The impact of US-Japan telecommunications trade upon Japanese Information Infrastructure development

Telematics and Informatics, Vol. 11, No. 3, pp. 275-292, 1994 Copyright @ 1994 Elsevier Science Ltd Printed in the USA. All rights reserved 0736-5853/94 $6.00 + .00

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THE IMPACT OF US-JAPAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS TRADE UPON JAPANESE INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT Toshiyuki Sueyoshi Jeffrey S. Baker Abstract-This article analyzes the impact of US-Japan telecommunications trade upon the development of the Japanese Information Infrastructure. The current telecommunications trade conflict between the two countries does not pay attention to an essential aspect; technology standards, arguing only national, self-centered, and short-range perspectives on bilateral trade. This article will open up a global perspective regarding bilateral trade, telecommunications infrastructure development, and government/business relationship. Our conceptual framework and empirical evidence will serve as a basis for not only the underlying essence of the bilateral telecommunications trade dispute, but also for discussing the nature of government/business relationships in the global information technology era.

INTRODUCTION The C l i n t o n - G o r e administration has proposed the development of the National I n f o r m a t i o n Infrastructure (NII) as a key c o m p o n e n t o f its technologyeconomy-science-education policy since 1992. The most important perspective of the N I I plan is related to the establishment of a nationwide global network a m o n g American industry, government, research, education, and families through an advanced information and telecommunications resource, so as to revitalize American competitiveness (Clinton & Gore, 1993). A similar plan can be found in Japan, as well. In 1990, Nippon Telegraph and Telephone (NTT) C o r p o r a t i o n announced an ambitious future strategy which would connect all h o m e and office sites through a nationwide BISDN (Broad-band Integrated Services Digital Network) between the years 1995 and 2015 (Yamaguchi, 1991; N T T Brochure, 1990). N T T ' s strategic BISDN plan is called "Visual, Intelligent and Personal (VI&P) Communications Service" and its future includes not only conventional telecommunication services, but also new services such as multimedia communication businesses and data network expansion in the C A T V (Cable Television) industry (Hayashi, 1993; Hayashi & Sueyoshi, 1994). Toshiyuki Sueyoshi is the Chair in Japan Professorship and Jeffrey S. Baker is a PhD student in the College of Business at The Ohio State University. All correspondence should be addressed to Dr. Sueyoshi, College of Business, The Ohio State University, 1775 College Road, Columbus, Ohio 43210, USA. 275

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As Hayashi and Sueyoshi (1994) discussed, many researchers, business leaders, policymakers, and individuals interested in the information infrastructure, have been anxiously watching whether or not the two industrial nations would be able to actually implement their plans on schedule. Many individuals have discussed the development of the strategic planning and implementation details for the global information network. (See, for example, Kahin [1993] in which more than 70 articles are compiled on this issue; and Presidential Speech in the House of Representatives on January 25, 1994.) However, Hayashi (1993), Oniki (1994), Hayashi and Sueyoshi (1994), and the more than 70 articles in Kahin (1993) do not discuss the important issue: the impact of the US-Japan telecommunications trade on the development of the Japanese information infrastructure. This article focuses on the Japanese information infrastructure development, given the underlying belief that the American government consistently exerts strong political pressure upon Japan. While, conversely, we cannot find any reciprocal case since World War II. Indeed, we cannot find any political impact upon the American Information Highway initiated by the Japanese government. The American political pressure on Japanese government is expected to broadly influence NTT's VI&P plan and its infrastructure establishment, because while NTT was privatized in 1985, today nearly two-thirds of its equity is still owned by the Japanese government, i.e., Ministry of Finance. Thus, NTT's operation exists under governmental control/regulation. Moreover, the Hosokawa administration puts more weight on the bilateral relationship with the United States than the Japanese information infrastructure, because the Japanese government does not want to lose a major trade partner. Furthermore, Japan has made a huge investment in the United States; to the level that the latter could well face widespread bankruptcies with the withdrawal of such Japanese funds. Between 1980 and 1988 Japanese annual investment in the United States increased from $35.3 billion to $284.8 billion--or eightfold-and fully 32.1°70 of Japan's 1988 investment in the United States was in the form of "other" investments; e.g., financial assets deposited in American banks (National Security and International Affairs Division, 1990). Supporting a large portion of the American debt, Japan should maintain an international strategy which enables the United States to maintain its economic strength as a world economic leader (Thurow, 1992). As a consequence of these political influences, the NTT's future VI&P plan for the Japanese information infrastructure will be influenced by bilateral trade conflict between the United States and Japan. It is indeed important to note that the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications (MPT) will announce a new plan for the Japanese information infrastructure. (See Hayashi & Sueyoshi [1994] on this governmental plan.) The governmental plan will be officially announced at the end of May, 1994. While awaiting the official governmental announcement, this article nonetheless asserts that NTT's VI&P plan describes the Japanese information infrastructure in the 21 st century. The importance of the research issue explored in this article can be very easily confirmed by a recent trade problem between the two n a t i o n s - a trade problem which the Clinton administration has successfully deployed as a basis for intensive political pressure on the Hosokawa administration: the sale of Motorola products in the Tokyo-Nagoya region. Moreover, the central perspective of this article discusses the importance of technology standards between the United States and Japan, because the bilateral trade issue is asserted to have essentially originated in the difference between Japanese and North American technology standards. Unfortunately, this technology standard issue has been disguised as a trade problem by both the joint efforts of the Clinton administration and Motorola, and as a result of questionable political deci-

