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The Indian Ocean and the Second Nuclear Age
The Indian Ocean and the Second Nuclear Age by Donald L. Berlin Donald L. Berlin is a professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu. The views expressed herein are personal opinions of the author and do not represent official positions of the U.S. government, the U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Pacific Command, or the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies.
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ne of the more troubling of post–Cold War international trends has been the advent of a ‘‘second nuclear age.’’ Rather than losing their relevance in these years, nuclear arms have become a new danger in this era, which is heralded in particular by the rise of Asian military power.1 Michael Krepon of the Stimson Center observed in 2002 that ‘‘this is the most dangerous time since the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. And the dangers are compounded because we are not just worried about one country. We are worried about Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and the Indian subcontinent.’’2 A new emphasis on the acquisition of nuclear weapons is evident in the Middle East and East Asia. With Japan under growing threats from neighboring countries, increased attention is being paid to the possibility of even its acquiring a nuclear arsenal. The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review and the 2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction indicate that Washington has taken these concerns seriously in considering its potential military options in these regions and elsewhere. In the troubled Indian Ocean region lying between the Middle East and East Asia—the arc from the Arabian Sea to the Bay of Bengal—nuclear arms pose a renewed threat. The first occurred during the Cold War, when the United States and the Soviet Union used these waters for patrols by their respective fleets, including their nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarines. This article focuses on the subset of current nuclear weapons developments involving sea-based or air-deliverable weapons that directly utilize Ocean 1 See, e.g., Paul Bracken, Fire in the East: the Rise of Asian Military Power and the Second Nuclear Age (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1990) and ‘‘The Structure of the Second Nuclear Age,’’ Orbis, Summer 2003. 2 Quoted by Faye Bowers and Howard LaFranchi, ‘‘Risk Rises for a Reignited Arms Race,’’ Christian Science Monitor, Dec. 31, 2002. See also Kurt M. Campbell, ‘‘Nuclear Proliferation Beyond Rogues,’’ Washington Quarterly, Winter 2002–03, pp. 7–15.
ß 2003 Published by Elsevier Limited on behalf of Foreign Policy Research Institute.
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BERLIN space, as opposed to those occurring in the broader region, which could encompass as many as 51 separate nations.3 The Indian and Pakistani nuclear blasts of 1998 were key milestones in this process, but there are other, often embryonic, nuclear weapons and delivery system developments in the Indian Ocean that are powerful pointers toward the future of this region. This nuclearization process, which connects regions that were once strategically distinct—the Middle East with South Asia, South Asia with East Asia—has potentially momentous consequences for international security. The Littoral States: India New Delhi’s nuclear weapons initiatives are potentially the most important in the region. Many observers initially believed India would pursue a minimalist, unhurried nuclear weapons development and deployment trajectory, distinct from those of established nuclear powers. It was thought that India would possess only a ‘‘force-in-being’’ for years before possessing a ‘‘robust and ready’’ or ‘‘operational’’ force such as that maintained by the United States. Possessing a ‘‘force-in-being’’ means being able to launch retaliatory nuclear strikes, but without immediacy: the requisite nuclear weapons would be physically separate from the delivery systems and under firm civilian control.4 Ashley Tellis, for example, has argued that ‘‘New Delhi does not currently possess or desire to build a ready nuclear arsenal, but instead seeks to develop a ‘force-in-being,’ consisting of unassembled nuclear weapons.’’5 The United States’ policy is apparently to reinforce this status quo and to discourage New Delhi from proceeding beyond this recessed nuclear deterrent. It is reasonable to assume that India’s nuclear weapons capability and evolving doctrine, even five years after the 1998 nuclear tests, remain relatively immature. However, there have been strong suggestions that it is gradually abandoning the force-in-being concept. First, the Draft Nuclear Doctrine promulgated by India’s National Security Advisory Board in August 1999 (and implicitly endorsed by the 3
There are a variety of definitions of the Indian Ocean and the Indian Ocean region. See Christian Bouchard, ‘‘Emergence of a New Geopolitical Era in the Indian Ocean: Characters, Issues and Limitations of the Indianoceanic Order,’’ paper presented at the Indian Ocean Research Group Inaugural Conference: ‘‘The Indian Ocean in a Globalizing World: Critical Perspectives on the 21st Century,’’ ICSSR Complex, Panjab University, Chandigarh, India, Nov. 18–22, 2002. 4 George Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb (Berkeley and Los Angeles, Calif.: University of California Press, 2000), pp. 483–84. 5 Ashley J. Tellis, ‘‘India’s Emerging Nuclear Doctrine: Exemplifying the Lessons of the Nuclear Revolution,’’ NBR Publications, vol. 12, no. 2, 2002.
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Indian Ocean Cabinet Committee on Security in its January 2003 restatement of many of the Doctrine’s key points)6 states that India should develop nuclear forces, to include aircraft, mobile land-based missiles, and sea assets. Presumably a key rationale for the latter would be to attain a secure second-strike capability, an obvious sine qua non for a state proclaiming a no-first-use posture. Equally important, however, New Delhi may have judged a sea-based deterrent to be the swiftest route to achieving a nuclear capability against China’s heartland, a target area that remains effectively beyond India’s reach and would likely remain so even if India acquires the land-based, 3,000 km-range Agni-III, which may soon be tested for the first time.7 A sea-based deterrent would be a momentous step away from nuclear minimalism, making nuclear weapons almost directly available for use. Although final control could still rest with the civilian leadership in New Delhi, officers on Indian surface warships or submarines would physically control these warheads, which raises important civil-military issues. Critics say that a sea-based deterrent will have a high cost, that there are too many technical hurdles to overcome, and that New Delhi does not need a robust second-strike capability since the nuclear forces of its potential foes—China and Pakistan—are still relatively primitive. Nonetheless, in December 2002 India’s navy chief reaffirmed his commitment to a sea-based deterrent, stating that: Any country that claims to be a nuclear weapon state and whose doctrine involves no first use must necessarily have a nuclear triad. And if you look around the world, the stronger leg of the triad is not only at sea, it is underwater. The British have already moved their assets underwater and the French forces are doing so and others will follow. It doesn’t make sense to keep nuclear weapons on land because you are targetable. . . . Worldwide that seems to be the trend.8
A second consideration for India is the inherent desirability of the Indian Ocean as a patrol zone for missile-carrying submarines, for reasons including the mix of warm and cold currents there, which can mask the presence of these boats. Both U.S. and Soviet boats took advantage of this and plied these waters during the Cold War. U.S. submarines—and those of France and the UK—almost certainly still do so, and it is likely that the nuclear-weapons-capable submarines of India and other littoral states eventually will do so as well. A third pointer is India’s establishment of a Strategic Forces Command (SFC) to manage its nuclear weapons, which it announced on January 4, 2003. The SFC is a joint command that will report directly to a Chief of Defence Staff, 6
‘‘The Cabinet Committee on Security Reviews Operationalization of India’s Nuclear Doctrine,’’ Ministry of External Affairs, Jan. 4, 2003. 7 A recent report says that ‘‘highly placed defence ministry officials’’ have indicated that the initial trial of the Agni III would be undertaken in the first week of November 2003. See ‘‘Govt to procure more Prithvi missiles,’’ Times of India (Sept. 8, 2003). 8 ‘‘Navy should be Repository of Nuclear Arsenal,’’ The Hindu, Dec. 2, 2002.
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BERLIN when one is named, and not to any single service. The navy is expected to have a strong role in the SFC and use its influence on behalf of a sea-based deterrent. The SFC is temporarily headquartered in New Delhi. However, at some point a permanent facility—very likely situated on one of India’s coasts—will be established. A coastal site will be symbolically significant even if the headquarters simply becomes a command-and-control facility. One of the locations under consideration is Trivandrum, in Kerala, on the Indian Ocean. The selection of this location would be noteworthy (and analogous to the Nebraska site of the U.S. Strategic Command) because it is maximally distant from China, which Defence Minister George Fernandes has called ‘‘potential threat number one.’’ The command is expected to ‘‘own assets and have its own force,’’ and India’s senior military officer affirmed in September 2002 that the organization would be a ‘‘fighting command.’’9 A fourth indicator of India’s shift away from nuclear minimalism is its continuing acquisition of a variety of cruise missiles. Among these is the Brahmos, which New Delhi is co-developing in conjunction with Russia. Set to enter into serial production in 2004, the Brahmos is supersonic and has a range of 300 km. It can be launched from land, air, sea, and sub-sea platforms and could well be intended to delivery nuclear payloads, among others, in the future. Cruise missile submarines, or surface ships with nuclear-armed cruise missiles, would be a more direct and technologically simpler path to a sea-based nuclear deterrent than would ballistic missile submarines. The option of employing submarines in conjunction with nucleararmed cruise missiles will be particularly alluring. It is virtually certain that India, as well as Israel and Pakistan, will mainly pursue this path. Because Indian cruise missiles will for some time lack the range to target China except from the South China Sea, New Delhi is planning for the ultimate deployment of its submarines—ideally nuclear-powered ones—here or elsewhere in China’s backyard. The growing power and wealth of southern coastal China is increasing the strategic significance of the South China Sea, and these waters are destined to be a zone of Sino-Indian maritime competition in future years. For these and other purposes, India continues to upgrade its existing submarine fleet while also developing or acquiring newer, more advanced submarines. The Indian navy’s principal subsurface combatants are currently ten Russian-produced Kilo submarines. These are being sent to Russia one by one for upgrades, including the addition of Club cruise missiles believed to have both anti-ship and land-attack capabilities.10 The four boats already 9
‘‘Special Nuclear Command on the Anvil,’’ The Hindu, Oct. 1, 2002; Elizabeth Roche, ‘‘India forging special unit to operate nuclear arsenal,’’ Agence France Presse, Sept. 30, 2002. The Sept. 1, 2003, inaugural meeting of the Political Council, the senior body making nuclear weapons decisions, reportedly ordered the transfer of the Army’s two missile battalions to the new SFC. 10 Malcolm Davis, ‘‘Back on Course,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, Jan. 24, 2001.
