The institutions-adaptive capacity nexus: Insights from coastal resources co-management in Cambodia and Vietnam

Environmental Science and Policy 76 (2017) 103–112

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Environmental Science and Policy journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/envsci

The institutions-adaptive capacity nexus: Insights from coastal resources comanagement in Cambodia and Vietnam

MARK

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Pedro Fidelmana, , Truong Van Tuyenb, Kim Nongc, Melissa Nursey-Brayd a

Sustainability Research Centre, University of the Sunshine Coast, Australia Hue University of Agriculture and Forestry, Vietnam c General Department of Administration for Nature Conservation and Protection, Ministry of Environment, Cambodia d Department of Geography, Environment and Population, University of Adelaide, Australia b

A R T I C L E I N F O

A B S T R A C T

Keywords: Adaptive capacity Institutional analysis Co-management Coastal resources management Vietnam Cambodia

Responding to the unprecedented social-environmental change facing humankind will require responsive and flexible governance institutions (i.e., systems of rules and social norms) that facilitate adaptive capacity of individuals, groups and organisations. This may explain the sustained interest in the institutional dimensions of adaptive capacity. However, a better understanding of how institutions may enable adaptive capacity is still evolving. The literature is yet to clearly articulate how institutions relate to attributes of adaptive capacity. This study contributes to address this knowledge gap; it employs an evaluative approach that underscores the relationship between types of institutions and attributes of adaptive capacity (i.e., variety, learning capacity, autonomy, leadership, resources and fair governance). Such approach is used to examine how institutions enable adaptive capacity in the context of coastal resources co-managemen in the Peam Krasaop Wildlife Sanctuary (Cambodia) and Tam Giang Lagoon (Vietnam). In this study, complexity emerges as a defining feature of adaptive capacity. It results from the relationship between institutions and adaptive capacity and the contextual factors in which such relationship takes place. Exercises aiming to assess adaptive capacity should consider the institutions-adaptive capacity nexus together with the embedding social, cultural and political context.

1. Introduction Overexploitation of natural resources, biodiversity loss and climate change illustrate the unprecedented fast pace at which humankind is experiencing social-environmental change. Adaptation – e.g., measures to minimise expected adverse impacts and/or take advantage of opportunities – is an important societal response to such change (Smit and Wandel, 2006). Critical to adaptation is the institutional and governance context. Anticipating and responding to social-environmental change will require governance institutions (i.e., systems of rules and social norms) that facilitate adaptive capacity of individuals, groups and organisations (Nelson et al., 2007; Engle, 2011; Agrawal, 2008; Adger et al., 2005). This will involve responsive and flexible institutions that support the ability of social actors to respond through both planned and spontaneous processes (Gupta et al., 2010). Similarly, more responsive and flexible institutional arrangements are deemed to be necessary to address pressing natural resources management issues (Carlsson and Berkes, 2005). Examples of such institutions include those that support collaborative decision-making and actions involving

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a range of stakeholders (e.g., government, resource users and nongovernment organisations), also known as collaborative natural resources management, partnership and co-management (Plummer and Armitage, 2007; Carlsson and Berkes, 2005). There has been a sustained interest in the institutional dimensions of adaptive capacity (Gupta et al., 2016; Van Den Brink et al., 2014; Engle and Lemos, 2010). In this regard, adaptive capacity is understood as the institutional preconditions that enable or constrain adaptation (Mandryk et al., 2015). However, a better understanding of how institutions may enable adaptive capacity is still evolving (Gupta et al., 2010,,2013; Berman et al., 2012; Berman et al., 2012; Mandryk et al., 2015; Termeer et al., 2011). However, the literature is yet to clearly articulate how institutions relate to attributes adaptive capacity. This study contributes to address this knowledge gap; it employs an evaluative approach that underscores the relationship between types of institutions and attributes of adaptive capacity. Such approach is used to examine how institutions enable adaptive capacity in the context of coastal resources co-management inthe Peam Krasaop Wildlife Sanctuary (PKWS, Cambodia) and Tam Giang Lagoon (TGL, Vietnam).

Corresponding author. E-mail addresses: contact@pedrofidelman.com, pedro@fidelman.me (P. Fidelman), [email protected] (T. Van Tuyen), [email protected] (K. Nong), [email protected] (M. Nursey-Bray). http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2017.06.018 Received 24 July 2016; Received in revised form 30 June 2017; Accepted 30 June 2017 1462-9011/ © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

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Table 1 Adaptive capacity attributes, evaluative criteria and relevant institutional rules/conditions (after Gupta et al., 2010; Ostrom and Crawford, 2005). Attribute

Definition

Evaluative criteria

Relevant rule/condition

Variety

The ability of institutions to encourage the involvement of a variety of actors, perspectives, and solutions. Because environmental change problems are complex and unstructured (lacks agreement on values), embedding diverse interests and perspectives, dealing with such problems requires multiple perspectives and solutions. This includes the participation of relevant stakeholders across different sectors and levels of governance in problem framing and formulation of solutions. Learning is critical for dealing with uncertainty, surprises and changes that characterise environmental change. There is an ongoing need to revise existing knowledge and understanding to enable adaptation. Learning allows actors to reformulate knowledge and understanding based on experiences. Adaptive institutions are therefore those that enable social actors to continuously learn and experiment to improve their institutions. The ability of social actors to autonomously review and adjust their institutions in response to environmental change. Adaptive institutions allow and motivate actors to self-organise, design and reform their institutions. Authority (legitimate or accepted forms of power) for decision-making and implementation is supported (or at least not undermined) by actors and other decision-making entities. Leadership may be regarded as a driver for change when it points to (a) direction(s) and motivates others to follow. Institutions supporting adaptive capacity are those that can mobilise leadership qualities of social actors in the process of (re)designing institutions. Resources are critical in generating incentives and reducing transaction costs for actors to engage in collective decision-making and action. Therefore, adaptive institutions have the capacity to mobilise resources (human, financial, technical) for making and implementing decisions (e.g., adaptation measures). Fair governance includes institutions that are accepted and supported by their constituents (legitimacy), considered to be fair (equity), responsive (responsiveness), and/or accountable to social actors (accountability).

