The green revolution and poverty in India

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Geography,

The green revolution and poverty in India A case study of West Bengal Tony Beck Institute of Asian Research, University of British Columbia, 1871 West Mall, Vancouver; BC, Canada V6T I22

This article analyses the green revolution from the perspective of the development and use of irrigation facilities between 1986 and 1989 in one village in West Bengal, India. It reviews recent debates concerning the green revolution in India, focusing on questions of equity and relative benefits to different sections of the rural population. It then presents evidence from a plot-to-plot survey of land farmed by the study villagers over three consecutive winter seasons, showing the ways in which socioeconomic village structures are imprinted on the surrounding landscape. The benefits of new irrigation facilities have been mediated by already existing village power structures and have flowed in a disproportionate fashion to the richer villagers. The poor have gained some absolute benefits, mainly through extra employment, but these appear quite marginal when compared to the increased revenue flows to their richer neighbours. In particular, the poorest villagers, mainly living in female-headed households, have gained least from the green revolution. The article concludes that in addition to the development of irrigation infrastructure, state intervention is necessary to support the livelihoods of the very poor if levels of poverty are to be reduced.

Despite over 20 years’ study on the green revolution, there have been relatively few indepth field studies examining the inter-class dynamics and effects on the poor of recent agrarian change in South Asia. The majority of studies on the green revolution consider returns gained by different sections of the rural population from farming during one agricultural season. Because of this, Lipton (1989: 300) has written after a comprehensive literature review: ‘Our grasp of how village microstructures of power . . . affects MVs’ [modem varieties] impact on the poor is at present crude and undifferentiated’. This paper presents findings from a survey of agrarian change over three agricultural boro (winter) seasons in a West Bengal village. Its aim is to analyse village power and microstmctures at work, including an analysis of cropping patterns, absolute and relative gains to different sections of the rural population, and land sales, through the evaluation of an irrigation project. A broader aim is to consider the patterns of socioeconomic change occurring as a consequence of the green revolution. The paper first provides a contextual analysis of recent debates on the green revolution, after which it introduces the study areas and the method of the survey. Next, it presents fieldwork findings on socioeconomic change, including the views on the green revolution of a sample of respondents from 25 of the 161

The green revolution and poverty in India: T Beck

poorest village households. A concluding section questions the promotion of irrigation development in isolation from other development projects.

The green revolution, poverty and social change The high-yielding variety (HYV) package, including HYV cereal seeds, chemical fertilizers and pesticides, was introduced into selected agriculturally ‘progressive’ areas of India in the mid-1960s. Those viewing the green revolution as a negative phenomenon have focused on whether it has led to increased polarization between rural classes and therefore an increase in agrarian conflict. An opposing view has come from studies arguing that there have been positive benefits to all classes of rural households, with little or no increase in polarization. Academics from the left have argued that a central aim of the introduction of the HYV package was agrarian as well as agricultural engineering. The background to experimentation with the HYV package was a series of crop failures in India (Dasgupta, 1980), and a correlation was made between the introduction of the HYV package, fears of agrarian unrest and the need to contain communist expansion in Asia (Harriss, 1987). Oasa (1987), for example, argues that one of the aims of the International Rice Research Institute, which propagated newer agricultural technology, was to concentrate on small, resourcepoor farmers, to halt ‘proletarianization’ and increasing differentiation between poorer and richer farmers and possible agrarian tension that would result from this. Despite this reading of its original intentions, in its early years some commentators argued that the green revolution was in practice leading to greater social unrest, an increase in landlessness and a widening gap between rich and poor (Frankel, 1971; Dasgupta, 1980). An additional problem for the poor was perceived to be loss of work because of mechanization of agricultural operations. As more empirical work was published, these assertions were modified (see Byres, 1981; Howes, 1985; Bhaduri et al., 1986; Harriss, 1987). Critics now perceived a process of what Byres (1981: 432) called ‘partial proletarianization’ : some poor peasant households become landless labourer households through enforced sale of land to richer households, and others maintain a hold on land by mortgaging or renting out land to ‘rich’ peasant households, while at the same time expanding their off-farm income opportunities. Further, Harriss (1987: 241) suggests that this process has stemmed the potential for rural violence: ‘any potential antagonism between rich and poor peasants has been dampened because of the participation of poor peasants, too, in the “green revolution”‘. Some Marxists, however, have continued to argue that agricultural growth without corresponding redistribution of resources in rural India would continue to polarize village society (Rudra, 1992). Dayal and Gulati (1993), in a study of regional changes of what they term ‘food poverty’ in India, have also found that hunger increased most during the last decade in states that are relatively prosperous and surplus producers of food. In contrast, recent studies have taken earlier authors to task for their perceived failure to consider the long-term benefits to village society of agricultural growth; that is, both increased crop production and the up- and downstream benefits this brings. In a review of the whole of Asia, Rigg (1989) summarizes much of the thinking concerning the societal benefits received from the green revolution. First, while larger farmers adopted HYVs first in the 1970s smaller farmers caught up in the 1980s and there may now be an inverse relationship between intensity of adoption and size of landholdings (see also Bradnock, 1984; Jones, 1984; Lipton, 1989). Secondly, smaller farmers may achieve higher yields than their richer counterparts. Thirdly, sharecroppers are willing to adopt HYVs and purchase necessary inputs for them (for a contrary view see Jones, 1984). Fourthly, the mechanization of agricultural practices is largely due to factors other than the spread of HYVs. Rigg concludes: 162

