The growth and impact of teachers' unions in states without collective bargaining legislation

Ecomm6cs of Education Review. Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 167-178, 1995

Copyright (~) 1995 Elsevier Science Ltd Printed in Great Britain. All rights reserved 0272-7757/95 $9.50 + (I.(10

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The Growth and Impact of Teachers' Unions in States without Collective Bargaining Legislation MAL('OLM M. DUPLANTIS,* TIMOTHY D. CHANI)LERI a n d TERRY G . GESKE:I:§ *Coteau-Bayou Blue Elementary School, Houma, LA 7(1364, U.S.A. ;-('ollegc of Business Administration, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, LA 70803, U.S.A, :i:College of Education, Louisiana State University, Baton Rougc, I,A 70803, U.S.A.

This paper examines teachers' union activity in large school districts in the eleven states without collective bargaining legislation. A supply and demand model of municipal labor markets was used to specify reduced form wage. employment, and expenditure equations. These equations were then estimated using ordinary least squares regression analysis to determine the impact of teachers' collective bargaining. The presence of a collective bargaining agreement had a statistically significant effect on wages and district expenditures. Average teachers" salary in districts with collective bargaining agreements was 9.5% higher than average salary in districts without collective bargaining agreements. Similarly, average school district expenditure was 15.6°/,, higher in districts with collective bargaining agreements. [JEL 121, J51] Abstract --

AI/IHOU(;tt MEMBERSHIP IN UNIONS and the number of collective bargaining agreements in the public sector in the United States remained relatively constant in most occupations throughout the 1980s, teachers" unions experienced significant growth during this period (Freeman and Ichniowski, 1988). The two major teachers' unions, the American Federation of Teachers ( A F T ) and the National Education Association ( N E A ) , presently represent approximately 90% of the nation's teachers. In addition, formal collective bargaining agreements have been adopted in about 70% of this country's local school districts (Freeman, 1986). Most research on the growth of public sector unions emphasizes the role of protective state legislation for collective bargaining. Although some experts reject the view that these collective bargaining laws are the primary cause of public sector union growth (Burton, 1979), several studies demonstrate the importance of these laws to union formation and growth (Ichniowski, 1988; Moore, 1978; Saltzman, 1985; Zax and Ichniowski, [99(}). As of 1991, thirty-

three states strongly fostered collective bargaining agreements in public education by the passage of duty-to-bargain laws. ~ At the same time, there were eleven states in which collective bargaining occurred even though there was no state legislation to provide a legal framework for these activities, in six of these eleven states - - Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Kentucky, Louisiana, and New Mexico-school boards were authorized to bargain with teacher unions, but they were not required to do so. The other five s t a t e s - Mississippi, Missouri. Utah, West Virginia, and W y o m i n g - had no legislative provisions governing collective bargaining, but they did contain school districts which had adopted collective bargaining contracts. In the absence of a collective bargaining statute that specifies the rules and regt, lations for recognition of the union and the procedures for the collective bargaining process, the employer, in this case, the local school board, is in a strong position to resist the concerted efforts of teachers if it decides to

[Manuscript rcceivcd 17 August 1993: revision accepted for publication 23 June 1994.] ~To whom correspondence should be addressed. 167

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do so. With regard to those jurisdictions without a collective bargaining law, Leibig and Kahn (1987) state that: no malter how much the employees support a union and let the employer know of this support, the employer does not have to deal with any union, except if the employer chooses to do so. And the employer can pretty well establish the ground rules on which it will deal with unions. For example, the employer can decide whether it will voluntarily recognize a union or will require an election. The employer can decide whether it will deal with the union as a representative of its members only or as an exclusive representative of all people in a "bargaining unit". Also the employer can unilaterally define the appropriate bargaining unit if there is no statute (p. 81). •

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This article investigates the extent of teachers" union activity in large school districts in the eleven states without collective bargaining legislation. The study surveyed local school superintendents to obtain information concerning the extent to which collective bargaining occurs and also concerning the nature of labor relations between teachers' unions and school boards. T h e study first assesses the growth of teachers" unions in these states and then uses simple regression techniques to examine the impact of collective bargaining agreements on teachers' wages, and on school district employment and expenditures, PUBLIC SECTOR TEACHERS' UNIONS Union Growth Two basic approaches have been used by economists and industrial relations experts to explain changes in union membership and union density, Some researchers have used macro-level studies to identify the primary factors, e.g., economic, historical, legal, political, which influence the growth and decline of labor unions. Other researchers have used micro-level studies to analyze the individual unionization-related behavior of workers, e.g., individuals" decisions to join a union, which affects membership in unions, Macro-level models emphasize demand and supply factors to examine union growth. 2 Specifically, the demand for unionization is thought to be affected by such factors as the price of union services, workers" tastes for unionization, pecuniary and nonpecuniary benefits of unionization, income, and the price of substitutes for union services. The