Inclusive participation of relevant actors

Position, boundary, choice, scope

Learning capacity

Autonomy

Leadership

Resources

Fair governance

Diversity of actions and issues addressed

Activities that entail learning (e.g., meetings, decision-making, monitoring and enforcement etc.)

Information, choice

Authority to make and implement decisions Authority is not undermined by other actors/ decision-making entities

Aggregation, choice, payoff

Ability of actors to direct and motivate others to follow

Position, boundary, choice

Human, financial and technical resources

Payoff

Legitimacy, equity, responsiveness, accountability

Boundary, choice, aggregation, information

Nevertheless, this study does not claim that the other theoretical perspectives noted above are less important. In fact, they may provide complementary contributions to the study of adaptation and adaptive capacity (see e.g., Nelson et al., 2007). The determinants of adaptive capacity include general categories, such as information and technology; material resources and infrastructure; organisation and social capital; political capital; wealth and financial capital; and, institutions and entitlements (see e.g., Eaking and Lemos, 2006; Engle and Lemos, 2010; Engle, 2011). Noteworthy is an increasing number of studies on institutional determinants (Hill and Engle, 2013). This reflects, in part, the critical importance of these determinants for building adaptive capacity. Institutions are systems of formal rules and social norms that constrain and extend behavioural options available to individuals or organisations in a given setting (Ostrom, 2005). They cause social practices, assign roles to participants in such practices, and guide interactions among occupants of relevant roles (Young, 2005). Therefore, institutions play a critical role in how societies respond to socialenvironmental change (Young, 2002; Gupta et al., 2010). In fact, institutions comprise resources actors use in responding and adapting to such change (Nelson et al., 2007). In this regard, institutions can be conceptualised in terms of “…formal and informal rules, rule-making systems, and actor networks at all levels of human society (from local to global) that are set up to steer societies towards preventing, mitigating, and adapting to global and local environmental change” (Biermann et al., 2009). Particularly important in this study is the concept of institutional rules (Crawford and Ostrom, 1995), as explored below. In this context, and for the purpose of this study, adaptive capacity is defined as the institutional preconditions that enable adaptation to social-environmental change. These comprise the “… the inherent characteristics of institutions that empower social actors to respond to short and long-term impacts, either through planned measures or through allowing and encouraging creative responses from society both ex ante and ex post (Gupta et al., 2010). Based on a literature review, Gupta et al. (2010) propose

Next, section 2 discusses the concepts of adaptive capacity and institutions and describes the nexus between them. Section 3 describes the approach to assess adaptive capacity and its relations to institutions. The subsequent section describes the case study context; and is followed by the results section. Sections 7 and 8 discuss the main findings and make concluding remarks, respectively.

2. Adaptive capacity and the role of institutions The notion of adaptive capacity – in conjunction with that of adaptation – has gained considerable prominence in recent years. Adaptive capacity refers to the preconditions that enable adaptation, including resources (e.g., social and physical elements) and the ability to mobilise these resources to anticipate or respond to environmental change (Nelson et al., 2007; Engle, 2011). Adaptive capacity is, therefore, a critical property for fostering adaptation; the higher adaptive capacity of a system, more likely such a system will adapt (Engle, 2011). Scholarship on adaptive capacity has particularly been developing in the context of the vulnerability framework. In this context, adaptive capacity is regarded as a critical system property for reducing vulnerability by modulating exposure and sensitivity (Engle, 2011). However, the concept of adaptive capacity has also been developing in the domain of the resilience framework, where it is often referred to as ‘adaptability’ to describe the capacity of actors to manage and influence resilience. The presence of adaptive capacity is believed to increase resilience (Engle, 2011; Nelson et al., 2007; Hill and Engle, 2013). Further, related themes have been addressed by other theoretical perspectives, e.g., adaptive governance, adaptive co-management and earth system governance (Folke et al., 2005; Armitage et al., 2009; Biermann et al., 2010). In this study, we draw particularly on the vulnerability framework. Such framework presents a more developed conceptualisation of the relationship between adaptive capacity and other elements of vulnerability (i.e., exposure and sensitivity). 104

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Fig. 1. Institutional rules as exogenous factors affecting the action situation (Ostrom, 2005, 2011).

determinants of adaptive capacity manifest and are mobilised. Seven categories of institutional rules, i.e., position, boundary, choice, aggregation, information, payoff and scope rules directly affect the action situation (Ostrom, 2005), as depicted in Fig. 1. In simple terms, drawing on Ostrom (2011), these rules are conceptualised in the context of this study as follows:

