveling at millions of km/hr). CMEs are often, but not always, associated with solar flares. Solar flares present a danger of skin cancer, genetic mutation, and dangerous electrical discharges on satellites. A CME that strikes the Earth directly (“geoeffective”) disturbs the Earth’s magnetic field and creates a geomagnetic storm that can significantly disrupt critical infrastructure such as the electrical grid, pipeline controls, SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) industrial control units, and other electronics. Historically, only large geomagnetic storms, defined as severe or extreme by NOAA, have led to electrical grid damage. However, 4
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Table 4 NEO scenarios span a wide range of risk levels. Scenario
Impact Energy, Mt
Consequence, US$B (Damage, lives)
Impact Interval, yrs.
Annual Probability
Risk ($/yr) (Probability x Consequence)
NEO1 NEO2 NEO3
1E8 1E4 10
3.4E7 (2.1E14, 7.7E9) 2E3 (1.3E10, 5E5) 2.8E1 (1.8E8, 7E3)
9E7 6E4 1E3
~1E-8 ~1.7E-5 ~1E-3
~375M ~33M ~28M
Table 5 The space weather scenarios pose significant risk. Scenario
Storm Size
Consequences (Terrestrial, Space)
Annual Probability
Risk ($/yr) (Probability x Consequences)
SW1; Quebec Event SW2; Carrington Event
G5 >G5
$530–550 M; ($500 M; 20 deaths) ~$10T; ($10T; 20,000 deaths)
6–7% 0.3–0.8%
31M-39M 30B-80B
determining how geomagnetic storms will interact with and harm the electric grid is challenging because these extreme storms are fairly rare and there are numerous factors that influence electric grid effects. In the Quebec event (SW1) of March 1989, a geoeffective CME impacted the Earth and caused widespread damage to the electric grid across the Northeast United States and Eastern Canada. During the event, the Hydro-Quebec electric power grid collapsed less than two minutes after CME arrival due to voltage instabilities throughout the system. This caused tripping of protective equipment in the Northeast United States and three transformers to fail in Canada resulting in power outages throughout the Canadian province of Quebec for nine hours and affecting 6 million people. While the replacement cost of transformers and damages due to the loss of power is difficult to calculate, various estimates range up to $250 M in damages and equipment repair. Adjusted for inflation, this could result in damages of $500 M in 2019 dollars. An exact estimate of lives lost is an even more difficult exercise. Fatalities or injuries might occur due to failure of respirators, safety/warning lights, electrically-powered railway barriers, and industrial control systems. Dozens of deaths and injuries are possible across affected areas. Therefore, the consequence of a SW1 scenario (i.e., extreme solar storm or G5, similar to Quebec event) is estimated to be $500 M in damages and 20 fatalities. Historical records indicate a recurrence rate for a Quebec-level geomagnetic storm is 50 years, with a range of 35 to 70 years [13]. The timing between the Quebec event in March 1989 and the Halloween event in October 2003 suggests that such (SW1) events have an annual probability of 6–7% yielding a 50% probability of one occurring every 15 years. This probability is converted to an annual probability of 4.5% assuming that the risk is constant and independent from year to year. The Quebec event provides strong clues as to the effect that an even stronger solar event (e.g., Carrington event, SW2) might have. However, the consequence of an SW2 event may be worse due to several factors. First, the increasing complexity and segregation of the generation, transmission, and distribution functions of the electrical grid introduces seams where protective measures against geomagnetic storms effects could fail. Additionally, the growing interconnectedness of critical infrastructure systems and key services such as water supply, healthcare, financial services, and transportation systems could result in cascading failures across multiple lifeline systems. Finally, there is a slow shift occurring in the Earth’s magnetic field that naturally protects Earth against CMEs which could worsen terrestrial consequences in the future from space weather events [11]. The Carrington event of 1859 (SW2) was on the order of 100 times more powerful than the 1989 Quebec event. A recent study of extreme space weather events predicts that between 2015 and 2025 there is a 6–12% probability that a Carrington-level event will be geoeffective; yielding an annual probability of 0.3–0.8% [12,13]. A Lloyd’s of London report stated the reoccurrence rate to be every 150 years (ranging from 100 to 250 years), which yields a similar annual probability of occurrence [14].
