The impact of the 1980 reapportionment in the United States

POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY QUARTERLY, Vol. 4, No. 2, April 1985,141-158

The impact of the 1980 reapportionment in the United States* LARRY M. SCHWAB John Carroll University, University He&&s, Cleveland OH 44118, USA

ABSTRACT. The 1980 reapportionment and redistricting continued several previous trends. The rural areas and big cities lost seats again, while the suburbs made substantial gains. In the 1982 election, the Republicans’ hopes for gains from reapportionment and redistricting were not realized. The Democrats entered the reapportionment and redistricting processes with the disadvantage of holding most of the heavily underpopulated districts and less than half of the heavily overpopulated districts. They emerged with a net gain of six seats from reapportionment and won most of the redistricting-influenced,races. They maintained almost all of their districts which had lost population in the 1970s. No support was found for the hypothesis that the population decreases in the northern cities and the population increases in the sunbelt would shift seats from liberal Democrats to conservative Republicans. While redistricting had little adverse impact on most incumbents in the 1982 election, it was a factor in about one-half of the races in which incumbents lost.

After many court cases, political deals and attempts at partisan gerrymandering, all the states with more than one district completed the 1980 reapportionment and redistricting of the seats in the US House of Representatives. These districts should stand for 10 years unless the courts order a few states to draw new lines. In addition, the 1982 election has been held using the new districts. l What impact did shifting 17 more seats to the sunbelt and changing the boundaries of most districts have on the population composition of the House districts and the 1982 election? Three of the most important questions dealing with the impact of these changes concern the effects on the population composition of House districts, the strength of the political parties, and the re-election of incumbents. What changes occurred in the number of urban, suburban and rural districts from the 1980 reapportionment and redistricting ? Which political party gained more political advantage from reapportionment and redistricting? Did the 1980 redistricting help or hinder the re-election of incumbents in the 1982 election? This study examines these three questions. The first section focuses on the population * An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association,

Chicago, Illinois, in April 1983.

0260-9827/85/02

0141-18

$03.00

0 1985 Butterworth

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Ltd

Impact of the 1980 US reapportionment

142

composition of the House districts, while the second and third sections deal with the political parties. The fourth section examines the impact on incumbents.

Population

composition

of the districts

To examine the changes in the House seats, the districts are divided into seven categories: urban (big city), suburban (big city suburbs), urban-suburban (half city, half suburbs), midurban and rural (middle-sized city and rural area), suburban-rural (suburbs and rural areas), mixed (city, suburbs and rural areas), and rural (rural areas).2 While some districts contain either all big-city, or suburban, or rural population, many districts consist of a combination of central-city areas, metropolitan areas outside central cities, and non-metropolitan areas. Consequently, a classification scheme is necessary to measure the districts with a mixture of different types of population.3 Noragon (1972) concluded that the rural areas, as expected, lost seats from the equalpopulation redistricting, while the cities gained a few more seats than the suburbs. However, the decline of the central-city population in older big cities during the 1960s meant that the central-city gains would last only a few years. With the 1970 reapportionment and redistricting, the big-city seats declined and suburban seats continued to increase (Lehne, 1971; Congressional Quarterly, 1974; Schwab, 1976). Also, rural areas lost more seats. Table 1 shows these trends and includes data on the impact of the 1980 redistricting. The major trends of the 1970 redistricting continued with the 1980 redistricting. Big-city districts declined again. Now the number of big-city districts is considerably below the number before equal-population redistricting. Conversely, the suburbs continued to gain districts. The suburbs gained 50 seats from 1963 to 1983. The suburban plus urbansuburban representatives now comprise over one-third of the House membership. Similarly to the big cities, the rural areas lost seats after the 1980 redistricting. Equalpopulation redistricting and the population growth patterns cost the rural areas about onethird of their seats from the 1960s to the 1980s. The data also indicate a large increase in mixed districts. As the metropolitan areas grew, districts in the rural and mid-urban and rural categories shifted to the mixed category with a higher proportion of the population residing in metropolitan counties. TABLE 1. Shift of US House districts by demographic

type

Number of districts

l!X3 1967 1971 (before equal- (after equal- (after equulpopulation poplotion population redistricting) redistricting)0 redistri&zg)b Urban Mid.-urb.lrural Suburban Urb.-sub. Rural Mixed Subrural At-large

93 29 65 29 163 35 4 17

’ Data based on the 1960 census. b Data based on the 1970 census.

101 31 71 25 153 44 6 4

1973 (after 1970 redistricting)

1983 (after 1980 redistricting)

97

90

:; 31 131 48 10 ...

;; 35 128 47 12 ...

79 12 115 38 111 75 5 ...

LARRYM.