that adaptive capacity is determined by six attributes, i.e., variety, learning capacity, room for autonomous change, leadership, resources and fair governance, as discussed in the next section. 3. Evaluative approach Assessments of adaptive capacity are typically based on predetermined attributes or indicators believed to be necessary to build such capacity (Engle, 2011). As noted above, Gupta et al. (2010: 462) synthesise the various institutional determinants of adaptive capacity into six broad attributes. These are the ability of institutions to (1) encourage the involvement of a variety of actors, perspectives, and solutions; (2) enable actors to continuously learn and improve their institutions; (3) allow and motivate stakeholders to self-organise, design and reform their institutions; (4) mobilise leadership qualities of social actors; (5) mobilise resources for decision-making and implementation; and (6) support principles of fair governance based on legitimacy, equity, responsiveness and accountability (Table 1). These attributes comprise the Adaptive Capacity Wheel (ACW), which has been used to examine adaptive capacity in different settings and sectors, e.g., water management, coastal protection, agriculture, regional planning and climate vulnerability (Grothmann et al., 2013; Van Den Brink et al., 2011, 2014; Grecksch, 2014; Bergsma et al., 2012; Gupta et al., 2016; Munaretto and Klostermann, 2011). The ACW has proven useful as a heuristic to examine strengths and weakness of adaptive capacity (Grothmann et al., 2013). However, it does not indicate how specific institutions relate to determinants of adaptive capacity. Therefore, we draw on the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework (Ostrom, 2011) in an attempt to establish such a missing relation, which, in turn, may entail improved insights into how institutions may enable determinants of adaptive capacity. The IAD framework is one of the main approaches to institutional analysis (Blomquist and Deleon, 2011). Particularly important to understand the links between institutions and determinants of adaptive capacity is the IAD’s concept of action situation. The action situation refers to the social space where actors interact, make decisions and realise outcomes from their interactions (Ostrom, 2011; Mcguinnis, 2011). In the context of this study, it is the locus where individuals, usually acting as agents of groups (e.g., resource user groups) or organisations (e.g., government departments), make decisions and implement actions in response to social-environmental change. Further, we suggest that the action situation is also the space where the

• Position rules specify the participants (who in turn have a combi• • • • • •

nation of resources, perspectives and preferences) and their roles in coastal resources management; Boundary rules specify how participants can take part in such management; Choice rules specify the actions participants can take as part of their roles; Aggregation rules specify decision-making procedures, including arrangements to aggregate the preferences of participants; Information rules specify the arrangements for information exchange between participants; Payoff rules specify the incentives and disincentives in terms of resources available to support decision-making and action; and, Scope rules specify the functional scope and geographic domain that can be affected by coastal resources management.

Importantly, we propose that, in affecting the action situation, these seven sets of rules also affect the determinants of adaptive capacity (i.e., variety, learning capacity, autonomy, leadership, resources and fair governance) that manifest in that situation. For example, by determining the participants in coastal resources management, their actions and potential outcomes; position, boundary, choice and scope rules, respectively, affect variety through inclusive participation, diversity of actions and issues addressed. Likewise, aggregation and choice rules affect autonomy by determining participants’ decisionmaking authority and their actions. Table 1 identifies the primary institutional rules affecting adaptive capacity attributes. It is important to note that, in many situations, institutional rules are not formally codified (e.g., as legislation or bylaws). Many of these rules are not even explicitly perceived by actors as rules (Ostrom, 2011). Further, in some cases, the rules affecting resources management efforts may refer to normative prescriptions (e.g., the notion of inclusive participation in co-management) rather than formal rules. These make identifying specific rules a rather challenging task (Ostrom, 2005). Therefore, in the context of this study, we suggest the notion of ‘institutional conditions’. These refer to general conditions resulting 105

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4.3. Co-management in the PKWS and TGL

from the effects of rules on the elements of the action situation. For example, inclusive (or exclusive) participation in resources management can be conceptualised as position and boundary conditions resulting from the effects of position and boundary rules. Accordingly, the effects of choice rules can be conceptualised as choice conditions and so on. This way, it is possible to link institutions to determinants of adaptive capacity without complete knowledge of specific rules. In other words, we suggest that such conditions may be used as “proxies” for rules.

In both PKWS and TGL, co-management was initially prompted and supported by international development initiatives in the mid-1990s, such as those of the International Development Research Centre (Marschke, 2012; Tuyen et al., 2010). Conceiving and implementing comanagement involved key institutional reforms. The resulting conditions from such reforms are summarised in Table 2. Co-management in the PKWS and TGL entails the participation of a range of actors (e.g., international donor agencies, researchers, government officials and resource users). As noted above, the resource management committees, in the PKWS, and fishing associations, in the TGL, are responsible for developing management plans and implementing specific activities locally. These activities include awareness raising and training workshops to build the capacity of actors to take part in shared coastal resources management and conflict resolution. Responsibility over coastal resources management is shared among relevant government and local actors. In both PKWS and TGL, there are arrangements providing for collaboration between government authorities (e.g., technical departments) and resource user groups (i.e., resource management committees and fishing associations) (Marschke, 2012; Tuyen et al., 2010). The management focus encompasses multiple and interrelated aspects of coastal resources management (e.g., resource protection, conservation and allocation with the aims of reducing conflicts among resource users and improving their livelihoods) within the boundaries of the PKWS and TGL. The participation of both state and non-state actors entails consideration of both technical and local knowledge. Planning and implementation activities involving government technical department staff and resource management committees and fishing associations, such as joint development of management plans and monitoring and patrolling illustrate the case. These activities are, in many cases, supported by shared resources. For example, the mobilisation of human resources among villagers and resource users for planting mangroves in the PKWS. In the TGL, membership and exploitation fees help fund the operation of fishing associations (Marschke, 2012; Tuyen et al., 2010). The institutional arrangements characterising co-management in the PKWS and TGL, described above, are unpacked and examined in how they enable the different attributes of adaptive capacity (i.e., variety, learning capacity, autonomy, leadership, resources and fair governance) in Section 6.