The 2013 Lloyds of London study estimated consequences as high $2.6 trillion for restoring thousands of transformers. Adjusting for inflation and considering the losses to electrical grids, pipelines, the internet, airline, train and automotive accidents, and threats to atomic energy plants–involving perhaps 20,000 fatalities–an estimate of $10 trillion for a SW2 event is not unreasonable. 4. Global risk continuum Fig. 5 shows the evaluated hazards plotted by annual probability and consequence with risk contours added for clarity. This Global Risk Continuum provides a means to compare the risk from a diverse suite of terrestrial and space threats. Two of the three OD scenarios had the lowest risk while influenza pandemic poses the greatest risk, according to the GRC. Most of the hazards have some overlap within the $102 –109 /year risk band. 5. Summary and way forward The process of establishing ’estimates’ of risk is an iterative process that will evolve and improve over time. This paper is designed to describe a thought process and the beginnings of a methodology rather than a definitive global risk assessment. The challenges are large - there is a lack of standardization of worldwide statistics on the type of information that is compiled about different hazardous events - natural catastrophes, pandemics, and human-caused accidents and wars. Even the information that is compiled can be compromised by those seeking to limit their liabilities or suppress information about war fatalities, oppression of the rights of minorities or prisoners, etc. Two of the largest challenges are: (i) keeping risk levels up to date as inflation, urbanization, new technologies, and other developments can alter risk assessments; and (ii) understanding and quantifying both immediate consequences and collateral damages which may be incurred over a long period of time. This is especially true for many global risks that are not considered in this paper such as geopolitical conflicts, climate change, biological threats, and technological vulnerabilities [19]. It is suggested that in assessing the value of this article one not focus merely on the size or impact of the various types of hazards or losses used as examples in this paper, but rather to consider ways to improve the methodology and comparative risk assessment process that is the main thrust of this exercise. Declaration of Competing Interest The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.
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References
[10] “Comet and asteroid risk: an analysis of the 1908 tunguska event,” RMS Special Report, 2009, https://www.ws.k12.ny.us/Downloads/1908_tunguska_event.pdf. [11] Byrd, D., “How earth’s magnetic field is changing,” Earth, 16 May 2016, https://earthsky.org/earth/how-earths-magnetic-field-is-changing-swarm. [12] P. Riley, On the probability of occurrence of extreme weather events, Space Weather 10 (2) (Feb 2012), doi:10.1029/2011sw000734. [13] J. Love, Credible occurrence probabilities for extreme geophysical events: earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, magnetic storms, Geophys. Res. Lett. 39 (2012) L10301, doi:10.1029/2012gl051431. [14] Lloyd’s of London, “Solar storm risk to the north American electric grid,” 2013, Section 4, p. 8 file:///C:/Users/User/Downloads/Solar%20Storm%20Risk%20to% 20the%20North%20American%20Electric%20Grid%20(6).pdf [15] N. Madhav, et al., Pandemics: risks, impacts, and mitigation, in: D.T. Jamison, H. Gelband, S. Horton, et al. (Eds.), Disease Control Priorities: Improving Health and Reducing Poverty, The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, Washington (DC), 2017 Nov 27 https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK525302/. [16] V. Fan, D. Jamison, L. Summers, Pandemic risk: how large are the expected losses, Bull. World Health Organ. 96 (2018) 129–134. [17] NWS jetstream - Tsunami Frequently asked questions, https://www.weather. gov/jetstream/tsunami_faq. [18] https://www.thrillist.com/cars/nation/how-likely-you-are-to-die-in-a-car-accidentin-every-us-state-the-most-dangerous-roads-in-america. [19] “The global risks report 2019: 14th edition,” insight reports of the world economic forum, January 2019. http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Global_ Risks_Report_2019.pdf.
