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The impact of the Fukushima nuclear accident on European energy policy
environmental science & policy 15 (2012) 1–3
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/envsci
Short communication
The impact of the Fukushima nuclear accident on European energy policy Bettina B.F. Wittneben * Smith School of Enterprise and the Environment, University of Oxford, 75 George Street, Oxford OX1 2BQ, United Kingdom
article info Published on line 20 November 2011 Keywords: Nuclear power generation Energy policy Germany UK
abstract The disaster that struck the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant in Japan has reignited the international debate on the future of nuclear energy. Interestingly, the incident has been used to both justify nuclear power generation and reconsider past decisions made on established or planned nuclear power sites. Geographically removed from the radioactive fallout, Europe’s response to the massive nuclear accident differed greatly among the member states. The UK and Germany stand out as examples of the wide spread of policy response to the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident. In the UK, policy makers remained firm on their decision to increase nuclear power generation in the near future, whereas in Germany, the federal government decided to at least temporarily shut down the old generation of nuclear reactors and reexamine the safety of all national nuclear power facilities. Furthermore, a regional voter backlash, fuelled by resentment of the Merkel government’s previous commitment to nuclear power, dealt a serious blow to the ruling coalition parties. How can national policy responses to the same event be so divergent in two European countries? This article attempts to answer this question in five arguments. I argue that in contrast to the UK, the German public faced imminent elections, stronger media reporting, increasing trust in renewable technologies, a history of nuclear resistance and a feeling of close cultural proximity to the Japanese. # 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1.
Imminent elections
The regional elections in Baden-Wu¨rttemberg and RheinlandPfalz roughly two weeks after the Japan earthquake meant that the national political response to the Fukushima accident would directly affect the regional candidates of the ruling coalition parties. In particular, the Merkel administration had to justify immediately the government’s previous firm support for nuclear power. Her government had brought a drastic change in German nuclear energy policy when she decided to significantly extend the lifespan of reactors.
In the UK, on the other hand, there were no elections immediately following the Fukushima disaster, so the government’s response did not have to appease voters in the short-term.
2.
Intensity of media reports
In Germany reports from the print and television media on the Fukushima accident were in-depth and dominated headlines for weeks. It seemed that the aim was to turn every citizen into a nuclear physicist to ensure everyone understands what
* Tel.: +44 1865 614 918. E-mail address: [email protected]. 1462-9011/$ – see front matter # 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.envsci.2011.09.002
2
environmental science & policy 15 (2012) 1–3
exactly went wrong at the power plant. Armed with this new knowledge, the public was able to demand more transparency on the operation of German reactors. In Britain reports were also frequent but soon took second place to reporting on Libya, where UK troops were directly involved. The British media reporting was also less drastic, shying away from calling events at Fukushima a catastrophe.
3.
Trust in renewable energy innovation
Germany has established itself as a leader in renewable energy technology and generation (Wassener, 2010). Energy generation from renewable energy sources has quadrupled since 1990. This has created a considerable number of new jobs and economic wealth. Renewable energy generation is therefore a growth sector and economic barriers to the technologies have been lifted. In the UK renewable energy generation is still well below its potential and is perceived as a high cost alternative to traditional energy sources. This perception pits nuclear power generation against carbon-intensive alternatives. The resulting zero-sum game points to an increase in carbon emissions with a decrease in nuclear power generation. Hence a critique of nuclear energy will be perceived as necessarily increasing the risk of dangerous climate change.
4.
History of nuclear resistance
During the Cold War various WWII allies hosted nuclear missiles within German borders often pointing at each other. Resistance to nuclear weapons in Germany was paramount during that time, especially in the generation that was educated in pacifist ideals after WWII. The anti-nuclear weapons sentiment fed into the anti-nuclear power movement that resulted in Germany’s declared phase-out of nuclear energy generation under Chancellor Schroeder. The nuclear power ‘renaissance’ in recent years and clever political lobbying by the utility companies have led to a change of this policy direction under the Merkel government. Reactions to the Fukushima accident brought out seasoned activists as well as a shocked public to once again demonstrate against nuclear power. The German language has an acronym for a nuclear accident: ‘GAU’ stands for ‘gro¨ßter anzunehmender Unfall’, roughly translates as ‘largest conceivable accident’. Fukushima was labelled a ‘Super-GAU’ which is easy to communicate and brings home a drastic message. In Britain nuclear weapons are more likely to be seen as a deterrent employed in the interest of national security. The legacy of the British experimentation with nuclear weapons is still evident in the massive amounts of remaining nuclear waste from military operations (Pagnamenta, 2010). Although the UK also has a strong green energy movement, it is by far not as pervasive and powerful as the one in Germany.