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sions formulated by the Japanese government. It is very clear that Japan will be unable to avoid the American Inc. strategy (a strong American government/business liaison in the international trade) when developing its future telecommunications infrastructure. Unfortunately, the Japanese government does not have such policymakers who can develop their domestic policy within the global international framework. There are many internationally-minded individuals in Japan, but these people are consistently excluded from governmental decision making on international trade negotiations. (Such a view can be easily confirmed by recent activities of Japanese opinion leaders, e.g., Mr. Keiichi Omae. See also Pollack, 1994, which describes medical regulation by Japanese government and unintentional discrimination to American medical-device makers.) As a major industrial nation, whose policy decisions influence many other countries, Japan has clearly entered into a new era, one which suggests a need for a restructuring of the governmental bureaucracy and the reforming of trade policies, so as to eliminate obstacles to the importation of foreign goods. The structure of this article is organized in the following manner. This section summarizes the current telecommunications trade issue between the two nations. The third section empirically examines the degree to which the Japanese market is closed to American producers. This section documents NTT's efforts to purchase foreign telecommunications products, presenting measures of NTT's importation success. The fourth section describes the development of the Japanese information infrastructure, focusing upon its BISDN and technology standards. The section also discusses technical and political problems in the BISDN-based information infrastructure development which result from the differences in technology standards for Japan and the United States. The fifth section contrasts the relationship of technology standards and telecommunications policy in the two nations. The last section concludes this research, summarizing policy implications and recommendations for Japanese information infrastructure development from the view of US-Japan bilateral trade. BILATERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS TRADE ISSUES: AMERICAN VIEW For over a decade, American telecommunications business strategies in the Japanese market have been symbolized by a single player fighting for a specific market share: Motorola's battle for a "fair American share" of the Japanese Cellular Mobile Telephone (CMT) market. Motorola's strategic responses to the Japanese CMT market dispute may be described and analyzed according to the following five elements: (a) the nature of the corporation's dispute with Japan, (b) Motorola's view of the dispute, (c) Motorola's strategic objectives, (d) Motorola's view of a recently-negotiated settlement, and (e) the future of the corporation's dispute with Japan. First, the nature of the corporation's dispute over the Japanese CMT market may be summarized as follows. In the early 1980's, technical standards existed to govern Japan's CMT market. NTT predominated in Japan's telecommunications market, with an established protocol. Motorola entered Japan's CMT market, employing an alternative (North American) protocol and encountered technical and marketing difficulties in selling their products, partly due to the fact that Motorola's products did not fit with technical standards governing Japan's CMT market. In 1986, a set of Market-Oriented Sector-Specific (MOSS) accords was negotiated between the United States and Japan, for committing each to the following principles in the regulation of its telecommunications markets: comparable market access, national treatment, nondiscrimination, and transparency. The 1986 MOSS agreements

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included no quantified minimum levels of Japanese CMT market share. As a concession, however, MPT appointed five American business representatives, including a Motorola official, to its existing Telecommunications Deliberations Council (Tyson, 1992, p. 67). The Council subsequently recommended any of three existing, competing telecommunication protocols, including Motorola's, for use in Japan's CMT market. Following a series of failed alternatives, MPT elected to approve a single nationwide protocol, NTT's protocol, while licensing one additional company in each region to compete against NTT (Tyson, 1992, p. 68). Beginning in 1987, Motorola equipment could be used in cellular franchises awarded outside Tokyo-Nagoya on a network owned by Daini Denden (DDI). Nippon Idou Tsushin Corporation (IDO) was granted the franchise for The Tokyo-Nagoya corridor, employing NTT's protocol and equipment (Tyson, 1992, p. 68). (The governmental decision is very questionable. Is it true that NTT had better CMT standards and technology than Motorola in the CMT in 19877 Why did the MPT allow Japanese and North American standards in the Japanese CMT market?) In 1988, responding to Motorola complaints that the company was effectively barred from competing within the Tokyo-Nagoya region, the US Congress enacted the Telecommunications Trade Act requiring the United States Trade Representative (USTR): (a) to investigate and designate foreign priority countries that have allegedly engaged in acts, policies, and practices that deny mutually advantageous market opportunities to US telecommunications exporters; (b) to both annually review compliance with negotiated telecommunications trade agreement and monitor for the preclusion of denial of mutually advantageous market opportunities; and (c) to seek US industry advice (in the form of an Industry-Sector Advisory Committee) before deciding whether to settle a negotiation under the Act. Retaliation and threatened retaliation in response to either an affirmative "violation or a denial of mutually advantageous market opportunities" are supportable under section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. Further, retaliation target countries could be required to persuade a council of the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) that US rights had not been violated. Motorola immediately assumed influential membership within the IndustrySector Advisory Committee. Later in the year, the American government asserted the expectation that Motorola protocol be employed in Tokyo-Nagoya (Tyson, 1992, p. 69). By 1989, Motorola had filed a formal complaint with the USTR charging that MPT had violated the MOSS agreement by failing to grant Motorola equal "access to Japanese markets for third-party radio systems and cellular telephone systems" (Tyson, 1992, p. 69). On April 28, 1989 the USTR, in its first annual 1988 Trade Act report, found Japan in violation of MOSS, noting that Super 301 retaliation (trade sanctions on Japanese imports) would occur within 30 days, absent a resolution of the conflict (Tyson, 1992, p. 69). The USTR had determined that there was inadequate explanation in MPT's process for allocating radio frequencies. The ministry prohibited the Motorola cellular radio system from operating in the Tokyo and Nagoya area, despite the then recent availability of spectrum which would have made the use of Motorola's equipment feasible for Japanese consumers in that market. By June of 1989, a commitment to additional spectrum allocation and technical assistance had been negotiated to avoid the trade sanctions, improving the competitive prospects of Motorola equipment (the Equal Access Agreement). However, the 1989 agreement, like the 1986 MOSS accords, included no market share guarantees, targets, or projections. Motorola's market share remained flat. In 1990, responding to increas-