Impact

of reapportionment

SCHWAB

143

on party strength

Before the court-ordered redistricting of the 196Os, some observers suggested that the Democrats would gain from redistricting, especially outside the South, because of the shift of seats from rural areas to the cities. With the conclusion by some that malapportionment had little impact on the political process and the realization that the suburbs would eventually gain most of the new seats, other researchers questioned the Democratic-gain thesis and posited that either the Republicans would gain more or both parties would gain about equally (e.g. Hacker, 1964; Jacob, 1964). After the equal-population redistricting, several studies analyzed its partisan impact on the US House of Representatives. One study, for instance, concluded that the Republicans gained more of an advantage from the equal-population redistricting (Noragon, 1973). Another study extended the analysisto cover the 1960s equal-population redistricting and the 1970 reapportionment and redistricting, and found that neither party gained an advantage. The researcher, however, concluded that within the Democratic Party the liberal-moderate wing improved its strength a little in relation to the conservative wing because of the huge loss of rural southern seats (Schwab, 1980: 34-35). The purpose of the following section is to continue this area of research by extending it to the 1980 reapportionment. Did the Republicans or the Democrats gain in the 1982 election from the 1980 reapportionment? Florida (four), Texas (three), California (two), Arizona (one), Colorado (one), Nevada (one), New Mexico (one), Oregon (one), Tennessee (one), Utah (one) and Washington (one) gained seats from the 1980 reapportionment; while New York (five), Illinois (two), Ohio (two), Pennsylvania (two), Indiana (one), Massachusetts (one), Michigan (one), Missouri (one), New Jersey (one) and South Dakota (one) lost seats. To analyze which party gained more seats from reapportionment, the party of the winners in the 17 new seats and the party of the representatives in the 17 eliminated seats are examined. A new seat is defined as one in which a non-incumbent won in a district which did not exist in the 1980 election. An eliminated seat consists of one where either an incumbent retired and the district became part of other districts, or an incumbent lost to another incumbent when parts of their old districts were combined. In New Mexico, for instance, Manuel Lujan and Joe Skeen won the state’s two districts in 1980. With the addition of the extra seat in the 1982 election, New Mexico had three winners: Lujan, Skeen and Bill Richardson. Therefore, Richardson’s district was considered the new one. In New Jersey, Millicent Fenwick’s district was considered the eliminated one because she was the only incumbent not seeking re-election and her district was divided up into other districts. Many Republicans believed that their party would gain from the reapportionment because of the transfer of seats from more Democratic areas in northern cities to more Republican areas in the sunbelt. In fact, some Republicans even stated that the reapportionment of seats would be a major factor in their winning control of the House in the 1982 election (see Cohen, 1982). Data in Table 2, however, show that the Democrats won three more seats than they lost (+ 10 - 7 = + 3) from reapportionment. Since the Republicans controlled 10 of the 17 eliminated seats and won only seven of the new districts, they had a loss of three seats ( - 10 + 7 = - 3). Therefore, the Democrats made a net gain of six seats. The closeness of the election in the new Arizona district and one of the new Texas districts indicates that if 1982 had been more of a Republican year, the party split in Lhe new districts might have been fairly even. On the other hand, the large number of Democrats

TABLE 2. Party gains and losses from the seats shifted in the 1970 and 1980 reapportionments 1980 reapportionment New seats State

Democrat

Eliminated seats Vote (%) 1982

Republican

Ariz Calif

50 61 67 63 61 68 51 53 57 64 55

1

co1 Fla

Nev N. Mex aeg

1

Ut

1 :

Democrat

Republican 2

Ill Ind Mass

1

Mich

1

1

E; NY Ohio Pa SD Total:

1 1 2 2

3 2 7

1 10

66 61 50 65 77 57

Tenn Tex

Wash Total:

State

1970 reapportionment

Republican (winner 1972-1982)

Democrat (winner 1972-1982)

State

Ariz Calif co1 Fla Tex Total:

Split (Democrat and Republican won

1972-1982)State

Democrat

Republican

1

Ala Iowa NY ND Ohio Pa Tenn W. Va Wis Total:

1 2 1 1 1 1 7

1 1

1 4

Totul 1970 and 1980 reapportionments Eliminated seats

New seats Democrat

14

Republican

12

Split

2

Democrat

14

Republican

14

Sources: Table was compiled by analyzing data in the following: US Census Bureau, Congressional District Data Reports, Districts of the 92nd Congress, Congressional District Atlas: Districts of the 95th Congress, and Congressional District Atkzs: Di,rtricts of the 98th Congress; and Congressional Quarterly, CongressioMl Districts in the 197Os, 2nd ed., and State Politics and Redistricting, Parts I and II.

LARRYM. Scl-lwAB

145

winning with over SOper centofthe vote suggests that the Democrats’ good showing in the new districts was not just a fluke caused by a national Democratic trend in the election. ‘IX& 2 also contains data on the 1970 reapportionment. it also indicates that the shift of seats to the sunbelt has not produced the Republican bonanza which some observers had speculated. The Democrats hold a slight advantage in the transfer of seats. Since US parties contain ideological factions and the conservative coalition remains a powerful force in the House, an analysis of the ideological background of the representatives in the new and eliminated seats is useful. This is particularly significant because the South has gained many of the new districts. If most of the Democrats who won new districts vote with the conservatives, the conservative coalition rather than the moderate and liberal Democrats would receive more benefits. Also, the decline of the population in northern cities and the increase of population in the sunbelt led to some speculation that urban liberal seats would be transformed into conservative sunbelt seats by the 1980 reapportionment. TABJ_E

3. Ideological background of representatives

in the new and eliminated districts

New seats 1980 raapportbrament

Elimind& seats

n

f%)

LiberaF Dem. Moderate Dem, Conservative Derk

6 4 0

35 24 0

3 I 0

27 9 0

Lsfra&ub.

0

0

0

0

Moderate Repub. Conservative &pub. Split Dem.Repub. district Total:

1 6

6

0

35

5

0 45

2 11

99

17

loo

1980 reapportionment

1970” reupportionment n

*

(%) Liberaf iDem. Moderate I&m.

2 5

12 29

c#~rvativf~.

0

Liberal Repub. Moderate Repub. Conservative Repub.

B The ch$ic&on

tb

fs’,)

9 5 0 0 1 11

32 18 0 0

2 28

7 100

349

of the rqesenratives

d

f%)

2

27 if3

0

2

18

0 24

0 2

35

2

100

11

4” 6

3

1:: 18

18

Total:

1980ad 1970 reapportionment ~orn~~~e~

Liberat Dem. Moderate Dem, Conservative Dem. Liberal Repub, Moderate &pub. Conservative Repub. Split Dem.Repub. district Totai:

(%,>

1970b r&apportiaament

17

99 1__-

198Oand 1970 rea~o~~o~~~t corn&& n Liberal Dem. Moderate Dem. Conservative Dem. Liberal Repub. Moderate Repub. Conservative Repub.

Total:

: 2 0 6 8

28

-

@I I.8 2T 7 0 :;

100

in the 1970 new seats and I980 eliminated seats was based on the

mean for ADA scores from 1977 to 1981.

