The Israeli election for prime minister and the Knesset, 1996

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Notes on Recent Elections

The Israeli Election for Prime Minister and the Knesset, 1996 ASHER ARIAN

Department of Political Science, University of Haifa, Haifa 31905, Israel and Graduate Centre, City University of New York, New York, N Y 10021, USA

Israelis directly elected their prime minister for the first time in these elections. According to legislation a d o p t e d before the 1992 elections, but applied for the first time in 1996, the prime minister is selected using a winner-take-all system, with a second round run-off b e t w e e n the two highest vote getters two weeks later if no candidate receives a majority in the first round (Doron and Kay, 1995; Hermann, 1995). The 120-member Knesset (parliament) is elected as in the past, using a strict p r o p o r t i o n a l representation list system with very few procedural or technical obstacles facing a group w h i c h chooses to compete. Since 1949, and in each of the 13 elections until 1996, the Knesset selected the prime minister, as is customary in parliamentary systems. The n e w system provides that the tenure of the prime minister and the Knesset shall be four years long, and that they shall be elected simultaneously but separately by the voters. The Knesset may remove the prime minister by a special vote of 80 members, u p o n w h i c h n e w elections for the prime minister take place. On the other hand, the prime minister, with the agreement of the president, can dissolve the Knesset; such a step w o u l d also end the prime minister's tenure and would force n e w elections for both. The Knesset can also remove the prime minister by expressing no confidence by a majority vote (61 votes), or by failing to pass the national budget, but then n e w elections for both prime minister and Knesset are held. Before the n e w system was used in practice, most commentators c o n c l u d e d that it lacked an integrating c o n c e p t of governance, that it would enervate political parties, would w e a k e n the Knesset, w o u l d increase the bargaining position of mediumsized and small parties, and would concentrate excessive p o w e r s in the hands of the prime minister (the most powerful actor in the system by far even before the reform). Unfortunately, the election results indicated that the o p p o n e n t s of the direct election of the prime minister w e r e correct (Hazan, 1996; for another point of view see Susser, 1989). The elections w e r e scheduled for late O c t o b e r 1996. Labor was t e m p t e d to call early elections, as the party and its leader, Shimon Peres, enjoyed a cascade of popular s u p p o r t in the months following the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in N o v e m b e r 1995. However, since the government was in the midst of negotiations with Syria over the future of the Golan Heights and Lebanon, it hesitated. Peres preferred an election campaign based on a draft peace treaty with Syria, and thought that he w o u l d have to negotiate face-to-face with President Assad of Syria to reach an agreement in time. Assad s e e m e d to agree to face-to-face negotiations but w o u l d provide no firm date for the meeting. Peres' assessment then was that Syria w o u l d not be forthcoming, and Labor o p t e d for elections at the end of May 1996. At the end of February 1996, w h e n the parties negotiated the actual date,