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ing pressure, the MPT assigned IDO to provide access to a cellular phone network for Motorola equipment in the Tokyo-Nagoya corridor. MPT required IDO to spend $60 million to construct a Motorola-compatible infrastructure-a second system. With a preexisting allegiance to the NTT system, IDO delayed compliance for 2 years (1 year elapsed before the requisite equipment was ordered, and another passed before its installation) while in 1990 alone, with its NTT system, "IDO realized a 400°7o increase in its revenues, mainly as a result of growth in the [CTM] market" (Tyson, 1992. p. 70). In 1993, Motorola appealed to the US Trade Representative (USTR), asserting that Japan had violated the 1989 Equal Access Agreement. On December 12, 1993 the USTR announced the intention to conduct an early review of Japan's compliance with the June, 1989 agreement. Following an impasse in Trade Framework discussions (February l l, 1994) between President Clinton and Prime Minster Hosokawa, the Clinton Administration, on February 15th, threatened to impose trade sanctions against Japan for violating the 1989 agreement which they interpreted as having been intended to open Japan's market to the Motorola cellular technology. Motorola's view of the above dispute - fully a decade in l e n g t h - m a y be summarized by the following points. Motorola "charged that the Japanese cellular carrier IDO Corporation blocked Motorola's expansion in one of Japan's most densely populated cellular markets, the Tokyo-Nagoya corridor" (Nomani & Hamilton, 1994, March 14, p. A1). The American corporation cited the following as evidence of blocking: a disparity in its market share in Tokyo-Nagoya, versus the remainder of Japan. This blocking action, Motorola contends, "violate[d] a 1989 agreement in which [Japan] had promised to provide 'comparable' market access to its cellular phone market" (Nomani & Hamilton, 1994, March 10, p. A5). The American corporation cites the following in support of Japan's breech of comparability: the American market is comparatively more open to Japanese telecommunications competitors. (The market openness is believed by the American people because of the trade deficit with Japan.) The following Motorola strategic objectives may be culled from the ongoing CMT dispute: (a) to achieve a fair CMT market share throughout J a p a n - t o successfully compete with the NTT system; (b) for IDO to collaborate with Motorola in the marketing of the latter's telecommunications system, including an increase in the number of IDO-furnished earth broadcast stations to which it has access (the opening of an additional "159 relay stations for the Tokyo-Nagoya corridor by the end of 1995 for Motorola's system of phone service would mean that Motorola would have a total of about 350 stations in Japan, and provide Motorola with part of the expansion that it's seeking" and "the company has asked for 16,000 channels, which could handle 450,000 subscribers by the end of 1995" [Nomani & Hamilton, 1994, March 10, p. A3, A5]); and (c) to preclude all future systemic obstacles to Motorola as a participant in the development of a digital Japanese mobile communications system. A recent settlement was negotiated in the form of a March 12th, 1994 Agreement providing Motorola with the following concessions: "IDO agreed to build 159 additional base stations by the end of 1995, providing Motorola with 9,000 more voice channels. The agreement will give Motorola coverage over 95% of the area by September 1995, an increase from about 45% now" (The Wall Street Journal, March 14, 1994, p. A1). Motorola's reaction to the March 12th Agreement? Company spokesman Tim Kellogg stated: "Motorola stands to gain as much as $300 million in exports to Japan" (Nomani & Hamilton, 1994, March 10, p. A5). Nonetheless, the corporation's dispute with Japan is not concluded. This study suggests that Motorola will not acquiesce until it realizes considerable market share

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gains, gains it likely perceives to have been unnecessarily deferred through an entire decade of unfulfilled MPT and IDO promises; e.g., the delayed 1989 network construction commitments from IDO, although mandated by MPT. Further, even hundreds of millions in incremental sales gains may not satisfy Motorola; the company will likely judge tomorrow's success in the Tokyo-Nagoya corridor by today's standard: it's percentage of the regional market share. Additionally, the CMT dispute is less likely to be permanently resolved when the extant, legitimate interests of other American corporations are considered. Here, according to many analysts, Motorola's recent settlement gains are likely losses for AT&T. A somewhat bewildered spokesman for AT&T, Jim McGann, acknowledged on the afternoon of the March 12th agreement: "The Japanese government has informed us that they are going to instruct IDO to not go forward with their plans to convert to digital. What we are trying to do now is, trying to analyze the situation fully, and try to analyze how we're going to be affected by this" (The Wall Street Journal, March 10, 1994, p. A5). The Wall Street Journal hazarded a succinct, if speculative, response to the AT&T query: "The accord c o u l d . . , hurt AT&T" (The Wall Street Journal, March 10, 1994, p. 1). Finally, these American reviews concerning the current bilateral telecommunications trade provide the following policy implication: The successful use of American trade policy produce costs for the two major industrial countries. Such socio-economic costs can be summarized by Tyson's comments: Motorola's struggles contributed to worsening trade tensions between the United States and Japan. The conflict strengthened American perceptions of the Japanese as unfair and predatory traders, and Japanese perceptions of the Americans as unreliable and whining bullies. The Motorola case was also dangerous because it strengthened incentives for American companies to resort to trade policy to win their competitive battles. (Tyson, 1992, p. 75) The Motorola's problem illustrates a clear-cut case in which an American firm had to deal with Japanese bureaucracy. The Japanese government, namely MPT, would appear to primarily protect Japanese business interests in the telecommunications industry; e.g., whether or not intended, the delays in granting fullest spectrum availability to Motorola served to allow Japanese business to counter Motorola's initial CMT technological lead (Tyson, 1992, p. 70). It is true that the firm had more advanced CMT technology than Japanese producers at the beginning of the trade dispute. The Japanese government protected Japanese producers who stood to benefit from delaying Motorola's entry to the Tokyo market, the most important market in Japan. (This type of governmental protection can be observed everywhere. For example, the American government protected auto and steel industries in the 1980's, as the Japanese telecommunications producers were protected in the Motorola case.)

JAPANESE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE The previous review of the bilateral telecommunications trade dispute indicates three important questions: (a) Is it true that the Japanese market is comparatively closed to American goods? For this purpose, is the United States trade deficit an appropriate measure in determining the openness of the Japanese market? (b) Is it true that the procurement practices of Japanese common carriers, such as NTT, exclude foreign

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product u s e - a n d by implication, the importation of such? (c) How will the joint effort of the Clinton administration and Motorola influence the future development of Japanese BISDN-based information infrastructure? These questions are addressed hereafter with several examples of empirical evidence.