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Many of the changes currently under way in rural areas-growing inequalities, rising landlessness, the breakdown of traditional society-are best understood as part of the wider process of agrarian change and agricultural commercialisation. The role of the Green Revolution has often been to ameliorate the negative consequences of these developments, not to promote them. (Rigg, 1989: 20) Hazel1 and Ramaswamy (1991) survey several studies from the 1980s arguing that the green revolution benefited the poor. Using data from one of the few long-term re-surveys in South Asia, from North Arcot, Tamil Nadu, between 1973 and 1983, they argue that the green revolution has effected a decrease in absolute poverty in the region through an even distribution of benefits. They report that there was no general concentration of land in their study area and that ‘there were sizable absolute gains for all household groups, and . . absolute poverty declined. The relative distribution of household incomes improved in that the small paddy farmers and landless workers gained relative to other groups’ (Hazel1 and Ramaswamy, 1991: 242). They also stress the importance of increases in non-farm linkages, building on an earlier argument by Mellor (1976). In another ten-year re-survey, of three villages in Burdwan District, West Bengal, Webster (1989) also found no increase in polarization between different categories of landowners from 1977-8 to 1987-8. Webster connects this to the Left Front government’s policies of avoiding structural change. Singh (1990), in an extensive review of literature from the 1970s from India, Bangladesh and Pakistan, broadly agrees with Hazel1 and Ramaswamy’s conclusions, stressing the benefits of the green revolution to small farmers. His definition of a ‘small farmer’ as a household owning 1.1-4.9 acres of land is, however, problematic, as in some parts of India a household within this category is not a ‘small’ landowner. He also points to benefits received from non-farm employment, and stresses in particular the gains to the landless from lower food prices caused by greater production. However, Singh does qualify his conclusions concerning relative benefits: ‘Small farmers may have gained relatively less and the landless have probably gained the least from the HYV technologies, but all rural households have gained absolutely and in real terms’ (Singh, 1990: 197). Similarly, Hossain (1989) reports from two large-scale studies in Bangladesh, covering in total 133 villages, that gains to the poor in agriculturally ‘advanced’ villages have been substantially greater than in ‘backward’ villages. Again from Bangladesh, Palmer-Jones (1993) questions studies that claim that real wage rates have been declining since the introduction of the green revolution, concluding that the processes of commercialization in agriculture cannot be seen to be leading to absolute impoverishment of the poor. The present study questions these more positive accounts of the effects of the green revolution on the poor. Part of the problem with most of these accounts is their exclusively economic emphasis, their assumption that broad conclusions about social process can be drawn through statistical or economic analysis rather than analysis of how classes or groups in villages interact. A further problem relates to the inability of authors on agrarian change to consider the perspective of those undergoing social change. A useful analogy here is the ‘standard-of-living debate’ in nineteenth-century Britain. Economists have claimed that the living standards of the British poor improved in the early part of the nineteenth century because workers received steady increases in wages. It was only later insights by Marxist historians such as Thompson (1963) and Hobsbawm (1964) that showed that while wages may have increased, levels of exploitation and the quality of life for the poor certainly did not. Rather than assuming that the ‘average’ agricultural labourer in India is better off after technological change because he or she receives one or two more rupees a day in wages, students of agrarian change need to understand the dynamics of rural societies and take a more holistic view of what an improvement in the Applied Geography I995 Volume 15 Number 2

ih3

The green revolution and poverty in India: T Beck

quality of life of a poor household means. It is this issue, the question of the dynamics of rural society, that this article will address, after analysing the differential benefits gained from the green revolution in the study village.

The study region and village The 1980-l Agricultural Census on land operation in West Bengal shows that some 70 per cent of rural households operated 30 per cent of land in the state, in holdings of less than 1 ha, while 30 per cent of land was farmed by 20 per cent of households operating l-2 ha and about 4 per cent of households operated more than 10 ha, covering 0.02 per cent of the area of the state (Lieten, 1990). In addition, some 35 per cent of West Bengal households are effectively landless (Dasgupta, 1984). Supporting evidence from a number of micro-level studies (Beck, 1991) suggests that the agrarian structure in West Bengal displays a concentration of land and power in the hands of an elite of ‘middle’ farming households (operating l-2 ha on average) who own small amounts of land relative to the all-India situation, but produce an agricultural surplus from their holdings. These middle farmers exist alongside a much larger group of ‘marginal’ farming households, owning less than about half an acre of land, and poor and largely landless households whose primary source of income is manual labour. There is some consensus that political expediency has meant that government development programmes have not been carried out in a manner that would antagonize the rural elite on whom the ruling Communist Party, in power since 1977, would appear to depend for their continued success (Kohli, 1987; Mallick, 1992; Harriss, 1993). The development of groundwater resources, including shallow tube wells, has been and continues to be a priority for the government (Government of West Bengal, 1986). This emphasis has led to a rapid increase in the number of shallow tube wells, from 78 000 in 1976-7 to some 340 000 in 1988 (Government of West Bengal, 1986; Palmer-Jones, 1989). In turn, this has led to increased paddy production during the bore season, estimated to have grown from some 8 per cent to 25 per cent of total state food grain production between 1977 and 1988 (Palmer-Jones, 1989). Fonogram (the village and villagers’ names are pseudonyms) is a Muslim village of about 140 households lying in a rich alluvial tract in north 24 Parganas District (see Figure I). The primary sources of income are the main crops of monsoon and winter paddy, vegetables and jute, an agricultural pattern representative of the area. Other employment comes from labouring on lorries, petty trading and occupations such as shop-keeping or working as maidservants. Fonogram was selected for two main reasons. First, winter-season irrigation was introduced there in 1985, enabling a study of the green revolution. Secondly, the author’s repeated visits to the area since 198 1 meant that it would be possible to access information on social change there relatively easily. However, before proceeding with the research care was taken to ensure that Fonogram was not unrepresentative of at least north 24 Parganas District. Extensive travel revealed that similar changes were also occurring elsewhere in the district. Also, according to National Sample Survey (NSS) data, Fonogram’s land operation patterns are roughly representative of the all-West Bengal figures (see Table I). The major differences in the NSS and Fonogram patterns come partly from the time difference between the sets of figures. In particular, in West Bengal as a whole the number of smallholdings and the amount of land in the hands of smallholders operating 0.1-2.5 acres has increased since 1970 (Harriss, 1993). In addition, census figures showed that employment and socioeconomic features in Fonogram were sufficiently close to the West Bengal situation (see Beck, 1991; Boyce, 1987) for Fonogram to be considered not atypical. 164

Applied Geography 1995 Volume 15 Number 2

The green revolution and poverty in India: T Beck

Boundaries m-s-.