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no o n e k n e w o f t h e series o f suicide b o m b i n g s awaiting Israel o r of t h e i n c o n c l u s i v e results o f t h e G r a p e s of W r a t h c a m p a i g n in Lebanon, n o r t h e i m p a c t o f t h e s e events o n t h e voters. T h e p r o v i s i o n in t h e d i r e c t e l e c t i o n l a w a l l o w i n g for a s e c o n d r o u n d runoff if no c a n d i d a t e g o t m o r e t h a n half t h e v o t e s p u t e n o r m o u s p r e s s u r e o n t h e c a n d i d a t e s o f t h e t w o big parties to p r e v e n t o t h e r c a n d i d a t e s from t h e i r side of the political s p e c t r u m f r o m running. In 1996, t h e p r e s s u r e w a s o n Binyamin Netanyahu, l e a d e r o f t h e Likud, t h e largest p a r t y o f t h e right, since viable c a n d i d a t e s from o t h e r p a r t i e s o f t h e right h a d a n n o u n c e d t h e i r candidacy, a n d since t h e r e w a s a r e a s o n a b l e c h a n c e that Peres c o u l d w i n t h e n e e d e d 50 p e r c e n t p l u s o n e w)te on t h e first round. N e t a n y a h u c u t deals w i t h David Levy's G e s h e r p a r t y a n d w i t h Rafael ('Raful') Eitan's T z o m e t p a r t y to p r e s e n t a joint L i k u d - G e s h e r - T z o m e t list. T h e s e deals w e r e n e g o t i a t e d just as the Likud w a s h o l d i n g its p r i m a r y a m o n g its 200,000 m e m b e r s for p l a c e s o n the list. N e t a n y a h u assured G e s h e r a n d T z o m e t seven seats e a c h o f t h e first 40 p l a c e s o n the n e w joint list at t h e e x p e n s e o f Likud c a n d i d a t e s . W h i l e t h e a g r e e m e n t w a s duly a p p r o v e d b y the Likud d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g b o d i e s , it h i g h l i g h t e d t h e fact that t h e d i r e c t e l e c t i o n of t h e p r i m e m i n i s t e r w o u l d n o t p r e v e n t t h e deals a m o n g p o l i t i c i a n s w h i c h h a d i g n o r e d the will of t h e e l e c t o r a t e a n d that h a d b e e n so offensive in t h e past. T h e e l e c t i o n c a m p a i g n itself w a s m o r e s u b d u e d t h a n e x p e c t e d . This w a s attrib u t e d to t h e s h o c k felt b y m o s t Israelis that it w a s a y o u n g religious J e w w h o h a d assassinated t h e p r i m e m i n i s t e r o f Israel in t h e n a m e of religious and nationalist ideals. Peres w a s p r e s e n t e d in t h e c a m p a i g n as t h e N o b e l Prize for Peace w i n n e r w h o , along w i t h c o - N o b e l laureates, t h e fallen Rabin and t h e PLO's Yasir Arafat, h a d w o r k e d o