[1] D. McKnight, Debris remediation examined via an operational success framework, J. Space Saf. Eng. 3 (2) (September 2016), doi:10.1016/S2468-8967(16)30022-2. [2] J. Pelton, Creation of a comprehensive global space risk scale (SRS), J. Space Saf. Eng. 5 (1) (March 2018) 77–81, doi:10.1016/j.jsse.2017.11.005. [3] C. Chapman, D. Morrison, Impacts on the Earth by asteroids and comets: assessing the hazard, Nature 367 (6 January 1994), doi:10.1038/367033a0. [4] Biausque, V. “The value of statistical life: a meta-analysis.” The Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, 30 Jan. 2012, www.oecd.org/env/tools-evaluation/env-value-statistical-life.htm. [5] Kniesner, T. J.; Viscusi, W.K.; Woock, C.; and Ziliak, J. P., "The value of a statistical life: evidence from paneldata" (2011). Economics Faculty Scholarship. 125. https://surface.syr.edu/ecn/125 . [6] Correspondence with Chris Kunstadter, AXA Insurance. In consulting with the IUAI (a trade organization for aviation and space insurers and reinsurers), they allowed me to provide the figure of $3-5m per casualty to the FAA with the following caveats: US person died in commercial airline accident in the US. [7] Cougnet, C., “Background: reducing vulnerability of space systems (ReVUS),” Paris, France, October 2013. [8] D. McKnight, M. Matney, K. Walbert, S. Behrend, P. Casey, S. Speaks, Preliminary analysis of two years of the massive collision monitoring activity, in: Proceedings of the 68th International Astronautical Congress, Adelaide, Australia, September 2017. [9] D. McKnight, Assessing potential for cross-contaminating breakup events from LEO to GEO, in: Proceedings of the 68th International Astronautical Congress, Bremen, Germany, October 2018.
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Journal of Space Safety Engineering xxx (xxxx) xxx
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Journal of Space Safety Engineering journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jsse
The global risk continuum (GRC) Darren S. McKnight a,∗, John A. Macdonald b, Joseph Pelton c, Chris Kunstadter d, Peter Martinez e, Rohit Arora a, Janelle V. Jenniges f a
Centauri Corporation, United States University of South Carolina, United States c International Association for the Advancement of Space Safety, United States d AXA XL, United States e Secure World Foundation, United States f United States Air Force, United States b
a r t i c l e Keywords: Risk Space debris Asteroid strike Space weather
i n f o
a b s t r a c t Space-related hazards come from both natural and man-made sources; these hazards pose risks based on the likelihood of exposure and consequence of that exposure. The use of satellites in Earth orbit is now essential to the functioning of nation-states and commerce. The loss of these resources increases global risk as both the world population and global reliance on technology increase. Risks from natural cosmic threats from outside the confines of Earth include asteroids (i.e., Near Earth Objects, NEOs), solar flares, and coronal mass ejections (CMEs). Threats from Near-Earth Objects (NEOS) are becoming clearer as our ability to detect and characterize them improves. Space weather, driven largely by solar dynamics, and changes to the Earth’s magnetic field that could decrease the natural protective shielding of Earth against solar storms, likewise threaten our planet. At the same time, the risk to the world’s population from catastrophes originating from human activity, war, pandemics, geophysical phenomena, weather, and other Earth-based risks appear to be increasing. As the global population has increased from 800 million in 1800 to nearly eight billion in 2019, the number of people whose lives might be affected by these low probability and high consequence events has risen significantly. While it is difficult to precisely determine the effect of any of these risks individually, it can be instructive to create a common framework that allows comparison of a diverse set of hazards to evaluate risk awareness, mitigation, and remediation. These hazards span from high probability, moderate consequence events to low probability high consequence scenarios. The Global Risk Continuum (GRC) presents individual scenarios within these threat classes along a single risk scale. As a first step in this analysis, a GRC is created by independently determining the probability for each type of event, and the consequence of each as represented in an estimated economic impact. The risk is then determined by taking the product of these two terms. Assumptions and conversion factors needed to enable this common baseline and preliminary observations of the results are provided. This is a "work in progress" that will require significant cooperation and collaboration to refine over time into a useful tool for policymakers, scientists, and others. The process of establishing ’estimates’ of risk is an iterative process that will evolve and improve over time. This paper describes a thought process and the beginnings of a methodology rather than a complete tool for global risk assessment.
1. Background The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
∗
Corresponding author. E-mail address: [email protected] (D.S. McKnight).
Risk management relies on awareness, calculation, and mitigation of hazards. First, one may not be aware of a particular hazard. Second, the risk from this hazard may be difficult to calculate. Once calculated, the risk may not appear relevant. Finally, an individual may choose to accept the risk rather than actively try to reduce it through a risk management strategy. Fig. 1 presents a simplified risk management process. Fig. 2 depicts the risk management process in more detail [1]. The first phase (“Prepare”) sets the foundation by identifying, characterizing, and assessing the risk.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jsse.2020.01.002 Received 13 October 2019; Received in revised form 12 January 2020; Accepted 22 January 2020 Available online xxx 2468-8967/© 2020 International Association for the Advancement of Space Safety. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Please cite this article as: D.S. McKnight, J.A. Macdonald and J. Pelton et al., The global risk continuum (GRC), Journal of Space Safety Engineering, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jsse.2020.01.002
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Fig. 1. There are many steps where a risk management effort can be derailed.