National

---

State

-----

District km

1

Figure

1

Location of the study area

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The green revolution and paver@ in India: T Beck

Table 1 Land operation in Fonogram village (1988-9) and West Bengal National Sample Survey (NSS, 1970-l)

Percentage of holdings

Percentage of land operated

Size (acres)

Fonogram

NSS

0

43

30.9

_

_

0.1-1.0 1.0-2.5 2.5-5.0 5.0-10.0 > 10

29 18 6 4

19.8 22.4 15.8 9.0 2.1

17.5 34.0 21.4 27.1 _

4.3 20.5 29.0 31.0 15.2

Fonogram

NSS

Source for NSS figures: Ghose (1983)

Purduh (seclusion of women) operated, and village women did not work in any farming operations. The only women working outside their households were the poor, who worked in local factories, thus ensuring that purduh regulations were not disturbed within the village. Class and patriarchy combined in such a way that it was the poorest women who received the least benefit from the green revolution.

Methodology Fieldwork was carried out over a total of 15 months during four research visits in the winter seasons between 1985 and 1989 and two short follow-up visits in 1991 and 1992. Interviews were carried out in Bengali. A plot-to-plot survey of the approximately 620 village plots farmed by village households was carried out over three boro crop seasons between 1986-7 and 1988-9, using mouza (land revenue) maps, available from the local Land Revenue Office. Information gathered in the field was cross-checked with records of plot ownership in the local Land Revenue Office as well as many of the farming households and the local land surveyor. Land Revenue records gave land size and type, which were in turn cross-checked with local farmers. Details on land ownership and operation can therefore be considered to display a high degree of accuracy. Information concerning the irrigation facilities in Fonogram comes from interviews with Fonogram villagers responsible for their introduction, and with the director of the Rural Development Consortium (RDC), a body that coordinates and channels support to about 250 voluntary projects in West Bengal, and through which Fonogram villagers applied for funding. Background information was found in the files at RDC and correspondence with the Stuttgart office of Bread for the World, an aid agency that funded the Fonogram facilities indirectly through RDC (for further details, see Beck, 1991). Total income of each village household from land, employment, trading and credit or interest on debt was calculated, following Scott’s (1985) methodology. After ranking households by income they were divided into four income groups, on the basis of breaks in the data, land ownership and occupation: 166

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The green revolution and poverty in India: T Beck Table 2 Fonogram Income

village

income groups No of households

group

51 40 31 19

Income

(36) (28) (22) (14)

(25) (28) (29)

Land operated (decimals)

(7) 45 (15) 132 (33) 291 (45)

Note: Percentages are given in parentheses

Group Group Group Group

1: 2: 3: 4:

< 900 rupees per consumption 901-1400 rupees 1401-2000 rupees > 2000 rupees

unit per year

These income categories were found to be sufficiently accurate to portray economic divisions within the village. In addition, each group also roughly corresponded to a Marxian category (group 1, landless labourer; group 2, marginal peasant; group 3, small peasant; group 4, middle peasant, or middle farmer). Details of income and land distribution for these four income groups are provided in Table 2. This shows that resource control in Fonogram mirrors the West Bengal situation, with a small village elite controlling most resources and existing alongside a majority of villagers, in income groups 1 and 2, who control marginal resources. Income group 3 can be considered as small-to-middle farmers owning adequate resources to provide a small surplus for their households. The effects of the green revolution discussed below need to be understood in this context of existing inequality in the village.

The green revolution in Fonogram The introduction of irrigation facilities and subsequent agricultural development in Fonogram needs to be seen in the context of a larger rural industrialization that was affecting the whole of north 24 Parganas. Urban linkages increased throughout the 1980s. Two of the richest Fonogram villagers bought lorries, mainly to transport earth and bricks for building. The presence of shallow tube wells also meant that mechanical hand tractors were used in selected local areas for the first time in 1986. Local shops also grew larger and more numerous in response to new opportunities, selling, for example, chemical fertilizers; and a new market grew up around the maintenance and repair of shallow tube wells. Several people were involved in the introduction of irrigation facilities into Fonogram. The first was Romesh Ali, whose household had the second-highest income in the village, operated the most land, and had bought in the mid-1980s about 2 ha of land. In the mid1970s Romesh had set up a committee called the Udayan Samaj Kalyan Samity (literally ‘the committee for the uplift of society’, and henceforth termed the sum@), a voluntary organization nominally formed by villagers from Fonogram and other local villages but in practice mainly run by Romesh and the heads of three middle-farmer households in income group 4. Its aim was, to quote from an RDC project application, to ‘build up a selfreliant community in which the economically and socially depressed people are capable of taking their place as equal partners of the society’. The samity treasurer lived near Fonogram, and also worked for the RDC. The RDC’s involvement with the samity appeared to be limited to funding and evaluation. Some small Applied Geography 1995 Volume I5 Number 2

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The green revolution and poverty in India: T Beck

initial RDC funding led to a larger scheme for the introduction of irrigation facilities, first suggested by the RDC to Bread for the World at the end of 1980. The main object of this was, to quote the pilot project plan sent by RDC to Bread for the World: . .to assist the landless agricultural and other landless labourer families by increasing employment opportunities and creating avenues for subsidiary income and also to extend irrigation facilities to the weaker section cultivating families to step up agricultural production by adoption of improved cultural practices and introduction of multiple cropping pattern. Following the funding of the project proposal, 14 shallow tube wells were installed in the Fonogram locality throughout 1985 (Figure 2), at a cost of 196000 rupees. Half of this money came from a district Rural Development Agency subsidy, through the Department of Rural Development of the Government of West Bengal. The remainder came from a bank loan, which had to be repaid over seven years at 10 per cent interest from the sale of water to farmers, and which was secured by funding of 50000 rupees from Bread for the World. RDC’s project proposal and subsequent report included an analysis of the socioeconomic status of Fonogram and surrounding villages. It targeted ‘landless working [sic], marginal and small farmer families’ as beneficiaries of the project, estimating that the latter two groups owned 70 per cent of cultivable land in the area. A ‘small farmer’ family was said to own 2.5-5 acres of land, and was contrasted with affluent families owning over 5 acres. In Fonogram, however, it is middle farmers who owned more than 2.5 acres, with small farmers in income group 3 owning on average some 1.3 acres (Table 2). As suggested above, the rhetoric around benefits from the green revolution accruing to ‘small farmers’ may be misleading, and the analysis below will show that using gross categories such as ‘2.5-5’ acres to describe a small farmer can be counter-productive in the West Bengal context, even though this category is used in the census. This is because about 90 per cent of farming households in West Bengal operate less than 5 acres of land (Lieten, 1990), and also because land quality, and therefore yields, varies throughout the state. In an appraisal at the end of 1986, an RDC report stated: ‘this project created a good impact among the target group of population. . .thereby extending avenues for landless labour families’. These assertions are considered below. In addition, the project documents ignored gender issues; this had implications for the way in which poor women viewed the project, which is also discussed below.