4. Case study context The case studies consist of institutions, i.e., systems of rules, norms, decision-making processes and property rights (Ostrom, 2005) defining coastal resources management in Peam Krasaop Wildlife Sanctuary, Cambodia, and Tam Giang Lagoon, Vietnam. They illustrate co-management arrangements characterised by decentralised and shared responsibility between state and local actors. Co-management is believed to be more adaptive than traditional forms of regulatory management (Armitage et al., 2009; Mcclenachan et al., 2015); and, therefore, provides an appropriate context to investigate the institutional dimension of adaptive capacity. Further, the case studies are embedded in a changing environmental, socio-economic and political context; which, provides an appropriate perspective to examine adaptive capacity. 4.1. Peam Krasaop Wildlife Sanctuary, Cambodia Peam Krasaop Wildlife Sanctuary (PKWS) is located in the Koh Kong province, southwest Cambodia (Fig. 2a). The PKWS contains approximately 24,000 ha of mangroves (Marschke and Nong, 2003) and is home to 10,000 people who live across three administrative districts, containing 6 communes and 15 villages. For most of these people, mangroves and associated resources provide opportunities for income generation and livelihood. However, since the early 1990s, coastal resources had significantly declined as a result of population growth, clearing of mangroves for aquaculture and charcoal production, destructive fishing practices (e.g., cyanide fishing), and illegal fishing (Marschke and Nong, 2003; Marschke, 2012). In response to resources decline, in the late 1990s, an initiative known as Participatory Management of Mangrove Resources, led by the Ministry of Environment, facilitated the establishment of village management committees comprising members of the community and resource users (The Participatory Management of Coastal Resources Project, 2008). These committees with the support of provincial and national authorities have responsibility for resources management at the local level. Marschke (2012) presents a comprehensive description of the PKWS.

5. Methods 5.1. Selection of cases As noted above, the case studies selected consist of institutions defining coastal resources co-management in Peam Krasaop Wildlife Sanctuary, Cambodia, and Tam Giang Lagoon, Vietnam. They illustrate co-management arrangements in a changing environmental, socioeconomic and political context, comprising appropriate cases to investigate adaptive capacity. In addition, these cases were selected given the availability of data and information from previous studies, and the long history of engagement with co-management. It is important to note that the case studies were used together to gain insights into how coastal resources co-management institutions enabled adaptive capacity; rather than to undertake a compare assessment of adaptive capacity between them.

4.2. Tam Giang lagoon, Vietnam The Tam Giang Lagoon (TGL) is located in Thua Thien Hue Province, Central Vietnam (Fig. 2b). It covers an area of approximately 22,000 ha and stretches approximately 70 km along the coast (Tuyen et al., 2010). The lagoon’s aquatic resources are directly or indirectly important for 300,000 people living in 33 communes and towns, and 326 villages across the lagoon area (Tuyen et al., 2010; Tuyen, 2002). The decline in fish catch and restricted access to the lagoon resulted from a rapid resource use intensification over the past 15 years or so (Tuyen, 2002). In addition, these problems were exacerbated by agricultural development and urbanisation (Tuyen et al., 2010). Co-management was initially adopted at the district level to complement the existing centralised, top-down management approach. Fundamental elements of co-management in the TGL include the fishing associations. These are a type of social-professional organisations with responsibility for resources management at the village or user group level (Tuyen et al., 2010). A detailed description of the TGL is presented in Tuyen et al. (2010).

5.2. Examining institutional adaptive capacity The evaluative criteria presented in Table 2 was used to examine how coastal resources co-management institutions enabled key attributes of adaptive capacity (i.e., variety, learning capacity, autonomy, leadership, resources and fair governance), and provide insights into 106

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Fig. 2. Peam Krasaop Wildlife Sanctuary (a) and Tam Giang Lagoon (b).

5.3. Data collection and analysis

the links between these attributes and institutional rules. As explained above, the notion of institutional conditions was used as proxies for institutional rules; particularly, in situations where defining specific rules proved challenging.

This study adopted a qualitative case study approach (Yin, 2003), drawing on multiple sources of data. These included documents (e.g., grey [technical reports] and academic literature, organisation’s 107

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Krasaop Wildlife Sanctuary (PKWS) and Tam Giang Lagoon (TGL). It also sought to complement interview and focus group data by drawing on previous studies. In this regard, it is important to note that co-authors T.V. Tuyen and K. Nong have been involved with coastal resources management in the TGL and PKWS, respectively, for approximately two decades. Observation, interviews and focus groups were undertaken between April and December 2014. Observations consisted of descriptions of activities, behaviours, actions, conversations and other interpersonal interactions relating to coastal resources co-management (Patton, 2002). Focus groups and interviews explored the perception of participants on how coastal resources co-management had enabled adaptive capacity, in terms of the six dimensions and criteria outlined above (Table 2). Interview respondents and focus group participants were selected based on their history of involvement with and/or knowledge of coastal resources co-management in the PKWS and TGL. These respondents included community/villagers, resource users, members of fishing associations and village management committees, and government officials (Table 3). The variation in number of participants interviewed and involved in focus groups reflects the different capacity and resources available for each case study. Formal methodological procedures were followed in both cases to ensure quality and validity (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Paton et al., 2004). Documents, interview and focus group data were analysed using systematic qualitative techniques (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Paton et al., 2004). These included content analysis of documents and interview and focus group data. Coding was undertaken by the lead author based on the six dimensions of adaptive capacity and criteria described in the evaluative approach (Table 2). It yielded patterns and themes, which were then consolidated (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Data analysis was undertaken using the software NVivo (QSR).

Table 2 Overall change as a result of institutional reforms towards co-management in the PKWS and TGL. Boundary conditions T0: Participant actors are mostly government authorities with responsibility over coastal resources T1: Participant actors include a range of state and non-state actors who affect and/or are affected by coastal resources management Position conditions T0: Government authorities are main “managers” of coastal resources T1: Government authorities and other non-government actors are partners in resources management Choice conditions T0: Resources management is based on command-and-control mechanisms T1: Management focuses on a range of mechanisms, e.g., awareness raising, capacity building, conflict resolution Aggregation conditions T0: Decisions are centralised, top-down and sectoral T1: Decision-making is shared among government and non-government actors Scope conditions T0: Management focuses on separate aspects of resources management; the geographical area of operation may overlap, yet not coincide T1: Management focuses on multiple aspects of resources management (e.g., protection, conservation, allocation, livelihoods) within a given geographical area Information conditions T0: Management emphasises technical information T1: Technical information and local knowledge are both considered Payoff conditions T0: Resources (human, financial, technical) support specific tasks of each authority involved T1: Resources are mobilised and shared to support joint activities T0: period (prior to 1990s) characterising the existing approach to coastal resources management; T1: period (after 1990s) characterising an alternative approach to such management (i.e., co-management).