u t an a c c o r d w h i c h r e l i n q u i s h e d effective Israeli c o n t r o l o v e r m u c h of the Arab p o p u l a t i o n o f the territories and set a t i m e t a b l e for n e g o t i a t i n g a p e r m a n e n t s e t t l e m e n t . N e t a n y a h u , t h e Likud's c a n d i d a t e , stressed t h e i n s e c u r i t y in t h e i r daily lives felt b y Israelis b e c a u s e of t h e w a v e o f suicide b o m b i n g s w h i c h h a d p l a g u e d t h e c o u n t r y in late F e b r u a r y a n d March. N e t a n y a h u r e a c h e d out to t h e c e n t e r by s u p p o r t i n g the p e a c e p r o c e s s a n d b y stressing security, w h i l e Peres did the same t h i n g in reverse, talking security a n d r e m i n d i n g his a u d i e n c e s o f the successful p e a c e n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h J o r d a n a n d t h e PLO. A l m o s t all t h e surveys, a n d the early e v e n i n g exit polls, s h o w e d Peres as t h e w i n n e r . T h e results of t h e p r i m e m i n i s t e r e l e c t i o n s w e r e a cliffhanger, w i t h N e t a n y a h u d e f e a t i n g Peres b y w i n n i n g 50.5 p e r c e n t o f t h e 3 million w)tes cast (see Table of results on p. 596 of this issue). N e t a n y a h u r e c e i v e d a b o u t 55 p e r c e n t of t h e votes o f Jews, Peres m o r e t h a n 90 p e r c e n t o f t h e v o t e s o f non-Jews, i n c l u d i n g in Nazareth, t h e largest Arab city in t h e c o u n t r y (see Table 1). C o m m u n i t i e s w i t h s t r o n g c o n c e n trations o f o b s e r v a n t Jews, such as Bnei Brak (largely h a r e d i ) and J e r u s a l e m ( b o t h h a r e d i a n d O r t h o d o x - Z i o n i s t ) , as w e l l as J e w s living b e y o n d t h e pre-1967 w a r b o r d e r ( ' t h e G r e e n Line'), w e n t heavily for Netanyahu. Peres d i d very w e l l in k i b b u t z i m (collective settlements), did slightly b e t t e r than N e t a n y a h u in s e c u l a r J e w i s h cities such as Tel Aviv, and d i d a b o u t as w e l l as Netanyahu in m o s h a v i m ( c o o p e r a t i v e s e t t l e m e n t s ) and o t h e r places, s u c h as t h e largely J e w i s h Nazareth Heights. T h e settlers of t h e G o l a n Heights, the f o r m e r Syrian area s e e n b y m a n y as crucial to Israeli security, w e r e largely Labor s u p p o r t e r s ; t h e y split almost e v e n l y in t h e p r i m e m i n i s t e r race since t h e y w e r e c o n c e r n e d that Labor w a s p l a n n i n g to r e t u r n t h e Golan. T h e rate o f invalid v o t e s in t h e p r i m e m i n i s t e r race w a s 4.8 p e r cent, m o r e t h a n