Cultivated land in the Fonogram area Fonogram village, the land operated by Fonogram households and its surroundings, is shown in Figure 2. In 1988-9 Fonogram villagers operated some 50ha of land, owning 490 separate plots on about 39 ha of land, and operating another 130 plots on 11 ha. On average, each land-operating household cultivated 7.5 plots and 150 decimals of land, and plots were some 21 decimals in size (100 decimals = 1 acre). These plots were not only very small, but were also scattered throughout the mouzu. This was partly related to Muslim inheritance laws, which direct that each plot be divided between heirs, but it also ensures a mix of land qualities and heights. This increases the possibility of growing a mix of crops and insures against natural disaster that might affect only some parts of a mouzu. The minifundist nature of land operation and the extent of fragmentation of holdings is visually apparent in Figure 2. Land height in particular determined farmers’ crop choice as it was more variable than soil type. Although the farming land around Fonogram appeared flat and monotonous, the 168

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The green revolution and poverty in India: T Beck

.....* m;uza boundary u&

Figure 2

=

private tube well

l

shallow tube well

Fonogram

village and its environs

The green revolution and poverty in India: T Beck

local farmers were well aware of how to take advantage of the complex mix of land heights and soils. To the south of the graveyard the height of the land was a protection against flooding during the monsoon, when land here generally flooded to the depth of 1 hat (a ‘hand’ or 45 cm). To the north of the graveyard, land was lower and flooding was deeper, up to the kurmo (the hip or 90 cm) and occasionally the buk (the chest or 120 cm). Retention of soil moisture due to greater flooding meant that boro farming was superior on the lower land.

Cropping patterns and adoption rates in the bore seasons, 1986-7 to 1988-9 The data for 1988-9 will be taken as representative of the three-year period of the study, as by 1986-7 a general cropping and tenancy pattern had developed that was similar in the following two years (Beck, 1991). Prior to the introduction of the samity’s shallow tube wells in 1985, village land had been irrigated by private pump sets run on diesel, and from ponds or tanks. These were owned almost exclusively by larger land-operators in income groups 3 and 4. A reconstruction made with farmers of cropping patterns for the period prior to the 1985-6 boro season showed that the crops grown were vegetables, mustard oil and wheat. After the introduction of the shallow tube wells, farmers tended to substitute paddy for the former crops during boro, experimenting with the new HYVs and looking for higher profits. Under the samity regulations, the shallow tube wells irrigated only paddy. In addition, the samity restricted the supply of water from each well to an area of 17 bighas (3 bighas = 1 acre), only 46 per cent of their capacity of about 5 ha, to stop disputes between farmers about theft of water. Such limitation is common throughout West Bengal (Boyce, 1987). Paddy was being grown on the lower-lying land around the wells, rather than on the peripheral higher land. The exception was the well to the south of the village boundary. The only rationale for this seemed to be that land in its immediate vicinity was owned by two of the wealthiest Fonogram farmers, who were also sum@ members. Elsewhere, households continued the previous pattern of growing a mix of vegetables with a scattering of wheat and fallow plots, while a small number of plots were also planted to different types of trees or bamboo. Land under paddy according to income groups in 1988-9 is shown in Figure 3. This displays the comparative advantage of the wealthier income groups in terms of growing paddy, and shows how the power structure within the village was firmly imprinted on the surrounding landscape. Figure 4 shows land under paddy rented by Fonogram households as well as land owned by absentee landlords. Details shown in Figure 3, as well as information on other crops grown according to income group, can be found in numerical form in Table 3. Taking into account both land owned and rented, percentages under paddy for the 1988-89 season were: Income Income Income Income

group group group group

1: 2: 3: 4:

55 47 42 40

per per per per

cent cent cent cent

Adoption of HYVs was not therefore restricted to richer households. It was the two lowerincome groups that had planted more of their land to paddy. This is consistent with much other evidence from South Asia (Lipton, 1989). 170

Applied Geography 1995 Volume 15 Number 2

The green revolution and poverty in India: T Beck

0

l

shallow

income

Figure 3

Ownership

tube

well

groups

of land under paddy by income group in Fonogram,

1988-9 boro season

The green revolution and poverty in India: T Beck

0

,

,

,

200m

I,

II

Figure 4 Land under paddy rented by Fonogram households, 1988-9 born season

172

and owned by absentee lan dlords,

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The green revolution and poverty in India: T Beck

boro season 1988-9

Table 3 Crops planted on owned land by income group, Fonogram, Land owned by crop (decimals) Income group

Paddy

Wheat

1 2 3 4

151 449 1141 1906

(37) (47) (38) (38)

_

Total

3647 (38)

Note: Percentages

Vegetables

Garden

Fallow

Total

8 (-) 111 (2)

189 325 1702 2384

34 68 136 139

34 115 241 433

408 957 3228 4973

119 (1)

4600 (48)

(47) (34) (52) (48)

(8) (7) (4) (3)

377 (4)

(8) (12) (7) (9)

823 (9)

9566

are given in parentheses

Who gained most from the green revolution? By the 1988-9 boro season, some 40 per cent of all land operated by Fonogram households was under paddy. Although poorer households planted a larger proportion of their land to paddy, the middle farmers dominated paddy cultivation. Larger landoperators owned plots scattered in a fashion similar to other villagers, and the larger the land-operator the larger the number of plots owned. If wealthier households scatter their landholdings, they tend to receive a disproportionate benefit from irrigation facilities wherever they are positioned (Chambers et al., 1989). Their domination in Fonogram can be seen from the fact that between them the two richer income groups operated 74 per cent of the 20 ha of land under paddy (operated land referring here to land both owned and rented). To gain a clear picture of overall benefits from the green revolution analysts should therefore consider not only proportions of landholdings under paddy but also the proportion of total land under paddy operated by different village groups or classes. To extend this analysis, factor shares (or shares of income to different income groups) from land under paddy are given in Table 4. This takes into account both profits from cultivation (the profit from land under paddy operated by each income group divided by the total number of households in the group) and extra income from employment. It shows that income groups 3 and 4 retained the relative advantage that control over 78 per cent of land allowed them: between them they gained 82 per cent of the total income from the boro paddy crop, with the 19 households in group 4 gaining 57 per cent of this income. The fact that even income-group- 1 households received more benefit from cultivation than Table 4 Average (rupees)

returns

to Fonogram

income

group households

from the 1988-9

boro paddy crop

group

Land owned”