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Indian Ocean refitted with these weapons constitute the Indian navy’s first submerged missile launch capability. India will also be building six to twelve French-designed Scorpene submarines, each of which will carry 16 Brahmos or Exocet cruise missiles. The Scorpene’s design allows for the installation of a small nuclear reactor. This contract apparently also provides for India’s acquisition of critical underwater missile launch technology.11 India has also lately accorded higher priority to the construction of a nuclear-powered missile submarine, the Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV). Fabrication of the hull and integration (with Russia’s assistance) of the ATV’s nuclear reactor is thought already to be under way.12 Its design is based on Russia’s Severodvinsk-class type 885 attack submarine, which has a significant cruise missile capability. The ATV is expected to be brought to sea trials by 2006.13 Perhaps most important, New Delhi is negotiating with Moscow to lease two Akula II nuclear-powered submarines. While these normally are equipped with intermediate range cruise missiles capable of mounting 200kiloton nuclear weapons, presumably Russia would not include either the missiles or the warheads in the lease. India is expected to use the Brahmos cruise missile—eventually with a nuclear warhead—as the principal weapon for these boats. Indian submariners reportedly familiarized themselves with Akula II operations during training in Severodvinsk in 2001.14 India will require forward bases to support these submarines, particularly for patrols near China. To this end, among others, India is transforming the unified command established in 2001 at Port Blair in the Andaman and Nicobar chain in the Bay of Bengal, reportedly to eventually accommodate a large proportion of the new SFC’s sea- and air-based assets. India was of two minds about retaining the islands until the May 1998 Pokhran nuclear tests; the original plan was ‘‘to abandon the Andaman and Nicobar Islands after exploiting its natural resources.’’15 India did transfer the Coco Islands to Burma, in 1954. However, by 1962, in the aftermath of India’s China war, New Delhi clearly was becoming sensitive to the archipelago’s value. By 1998, ‘‘the Vajpayee government woke up to the islands’ huge 11
Bharat Karnad, ‘‘Putting Bang in the Bomb,’’ Indian Express, Nov. 13, 2002. Commander Vijay Sakhuja, ‘‘Sea Based Deterrence and Indian Security,’’ Strategic Analysis: A Monthly Journal of the IDSA, Apr. 2001; ‘‘Counterproliferation—Russia-India: New Developments in Science and Technology Cooperation,’’ FBIS, Jan. 14, 2003. 13 See D. R. SarDesai and Raju G. C. Thomas, eds., Nuclear India in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2002), pp. 108, 221. 14 ‘‘Russian Submarines in Indian Waters,’’ Intelligence Online, Oct. 24, 2002; Manoj Joshi, ‘‘Russia Gives Nuclear Edge to Indian Defence,’’ Times of India, Jan. 19, 2003; and Sergey Sokut, ‘‘Indian Navy to be Augmented by our Nuclear Boat,’’ Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Dec. 6, 2002. 15 Prakash Nanda and Zhao Nanqi, ‘‘Unified Command: Strategic Significance of the Andamans,’’ The Statesman (New Delhi), Oct. 18, 2002. 12
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BERLIN strategic importance.’’16 India’s navy chief has said that the Andaman and Nicobar theater will become increasingly important in the coming years.17 Toward the day when Indian ‘‘penetration’’ of the Strait would be routine, India gained some area familiarization through its 2002 collaboration with the United States in combined Malacca Strait patrols, in which it employed warships based at Port Blair. A variety of other Indian activities also stem in part from a long-term interest in the South China Sea. Since 1995, for example, New Delhi has hosted regular gatherings of warships from Southeast Asian nations at Port Blair. Its South China Sea naval exercise with Vietnam in 2000, which prompted a protest from Beijing, likewise reflected New Delhi’s interest in these waters. In addition to its importance for any sea-based Indian nuclear deterrent, the Indian Ocean will also be critical should India wish to strengthen its air-based nuclear deterrent vis-a`-vis China. One of New Delhi’s motives in ongoing talks to acquire the former Russian aircraft carrier, the Adm. Gorshkov, is its potential use as a nuclear weapons platform. The same motive may be behind the planned construction of an Air Defense Ship. No contract for the Gorshkov has yet been finalized, but India also has been negotiating with Moscow to acquire a complement of MiG-29K aircraft for use with the carrier. At least some versions of the MiG-29K are capable of delivering nuclear ordnance. Another path toward a more robust Indian strategic air deterrent would be to base the requisite air force or navy aircraft in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Campbell Airport on Great Nicobar is as near China’s populated heartland as any airfield in India and also affords aircraft an overwater route to China that is undefended compared to various transHimalayan approaches.18 To this end, there have been reports that the Indian Air Force is planning to extend the runway at Campbell. The key aircraft at Campbell prospectively may be the Jaguar. New Delhi expects to upgrade its 140 Jaguar aircraft and acquire more of them from the UK. The upgrades—an almost definitive sign that these aircraft will continue to have a nuclear strike mission—include the addition of more modern navigation systems and new electronic countermeasures gear.19 In 16
A. B. Mahapatra, ‘‘Andaman Faces Kargil-Type Invasion,’’ newsinsight.net, Oct. 23, 2002. As early as 1945, K. M. Panikkar wrote, ‘‘With the islands of the Bay of Bengal properly equipped and protected and with a navy strong enough in its home waters, security can return to that part of the Indian Ocean which is of supreme importance to India. . . . The possession of the Andamans and the Nicobars gives to India strategic bases which if fully utilized in coordination with air power can convert the Bay of Bengal into a secure area.’’ See K. M. Panikkar, India and the Indian Ocean (Bombay: George Allen and Unwin, 1961). 17 ‘‘Indian Naval Chief Satisfied with Performance of Unified Command at Andamans,’’ The Hindu, July 6, 2002. 18 Karnad, ‘‘India’s Force Planning Imperative,’’ p. 125. 19 Pulkit Singh, ‘‘India Bolstering Jaguar Fleet, Phasing Out Some Older MiGs,’’ Journal of Electronic Defense, Oct. 2002.
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Indian Ocean addition, India is negotiating with France to acquire 126 Mirage 2000H fighters. The Indo-French discussions have included the acquisition of 12 Qatari Mirages, which will form India’s first squadron. Capable of carrying a tactical nuclear payload, the Mirage has a maximum range of more than 3,000 km if fitted with drop tanks.20 If Moscow and New Delhi can come to terms, a naval air squadron of Backfire bombers may eventually supplement the Jaguars and/or Mirage aircraft. India also plans to sign a contract with Russia to upgrade its TU-142 Bear maritime surveillance and strike aircraft, along with its aging IL-38 maritime patrol aircraft. In all, the Indian navy wants to procure 30 more maritime surveillance aircraft, including P-3 Orions from the United States.21 New Delhi’s pronounced interest in aircraft of these types is suggestive. The Bear will be fitted with a variety of updated equipment, including gear intended for the detection of low-noise nuclear-powered submarines. An attack submarine is usually regarded as the best weapon against other submarines. Thus, India’s acquisition of maritime surveillance and strike aircraft is almost certainly intended to thwart or forestall a future Chinese attack on Indian cruise-missile platforms in the Indian Ocean and/or the South China Sea.22 The Littoral States: Pakistan Islamabad would seem to be far from mounting any kind of serious response to India’s intent to forge a nuclear weapons triad. Lately, however, notwithstanding its historic preoccupation with its land forces, Islamabad has increasingly regarded the Indian Ocean as central to its security. Pakistan’s vulnerability from the sea was most recently exposed in 1998, when 75 to 100 Tomahawk missiles were fired at Afghan targets from U.S. warships and submarines in the Arabian Sea, flying undetected over Pakistan’s airspace.23 The incident highlighted the poor state of Pakistan’s seaward defense and surveillance capabilities. A variety of other factors have also increased Pakistan’s maritime consciousness. One is the recent emergence of a more porous ‘‘boundary’’ between west and south Asia and the growing role of the Indian Ocean as the arena in which these interactions occur. Developments such as the new and 20
‘‘France Offers Technology Transfer for Mirages,’’ Hindustan Times, Sept. 29, 2002. ‘‘Russia to Upgrade TU-142 Warplanes,’’ Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostey, Oct. 21, 2002; and Bulbul Singh, ‘‘India, U.S. Near to Completing P-3 Orion Sale,’’ Aerospace Daily, Aug. 28, 2002. 22 The Indian Navy may also play an important role in the future in nuclear missile defense. See Captain Girish Luthva, ‘‘Sea-Based Missile Defense and Regional Security,’’ Indian Defence Review, July-Sept. 2002. 23 Commander Vijay Sakhuja, ‘‘Pakistan Navy and Nuclear Deterrence,’’ Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (New Delhi), Sept. 9, 2002. 21
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BERLIN growing Indo-Israeli and Indo-Iranian relationships, the Iranian-South African nexus, and the U.S. war on terrorism all strengthen Pakistan’s Ocean consciousness. The growing connectivity of west and south Asia is also reflected in India’s characterization of its security milieu as ‘‘Southern Asia’’ versus ‘‘South Asia.’’24 A second impetus for Islamabad is Pakistan’s endemic problem of lacking strategic depth. Many Pakistani security specialists consider the country too small and too geographically narrow to be properly or easily defended. This failing was relieved to some degree as long as Afghanistan and its government were Pakistani clients. With that more desirable state of affairs now in the past, Islamabad will be looking to the Indian Ocean (and to the undeveloped Baluchistan hinterland) as an alternate means of addressing this problem. For example, there are plans to extend Pakistan’s Exclusive Economic Zone from 200 to 230 nautical miles. Third and finally, Pakistan is now more aware than ever before that one of its principal strengths vis-a`-vis India is its geographic location in Southwest Asia, near the Persian Gulf and Central Asia and astride the Indian Ocean sea-lanes. This location has been very useful to Islamabad since 9/11 and has helped in restraining Washington from embracing New Delhi. Some observers even believe that Pakistan’s geographic situation will make it a key impediment to India’s ever attaining dominance in South Asia.25 Given this set of perceptions, Pakistan has lately sought to realize its potential as a maritime state. A sea-defense research institute, the Maritime Technology Complex (MTC), was established at Rawat, and Islamabad inaugurated the Jinnah Naval Base at Ormara. In March 2002, President Musharraf and a senior Chinese official laid the foundation stone of a deepsea port and naval facility at Gwadar, near the entrance to the Persian Gulf. Financed by the Chinese, the first phase of construction is scheduled for completion by March 2005. The facility will feature three multi-purpose berths and one service berth. Some naval air assets will likely also be based at Ormara and/or Gwadar. Pakistani naval-modernization initiatives also reflect this growing maritime orientation. In August 2002, Pakistan launched the second of three Agosta 90-B class submarines. The final boat in the series is currently under construction at Karachi dockyard. Pakistan is also negotiating to buy four Jiangwei-II Class frigates from China, the final three of which will be built in Pakistan. Finally, it appears that Islamabad plans to deploy various ballistic or cruise missiles on its southern coast to challenge, if necessary, Indian naval formations in the Arabian Sea. Many of these initiatives are rooted in Pakistani 24
Shireen M. Mazari, ‘‘West Asia: a Pakistani Strategic Perspective,’’ Strategic Studies, 2001. I am indebted to my colleague, Satu Limaye, for this observation. See also ‘‘Pakistan Navy on way to self-reliance,’’ Jihad-I-Kashmir in Urdu as translated by FBIS, Apr. 10–16, 2002. 25
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Indian Ocean concerns that date back to the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war, when the Indian navy successfully blockaded Karachi. Moreover, Pakistan will likely want a submarine-based nuclear weapons delivery system for its own sake. Because it lacks a no-first-use doctrine, Islamabad will worry that in a confrontation, New Delhi would try to deny it the opportunity to launch a first strike. Under these circumstances, minimum credible deterrence for Pakistan will require both first- and secondstrike capabilities. In May 1999 the Pakistani navy was in fact ‘‘assigned a nuclear role,’’ and Pakistan’s navy chief has affirmed Islamabad’s intention to develop a seabased deterrent.26 This could be bluster, but the Agosta acquisition discussed above could be quite important in this connection. These boats will provide Pakistan with a significant conventional-strike capability in the Arabian Sea, and according to one Pakistani naval analyst, ‘‘the Agosta submarine . . . can be used to fire a nuclear missile. As the submarine can stay under water for 60 days . . . it is said to be the best way to protect Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and also gives Pakistan the capability of a second nuclear strike.’’27 A former Indian navy chief apparently agrees: ‘‘Pakistan obviously did not spend such a huge amount of precious foreign exchange on acquiring new submarines, merely to have them launch conventional missiles and torpedoes. They had a long-term strategy in mind for the use of these subs.’’28 Scientific and technical challenges would make it difficult for Islamabad to develop the capability to launch nuclear-armed ballistic missiles from a submerged submarine.29 However, as in India’s case, the path toward a submerged-launch cruise missile capability would be less onerous. It remains to be seen whether Pakistan can adapt the anti-ship Harpoon Block I missiles it has in its inventory for this purpose or will acquire other, more suitable, cruise missiles. The Outsiders United States. The United States has been increasing its security presence over the past few years from the coast of East Africa to Djibouti, Yemen, Oman, Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka, and Diego Garcia, and on to the 26
Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha, ‘‘South Asia: Nuclear Navies?’’ Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Sept.-Oct. 2000. 27 Major General Dipankar Banerjee, ‘‘Trends in Force Modernization in South Asia,’’ paper presented at the conference on Conventional Arms Rivalry in the Asia-Pacific, Oct. 23–25, 2001, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Honolulu, Hawaii; quote from Hafiz Tareq Manzoor, ‘‘Importance of the Indian Ocean,’’ Jamaat-ud-Daawa Pakistan in Urdu as translated by FBIS, Sept. 29, 2002. 28 Admiral (Ret.) J. G. Nadkarni, ‘‘Raising the Nuclear Threshold,’’ rediff.com, June 17, 1999. 29 See Nuclear Stability in South Asia, published by the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc. in association with the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Spring 2002.