5.
Perceived cultural proximity
Despite holding vastly different traditions and probably never having travelled to this country, Germans feel a close
cultural proximity to Japan. In fact, they may even see the Japanese as ‘better Germans’. Both countries had to rebuild their infrastructure and identity after WWII and both countries pride themselves in quality engineering and efficiency. This perceived cultural proximity brought one very vivid image to mind: if an unexpected nuclear accident can happen in Japan, it can happen in Germany. This conclusion was more based on an expectation of engineering knowledge and quality control than proneness to earthquakes or hosting the same type of reactors, such as in the United States (Wald, 2011). The geographic distance of Japan to Europe is much more apparent in Britain, where the public is more likely to feel culturally connected to English-speaking Western nations than to Japan. Since any radioactive contamination is unlikely to reach Britain, the public did not become too concerned. The Fukushima accident has significantly changed the political landscape surrounding nuclear power. A strong commitment to nuclear despite the Japanese crisis is as much a signal to the market as a struggle to undo past nuclear energy policies. The decisions impact the prices of energy, carbon and uranium (McDonald, 2011). A change in national energy policy also affects CO2 emissions, technological innovation, national competitiveness and corporate policies. As the UK and Germany set out in different directions regarding nuclear power, companies operating in both countries will need to take a position or attempt to reconcile the different pathways. In two important regions of the German federation, voters came out against nuclear power. They did not trust that staunch supporters of nuclear power would seriously challenge utilities to increase nuclear safety post Fukushima. Instead, they brought in a new government. Some of those same companies will be able to breathe more easily in London, where their world has not been turned upside down. The German public demands transparency in nuclear safety issues post Fukushima. This has shifted the boundaries of risk management from solely concerning corporations and state into the public realm. The NIMBY (Not-In-My-Back-Yard) notion has expanded to encompass all of Germany and its neighbouring countries. Interactive graphics on media websites provide technical details on power plants and their safety precautions. There is a sense that neither the companies nor the government can be trusted to operate nuclear facilities safely. Not after Fukushima. Another message the Japanese crisis brings to Germany is that the costs of nuclear power may be vastly underestimated. An accident of the magnitude of Fukushima brings immense costs with it. Interestingly, neither insurance companies nor re-insurance companies saw their stocks tumbling after the nuclear power plant burst out of its containment. Although the earthquake brought down insurance companies’ stock prices, Agence France Presse (2011) is quoting Munich Re, an international re-insurance company, as stating that the subsequent crisis at Fukushima No. 1 ‘‘will probably not significantly affect private insurers’’. The Japanese taxpayer and the company, as long as it is still solvent, will have to pick up the bill for years of clean-up, population relocation and health issues (see McCurry, 2011). All because Fukushima is in fact beyond the ‘largest conceivable accident’.
environmental science & policy 15 (2012) 1–3
references
Agence France Presse, 2011. Japanese Crises Hit European Energy and Insurance Shares. (14 March). McCurry, J., 2011. Nuclear industry: tsunami-hit Fukushima plant reveals £9. 5 bn loss. The Guardian (21 May).
McDonald, H., 2011. Japan’s shock vibrates around the world. Sydney Morning Herald (26 March). Pagnamenta, R., 2010. Sellafield considers cull as seabirds swim in ponds of radioactive waste. The Times (25 February). Wald, M., 2011. N.R.C. lowers estimate of how many would die in meltdown. The New York Times (30 July). Wassener, B., 2010. Wind power still driving old shipyard. The International Herald Tribune (3 May).