Land operatedb

EmploymentC

Total (%)

1 2 3 4

73 276 906 2468

81 127 219 205

132 125 62 10

286 (6) 528 (12) 1187 (25) 2683 (57)

Income

a Estimating 812 rupees per bigha profit. b Estimating 406 rupees per bigho profit. ’ Estimating 192 rupees per hired labourer (16 days extra work at 12 rupees a day), adjusted for numbers of labourers per household. 12 rupees was the sum earned for working from 6am to noon. If the labourer worked until 3 pm, he earned a further 3 rupees Applied Geography 1995 Volume I.5 Number 2

173

The green revolution and poverty in India: T Beck

labour shows both the profitability of the HYV crop and the low relative returns to labour. An income-group-4 household on average gained over nine times more income from the crop than a group-l household. This is not to suggest that 286 rupees is a small amount of extra income for a poor household, but that their richer neighbours were making much larger gains. Absentee

landlordism

A further group gaining significantly from the irrigation project was the wealthy absentee landlords. Fonogram households rented some 10 ha of land from absentee landlords (90 per cent of all land rented by villagers). In 1989, 59 per cent of this land was under paddy. In addition, absentee landlords owned 6 ha within the command area of the samity’s shallow tube wells, which was being farmed under paddy in the 1988-9 season by labourers, sharecroppers and cultivators from villages other than Fonogram (Figure 4). Absentee landlords therefore benefited significantly from the introduction of the shallow tube wells, with a total of 12 ha under paddy in the 1988-9 season, equivalent to a quarter of the total Fonogram holding. This phenomenon will be discussed briefly, as little systematic attention has been given to absentee landlordism in West Bengal. Almost all of these landlords were Hindus renting out land to Muslims, continuing an exploitative pattern that dates back at least to the 1830s. About 60 per cent of the land rented out to Fonogram households belonged to four families. The largest landholding (3.5 ha) belonged to four brothers living locally, who came from one of the wealthiest and most powerful families in the area. Two also owned local factories in which Fonogram villagers, particularly women from the poorest households, worked at exploitative rates of pay. The oldest brother also ran a business in Calcutta, involving among other things the export of shrimps. The brother of one of the members of the samity, a competent and hardworking farmer from an income-group-4 household, was, according to one Fonogram villager, ‘in and out of this landlord’s house’. The three other families owned about 2 ha each and were either local traders or businessmen or in professional jobs. It is clear that any rural development initiative in West Bengal or neighbouring Bangladesh needs to consider that a relatively large percentage of land in the command areas of irrigation facilities may be owned by town dwellers or local rich absentee landholders, and that the benefits of such initiatives might ‘trickle-up’ to the non-poor. Land sales Proponents of the theory that differentiation will increase because of the green revolution have stressed that the sale or mortgaging of land from poor to rich might be one effect of agrarian change (see, for example, BARD, 1976; Dasgupta, 1980; Howes, 1985). Mortgaging was insignificant in Fonogram, but land sales were not; details of sales to and by Fonogram households between 1986-7 and 1988-9 are given in Table 5. In total, 83 per cent of sales went to a higher income group, and there was a clear movement of land towards income-group-4 households, who bought 70 per cent of all land sold. Details of land transactions between Fonogram households and villagers from neighbouring villages are given in Table 6. This shows that a further 5 11 decimals changed hands between Fonogram households and outsiders, with income-group-4 households buying in 71 per cent and group-2 households selling 73 per cent of this land. Incomegroup-4 households therefore gained 57 per cent of total land bought from within and outside the village. The total transfer of land to this group was 371 decimals, or 7 per cent of land owned by this group in 1988-9. Of all land bought by this group, 56 per cent was bought by three households. One of these was in the samity, and of the other two, one had a nephew in the samity and the other had benefited significantly from the introduction of the shallow tube wells. Income group 2, the group with a substantial amount of land at risk 174

Applied Geography 1995 Volume 15 Number 2

The green revolution and poverty in India: T Beck Table 5 Land exchanges

between Fonogram

income groups, 1986-7 to 1988-9 (decimals)

Sellers’ income

Buyers’ income group

group

1

2

3

I

2 3 4

4

Total

4

35 35

4

Total

21 _ 5 5

63 85 33

27 67 125 38

37

181

257

(group 1 owning only a very small amount of land), made a net loss of 129 decimals. This amounts to some 18 per cent of land held by this group in 1988-9. This is particularly serious, given the importance of land as an asset and the hardships suffered by poor households to retain land. Each land sale by poorer households probably involved several months of cuts in consumption prior to the sale, the disappearance of an inherited and vital resource to a wealthier neighbour or relative, and decline towards landlessness. Should land sales in Fonogram be categorized as exploitative? Of land bought by group-4 households, 30 per cent was from wealthy absentee landlords; that is, the transactions were between the local rich. About haif the land transactions were between close relatives (siblings, aunts, uncles, nieces, nephews or first cousins); one reason for this may be that in times of hardship, when poorer households sell land, a relative may give a better, if still below market, price than a non-relative. Consecutive poor aman (monsoon) crops during the fieldwork period increased pressure on poorer households to sell assets, and some of this pressure came from wealthier relatives within the village. Intra-family land sales in Bangladesh are also discussed, as a negative phenomenon, by Jansen (1986) Howes (1985) and Cain (1981). Land scarcity regulated the market, and land sales in Fonogram must be considered in this context. Wealthier households were taking the opportunity to buy land, but were not paying lower than market prices for it. At the same time, land prices were increasing markedly in the area; land located near a road or a shallow tube well had tripled in value between 1979 and 1989. This rise in prices meant that it was unlikely that poorer households would be able to remain in the land market except as sellers, but also that they would receive very high prices for their land. Features of the West Bengal or Bangladeshi agrarian economy such as land sales and absentee landlordism appear to have been poorly covered in previous rural surveys, and