supply of unionization is specified as a function of the price of union services, the cost of organizing. the cost of providing services to union members, and union goals. Micro-level models tend to emphasize the demand for union services by the individual with particular emphasis on the effects of job satisfaction (e.g., Fiorito, Gallagher and Greer, 1986: Premack, 1984) and various demographic characteristics of workers (e.g. Bigoness, 1978; Farber and Saks, 1980; Fiorito, Gallagher and Greer, 1986; Hills, 1985; Kochan, 1979; Maxey and Morhman, 198[}: Voos, 19831. Initial research on the growth of teachers" unions used micro-level studies to identify characteristics of teachers who join unions (Cole, 1968: Hellrcigel, French and Patterson, 197(/; Rosenthal, 1966). These studies typically used regression techniques to analyze teachers" decisions to join unions. Generally, union members were identified as male teachers, less experienced teachers, and teachers in large school districts. From the macro-perspective, the impact of public sector bargaining laws on teacher unionism has received considerable attention. Saltzman (1985), expanding on the earlier work by Moore (1978), analysed state level data for 1959-1978 to determine whether the growth of teacher unionism during those years was primarily a result or a cause of public sector bargaining laws adopted during that period• Saltzman concluded that changes in the percentage of teachers covered by collective bargaining contracts were positively related to the enactment of bargaining laws. Moreover, Saltzman found that causality runs in both directions, but bargaining laws appear to have a much greater impact on the extent of bargaining than the extent of bargaining has on bargaining laws. The presence of protective bargaining legislation affects teacher unionization by determining the level and type of employer opposition to union organizing and collective bargaining (i.e., the cost of organizing and servicing members) and by affecting union bargaining power and, consequently, their ability to provide benefits to union members. Although government employer opposition to union organizing and collective bargaining is considered modest when compared to the private sector (Freeman, 1988), employer opposition isan important factor to consider when examining the growth of teacher unions in states without protective bargaining legislation.

Teachers' Unions in the U.S.A. In addition to state bargaining laws, policy developments at the local and state levels affect pecuniary and nonpecuniary aspects of employment. At the school district level, school boards experiencing fiscal difficulty have considered options such as reduction-in-force policies, reduction of teachers" salaries and benefits, and changes in working conditions in order to meet financial obligations. At the state level, reform legislation which may change tenure rights and certification requirements may increase the degree of dissatisfaction among teachers. These developments could increase demand for union services,

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Eberts (1984) reported that collective bargaining had positive effects on the student-teacher ratio but he failed to estimate the size of the effects. Gallagher (1978) studied the school budgets of 133 Illinois school districts and noted a 9"/,, differential in total operating expenditures betwecn bargaining and nonbargaining districts, His research suggests that unions have increased nonsalary benefits, e.g., medical and dental insurance, retirement benefits, life insurance, and teacher leave provisions, and although these costs are usually not reported as wage increases, they can represent a substantial increase in expenditures for sch~u~l districts. Chambers (1977), on the other hand, reported that Union Impacts collective bargaining did not significantly affect Two basic perspectives are used to describe thc educational expenditures, but he noted that his impact of unions on employment-related issues research was carried out on a relatively small cross(Freeman and Medoff, 1984). Some experts view section sample of school districts in only one state. unions as monopolies in the labor market that In contrast to the extensive research examining function primarily to raise members' wages at the thc effect of collective bargaining, on teaehcrs" expense of nonunion labor, and also at the salaries, relatively few studies have examincd the expense of the efficient operation of the economy, effect of collectivc bargaining on productivity. Other experts argue that unions have beneficial Teachcr tmions typically bargain for contracts which economic and political cffects because they induce protect thc individual teacher, while providing the more efficient management practices and higher teacher an environment to increase productivity. productivity by providing information about the Consequently, teacher contracts are very explicit in operations of the business, and improving worker certain areas such as the gricvancc procedure with skills and morale. The first view, the monopoly face binding arbitration, working conditions, and effects of unions, is concerned primarily with seniority benefits. documenting the effects of unions on teacher Perry (1979) found that scniority played a greater salaries and fringe benefits. The second view, the role than performance in promotions and layoffs in collective voice effects of unions, is concerned union districts than in nonunion districts. Schnaufer primarily with documenting the effects of unions on (1967) reported that slightly more than one-fourth productivity, of the 88 sumplc contracts had substantive proSeveral reviews of union wage effcctsstudies for visions mandating hinding arbitration, whereas teachcrs have reached the same basic conclusion Goldschmidt. Bowers, Riley and Stuart (1984) that unionism has a positive, but small effect found that four out of five htrge districts" contracts (approximately 3 to 9%), on salaries (Cooper. 1982; negotiated in 1984 contained provisions subiccting ('resswcll and Spargo, t980: Finch and Naglc. 1984" contract disputes to binding arbitration. Moreover, l+ipsky. It,~82). An exception to these findings isthe building on work by Frecman (1980) which indiwork of Baugh and Stone (1982) who found that cated that union workers arc less likel~ to quit their teachers' unions increased teachers' salaries by as jobs than nonunion workers. Rccs( lt)9l ) found that much as 21%. In addition, studies of perceptions of teachers who arc covered by strong union negoteachers, stiperintcndents, and school board t i a t c d g r i e v a n c e p r o c c d u r c s h a d a l o w c r probability mcmbers indicate that collective bargaining had of quitting than those workingundcrwcakergricxpositive effects on salaries and fringe benefits ance procedurcs. Given that decreases in t u r n m c r (Kersey, 1986; Rogers, 1988; Salter, 1986). reduce hiring and training costs, these findings [11 COltlparison to the numl+~cr of studies on the suggest a positive impact of ullions in unit~llJZCd effects of collective bargaining on wages, the effects school districts. of collective bargaining on school district employIn addition to issues affecting school district mcnt and expenditures are relatively unexplored, personnel practices, teachers" unions ]Ta~.e nego-