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BERLIN Strait of Malacca and Singapore. There are many situation-specific reasons for this, most obviously the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. More broadly, the United States has been strengthening its military profile in the Indian Ocean because of a perception predating 9/11 that it is here—the historic home to most of the world’s Muslims, 60 percent of the world’s poor and 70 percent of the world’s illiteracy—that the more extreme, unpredictable, and undeterrable threats will arise. It is in this respect that the December 2001 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review is relevant. The Review reverses the almost twenty-year trend of relegating nuclear weapons to the category of weapons of last resort. Rather, it expands the circumstances for the use of nuclear weapons beyond situations threatening the United States’ national survival. These circumstances will now include retaliation for the use of chemical or biological weapons, or simply as a response to ‘‘surprising military developments.’’ The review abandons ‘‘negative security assurances’’ and directs the development of contingency plans for the use of nuclear weapons against a wider range of potential adversaries, regardless of their nuclear status. Finally, the review places more emphasis on ‘‘adaptive planning’’—the ability to generate war plans quickly in time-critical situations. To this end, the U.S. Navy is incorporating new and adaptive planning capabilities into its Trident submarines. In October 2003, coinciding with the SIOP-04 war plan’s entering into force, the navy was to complete deployment of a new submarine-launched ballistic missile retargeting system (SRS). The SRS will enable Trident submarines patrolling the Indian Ocean ‘‘to quickly, accurately, and reliably retarget missiles to targets [and] allow timely and reliable processing of an increased number of targets.’’30 In that the Review specifically identified Iran as a potential target, and since regional circumstances are such that there could be other state or nonstate targets in the future, the likelihood of U.S. employment of nuclear weapons in the region has increased.31 Israel. Tel Aviv too has come to see this region more darkly than heretofore. Notwithstanding its geographical distance, Israel’s ties to the region are longstanding. Notably, it has had important ties with South Africa, Singapore, and even India. It cooperated extensively with apartheid South Africa on nuclear weapons, providing Pretoria with nuclear weapons design advice. Israel’s trade with South Africa, moreover, included tritium exports and uranium imports. In addition, a flash over the Ocean detected by an American satellite in 1979 may have been a joint nuclear test by Tel Aviv and Pretoria.32 30
Hans M. Kristensen, ‘‘Preemptive Posturing,’’ Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Sept./Oct. 2002. 31 See ‘‘Pentagon Memo Raises Possibility of Nuclear Testing,’’ Arms Control Today, Dec. 2002, p. 14. 32 See Seymour Hersh, The Sampson Option (New York: Random House, 1991).
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Indian Ocean During the 1980s, Israel worked with South Africa to assist the latter in producing its own family of missiles based on the Israeli Jericho-2. Israel’s missile program benefited by sharing costs and resources with Pretoria and by using South African test facilities, particularly the excellent Overberg Test Range established in 1986 near Arniston on the Indian Ocean. With Israel’s help, this site was developed into a sophisticated test range, essentially a duplicate of the Palmichim test range in Israel. Overberg was used first used by Israel and South Africa for a launch of the South African Jericho-derived missile to a target area in the Ocean’s Prince Edward Islands in 1989. Israel’s most important military link in the eastern Indian Ocean has been with Singapore, with whom it began a close and multifaceted military relationship in the mid-1960s. The Lion City clearly regarded Israel as a military model to be emulated, and Singapore was Israel’s most important defense export market during the 1990s. Israeli-Singaporean military cooperation continues to this day, with the Singapore Ministry of Defence publicly acknowledging in 2000 that there were ‘‘several joint projects.’’33 The ongoing joint research and development of a space-based surveillance system is particularly noteworthy. While formal diplomatic ties between India and Israel date only from 1992, there have been important connections between the two since at least the early 1980s. In 1983, after Islamabad converted its U.S.-supplied F-16s to make them capable of dropping nuclear bombs, senior Indian military personnel visited Israel to receive briefings on F-16 capabilities and vulnerabilities and to buy electronic warfare equipment to neutralize Pakistani aircraft.34 Soon thereafter, based on a common concern about Pakistani nuclear ambitions, India and Israel formulated plans to jointly attack and neutralize Pakistan’s embryonic nuclear weapons research and development complex. Although eventually aborted, the plan reflected the intimacy of the Indian-Israeli relationship even then. Since the 1999 advent of the BJP-led government in India, this early relationship has been greatly expanded.35 A parade of senior Israeli and Indian officials have exchanged visits, and military relations have become so close that many observers see the connection as practically tantamount to a military alliance. In June 2002, following Pakistan’s downing of an unmanned 33
Tim Huxley, Defending the Lion City: the Armed Forces of Singapore (St. Leonards, New South Wales, Australia: Allen and Unwin, 2000), pp. 197–98. 34 Bharat Karnad, Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security the Realist Foundations of Strategy (Delhi: Macmillan India Limited, 2002), pp. 344–50. Pakistan remains sensitive about the possibility of preemptive Israeli or Israeli-Indian attacks on its nuclear facilities. See Owen Bennett Jones, Pakistan: Eye of the Storm (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), pp. 187–90. 35 Ilan Berman, ‘‘Israel, India and Turkey: Triple Entente,’’ Middle East Quarterly, Fall 2002; and Ghani Jafar, ‘‘ ‘Soul Mates’ Come Together: The Brahmanic-Talmudist Alliance,’’ Regional Studies, Spring 2002.
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BERLIN reconnaissance drone manufactured (and perhaps operated) by Israel, Pakistan’s President Musharraf complained ‘‘that the cooperation between India and Israel not only relates to Pakistan, but the Middle East region as a whole.’’36 Notwithstanding all this, the scope and character of Israel’s strategic military involvement in the Indian Ocean has received little international attention and remains relatively opaque. An evolution toward a strategic footprint encompassing a part of the Ocean region would be consistent with Israel’s historic emphasis on power projection, and especially with Prime Minister Sharon’s strategic vision of defending Israel from as far away from its borders as possible. Tel Aviv’s land-based missiles, air power, and incipient sea-based deterrent will all be part of this quest. Israel’s missile force, by virtue of an upgraded version of the multistage Jericho missile—with a reported range of up to 2,800 miles—has become capable of reaching targets in Iran and Pakistan. In addition, there is good evidence that the Israeli Air Force is thinking seriously about how it can reach targets in the Arabian Sea area. A 2002 semi-official report that parallels some of the views and rationale articulated in the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review recommends that Israel’s warplanes be made capable of operating within a combat radius of 2,000 km and launching second-strike attacks in retaliation for the use of WMD. The report calls for a capability to mount rapid air strikes at the Indian Ocean entrance of the Red Sea (Bab-el-Mandab) against Iranian targets in the Persian Gulf, Sudan, and, in a worst-case scenario, Pakistan.37 The development of an Israeli naval capability in the Indian Ocean appears to be more advanced than the air arm’s. The Israeli navy some time ago prepared a formal proposal to give the service a broader ‘‘strategic’’ mission. This plan was then discussed at a meeting of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee. The plan recommends that the navy operate in the Ocean so as to deter Iran and, if necessary, ‘‘intervene in land battles . . . and come out victorious through the use of advanced weapons systems.’’ The service is to be capable of deploying 30 percent of Israel’s strategic nuclear weapons by 2020 and of firing missiles that could reach targets at least 300 km inland.38 Concerns about advances in long-range missile capabilities by Iran and other Middle Eastern countries have been driving Israel to strengthen its sea-based force. Sea-launched missiles would boost Israel’s deterrent capability, making clear to a potential foe that even if a surprise attack 36
Zawahir Siddique, ‘‘Indian Campaign Against Kashmiri Mujahiden Based on Assistance from Israel,’’ Muslimedia.com, Aug. 16–31, 2002. 37 Yoash Tsiddon-Chatto, ‘‘Non-Classified Realities Affecting Israel’s Air Force: 2005–2010,’’ Policy Paper No. 136, Ariel Center for Policy Research, 2002. 38 See ‘‘ ‘Secret’ Report Advises: Navy to Operate Far from Israel’s Beaches,’’ Voice of Israel, (Jerusalem) Feb. 13, 2002.
