The Italian fight against world hunger. A critical analysis of Italian aid for development in the 1980s

Sm. Sci. Med.

Pergamon

0277-9536(93)EOO68-P

Vol. 39, No. 5, pp. 607-620, 1994 Copyright G 1994Elsevier Science Ltd

Printed in Great Britain. Allrights reserved

0277-9536/94 167.00 f0.00

THE

ITALIAN FIGHT AGAINST WORLD HUNGER. CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF ITALIAN AID FOR DEVELOPMENT IN THE 1980s PAOLABOLLINI

and MICHAEL

A

R.REICH*

Department of Population and International Health, Harvard School of Public Health. Boston, MA 02115, U.S.A. Abstract-During the 198Os, Italy expanded its development assistance, soon becoming the fifth largest donor. Italian development cooperation directed much effort to alleviate hunger, malnutrition and their health consequences. This paper provides an evaluation of Italy’s fight against world hunger considering the political environment in which the policy was conceived and implemented, the organizational structure behind the policy, and the available quantitative indicators of outcome. The analysis shows how powerful humanitarian drives, supported by inchoate thinking about development problems and priorities, and by institutional and technical confusion, gave rise to development programs below accepted standards. Poor financial planning and the absence of proper mechanisms for project appraisal facilitated the capture of some programs by domestic political and commercial interests. In 1992, Italian magistrates began investigations into the extent of corruption in development assistance; preliminary reports documented widespread waste and ineffectiveness in major aid projects. Substantial changes in organization and priorities are needed in order to control past practices of corruption, improve the effectiveness of projects, and redirect Italian aid towards development goals. Key words--development

aid, Italy, world

hunger,

aid policy evaluation,

politics

Italian aid for development in the 198Os, using the quantitative evidence available and comparing Italy’s performance to that of other donors. Special attention is paid to programs intended to alleviate hunger, malnutrition and their health consequences, as these issues were the main focus of Italian aid [14]. Many of the issues analyzed for Italy in this article reflect more general problems faced by other aid donors. Development aid has assumed a higher public profile in developed countries, due in part to increased awareness of the vast inequalities between North and South. Although aid constitutes only a small portion of the capital flow to developing countries, it carries a humanitarian objective to help relieve basic conditions of disadvantage, including hunger. Yet aid programs have repeatedly failed to live up to expectations. This article argues through its analysis of the Italian case that political, diplomatic and commercial interests influence aid policy in ways that undermine the achievement of humanitarian objectives.

INTRODUCTION

During the 198Os, donor countries, international agencies, and development scholars increasingly questioned the effectiveness of foreign aid, prompted by disappointing results over more than two decades [l-4, 1985 issue]. Various analyses challenged the ability of development aid to improve the living conditions of the poor in developing countries: some evaluations focused primarily on specific projects or programs, or on specific countries [3,5-81. Some reports have assessed the global aid policy of a donor country [9-111. These reports, however, do not usually take into account the political factors that shaped the aid policy, the policy making process, or the organizational structures behind the policy, even though these aspects directly affect the way policy is conceived and implemented [12, 131. In the 198Os, Italy rapidly expanded its development assistance, becoming the world’s fifth largest donor in 1986. Italy’s aid focused on the fight against world hunger and malnutrition, based on a new aid policy passed in 1979. Although the effectiveness of Italy’s new policy was repeatedly challenged, a full and systematic evaluation was not carried out. This article provides an initial and limited assessment of

EVALUATIONOFDEVELOPMENTAID

Development aid serves different purposes, including diplomatic, commercial, and humanitarian objectives. Since positive results are rarely obtained in all three areas simultaneously, a central problem in evaluating development aid is to identify the most relevant objective and assess effectiveness accord-

*Address correspondence to: Michael R. Reich, Takemi Program in International Health, Department of Population and International Health, 655 Huntington Avenue, Boston, MA 02115, U.S.A. 607