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tiated issues directly affecting educational policy, Over the past 25 years, teachers have bargained not only over the length of their contract year, but also over the number of work days allocated to classroom instruction (Goldschmidt and Painter, 1978). According to Eberts and Pierce (1980), teachers in bargaining districts spent more time than teachers in nonbargaining districts in nonteaching activities such as preparing lessons, performing clerical duties, and meeting with parents. McDonnell and Pascal (1979) reported that collective bargaining had no effect on classroom operations, but improved staff morale and provided teachers greater autonomy. Researchers investigating the effect of collective bargaining on student achievement have reported both positive and negative results (Eberts, 1984; Eberts and Stone, 1984, 1987; Grimes and Register, 1991; Kurth, 1987). The economics and industrial relations literatures provide valuable insights into the growth of teacher unions and their impact on various employmentrelated issues. Little is known, however, about the growth and impact of teacher unions in states without collective bargaining legislation. Several questions that need addressing are: What factors lead to union growth in the absence of protective bargaining legislation? How have school districts responded to teachers" requests for union representation and collective bargaining? And, how has collective bargaining impacted wages, employment, and school district expenditures in states without protective bargaining legislation? Identifying determinants of teacher union growth and assessing teachers" unions ability to engage in

collective bargaining in school districts located in states without collective bargaining legislation may shed light on the future growth of teacher unions and the prospects for the passage of bargaining legislation in these states. In addition, the impact of teacher collective bargaining on wages, employment, and school district expenditures will be an important determinant of the level of support for, and opposition to, the further growth in collective bargaining between teacher unions and school districts. SAMPLE SCHOOL DISTRICTS AND DATA COLLECTION All school districts with more than l(I,()()0students in the eleven states inw~lved in this study (106 school districts) were surveyed to obtain local school district data about the number of teachers employed, average teacher salaries, and district expenditures, and about the status of labor relations between teachers' unions and school boards. Surveys were mailed to local school superintendents in June, 1992; a total of 82 instruments were returned for a response rate of 77%. Table 1 indicates the number of school districts in each state, the number surveyed, and the number that responded. The survey was also used to collect data about the frequency of requests for certification elections, certification election results, and any negotiated collective bargaining agreements. School superintendents were asked to describe any critical or key incidents which may have prompted growth in

Table I. Number of school districts, by State, 1991-92, number of districts surveyed, and number of districts responding

State Arizona Arkansas Colorado Kentucky Louisiana Mississippi Missouri New Mexico Utah West Virginia Wyoming Totals

Number of school districts in State I

Number of districts with 10,(X)0+ students 2

Number of school districts responding 3

219 324 176 177 66 151 543 88

12 2

55 49

19 2 16 4 21 5 12 5 12 8 2

1888

l(J6

82

41)