Fig. 2. Risk management can be implemented before, during, and after exposure to a risk.
Previous attempts by others have helped to guide this process even further [3]. The current paper will build from all these initial efforts. and globally accepted GRC is a daunting task. 2. Technical approach This paper takes an iterative and incremental approach to the creation of the GRC. The scope is limited by the following four constraints (which will be addressed in future efforts): - We do not consider risk perception and acceptance. However, global and cross-domain cultural and organizational variations in risk communications will eventually have to be considered. - All consequences are normalized to U.S. dollars. This will require simplifications and conversion factors (e.g., how much is a human life worth) that will be enhanced in future GRC developments. - Only current risk levels are considered. Predicting future risk levels adds additional uncertainty into already difficult risk characterization calculations. - Risk is based on the immediate effects of an event as opposed to its long-term effects. For example, a war, a pandemic, or a massive coronal mass ejection may create long-term issues for public health and vital infrastructure whose total consequence will take many years to be realized. This paper only considers the immediate effects.
Fig. 3. The risk graphic proposed ranks space hazards on a scale from 1 to 10 based on the product of probability and consequence levels.
The risk management process ramps up in the “Plan” phase by consideration of dissuading, denying, and/or deterring the risk. If a hazard has been identified or a target is exposed to the hazard, then one may be able to manage the risk by “Acting During” the exposure via interdiction, suppression, and/or mitigation. Finally, one may “Act” after the exposure through remediation, recovery, or reconstitution. In this paper, the authors have examined the risk for a number of diverse space and terrestrial hazards with a focus on awareness in the “Prepare” phase (i.e., identify and characterize). This paper was motivated several years ago when one of the authors provided an outline for a proposed paper to the technical subcommittee of the International Association for the Advancement of Space Safety (IAASS) recognizing a need for examining space risks in a common format. The author drafted a template of a possible framework for consideration, shown in Fig. 3. Another author of this paper developed the concept more fully in a paper describing the Space Risk Scale (SRS) [2].
One fundamental aspect of the GRC is that the probability and consequence values will be calculated independently then multiplied together to quantify risk. People often think they are considering the highest risks when in reality they are only considering the events with the highest consequences. Similarly, some risk assessments focus on events based solely on probability, neglecting the consequences of the events. The authors acknowledge that both probability and consequence for the hazards being examined often have large uncertainties, but that uncertainty should not drive us to inaction. Rather, it should drive us to either reduce the uncertainties or manage the risks, rather than hoping the adverse event will not occur. 2
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3.1. Influenza pandemic
Do not consider risk perception and acceptance. Normalize consequences to US$. Probability will be calculated for one year. Determine probability and consequence independently. Select diverse scenarios: orbital debris, space hazards from the solar system, and terrestrial hazards.
Several publicly-stated probabilities and consequences for influenza pandemics are summarized in Table 2. These diverse estimates provide a wide range of potential outcomes and are plotted on Fig. 5 relative to the other hazards being examined (Table 3). 3.2. Tsunami On average, two damaging tsunamis occur each year throughout the world, however, about every 15 years a highly destructive, ocean-wide tsunami occurs. Earthquakes not associated with tsunamis have historically not been as destructive as ocean-wide tsunamis. As a result, only large-scale tsunamis are scrutinized. Recent events and analyses have been leveraged to complete the table below [17].
Fig. 4. Key aspects of the initial GRC development scope this activity so that it is manageable but not the final solution. Table 1 The initial GRC development examined several widely diverse hazardous events that range from easy to calculate low risk to difficult to determine high risk events. Terrestrial
Space
Influenza Pandemic Tsunami Traffic Fatality in US
Orbital Debris Near-Earth Objects Space Weather
3.3. Traffic fatality in US An easily-calculable hazard (due to the availability of actual occurrence data) is traffic accident deaths in the United States. This risk is included among other low probability, high consequence events for contrast and grounding. It also provides a reasonably simple explanation for the uncertainty addressed in our consideration of the major space and terrestrial events. It is reported that the probability of an American dying in a traffic accident annually is approximately 1.5E-4 (or ~1/6500). However, it is reported that the location with the lowest probability is Washington, DC (3.1E-5 or 1/32,322) and the location with the highest probability is Montana (2.2E-4 or 1/4433) [18]. The consequence of such an event is one life or $3–5 M, as reported earlier. The resulting risk uncertainty is depicted in Fig. 5.