PAOLA BOLLINI and MICHAEL R. REICH

608

ingly. A related problem is whether to evaluate aid from the donor or the recipient perspective. Within a donor country, aid policy is shaped by political processes aimed at balancing diverging interests. Diplomatic and economic objectives are often considered most important, while humanitarian goals have been seen as negligible or rhetorical [ 15-171. But the conventional wisdom that aid is given to satisfy the self-interest of the donor country fails to explain donors’ recent behavior. Over the last 15 years, economic conditions in donor countries have progressively deteriorated, increasing the opportunity cost of aid. but development aid has consistently continued to flow [3. 1X]. One explanation for continued aid is that “. the sickness, ignorance and premature death, not to mention the violence, ugliness and despair of daily life, which accompany poverty and unemployment revolt most people” [ 191 in donor countries and create widespread public support for aid. Moral justifications for aid range from the goal of human solidarity. to the recognition of basic human rights, to the obligation towards the international community. Indeed, moral considerations about the injustice of living conditions in Third World countries have shaped both domestic political opinion and international debate. although the details of each country’s aid policy remain subject to political determination [3. 1922]. Public opinion polls in donor countries have consistently reported large public support for aid to the Third World, and criticism has mainly been directed against the failures of policies to reach those most in need [see 4: 1985 issue, 3,23,24]. If development aid is considered part of a moral obligation to end unacceptable levels of poverty in the Third World, then two considerations follow. First, the relief of poverty should be the main objective of aid. overriding diplomatic and commercial considerations. Second, policy evaluations should be performed to redirect aid toward poverty alleviation and to ensure the effective and equitable distribution of aid. The moral obligation to provide aid thus carries with it the additional obligation to ensure that aid is used for development objectives. These objectives. moreover. agree with the wishes of most people and most governments in developing countries.

METHODS I.

Qualitative

assessment

The article first undertakes a qualitative analysis to help place Italy’s aid policy in its political and institutional contexts. Information was collected from published sources and combined with direct interviews with government officials and national and international experts. This section analyzes the domestic politics behind the emergence of Italy’s first

comprehensive law on development aid in 1979, and then examines the rapid expansion and reorganization of Italian aid in the 1980s. Finally, the disclosures in 1992 of widespread corruption in the management of Italy’s public sector are discussed, and the effects on international cooperation are described. 2. Quantitative

assessnzent

Although evaluations of the impact of aid increased significantly in the 1980s it remains an elusive exercise [3]. The objects, methods, and timing of evaluation are difficult to define, and the aspects considered (economic, social, cultural, etc.) are often shaped by the professional background of the evaluator. In sum, the evaluation of development aid performance still lacks a summary measure or common set of indicators. In this article, we analyze selected indicators of development cooperation as proxies for some basic characteristics of aid policy [25]. This approach allows us to examine the extent to which Italian aid policy served the national interests of Italy (chiefly diplomatic and commercial) compared to the interests of the recipient countries. Four indicators were chosen using data published yearly by the OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development). While they arc not completely informative, these data have been consistently collected and published for three decades: (a) The zlolume of aid. both as a total and as a percentage of GNP, indicating the relative attention paid by the donor country to the problems of Third World development. (b) The _ proportion of official development assist_ ante (ODA) devoted to nzultilateral agencies (specialized agencies of the United Nations system, such as the World Health Organization and the United Nations Children’s Fund), compared to bilateral cooperation (direct cooperation between a government and other governments or institutions), indicating the degree of diplomatic or commercial interest in the allocation of ODA. The proportion of ODA provided as grants (c) rather than loans, reflecting the generosity of aid. (4 The tying status of ODA (tied to the procurement of goods and services from the donor country), reflecting the influence of commercial interests on aid policy. Since there are no agreed upon standard values for the above indicators, this analysis compares the performance of Italian aid policy for each indicator to that of other donor countries during the same period. Italian aid is compared to aid provided by two different categories of donors: (I) a group of ‘internationally minded’ Western donors, as defined by Stokke [25]-Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands,