14

4 I£ 5 10 2 9 5 I

Teachers' Unions in the U.S.A. t e a c h e r unionism in their districts. I n f o r m a t i o n was also collectd a b o u t the e x t e n t to which teachers" u n i o n s e n d o r s e d c a n d i d a t e s for school boards, In addition to these survey data, various d e m o graphic and e c o n o m i c data were also o b t a i n e d from several p u b l i s h e d sources for use in estimating the impact of teachers" unions in these states. A supply and d e m a n d model of municipal labor m a r k e t s was used to specify separate equations, using ordinary least squares ( O L S ) regression analysis to d e t e r m i n e the impact of teachers' collective bargaining on wagcs, e m p l o y m e n t , and expenditures. Table 2 p r o v i d e s a list of the variables, their definitions, and the data sources used in the analyses. Table 3 p r e s e n t s the m e a n s and s t a n d a r d deviations for each wlriable for the school districts surveyed, catcgorized into those districts with and without collectivc b a r g a i n i n g a g r e e m e n t s , T H E STATUS O F UNION A C T I V I T Y T h e school s u p e r i n t e n d e n t s in the large school

171

districts surveyed in these eleven states r e p o r t e d that t h r e e issues p r o m p t e d teachers to join the union in t h e i r districts - - wages, j o b security, and a desire for a voice in a d m i n i s t r a t i v e decisions. Incidents affecting salaries were identified most frequently by the school s u p e r i n t e n d e n t s as the key incident which increased tcachers' i n v o l v e m e n t in unions, ina d e q u a t e increases or no increases in teachers' salaries in some school districts in A r i z o n a , A r k a n s a s , Louisiana, New Mexico, and Missouri wcrc identified as factors stimulating growth in union m e m b e r s h i p . Some s u p e r i n t e n d e n t s n o t e d that w h e n the school district had a large balance of funds, but failed to increase teachers' salaries, teachers b e c a m e more interested in unionization. T h c second key incident most frequently described by s u p e r i n t e n d e n t s was related to j o b security. G i v e n tight fiscal constraints, school districts s o m e t i m e s decide to reduce e m p l o y m e n t to decrease total e x p e n d i t u r e s as an alternative to reducing salaries or benefits of teachers. A p p a r -

Table 2. Definition of wlriables, and data sources Dependent variables InWAGE InEMPLOYMENT InEXPENDITURE Independent variables

Data source I I I

Definition The natural log of the average teachers' salary of the district The nautral log of the number of teachers employed in the district The natural log of the school district expenditure

Data source

Definition

CBA

1

ENROLLMENT ENDORSE

1 1

PCTUNION UNEMPLOYMENT HOUSING lnPC1 PCTONONWHITE POPULATION PCTCOLLEGE WNC SATL ESC WSC InOPPWAGE

2 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5

Dummy variable for presence of a collective bargaining agreement between the school board and teachers" union Total school district enrollment A measure of the superintendent's perception of the teachers' union endorsement of candidates for school board. The values of this variable are measured on a 6 point scale where 0 is never endorsed, 1 is extremely inactive, 2 is inactive, 3 is somewhate active, 4 is active, and 5 is extremely active The percentage of unionized public sector workers employed in the state The percentage unemployment rate in the municipality for 1991 The median value of housing in the municipality The natural log of per-capita income of municipal residents The percentage of municipal population that is nowhite The municipal population The percentage of the municipal population that has graduated from college Regional dummy variable for West-North Central geographic division Regional dummy variable for South Atlantic geographic division Regional dummy variable for East-South Central geographic division Regional dummy variable for West-South Central geographic division The natural log of the average hourly wage of manufacturing production workers in the municipality

Data sources: ( 1) From survey instrument. (2) Front Curme, Hirsch, and Macpherson (1990), Table 5, p. 22. (3) From U.S. Department of Labor, (1991). (4) From U.S. Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census (1990). (5) From the U.S. Department of Commerce (1987),

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Table 3. Variable means and standard deviations for school districts surveyed, with and without collective bargaining agreements (CBA) With CBA N = 26

Without CBA N = 56

Variable

Mean

Standard deviation

Mean

Standard deviation

InWAGE InEMPLOYMENT InEXPENDITURE ENROLLMENT ENDORSE PCTUNION UNEMPLOYMENT HOUSING lnPCl PCTNONWH ITE POPU LATI ON PCTCOLLEGE InOPPWAGE

10.395 7.286 18.339 28833.307 3.462 23.96,5 4.612 71853.846 9.494 18.758 1591119.154 22,023 2.338

0.125 0.657 0.601 2 324 5 2 1.655 4.723 1.394 16238.774 0.129 18.599 217966.489 1(t.I}118 0.167

1tl.239 6.916 17.851 18992.571 2.375 20.677 5.56,4 65526.786 9.374 26.915 9291)9.893 __.774 _._7,