6. Results

websites, policies and legislation), participant observation, interviews and focus groups (Table 3). Data collection was guided by the question of how resources management institutions enabled adaptive capacity to social-environmental change; and, the evaluative criteria presented in Table 2. The review of documents sought to gather secondary data, e.g., factual information about coastal resources management in the Peam

Coastal resources co-management institutions have enabled to varying extents the six dimensions of adaptive capacity (i.e., variety, learning capacity, autonomy, leadership, resources and fair governance); producing both enabling and disabling conditions (Table 4). Each of these dimensions is examined, as follows:

Table 3 Data collection methods. Case Study Peam Krasaop Wildlife Sanctuary (PKWS), Cambodia (Fig. 2a)

Case sites (communities): Koh Kapic Koh Sralao Koh Kang Peam Krasaop

• • • •

Tam Giang Lagoon (TGL), Vietnam (Fig. 2b)

Case sites (communes): Loc Binh Vinh Giang Vinh Phu

• • •

Method review of co-management in PKWS • Desktop scoping discussions and participant observation in each site for week • Informal Focus groups, three in each site, involving 25–30 participants from Village Management Committee, fishers and • villagers with 50 key informants: former Staff of the Participatory Management of Coastal Resources project, high • Interviews level officers and managers from the Provincial Department of Environment, Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and

•

Forestry, Provincial Department of Women’s Affairs, and Peam Krasaop Wildlife Sanctuary; former UNDP-GEF small grant’s manager; past representatives of Village Management Committees; and, respected village elders Validation and dissemination workshop involving 26 participants

review of co-management in TGL • Desktop with 20 key informants, including researchers and officers from government, fisheries and environment/ • Interviews resource agencies, and Fishing Associations • Focus groups in each of the case sites involving 12–15 Fishing Association officers and members

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Table 4 General enabling and disabling conditions of adaptive capacity in the PKWS and TGL. Dimension

Adaptive Capacity Enabling

Disabling Conflicts and tensions between actors as a result from diverse perspectives, interests and authority

Autonomy

Engagement of state and non-state actors from various sectors and multiple levels of governance Involvement of diverse knowledge and expertise Decision-making and management activities with potential to entail leaning through interaction and information exchange, e.g., training workshops, discussion forums, joint implementation, regular meetings Policies and legislation supporting decentralised resource management

Leadership

Engagement and commitment of local and external leaders

Resources

Ability of actors to mobilise external and internal resources (financial, technical and human) Decentralisation of resource management, devolution of authority, allocation of property rights

Variety

Learning capacity

Fair Governance

Coastal resources co-management in both the PKWS and TGL involves a variety of state and non-state actors, who represent diverse sectors and multiple governance levels (from local to international) (Table 5). In general, the variety of actors increased as co-management evolved and new partnerships were formed. In the PKWS, these included engagement of actors not involved initially in co-management, such as the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, at the national level, and the Department of Women’s Affairs, at the provincial level. Another example from the PKWS was a discussion between government authorities and resource management committees on how to address mangrove degradation. The discussion led eventually to the formation of a taskforce with a diverse composition, including government departments, the military, police and villagers. In addition, some of the actors identified aggregate a variety of other actors in their composition. For example, the co-management board in the TGL consists of representatives from the commune people’s committee, commune police, fishing association, leaders, and unions (e.g., farmers, women). Its advisory board comprises a variety of relevant provincial and district technical agencies and departments. The variety of actors, sectors and levels involved in coastal resources co-management (position and boundary conditions) affects choice conditions by creating opportunity for considering multiple problem frames and solutions. For example, in the PKWS, addressing resources decline involved diverse approaches, such as awareness raising, investing in alternative livelihoods (e.g., tourism), developing

Tensions and conflicts, power imbalance, partial support from highlevel authorities, limited resources, inconsistent policy implementation

6.2. Learning capacity The involvement of multiple actors, sectors and levels (variety) in coastal resources co-management, as discussed above, has significant implications for learning by means of communication and interaction (information conditions). Such variety has the potential to enhance learning capacity through, for example, combining information and knowledge (e.g., local and technical), sharing of experiences through networks, and learning from other actors through joint activities (Table 6). In the PKWS, the Participatory Management of Mangrove Resources Project adopted a “learning by doing” approach. Such approach proposes that co-management may be an experimental, reflective and adaptive process. Thus, the project team spent its first few years developing activities to facilitate learning − i.e., activities by which actors could exchange ideas and perspectives, and build capacity. These

Table 5 Example of actors involved in coastal resources management in the Peam Krasaop Wildlife Sanctuary (PKWS) and Tam Giang Lagoon (TGL).

Development •International Research Centre of Environment • Ministry Department of • Provincial Fisheries Department of Rural • Provincial Development Department of Rural • Provincial Affairs of Women’s Affair • Department Management • Resource Committees Councils • Commune Chiefs • Village • Resource users

Limited decision-making and implementation authority Partial support from higher-level authorities Leadership qualities eroded by limited resources, self-interest, power imbalance, conflicts and tensions between actors Limited, inconsistent resources; over dependence on external sources

links between resource users and authorities, mangrove replanting, and patrolling. On the other hand, involving a variety of actors, sectors and levels in resources management may pose many challenges. In particular, involving relevant actors and reconciling different perspectives, interests and levels of authority may be problematic at times. For example, in the TGL, the youth and women, despite their participation in fishing activities, have overall had limited participation in the fishing associations. Thus, the Giang Xuan fishing association has organised training aiming to empower women to engage in resources co-management. In the PKWS, the diversity of perspectives, interests and authority has, in some cases, underscored existing conflicts and tensions between actors. For instance, in Koh Sralao and Koh Kapic communities, the head of commune council and village chief consider the resources management committees as adversaries.