Market closure of the Japanese market The first question, that of Japanese market closure;is most broadly (and commonly) addressed by the following data: The 1990 exports from Japan to the United States totaled $90,322 million, while the imports were merely $52,369 million (Japan's merchandise trade by area, 1993). Thus, admittedly there was indeed a 1990 trade deficit of $37,953 million experienced by the United States in its bilateral trade with Japan. Indeed, as argued by the American government (Tyson, 1992, p. 55), Japanese market might be deemed to be closed to US producers in terms of the trade deficit. However, it is easily found that this American view is not valid when one further accounts for the disparity in market size of the two nations. The 1990 population of Japan was 123,460,000-or less than one-half of the United States respective population of 249,224,000 (UN World Population Prospects, 1993). Thus, the per capita American purchase of Japanese products, at a mere $365.62, was less than the $393.52 per capita Japanese purchase of American products. The nature of the contrast between the two per capita figures clearly suggests that the Japanese market is comparatively open to American producers. Thus, any presumed American trade deficit with Japan is due to the relative market size of the two nations. Admittedly, it is important to note that, as argued by Tyson (p. 54), Japan has exported high-technology products (e.g., telecommunications equipment and computers) and conversely imported low-technology products from the United States. This has no doubt been a source of American frustrations, and a source of the recent rise in Japan exportation, given the burgeoning importance of high-technology products in the past decade. The real problem for Japan has been the visibility of such exports, such that the nation's success in a single industry invites so-called "diminished giant syndrome" or national resentment from the United States (Tyson, 1992, p. 53). (The United States suffered the same national resentment from the United Kingdom at the end of the 19th century.) Moreover, perhaps the painful evidence that the United States now needs Japan's annual $140 billion investment, and will experience some difficulty in paying the interest on US treasury bills, provides another explanation for the "Japan bashing" now offered by some American opinion leaders. Conversely, the real problem for the United States is that American government and businesses have to deal with unintentional discrimination such as Japanese business laws, industrial policy strategy formulated for "catching-up western societies," and complicated market distribution systems. This task needs the fundamental restructuring of the Japanese economic system and society. It requires a great deal of time and huge efforts for Japanese policymakers. The Japanese success became visible after 1980s. Before then, Japanese industrial policy focused upon the development of industry and science to the level of American and European nations. Now, nobody denies that Japan is an advanced, industrial nation. Unfortunately, the Japanese political and social systems have not yet completed their restructuring to the level of Japanese (world class) industry, lacking an international view and level of responsibility expected by other nations. The Japanese long-term restructuring efforts will not harmoniously exist with the result-oriented American trade policy.

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Table 1. Total Foreign Procurement by NTT.

Fiscal Year

Foreign Procurement ($US)

1991 1990 1989 1988 1987 1986 1985 1984 1983 1982 1981

$603,000,000 $465,000,000 $352,000,000 $323,000,000 $275,000,000 $232,000,000 $167,000,000 $144,000,000 $147,000,000 $44,000,000 $19,000,000

$ Change

% Change (PY)

138,000,000 113,000,000 29,000,000 48,000,000 43,000,000 65,000,000 23,000,000 - 3,000,000 103,000,000 25,000,000

30.0 32.1 9.0 17.5 18.5 38.9 16.0 -2.0 234.1 132.6

Source: NTT ProcurementActivities (1992) p. 5. Note: Figures from FY 1988 exclude procurement by NTT Data Communications Systems Corporation. NTT procurement

In an effort to answer the second question (i.e., whether or not the procurement practices of Japanese common carriers, such as NTT, exclude foreign products), this study reviews the current NTT international procurement practices. As mentioned previously, foreign procurement will influence NTT's VI&P plan. The NTT has been routinely targeted in the series of MOSS negotiations between the two governments, perhaps because telecommunications is a symbolic high-technology industry and a primary contributor to the United States trade deficit with Japan. Unfortunately, the considerable NTT efforts to purchase foreign products are not often recognized by the American and European telecommunications communities. Consequently, NTT's procurement behaviors, and Japan's telecommunications trade practices, have been internationally misunderstood and under-appreciated. Here, such misunderstanding invites unwarranted criticism of Japan's telecommunications market which, in turn, has produced a major delay in the development of the Japanese information infrastructure. This article presents important NTT procurement data. Table 1 indicates total foreign procurement by NTT. The total amount of NTT's foreign products indicates the import efforts of the common carrier. Additionally, beyond the numbers in Table 1, this article must acknowledge that by fiscal 1991 the value of NTT's total procurement from overseas suppliers, representing more than 11 070of its total product procurement, exceeded $600 million (NTT Procurement Activities, 1992, p. 5-6). Second, NTT procurement procedures vary across seven categories of purchased telecommunications products, or designated "tracks," broadly ranging from office supplies to supercomputer and satellites. Importantly, in 1991, with high-technology products accounting for more than 80°70 of its total product procurement from nonJapanese suppliers, NTT purchased from over 500 foreign firms (NTT Procurement Activities, 1992, p. 6). Table 2 delineates NTT-purchased products by overseas supplier and country of origin. For the purposes of this discussion, it is worth noting the preponderance of American firms supplying major products to NTT. Lastly, although perhaps belied by Table 2, NTT typically purchases from other than major corporations; less than 10070 of NTT's 1991 fiscal year foreign suppliers were listed among the "Global 1,000" (NTT Procurement Activities, 1992, p. 6).

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Table 2. Major Products Purchased from Non-Japanese Suppliers. Product 1. ATM link system 2. N-STAR communications satellites 3. Digital transmission equipment 4. Optical switching equipment 5, Digitial switiching equipment 6. Automation system for telephone office operations 7, Multifunction operating system for private networks 8, Service information integrator for leased circuit service 9, Pocket-bell pagers 10. Mobile telephone equipment 11. Medium capacity sealed lead-acid batteries 12. Computers 13. Modems 14. R & D equipment 15. Digital mobile telephone systems*

16. ATM systems* 17. High-count preconnectorized optical fiber cable*

Supplier (Country) AT&T (USA) Siemens (Germany) SPACE SYSTEMS/LORAL (USA) AT&T (USA) Siecor (USA) Northern Telecom (USA) Redcom Laboratories (USA) Cincinnati Bell (USA) Systems (USA) AT&T (USA) AT&T (USA) Motorola (USA) Motorola (USA) GNB (USA) Multifarious Suppliers from United States AT&T Paradyne (USA) General Datacomm Industries (USA) Hewlett Packard (USA) Tektronix (USA) AT&T (USA) Ericcson Radio Systems (Sweden) Motorola (USA) AT&T (USA) Northern Telecom (USA) Siemens (Germany) Siecor (USA)

Source: NTT Procurement Activities (1992) p. 7. *Products under joint research and development in compliance with Track III procedure.

In fact, the success of a foreign firm in selling to NTT may be largely dictated by the former organization's willingness to respond to NTT's published supplier selection criteria (NTT Procurement Activities, 1992, p. 36): NTT evaluates the materials submitted in accordance with the criteria stated in the procurement documentation. Evaluation is based primarily on the following points: (1) product or computer service evaluation-function, performance, quality, reliability, compatibility with the NTTsystem [italics added] and cost effectiveness; (2) applicant evaluation-business and financial stability, research and development ability, production or computer service capacity and ability to provide a stable supply. Indeed, NTT publicly specifies a preference for suppliers exhibiting the following three behaviors (NTT Procurement Activities, 1992, p. 16): (a) attention to NTT published procurement information (announcements, seminars, and international symposia); (b) the proposal of reasonably-priced high quality products; and (c) flexibility in making adjustments and modifications. Thus, both NTT's importation results, and the criteria engendering such, support a belief that the Japanese telecommunication

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industry is open to foreign suppliers-especially those firms offering products and materials meeting critical, and warranted, specifications. Finally, admitting NTT's recent foreign procurement efforts, we need to mention the fact that NTT had not announced the procurement procedures before its 1985 privatization. The subsequent, consistent increases in NTT's foreign procurement may be considered to be the result of a political victory-NTT's privatization-for the American government.