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Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/envsci
Short communication
The impact of the Fukushima nuclear accident on European energy policy Bettina B.F. Wittneben * Smith School of Enterprise and the Environment, University of Oxford, 75 George Street, Oxford OX1 2BQ, United Kingdom
article info Published on line 20 November 2011 Keywords: Nuclear power generation Energy policy Germany UK
abstract The disaster that struck the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant in Japan has reignited the international debate on the future of nuclear energy. Interestingly, the incident has been used to both justify nuclear power generation and reconsider past decisions made on established or planned nuclear power sites. Geographically removed from the radioactive fallout, Europe’s response to the massive nuclear accident differed greatly among the member states. The UK and Germany stand out as examples of the wide spread of policy response to the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident. In the UK, policy makers remained firm on their decision to increase nuclear power generation in the near future, whereas in Germany, the federal government decided to at least temporarily shut down the old generation of nuclear reactors and reexamine the safety of all national nuclear power facilities. Furthermore, a regional voter backlash, fuelled by resentment of the Merkel government’s previous commitment to nuclear power, dealt a serious blow to the ruling coalition parties. How can national policy responses to the same event be so divergent in two European countries? This article attempts to answer this question in five arguments. I argue that in contrast to the UK, the German public faced imminent elections, stronger media reporting, increasing trust in renewable technologies, a history of nuclear resistance and a feeling of close cultural proximity to the Japanese. # 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1.
Imminent elections
The regional elections in Baden-Wu¨rttemberg and RheinlandPfalz roughly two weeks after the Japan earthquake meant that the national political response to the Fukushima accident would directly affect the regional candidates of the ruling coalition parties. In particular, the Merkel administration had to justify immediately the government’s previous firm support for nuclear power. Her government had brought a drastic change in German nuclear energy policy when she decided to significantly extend the lifespan of reactors.
In the UK, on the other hand, there were no elections immediately following the Fukushima disaster, so the government’s response did not have to appease voters in the short-term.
2.
Intensity of media reports
In Germany reports from the print and television media on the Fukushima accident were in-depth and dominated headlines for weeks. It seemed that the aim was to turn every citizen into a nuclear physicist to ensure everyone understands what
* Tel.: +44 1865 614 918. E-mail address: [email protected]. 1462-9011/$ – see front matter # 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.envsci.2011.09.002
2
environmental science & policy 15 (2012) 1–3
exactly went wrong at the power plant. Armed with this new knowledge, the public was able to demand more transparency on the operation of German reactors. In Britain reports were also frequent but soon took second place to reporting on Libya, where UK troops were directly involved. The British media reporting was also less drastic, shying away from calling events at Fukushima a catastrophe.
3.
Trust in renewable energy innovation
Germany has established itself as a leader in renewable energy technology and generation (Wassener, 2010). Energy generation from renewable energy sources has quadrupled since 1990. This has created a considerable number of new jobs and economic wealth. Renewable energy generation is therefore a growth sector and economic barriers to the technologies have been lifted. In the UK renewable energy generation is still well below its potential and is perceived as a high cost alternative to traditional energy sources. This perception pits nuclear power generation against carbon-intensive alternatives. The resulting zero-sum game points to an increase in carbon emissions with a decrease in nuclear power generation. Hence a critique of nuclear energy will be perceived as necessarily increasing the risk of dangerous climate change.
4.
History of nuclear resistance
During the Cold War various WWII allies hosted nuclear missiles within German borders often pointing at each other. Resistance to nuclear weapons in Germany was paramount during that time, especially in the generation that was educated in pacifist ideals after WWII. The anti-nuclear weapons sentiment fed into the anti-nuclear power movement that resulted in Germany’s declared phase-out of nuclear energy generation under Chancellor Schroeder. The nuclear power ‘renaissance’ in recent years and clever political lobbying by the utility companies have led to a change of this policy direction under the Merkel government. Reactions to the Fukushima accident brought out seasoned activists as well as a shocked public to once again demonstrate against nuclear power. The German language has an acronym for a nuclear accident: ‘GAU’ stands for ‘gro¨ßter anzunehmender Unfall’, roughly translates as ‘largest conceivable accident’. Fukushima was labelled a ‘Super-GAU’ which is easy to communicate and brings home a drastic message. In Britain nuclear weapons are more likely to be seen as a deterrent employed in the interest of national security. The legacy of the British experimentation with nuclear weapons is still evident in the massive amounts of remaining nuclear waste from military operations (Pagnamenta, 2010). Although the UK also has a strong green energy movement, it is by far not as pervasive and powerful as the one in Germany.