The probability for each hazard is determined on an annual basis at the currently-recognized levels. The intent of using an annual probability is to keep the GRC focused on current risks and not become a brainstorming exercise that attempts to predict trends over decades or centuries. However, some of the annual probabilities are indeed taken as a subset of decadal or longer assessments. Just as with the consequence parameter, the probability is normalized for simplicity and consistency. This focus will hopefully help to motivate immediate risk management efforts. Avoiding long-term predictions or trends also help to minimize uncertainty. Fig. 4 summarizes the major design issues for the initial GRC development.
3.4. Orbital debris The probability that a typical operational satellite in low Earth orbit (LEO) will have its mission terminated due to an impact from orbital debris is roughly 1%/yr (i.e., OD1) [7]. The consequence of the loss of one satellite in LEO is estimated to be between $50k to $100 M. The OD1 risk is posed primarily by a population of 500,000–700,000 lethal nontrackable (LNT) debris objects in LEO. As a result, if two operational satellites collide at 700 km (i.e., OD2) or two large rocket bodies (e.g., Russian SL-16) collide at 850 km (i.e., OD3) the LNT produced is added to this existing population and the OD1 number will be recalculated for a subset of LEO orbits. It is considered unlikely that two operational satellites will collide in Earth orbit due to the number of safeguards in place such as selfawareness of positions and supporting space surveillance systems. The probability is conservatively estimated to be 10−8 /yr. In addition, the consequence will be relatively small due to the typically low mass of satellites in LEO. The mass of the satellites in LEO typically range from 1 kg to 1000 kg – we use 400 kg each for a total of 800 kg involved mass in the collision. From previous studies, the number of LNT produced from a hypervelocity collision in space with two payloads is typically about 25–30 per kg of mass involved [8]. As a result, this collision will have 20,000–24,000 LNT distributed across the 700–1000 km altitude range (i.e., likely debris dispersion from collision at 850 km). This addition produces about a 6–10% increase in the LNT population since 20,000–24,000 LNT were added to about 250,000–350,000 LNT likely in this altitude range out of the total 500,000–700,000 LNT. This is shown in Fig. 5 as OD1|OD2 (i.e., OD1 given OD2 occurs). The probability of two SL-16 s colliding at ~850 km has been welldocumented in research papers covering the Massive Collision Monitoring Activity (MCMA) [10]. The probability is estimated at 1/600 per year, and the direct consequences are the liberation of 332,000–415,000 LNT. This larger debris generation is due to the two SL-16 rocket bodies having a combined 16,600 kg of mass involved and the number of
2.1. Risks examined This paper examines a wide range of specific space and terrestrial hazards as depicted in Table 1. The terrestrial hazardous events that are easier to quantify will be covered first to provide a baseline for the risk methodology before scrutinizing the more dynamic and uncertain space hazards. 2.2. Consequence normalization Before examining each hazard, a discussion of consequence normalization is necessary. For the concept of GRC to materialize we must find some means to normalize consequence results; and we will examine other alternatives in future development efforts. However, for this first effort the key factors are the value of a human life, the value of infrastructure, and the value of a satellite. These parameters can and do vary globally from region to region. For the loss of satellites and infrastructure, we consider only replacement cost; not loss of revenue from interrupted services. Estimates of the value of a human life range from about $10K to $20M, based on such factors as age, income, dependents, and others [4,5]. However, for study we use $3–5M based on U.S. launch safety and insurance coverage for natural disasters [6]. The wide range of values for this category is noteworthy but is really part of a larger issue of risk perception and risk acceptance. 3. Risks considered The terrestrial hazardous events followed by the space events are now detailed. 3
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Table 2 Influenza pandemic risk assessments vary widely [15,16]. Title
Probability/Year
2009 Swine Flu Influenza Pandemic 1918 Spanish Flu Global Pneumonia and Influenza
3E-2 1E-2 2E-4 1E-4 1E-5 8E-3
Average
Consequence
Risk ($B/yr)
Lives Lost
$B US
150,000 to 620,000 6 to 85 million 85 to 427 million 100 to 130 million 300 to 400 million 98 to 210 million
5E2 2E4 1E6 4E5 1E6 3E5
to to to to to to
3E3 4E5 2E6 7E5 2E6 6E5
1E1 2E2 5E1 3E1 9E0 6E1
to to to to to to
9E1 3E2 4E2 6E1 2E1 2E2
Fig. 5. The GRC hazards scenarios span a large probability and consequence space; risk contours are provided to depict a means to create a global risk continuum. Table 3 The vast range of consequences from tsunamis leads us to focus on the average occurrence rate (i.e., two per year).