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TABLE 1. Voting support (in %) for Prime Minister, Likud and Labor in selected communities: 29 May 1996 (23 June 1992) a Netanyahu

Peres

Likud-GesherTzomet

Labor

National Total

50.5

49.5

24.9 (31.3) b

Jewish settlements Non-Jewish settlements Druze settlements Bedouin settlements

55.5 5.2 21.3 6.8

44.4 94.7 78.6 93.1

27.4 2.2 11.7 1.5

(33.0) (8.8) (24.9) (15.6)

27.7 16.6 40.3 14.9

(36.3) (20.3) (29.3) (17.4)

Bnei Brak Jerusalem Nazareth Nazareth Heights Tel Aviv

88.9 69.9 1.3 51.2 44.8

11.0 30.0 98.6 48.7 55.1

11.1 25.6 0.3 28.4 26.6

(14.9) (31.0) (2.3) (31.5) (32.1)

6.6 16.3 8.5 28.4 33.9

(11.4) (20.8) (14.5) (49.7) (38.5)

Golan Heights Jews beyond Green Line Kibbutzim Moshavim

49.7 83.7 10.0 51.7

50.2 16.2 89.9 48.2

16.3 32.2 3.1 26.8

(30.6) (37.6) (4.2) (28.7)

31.2 10.1 55.0 34.6

(41.7) (14.7) (53.3) (39.5)

26.6 (34.6)

aOffical election results of the Central Elections Committee, as reported in H a y o m supplement o f M a ' a r i v , 2 June 1996, pp. 8-17. bin 1992, Gesher had not yet split, and Likud received 24.9 per cent of the vote: Tzomet 6.4 per cent. d o u b l e the rate (2.2 p e r c e n t ) for the Knesset. The difference b e t w e e n the rates indicates that it was n o t a lack of u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the e l e c t i o n rules w h i c h caused the high rate of invalid voters for p r i m e minister; rather, it p o i n t s to an u n w i l l i n g n e s s to c h o o s e either of the t w o candidates o n the part of a sizable n u m b e r of voters. This r e l u c t a n c e was generalized t h r o u g h o u t the system, rather t h a n c o n c e n t r a t e d in o n e area or v o t e r category. In Arab Nazareth, 8.6 p e r c e n t of those w h o v o t e d in the p r i m e ministerial e l e c t i o n cast b l a n k or invalid ballots, while in Jewish Tel Aviv the p e r c e n t a g e was 5.1, a n d in o b s e r v a n t Jerusalem a n d haredi Bnei Brak it was 4.3 p e r c e n t in each. C o n s i d e r i n g that the difference b e t w e e n the t w o candidates was less t h a n 30,000 votes, these a b s t e n t i o n s w e r e crucial. The Knesset elections, almost c o m p l e t e l y i g n o r e d in the campaign, p r o v i d e d repr e s e n t a t i o n to 11 lists (1.5 p e r c e n t of the valid votes w e r e n e e d e d to w i n r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ) , out of the 20 lists that c o m p e t e d . Both Likud a n d Labor did less well in 1996 t h a n they did in 1992 in each of the s e t t l e m e n t s for w h i c h election results are p r e s e n t e d in Table 1, w i t h the e x c e p t i o n s of k i b b u t z i m a n d B e d o u i n settlements for Labor. T h e Israeli v o t e r used the ballot b o x in a sophisticated m a n n e r , a n d left in the wake of the vote a w e a k e n e d party system, a n d a Knesset that was fractionalized a n d u n n e r v e d c o m p a r e d to the p r i m e m i n i s t e r a n d the e x e c u t i v e branch. Splitting their ticket, m a n y voters sent a differentiated message using differently the t w o votes a v a i l a b l e - - o n e for the p r i m e m i n i s t e r a n d o n e for the Knessset, a n d t h e r e b y blurring the clarity of the Knesset election results regarding national issues. In a national survey of adult Jews (N = 1,161) c o n d u c t e d in the w e e k s before the election, respond e n t s w e r e asked h o w they w o u l d vote if the old system w e r e in place a n d they only had o n e vote each.~ Almost all Likud a n d Labor voters r e p o r t e d they w o u l d