Impacts upon the Japanese information infrastructure Japanese telecommunications laws. In order to reply to the third question (i.e., how will the joint effort of the Clinton administration and Motorola influence the future development of Japanese BISDN-based information infrastructure?), this research must describe a legal framework within which the BISDN of NTT's VI&P plan for the Japanese information infrastructure will be proposed and developed. Then, a technological difficulty in the BISDN installment is discussed from the perspective of US-Japan bilateral trade. Beginning in April of 1985, with the advent of NTT's privatization, Japan's telecommunications industry was restructured by means of two pieces of legislation: Telecommunications Business Law (TBL), a legal restructuring framework; and Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation Law (NTTCL), identifying the NTT privatization criteria and plan. The TBL's restructuring framework identified two primary telecommunications sector categories, according to a single characteristic: the availability of transmission circuits (Ministry of Post and Telecommunications, 1985). Type I Japanese telecommunications common carriers operate the transmission circuits regulated by the MPT. Type II carriers, prohibited from owning circuits, lease them from Type I carriers, and otherwise experience free entry, unrestricted pricing and unregulated operation. (A third carrier-type subsequently acknowledged, and deemed Type 0 [Hayashi, 1989], is comprised of telephone users who develop their own local networks and provide telecommunications services within their own firms.) Furthermore, two additional points elsewhere articulated are pertinent to this study's discussion of Japanese telecommunications trade: (a) Type 0 carriers may function like common carriers; however, (b) while Type I common carriers develop networks in the absence of a known or eventual service context, for the Type 0 carrier, the ultimate service context is both known and utilized throughout the network development phase. (Note that Type 0 legally belongs to Type I in the TBL's framework.) Foreign owners are prohibited from acquiring more than one-third of the equity in a Type I carrier. Conversely, foreign ownership of a Type II carrier is fully allowed; there are no restrictions on the pricing, nor the operation of such carriers, including the resale of leased circuits (Oniki, 1993). Thus, Type II carriers of Japanese telecommunications may be foreign firms with free entry into Japanese markets. The problem for Motorola has been that Japanese CMT services are of the Type I category, according to the Japanese telecommunications law. Given the above, Motorola's difficult entry into the Japanese CMT market is to have been expected; just as one could have predicted the resultant attempts by the firm to manage MPT, the bureaucracy enforcing Motorola's difficult entry. If Motorola's products had belonged to the Type II category, it is likely that the firm would have penetrated the Japanese market more easily. Clearly, the Japanese telecommunications laws present significant implications for foreign firm entry into the Japanese market.

Impact of US-Japan telecommunications trade

Legal Classification

Hierarchy

(Layer)

Upper Layer

Type 0

Function Video, Broadcasting Supply (Library), Enhanced Information Service, Teleservice (Data Base, Education and Medial Applications), and Various Services Associated with Information Context

Type lI

Type I

285

Telephone, TV-Telephone, TV-Conference, Telephone-Meeting, E-mall, Image Transmission, Public Broadcasting, LAN.WAN and Specific Services not Associated with Information Context

AAL (ATM Adaptation Layer)

Information Formats such as Voice, Image, Data, Signal (Contxol Data), Information Transmission Methods Depending Upon Specific Transmission (One-to-One Connection, and One-to-Many Connections)

ATM Layer

Transmission for ATM Cell (Not Depending upon Specific Service and Information Format)

Physical Layer

Optical Fibers, Other Cables, Wireless Communication, and Information Transmission between Two Physical Facilities

Source: Oniki (1994) Figure 1. Type of BISDN Services (BISDN Protocol).

Impact to BISDN technology. The two types of legal carrier classification (Types I and II) can be further segmented on the basis of the BISDN technology development. As discussed in Hayashi and Sueyoshi (1994), the Japanese information infrastructure requires the installation of a global fiber-optic BISDN system all over Japan, rather than the development of a global computer network, as with the American INTERNET. A description of the BISDN technology within the legal classification (i.e., Types I and II) provides which part of Japanese information infrastructure will be influenced by Motorola's entry, bringing North American Standards into the Japanese telecommunications market. As mentioned in Oniki (1994), BISDN is an integrated telecommunications network, with bandwidth capabilities from 165 Mb/s to 600 Mb/s. The Japanese goal of BISDN is to plan and construct a set of standards and interfaces that allow video, voice, image, FAX, and computer communications within an integrated digital network. The basic technology of the BISDN includes: (a) large-scale implementation of optical fiber cables, (b) ATM (Asynchronous Transfer Mode) services, and (c) various telecommunications terminals. The basic Japanese BISDN technology is functionally structured by the Consultative Committee of the International Telegraph and Telephone (CCITT) of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). This CCITT specification classifies the BISDN structure by the following four layers: physical layer, ATM layer, AAL (ATM Adaptation Layer), and upper layers 1 and 2. Figure 1 lists the legal types of common carriers in the first column, the five CCITT-BISDN layers in the second column, and the descriptions of their service functions in the third (last) column. (Figure 1 was originally presented in Oniki [1994] and has been modified in this paper for our descriptive purpose.) Since Oniki (1994) describes the five layers in detail, this article avoids a descriptive duplication, except noting that Figure 1 incorporates an underlying assumption regarding BISDN technology standards. That is, Figure 1 assumes that the standardization and simplification of information transmission are achieved in all the layers, conse-