Table 6 Land sales between Fonogram income groups and non-Fonogram households, 1986-7 to 1988-9 (decimals) Income group

Applied Geography

Land bought

Land sold 6 106 _

1

_

2 3

9 96

4

261

33

Total

366

145

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The green revolution and poverty in India: T Beck

until they are investigated more carefully, especially their effect on socioeconomic structures and the rural poor, it is difficult to draw any general conclusion concerning the effects of the green revolution in the region. Benefits to the landless The literature on the green revolution has not focused sufficiently on its effect on agricultural labourers or the non-agricultural poor. This section therefore discusses the benefits that accrued to the 25 poorest households in Fonogram, which were effectively landless, gaining their income through manual labour. Seven were headed by women, which points to the powerful nexus of class and patriarchal structures in ensuring the continuation of female poverty. Fourteen of the sample households with agricultural labourers as the main income earner were asked how many extra days of hired employment they received from the HYV crop. The reply was standard-15-20 extra days, the return to a household with one labourer member thus being 225-300 rupees per bigha farmed (at 15 rupees for a day’s work). A calculation of total extra labour supplied for the new paddy crop divided by the number of agricultural labourers in the village showed that the labourers’ replies were accurate. Their estimates are also in keeping with other findings, which show that HYV farming increases employment (see Beck, 1991). Agricultural labourers might also have benefited from higher wage rates. However, using the price of rice in 24 Parganas District as a deflator (taken from Kynch, 1990), it appeared that there had been little increase in the real wage rates of labourers in the 198Os, despite the introduction of the shallow tube wells. Lipton (1989: 186) has also commented that ‘MVs seldom raise real wage-rates’, although there is some conflicting evidence concerning this (Beck, 1991). Wages in the Fonogram area during the bore season, at 15 rupees for a full day’s work in 1988-9, were high compared to other parts of West Bengal. For example, wage rates for men in Midnapore and Birbhum District villages in 1989 were about 25 per cent lower than the Fonogram figure (and even lower for women). The higher level in Fonogram was probably partly caused by the prevalence of cash cropping in north 24 Parganas in the bore season for many decades before the introduction of the shallow tube wells, which meant a higher demand for labour in this season. Labourers in Fonogram also gained little from extra employment outside the village, as they tended not to work as agricultural labourers on the land of other villages, or from extra employment on non-irrigated land, since the introduction of the shallow tube wells did little to raise the cropping index. As noted above, following Mellor (1976) various commentators on the green revolution have highlighted the importance to the poor of non-farm employment created by agricultural technology. Some non-agricultural employment was created by the rural industrialization taking place in the Fonogram locality, of which the introduction of the shallow tube wells was one part. This employment was mainly the extremely hard work of labouring on lorries, which required fully fit and strong men, and employed eight male labourers at a rate of pay of 20-25 rupees a day. Although Romesh Ali owned two lorries (bought after the introduction of the shallow tube wells), and one lorry was owned by another member of the samity, they preferred to hire labourers from outside Fonogram as a way of avoiding intra-village conflict; thus income gains from labouring on lorries were accrued mostly outside the village. There was little other evidence in Fonogram of ‘trickle-down’ to the poor. One group- 1 household member had a job in a bakery, several of which had opened to supply bread to factories locally. More grocery and tea-shops were opening, and a boy from another group-l household had a job in one of the latter. There were, therefore, a few gains, which were certainly significant for individual households. However, employment had been 176

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found in local factories before the introduction of the agricultural technology, and both pre- and post-1985 could only be found at exploitative wage rates and in unpleasant and sometimes dangerous working conditions. When considering non-farm gains from the green revolution, co~entators also therefore need to consider what kinds of jobs are being created and the conditions under which people work in them. Perceptions of the poorest on the green revolution The views of the very poor are often not canvassed during rural surveys, and for this reason detailed interviews concerning the living conditions, priorities and perceptions of the 25 poorest villagers in Fonogram (including 14 female respondents) were carried out. When asked what they had gained from the green revolution, these respondents said that they received a little more work, although one thought that farmers were generally using their own labour to farm the bore paddy crop. A female respondent thought that ‘people who are farming paddy might be happy with it. Those who are farming it are going to get richer whereas the poor can’t farm’. Another woman said with sarcasm: ‘There may have been some benefits from the new farming, but I haven’t seen any,’ Neither was there much evidence of ‘trickle-down’ to this poorest group from their richer neighbours. None of the 25 poorest households reported receipt of zukat (postharvest donations of grain), which usually takes place from the rich to the poor in Islamic societies (Scott, 1985). They said that such donations may have taken place in the past, but now no one ever heard of them. The poorest households were not even able to glean after the bore crop, which would have provided them with an important source of subsistence after the monsoon paddy was harvested. According to respondents, the HYV paddy husks did not fall as easily as those grown during the amn season, leaving little left for them to pick up. In addition, postharvest processing work was not passed on to poorer households but was carried out mainly by the household growing the crop. As one woman put it: ‘There is no more work after the harvest in terms of processing. People will sell paddy in the market and buy rice rather than give work to the poor.’ Another woman expressed this anti-rich feeling more vividly: ‘If we asked for rice-processing work the rich would say, ‘Go away and die!“they wouldn’t give us any paddy to process.’ Apart from watching their neighbours get richer, the green revolution passed the poorest by. As one woman, a factory worker, stated: ‘I don’t know anything about farming-I go out to work in the factory at seven in the morning and come back at eight at night.’ The poorest people agreed almost unanimously that the rich were getting richer and the poor poorer, and that they were not the villagers receiving benefits from the new irrigation facilities. Social change and the green revolution This analysis has shown that the RDC’s objectives were not met. The project failed to deliver major benefits to the poor, although some benefits did seep through. Agricultural labourers received an extra 225-300 rupees in wages, and given an average agricultural labourer yearly wage of 2700 rupees, this was no doubt welcome. In addition, those poorer households that had land turned a large proportion of it over to HYVs. However, the gains the poor received were small compared to those of households in income groups 3 and 4, those in group 4 gaining on average nine times the amount gained by group-l households. In percentage terms of their own total incomes, the returns to the Applied Geograpky I995 Votume 15 Number 2