6.1. Variety

PKWS

Limited resources for activities entailing learning, conflict and tensions between actors, power imbalance, weak leadership

TGL

Table 6 Examples of activities and entailed learning in the Peam Krasaop Wildlife Sanctuary and Tam Giang Lagoon.

Development Research • International Centre People Committee • Province Fishing Association • Province Department of Agriculture and • District Rural Development Department of Natural • District Resources and Environment People Committee • Commune Board • Co-management Fishing Associations • Village • Resource users

Activities

•Field visits/tours meetings • Regular forums • Multi-actor workshops • Training (e.g., problem identification, • Planning finding solutions, drafting plans) (e.g., mangrove • Implementation replanting, monitoring) education/awareness • Environmental raising 109

Learning about and potential • Problems solutions actor’s perspectives • Different and expectations regulation and • Relevant policies and duties • Rights approaches • Management and technical knowledge • Local and dynamic of the • Status system and its resources

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the key counterparts of the government to cooperatively manage fisheries activities and fisheries resources in the Tam Giang lagoon” (Article 1). Further, fishing associations may also receive fishing rights. The decision 942/2009 of the People’s Committee of the Phu Loc district allocates fishing rights to the Giang Xuan fishing association – this is regarded as Vietnam’s first ever allocation of fishing rights from the district authority to a fisher’s organisation. Similarly to PKWS resource management committees, fishing associations are also reliant on external authority – i.e., district and commune officials – to implement some actions (Tuyen et al., 2010). Despite the legal support to decentralisation and some level of authority transferred to local entities, these entities still have limited power in terms of decision-making and implementation. For example, in both case studies, the ultimate responsibility for decisions remains with high-level policy- and decision-makers. Further, some government officials did not fully embraced decentralisation even after a formal authority to manage coastal resources was delegated to resource management committees and fishing associations. The following quote from an informant in the TGL is illustrative: “… [administrators] did not want to share their power with local people… they did not fully support the development of this [co-management] …yet.”

included a number of awareness raising and training workshops, and study tours covering a range of topics (e.g., environmental management, good governance, project management, livelihoods improvement, coastal conservation, and mangrove inventory and restoration). Learning capacity has been supported by similar approaches and activities in the TGL. For example, capacity building involved activities, such as training of fishing association officers (at provincial, district and sub-district levels) on planning, organisational development and management; workshops for identifying inputs for policy development; and multi-actor workshops aiming to build consensus on guidelines for allocation of fishing rights and authorised management actions. Learning may have led to change in attitude and behaviour of those involved in co-management. For example, in the TGL case, government officers at the commune level have attributed the change in vision and management strategies to learning from their involvement in coastal resources co-management. Such vision and strategies have reportedly shifted from short-term and top-down to integrated, long-term and participatory (Tuyen et al., 2010). Also, fishers have perceived emerging horizontal arrangements resulting from co-management as enabling exchange of experiences with other villages and communes (Armitage et al., 2011). On the other hand, factors that may hinder learning capacity in the context of resources management include: inadequate resources to support learning activities (payoff conditions; these are discussed in sub-section 6.5 on resources), conflict and tensions among actors, and power imbalance (these are discussed above, in sub-section 6.1 on variety). Another critical factor constraining learning capacity is weak leadership (see Marschke and Sinclair, 2009 for discussion on learning in the context of the PKWS).

6.4. Leadership Leadership qualities of actors (i.e., participants, defined by position and boundary rules) are affected in part by autonomy by way of aggregation conditions, as discussed above. Strong leadership was regarded as an important attribute enabling co-management. In the PKWS, for example, leadership and facilitation from the Participatory Management of Mangrove Resources Project team and Ministry of Environment proved critical in establishing and moving forward comanagement. Leadership from the resource management committee in Peam Krasaop has helped mobilise support from its members and villagers. In the TGL, members of the fishing association executive boards may include experienced, responsible and prestigious fishers – in some cases, the association chairperson is also the village chief. In these instances, leadership has proven to be an enabling factor contributing to success (Marschke and Sinclair, 2009). Conversely, weak leadership in Koh Sralao and Koh Kapic communities was regarded as a main contributor to ineffective and/or dysfunctional resource management committees. Likewise, in the TGL, the co-management board – established to facilitate coordination between fishing associations and local authorities – has a poor record of accomplishments given, in part, its weak leadership. In general, leadership qualities were eroded by limited resources, self-interest, power-imbalance, and conflicts and tensions among local actors.

6.3. Autonomy Legislation has been enacted providing for co-management in both PKWS and TGL (Table 7). This involved transferring some level of authority over the design and reform of resources management institutions to actors at sub-national and/or local levels (choice and aggregation conditions). In the PKWS, resource management committees are responsible for developing management plans and implementing locally-based action, such as patrolling, mangrove replanting, and awareness raising. Some of these actions require the approval and/or collaboration of government authorities. Patrolling, which may involve confiscating fishing gear and issuing fines, is illustrative. It can only be undertaken by resource management committees if accompanied by a member of a technical department or local police. In many cases, assistance from local authorities is not assured (Marschke, 2012). Further, these committees do not have the authority to deal with higher level or external issues impacting local-based activities. Sand mining and illegal fishing by trawlers are examples of these issues. In the TGL, similarly to PKWS, legislation allows for collaboration between government authorities and resource users. Under the legislation, fishing associations are established to manage fisheries and aquaculture within the lagoon. The Decision 3677/2004/QD-UB of the People’s Committee of Thua Thien Hue Province is illustrative; it states: “…fisheries organisations under the Vietnamese Fisheries Associations are