0.146 11.561 0.520 12659.879 1.712 5.235 1.85 I 17583.200 0.216 21.546 151162.867 9.644 tl.231

Table 4. NEA membership and percentage of NEA membership of teachers, by States, 1975 and 19911 Number of teachers (in thousands)

Percentage difference

Percentage NEA

State

1975 I

19911 2

1975 3

19911 4

difference 5

Arizona Arkansas Colorado Kentucky

23.5 21.8 28.5 32.3

33.1} 25.0 32.3 3,6.8

78.1 43.5 85.11 85.5

74.7 55.3 87.S 89.4

-3.4 + I 1.8 + 2.8 + 3.9

Louisiana Mississippi Missouri

40.4 24.1 48.6

43.9 28. I 52.3

26.4 22. I 29.5

45.3 34.9 36.4

+ 18.9 + 12.8 +6.9

New Mexico Utah West Virginia Wyoming

12.9 13.0 21L2 5.0

16.7 17.9 21.5 6.8

79.3 80.2 78.4 96.8

38.~ 84.8 69.4 89.9

411.7 +4.6, -9.1~ -(~.9

Source: Column 1: U.S. Office Education (1976). Table 48. p. 50: Cohtmn 2: U.S. Office of Education ( 1991 ). Table 7. p. 7; Columns 3, 4, and 5: computed by authors from National Education Association membership data contained in National Education Association (1976 and 1991 ). Table 2, p. 137 and Tahlc 2. p. 156, respectively. ently, teachers perceived unions as protection from the c o n s e q u e n c e s of reduction-in-force policies, Finally, s u p e r i n t e n d e n t s r e p o r t e d that a variety of administrative factors served as key incidents which resulted in a growth in teacher unionism, p e r h a p s suggesting that unionization is seen as a m e a n s of gaining greater participation in decision-making. In one state, for example, legislative adoption of a c o m p r e h e n s i v e teacher evaluation program stimulated a considerable increase in union m e m b e r s h i p , As a result of d e m a n d for union services, union m e m b e r s h i p has remained constant or increased over the past fifteen years in these states without

collective bargaining legislation. Table 4 depicts changes in N E A m e m b e r s h i p from 1975 to 1990. ( A F T m e m b e r s h i p data wcrc not available). The d e m a n d for union services created by concerns over wages, job security, and a desire for a voice in administrative decisions encourages teachers' unions to provide services to teachers. In o r d e r to provide these scrvices, teachers' unions typically request collective bargaining with the school districts so that the teachers" union may ncgotiatc a formal contract covering various aspects of the e m p l o y m e n t relationship. Before bargaining begins, the teachers" union

Teachers" Unions in the U.S.A. Table 5. Requests by Teachers" Union for certification elections, and number of elections conducted in school districts st,rveyed, by state, 1960-1991 Year(s)

Requests for CBA bv State

1960s

Arizona (I) Colorado (5) Kentuck'~ (2) Missouri [1) Utah (I) 197(Is Arizona 121 Arkansas ( I ) ('olorado (4) Louisiana (2) Missouri (2) Utah (2) 1980s Arizona (I) Colorado ( 1) Missouri ( 1) Louisiana (I) West Virginia (2) 1990and 1991 Louisiana(l) Missouri(l) Ne~ Mexico {2) Totals Total districts surveyed

Total requests

Elections conducted

II)

9

13

II1

6

3

4

I

33 82

23

must first be recognized as a legitimate representative of the teachers. This is accomplished via a certification election. Table 5 indicates the frequency of requcsts by teachers" unions for certification elections in the districts surveyed, by stale, across decades. Thirty-three school boards received requests by a teachers' union to conduct a ccrtification election. Requests were received by school boards in each state with the exception of Mississippi and Wyoming. Six school districts (Gallup and Santa Fe, New Mexico: Baton Rouge and Houma, Louisiana: and Morgantown and Clarksburg, West Virginia) refused to conduct certification elections, Four school districts (North Kansas City and FIorissant, Missouri: and Salt Lake City and Ogden, Utah) vohmtarily recognized the teachers" union without an election, and entered into a collective bargaining agreement, Twenty-three certification elections were conducted which resulted in negotiated collcctive bargaining contracts in twenty-two school systems, Only one system (Springfield, Missouri) conducted a certification election in which neither of the two major teachers" unions obtained a majority vote of the teachers. Hence, the school board did not