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quently maximizing the efficiency of entire network and minimizing the negative influence due to any system change. Thus, the technological standardization is essential for the efficiency enhancement of the entire BISDN system. Here, assuming that the technical hierarchical structures of the Japanese information infrastructure are interconnected by Japanese BISDN technology standards, we may wonder what happens to the entire network if North American standards are partly incorporated into one of the five layers; in particular, the infrastructure layers such as the physical layer and/or the ATM layer. The answer is very clear; the Japanese information infrastructure development needs a huge additional investment to establish transmission/exchange facilities interconnecting Japanese and North American technology standards, usually necessitating a considerable delay in the construction of the Japanese telecommunications infrastructure. Who should pay the additional investment expenditure? Who should operate and maintain the entire network which incorporates two different types of technology standards? Why does such a problem occur? Are the fundamental American principles of "fairness" and "equal treatment" upheld by such impacts upon the Japanese infrastructure development? When Motorola brings North American standards into the Japanese CMT market, the physical layer needs to be further separated into two layers: Japanese and North American layers. A major problem immediately occurs in the Japanese telecommunications infrastructure. That is, Japanese telecommunication carriers must have physical CMT facilities connecting Japanese and North American Standards. If Japanese firms similarly attempted to impose Japanese standard products into the American market, would it be possible for them to sell their products? Clearly, not. Do such incongruous trade practices constitute fair and equal treatment? Furthermore, as depicted in Figure 1, the two different technology standards in the physical layer separate the ATM layer into two layers, while the ATM layer needs to incorporate a special protocol for transmission/exchange of information cells between the ATM-Japanese and ATM-North American standards. Consequently, the entire network communications efficiency of the Japan information infrastructure is disrupted by the forced inclusion of the North American Standards. The same type of problem may occur in the ALL and the upper layer 1, as well. (No damage will occur in the upper layer 2, because the latter depends upon an information context, rather than a communication facility.) The above problems clearly explain the Japanese government's historical reluctance to succumb to American pressures in the bilateral trade negotiations. The telecommunications infrastructure, incorporating two such different types of technology standards, produces a major delay and a prohibitive cost in the development of the Japanese information infrastructure. TECHNOLOGY STANDARDIZATION It is clear from the previous discussions that technological standardization is an essential issue in the international telecommunications trade. Therefore, this article needs to discuss the issue in a more detailed manner. This article examines the relationship between the standards-setting processes in Japan and the United States. Such a relationship is visually summarized in Figure 2. (Figure 2 is originally presented in Landsbergen [1992, p. 335]. This research adapts his diagram in a fashion that incorporates international perspectives and telecommunications infrastructure development.) Figure 2 can be broken down into the Japanese standard setting system (depicted at the left-hand side) and the American standard setting system (depicted at the righthand side). At the center of the figure is the international standard setting organiza-

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tion, such as CCITT within ITU. Here, Standards are "sets of technical specifications adhered to a producer tacitly or as a result of a formal agreement" (Landsbergen, 1992). As discussed previously, CCITT was established for the development of international technology standards which guide all the BISDN implementation. In the CCITT meetings, American delegates argue the technical standards from the perspective that American companies can compete abroad. The same observation can be applied to Japan and European countries. There was a lengthy battle (only later deemed to have been a negotiation) waged among participating members, because producers in a "winning" county can potentially control foreign markets. In addition to the conflict of interest between international needs, the CCITT has a major problem: The voluntary standards organization does not have the requisite authority to mandate, let alone to enforce, that all participating nations follow its technical standards. Consequently, there are North American, Japanese, and European standards for the delivery of telecommunications services. However, it is true that the CCITT agreement on telecommunications standards influences each nation's standard setting process. Therefore, Figure 2 depicts the influence of the international standard setting organization by an arrow indicating a weak influence. Second, Landsbergen (1992) defines ideology as "the fundamental values of society." As depicted in Figure 2, ideology is exogenous; it can affect telecommunications policy, but is not influenced by events in the telecommunications industry. Ideology depends upon cultural and historical perspectives of each country. For example, the concept of "universal services" belongs to this category. This concept was originally proposed to integrate many small, independent telephone firms into the Bell System in the United States. Meanwhile, NTT Public Corporation (1952-1985) had provided comprehensive telecommunication services from the beginning of telecommunications development in Japan. Thus, the concept of universal services was a given within Japan until 1985. However, the NTT privatization (1985) initiated a new issue: the divestiture of the Japanese telecommunications market. The NTT breakup was argued by means of appeals to several conflicting perspectives, perspectives other than universal serv.ices; e.g., scale efficiency, and equal market access for both domestic and foreign producers. Ultimately, though, the concept of universal services has come to

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have a real meaning for Japanese policymakers as a result of NTT's divestiture (Hayashi, 1994). The "diminished giant syndrome" (or national resentment) and "Japan bashing" in the United States, both belong to this category, as well. Such concepts serve as a basis for American international trade policies, as expressed in MOSS negotiations and Section 301 of the Trade Act, that strongly influence Japanese telecommunications policy and its standard setting process, as presented in the second section of this study. Third, "propriety providers of goods and services" have a strong influence on the development of both technology standards and telecommunications infrastructure. For example, NTT developed its VI&P plan for the future information infrastructure, in addition to the determination of standards for Japanese telecommunications. Many small common carriers, such as IDO, must provide their services within the NTT standards. As discussed by Landsbergen (1992), the proprietary providers have two strategies by which to cause their standards to be adopted: either by creating their own propriety standards, or by having particular standards determined by Japanese MPT, CCITT, or ANST. However, the strategies of propriety providers become much more complicated in the international arena. For example, as found in the recent Motorola case, a determined administration may exert overwhelming political pressure upon a weak Japanese administration, insisting that the "closed" Japanese market be opened. Consequently, Japanese common carriers, such as IDO, are granted no option beyond the adoption of North American telecommunications standards. Here, a propriety provider like Motorola can strongly influence the Japanese market and the Japanese information infrastructure by means of the American government. Evidently, it is a viable international market share strategy for the American corporation to lobby the US Congress and the American administration. Finally, policy is defined by Landsbergen (1992) as "the laws and rules that demand minimum stands of behavior of the policy actors." This article considers that the policy implies international and domestic contexts. The domestic policy towards technology standards is related to the market structure and technology development, while the international policy implies global technology strategies related to international trade, national security, and technology competition. The global perspective of the international policy offers two rationale for the Japanese government's acceptance of American pressure, even though the MPT knows that such acceptance Mll produce a major delay in the development of Japanese information infrastructure. First, the United States is a major trade partner. Second, the Japanese government perceives the United States to be important for Japanese national security. An inseparable linkage can be often found between the domestic policy and the international policy. A good example is the information highway plan proposed by the Clinton-Gore administration. This plan was proposed as a key component of a technology-economy-science-education policy for revitalizing American manufacturing industry. Here, the success of American manufacturing revitalization will be compared with Japan and the EC nations in the perspective of international trade and competition. Thus, this example clearly indicates that the domestic policy regarding the information infrastructure development is closely related to the international policy.