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v o t e as t h e y did, a third o f t h e left-wing Meretz v o t e r s said t h e y w o u l d v o t e Labor, and 12 p e r c e n t o f t h e v o t e r s for religious p a r t i e s r e p o r t e d that t h e y w o u l d v o t e for t h e Likud. T h e political p a r t y s y s t e m w a s dealt a s e v e r e b l o w b y t h e 1996 elections. W i t h Labor e l e c t i n g 34 m e m b e r s a n d Likud 32 m e m b e r s in t h e 120-seat Knesset, i n s t e a d o f 44 a n d 40 as in 1992, t h e p a r t y system w a s f r a g m e n t e d as n e v e r b e f o r e (Arian and Shamir, 1993). N e v e r in Israeli political h i s t o r y h a d t h e r e b e e n a w i n n i n g p a r t y w i t h s u c h a small K n e s s e t d e l e g a t i o n as Labor w o n in 1996. Moreover, t h e total seats w o n b y t h e t w o b i g g e s t parties w a s also unusually small. O n e m u s t l o o k to t h e 1949 e l e c t i o n s a n d t h o s e in t h e early 1950s to find t h e t w o m a j o r parties comm a n d i n g so f e w o f t h e v o t e s o f t h e e l e c t o r a t e . Like t h o s e p r e v i o u s p e r i o d s , this e l e c t i o n signified t h e e m e r g e n c e of sectarian interests, r e p r e s e n t e d b y Arab parties, religious parties, and a p a r t y of n e w immigrants from t h e f o r m e r Soviet Union. T h e t w o Arab lists, Hadash (the left w i n g D e m o c r a t i c F r o n t for P e a c e a n d Equality) a n d t h e centre-right parties w h i c h f o r m e d t h e Arab D e m o c r a t i c list, raised t h e i r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n from five seats in 1992 to n i n e scats in 1996. T h e t h r e e J e w i s h religious parties, t h e O r t h o d o x - Z i o n i s t National Religious party, t h e S e p h a r d i u l t r a - O r t h o d o x Shas, a n d the A s h k e n a z i u l t r a - O r t h o d o x United T o r a h J e w r y , s a w t h e i r c o m b i n e d r e p r e s e n t a t i o n g r o w from 16 to 23 seats. A n d t h e Israel b'Aliya i m m i g r a n t list ran for t h e first t i m e and w o n s e v e n seats. A d d to this t h e Third Way, a centrist party, h e a d e d b y t w o f o r m e r Labor m e m b e r s of Knesset, a n d t h e r o s t e r of t h e big w i n n e r s is c o m p l e t e . T h e 1996 c a m p a i g n w a s o n e o f t h e h a r d e s t f o u g h t in Israel's history, and o n e of t h e m o s t inconclusive. T h e d i r e c t e l e c t i o n of t h e p r i m e m i n i s t e r left t h e i m p r e s s i o n in Israel and a b r o a d that Israelis h a d t u r n e d to t h e right and a w a y f r o m t h e p e a c e p r o c e s s . This m a y o r m a y n o t b e t h e p o l i c y o f t h e n e w g o v e r n m e n t , b u t t h e differe n c e of 30,000 v o t e s b e t w e e n t h e t w o c a n d i d a t e s did n o t justify that c o n c l u s i o n . T h e d i r e c t e l e c t i o n o f t h e p r i m e m i n i s t e r e n c o u r a g e d c o n c e i v i n g it as a horse-race, and this in turn h e i g h t e n e d t h e sense of an internal struggle b e t w e e n t w o o p p o s i n g and u n y i e l d i n g c a m p s . W h i l e t h e r e w a s s o m e t r u t h to that d e s c r i p t i o n , it o v e r l o o k e d t h e m a j o r i t y o f p e o p l e w h o w e r e n o t clearly in e i t h e r of t h e o p p o s i n g e x t r e m e c a m p s . T h e p r e v i o u s system d a m p e n e d d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n w a r r i n g sides b e c a u s e s o m e o f the m a n y p a r t i e s p r o v i d e d a s o o t h i n g effect to t h e political p a s s i o n s o f the e x t r e m e s . That quality w a s lost in t h e s e e l e c t i o n s and t h e w o u n d s w o u l d likely last l o n g e r a n d b e s l o w e r in healing. The t w i n issues of n a t i o n a l i s m (the territories) a n d G o d (religious o b s e r v a n c e ) r e m a i n e d t h e m o s t p o w e r f u l p r e d i c t o r s o f t h e v o t e (see Table 2), b a s e d o n the results o f t h e s u r v e y d e s c r i b e d above. This r e p l i c a t e d p a t t e r n s o b s e r v e d in t h e past (Arian, 1995, C h a p t e r 5). T h e c o r r e l a t i o n s w e r e v e r y similar b e t w e e n willingness to r e t u r n t e r r i t o r i e s for p e a c e a n d t h e c a n d i d a t e s on t h e o n e hand, and for willingness to r e t u r n a n d v o t i n g for t h e t w o large parties, o n t h e other. H o w e v e r , t h e c o r r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n religious o b s e r v a n c e a n d c h o i c e of c a n d i d a t e s w a s h i g h e r t h a n b e t w e e n religious o b s e r v a n c e a n d t h e c h o i c e b e t w e e n Likud o r Labor. That o c c u r r e d b e c a u s e almost all religious p a r t y v o t e r s c h o s e N e t a n y a h u , w h i l e v o t e r s for o t h e r parties split t h e i r c h o i c e b e t w e e n N e t a n y a h u a n d Peres. Ethnic d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n S e p h a r d i a n d A s h k e n a z i J e w s r e m a i n i m p o r t a n t in t e r m s o f attitudes a n d t h e vote, as d o o t h e r social factors, such as living density, e d u c a t i o n , a n d i n c o m e level. Age is w e a k l y r e l a t e d to t h e vote, w i t h t h e y o u n g m o r e likely to s u p p o r t N e t a n y a h u a n d t h e Likud, t h e old Peres a n d Labor. T h e r e w e r e