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Indian Ocean eliminated Israel’s land-based nuclear arsenal, it could still retaliate with 39 WMD. It is unclear to what extent Israel’s navy already has put in place this kind of capability. However, there have been reports for some time that Israel has been refitting its three Dolphin-class submarines to make them capable of firing submerged-launch cruise missiles—locally produced or modified Tomahawks—for land-attack missions. In May 2000 Israel reportedly test fired, possibly in coordination with India, cruise missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads from two Dolphin-class submarines off Sri Lanka. There also have been indications that Eritrea—located at the Red Sea entrance to the Ocean—could come to constitute a covert forward operating base for Oceandedicated Israeli forces in the future. With a half-Christian, half-Muslim population, Eritrea has resisted joining the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic States. In 2000, Jane’s doubted that Israel had yet put in place a sea-based nuclear deterrent. It considered that ‘‘given the 30-day endurance of Israel’s three diesel-electric submarines, the geographic constraints imposed by the Bab-el-Mandab and Hormuz straits, and the emerging anti-submarine capabilities of Iran and Saudi Arabia it would be very difficult to maintain a boat on such a station.’’40 While a fair judgment at the time, it is fairly certain that Israel does have such a capability today. China. For decades, Indian security analysts have expected Beijing to expand its strategic and maritime area of interest to include the Indian Ocean and its littoral. In the broadest sense, this expectation has been fulfilled and China today is part of the Ocean’s strategic landscape. A key consideration for Beijing is the one-third of China’s GDP attributable to foreign trade and the importance of the Indian Ocean, particularly for commerce with Europe and petroleum imports from the Middle East, in that trade. China will therefore seek to establish a security posture in the area that allows it to protect its sea lines of communications. India’s sea-lanes obviously also transit the Ocean and overlap those of China. Each will therefore want to protect these overlapping routes.41 China also will be concerned that India would have a geostrategic advantage in the Ocean in any conflict along its land border, and that India could try to compensate for continental power inadequacies by taking action against Chinese interests in the Ocean. China also needs Ocean access 39 Nathan Guttman, ‘‘Israel Denies Report Subs Can Launch Nuclear Missiles,’’ Haaretz, July 7, 2002; Walter Pincus and Vernon Loeb, ‘‘Missile Worries Focus Israel on Navy,’’ Washington Post, June 19, 2002. 40 See ‘‘Claims About Israel’s Nuclear Capability Doubted,’’ Jane’s Sentinel, July 18, 2000. 41 John W. Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001), pp. 275–312; and Philip Andrews-Speed, Xuanli Liao and Roland Dannreuther, The Strategic Implications of China’s Energy Needs (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).
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BERLIN because, in the event of conflict with the United States or Japan in East Asia, it would want to have secured one of its backdoors. The latter interest, of course, was a matter of the greatest importance during China’s struggle with Imperial Japan in World War II. More generally, China will strive to thwart Indian power in the Ocean region because great powers that have achieved regional hegemony, or seek to do so (as China presumably will be doing in East Asia), normally seek to prevent rival powers from replicating this feat in their own regions. As John Mearsheimer put it, ‘‘Thus the United States (easily dominant in the Western Hemisphere), for example, played a key role in preventing imperial Japan, Wilhelmine Germany, Nazi Germany, and the Soviet Union from gaining regional supremacy (in East Asia, Europe, and Eurasia respectively).’’42 The Indian Ocean region has not yet figured importantly in China’s nuclear weapons posture. China targets India with nuclear weapons from facilities on the Tibetan plateau (probably from Qinghai and/or Yunnan province rather than the Tibetan Autonomous Region per se). To date, however, China apparently has not deployed nuclear weapons directly into the region in surface warships, submarines, or aircraft, or to Chinese ‘‘bases’’ but instead has engaged in a strenuous and well-conceived ‘‘preparation of the battlefield’’ effort. This has entailed taking those steps necessary to have the capability and option to deploy or station nuclear weapons in this region in the future. The PLA’s navy, for example, has been strengthening its force projection options by enhancing its capability to deploy submarines on extended patrols. Most worrisome for India is China’s developmental work on the Type 094 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine that is expected to carry an advanced SLBM. A more immediate concern, however, will be the Type 093 nuclearpowered attack submarine. Expected to enter service by late 2004 or early 2005, this boat will be capable of firing land-attack cruise missiles with nuclear warheads. It will constitute one of the most significant increments to Chinese military power in recent decades.43 One employment scenario for the weapon would be against a regional foe such as India. The Type 093, of course, also could be quite useful against the U.S. Navy, particularly the submarine’s advanced wireguided and wake-homing torpedo capability. Against the United States, however, China would be forced to contend with anti-submarine warfare capabilities that have been well honed in decades of competition with the Soviet Union. 42
John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2001) p. 41. 43 U.S. Department of Defense, Report to Congress, Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act, ‘‘Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China’’ (July 2002).
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Indian Ocean Politically, Beijing has also tried to cultivate closer relations with a variety of Indian Ocean states. Like any large power, China has engaged in development projects, military assistance programs, and bilateral trade in order to foster cooperation and (later) dependence. Among the Chinese ‘‘targets’’ in the Indian Ocean have been Burma, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, the Maldives, Iran, Sudan, South Africa, and Tanzania. One of the most significant recent developments along these lines was the December 2002 Defence Cooperation Agreement between China and Bangladesh—an initiative that must have caused consternation in New Delhi.44 Farther afield, South Africa and Sudan are respectively China’s number-one and -two trading partners on the African continent.45 Beijing’s ties with Pakistan have been its most important connection in the region. They have consisted of important military-to-military relations; critical and continuing Chinese assistance with Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programs, including M-11 missiles; and Chinese work on the Pakistani port at Gwadar, a facility the Chinese navy undoubtedly will use. In addition to its work at Gwadar, China has demonstrated a pronounced interest in the construction of a variety of commercial ports, shipyards, naval bases, and other facilities in the Ocean, some of which already include a Chinese military presence. Beyond the profit motive for some of these efforts, China surely also wants to be well positioned, should the need arise, to project power in the Ocean region. The most important of these initiatives have been in Burma. There, a new Chinese-built port and shipyard was inaugurated at Thilawa, 25 km south of Rangoon, early in 2002. The sprawling port facility can handle ships of up to 10,000 deadweight tons—of which the Burmese have only a few—and is designed to cater primarily to Chinese exports on Chinese ships. China also has built and may have a military presence at a number of other facilities in Burma, including Ramree, Great Coco, and St. Matthew’s Islands. These facilities have variously been identified as signals intelligence facilities, radar stations, or, in the case of Zadetkyi Kyun, as a PRC satellite ground station. Chinese navy and air force personnel have started helping Burma build a naval base near Kyaukpyu and a naval and air base near Kawthaung. One report claims that the latter facility, not far from the Strait of Malacca, will be Burma’s largest navy base.46 44
Subhash Kapila,‘‘ Bangladesh-China Defence Cooperation Agreement’s Strategic Implications,’’ web site of the South Asia Analysis Group, Jan. 14, 2003. 45 ‘‘China’s 21st Century Africa Policy Evolving,’’ STRATFOR, Aug. 7, 2002. 46 For dark appraisals of the size and importance of China’s presence in Burma, see Prakash Nanda, ‘‘Strategic Significance of the Andamans,’’ Indian Defence Review, July-Sept. 2002, pp. 20–24, and John W. Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001), pp. 275–312. Andrew Selth offers a contrary view in Burma’s Armed Forces: Power Without Glory (Norwalk, Conn.: EastBridge, 2002).
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BERLIN Conclusion The growing nuclearization of the Indian Ocean region is but the latest in a series of strategic developments that reflect the numerous strategic rivalries that are finding a focus in this theater. The most intense of these are those pitting Islam against the West and involving China against India. On a somewhat lower plane are the Sino-American and Indo-U.S. competitions. The last of these may be in abeyance, but would intensify the moment New Delhi’s comprehensive power eclipses that of Beijing. Finally, there is France and the growing—albeit so far restrained—competition between Paris and Washington in parts of the region, most recently in Madagascar and Djibouti.47 These rivalries often will be injurious to international order and security. The armaments process can enhance security—when, for example, the likelihood of aggression is reduced because a potential target state is adequately armed. ‘‘Nuclear optimists’’ such as Kenneth Waltz elaborate upon this point in arguing the utility of a world of states equipped with nuclear weapons. Along these same lines, K. Subrahmanyam, sensitive like many Indians to India’s military power deficit relative to China and the United States, has argued that ‘‘interstate violence becomes more frequent when vast asymmetries develop in the weapons capabilities of nations and there is no balance of power.’’48 One of the key attributes of global political geography in the twentieth century was the salience of northern Europe and East Asia, where most of the great powers were concentrated, where the great wars occurred, and where the key international developments mainly unfolded, from the Brandenburg Gate to the Korean DMZ and from Haiphong to Danzig. We do not yet understand the geopolitics of the twenty-first century. However, no region is likely to feature as prominently in that geography as the Indian Ocean region, due to its combination of oil, Islam, and the likely rise (and probable mutual rivalry) of both India and China. If the Ocean has failed to regionalize economically, it is certainly doing so militarily, especially in nuclear weapons. The Mediterranean dominated strategic competition in times past, as the Atlantic and the Pacific did in the twentieth century. Based on recent developments, including those in the nuclear realm, it is a good bet that the Indian Ocean will loom larger than any of these sea and ocean basins in the coming century. It will no longer be possible to overlook what has previously been ‘‘the neglected ocean.’’ 47
C. Mark Brinkley, ‘‘Tiny Nation Will Play Bigger Role in Corps’ Future,’’ Marine Corps Times, July 15, 2002. See also Peter J. Schraeder, ‘‘Cold War to Cold Peace: Explaining U.S.-French Competition in Francophone Africa,’’ Political Science Quarterly, Fall 2000. 48 Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2003); and K. Subrahmanyam, ‘‘India and the International Nuclear Order,’’ in SarDesai and Thomas, Nuclear India, p. 63.