CONCLUSION: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS Reflecting upon the previous discussion, this study reaches a number of important conclusions as regards the nature of the government/business relationships in Japan

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and the United States. First, the policies pursued by each of the four respective players may be linked to rational attempts to attain identifiable and distinct goals. Second, the distinct strategies of the four respective players are often perceived by such to be in conflict. Third, however paradoxical, a reframing of the respective strategies will allow the four players to move beyond conflict, attaining a synthesis of ultimate purposes and successful collaboration. Fourth, such collaboration could be manifested as the development of a global telecommunications infrastructure, based upon a single set of international telecommunication standards. Here, an examination of the nature of government and telecommunications business relationships within both countries suggests distinct policy recommendations for American government, American business, Japanese government, and Japanese business.

Policy recommendations for the American government First, the American government needs to admit that the extant Japanese market is open. Following such a recognition, Japan and the United States must craft joint efforts for the long-term reduction of the US trade deficit. Albeit, such efforts will not produce any dramatic, immediate benefits for the US economy given the proportional insignificance of the US trade deficit with Japan ($42.5 billion, in 1991) relative to a US economy with an expansive GDP ($5,672.6 billion, in 1991). Second, the American government may achieve both national interests and international aims by refraining from overtly reactive, politicized behaviors. The highly responsive nature of American government is evidenced by the Motorola CMT case. Here, the following objectives have been proposed as the basis for the 1993 USTR early review of the case: The American government needs a coordinated effort by high-level US officials to exert political pressure on the Japanese government in trade sectors of particular importance to US industry, including market access in the semiconductor, computer, construction, and telecommunications sectors. The government also needs to elevate US-Japan telecommunications trade issue generally, and the CMT dispute in particular, to the level currently reserved for issues subject to the bilateral framework agreement, to increase the visibility of the CMT issue, and perhaps to result in a more immediate and favorable response from Japanese trade officials. While effective as a means of attenuating political attention and diplomatic retaliation, the American government's response may be described as follows: (a) overtly reactive to the crisis of the day, (b) presuming malicious intentions within an adversarial context, and (c) likely to be perceived as bullying Japan purely to allocate greater market share to a US company. Finally, while American business likely appreciates the responsiveness of the American government's approach, and likewise embraces the system of negotiation or arbitration, this study recommends the American government adopt a more strategic, long-range approach to the planning of telecommunications trade policy. Here, the primacy of a universal standard supporting a global information infrastructure is likely to emerge in the absence of political posturing and international mandates.

Policy recommendations for American business As explored in this research, Motorola consistently appeals to the American government for interventions, negotiation, adjudicative review (USTR), and redress (settlements and agreements), all the while further ostracizing the firm from its Japanese market comprised of increasingly skeptic target consumer population, e.g., the recent

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report of grafiti and other signs of protest at Motorola's Japan headquarters. Motorola may have eschewed challenging the Japanese government directly in an attempt to avoid further antagonizing the Japanese government, especially MPT. However, on the very day (March 12) of the recently negotiated "new CMT Agreement," amid Motorola predictions for increases in company sales of "hundreds of millions," National Public Radio commentators mused: "It is still not clear how much today's agreement will ease tensions created by the threatened US sanctions." Motorola appears to have won the latest legal battles, but to have likely lost the market share war. This study predicts that Motorola will likely continue to experience Japanese CMT market shares below its expectation, not primarily due to any continued market disadvantage, but rather the result of an unfortunate loss of credibility with Japanese consumers. For Motorola to seek further redress from the American government could be deemed impolitic. Therefore, this study recommends a less litigious path for American business in Japan, at least where the goal is increased market share. This study recommends that American business assess the value of assurances in the presence of distrust. For example, what assurances would Motorola consider sufficient to fully assuage their real fears of the Japanese government, especially MPT? Here, if the relationship is based upon nothing more solid than negotiation, then Motorola must continue to pursue, to the point of securing, objective and quantitative measures of the expected Japanese CMT market share outcomes. Here, the attainment of a specified number of earth stations is far from certain to yield the expected Japan CMT market share outcomes for Motorola. Clearly, such milestones are inadequate as guarantees of Motorola's future achievement of the primary measure and motive of even the original 1989 CMT Agreement. Admittedly, though, even the most objective standards will be insufficient safeguards within an adversarial relationship. Therefore, this study recommends that American business assess the long-term implications of threatened sanctions. For example, which Motorola fears are eradicated by the invoking of threatened trade sanctions? How is the relationship between Motorola and the Japanese government enhanced by the former's exhibited unwillingness or inability to resolve concerns directly with the latter, thus relying on the formal presence of USTR? Motorola may well desire today's increase in the number of earth broadcast stations (representing only potential increases in future sales), but at what cost to the company's vital image with the Japanese consumer? How much must protests outside the Motorola building mean in lost corporate prestige and, ultimately, in lost market share? Here, the rightfulness of the threatened sanctions is less the issue than how such are perceived by the critical Japanese telecommunications consumer. Finally, this study asserts that American business engenders Japanese business resistance by the former's unwillingness to modify American products for the Japanese market. In regards to CMT telecommunications, the existence of multiple and incompatible protocols, and Motorola's early election to forego product modifications which would have yielded consistency with existing Japanese telecommunication protocol, prompted the ensuing series of moves and countermoves, Bardachian plays and counterplays. This study recommends American business evidence good faith by adapting products to the conditions of the local marketplace, even while lobbying for a universal standard selected by international consensus.

Policy recommendations for the Japanese government This study asserts that the player among the four which most muddles the current telecommunications trade issue is the Japanese government. While this study concludes that the incompatibility level of multiple protocols confounds the task of both govern-

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ments, it is the governmental bureaucracy of MPT that may consistently be interpreted as executing intended, nearly transparent, blocking tactics against American business. Here, the Japanese government engenders the United States fears and accusations that the former could have been acting in a manner inconsistent with good faith. As mentioned previously, the Japanese government, namely MPT, would appear to primarily protect Japanese business interests in the telecommunications industry; e.g., whether or not intended, the delays in granting fullest spectrum availability to Motorola served to allow Japanese business to counter Motorola's initial CMT technological lead (Tyson, 1992, p. 70). Moreover, whatever the etiology, Japanese business in the United States is widely perceived to experience fewer restrictions, than do their American business counterparts in respective Japanese markets. This study recommends that Japanese government abandon short-term tactics, in favor of affirmative acts for domestic producers. Simply, the Japanese government should reduce bureaucratic influence over the Japanese telecommunications industry.