Range Average
Consequences (deaths)
Consequences (damage, $B US)
Consequences Total ($B US)
Probability/yr
Risk ($B/yr) (Probability x consequences)
131 to 300,000 1.5E5
4E-1 to 4E2 2E2
8E-1 to 2E9 8E2
2E-8 to 3E-2 1.5E-2
2E-9 to 6E1 1E1
LNT per kg of mass involved is 20–25 due to this encounter involving two rocket bodies. This LNT added to the 700–1000 km range produces a 95–166% increase in OD1. This is shown in Fig. 5 as OD1|OD3 (i.e., OD1 given OD3 occurs).
However, the consequence of an asteroid strike depends not only on the impact energy from the strike but also where on the Earth it occurs. For the NEO1 scenario, the consequence does not depend as much on the impact location due to massive destruction that it would create. However, the smaller NEO3 scenario has a very large range of potential consequences due to the variability of population density worldwide [10].
3.5. Near-Earth Objects (NEOs) The risks associated with Near Earth Objects (NEOs, e.g., asteroids and meteoroids) striking Earth have been known for some time, and we are increasing our knowledge more rapidly each year. Scientists are scouring the heavens to detect possible threats and to study means to divert incoming impacts by NEOs. There are a number of formulas and historical examples of asteroid impacts (i.e., Tunguska Event) that help to anchor and validate estimates of the probability and consequence of NEO impacts. In this study, three NEO scenarios are examined that create impact energies ranging from 101 to 108 megatons (Mt). The three sizes are selected to (1) span a large range of possibilities and (2) select sizes where variances are smaller between models. Table 4 summarizes data derived from previous risk analyses [3,9]. Table 5.
3.6. Space weather The most significant types of space weather that affect the Earth are variations in the solar wind and coronal mass ejections (CMEs) (i.e., high-speed streams of ions, typically traveling at millions of km/hr). CMEs are often, but not always, associated with solar flares. Solar flares present a danger of skin cancer, genetic mutation, and dangerous electrical discharges on satellites. A CME that strikes the Earth directly (“geoeffective”) disturbs the Earth’s magnetic field and creates a geomagnetic storm that can significantly disrupt critical infrastructure such as the electrical grid, pipeline controls, SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) industrial control units, and other electronics. Historically, only large geomagnetic storms, defined as severe or extreme by NOAA, have led to electrical grid damage. However, 4
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Table 4 NEO scenarios span a wide range of risk levels. Scenario
Impact Energy, Mt
Consequence, US$B (Damage, lives)
Impact Interval, yrs.