5.
Perceived cultural proximity
Despite holding vastly different traditions and probably never having travelled to this country, Germans feel a close
cultural proximity to Japan. In fact, they may even see the Japanese as ‘better Germans’. Both countries had to rebuild their infrastructure and identity after WWII and both countries pride themselves in quality engineering and efficiency. This perceived cultural proximity brought one very vivid image to mind: if an unexpected nuclear accident can happen in Japan, it can happen in Germany. This conclusion was more based on an expectation of engineering knowledge and quality control than proneness to earthquakes or hosting the same type of reactors, such as in the United States (Wald, 2011). The geographic distance of Japan to Europe is much more apparent in Britain, where the public is more likely to feel culturally connected to English-speaking Western nations than to Japan. Since any radioactive contamination is unlikely to reach Britain, the public did not become too concerned. The Fukushima accident has significantly changed the political landscape surrounding nuclear power. A strong commitment to nuclear despite the Japanese crisis is as much a signal to the market as a struggle to undo past nuclear energy policies. The decisions impact the prices of energy, carbon and uranium (McDonald, 2011). A change in national energy policy also affects CO2 emissions, technological innovation, national competitiveness and corporate policies. As the UK and Germany set out in different directions regarding nuclear power, companies operating in both countries will need to take a position or attempt to reconcile the different pathways. In two important regions of the German federation, voters came out against nuclear power. They did not trust that staunch supporters of nuclear power would seriously challenge utilities to increase nuclear safety post Fukushima. Instead, they brought in a new government. Some of those same companies will be able to breathe more easily in London, where their world has not been turned upside down. The German public demands transparency in nuclear safety issues post Fukushima. This has shifted the boundaries of risk management from solely concerning corporations and state into the public realm. The NIMBY (Not-In-My-Back-Yard) notion has expanded to encompass all of Germany and its neighbouring countries. Interactive graphics on media websites provide technical details on power plants and their safety precautions. There is a sense that neither the companies nor the government can be trusted to operate nuclear facilities safely. Not after Fukushima. Another message the Japanese crisis brings to Germany is that the costs of nuclear power may be vastly underestimated. An accident of the magnitude of Fukushima brings immense costs with it. Interestingly, neither insurance companies nor re-insurance companies saw their stocks tumbling after the nuclear power plant burst out of its containment. Although the earthquake brought down insurance companies’ stock prices, Agence France Presse (2011) is quoting Munich Re, an international re-insurance company, as stating that the subsequent crisis at Fukushima No. 1 ‘‘will probably not significantly affect private insurers’’. The Japanese taxpayer and the company, as long as it is still solvent, will have to pick up the bill for years of clean-up, population relocation and health issues (see McCurry, 2011). All because Fukushima is in fact beyond the ‘largest conceivable accident’.
environmental science & policy 15 (2012) 1–3
references
Agence France Presse, 2011. Japanese Crises Hit European Energy and Insurance Shares. (14 March). McCurry, J., 2011. Nuclear industry: tsunami-hit Fukushima plant reveals £9. 5 bn loss. The Guardian (21 May).
McDonald, H., 2011. Japan’s shock vibrates around the world. Sydney Morning Herald (26 March). Pagnamenta, R., 2010. Sellafield considers cull as seabirds swim in ponds of radioactive waste. The Times (25 February). Wald, M., 2011. N.R.C. lowers estimate of how many would die in meltdown. The New York Times (30 July). Wassener, B., 2010. Wind power still driving old shipyard. The International Herald Tribune (3 May).
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