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recognize either union and did not enter into collective bargaining. In general, the success in obtaining collective bargaining agreements during the 1960s and 1970s did not continue into the 1980s and early 1990s. The decrease in union activity is similar to what has occurred in other public services involving federal and municipal employees (Freeman, 1986). The decline in requests for collective bargaining may reflect the adverse political climate in which unions have been operating in recent years, or alternatively, the trend may simply indicate that all of the " " organizable districts were already organized by 19811. THE IMPACT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS In models focusing on union effects, demand for public employees is derived from demand for m~vcrnmental services. Demand for governmental services is generally specified to be a function of the price of the service, the community's "'taste" for the service, and the community's ability to pay. Public sector unions are generally viewed as using their political power to raise the demand for public services (Freeman, 1986). A community's "'taste" for governmental services and its ability to pay can be represented by per capita income of local residents (InPCl), the median valuc of housing within the municipality (HOUSING), the percentage of the municipal population which has graduated from college (PCTCOLLEGE), and school district enrollment (ENROLLMENT). In addition, union political activity, as evidenced by the endorsement of school board candidates (ENDORSE), and also a dummy variable representing the existence of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the school board and the teachers" union are included in the analyses. The supply of labor to local governments is typically specified as being positively related to the availability of workers having the skills or tastes to work in governmental occupations, and to measures of the faw)rableness of alternative employment opportunities. The average hourly wage of manufacturing production workers (InOPPWAGE) represents the quality of alternative employment opportunities, whereas the unemployment rate of the municipality fl)r 1991 (UNEMP) is used to

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represent the availability of alternative employment opportunities. The percentage of the population that is nonwhite (PCTNONWHITE) is also included in the analyses to represent the possibility that workers' tastes for employment in education may vary. Finally, three additional characteristics of the school district which may affect public labor markets are also included in the estimating e q u a t i o n s - the population of the municipality (POPULATION), the percentage of unionized public sector workers in the state (PCTUNION), and regional dummy variables (WNC, SATE, ESC, and WSC). Table 6 presents the multiple regression results for the three equations estimating teachers' salaries,

employment, and expenditures in large school districts in the eleven states without collective bargaining legislation. The presence of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) had a statistically significant effect on wages and district expenditures, and a positive but nonsignificant effect on employment. Average teachers" salary in a school district with a collective bargaining agreement was 9.5% higher than average salary in a district without a collective bargaining agreement. 3 The average hourly wage of manufacturing production workers in the municipality (InOPPWAGE) and the median wdue of housing in the municipality (HOUSING) significantly and positively affected wages. At the

Table 6. O L S coefficient estimates for teachers' salaries (InWAGE), employment (lnEMPLOYMENT), and expenditure ( I n E X P E N D I T U R E ) equations (standard errors of estimates are in parentheses) Variable InPCI HOUSING PCTCOLLEGE ENDORSE CBA InOPPWAGE UNEMPLOYMENT PCTNONWH ITE POPULATION PCTUN1ON ENROLLMENT WNC SATE ESC WSC

constant N = F = R-" =

InWAGE 0.032 (0. 1118) 3.449E-6::: ( 1.869E-61 - 4.277E-3':' (2.251 E-3) -5.667E-3 (8.448E-3) 0.091 ::'::':: (0.031 ) II. 193: .... (11.11751 -0.1)12 (0.01 I ) 6.151E-4 (7.368E-4) 8.465E-8 (7.948E-8) 1.419E-3 (5.165E-3) 8.1195E-8 (8.912E-7) 0.105': (11.1156) I).1183 (0.t)78) 0.047 (t).082) -0.1149 ((1.0661 9.4111 ': :: :: (11.984) 73 f~.773: ........ 0.641

InEMPLOYMENT -0.t194 (0.3161 5.791E-6 15.238E-61 - 2.425E-4 (11.11116) 11.11115 (0.1124) 0.128 10.11910 0.416 :~ 10.2111 11.1t117 (0.031 ) 0.01)2 (o.002) 1.642E-7 (2.324E-7) (I.Ill 3 (0.015) 2.779E-5 ........... 2.561E-6 0.238 (0. 161 ) I).282 (0.219) 0.387" ((1.22t)) 11.464 ...... (0.1 t) I ) 5.308::: (2.8¢~11) 77 15.894'::': 0.796

InEXPEND1TURE 0.392 (0.263) -3.174E-7 (0.440E-7) 0.1104 111.1t115) 0.036::' (0.1120) 0.145:: (0.1if6) 0.436::: ill. 1751 11.003 (0.025) 7.566E-4 (IL0112) 1.929E-7 t0.231E-(q - 2,733E-4 (11.1tl2) 2.692 .......... ((I.236E-5) O. 104 (0. 128) I1.187 (0,179) 0.1190 (l). 196) 11.213 (I). 157) 12.43 I : : :: ::' (2.419) 65 23.25(t:::::'::' 0.877

:' Statistically significant at the I).115level: * :::at the I).1125 level; ::"":'at the 0.0115 level: ':" ':" at the (LOI)05 level ( o n e - t a i l e d tests).