6.5. Resources External resources were critical in supporting pilot projects aiming to introduce co-management in the PKWS and TGL (payoff conditions). Human, financial, technical resources were provided by international development agencies, such as the Canadian International Development Agency and International Development Research Centre, researchers and government authorities. As discussed above, the Participatory Management of Mangrove Resources Project team in the PKWS facilitated a wide range of activities to build the capacity of the community, resource users and authorities to engage in co-management. In the TGL, a research team was initially engaged in activities towards establishing the fishing associations and facilitating user group meetings (Tuyen et al., 2010). Over the years, national and international non-government organisations have supported a number of projects in the PKWS and TGL. These projects include those on mangrove planting, climate change adaptation, resources inventory, and alternative livelihoods. In addition to external financial and technical support, payoff

Table 7 Example of key legislation and policies supportive of co-management in the Peam Krasaop Wildlife Sanctuary (PKWS) and Tam Giang Lagoon (TGL). Case Study PKWS TGL

Legislation/Policy on Community Fisheries Management 2005, 2007 • Sub-decree • Guidelines for Community Fisheries 2007 Law 2003 • Fisheries 3677/2004/QD-UB • Decision • Decision 4260/2005/QB-UBND

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institutions influencing complex and interacting such conditions. Institutions can inherently both expand and/or limit human decisionmaking and action (Ostrom, 2005) and, therefore, enable and/or constrain adaptation (Engle and Lemos, 2010; Eakin et al., 2014). Further, institutional rules are interconnected and interact in a configurational manner rather than independently. As seen above, one type of institutional rules can, through its direct impact on one of the components of the action situation, affect other components of the situation (Ostrom and Crawford, 2005). For example, position and boundary rules affect variety, which has significant implications for other dimensions of adaptive capacity, particularly, learning capacity, autonomy and fair governance through its effects on information, choice and aggregation rules. Specifically, fishers in the TGL perceive the fishing associations as a bridge for information from district and provincial authorities (learning capacity); links with commune authorities provide opportunity for engagement in addressing threats to the Lagoon resources and dispute resolution strategies (autonomy); and, there is greater involvement in decisions regarding resources use and management through their membership in these associations (fair governance) (Armitage et al., 2011). The configurational nature and interconnectedness of institutional rules may also determine the interdependent nature of the six dimensions of adaptive capacity, as these dimensions can reinforce and/or undermine each other (Gupta et al., 2010). For example, external financial and technical resources were critical to support learning activities in the cases studied (resources have supported learning capacity). Such activities aimed to enhance the ability of villagers, fishermen, government authorities and technical staff to participate in co-management (learning has reinforced variety). Resources also helped mobilise leadership by, for example, reducing the transaction costs of participation. Leadership, in turn, proved critical to mobilise external technical resources and authority (autonomy). Later, policies and legislation formalised and provided legitimacy and legal authority for local actors to take part in resources management (autonomy has supported governance and variety). Conversely, limited resources and autonomy have constrained leadership qualities of local actors; and, inconsistent policy implementation and law enforcement have undermined local authority in some instances (governance has constrained autonomy). In sum, co-management institutions have enabled actors to: organise themselves; learn and improve resources management; mobilise leadership, resources and authority; and, make progress towards improved governance. These comprise instances of building and mobilising adaptive capacity, particularly at the local level. Conversely, constraining conditions featuring power imbalance and conflicting interests among the actors involved corroborate findings from other sites in the PKWS and TGL (Armitage et al., 2011; Marschke, 2012; Ho et al., 2015) and co-management experiences elsewhere (Plummer and Armitage, 2007). They indicate that co-management of natural resources is rather challenging to implement, and results are, therefore, variable (Plummer and Armitage, 2007; Carlsson and Berkes, 2005). Further, responding to social-environmental change usually involves coping and adaptation strategies that may lead to adaptation and maladaptation (Fidelman et al., 2013; Berman et al., 2012; Boonstra and Hanh, 2014). Importantly, the institutional constraints highlighted in the case studies suggest that contextual factors play a critical role in framing adaptive capacity. In terms of the IAD framework, institutional rules interact with other contextual factors in affecting the action situation, i.e., the locus where adaptive capacity emerges and is mobilised. These contextual factors comprise the characteristics of the biophysical environment and attributes of the communities of individuals involved (Ostrom, 2005). In this context, reinforcing existing enabling conditions will involve, in addition to changing institutional rules to provide adequate financial and technical resources (payoff rules), authority (choice rules) and conflict resolution mechanisms (aggregation rules), providing alternative livelihoods, alleviating poverty, reducing inequality, and building human and social capital.

conditions also involved local arrangements. This was the case of Peam Krasaop community, which used financial resources generated from ecotourism to fund conservation, development and poverty alleviation activities. In the TGL, fishing associations collect annual membership and exploitation fees, which help support their operations. Local actors have also been able to mobilise human and technical support through their networks. For example, some communities in the KPWS have worked with consultants and NGOs to develop grant applications to support resources conservation. Nevertheless, resources have overall been limited, inconsistent, and, very often, over reliant on external sources; which has constrained management activities. In the PKWS, for example, the absence of a speed boat and limited technical support have impacted the capacity of resource management committees to engage in patrolling. Similarly, limited financial resources may constrain the capacity of fishing associations in the TGL to sustain their activities (Tuyen et al., 2010). 6.6. Fair governance Overall, the resources management initiatives examined have helped improve principles of fair governance, such as legitimacy, equity, responsiveness and accountability. It is important to note that co-management in Cambodia and Vietnam takes place in a complex and evolving political context, characterised by centralised government systems. In this context, the transfer of authority (yet somewhat limited) over resources use and management to local non-state actors (aggregation conditions) is a positive outcome in its own right. Further, local entities to which such authority has been transferred, such as resource management committees consist of members elected by villagers and resource users (boundary conditions). Fishing associations and resource management committees have entailed the participation of villagers and resource users in local ruleand decision-making over resources use and management (position and boundary conditions). These instances have implications for responsiveness, i.e., the ability of the governance system to timely respond to local concerns and needs. In the TGL, as noted above, fishing rights have been formally transferred to fishing associations (aggregation conditions) – such rights can only be granted if at least 75% of a village is part of the association (Marschke et al., 2012). Therefore, such allocation of rights provides legitimacy to local resources management. Legitimacy also manifests in terms of compliance (Jentoft, 2000); in this regard, levels of compliance with locally-made rules are somewhat high in some case sites. For instance, Giang Xuan fishing association regulations are mostly respected and have resulted in change in fishing practices (e.g., resizing of fishing corrals, reducing the number of fishing gears, and ending electric fishing). Despite the instances of legitimacy, equity, responsiveness and accountability noted above, fair governance remains challenging in the cases examined. Tensions and conflicts, power imbalance, partial support from high-level authorities, limited resources, and inconsistent policy implementation are some of the constraining factors. Importantly, as seen previously, the ultimate authority to make decisions in all cases examined remains with high-level government authorities. 7. Discussion This study employed an evaluative approach that link attributes of adaptive capacity (Gupta et al., 2010) and institutional typology (Ostrom, 2011) to examine how institutions enabled adaptive capacity in the context of co-management in the Peam Krasaop Wildlife Sanctuary (PKWS, Cambodia) and Tam Giang Lagoon (TGL, Vietnam). Adaptive capacity (i.e., variety, learning capacity, autonomy, leadership, resources and fair governance) was associated with both enabling and disabling conditions. This may be explained by the very nature of 111