* The&ss&ation of the representatives in the 1970 eliminated seats was based on the mean for AI?A scores from 1969 ta 1971. c L&e&= Americans for Democratic Action (ADA] score of 80-100; moderate= 21-79 ADA score; conservative = O-20 ADA score.

146

Impact of the 1980 US reapportionment

Table 3 classifies representatives in the new and eliminated districts as liberal, moderate, and conservative Republicans and Democrats based on ratings from the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA).4 The data do not support the hypothesis that the snowbeltsunbelt population shift would eliminate liberal Democratic districts and create conservative Democratic and conservative Republican seats. The liberal Democrats lost only a few seats from the reapportionments of 1970 and 1980. More conservative Republicans lost seats than liberal Democrats. Among new seats, the moderate and liberal Democrats won several more than the conservative Republicans. None of the new seats has been won by conservative Democrats.

Impact

of redistricting

on party strength

The task here again is to determine if the Republicans gained over the Democrats. While the first section focused on the 34 new and eliminated districts in reapportionment, this section examines the partisan impact on the 1982 election of drawing the new lines in all the redistricted states. The effects of the transfer of the 34 reapportionment seats are also part of this section. The analysis here concentrates on redistricting in the individual states. Since the mostly Democratic big cities generally lost population and many suburban areas continued to grow, Republicans felt that they should gain from redistricting in many states. Although Democrats win in many suburban areas, Republicans certainly win much more in the suburbs than the big cities. Before examining some measures of party gain, two types of preliminary analysis are useful. First, some determination of party strength in the areas of population increase and decline is necessary. This type of measure is essential to determine which party began the redistricting process with more districts with increasing or decreasing population. Did the Republicans hold most of the growth districts? Did the Democrats control most of the declining districts? The party with most of the districts which lost population would face the redistricting process at a disadvantage. One way to analyze the population growth patterns is to compare the districts with the highest and lowest rates of population growth. Table 4 presents data on the regional and urban-suburban-rural background of the 50 districts with the greatest population gains and the 50 districts with the largest losses during the 1970s. Table 5 presents the party results in these districts for the elections from 1974 to 1980. The data indicate that most of the fastest-growing districts were suburban, rural and mixed districts in the South and West, while most of the districts losing population were bigcity districts in the Midwest and Northeast. 5 Since most big cities elect Democratic representatives, Democrats controlled 90 per cent of the bottom 50 districts in population growth. The parties split the top 50 districts from 1974 to 1980. The Democrats won the majority in 1974 and 1976, whereas the Republicans gained the majority in 1978 and 1980. However, the Republicans’ majority (60 per cent) in 1980 is significant because this was the last election before redistricting. Consequently, the Republicans did have an advantage in population growth patterns in the districts before the 1980 redistricting. They won 60 per cent of the fastest-growing districts in the 1980 election, while the Democrats controlled almost all of the districts with large population losses. So going into the redistricting process, a high proportion of the districts needing to add 100000 people or more to comply with states’ equal-population guidelines were Democratic seats in the big cities. The second preliminary analysis is to examine which party controlled the redistricting

LARRYi%. SCHWAB

147

TABLE 4.

Regional and democratic background of the top 50 and bottom 50 House districts in population growth, 1970-1980 South”

West

:

2 :

Midwest

Northeast

Top 50

3 2 26

0 2 0 0 0 0 2

:: 0 0

5 0 0

0 0 0

15 2 0

16 6 1

05

0

225

2;

Urban Suburban Urban-sub&au Mixed Rural Suburban-rural Total

3 4 8 3 22

Bottom 50 Urban Suburban Urban-suburban Total Rural

0 0 0

Source of population data: US Census Bureau, ‘1980 Census of Population and Housing: Advance Reports’, PHCBO-V-1; and US Census Bureau, Congressional i?istrict L&a Book:93rd Congress. a The classiication of the regions is as follows. South-Ala: Ark, Ga, Fla, Ky, &r, Miss, NC, Okla, SC, Term, Tex, Va, W.Va; West-Alas: Ariz, Calif, Col, HI, Ida, Mont, Nev, N Mex, Oreg. Ut, Wash, Wyo; Midwest-Ill: Ind, Ia, Kans, Mich, Minn, MO, Neb, ND, Ohio, S Dak, Wii; Northeast-C&n: Del, Me, Mass, Md, NH, NJ, NY, Pa, RI, Vt.

TABLE 5. Party control of the 50 House districts gaining and losing the most population,

1970-1980 1976

1974 Election victories SO top gainers Democrats

Republicans Total SO biggest losers Demwrats Repubiicaus Total

?a

28 :;

%

56 140:

1980

1978

n

56

n

%

29 21 50

58 42 100

24 26 50

48 52 100

44 6 50

88 12 100

45 5 50

90 10 100

1974-1980

71

%

R

%

:: 50

40 60 100

101 99 200

51 49 100

88

177

88

23 200

12 100

44 6

50

1;;

Source of population data: US Census Bureau, ‘ 1980 Census of Population and Housing: Advance Reports’, PHC80-V-I.

process in the states for the 1980 redistricting. A political party would have a great advantage in redistricting if it dominated most of the states during the redistricting process. Table 6 divides the state governments into Democratic-controlled, R~ubljcan-contro~ed and divided, based on whether one party held the governor’s office and a majority in both state legislative chambers. In addition, the table categorizes the resuits of the redistricting in these three groups of states into pro-Democratic, pro-Republican and bipartisan. The primary criteria for determining the partisan classification of the outcome are based on the

148

Impact of the 1980

US reapportionment

TABLE6. Partisan redistricting in the 1980 redistricting Redistricting results in state governments

Pro-Democratic

Bipartisan

Pro-Republican

Controlled by Democrats

Democratic seats Republican seats Total

30 28 58

71 32 103

0

0 0 0

3 6 9

19 23 42

19 23 42

88 70 158

0

0

Controlled by Republicans

Democratic seats Republican seats Total Divided party control

Democratic seats Republican seats Total

Source of information on redistricting: CongressionalQuart&, Redistricting’, Parts I and II.