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The green revolution and poverty in India: T Beck

different income groups were much more equal. However, poor villagers did not tend to think in such terms. They were involved in daily relations with other villagers, both economic and extra-economic. They looked at the improvement in the standard of living of the sum&y members and the other richer villagers, and compared it with their own. This comparison was central to their experience of poverty, and bitterness and anger were the outcome. Lipton (1989: 401) has noted that ‘MVs are an evolutionary technique . . . not one that requires (or stems from) a transformation in the structure of rural power. An evolutionary technique . . . tends, when introduced into an entrenched power structure, to be used so as to benefit the powerful’. This is precisely what occurred in Fonogram; it appears that the green revolution has intensified the increasing landlessness and pauperization that had been occurring in the study area for several decades (Bose, 1986), as poorer households were being forced to sell land to the higher-income groups at an alarming rate. What did this concentration of power and wealth mean in Fonogram? In the years after the introduction of the shallow tube wells, two households in particular, whose heads were members of the samity, had perceptibly increased their wealth. The first of these, Jainul, was a lorry-owner and the main purchaser of land during the fieldwork period. He had also bought a motorbike, a conspicuous symbol of his wealth. The second was Romesh Ali, who purchased 2 ha of land and two lorries and had access to large amounts of urban credit. He had also repaired his house, but did not engage in any other conspicuous expenditure. He was rarely at home, spending most of his time in the local town conducting his various business affairs, most recently the sale of bricks, tiles, earth and sand for building. Four other households in income group 4, whose heads were four brothers, had all also benefited substantially. The eldest of these, Daoud, came from the richest household in the village and was also a member of the samity. He was involved in the division of land into housing plots near to Fonogram, as well as in the sale of building material for this housing, from all of which he was likely to reap substantial profits, and which necessitated urban links. His family had also recently purchased a hand tiller which would cut costs and was also a status symbol. He and another brother had bought land in Fonogram from their friend the local factory owner and absentee landowner mentioned above, and by 1990 both had built large brick houses on the land, costing at least 50000 rupees each. These were in stark contrast to the shack of leaves and palm fronds owned by one of the poorest households in the village, which lay in front of their new residence. This was a potent symbol of the increased differences in wealth between very rich and very poor. With an increase in urban links and increased investment outside agriculture, their ties to absentee landlords, as well as their increased profits from the shallow tube wells, the village elite maintained firm control over village resources. Chambers (1983) has described ‘integrated rural poverty’, or an interlocking set of factors that trap the poor in deprivation. In Fonogram ‘integrated rural wealth’ was also found, with power, wealth, good health and contacts integrated to ensure power for a select few households. These social changes have not passed without resistance. Boyce (1987) cites a reference to the sabotaging of irrigation facilities in Bangladesh. This also occurred in Fonogram. Three shallow tube wells were stolen during the fieldwork period, one from a plot of land owned by Romesh’s household just before they were to begin irrigation. The power lines bringing electricity to Fonogram were also stolen, causing delays in irrigation. That this was an antagonistic act rather than straightforward theft can be seen from its regular occurrence every boro season during the fieldwork period, rather than at times when the wells were hardly in use. The perpetrators of these acts remained unknown. There had also been several attempts at theft from Romesh Ali’s house. The building of brick houses by richer Fonogram households was as much for protection as for comfort or to display 178

Applied Geography 1995 Volume 15 Number 2

The green revolution and poverty in India: T Beck

increased wealth. Discussions with richer household members showed them to be frightened of theft and violence. It would be ahistorical to suggest that the relative polarization of income between richer and poorer households noted in Fonogram is likely to cause increased violence between the rich and poor in the village. What it did appear to be leading to was continued bitterness among the poor, and more ‘everyday forms of poor people’s resistance’ (Scott, 1985) which were part of the friction that was integral to everyday village life.

Conclusions The aim of this article was to analyse village power and microstructures and to consider how these interacted with the green revolution to cause socioeconomic change. The analysis shows that resources entering the study village were mediated through the village power brokers, use of these resources reinforcing patterns of integrated rural wealth and poverty. In Fonogram it was clear that the introduction of irrigation facilities was distorting socioeconomic structures in favour of those who already had much power in the village and its surroundings, particularly middle farmers and absentee landlords, who were likely to gain both more power and wealth. This article supports the conclusions of Dasgupta (1980) who, in a survey of all-India data, found that the green revolution had strengthened the hands of a rural elite. The perceived original aims of the propagators of the green revolution of maintaining or reinforcing the status quo in villages has been met in Fonogram. Poor villagers interviewed did not hesitate to express their anger about this. Given this finding, the financing of irrigation facilities in isolation from other development programmes that provide support to the poor must be questioned. In the context of minifundist farming and rural inequality, as in West Bengal or Bangladesh, planners should not rely on the effects of ‘trickle-down’ or urban linkages, or in other words the functioning of the market, to ameliorate rural poverty. State intervention is also crucial in order to support the livelihoods of the poor. The theory of ‘partial proletarianization’ is supported by the evidence from Fonogram; poorer cultivators and agricultural labourers were gaining absolutely at the same time as losing relatively in comparison with their richer neighbours. It is therefore possible to concur with a number of other studies from the region that have come to similar conclusions concerning the increasing inequality effected by the green revolution (Van Schendel, 1981; BRAC, 1983; Boyce, 1987; Hartmann and Boyce, 1983; Howes, 1985). The idea that the green revolution could bring both greater growth and equity, as argued by Hazel1 and Ramaswamy (1991) and others, did not prove to be true in Fonogram, suggesting that, because of regional variations, it is difficult to draw broad conclusions concerning its effects in South Asia. As stated earlier, much of the literature pointing to its success takes an economic view, ignoring social and political interaction at the village level, and villagers’ perceptions. Viewed from an absolutist perspective, in terms of percentage gains to a household’s income, most households in Fonogram, excepting the very poorest, benefited. But from a relative perspective, the perspective taken by poor villagers in Fonogram, the benefits to marginal farmers and landless households appeared small in comparison to the gains made by their wealthier neighbours. Although covering only one village, the data presented in this article are probably more detailed and accurate than most evaluations of irrigation projects. They show that a good understanding of village agro-ecology and socioeconomic structures is essential for the formulation of rural development programmes like the green revolution. Failure to understand this will mean that most new resources will flow, like the mythical river in the Mahabharata, upwards. Applied Geography I995 Volume 15 Number 2

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Acknowledgements I am grateful to Tirthankar Bose and Barrie Morrison for their comments on a draft of this paper. The local knowledge and assistance of a Fonogram agricultural labourer was invaluable during the three years of the survey.