Annual Probability
Risk ($/yr) (Probability x Consequence)
NEO1 NEO2 NEO3
1E8 1E4 10
3.4E7 (2.1E14, 7.7E9) 2E3 (1.3E10, 5E5) 2.8E1 (1.8E8, 7E3)
9E7 6E4 1E3
~1E-8 ~1.7E-5 ~1E-3
~375M ~33M ~28M
Table 5 The space weather scenarios pose significant risk. Scenario
Storm Size
Consequences (Terrestrial, Space)
Annual Probability
Risk ($/yr) (Probability x Consequences)
SW1; Quebec Event SW2; Carrington Event
G5 >G5
$530–550 M; ($500 M; 20 deaths) ~$10T; ($10T; 20,000 deaths)
6–7% 0.3–0.8%
31M-39M 30B-80B
determining how geomagnetic storms will interact with and harm the electric grid is challenging because these extreme storms are fairly rare and there are numerous factors that influence electric grid effects. In the Quebec event (SW1) of March 1989, a geoeffective CME impacted the Earth and caused widespread damage to the electric grid across the Northeast United States and Eastern Canada. During the event, the Hydro-Quebec electric power grid collapsed less than two minutes after CME arrival due to voltage instabilities throughout the system. This caused tripping of protective equipment in the Northeast United States and three transformers to fail in Canada resulting in power outages throughout the Canadian province of Quebec for nine hours and affecting 6 million people. While the replacement cost of transformers and damages due to the loss of power is difficult to calculate, various estimates range up to $250 M in damages and equipment repair. Adjusted for inflation, this could result in damages of $500 M in 2019 dollars. An exact estimate of lives lost is an even more difficult exercise. Fatalities or injuries might occur due to failure of respirators, safety/warning lights, electrically-powered railway barriers, and industrial control systems. Dozens of deaths and injuries are possible across affected areas. Therefore, the consequence of a SW1 scenario (i.e., extreme solar storm or G5, similar to Quebec event) is estimated to be $500 M in damages and 20 fatalities. Historical records indicate a recurrence rate for a Quebec-level geomagnetic storm is 50 years, with a range of 35 to 70 years [13]. The timing between the Quebec event in March 1989 and the Halloween event in October 2003 suggests that such (SW1) events have an annual probability of 6–7% yielding a 50% probability of one occurring every 15 years. This probability is converted to an annual probability of 4.5% assuming that the risk is constant and independent from year to year. The Quebec event provides strong clues as to the effect that an even stronger solar event (e.g., Carrington event, SW2) might have. However, the consequence of an SW2 event may be worse due to several factors. First, the increasing complexity and segregation of the generation, transmission, and distribution functions of the electrical grid introduces seams where protective measures against geomagnetic storms effects could fail. Additionally, the growing interconnectedness of critical infrastructure systems and key services such as water supply, healthcare, financial services, and transportation systems could result in cascading failures across multiple lifeline systems. Finally, there is a slow shift occurring in the Earth’s magnetic field that naturally protects Earth against CMEs which could worsen terrestrial consequences in the future from space weather events [11]. The Carrington event of 1859 (SW2) was on the order of 100 times more powerful than the 1989 Quebec event. A recent study of extreme space weather events predicts that between 2015 and 2025 there is a 6–12% probability that a Carrington-level event will be geoeffective; yielding an annual probability of 0.3–0.8% [12,13]. A Lloyd’s of London report stated the reoccurrence rate to be every 150 years (ranging from 100 to 250 years), which yields a similar annual probability of occurrence [14].
The 2013 Lloyds of London study estimated consequences as high $2.6 trillion for restoring thousands of transformers. Adjusting for inflation and considering the losses to electrical grids, pipelines, the internet, airline, train and automotive accidents, and threats to atomic energy plants–involving perhaps 20,000 fatalities–an estimate of $10 trillion for a SW2 event is not unreasonable. 4. Global risk continuum Fig. 5 shows the evaluated hazards plotted by annual probability and consequence with risk contours added for clarity. This Global Risk Continuum provides a means to compare the risk from a diverse suite of terrestrial and space threats. Two of the three OD scenarios had the lowest risk while influenza pandemic poses the greatest risk, according to the GRC. Most of the hazards have some overlap within the $102 –109 /year risk band. 5. Summary and way forward The process of establishing ’estimates’ of risk is an iterative process that will evolve and improve over time. This paper is designed to describe a thought process and the beginnings of a methodology rather than a definitive global risk assessment. The challenges are large - there is a lack of standardization of worldwide statistics on the type of information that is compiled about different hazardous events - natural catastrophes, pandemics, and human-caused accidents and wars. Even the information that is compiled can be compromised by those seeking to limit their liabilities or suppress information about war fatalities, oppression of the rights of minorities or prisoners, etc. Two of the largest challenges are: (i) keeping risk levels up to date as inflation, urbanization, new technologies, and other developments can alter risk assessments; and (ii) understanding and quantifying both immediate consequences and collateral damages which may be incurred over a long period of time. This is especially true for many global risks that are not considered in this paper such as geopolitical conflicts, climate change, biological threats, and technological vulnerabilities [19]. It is suggested that in assessing the value of this article one not focus merely on the size or impact of the various types of hazards or losses used as examples in this paper, but rather to consider ways to improve the methodology and comparative risk assessment process that is the main thrust of this exercise. Declaration of Competing Interest The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.
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