Italian development aid Norway and Sweden-whose aid policies have been traditionally liberal and disinterested, although to different degrees; and (2) the United States, the ‘nationally minded’ donor par excellence, whose policy has been consistently guided largely by security concerns and national interest [26]. 3. Outcome assessment The effectiveness of the Italian aid program in the recipient countries is even more difficult to assess. First, the criteria for evaluation have evolved as the theories of development have changed over the years. For instance, a development project not targeted to the poorest could be judged as legitimate in the 1960s when ‘trickle-down’ development was accepted, while the same project could be criticized in the 1970s and the 1980s when basic needs and human capabilities development were in turn stressed [3, 27,281. Furthermore, in Italy the lack of formal evaluation procedures within the aid agency resulted mostly in output-oriented documents, which are of little use in the evaluation of impact. To provide an indication of outcome assessment, we have chosen two specific examples of Italian aid that received formal independent evaluations: a multilateral nutrition program funded entirely by Italy, and a bilateral program to reduce world hunger funded by Public Law No. 73. We believe that these two examples are representative of the efforts of Italian development cooperation during the 1980s to fight against hunger and malnutrition. RESULTS 1.

Politics of Italian aid to 1979

Italian development aid during the 1960s and 1970s was limited to mandatory contributions as a member state of international organizations, with additional limited aid to the ex-colonies of Somalia and Ethiopia [29]. Until the mid-1970s part of Italian aid was for war reparations [4: 1978 issue]. The Treasury administered funds for multilateral organizations and international financial institutions, while the limited amount allocated to technical cooperation was left to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs [30]. The average amount of official development assistance in

609

1970-1971 was $542 million per year (at 1986 prices and exchange rates), placing Italy in ninth place among OECD countries [4: 1988 issue, 311. Post-war reconstruction and internal development preoccupied the Italian government during the 1950s and the 1960s when most Western donors were allocating budgets and creating institutional capacity for development aid. The Italian government’s lack of commitment to development aid was also reflected in the lack of legislative instruments. A number of laws passed between 1962 and 1970 dealt with specific problems, particularly administrative arrangements for personnel sent to Third World countries. Although a law on technical cooperation passed in 1971 (Public Law No. 1222) its scope and instruments were limited. Another eight years of debate was necessary before Parliament would approve Italy’s first comprehensive law on development aid, Public Law No. 38 of 1979 (Table 1). This length of time can be explained by the administrative complexities of entering a new area of governmental activity, by disagreement among political parties over the organization of a new agency to implement the policy, and by the low priority of international aid on the government’s agenda [32]. The parliamentary commission in charge of drafting the aid legislation emphasized technical cooperation and the satisfaction of basic needs, rather than industrialization and the provision of infrastructure. The commission based its work on the critique that emerged in the 1970s of aid policies aimed at industrialization [33]. This orientation reflected a bias against industrialization shared by Italy’s leftist parties and by its grassroots Catholic organizations involved in voluntary work in Third World countries. During the 1970s Italy’s ODA contribution ranged from 0.08 to 0.15% of Gross National Product (GNP). Italy’s first comprehensive law on development aid, Public Law No. 38, was approved in early 1979. The law aimed to foster economic, technical, cultural and social development of developing countries, and offer humanitarian aid in specific emergency situations. Development aid policy would be administered by a newly created Comitato Interministeriale per la Politica Economica Estera (Interministry Committee for

Table I. Laws and aaencies of Italian

develooment

Legislation on development cooperation

Year

Agency in charge

Public Law No. 38

1979

Public Law No. 73

1985

Public Law No. 49

1987

DIPCO (Department for Development Coperation), within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs FAI (Italian Aid Fund), within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs DGCS (Head Office for Development Cooperation), within the Ministry of Foreian Affairs

coooeration

Comments First comprehensive development aid

legislation

Mandate limited to I9 months; on ‘endemic emergencies’