175

Teachers" Unions in the U.S.A.

same time, the percentage of the population graduated from college (PCTCOLLEGE) had a statistically significant negative effect on teachers" salaries. This negative association between the percentage of population graduated from college (PCTCOLLEGE) and the average salary of teachers suggests that this variable might represent a greater supply of labor to school districts rather than a greater demand for education) This finding of a 9.5% increase in teachers' salaries in school districts with collective bargaining agreements is similar to findings reported in prcvious union wage effect studies (Cooper, 1982; Cresswell & Spargo, 1980; Lipsky, 1982). As evidenced by the stastically significant effect of opportunitv wages on the wages of teachers, school districts arc affected by the average wage earning ability of workers in the community. Since school districts compete for workers in the community with other businesses, wages must be competitive in order to obtain a sufficient number of workers. On the other hand, voters compare salaries of teachers with other services such as fire and police, as well as with their {)wn salaries, when deciding to vote on tax measures, With rcgard to employment, the regression results indicate that the presence of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) had a positive but nonsignificant eftoct on the number of teachers employed in a district. School district enrollment (ENROLLMENT) and the average hourly wage of manufacturing production workers in the municipality (InOPPWAGE), both had significant positive cocfficicnts. Perhaps teachers" unions arc able to increase the demand l~,~rlabor thus enabling them to prevent a wage-employment tradeoff, In addition, the lack of a wage-employment tradeoff for teachers may be a result of the negotiation process in which teachers" unions request additional benefits for teachers which affcct both wages and employrnent rates. Employment of teachers is affected by factors which are traditionally bargained for such as planning time, class size, and studcnt enrichmcntorremediation programs. These provisions in collective bargaining contracts necessitatc the employment of additional personnel. These provisions, however, are presented to constituents as improvements in the educatiom, I program, and are further justified by appealing to the belief that these programs positively impact student achievement,

The average district expenditure in school districts with collective bargaining agreements was 15.6% higher than in school districts without collective bargaining agreements. School district enrollment (ENROLLMENT), teachers" union endorsement of candidates fi)r the school board (ENDORSE), and the average wage of manufacturing production workers in the municipality (InOPPWAGE), all had significant positive coefficients. The expenditure effects of a collective bargaining agreement are not surprising given the significant, positive effects of teachers" unions on wages and the positive, albeit nonsignificant, effects on employment. In the absence of a wage-employment tradeoff, district expenditures mr,st increase unless school boards arc able to reduce other operating costs. Moreover, the positive and significant effects of union endorsements of school board candidates on district expenditures suggest that teachers" unions" ability to affect educational expenditures is not confined to the bargaining table, This finding may indicate that teachers' unions are using their support of school board candidates to increase educational spending independent of wages and employment. The expenditure effects of teacher collective bargaining and teacher union endorsements of school board candidates are consistent with the findings of Chambers (1977). Chambers argued that the very existence of a collective bargaining contract may affect the preferences of decision makers with regard to educational services. That is, since teachers recognize that larger school budgets lead to greater benefits, the union will attempt to exert eve,-y possible influence on the demand for cducational quality and, hence on school district budget decisions.

SUMMARY The findings presented in this study suggest that teachers" unions are very active in the large school districts in the eleven states without collective bargaining legislation. The findings suggest that these teachers" unions are having significant effects on teachers" salaries and on school district expenditures. The economic effects of unions will affect teachers" demand for union services and school boards" resistance to tmions. These effects, along with possible changes in state legislation protecting

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the unionization and bargaining rights of teachers, should largely d e t e r m i n e the potential for growth in teachers" unions in these states, School s u p e r i n t e n d e n t s indicated that teachers expressed a high level of c o n c e r n o v e r issues inw)lving wages, job security, and working conditions, which suggests that the d e m a n d for the services provided by teachers" unions will continue and even increasc in these states. M o r e o v e r . teachers' c o n c e r n s over these issucs were g r e a t e r in those school districts without collective bargaining a g r e e m e n t s than in those districts with collective bargaining. This difference in the level of concern expressed by t e a c h e r s may reflect the belief on the

part of teachers w h o are unionized that, because of a collective bargaining a g r e e m e n t , they enjoy a greater sense of efficacy involving issues in thc workplace. If teachers in n o n u n i o n or n o n b a r g a i n i n g districts believe that unionization and collective bargaining will e n a b l e t h e m to effectively address their concerns in the workplace, unionization and collective bargaining may increase. M o r e o v e r , if teachers, as well as o t h e r public employees, are unable to achieve effective union r e p r e s e n t a t i o n because of the lack of protective bargaining legislation, political pressure could m o u n t for the passage of such legislation.