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TABLE2. Correlations~ between Netanyahu, Peres, Likud, and Labor, by selected indicators h Netanyahu/Peres ( N = 1,113)

Likud/Labor (N= 798)

0.63 0.44 0.28 0.20 0.18 0.12 0.09 (0.08) (0.06)

0.65 0.36 0.30 0.18 0.21 0.12 0.13 (0.07) (0.04)

Territories for peace Religious observance Ethnicity Living density Years of education Income Age Capitalism/socialism Gender

apearson correlations, significant above the 0.05 level, except for those in parentheses. V'Fhe coding for these correlations was Netanyahu = 1, Peres = 2; Likud = 1, Labor = 2. Low scores for the other variables indicated unwillingness to concede territories for peace, high religiosity, Sephardi, high density, low education, low income, young age, male, and favoring capitalism over socialism.

m a n y w h o a n t i c i p a t e d t h e y o u t h v o t e to shift to Peres after t h e assassination, b u t that d i d n o t materialize. T w o factors w h i c h c a r r y little w e i g h t in t h e v o t e d e c i s i o n o f Israelis are m a t t e r s o f social a n d e c o n o m i c i d e o l o g y (capitalism vs socialism) and gender. N e t a n y a h u p r e s e n t e d his c a b i n e t to t h e K n e s s e t w e l l b e f o r e t h e 45-day d e a d l i n e r e q u i r e d b y law, b u t b e f o r e all t h e c o a l i t i o n b a r g a i n i n g w a s c o m p l e t e d . W h e n setting u p his c a b i n e t h e i g n o r e d m a n y o f his fellow-leaders o f t h e Likud, a n d settled quickly w i t h t h e religious parties, Israel b'Aliya, a n d t h e T h i r d Way, to w i n their s u p p o r t . Ariel Sharon, t h e Likud l e a d e r a n d a r c h i t e c t o f t h e Liud-Gesher-Tzomet a g r e e m e n t w h i c h p r e v e n t e d t h e r u n o f f a n d facilitated N e t a n y a h u ' s election, w a s s t y m i e d in his effort to join t h e g o v e r n m e n t , a l t h o u g h N e t a n y a h u w a s f o r c e d to m a k e efforts to solve t h e p r o b l e m b y c r e a t i n g a n e w m i n i s t r y o f national r e s o u r c e s for h i m a n d b y d i v e r t i n g f u n c t i o n s and b u d g e t s to h i m f r o m o t h e r ministries. T h e e x t e n t o f b a r g a i n i n g w i t h small- a n d m e d i u m - s i z e d sectarian parties to form t h e coalition w a s as g r e a t as it w a s in t h e past, if n o t greater. T h e p r i m e m i n i s t e r h a d to satisfy m a n y different d e m a n d s that inevitably p u t p r e s s u r e o n t h e p u b l i c treasury. D e s p i t e t h e e x p e c t a t i o n p r o p a g a t e d b y p r o p o n e n t s o f t h e d i r e c t e l e c t i o n o f t h e p r i m e m i n i s t e r that t h e n e w system w o u l d a l l o w t h e l e a d e r to rule u n e n c u m b e r e d b y u n r e a s o n a b l e d e m a n d s b y small parties in t h e cabinet, it is likely that t h e c o a l i t i o n a g r e e m e n t will d e m a n d r e n e g o t i a t i o n often d u r i n g t h e lifetime o f the g o v e r n m e n t as n e w issues p o s e threats to t h e stability o f t h e coalition. It is also likely that t h e p r i m e m i n i s t e r will have to p a y m o r e in t e r m s o f his o w n time to calm his coalition p a r t n e r s a n d m o r e in t e r m s o f t h e national b u d g e t in o r d e r to k e e p t h e coalition t o g e t h e r . Notes

1. The survey was supervised by Asher Arian and Michal Shamir, funded by the Israel Democracy Institute and the Pinhas Sapir Center for Development; the field work was conducted by Modi'in Ezrachi.