References BARD (1976) Exploitation and the Rural Poor: A Working Paper on the Rural Power Structure in Bangladesh Bangladesh Academy for Rural Development, Comilla Beck, T (1991) Poverty and Power: Survival Strategies of the Poorest in Three Villages of West Bengal, India Unpublished PhD thesis, University of London Bhaduri, A (1973) ‘A study in agricultural backwardness under semi-feudalism’, Economic Journal 83, 120-137 Bhaduri, A et al. (1986) ‘Persistence and polarisation: a study in the dynamics of agrarian contradiction’, Journal of Peasant Studies 13(3), 82-89 Bose, S (1986) Agrarian Bengal: Economy, Social Structure and Politics 1919-1947 Cambridge University Press, Bombay Boyce, J K (1987) Agrarian Impasse in Bengal: Institutional Constraints to Technological Change Oxford University Press, Oxford BRAC (1983) Who Gets What and Why: Resource Allocation in a Bangladesh Village Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee, Dhaka Bradnock, R (1984) ‘Agricultural development in Tamil Nadu: two decades of land use change at village level’, in Bayliss-Smith, T and Wanmali, S (eds) Understanding Green Revolutions: Agrarian Change and Development Planning in South Asia Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Byres, T J (1981) ‘The new technology, class formation and class action in the Indian countryside’, Journal of Peasant Studies 8(4), 405-454 Cain, M (1981) ‘Risk and insurance: perspectives on fertility and agrarian change in India and Bangladesh’, Population and Development Review 7(3), 435-474 Chambers, R (1983) Rural Development: Putting the Last First Longman, Harlow Chambers, R, Saxena, N C and Shah, T (1989) To the Hands of the Pooc Water and Trees IT Publications, London Dasgupta, B (1980) The New Agrarian Technology and India Macmillan, Delhi Dasgupta, B (1984) ‘Agricultural labour under colonial, semi-capitalist and capitalist conditions’, Economic and Political Weekly 19(39), A129-148 Dayal, E and Gulati, C (1993) ‘Regional changes in food poverty in India’, Geojoumal 30(2), 167-177 Frankel, F (1971) Indiab Green Revolution Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ Ghose, A K (1983) ‘Agrarian reform in West Bengal: objectives, achievements and limitations’, in Ghose, A K (ed) Agrarian Reform in Developing Countries Croom Helm, London Government of West Bengal (1986) Lefi Front Government in West Bengal: Nine Years Department of Information and Cultural Affairs, Government of West Bengal, Calcutta Harriss, J (1993) ‘What is happening in rural West Bengal? Agrarian reform, growth and distribution’, Economic and Political Weekly 28(24), 1237-1247 Harriss, J (1987) ‘Capitalism and peasant production: the green revolution in India’, in Shanin, T (ed) Peasants and Peasant Societies Basil Blackwell, Oxford Hartrna~, B and Boyce, J (1983) A Quiet Violence. View from a Bangladesh Village Zed Press, London Hazell, P and Ramaswamy, C (1991) The Green Revolution Reconsidered: the Impact of High-yielding Rice Varieties in South Zndia Johns Hopkins University Press, London Hobsbawm, E J (1964) Labouring Men: Studies in the History of Labour Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London Hossain, M (1989) Green Revolution in Bangladesh: Impact on Growth and Distribution of Income University Press Limited, Dhaka Howes, M (1985) Whose Water? An Investigation of the Consequences of Alternative Approaches to the Smallscale Irrigation in Bangladesh BIDS, Dhaka Jansen, E (1986) Rural Bangladesh: Competition for Scarce Resources University Press Limited, Dhaka Jones, S (1984) ‘Agrarian structure and agricultural innovation in Bangladesh: Panimara village, Dhaka district’, in Bayliss-Smith, T and Wanmali, S (eds) Understanding Green Revolutions: Agrarian Change and Development Planning in South Asia Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Kohli, A (1987) The State and Poverty in India Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Kynch, J (1990) Agricultural Wage Rates in West Bengal and their Trends over Time Centre for Development Studies, University College of Swansea (mimeo) 180

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The green revolution and poverty in India: T Beck Lieten, G (1990) ‘Depeasantization discontinued: land reforms in West Bengal’, Economic and Political Weekly 25(40), 2264-2271 Lipton, M, with Longhurst, R (1989) New Seeds and Poor People Unwin Hyman, London Mallick, R (1992) ‘Agrarian reform in West Bengal: the end of an illusion’, World Development 20(5), 735-750 Mellor, J (1976) The New Economics of Growth: a Strategy for India and the Developing World Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY Oasa, E (1987) ‘The political economy of international agricultural research: a review of the CGIAR’s response to criticisms of the “Green Revolution”‘, in Glaeser, B (ed) The Green Revolution Revisited: Critique and Alternatives Allen and Unwin, London, pp 13-55 Palmer-Jones, R (1989) Water Management and Irrigation Issues in West Bengal Report for the Ford Foundation, New Delhi (mimeo) Palmer-Jones, R (1993) ‘Agricultural wages in Bangladesh: what the figures really show?‘, Journal oj Development Studies 29(2), 277-300 Rigg, J (1989) The Green Revolution, Agricultural Commercialisation and Village Relations School of Oriental and African Studies, London (mimeo) Rudra, A (1992) Political Economy of Indian Agriculture K P Bagchi, Calcutta Scott, J C (1985) Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance in Southeast AsiaYale University Press, New Haven, NJ Singh, I (1990) The Great Ascent: The Rural Poor in South Asia Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD Thompson, E P (1963) The Making of the English Working Class Penguin, Harmondsworth Van Schendel, W (1981) Peasant Mobility: The Odds of Ltfe in Rural Bangladesh Van Gorcum, Assert Webster, N (1989) Agrarian Relations in Burdwan District, West Bengal: From the Economics of the Green Revolution fo the Politics of Panchayati Ruj Centre for Development Research, Working Paper 89.2, Copenhagen (Revised manuscript

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