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O
ne of the more troubling of post–Cold War international trends has been the advent of a ‘‘second nuclear age.’’ Rather than losing their relevance in these years, nuclear arms have become a new danger in this era, which is heralded in particular by the rise of Asian military power.1 Michael Krepon of the Stimson Center observed in 2002 that ‘‘this is the most dangerous time since the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. And the dangers are compounded because we are not just worried about one country. We are worried about Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and the Indian subcontinent.’’2 A new emphasis on the acquisition of nuclear weapons is evident in the Middle East and East Asia. With Japan under growing threats from neighboring countries, increased attention is being paid to the possibility of even its acquiring a nuclear arsenal. The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review and the 2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction indicate that Washington has taken these concerns seriously in considering its potential military options in these regions and elsewhere. In the troubled Indian Ocean region lying between the Middle East and East Asia—the arc from the Arabian Sea to the Bay of Bengal—nuclear arms pose a renewed threat. The first occurred during the Cold War, when the United States and the Soviet Union used these waters for patrols by their respective fleets, including their nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarines. This article focuses on the subset of current nuclear weapons developments involving sea-based or air-deliverable weapons that directly utilize Ocean 1 See, e.g., Paul Bracken, Fire in the East: the Rise of Asian Military Power and the Second Nuclear Age (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1990) and ‘‘The Structure of the Second Nuclear Age,’’ Orbis, Summer 2003. 2 Quoted by Faye Bowers and Howard LaFranchi, ‘‘Risk Rises for a Reignited Arms Race,’’ Christian Science Monitor, Dec. 31, 2002. See also Kurt M. Campbell, ‘‘Nuclear Proliferation Beyond Rogues,’’ Washington Quarterly, Winter 2002–03, pp. 7–15.
ß 2003 Published by Elsevier Limited on behalf of Foreign Policy Research Institute.
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BERLIN space, as opposed to those occurring in the broader region, which could encompass as many as 51 separate nations.3 The Indian and Pakistani nuclear blasts of 1998 were key milestones in this process, but there are other, often embryonic, nuclear weapons and delivery system developments in the Indian Ocean that are powerful pointers toward the future of this region. This nuclearization process, which connects regions that were once strategically distinct—the Middle East with South Asia, South Asia with East Asia—has potentially momentous consequences for international security. The Littoral States: India New Delhi’s nuclear weapons initiatives are potentially the most important in the region. Many observers initially believed India would pursue a minimalist, unhurried nuclear weapons development and deployment trajectory, distinct from those of established nuclear powers. It was thought that India would possess only a ‘‘force-in-being’’ for years before possessing a ‘‘robust and ready’’ or ‘‘operational’’ force such as that maintained by the United States. Possessing a ‘‘force-in-being’’ means being able to launch retaliatory nuclear strikes, but without immediacy: the requisite nuclear weapons would be physically separate from the delivery systems and under firm civilian control.4 Ashley Tellis, for example, has argued that ‘‘New Delhi does not currently possess or desire to build a ready nuclear arsenal, but instead seeks to develop a ‘force-in-being,’ consisting of unassembled nuclear weapons.’’5 The United States’ policy is apparently to reinforce this status quo and to discourage New Delhi from proceeding beyond this recessed nuclear deterrent. It is reasonable to assume that India’s nuclear weapons capability and evolving doctrine, even five years after the 1998 nuclear tests, remain relatively immature. However, there have been strong suggestions that it is gradually abandoning the force-in-being concept. First, the Draft Nuclear Doctrine promulgated by India’s National Security Advisory Board in August 1999 (and implicitly endorsed by the 3
There are a variety of definitions of the Indian Ocean and the Indian Ocean region. See Christian Bouchard, ‘‘Emergence of a New Geopolitical Era in the Indian Ocean: Characters, Issues and Limitations of the Indianoceanic Order,’’ paper presented at the Indian Ocean Research Group Inaugural Conference: ‘‘The Indian Ocean in a Globalizing World: Critical Perspectives on the 21st Century,’’ ICSSR Complex, Panjab University, Chandigarh, India, Nov. 18–22, 2002. 4 George Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb (Berkeley and Los Angeles, Calif.: University of California Press, 2000), pp. 483–84. 5 Ashley J. Tellis, ‘‘India’s Emerging Nuclear Doctrine: Exemplifying the Lessons of the Nuclear Revolution,’’ NBR Publications, vol. 12, no. 2, 2002.
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Indian Ocean Cabinet Committee on Security in its January 2003 restatement of many of the Doctrine’s key points)6 states that India should develop nuclear forces, to include aircraft, mobile land-based missiles, and sea assets. Presumably a key rationale for the latter would be to attain a secure second-strike capability, an obvious sine qua non for a state proclaiming a no-first-use posture. Equally important, however, New Delhi may have judged a sea-based deterrent to be the swiftest route to achieving a nuclear capability against China’s heartland, a target area that remains effectively beyond India’s reach and would likely remain so even if India acquires the land-based, 3,000 km-range Agni-III, which may soon be tested for the first time.7 A sea-based deterrent would be a momentous step away from nuclear minimalism, making nuclear weapons almost directly available for use. Although final control could still rest with the civilian leadership in New Delhi, officers on Indian surface warships or submarines would physically control these warheads, which raises important civil-military issues. Critics say that a sea-based deterrent will have a high cost, that there are too many technical hurdles to overcome, and that New Delhi does not need a robust second-strike capability since the nuclear forces of its potential foes—China and Pakistan—are still relatively primitive. Nonetheless, in December 2002 India’s navy chief reaffirmed his commitment to a sea-based deterrent, stating that: Any country that claims to be a nuclear weapon state and whose doctrine involves no first use must necessarily have a nuclear triad. And if you look around the world, the stronger leg of the triad is not only at sea, it is underwater. The British have already moved their assets underwater and the French forces are doing so and others will follow. It doesn’t make sense to keep nuclear weapons on land because you are targetable. . . . Worldwide that seems to be the trend.8
A second consideration for India is the inherent desirability of the Indian Ocean as a patrol zone for missile-carrying submarines, for reasons including the mix of warm and cold currents there, which can mask the presence of these boats. Both U.S. and Soviet boats took advantage of this and plied these waters during the Cold War. U.S. submarines—and those of France and the UK—almost certainly still do so, and it is likely that the nuclear-weapons-capable submarines of India and other littoral states eventually will do so as well. A third pointer is India’s establishment of a Strategic Forces Command (SFC) to manage its nuclear weapons, which it announced on January 4, 2003. The SFC is a joint command that will report directly to a Chief of Defence Staff, 6
‘‘The Cabinet Committee on Security Reviews Operationalization of India’s Nuclear Doctrine,’’ Ministry of External Affairs, Jan. 4, 2003. 7 A recent report says that ‘‘highly placed defence ministry officials’’ have indicated that the initial trial of the Agni III would be undertaken in the first week of November 2003. See ‘‘Govt to procure more Prithvi missiles,’’ Times of India (Sept. 8, 2003). 8 ‘‘Navy should be Repository of Nuclear Arsenal,’’ The Hindu, Dec. 2, 2002.
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BERLIN when one is named, and not to any single service. The navy is expected to have a strong role in the SFC and use its influence on behalf of a sea-based deterrent. The SFC is temporarily headquartered in New Delhi. However, at some point a permanent facility—very likely situated on one of India’s coasts—will be established. A coastal site will be symbolically significant even if the headquarters simply becomes a command-and-control facility. One of the locations under consideration is Trivandrum, in Kerala, on the Indian Ocean. The selection of this location would be noteworthy (and analogous to the Nebraska site of the U.S. Strategic Command) because it is maximally distant from China, which Defence Minister George Fernandes has called ‘‘potential threat number one.’’ The command is expected to ‘‘own assets and have its own force,’’ and India’s senior military officer affirmed in September 2002 that the organization would be a ‘‘fighting command.’’9 A fourth indicator of India’s shift away from nuclear minimalism is its continuing acquisition of a variety of cruise missiles. Among these is the Brahmos, which New Delhi is co-developing in conjunction with Russia. Set to enter into serial production in 2004, the Brahmos is supersonic and has a range of 300 km. It can be launched from land, air, sea, and sub-sea platforms and could well be intended to delivery nuclear payloads, among others, in the future. Cruise missile submarines, or surface ships with nuclear-armed cruise missiles, would be a more direct and technologically simpler path to a sea-based nuclear deterrent than would ballistic missile submarines. The option of employing submarines in conjunction with nucleararmed cruise missiles will be particularly alluring. It is virtually certain that India, as well as Israel and Pakistan, will mainly pursue this path. Because Indian cruise missiles will for some time lack the range to target China except from the South China Sea, New Delhi is planning for the ultimate deployment of its submarines—ideally nuclear-powered ones—here or elsewhere in China’s backyard. The growing power and wealth of southern coastal China is increasing the strategic significance of the South China Sea, and these waters are destined to be a zone of Sino-Indian maritime competition in future years. For these and other purposes, India continues to upgrade its existing submarine fleet while also developing or acquiring newer, more advanced submarines. The Indian navy’s principal subsurface combatants are currently ten Russian-produced Kilo submarines. These are being sent to Russia one by one for upgrades, including the addition of Club cruise missiles believed to have both anti-ship and land-attack capabilities.10 The four boats already 9
‘‘Special Nuclear Command on the Anvil,’’ The Hindu, Oct. 1, 2002; Elizabeth Roche, ‘‘India forging special unit to operate nuclear arsenal,’’ Agence France Presse, Sept. 30, 2002. The Sept. 1, 2003, inaugural meeting of the Political Council, the senior body making nuclear weapons decisions, reportedly ordered the transfer of the Army’s two missile battalions to the new SFC. 10 Malcolm Davis, ‘‘Back on Course,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, Jan. 24, 2001.