‘State Politics and

following: the party of representatives in eliminated districts, the party of representatives forced to run against each other, and the party balance in new districts. In bipartisan states the incumbents of both parties are usually protected and neither party gained a significant advantage in eliminated districts, same-party incumbent races, and new districts. With the states where the courts decided the final outcome, the same criteria are used for the classification of the redistricting outcome. The data show a huge advantage for the Democrats in redistricting: only 5 1 districts were involved in pro-Republican redistricting. The pro-Democratic number is much higher primarily because of the Democratic gerrymander qf the California districts. Most of the districts are in the bipartisan category where incu&bepts of both parties are generally favored. Since the Democrats held the majority of seats in the bipartisan states, they gained an overall advantage in those states, through incumbency. Consequently, the Republicans held the advantage in population growth patterns and the Democrats had a more favorable position in the redistricting process. Of course, the Democrats in 1982 also had a more favorable national election trend in comparison to 1980. Now with the preliminary analysis completed, the next step is to examine if either party was able to use its advantages or capitalize on the opposition’s disadvantages to gain seats or increase their vote through redistricting. One way of testing for party advantage in redistricting is to follow what happened to the districts with the greater population gains and losses. Much of the action in redistricting revolves around attempts to add people to underpopulated districts and subtract people from overpopulated districts for partisan advantage. Since the Democrats won 44 of the 50 districts with the largest population loss (see Table 5) in the 1980 election and the Republicans won 30 of the 50 districts with the largest population gain, Republicans should have been able to pick up several districts in the redistricting of these 100 districts. To test whether the Republicans did make gains from the redistricting of the top and bottom 50 districts in population growth, each of these districts was followed through the 1980 redistricting process. Table 7 shows the outcome for the 50 bottom districts. The Democrats had an excellent record in maintaining their formerly underpopulated districts.

LARRYM. kHWAB TABLE 7. Party impact of the 1980 reapportionment the least population growth

and redistricting

1980 election Democrat Midwest Northeast SOUth

149

Republican

19 (19 Democrats mean vote2% = 77) 20 (20 Democrats mean vote4% = 77) 0 5 (5 Democrats mean vote % = 80)

of the 50 House districts with

1982 election Democrat

Republican

2 19 (19 Democrats mean vote % = 80) (18 DeALrats

mean vote4% = 79)

(5 Demkats

mean vote’% = 79)

They lost only two of their 44 districts in the bottom 50. These two districts were among the 17 districts eliminated through reapportionment. Also note the ability of the Democrats in these districts to still win with around an 80 per cent average after the addition in most cases of 100000 to 200000 new constituents. Representative Robert Garcia (D) might possibly be considered the champion at adapting to population additions in redistricting. Garcia’s district in New York City led all the House districts in percentage population decline during the 1970s. The district’s 50 per cent decline meant that it needed over 280000 more people in the 1980 redistricting. Garcia won the 1980 election with 98 per cent of the vote. Then in the 1982 election, after thousands of new people were added to the district, Garcia won with 99 per cent of the vote. The Democrats’ strong showing in the heavily underpopulated districts was not only helped by favorable redistricting, but also by civil rights laws. Democratic congressmen from minority groups represented several of the districts which lost thousands of people. The protection of these minority-controlled seats was often aided by the possibility of a legal challenge or the rejection of a state’s redistricting plan by the Justice Department. Also, the high proportion of Democratic voters in central cities contributed to the Democrats’ success. These districts are so heavily Democratic that even the addition of new areas still placed the Republican challengers at a severe disadvantage. Following the top 50 districts in population gain leads to the 17 new seats created by reapportionment. Forty of the 50 top districts were in the states gaining seats in the reapportionment. Primarily, the excess population in the highly overpopulated districts was placed either in the new districts or in old districts, thus allowing parts of these old districts to form the new ones. The redistricting of the other 10 seats did not effect a party gain for either party. Since the Republicans won three fewer seats than the Democrats among the 17 new seats and the Democrats only lost two among the bottom 50 districts, the Republicans failed to capitalize on their favored position in the bottom and top 50 districts in population growth. Another way to measure party gains and losses is to broaden the perspective and analyze all the redistricted seats in the states which experienced a shift in party balance. The purpose of this part of the study is to first examine how many of the districts that shifted from one party to the other were affected by redistricting and apportionment; and then compute which party gained more of these districts. Table 8 shows the number of party switches which were affected by reapportionment and redistricting. A partisan change in the election is considered to have been affected by redistricting (includes the 34 seats involved in reapportionment) in the following situations:

Impact of the 1980

150 TABLE 8.

US

reapportionment

Impact of reapportionment and redistricting on seats gained and lost by the parties, 1982

election Changes in party seats 1980 to 1982 elections

Number of party seats (before redistricting) with low population growth” Democrat

Repub.

State

Ala Ariz Calif Fla Ill Ind Mass Mich Minn Miss MO Nev

NJ

N Mex NY NC Ohio @eg Pa SC S Dak Tenn Tex Ut Va Wash WVa

0 0 8 :

3 8 6 2 0 4 0 5 0 20 0 7 1 10 0 1 1 2 0 0 1 0

0 0

3 0 3 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 10 0 6 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0

Democrat

RepubLican

1980

1982

1980

1982

42 22 11

25 28

23 21

: 17

13 12 5 10 12

4 14 5 2 :

6 10 5 1 6 5

46 1 8 0 22 7 10 3 12 2 1 5

4: 1 9 1 20 9 10 3 13 3 1 6

61 0 7 2 17 4 13 1 13 4 :

: 1 5 2 14 2 11 2 10 3 0 3

190 1 5 2

220 4 5 4

05 9 2 2

: 6 3 0

10 6 10 12 3

Party changes affected by redistricting

Party changes affected by reapportionmentb

D +2D +2D/+2R -2R -lD -lR -lD +1

+2D/-2R +lD/-IR +lR +1 D/-l +lD/-1R

R

+lD/-1R -1 D/+1 R

-lR +lR -lR +lD -3D/-2R -2R +lR -2D -lR +lD +3D +lR +lR

a Districts with population loss or 4.0 per cent or less of population growth during the 1970s. ’ These districts would also be affected by redistricting. The purpose of this column is to differentiate districts involved in the reapportionment from the other party changes affected by redistricting.