on

focus

Central and local units of experts mstituted

610

PAULA BOLLINI and MICHAEL R. REICH

Foreign Economic Policy, CIPES), including the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Treasury, Budget and Economic Planning, Agriculture, Industry and Foreign Trade. CIPES was responsible for defining the geographical areas of Italian aid concentration, the distribution of funds between bilateral and multilateral channels, the sectors of intervention, and the economic conditions of aid. CIPES would also approve all projects above 2 billion Italian lire. Finally, Parliament expected to retain political control over implementation of the new policy, through reporting and budgeting procedures. Bureaucratic control of development aid was assigned to a newly created department within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dipartimento per la allo Sviluppo (Department for Cooperazione Development Cooperation, DIPCO), in charge of the implementation, and monitoring of design, development projects. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs submitted an annual report on its activities and future planning to CIPES and, after CIPES approval, to Parliament. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs assumed the central role for design and implementation of the new policy and directly managed grants. The Treasury was in charge of most multilateral funds (mandatory contributions to United Nations agencies. and participation in international banks and monetary institutions), and also disbursed loans, which were assigned in agreement with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs [30, 341. The first set of policy guidelines that CIPES issued in 1979 [35] established that development aid would concentrate on those countries with which Italy had special relationships or economic interests (Mediterranean basin, Middle East, and Horn of Africa), and on other countries with special problems. Agriculture. energy and raw materials, services, and industry were the four sectors of Italian aid. Health and vocational training were included 3 years later, in 1982. Multilateral cooperation was seen as the major channel for implementing the new aid policy [36]. Finally, a rather modest 5-year budget of 300 billion lire was assigned by the law for development cooperation. In the late 1970s two major events had a crucial effect on re-shaping Italian aid policy. First, in 1979 the Radical Party, a small political party, historically involved in human rights and civil liberties campaigns, started a national and international campaign against world hunger [37]. The Radical Party highlighted the dramatic imbalance of resources between the world’s North and the South, and criticized the policies of modernization and industrialization implemented by many developed countries. Instead, the Party proposed to solve a ‘simpler’ problem, ‘extermination by hunger’, through an increase in government funds. The party called the fight against world hunger a preliminary and unavoidable step before any development policy could take place, subsequently and organized an international

campaign, including 53 Nobel Prize winners, to save 1‘ . hundred of millions, in each generation, from death by starvation”. The campaign was conducted through public marches and hunger strikes, and other forms of public non-violent action typical of the party ]371. The second major event was a concurrent shift in Italian foreign policy that created favourable political conditions for an increase of aid funds. During the late 1970s Italy was initiating intense diplomatic efforts aimed at securing an independent political role in the international arena. Bilateral agreements (for instance, on the control of terrorism) were negotiated with countries in the Mediterranean region. with the objective of reducing regional tensions and increasing Italy’s influence [38]. Both the government and the opposition shared the goal of finding an international role for Italy appropriate to the nation’s rising level of economic power [39,40]. Furthermore, the Italian Communist Party, the main opposition party, supported the new policy because of its autonomous stance from United States foreign policy [4l]. For these reasons, as well as the emotional appeal of saving human beings from starvation, the Radical Party’s pressure to increase government aid to developing countries found a large degree of agreement and support both in and out of the government coalition. Italian public opinion, on the other hand. was relatively unconcerned about aid at the end of the 1970s. Only a small group of people affiliated with Catholic voluntary organizations considered international aid an important part of government policy. The Catholic Church, through its support for missionary work, was probably the only major institution in Italy with working experience in Third World countries [42]. In the general public, Italy’s colonial past was perceived as ‘soft’ colonization that brought development, while the negative aspects of colonization were blamed on the Fascist government (although Italy’s colonial adventure actually started at the end of the nineteenth century). Most Italians therefore had little sense of responsibility for Third World development. In summary, Italy initiated a new policy of development aid at the end of the 1970s but without a clear policy design or objective, and with little support from public opinion [32]. Development aid was seen as an appendix to Italy’s diplomatic activities, with a small budget mainly assigned to multilateral institutions. Competition among political parties, originated by the campaign against world hunger led by the Radical Party. helped place development aid high on the political agenda. And concern about expanding Italy’s role in international affairs, both in government and opposition parties, provided support for the idea of increasing the size of development cooperation. However, no provisions were made to upgrade the institutional capacity of the agency in charge of implementing the aid policy,