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Indian Ocean refitted with these weapons constitute the Indian navy’s first submerged missile launch capability. India will also be building six to twelve French-designed Scorpene submarines, each of which will carry 16 Brahmos or Exocet cruise missiles. The Scorpene’s design allows for the installation of a small nuclear reactor. This contract apparently also provides for India’s acquisition of critical underwater missile launch technology.11 India has also lately accorded higher priority to the construction of a nuclear-powered missile submarine, the Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV). Fabrication of the hull and integration (with Russia’s assistance) of the ATV’s nuclear reactor is thought already to be under way.12 Its design is based on Russia’s Severodvinsk-class type 885 attack submarine, which has a significant cruise missile capability. The ATV is expected to be brought to sea trials by 2006.13 Perhaps most important, New Delhi is negotiating with Moscow to lease two Akula II nuclear-powered submarines. While these normally are equipped with intermediate range cruise missiles capable of mounting 200kiloton nuclear weapons, presumably Russia would not include either the missiles or the warheads in the lease. India is expected to use the Brahmos cruise missile—eventually with a nuclear warhead—as the principal weapon for these boats. Indian submariners reportedly familiarized themselves with Akula II operations during training in Severodvinsk in 2001.14 India will require forward bases to support these submarines, particularly for patrols near China. To this end, among others, India is transforming the unified command established in 2001 at Port Blair in the Andaman and Nicobar chain in the Bay of Bengal, reportedly to eventually accommodate a large proportion of the new SFC’s sea- and air-based assets. India was of two minds about retaining the islands until the May 1998 Pokhran nuclear tests; the original plan was ‘‘to abandon the Andaman and Nicobar Islands after exploiting its natural resources.’’15 India did transfer the Coco Islands to Burma, in 1954. However, by 1962, in the aftermath of India’s China war, New Delhi clearly was becoming sensitive to the archipelago’s value. By 1998, ‘‘the Vajpayee government woke up to the islands’ huge 11
Bharat Karnad, ‘‘Putting Bang in the Bomb,’’ Indian Express, Nov. 13, 2002. Commander Vijay Sakhuja, ‘‘Sea Based Deterrence and Indian Security,’’ Strategic Analysis: A Monthly Journal of the IDSA, Apr. 2001; ‘‘Counterproliferation—Russia-India: New Developments in Science and Technology Cooperation,’’ FBIS, Jan. 14, 2003. 13 See D. R. SarDesai and Raju G. C. Thomas, eds., Nuclear India in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2002), pp. 108, 221. 14 ‘‘Russian Submarines in Indian Waters,’’ Intelligence Online, Oct. 24, 2002; Manoj Joshi, ‘‘Russia Gives Nuclear Edge to Indian Defence,’’ Times of India, Jan. 19, 2003; and Sergey Sokut, ‘‘Indian Navy to be Augmented by our Nuclear Boat,’’ Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Dec. 6, 2002. 15 Prakash Nanda and Zhao Nanqi, ‘‘Unified Command: Strategic Significance of the Andamans,’’ The Statesman (New Delhi), Oct. 18, 2002. 12
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BERLIN strategic importance.’’16 India’s navy chief has said that the Andaman and Nicobar theater will become increasingly important in the coming years.17 Toward the day when Indian ‘‘penetration’’ of the Strait would be routine, India gained some area familiarization through its 2002 collaboration with the United States in combined Malacca Strait patrols, in which it employed warships based at Port Blair. A variety of other Indian activities also stem in part from a long-term interest in the South China Sea. Since 1995, for example, New Delhi has hosted regular gatherings of warships from Southeast Asian nations at Port Blair. Its South China Sea naval exercise with Vietnam in 2000, which prompted a protest from Beijing, likewise reflected New Delhi’s interest in these waters. In addition to its importance for any sea-based Indian nuclear deterrent, the Indian Ocean will also be critical should India wish to strengthen its air-based nuclear deterrent vis-a`-vis China. One of New Delhi’s motives in ongoing talks to acquire the former Russian aircraft carrier, the Adm. Gorshkov, is its potential use as a nuclear weapons platform. The same motive may be behind the planned construction of an Air Defense Ship. No contract for the Gorshkov has yet been finalized, but India also has been negotiating with Moscow to acquire a complement of MiG-29K aircraft for use with the carrier. At least some versions of the MiG-29K are capable of delivering nuclear ordnance. Another path toward a more robust Indian strategic air deterrent would be to base the requisite air force or navy aircraft in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Campbell Airport on Great Nicobar is as near China’s populated heartland as any airfield in India and also affords aircraft an overwater route to China that is undefended compared to various transHimalayan approaches.18 To this end, there have been reports that the Indian Air Force is planning to extend the runway at Campbell. The key aircraft at Campbell prospectively may be the Jaguar. New Delhi expects to upgrade its 140 Jaguar aircraft and acquire more of them from the UK. The upgrades—an almost definitive sign that these aircraft will continue to have a nuclear strike mission—include the addition of more modern navigation systems and new electronic countermeasures gear.19 In 16
A. B. Mahapatra, ‘‘Andaman Faces Kargil-Type Invasion,’’ newsinsight.net, Oct. 23, 2002. As early as 1945, K. M. Panikkar wrote, ‘‘With the islands of the Bay of Bengal properly equipped and protected and with a navy strong enough in its home waters, security can return to that part of the Indian Ocean which is of supreme importance to India. . . . The possession of the Andamans and the Nicobars gives to India strategic bases which if fully utilized in coordination with air power can convert the Bay of Bengal into a secure area.’’ See K. M. Panikkar, India and the Indian Ocean (Bombay: George Allen and Unwin, 1961). 17 ‘‘Indian Naval Chief Satisfied with Performance of Unified Command at Andamans,’’ The Hindu, July 6, 2002. 18 Karnad, ‘‘India’s Force Planning Imperative,’’ p. 125. 19 Pulkit Singh, ‘‘India Bolstering Jaguar Fleet, Phasing Out Some Older MiGs,’’ Journal of Electronic Defense, Oct. 2002.
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Indian Ocean addition, India is negotiating with France to acquire 126 Mirage 2000H fighters. The Indo-French discussions have included the acquisition of 12 Qatari Mirages, which will form India’s first squadron. Capable of carrying a tactical nuclear payload, the Mirage has a maximum range of more than 3,000 km if fitted with drop tanks.20 If Moscow and New Delhi can come to terms, a naval air squadron of Backfire bombers may eventually supplement the Jaguars and/or Mirage aircraft. India also plans to sign a contract with Russia to upgrade its TU-142 Bear maritime surveillance and strike aircraft, along with its aging IL-38 maritime patrol aircraft. In all, the Indian navy wants to procure 30 more maritime surveillance aircraft, including P-3 Orions from the United States.21 New Delhi’s pronounced interest in aircraft of these types is suggestive. The Bear will be fitted with a variety of updated equipment, including gear intended for the detection of low-noise nuclear-powered submarines. An attack submarine is usually regarded as the best weapon against other submarines. Thus, India’s acquisition of maritime surveillance and strike aircraft is almost certainly intended to thwart or forestall a future Chinese attack on Indian cruise-missile platforms in the Indian Ocean and/or the South China Sea.22 The Littoral States: Pakistan Islamabad would seem to be far from mounting any kind of serious response to India’s intent to forge a nuclear weapons triad. Lately, however, notwithstanding its historic preoccupation with its land forces, Islamabad has increasingly regarded the Indian Ocean as central to its security. Pakistan’s vulnerability from the sea was most recently exposed in 1998, when 75 to 100 Tomahawk missiles were fired at Afghan targets from U.S. warships and submarines in the Arabian Sea, flying undetected over Pakistan’s airspace.23 The incident highlighted the poor state of Pakistan’s seaward defense and surveillance capabilities. A variety of other factors have also increased Pakistan’s maritime consciousness. One is the recent emergence of a more porous ‘‘boundary’’ between west and south Asia and the growing role of the Indian Ocean as the arena in which these interactions occur. Developments such as the new and 20
‘‘France Offers Technology Transfer for Mirages,’’ Hindustan Times, Sept. 29, 2002. ‘‘Russia to Upgrade TU-142 Warplanes,’’ Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostey, Oct. 21, 2002; and Bulbul Singh, ‘‘India, U.S. Near to Completing P-3 Orion Sale,’’ Aerospace Daily, Aug. 28, 2002. 22 The Indian Navy may also play an important role in the future in nuclear missile defense. See Captain Girish Luthva, ‘‘Sea-Based Missile Defense and Regional Security,’’ Indian Defence Review, July-Sept. 2002. 23 Commander Vijay Sakhuja, ‘‘Pakistan Navy and Nuclear Deterrence,’’ Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (New Delhi), Sept. 9, 2002. 21
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BERLIN growing Indo-Israeli and Indo-Iranian relationships, the Iranian-South African nexus, and the U.S. war on terrorism all strengthen Pakistan’s Ocean consciousness. The growing connectivity of west and south Asia is also reflected in India’s characterization of its security milieu as ‘‘Southern Asia’’ versus ‘‘South Asia.’’24 A second impetus for Islamabad is Pakistan’s endemic problem of lacking strategic depth. Many Pakistani security specialists consider the country too small and too geographically narrow to be properly or easily defended. This failing was relieved to some degree as long as Afghanistan and its government were Pakistani clients. With that more desirable state of affairs now in the past, Islamabad will be looking to the Indian Ocean (and to the undeveloped Baluchistan hinterland) as an alternate means of addressing this problem. For example, there are plans to extend Pakistan’s Exclusive Economic Zone from 200 to 230 nautical miles. Third and finally, Pakistan is now more aware than ever before that one of its principal strengths vis-a`-vis India is its geographic location in Southwest Asia, near the Persian Gulf and Central Asia and astride the Indian Ocean sea-lanes. This location has been very useful to Islamabad since 9/11 and has helped in restraining Washington from embracing New Delhi. Some observers even believe that Pakistan’s geographic situation will make it a key impediment to India’s ever attaining dominance in South Asia.25 Given this set of perceptions, Pakistan has lately sought to realize its potential as a maritime state. A sea-defense research institute, the Maritime Technology Complex (MTC), was established at Rawat, and Islamabad inaugurated the Jinnah Naval Base at Ormara. In March 2002, President Musharraf and a senior Chinese official laid the foundation stone of a deepsea port and naval facility at Gwadar, near the entrance to the Persian Gulf. Financed by the Chinese, the first phase of construction is scheduled for completion by March 2005. The facility will feature three multi-purpose berths and one service berth. Some naval air assets will likely also be based at Ormara and/or Gwadar. Pakistani naval-modernization initiatives also reflect this growing maritime orientation. In August 2002, Pakistan launched the second of three Agosta 90-B class submarines. The final boat in the series is currently under construction at Karachi dockyard. Pakistan is also negotiating to buy four Jiangwei-II Class frigates from China, the final three of which will be built in Pakistan. Finally, it appears that Islamabad plans to deploy various ballistic or cruise missiles on its southern coast to challenge, if necessary, Indian naval formations in the Arabian Sea. Many of these initiatives are rooted in Pakistani 24
Shireen M. Mazari, ‘‘West Asia: a Pakistani Strategic Perspective,’’ Strategic Studies, 2001. I am indebted to my colleague, Satu Limaye, for this observation. See also ‘‘Pakistan Navy on way to self-reliance,’’ Jihad-I-Kashmir in Urdu as translated by FBIS, Apr. 10–16, 2002. 25
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Indian Ocean concerns that date back to the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war, when the Indian navy successfully blockaded Karachi. Moreover, Pakistan will likely want a submarine-based nuclear weapons delivery system for its own sake. Because it lacks a no-first-use doctrine, Islamabad will worry that in a confrontation, New Delhi would try to deny it the opportunity to launch a first strike. Under these circumstances, minimum credible deterrence for Pakistan will require both first- and secondstrike capabilities. In May 1999 the Pakistani navy was in fact ‘‘assigned a nuclear role,’’ and Pakistan’s navy chief has affirmed Islamabad’s intention to develop a seabased deterrent.26 This could be bluster, but the Agosta acquisition discussed above could be quite important in this connection. These boats will provide Pakistan with a significant conventional-strike capability in the Arabian Sea, and according to one Pakistani naval analyst, ‘‘the Agosta submarine . . . can be used to fire a nuclear missile. As the submarine can stay under water for 60 days . . . it is said to be the best way to protect Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and also gives Pakistan the capability of a second nuclear strike.’’27 A former Indian navy chief apparently agrees: ‘‘Pakistan obviously did not spend such a huge amount of precious foreign exchange on acquiring new submarines, merely to have them launch conventional missiles and torpedoes. They had a long-term strategy in mind for the use of these subs.’’28 Scientific and technical challenges would make it difficult for Islamabad to develop the capability to launch nuclear-armed ballistic missiles from a submerged submarine.29 However, as in India’s case, the path toward a submerged-launch cruise missile capability would be less onerous. It remains to be seen whether Pakistan can adapt the anti-ship Harpoon Block I missiles it has in its inventory for this purpose or will acquire other, more suitable, cruise missiles. The Outsiders United States. The United States has been increasing its security presence over the past few years from the coast of East Africa to Djibouti, Yemen, Oman, Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka, and Diego Garcia, and on to the 26
Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha, ‘‘South Asia: Nuclear Navies?’’ Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Sept.-Oct. 2000. 27 Major General Dipankar Banerjee, ‘‘Trends in Force Modernization in South Asia,’’ paper presented at the conference on Conventional Arms Rivalry in the Asia-Pacific, Oct. 23–25, 2001, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Honolulu, Hawaii; quote from Hafiz Tareq Manzoor, ‘‘Importance of the Indian Ocean,’’ Jamaat-ud-Daawa Pakistan in Urdu as translated by FBIS, Sept. 29, 2002. 28 Admiral (Ret.) J. G. Nadkarni, ‘‘Raising the Nuclear Threshold,’’ rediff.com, June 17, 1999. 29 See Nuclear Stability in South Asia, published by the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc. in association with the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Spring 2002.