the 34

(1) creation of a new district, (2) elimination of a district, (3) an election between two incumbents, and (4) a defeated candidate with a lower vote percentage in the new areas (new from the 1980 redistricting) of the district as compared to the old areas (held over from the 1970 redistricting).(j This last criterion provides a method to estimate whether the election outcome was affected by redistricting or just by electoral trends. Party switches which do not meet these criteria are considered to have been caused primarily by electoral trends.’ The table also contains data on partisan control (before redistricting) of each state’s districts with population loss or low population growth (4.0 per cent or less). This provides some perspective on the relative advantage or disadvantage of the parties going into the redistricting. The new district from reapportionment was the major change in Arizona. John McNulty (D) won the new seat in a close race.*

LARRYM. SCHWAB

151

The most important gerrymandering in the country occurred in California. The Democrats under the guidance of Phillip Burton drastically changed many of the districts to benefit their party. They accomplished this even though Democratic representatives held most of the underpopulated districts. From the 1980 to 1982 elections, the partisan balance shifted from a 22 to 21 Democratic advantage to a 28 to 17 split. Most of the Republican losses and the Democratic gains can be related to redistricting. The gerrymandering destroyed several Republican districts and created five new districts. Democrats won four of those new districts. The redistricting forced John Rousselot (R) into a race against a Democratic incumbent. Rousselot lost in this district which was drawn to favor his opponent. In addition, Wayne Grisham (R) lost to David Dreier (R) in the primary after the gerrymandering placed these incumbents in the same district. Reapportionment created a new fifth district in Colorado. This district was Colorado’s addition from reapportionment. A Republican easily won the seat. Redistricting had little impact on the elections in the 15 old districts in Florida. The big change was the addition of four new districts from reapportionment. The parties each won two of the new districts. Democrats received a surprise redistricting victory in Illinois. After months of party wrangling, a federal court drew the redistricting map. To the Republicans’ dismay, it favored the Democrats. While Democrats held most of the underpopulated districts, both seats eliminated for reapportionment were held by suburban Chicago Republicans. These losses were especially upsetting to the Republicans because almost all the Democratic Chicago districts lost population, whereas some Republican suburban districts increased their population significantly. Furthermore, Paul Findley (R) lost in a downstate race which was affected by redistricting. He ran ahead of his opponent in the old counties of the district, but he lost by several thousand votes in the new counties. Indiana Republicans eliminated two Democratic districts and created a new district which a Republican won easily. Their redistricting efforts, however, failed to defeat other Democratic incumbents. Also, a Republican incumbent lost in a race where redistricting had little impact. The major effect of redistricting in Massachusetts was to force incumbent Barney Frank (D) into the same district with incumbent Margaret Heckler (R). This was the way Massachusetts eliminated the district the state lost from reapportionment. Frank won despite the fact the district contained a high proportion of Heckler’s former constituents. As in several other states, Democrats in Michigan fared well with redistricting even though they held the districts which lost population. After the 1982 election, the Democratic delegation was still 12 and the Republicans dropped from seven to six. Although the court-ordered redistricting plan eliminated a Democratic seat (the seat Michigan lost in reapportionment), Bob Car-r (D) defeated Jim Dunn (R) in a contest heavily influenced by redistricting. Dunn beat Carr in the old counties of the districts, but he lost by 10 000 votes in an area in Oakland county which redistricting added to the district. Two incumbent Republicans in Minnesota lost in heavily redistricted districts. The additional territory aided the Democrats’ victory in one of the races. In Missouri, the Democrats entered redistricting with all of the state’s districts which lost population and saved all of their seats. To eliminate the district the state lost in reapportionment, an incumbent Republican was forced to run against an incumbent Democrat in a district favoring the Democrat. The Republican lost by about 15 000 votes. Nevada received a second seat from reapportionment. The incumbent Democrat ran for the Senate and a Republican and a Democrat won the seats. The New Jersey Democrats had some success with their attempt at a partisan gerry-

152

Impact of the 1980 US reapportionment

mander. They eliminated one Republican district to comply with the reduction of one seat required by reapportionment. New York is yet another example of a state where the Democrats held most of the districts with population loss (primarily in New York City) and still ended up increasing their lead over the Republicans in the state delegation. To eliminate four seats for reapportionment, the two parties agreed to combine two sets of Democratic incumbents and two sets of Republican incumbents. For the fifth seat, the parties agreed to combine a Republican and Democratic incumbent in one district for a fair match. Although Benjamin Gilman (R) won the Democrat-Republican matched race, the Democrats still widened the party gap by one because Robert Mrazek (D) beat incumbent John LeBoutillier (R) in a redistricted seat. LeBoutillier lost badly in the Suffolk County part of the district which was not in his old district. After months of political battles, the two parties in Ohio agreed to eliminate one Democratic seat in Cuyahoga County by combining Dermis Eckart’s (D) and Ron Mottl’s (D) suburban Cleveland districts and one Republican seat (whose incumbent ran for Governor) in central Ohio by dividing it into other districts. The Democrats, however, ended up forcing both losses on the Republicans when J. William Stanton (R), the incumbent in the district east of Cuyahoga County, decided to retire for health reasons. Eckart moved into Stanton’s district and easily won the election. So the Democrats ended with the same number of representatives in Northeastern Ohio. Two other Ohio districts changed parties with the defeat of incumbents, a Republican in the Toledo area and a Democrat in the Columbus area. Ed Weber’s (R) loss in Toledo was mostly from election trends and not redistricting, whereas Bob Shamansky (D) was hurt by redistricting in his Columbus district. Republicans drew the districts in Pennsylvania. They eliminated two Democratic districts to cover the losses from reapportionment. Despite other attempts to aid their party, four incumbent Republicans lost their seats. Most of these losses, however, were primarily affected by changes in electoral patterns rather than redistricting. The loss of one seat in South Dakota from reapportionment created a race between the incumbent Republican and Democrat for the one remaining at-large district. The Democrat won the contest. ln New Mexico, Oregon, Tennessee, Texas, Utah and Washington the major development was the addition of seats from reapportionment. Democrats won the new seats in New Mexico, Tennessee and Texas, while Republicans won in Oregon, Utah and Washington. Democrats picked up eight seats in election victories in North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia and West Virginia, but redistricting had little impact on the results. Overall, the Democrats gained more from redistricting than the Republicans. They entered the redistricting process with most of the seats with large population losses and managed to hold almost every one of these seats. Besides the Democrats’ advantage in the reapportionment seats, Table 8 shows that they gained six seats in elections affected by redistricting while the Republicans won only two.