Italian development aid leading to many of the problems that came to haunt Italian cooperation in the following decade. 2. Politics of Italian aid in the 1980s In January 198 1, the Radical Party’s campaign to fight world hunger obtained its first major success: the aid budget was linked to the general state budget (Public Law No. 7), starting a substantial increase in aid contributions [43]. Shortly thereafter, CIPES updated the guidelines of aid policy [44], stressing the priority of the bilateral (and multi-bilateral) channel over the multilateral one, in order to pursue Italy’s national interests. The new development policy had officially started. CIPES stated that Italy would increase the funds devoted to development assistance up to 0.7% of GNP within the 1980s. Geographical priorities were redefined into two groups of priority countries and one special program: 1. Somalia, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Egypt, Zimbabwe, Sudan, Angola, Tanzania, and Peru. 2. Tunisia, Colombia, Ecuador, Jordan, North Yemen, Zaire, Turkey, Uganda, Indonesia, India, Pakistan, China, and Bolivia. 3. Special program to fight hunger and malnutrition in the Sahel region: Senegal, Burkina Faso, Capo Verde, Chad, Gambia, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. Finally, specific mention was made of the Caribbean region [36]. The administrative and organizational capacity of DIPCO, however, was not increased to match the increase in spending. DIPCO personnel went from 167 full-time units in 1981 to 234 in 1984 [36], an increase of 40%, compared to a 400% increase in the net funds disbursed by the agency since its creation. The relative lack of expertise in development cooperation, as well as the rapid increase of funds, severely limited DIPCO’s ability to design and monitor development projects. Indeed, only the administrative appropriateness of new projects was assessed, allowing Italian firms to propose and implement projects of their choice [34,45]. Furthermore, DIPCO had substantial autonomy in the design and implementation of aid policy. DIPCO’s annual report submitted to CIPES and to Parliament included reports on projects and activities, but the accounting procedures and the manner in which data were aggregated changed yearly, making it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to monitor the agency’s performance externally [34]. In the early 1980s the Radical Party and members of the government coalition criticized implementation of the 1979 law. Two specific problems were long delays between the submission of project proposals and the disbursement of aid funds, and DIPCO’s inability to expend its entire budget on development projects. The Radical Party publicly denounced the failure of Italian development aid, claiming that 2700

611

billion lire (approx. $1.4 billion) were spent on useless projects in 77 countries, while 4500 billion lire (approx. $2.3 billion) had yet to be assigned [46]. The capacity to spend money suddenly became synonymous with effective aid, as has happened elsewhere [471. In 1984, the famine in the Sahel and Ethiopia documented by the mass media and the international press attracted and retained the world’s attention on famine in Africa [24]. The Radicals and their new allies, the Socialist Party and a group of Christian Democrats, once again proclaimed the need for quick and effective intervention. The political debate focused on DIPCO’s slow spending, with little attention or analysis paid to the effectiveness of projects implemented, except for a general acknowledgement that they were not satisfactory. Two alternative organizational solutions were proposed: the continuation of DIPCO, while a new comprehensive aid legislation was prepared (supported by the Communist Party, Independent Left, and part of the Christian Democrats, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), and the creation of a new agency to deal with Third World emergencies (supported by the Radicals, Socialists, Christian Democrats, and other minor parties). A political compromise was eventually reached: a temporary new agency was created next to DIPCO, while plans were designed for comprehensive a rearrangement of Italian cooperation that would take into account the problems and limitations that had surfaced in the previous 5 years. The new legislation was discussed and approved by Christmas 1984, against the background of an emotional campaign to fight world hunger. A new agency, Fondo Aiuti Italiani (Italian Aid Fund, FAI) was created by Public Law No. 73 to respond to acute emergencies and to intervene in situations of ‘endemic emergency’ (Table 1). As with DIPCO, FAI was located within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and headed by an under-secretary for Foreign Affairs. FAI was assigned a total budget of 1900 billion lire (approx. $1 billion) to be spent between March 1985 and February 1987, with simplified accounting procedures. All the money was spent or committed within the time assigned, but criticism arose about the efficiency and costs of many projects. In 1988, an official judicial inquiry was opened to ascertain possible fraud and mismanagement [48]. After FAI’s mandate expired in February 1987, no political party even suggested its renewal. A new comprehensive legislation, Public Law No. 49, was enacted in 1987. For the first time, this new Law explicitly acknowledged international cooperation as an instrument of Italian foreign policy, and indicated its main objectives as satisfaction of the recipients’ basic needs, protection of human life, food selfsufficiency, environmental protection, and selfsustained development. It rearranged the administrative structure of DIPCO, which became