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8. Concluding remarks This study underscored the complex and interrelated nature of institutions in how they may enable (and/or constrain) key attributes of adaptive capacity (i.e., variety, learning capacity, autonomy, leadership, resources and fair governance). Given the configurational nature of the rule types, interdependency of institutional attributes of adaptive capacity, and compounding contextual factors, complexity emerges as a defining property of institutional adaptive capacity. Therefore, exercises aiming to assess adaptive capacity and reform institutions to support such capacity should be considered in the context of the relationship between rule types and attributes of adaptive capacity, and the embedding social, cultural and political context. Last, this study offered an improved approach to assess adaptive capacity by linking institutional rules to attributes believed to support societies in responding to social-environmental change. Future studies that investigate how contextual factors interact with institutional rules to affect adaptive capacity would be beneficial in improving assessments of adaptive capacity using the IAD framework. Acknowledgements We would like to thank the participants in the interviews, focus group discussions and workshops for sharing their time and knowledge. This study was funded by the Asia-Pacific Network for Global Change Research (APN) and University of the Sunshine Coast, Australia. An earlier version of this paper was awarded the 2016 Pete Hay Environmental Politics Prize by the Australian Political Studies Association. References Adger, N.W., Arnell, N.W., Tompkins, E.L., 2005. Successful adaptation to climate change across scales. Glob. Environ. Change 15, 77–86. Agrawal, A., 2008. The Role of Local Institutions in Livelihoods Adaptation to Climate Change. University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. Armitage, D.R., Plummer, R., Berkes, F., Arthur, R.I., Charles, A.T., Davidson-Hunt, I.J., Diduck, A.P., Doubleday, N.C., Johnson, D.S., Marschke, M., Mcconney, P., Pinkerton, E.W., Wollenberg, E.K., 2009. Adaptive co-management for social–ecological complexity. Front. Ecol. Environ. 7, 95–102. Armitage, D., Marschke, M., Tuyen, T.V., 2011. Early-stage transformation of coastal marine governance in Vietnam? Mar. Policy 35, 703–711. Bergsma, E., Gupta, J., Jong, P., 2012. Does individual responsibility increase the adaptive capacity of society? The case of local water management in the Netherlands. Resour. Conserv. Recycl. 64, 13–22. Berman, R., Quinn, C., Paavola, J., 2012. The role of institutions in the transformation of coping capacity to sustainable adaptive capacity. Environ. Dev. 2, 86–100. Biermann, F., Betsill, M.M., Gupta, J., Kanie, N., Lebel, L., Liverman, D., Schroeder, H., SIEBENHUNER, 2009. Earth System Governance: People, Places, and the Planet. Science Implementation Plan of the Earth System Governance Project. International Human Dimensions Programme on Global Environmental Change, Bonn. Biermann, F., Betsill, M.M., Gupta, J., Kanie, N., Lebel, L., Liverman, D., Schroeder, H., Siebenhüner, B., Zondervan, R., 2010. Earth system governance: a research framework. Int. Environ. Agreements: Politics Law Econ. 10, 277–298. Blomquist, W., Deleon, P., 2011. The design and promise of the institutional analysis and development framework. Policy Stud. J. 39, 1–6. Boonstra, W.J., Hanh, T.T.H., 2014. Adaptation to climate change as social–ecological trap: a case study of fishing and aquaculture in the Tam Giang Lagoon, Vietnam. Environ. Dev. Sustain. 17, 1527–1544. Carlsson, L., Berkes, F., 2005. Co-management: concepts and methodological implications. J. Environ. Manag. 75, 65–76. Crawford, S.E.S., Ostrom, E., 1995. A grammar of institutions. Am. Political Sci. Rev. 89, 582–600. Eakin, H.C., Lemos, M.C., Nelson, D.R., 2014. Differentiating capacities as a means to sustainable climate change adaptation. Glob. Environ. Change 27, 1–8. Eaking, H., Lemos, M.C., 2006. Adaptation and the state: Latin America and the challenge of capacity-building under globalization. Global Environ. Change 16, 7–18. Engle, N.L., Lemos, M.C., 2010. Unpacking governance: building adaptive capacity to climate change of river basins in Brazil. Glob. Environ. Change 20, 4–13. Engle, N.L., 2011. Adaptive capacity and its assessment. Glob. Environ. Change 21, 647–656. Fidelman, P., Leitch, A., Nelson, D.R., 2013. Unpacking multilevel adaptaion in the Great

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