Impact

on incumbents

While some incumbents in 1982 ran in districts with only slight changes in their constituency, seven others ran in districts with over 200000 new people. Most of them campaigned in districts somewhere in between these extremes. Incumbents with a high proportion of the same constituents would seem to have an advantage in an election over their colleagues with many new voters from redistricting. The reelection chances of

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153

incumbents, however, would be strengthened if redistricting added many new people who were more likely to vote for them. In a study of previous redistricting, Charles Bullock (1975) concluded that redistricting had little impact, particularly an adverse impact, on House incumbents. Several measures are applied in this section to test Bullock’s hypothesis on the 1980 redistricting. For the analysis, the population of the incumbents’ districts is compared before and after redistricting. The districts are then divided into the categories of little, moderate or large change based on the amount of population change in the districts from redistricting. Incumbents have 91 per cent or more of their old district population in the little-change category, 81-90 per cent in the moderate-change category, and 80 per cent or less in the large-change category.9 Just the districts with little and large changes, however, are used in the computations. The incumbents are divided into three groups: winning, retiring and losing. The effects of redistricting on each of these sets of incumbents are examined below. The analysis of the winning incumbents focuses on the increase or decrease of the votes of incumbents gaining reelection in the districts with large changes from redistricting. If redistricting has little adverse impact on incumbents’ elections in large-change districts, their 1982 vote should be fairly even with their 1980 vote (in comparison with the national election trends) and the incumbents’ vote in the little-change districts. Tables 9, IO, 11 and 12 present data on the 1980 and 1982 vote in the districts with little or large changes from redistricting. The 1980 vote (and the 1978 vote in Table 10) is included as a pre-test to show the voting patterns in the little- and large-change districts before redistricting. Table 9 compares the mean vote percentage of the election in the two redistricting categories. Table 10 presents the same data with party as a control variable. In Table 11 a comparison is presented between the correlation coefficients of the voting percentage of TABLE 9. Impact of redistricting on the vote of House incumbents winning in the 1980 and 1982 elections Districts wih little redistricting change

Districts with large redistricting change

69.6” (149)b 71.6 (149)

69.2 (137) 70.3 (137)

1980 1982

’ Mean vote percentage.

b Numberof districts.

TABLE 10. Impact of redistricting on the vote of House incumbents winning in the 1980 and 1982 elections, control for party Democratic districts

1980 1982

Little change

Large change

69.6” 75.1

71.7 74.8

’ Mean vote percentage.

Republican d&tits Little change 69.7 67.1

Large change 65.1 63.1

Impact of the 1980 US reapportionment

154

TABLE 11. Correlation of the vote of House with large winning in districts incumbents redistricting changes, 1978, 1980, 1982 elections Pearson ‘s correkztion coefficient

n

0.89 0.90

112 112

1978-1980 1980-1982

TABLE 12. Comparison of districts with little or large redistricting number of elections with a big vote loss, 1980 to 1982 elections

changes in the

Number of winning incumbentsa Democratic districts Percentage decline in vote, 1980 to 1982

Republican districts

Little change

Large change

Little change

barge change

6-10% 11% or more

5 3

5 4

8 11

10 10

rl Districts where the incumbent election were not included.

ran unopposed or received 99.5 % or more of the vote in either

winning incumbents from large-change districts in the 1978 and 1980 elections, and the 1980 and 1982 elections. Finally, Table 12 presents data on the number of winning incumbents in the little- and large-change categories whose vote percentage dropped considerably from 1980 to 1982. The data in the tables support Bullock’s findings that redistricting has little adverse effect on incumbents. Only a small difference exists in the changes in votes between the winning incumbents’ districts with small and big alterations from redistricting. Republicans with little and large changes in their districts averaged a similar decline in vote. The Democrats in these two categories increased their vote by a fairly similar amount although the increase in the little-change districts was slightly higher. Table 11 shows high correlations for the two sets of election percentages in the districts with large redistricting changes. This indicates that most incumbents in these districts won by a fairly similar vote percentage in the 1978, 1980 and 1982 elections; so the winning incumbents’ vote percentage in large-change districts did not change much after redistricting. Moreover, Table 12 indicates that the number of winning incumbents (excluding unopposed races) with large vote declines from 1980 to 1982 were almost evenly distributed between the two categories. The number of winning incumbents with substantial vote losses were not concentrated in the large-change seats. The next group of representatives to examine are the incumbents who retired before the 1982 election. Redistricting might affect the first post-redistricting election of each decade by significantly increasing the numbers of incumbents retiring. Many incumbents might want to retire rather than face an election in a district changed by redistricting. Measuring the impact of redistricting on the decision to retire is difficult without detailed interviews from each of the incumbents not seeking re-election. However, statistical records can provide some useful data to examine redistricting effects.