612

PAULA BOLLINI and MICHAEL R. REICH

one of the Head Offices of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Direzione Generale per la Cooperazione allo Sviluppo (DGCS), with a special unit for emergency interventions. Within DGCS, a new Central Technical Unit staffed by specialists in development cooperation was established, to design, implement and monitor development programs. Local Technical Units were also planned in some Third World countries. The new law allowed the participation of other Italian institutions (National Research Council, universities, etc.) in policy formulation. Finally, the new law stressed the role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), which could now independently propose humanitarian interventions, and it allowed the government to provide partial funding of venture capital by Italian companies engaged in joint ventures in developing countries. Overall policy responsibility for Italian aid remained assigned to an interministerial committee, and responsibility for the disbursement of funds continued to be shared between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Treasury. Two years after the new law’s enactment, the Central and Local Technical Units were not yet functioning [49], possibly due to internal conflicts between diplomats and development experts as to the directions and priorities of Italian aid policy [50]. The administrative capacity of DGCS (as with DIPCO before) still proved to be inadequate. But instead of previous problems of underspending, the opposite occurred. The actual funds committed to bilateral projects greatly exceeded the allocated budget, and in July 1989 all development aid funds were frozen. Small projects conducted by NGOs were severely affected, and many NGOs which depended on government funds were forced to close [5l-531. At the same time, in 1989 and 1990, the dramatic transformations occurring in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union diverted donor attention away from Third World countries [54]. Italy was no exception [55]. The new directions in aid policy were accompanied by a flurry of criticism [56], and it remains unclear how much Italian aid previously assigned to multilateral agencies and developing countries will be redirected toward Eastern Europe. Yugoslavia. Poland and Hungary were temporarily included in 1990 among the countries of first priority for Italian cooperation, whose budget has been increased accordingly by 100 billion lire (approx. $80 million) ]571. During the 1980s the Italian public became more familiar with the problems faced by developing countries, probably due to the country’s involvement in development aid and the influx of immigrants from the Third World. The degree of involvement of public opinion was not as profound as that in Scandinavian countries, where development projects have been familiar to the general public since the early 1960s [58]. Nonetheless, polls in the late 1980s showed that

more than 80% of Italy’s general public was favourable to helping the Third World [34]. In summary, during the first 8 years of the new Italian aid policy (197991987) three laws were passed resulting in three different institutional arrangements to implement development aid programs. These unusually rapid changes were supported by political pressure, chiefly from the Radical Party, to achieve a more effective implementation of the policy. However, the political debate often focused on unrealistic goals, while the implementing structures remained inadequate. At the same time, the connection between development aid and foreign policy was strengthened over the years. Undoubtedly, all the above legislative and bureaucratic changes had an impact on the implementation of the policy and, ultimately, on its effectiveness. In 1992. a widespread political scandal brought new insights into the implementation of Italian development aid. During 1992 and 1993, Italian magistrates disclosed corruption and bribery throughout all sectors of public management, which involved most political parties, especially Christian Democrats and Socialists, public managers, and the private sector. Many politicians and businessmen were arrested, and many more had to resign from public positions [59]. Development cooperation was one area of inquiry. Rome’s magistrates opened an investigation into the way funds were assigned and spent by FAI and the DGCS, and documented cases of bribery, projects meeting the needs of private firms as opposed to those of recipient countries, and a tremendous waste of resources. A number of former government officials responsible for development policy were arrested [60]. Investigations continued in 1993, and are expected to disclose the extent of corruption in the management of Italy’s development aid. In the meantime, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, appointed in 1993 under a new coalition government (Christian Democrats, Socialists, Republicans, and Liberals) which will run the country until general elections scheduled in 1994, commissioned an independent firm to conduct an administrative evaluation of development cooperation. The report found that out of 119 major projects in eight countries, for a total cost of approx. 3 billion dollars, more than two thirds were assigned without any prior feasibility study, and 85% without public competitive bidding. Of the I I9 projects only 37 could be considered successfully completed and functioning [6l]. 3. Trends in Italian ODA Four indicators are used to provide a quantitative assessment of Italian ODA, with chronological and cross-national comparisons: Volume. The evolution of the Italian ODA (net disbursement) to developing countries is presented in Fig. I. From $147 million at the beginning of the 1970s the volume rose to $672 million in 1980. following Public Law No. 38, and doubled from

Italian

development

aid

613

average: 0.9%

0.8

8 %

0.6

# 0.4

0.2

0.0 Year Fig. 1. Italian official development assistance: total volume and percentage of GNP (1968-1988). Source: OECD, issues 1969-1989.