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BERLIN Strait of Malacca and Singapore. There are many situation-specific reasons for this, most obviously the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. More broadly, the United States has been strengthening its military profile in the Indian Ocean because of a perception predating 9/11 that it is here—the historic home to most of the world’s Muslims, 60 percent of the world’s poor and 70 percent of the world’s illiteracy—that the more extreme, unpredictable, and undeterrable threats will arise. It is in this respect that the December 2001 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review is relevant. The Review reverses the almost twenty-year trend of relegating nuclear weapons to the category of weapons of last resort. Rather, it expands the circumstances for the use of nuclear weapons beyond situations threatening the United States’ national survival. These circumstances will now include retaliation for the use of chemical or biological weapons, or simply as a response to ‘‘surprising military developments.’’ The review abandons ‘‘negative security assurances’’ and directs the development of contingency plans for the use of nuclear weapons against a wider range of potential adversaries, regardless of their nuclear status. Finally, the review places more emphasis on ‘‘adaptive planning’’—the ability to generate war plans quickly in time-critical situations. To this end, the U.S. Navy is incorporating new and adaptive planning capabilities into its Trident submarines. In October 2003, coinciding with the SIOP-04 war plan’s entering into force, the navy was to complete deployment of a new submarine-launched ballistic missile retargeting system (SRS). The SRS will enable Trident submarines patrolling the Indian Ocean ‘‘to quickly, accurately, and reliably retarget missiles to targets [and] allow timely and reliable processing of an increased number of targets.’’30 In that the Review specifically identified Iran as a potential target, and since regional circumstances are such that there could be other state or nonstate targets in the future, the likelihood of U.S. employment of nuclear weapons in the region has increased.31 Israel. Tel Aviv too has come to see this region more darkly than heretofore. Notwithstanding its geographical distance, Israel’s ties to the region are longstanding. Notably, it has had important ties with South Africa, Singapore, and even India. It cooperated extensively with apartheid South Africa on nuclear weapons, providing Pretoria with nuclear weapons design advice. Israel’s trade with South Africa, moreover, included tritium exports and uranium imports. In addition, a flash over the Ocean detected by an American satellite in 1979 may have been a joint nuclear test by Tel Aviv and Pretoria.32 30
Hans M. Kristensen, ‘‘Preemptive Posturing,’’ Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Sept./Oct. 2002. 31 See ‘‘Pentagon Memo Raises Possibility of Nuclear Testing,’’ Arms Control Today, Dec. 2002, p. 14. 32 See Seymour Hersh, The Sampson Option (New York: Random House, 1991).
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Indian Ocean During the 1980s, Israel worked with South Africa to assist the latter in producing its own family of missiles based on the Israeli Jericho-2. Israel’s missile program benefited by sharing costs and resources with Pretoria and by using South African test facilities, particularly the excellent Overberg Test Range established in 1986 near Arniston on the Indian Ocean. With Israel’s help, this site was developed into a sophisticated test range, essentially a duplicate of the Palmichim test range in Israel. Overberg was used first used by Israel and South Africa for a launch of the South African Jericho-derived missile to a target area in the Ocean’s Prince Edward Islands in 1989. Israel’s most important military link in the eastern Indian Ocean has been with Singapore, with whom it began a close and multifaceted military relationship in the mid-1960s. The Lion City clearly regarded Israel as a military model to be emulated, and Singapore was Israel’s most important defense export market during the 1990s. Israeli-Singaporean military cooperation continues to this day, with the Singapore Ministry of Defence publicly acknowledging in 2000 that there were ‘‘several joint projects.’’33 The ongoing joint research and development of a space-based surveillance system is particularly noteworthy. While formal diplomatic ties between India and Israel date only from 1992, there have been important connections between the two since at least the early 1980s. In 1983, after Islamabad converted its U.S.-supplied F-16s to make them capable of dropping nuclear bombs, senior Indian military personnel visited Israel to receive briefings on F-16 capabilities and vulnerabilities and to buy electronic warfare equipment to neutralize Pakistani aircraft.34 Soon thereafter, based on a common concern about Pakistani nuclear ambitions, India and Israel formulated plans to jointly attack and neutralize Pakistan’s embryonic nuclear weapons research and development complex. Although eventually aborted, the plan reflected the intimacy of the Indian-Israeli relationship even then. Since the 1999 advent of the BJP-led government in India, this early relationship has been greatly expanded.35 A parade of senior Israeli and Indian officials have exchanged visits, and military relations have become so close that many observers see the connection as practically tantamount to a military alliance. In June 2002, following Pakistan’s downing of an unmanned 33
Tim Huxley, Defending the Lion City: the Armed Forces of Singapore (St. Leonards, New South Wales, Australia: Allen and Unwin, 2000), pp. 197–98. 34 Bharat Karnad, Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security the Realist Foundations of Strategy (Delhi: Macmillan India Limited, 2002), pp. 344–50. Pakistan remains sensitive about the possibility of preemptive Israeli or Israeli-Indian attacks on its nuclear facilities. See Owen Bennett Jones, Pakistan: Eye of the Storm (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), pp. 187–90. 35 Ilan Berman, ‘‘Israel, India and Turkey: Triple Entente,’’ Middle East Quarterly, Fall 2002; and Ghani Jafar, ‘‘ ‘Soul Mates’ Come Together: The Brahmanic-Talmudist Alliance,’’ Regional Studies, Spring 2002.
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BERLIN reconnaissance drone manufactured (and perhaps operated) by Israel, Pakistan’s President Musharraf complained ‘‘that the cooperation between India and Israel not only relates to Pakistan, but the Middle East region as a whole.’’36 Notwithstanding all this, the scope and character of Israel’s strategic military involvement in the Indian Ocean has received little international attention and remains relatively opaque. An evolution toward a strategic footprint encompassing a part of the Ocean region would be consistent with Israel’s historic emphasis on power projection, and especially with Prime Minister Sharon’s strategic vision of defending Israel from as far away from its borders as possible. Tel Aviv’s land-based missiles, air power, and incipient sea-based deterrent will all be part of this quest. Israel’s missile force, by virtue of an upgraded version of the multistage Jericho missile—with a reported range of up to 2,800 miles—has become capable of reaching targets in Iran and Pakistan. In addition, there is good evidence that the Israeli Air Force is thinking seriously about how it can reach targets in the Arabian Sea area. A 2002 semi-official report that parallels some of the views and rationale articulated in the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review recommends that Israel’s warplanes be made capable of operating within a combat radius of 2,000 km and launching second-strike attacks in retaliation for the use of WMD. The report calls for a capability to mount rapid air strikes at the Indian Ocean entrance of the Red Sea (Bab-el-Mandab) against Iranian targets in the Persian Gulf, Sudan, and, in a worst-case scenario, Pakistan.37 The development of an Israeli naval capability in the Indian Ocean appears to be more advanced than the air arm’s. The Israeli navy some time ago prepared a formal proposal to give the service a broader ‘‘strategic’’ mission. This plan was then discussed at a meeting of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee. The plan recommends that the navy operate in the Ocean so as to deter Iran and, if necessary, ‘‘intervene in land battles . . . and come out victorious through the use of advanced weapons systems.’’ The service is to be capable of deploying 30 percent of Israel’s strategic nuclear weapons by 2020 and of firing missiles that could reach targets at least 300 km inland.38 Concerns about advances in long-range missile capabilities by Iran and other Middle Eastern countries have been driving Israel to strengthen its sea-based force. Sea-launched missiles would boost Israel’s deterrent capability, making clear to a potential foe that even if a surprise attack 36
Zawahir Siddique, ‘‘Indian Campaign Against Kashmiri Mujahiden Based on Assistance from Israel,’’ Muslimedia.com, Aug. 16–31, 2002. 37 Yoash Tsiddon-Chatto, ‘‘Non-Classified Realities Affecting Israel’s Air Force: 2005–2010,’’ Policy Paper No. 136, Ariel Center for Policy Research, 2002. 38 See ‘‘ ‘Secret’ Report Advises: Navy to Operate Far from Israel’s Beaches,’’ Voice of Israel, (Jerusalem) Feb. 13, 2002.