NOTES I. See Valetta and Freeman (1988). The data for this study were collected in June, 1992. Shortly after the data had been collected, New Mexico enacted a duty-to-bargain statute. 2. See Hirsch and Addison (1986) tor an overview of the demand and supply framework l\)r unionizathm. 3. The percentage effects of a collective bargaining agreement on the designated variables is equal to cn-I. 4. The possibility that PCTCOLLEGE affects the supply of labor to school districts rather than the demand for education in the district is consistent with Baum (1986). REFERENCES l?,Atr(in, W.H. and SIoNI , J.A. (1982) Teachers, unions, and wages in the 1970s: Unionism now pays. hulustrial aml Lahor Relations Review 35. 410-417. BAtIM, D.N. (1986) A simultaneous equations model of the demand for and production of local public services: The casc of education. I'uhlic Finance Quarterly 14, 157-178. BI(;oNI~ss, W.J. (1978) Correlates of faculty attitudes toward collective bargaining. Jourmd ~1"Applied f'sychology 63, 228-233. Bt!uloN,J.F. (1979) The extent of collective bargaining in the public sector. In Public-Sector Bargaining (Edited by AARON. B., GRODIN, J. and SIERN, J.L.). Washington, DC: Bureau of National Affairs, 1-43. ('tlAMI~ERS, J.G. (1977) The impact of collective bargaining for teachers on resource allocation in public school districts. Jourmd ~)1"Urban Ecom;mics 4, 324-339. C(nf., S. (19680 The unionization of teachers: Determinants of rank-and-file support. Sociology Ol Education 41, 06-87. ('()()PIR, B. (1982) Collective Bargaining, Strikes tllld Financial Cost iH Public Education: A ('~mqmrative Review. Eugene, OR: ERIC No. ED215441, University of Oregon. CRI SSWI I t , A . M . and SPAR(i(). F. (1981)) Impacts ~l' Collective Bargaining Poli( 3' in Eh'mentarv aml Secondary Education: A Review 0[' Research and Methodology: Recommendations fin" New Research. Denver, CO: Education Commission of the States. CtrrMI. M.A., Hn~s
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E c o n o m i c s o f Education Review SA[.IZMAN, G. (1985) Bargaining laws as a c~tuse and consequence of the growth of teacher unions. Imtustrial and Labor Relations Review 38,335-351. S('HNAtIFER, P. (1967) Collective bargaining contr~lcts: From the houses of A F T and N E A . ~]Tte America, Teacher 5, 9-16. UNIIE-I) SI Alt~S D|-I'ARIMt~NI OF C()MMER('|~ (1987) 1987 Census o[' Ma,uJ~tct,ret:~, (;eographic Area S,rvey. Washington, DC: Author. UNIII.I) SI AI'ES DI~I'ARI MEN I OF COMMER(E. BURbAU Of: I'HE CENSUS (1991)) The Ce,stts ~]' Poptthttiott a , d Ho,sing Reports. Washington. DC: Author. UNII|(I) SIAIES Df~I'ARIMENI OF EDt/~,'AIION (1991) Public attd Private Elemetttarv a , d Secolldllt'V Edtwatio, Statistics: School Year 1991-1992. Washington, DC: Author. UNIII I) SI AlES DH'AR FMENI ()F LABOR ( 1991 ) S,pplement to Employment tlltd Uttemployme,t i, States a , d Local Areas. W~lshington, DC: Author. UNIIID SIAII~S ()FII('t ()F EI)U(AIION (1976) Digest ~1' Edttcationa[ Statistics. Washington. DC: Attthor. VAI.I II A. R.G. and Frill:MAN. R.B. (1988) The N B E R Public Sector Collective Bargaining Law l)ata Set. In Whe, P , blic Sector Worker~ U, io,ize. (Edited by FREEMAN. R.B. and k'ttNIOWSKI. C.). Chicago: University Press. 399-419. V o o s . P. (1983) Union organizing cost and benefits, hulustritd and Labor Relatio,s Review 36.571-591. Z,xx, J.S. and ]('ttNI()WSKI, C. (1991)) Bargaining laws and unionization in the local public sector. Imhtstrial aml Labor Rehttio,s Review 43, 447 462.