LARRY

M. SCHWAB

One way to analyze the impact of redistricting

155

is to compare the number of retirements

in

1982with previous years. While the 40 retirements in 1982 were six more than in 1980, this is below the retirements for 1974, 1976 and 1978. So the retirements in 1982 were below the average for 1974-1980 (see Buchanan, 1980; Hibbling, 1982a,b). Certainly, redistricting affected the decision of a few incumbents to not seek m-election. The situations of some retirees suggest that their retirement was strongly influenced by redistricting. Two California Republicans, for instance, had their districts drastically altered in the Democratic gerrymander. Three other incumbents decided to retire after they were placed in the same district with an incumbent of their own party (see Congressional Qu&erly, 1982, I: 104; II: 37, 45). In contrast to the few retiring incumbents who faced difficult redistricting situations, most of the 40 retirees held safe seats in states with either a partisan redistricting in their favor or a bipartisan redistricting which largely protected incumbents. Only seven were in the opposition party in states with either pro-Democratic or pro-Republican gerrymandering. Twenty-nine of them won with 65 per cent or more of the vote in the 1980 elections, while 25 won with 70 per cent or more. To sum up, the data indicate that only a few retirements were influenced by redistricting. Retirements in 1982 were equal to or below the number in the elections in the 1970s and most of those retiring were in situations where redistricting could not harm them very much. Ten incumbents lost their seats in primaries, and 29 incumbents lost their seats in the 1982 election. How many of these defeats were affected by reapportionment and redistricting? Table 13 presents the percentage of losing incumbents in the categories based on how much the district changed by redistricting, while Table 14 compares incumbent losses in 1982 (primaries and general election) affected by redistricting and those primarily determined by election trends. lo The determination of redistricting impact in Table 14 is the same as the method used in Table 8.

TABLE 13.

Comparison of the percentage of incumbents defeated in districts with little or large change in redistricting, 1982 election Districts with little redistricting change

Districts with large redistticting change

5.8

6.0

Percentage of incumbents defeated in incumbent vs. non-incumbent races

TABLE 14. Impact of redistricting on House incumbents losing in the 1982 Primaries and General Election

Number of incumbents’ defeats affected by redistricting Incumbent vs. incumbent race

Incumbent vs. non-incumbent race

Number of incumbents ’ &feats not affected by redistricti@

12

7

18

u Two undetermined races are not in the table.

156

Impact of the 1980 US reapportionment

The interpretation of the data in these tables depends on what the number of defeats affected by redistricting is compared with in the analysis. The data support Bullock’s conclusion that redistricting affects the defeat of only a small number of incumbents in incumbent-versus-non-incumbent contests. The percentage of losses by incumbents in little- and large-change districts is about the same. And only seven defeats besides the 12 incumbent-versus-incumbent losses were strongly influenced by redistricting. On the other hand, the defeats influenced by redistricting comprise a substantial proportion (19 of 39) of the total number of defeats. Since so few House incumbents lose, the outcome of elections in a small portion of the total will determine the size of a party’s gain or loss. Therefore, just focusing on the proportion of the defeats affected by redistricting in relationship to the total number of races minimizes the impact of redistricting.

Conclusion The 1980 reapportionment and redistricting continued the trends toward more districts in the South and West, and the suburbs. The central cities and rural areas lost more seats. No support was found for the hypothesis that the decline of population in the Northern cities and the increase of population in the sunbelt would shift seats from the liberal Democrats to conservative Republicans. The House Democrats hold a slight advantage in the districts created by the 1970 and 1980 reapportionments. While Democrats held most of the Northern urban districts which lost so many people, the Republicans held the majority of eliminated seats. The Democrats were successful in the eliminated districts for several reasons. First, some states ended up with a bipartisan compromise whereby the Democrats and Republicans shared in the eliminated districts. Consequently, the Republicans were forced to share in the losses even though Democrats controlled most of the underpopulated districts. Second, civil rights laws helped the Democrats protect the minority-controlled districts which had large population declines. Third, the Democrats got favorable court-ordered redistricting plans in several of the states which needed to eliminate districts. The Democrats won the majority of the new seats primarily because of their success in California, Texas and Florida. These states received a majority of the new seats and Democrats won most of them. The Democratic gerrymander in California gave the Democrats the two new seats even though Republican representatives held a majority of the districts with large population increases. As long as most of the new sunbelt seats continue to go to California, Texas and Florida, there seems to be little chance that the Republicans will make significant gains over Democrats. Democrats win a high proportion of the Texas and Florida seats, and they often win a majority of the California seats. The Democrats winning the new sunbelt seats are not predominantly conservatives. Most of them are moderates and liberals. Looking at the 1982 House election from the standpoint of 435 election contests, reapportionment and redistricting had only a small impact on the election. Most incumbents ran for re-election and won easily regardless of how redistricting affected their district. A high proportion of the incumbents running in districts drastically changed by redistricting won by a vote percentage similar to their 1980 victory. Only a small number of incumbents lost in races with outcomes influenced by changes in the district lines. From the perspective of the 26-seat gain scored by the Democrats, however, the small number of races affected by reapportionment and redistricting becomes important. The Democrats entered the reapportionment and redistricting processes with the disadvantage of holding most of the heavily underpopulated districts and less than half of the heavily over-

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157

populated districts. They emerged with a net gain of six seats from reapportionment and won most of the redistricting-influenced races. They maintained almost all of their districts which had lost population in the 1970s. Much of the discussion before the 1982 House election focused on the size of the moderate-and-liberal Democratic bloc versus the conservative coalition. Many observers believed that a Democratic gain of only five to ten seats would slightly wound the conservative coalition, whereas a 20- to 35-seat victory would significantly strengthen the moderate to liberal Democrats. Consequently, the aid reapportionment and redistricting gave the Democrats in pushing the total increase to 26 had an important impact.