Policy recommendations for Japanese business The disclosures by Mr. Takeo Tsukada, President of the IDO, reported in The New York Times, (February 22, 1994) acknowledge the company's failure to earnestly fund the second system-the system which should have been supporting Motorola's protocol. Albeit, offering plausible reasoning for such a failure (insufficient funding), corroborated by the company's financial performance, nonetheless Tsukada's disclosures support Motorola's contention that the North American protocol remains underrepresented in the Tokyo-Nagoya corridor. (The recent decision of the Japanese government is highly questionable. Why must the IDO use two standards?) Further, IDO's reasoning for having given primacy to the establishment of the competing NTT system--because IDO had started on the NTT system first and needed to build it up so it could compete-is precisely the reasoning employed by both Motorola and USTR to question IDO's tactics. If IDO is able to build up the NTT system, then why cannot the company build up Motorola's system? MPT committed IDO to funding a second system. Perhaps, there was not sufficient funding to fully fund both CTM systems. Trade-offs were required. It seems meaningful that IDO apparently acquiesced to MPT's demand that the company fund a second system. Does Japanese business reserve the right to refuse to adhere to a ministerial mandate? Given the above, this study would baldly recommend that Japanese businesses adopt the following stratagem: Commit only to that which is reasonable, prudent, and viable for the firm. However, it is here recognized that such a luxury is not enjoyed by Japanese telecommunications firms because their businesses are regulated and controlled by both the MPT and the American government. The telecommunications industry does not exhibit a perfect market, as economists believe, where producers can freely compete with each other on the basis of the price and quality of their products. For example, consumers do not determine the price of telecommunications services. There will continue to be some degree of governmental regulation and political pressure from not only the Japanese government, but also the American government. Therefore, this study recommends a more feasible policy for Japanese business: an abandonment of the defense of domestic market share, in favor of an attack on the true long-range telecommunications p r o b l e m - t h e absence of a universal protocol supporting a global telecommunications infrastructure. Japan's most significant and urgent priority is the development of its information infrastructure. Here, the longrange and immediate needs are linked. Admittedly, the long-standing telecommunica-

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tions trade tension between the two countries-the absence of a universal protocolhas deflected Japan's attention from the natural diplomatic priorities. In fact, the difficulty of Japan and the United States to agree upon a universal protocol could have been presaged in their past unwillingness to recognize the legitimacy of national trade legislation (US Telecommunications Trade Act of 1988), or even the legitimacy of international trade agreements (GATT). How can a universal standard be created in the absence of a willingness to accept a superordinate authority which must by its very nature supersede national, industry, or even single firm, interests? In conclusion, the bilateral trade relationship, represented as it is by the ongoing telecommunications trade conflagration, deters future international prosperity. It might be true that the two nations, with different social and historical backgrounds, now jointly face a restructuring of the relationship for the 21st century. It is hoped that this study can make a small contribution to the bilateral relationship between Japan and the United States. REFERENCES Clinton, W. J., & Gore, A. (1993, April 8). Technology f o r America's economic growth: A new direction to build economic strength. Washington DC: White House. Hayashi, K. (1989). The economics o f networking (in Japanese). Tokyo: NTT Publishing. Hayashi, K. (1993). Information infrastructure: Who builds broadband networks. Information Economics and Policy, 5, 295-309. Hayashi, K. (1994). Universal Service (in Japanese). Tokyo: Chuo Koron Sha. Hayashi, K., & Sueyoshi, T. (1994). Information infrastructure development: International comparison between the United States and Japan. Telematics andlnformatics, 11(3), 153-166. Kahin, B. (1993). Information infrastructure sourcebook. Cambridge, MA: Office of Information Technology, Harvard University. Landsbergen, D. (1992). Establishing telecommunications standards: A problem of procedures and values. Informatization and the Public Sector, 2, 329-346. Ministry of Post and Telecommunications. (1985). Report on present state o f communications in Japan. Tokyo: The Japan Times, Ltd. National Security and International Affairs Division. (1990, July 31). The extent of Japanese investment in the United States and US investment in Japan. In Foreign Investment: Aspects o f the US-Japan Relationship. Fact Sheet for the Chairman, Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, US Senate (p. 6). Washington, DC: General Accounting Office. Nomani, A. Q., & Lavin, D. (1994, March 10). US and Japan nearing accord in trade dispute: Tentative compromise aids Motorola, not AT&T; Progress on autos seen. The Wall Street Journal, A3 and A5. Nomani, A. Q., & Hamilton, D. P. (1994, March 14). US and Japan move to ease trade tensions: Cellularphone agreement, expected chip figures contribute to calming. The Wall Street Journal, A2 and A4. NTT. (1990). Realization o f visual, intelligent and personal communications service- a service vision f o r the 21st century. Tokyo: NTT. NTT. (1992). N T T Procurement Activities. Tokyo: NTT. Oniki, H. (1993). Japan's international trade in telecommunications services. In M. Jussawalla (Ed.). United States-Japan trade in telecommunications: Conflict and compromise (pp. 71-94). Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Oniki, H. (1994). Japanese telecommunications as network industry: Industrial organization for the BISDN generation technology. Telematics and Informatics, 11(3), 205-215. Pollack, A. (1994, March 28). Medical companies berate Japan: American rivals see arbitrary regulation. The New York Times, DI and D8. Thurow, L. (1992). Head to head: The coming economic battle among Japan, Europe and America. New York: Morrow. Tyson, L. (1992). Trade conflict in high-technology Industry. Washington, DC: Institute of International Economics. UN World Population Prospects. (1993). Population, area, and population density. In K. Morimoto (Ed.), Japan 1993: A n International Comparison. (lst Edition, p. 6). Tokyo: Keizai Koho Center (Japan Institute for Social and Economic Affairs). Yamaguchi, H. (1991). Telecommunications--NTT's version o f the future. Tokyo: NTT Publishing.