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Indian Ocean eliminated Israel’s land-based nuclear arsenal, it could still retaliate with 39 WMD. It is unclear to what extent Israel’s navy already has put in place this kind of capability. However, there have been reports for some time that Israel has been refitting its three Dolphin-class submarines to make them capable of firing submerged-launch cruise missiles—locally produced or modified Tomahawks—for land-attack missions. In May 2000 Israel reportedly test fired, possibly in coordination with India, cruise missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads from two Dolphin-class submarines off Sri Lanka. There also have been indications that Eritrea—located at the Red Sea entrance to the Ocean—could come to constitute a covert forward operating base for Oceandedicated Israeli forces in the future. With a half-Christian, half-Muslim population, Eritrea has resisted joining the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic States. In 2000, Jane’s doubted that Israel had yet put in place a sea-based nuclear deterrent. It considered that ‘‘given the 30-day endurance of Israel’s three diesel-electric submarines, the geographic constraints imposed by the Bab-el-Mandab and Hormuz straits, and the emerging anti-submarine capabilities of Iran and Saudi Arabia it would be very difficult to maintain a boat on such a station.’’40 While a fair judgment at the time, it is fairly certain that Israel does have such a capability today. China. For decades, Indian security analysts have expected Beijing to expand its strategic and maritime area of interest to include the Indian Ocean and its littoral. In the broadest sense, this expectation has been fulfilled and China today is part of the Ocean’s strategic landscape. A key consideration for Beijing is the one-third of China’s GDP attributable to foreign trade and the importance of the Indian Ocean, particularly for commerce with Europe and petroleum imports from the Middle East, in that trade. China will therefore seek to establish a security posture in the area that allows it to protect its sea lines of communications. India’s sea-lanes obviously also transit the Ocean and overlap those of China. Each will therefore want to protect these overlapping routes.41 China also will be concerned that India would have a geostrategic advantage in the Ocean in any conflict along its land border, and that India could try to compensate for continental power inadequacies by taking action against Chinese interests in the Ocean. China also needs Ocean access 39 Nathan Guttman, ‘‘Israel Denies Report Subs Can Launch Nuclear Missiles,’’ Haaretz, July 7, 2002; Walter Pincus and Vernon Loeb, ‘‘Missile Worries Focus Israel on Navy,’’ Washington Post, June 19, 2002. 40 See ‘‘Claims About Israel’s Nuclear Capability Doubted,’’ Jane’s Sentinel, July 18, 2000. 41 John W. Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001), pp. 275–312; and Philip Andrews-Speed, Xuanli Liao and Roland Dannreuther, The Strategic Implications of China’s Energy Needs (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).
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BERLIN because, in the event of conflict with the United States or Japan in East Asia, it would want to have secured one of its backdoors. The latter interest, of course, was a matter of the greatest importance during China’s struggle with Imperial Japan in World War II. More generally, China will strive to thwart Indian power in the Ocean region because great powers that have achieved regional hegemony, or seek to do so (as China presumably will be doing in East Asia), normally seek to prevent rival powers from replicating this feat in their own regions. As John Mearsheimer put it, ‘‘Thus the United States (easily dominant in the Western Hemisphere), for example, played a key role in preventing imperial Japan, Wilhelmine Germany, Nazi Germany, and the Soviet Union from gaining regional supremacy (in East Asia, Europe, and Eurasia respectively).’’42 The Indian Ocean region has not yet figured importantly in China’s nuclear weapons posture. China targets India with nuclear weapons from facilities on the Tibetan plateau (probably from Qinghai and/or Yunnan province rather than the Tibetan Autonomous Region per se). To date, however, China apparently has not deployed nuclear weapons directly into the region in surface warships, submarines, or aircraft, or to Chinese ‘‘bases’’ but instead has engaged in a strenuous and well-conceived ‘‘preparation of the battlefield’’ effort. This has entailed taking those steps necessary to have the capability and option to deploy or station nuclear weapons in this region in the future. The PLA’s navy, for example, has been strengthening its force projection options by enhancing its capability to deploy submarines on extended patrols. Most worrisome for India is China’s developmental work on the Type 094 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine that is expected to carry an advanced SLBM. A more immediate concern, however, will be the Type 093 nuclearpowered attack submarine. Expected to enter service by late 2004 or early 2005, this boat will be capable of firing land-attack cruise missiles with nuclear warheads. It will constitute one of the most significant increments to Chinese military power in recent decades.43 One employment scenario for the weapon would be against a regional foe such as India. The Type 093, of course, also could be quite useful against the U.S. Navy, particularly the submarine’s advanced wireguided and wake-homing torpedo capability. Against the United States, however, China would be forced to contend with anti-submarine warfare capabilities that have been well honed in decades of competition with the Soviet Union. 42
John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2001) p. 41. 43 U.S. Department of Defense, Report to Congress, Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act, ‘‘Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China’’ (July 2002).
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Indian Ocean Politically, Beijing has also tried to cultivate closer relations with a variety of Indian Ocean states. Like any large power, China has engaged in development projects, military assistance programs, and bilateral trade in order to foster cooperation and (later) dependence. Among the Chinese ‘‘targets’’ in the Indian Ocean have been Burma, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, the Maldives, Iran, Sudan, South Africa, and Tanzania. One of the most significant recent developments along these lines was the December 2002 Defence Cooperation Agreement between China and Bangladesh—an initiative that must have caused consternation in New Delhi.44 Farther afield, South Africa and Sudan are respectively China’s number-one and -two trading partners on the African continent.45 Beijing’s ties with Pakistan have been its most important connection in the region. They have consisted of important military-to-military relations; critical and continuing Chinese assistance with Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programs, including M-11 missiles; and Chinese work on the Pakistani port at Gwadar, a facility the Chinese navy undoubtedly will use. In addition to its work at Gwadar, China has demonstrated a pronounced interest in the construction of a variety of commercial ports, shipyards, naval bases, and other facilities in the Ocean, some of which already include a Chinese military presence. Beyond the profit motive for some of these efforts, China surely also wants to be well positioned, should the need arise, to project power in the Ocean region. The most important of these initiatives have been in Burma. There, a new Chinese-built port and shipyard was inaugurated at Thilawa, 25 km south of Rangoon, early in 2002. The sprawling port facility can handle ships of up to 10,000 deadweight tons—of which the Burmese have only a few—and is designed to cater primarily to Chinese exports on Chinese ships. China also has built and may have a military presence at a number of other facilities in Burma, including Ramree, Great Coco, and St. Matthew’s Islands. These facilities have variously been identified as signals intelligence facilities, radar stations, or, in the case of Zadetkyi Kyun, as a PRC satellite ground station. Chinese navy and air force personnel have started helping Burma build a naval base near Kyaukpyu and a naval and air base near Kawthaung. One report claims that the latter facility, not far from the Strait of Malacca, will be Burma’s largest navy base.46 44
Subhash Kapila,‘‘ Bangladesh-China Defence Cooperation Agreement’s Strategic Implications,’’ web site of the South Asia Analysis Group, Jan. 14, 2003. 45 ‘‘China’s 21st Century Africa Policy Evolving,’’ STRATFOR, Aug. 7, 2002. 46 For dark appraisals of the size and importance of China’s presence in Burma, see Prakash Nanda, ‘‘Strategic Significance of the Andamans,’’ Indian Defence Review, July-Sept. 2002, pp. 20–24, and John W. Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001), pp. 275–312. Andrew Selth offers a contrary view in Burma’s Armed Forces: Power Without Glory (Norwalk, Conn.: EastBridge, 2002).
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BERLIN Conclusion The growing nuclearization of the Indian Ocean region is but the latest in a series of strategic developments that reflect the numerous strategic rivalries that are finding a focus in this theater. The most intense of these are those pitting Islam against the West and involving China against India. On a somewhat lower plane are the Sino-American and Indo-U.S. competitions. The last of these may be in abeyance, but would intensify the moment New Delhi’s comprehensive power eclipses that of Beijing. Finally, there is France and the growing—albeit so far restrained—competition between Paris and Washington in parts of the region, most recently in Madagascar and Djibouti.47 These rivalries often will be injurious to international order and security. The armaments process can enhance security—when, for example, the likelihood of aggression is reduced because a potential target state is adequately armed. ‘‘Nuclear optimists’’ such as Kenneth Waltz elaborate upon this point in arguing the utility of a world of states equipped with nuclear weapons. Along these same lines, K. Subrahmanyam, sensitive like many Indians to India’s military power deficit relative to China and the United States, has argued that ‘‘interstate violence becomes more frequent when vast asymmetries develop in the weapons capabilities of nations and there is no balance of power.’’48 One of the key attributes of global political geography in the twentieth century was the salience of northern Europe and East Asia, where most of the great powers were concentrated, where the great wars occurred, and where the key international developments mainly unfolded, from the Brandenburg Gate to the Korean DMZ and from Haiphong to Danzig. We do not yet understand the geopolitics of the twenty-first century. However, no region is likely to feature as prominently in that geography as the Indian Ocean region, due to its combination of oil, Islam, and the likely rise (and probable mutual rivalry) of both India and China. If the Ocean has failed to regionalize economically, it is certainly doing so militarily, especially in nuclear weapons. The Mediterranean dominated strategic competition in times past, as the Atlantic and the Pacific did in the twentieth century. Based on recent developments, including those in the nuclear realm, it is a good bet that the Indian Ocean will loom larger than any of these sea and ocean basins in the coming century. It will no longer be possible to overlook what has previously been ‘‘the neglected ocean.’’ 47
C. Mark Brinkley, ‘‘Tiny Nation Will Play Bigger Role in Corps’ Future,’’ Marine Corps Times, July 15, 2002. See also Peter J. Schraeder, ‘‘Cold War to Cold Peace: Explaining U.S.-French Competition in Francophone Africa,’’ Political Science Quarterly, Fall 2000. 48 Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2003); and K. Subrahmanyam, ‘‘India and the International Nuclear Order,’’ in SarDesai and Thomas, Nuclear India, p. 63.
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