Notes 1. For background on reapportionment and redistricting in the US House of Representatives, see: Hacker, 1964; Lehne, 1969, 1971; Cummings, 1971; Mayhew, 1971; Noragon, 1972; Congressional Quarter&, 1974, 1982; Bullock, 1975, 1982; Schwab, 1976; Morrill, 1981, 1982; Backstrom, 1982; Grofman, 1982. 2. The classification scheme for the districts is: Urban-55 per cent or more of the population of the district is in the central city of a Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA); Suburban5 5 per cent or more of the population of the district is in the area outside the central city of an SMSA, and the district is part of an SMSA with a central city of at least 250 000 population; Rural-55 per cent or more of the population is outside of an SMSA. Or: 50 per cent or more of the population is in rural (Census Bureau’s definition) areas; Urban-Suburban-80 per cent or more of the population of the district is in an SMSA, 30-54 per cent in central city, and 30-54 per cent outside of it; Mid-urban and Rural-the district has a central city of 90 000 to 250 000 people and less than 30 per cent outside the central city of an SMSA; Suburban-Rural-80 per cent or more of the population is outside the central city of an SMSA (SMSA’s central city has at least 250 000 people), 30-54 per cent is outside the central city of the SMSA, and 30-54 per cent is outside the SMSA; Mixed-those districts that do not meet the above criteria. (These districts contain central-city, suburban, and non-metropolitan areas.) The data came from Census Bureau statistics (US Bureau of the Census, 1963, 1971, 1973, 1983b) and Congressional Quurterly publications (Congressional Quarterly, 1964, 1974). 3. For examples of other population classification schemes of House districts, see Hacker (1964) and Lehne (1969). 4. Since no 1983 ADA ratings are available at this time, the classification of the new representatives from the 1980 reapportionment was based on 17 roll-call votes (e.g. American Conservation Corps, Social Security, nuclear freeze, MX missile, and jobs bills) cast from January to October 1983. I determined whether a Yes or No vote was a liberal vote on these roll-calls by examining past positions taken by the ADA. 5. The demographic classification of the districts was based on the population composition of the districts in 1972. Population changes during the 1970s might have altered the classification of a few of the districts. 6. In the comparison of the vote in the district’s old and new areas, an election rate was classified as being affected by redistricting if the gains of the winner in the new areas amounted to 50 per cent or more of the difference in total vote between the candidates. 7. The determination of the impact of redistricting was not completed in two districts. I was unable to acquire the election records in one district. In the other one, the district just lost population from redistricting and therefore a comparison of the vote in the old and new areas was impossible. 8. Besides the data in Table 8, this section utilizes information from Congressional Quurterly (1982), and Duncan (1982). 9. Data from US Bureau of the Census (1977, 1983a, b) were utilized to classify the districts. 10. I was unable to determine the classification of elections in two districts. See Note 7 above.

158

Impact

of the 1980

US reapportionment

References BACKSTROM,C. (1982). The practice and effect of redistricting. Political Geography Quarter!~ 1, 351-359. BUCHANAN, C. (1980). Congressional retirement drops in 1980. CongressionalQuarterly Weekly Report 38,80. BULLOCK,C. (1975). Redistricting and congressional stability, 1962-1972. Journal o/Politics 37, 569-575. BULLOCK,C. (1982). The inexact science of congressional redistricting. PS 15, 431-438. COHEN,R. (1982). Despite map maker’s best efforts, redistricting won’t help either party. National Journal 14, 752-756. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY(1964). CQ census analysis: congressional districts of the United States. Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 22, 1783-1894. CONGRESSIONALQUARTERLY(1974). Congressional Districts in the 1970s. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY(1982). State Politics and Redistricting, Part I and II. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly. CUMMINGS,M. (1971). Reapportionment in the 1970s: its effects on congress. In Reapportionment in the 1970s (N. Polsby, ed.) pp. 209-241. Berkeley, Calif: University of California Press. DUNCAN, P. (1982). House vote: a major midterm setback for the Republicans. Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 39, 2780-2788. GROFMAN, B. (1982). Reformers, politicians, and the courts: a preliminary look at US redistricting in the 1980s. Political Geography Quurterb 1, 303-316. HACKER, A. (1964). Congressional Districting, rev. ed. Washington, DC: Brookings Institute. HIBBLING,J. (1982a). Voluntary retirement from the US House: the costs of congressional service. Lgislative Studies Qwrterb 7, 57-74. mBLlNG, J. (1982b). Voluntary retirements from the US House of Representatives: who quits? American Journl of Political Science 26,467-484. JACOB, H. (1964). The consequences of malapportionment: a note of caution. Social Forces 43, 256-261. LEHNE, R. (1969). Shape of the future. National Civic Review 58, 351-355. LEHNE, R. (1971). Representation in Congress: a projection for 1972. National Civic Review 60, 372-376. MAYHEW, D. (1971). Congressional representation: theory and practice in drawing the districts. In Reapportionment in the 1970s (N. Polsby, ed.) pp. 249-285. Berkeley, Calif: University of California Press. MORRILL,R. (1981). Political Redistricting and Geographic Theory. Washington, DC: Association of American Geographers. MORRILL, R. (1982). Redistricting standards and strategies after 20 years. Political Geography Quarterly 1, 361-369. NORAGON,J. (1972). Congressional redistricting and population composition, 1964-1970. Midwest Journal of Political Science 16, 295-302. NORAGON,J. (1973). Redistricting, political outcomes, and gerrymandering in the 1960s. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 219, 314-333. SCHWAB,L. (1976). The impact of equal-population redistricting on the House of Representatives: a district, state and regional analysis. Capital Studies 4, 67-84. SCHWAB, L. (1980). Changing Patterns of Congressional Politics. New York: D. Van Nostrand. US BUREAU OF THE CENSUS(1963). Congressional District Data Book: 88th Congress. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office. US BUREAUOF THE CENSUS(1971). Congressional District Data Book: 92nd Congress. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office. US BUREAU OF THE CENSUS(1973). Congressional District Data Book: 93rd Congress. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office. US BUREAUOFTHE CENSUS (1977). CongressionalDistrict Atlas: Districts of the 9_%bCongress. Washington, DC: US Printing Office. US BUREAUOF THE CENSUS (1983a). Congressional District Atlas: Districts of the 98tb Congress. Washington, DC: US Printing Office. US BUREAUOF THE CENSUS (1983b). Congressional Districts of the 98th Congress. Washington, DC: US Printing Office.