Notes on Recent Elections

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References Arian, Asher (1995) Security Threatened: Surveying Israeli Opinion on Peace and War. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Arian, Asher and Shamir, Michal (1993) Two reversals in Israeli politics: Why 1992 was not 1977. Electoral Studies 12, 315-341. Doron, Gideon and Kay, Barry (1995) Reforming Israel's voting schemes. In The Elections in Israel--1992, eds., Asher Arian and Michal Shamir, pp. 299-320. SUNY Press, Mbany. Hazan, Reuven Y. (1996) Presidential parliamentarism: direct popular election of the Prime Minister, Israel's new electoral and political system. Electoral Studies 15, 21-37. Hermann, Tamar (1995) The rise of instrumental voting: the campaign for political reform. In The Elections in Israel--1992, eds., Asher Arian and Michal Shamir, pp. 275-297. SUNY Press, Mbany. Susser, Bernard (1989) Parliadential politics: a proposed constitution for Israel. Parliamentary Affairs 42, 112-122.

The 1996 Czech Elections JOHN FITZMAUR1CE Free University o f Brussels, 1 0 5 0 Brussels, B e l g i u m

Most o b s e r v e r s e x p e c t e d little d r a m a f r o m t h e 1996 C z e c h e l e c t i o n s h e l d o n 31 May a n d 1 J u n e 1996, b u t t h e y w e r e to b e s u r p r i s e d b y t h e result, w h i c h saw t h e Social D e m o c r a t s (CSSD) i n c r e a s e its v o t e f r o m 6.53 p e r c e n t in 1992 to 26.4 p e r cent, r u n n i n g a close s e c o n d to t h e Civic D e m o c r a t i c Party (ODS) a n d d e n y i n g t h e o u t g o i n g c e n t r e - r i g h t coalition a majority. T h e election, h o w e v e r , illustrated t h e r e m a r k a b l e political stability o f t h e C z e c h R e p u b l i c a n d saw s o m e significant c o n c e n tration o f t h e p a r t y s p e c t r u m a n d t h e e m e r g e n c e o f an effective d e m o c r a t i c o p p o sition. T h e o u t c o m e b r o a d l y f o l l o w e d t h e long-term t r e n d s of t h e polls, t h o u g h n o n e h a d p r e d i c t e d s u c h a s t r o n g CSSD result. Until t h e last p h a s e of t h e c a m p a i g n , all t h e m a i n s t r e a m p a r t i e s h a d s o u g h t to k e e p t h e e m o t i v e conflict w i t h G e r m a n y o v e r t h e v e x e d issue o f t h e S u d e t e n expellees o u t o f t h e c a m p a i g n . This aim w a s b l o w n out o f t h e w a t e r d u r i n g t h e W h i t s u n w e e k e n d , less t h a n a w e e k b e f o r e e l e c t i o n day, w h e n G e r m a n F i n a n c e Minister, T h e o W a i g e l (CSU), m a d e s t a t e m e n t s at t h e traditional a s s e m b l y o f t h e S u d e t e n Landm a n n s c h a f t , calling for a C z e c h a d m i s s i o n that t h e e x p u l s i o n of t h e S u d e t e n Germans in 1945 h a d b e e n a c r i m e a n d t h e r e f o r e a n n u l m e n t o f t h e so-called Benes D e c r e e and p r i o r a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n t h e S u d e t e n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s and t h e C z e c h as a condition o f any i n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l a g r e e m e n t . He l i n k e d this w i t h an o v e r t t h r e a t to v e t o C z e c h EU m e m b e r s h i p . Of c o u r s e , m u c h o f this w a s political theatre, b u t n o C z e c h political p a r t y c o u l d a c c e p t this diktat at any time, let a l o n e just b e f o r e an election. In t h e event, t h e c o m b i n e d v o t e o f t h e e x t r e m i s t p a r t i e s (the C o m m u n i s t s (KSCM) a n d R e p u b l i c a n s (SPR-RSC)) that e x p l o i t e d this issue actually fell b y 2 p e r cent.

T h e Political Parties T h e m a i n political p a r t i e s taking p a r t in t h e e l e c t i o n can b e relatively easily and u n c o n t r o v e r s i a l l y classified a l o n g a classic left/right s p e c t r u m : far left, m o d e r a t e left, centre, centre-right, far right.