$1098 million in 1985 to $2403 million in 1986, due to additional contributions provided by Public Law No. 73. The percentage of GNP devoted to ODA, which represents a more direct indicator of the share of national wealth devoted to developing countries, had a decreasing tendency during the 1970s. Thereafter, it increased steadily, from 0.08% in 1980 to 0.4% in 1988, representing a 5-fold increase in 8 years. A cross-sectional comparison of the percentage of GNP devoted to ODA by a group of selected donors defined earlier is shown in Fig. 2. Although Italy was the fifth largest donor among OECD countries in 1986 (following the United States, Japan, France, and Germany), only 0.4% of its GNP was devoted to ODA, as compared to an average of 0.9% of the 5 most liberal donors, and to 0.2% of the United States. Multilateral aid. The proportion of ODA given to multilateral institutions increased up to 1979, and then proceeded to decline (Fig. 3) reflecting the diminished emphasis on multilateral cooperation. The multilateral share of ODA in 1986 was 38% for Italy, as compared to an average 37% of the 5 ‘internationally minded’ donors, and to 21% of the U.S. (Fig. 4). This figure confirms the attitude of the U.S., the largest world donor, to rely preferably on aid programs tailored to its own priorities, rather than letting multilateral institutions decide on the allocations. However, due to the absolute size of its development aid budget, the U.S. remains a major donor for many multilateral agencies. The percentage of multilateral ODA given to UN agencies in 1986 ranged from 33 to 58% for the 5 liberal donors, and was 32% for the U.S., well above the 14% given by Italy. In 1987, multilateral aid represented 28% of Italian total ODA, as compared to 92% in 1979. In

Fig. 2. Net ODA disbursement as percentage of GNP for selected countries, 1986. I.M.D. = internationally minded donors. Source: OECD, 1987 issue.

1987, aid to EEC represented 33% of multilateral aid, followed by aid to the International Bank for Reconstruction Development and and the International Development Association (IBRD/IDA) (33%), to United Nations agencies (21%), and to Regional Development Banks (7%). Grant aid. The percentage (based on commitments) of aid given as grants was on average close to 99% for Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and

100 -

20 -

04 1965

1965

1975

Y&U Fig. 3. Italian official development assistance: percentage of multilateral contributions (1968-1988). Source: OECD, issues 1969-1989.

PAULA BOLLINI and MICHAEL R. REICH

614

50

1

I.M.D. average: 37%

was the highest of DAC countries in 1987, indicating a heavy influence of commercial interests on aid policy. It has to be noted that at the end of the 1980s Italy started to align its development efforts with those of the European Community, in the light of increasing political integration within EC. Finally, Italy consistently supported the governments of Somalia and Ethiopia for foreign policy reasons, but spread aid over 77 countries, again for diplomatic reasons rather than for development concerns. 4. Outcome assessment hunger

Fig. 4. ODA to multilateral institutions as percentage of total ODA for selected countries, 1986. I.M.D. = internationally minded donors. Source: OECD. 1987 issue.

Sweden in 1986, while it was 97% for the United States and 93% for Italy. Tied aid. Tying status is considered the main indicator of the commercial interests linked to aid, and the principal cause of increased costs and decreased efficiency and sustainability of aid [ 19,62,63]. The five ‘internationally minded’ donors tied 25% of their aid to procurement in their countries (again, the percentage is based on commitments), while the United States tied 38% and Italy 59%, the highest figure among DAC* countries (Fig. 5). In summary, these five indicators show the considerable increase in Italian aid to developing countries in the 1980s although the percentage of GNP devoted to development aid remained modest. In the process, Italian aid lost a substantial degree of its multilateral thrust, as the proportion devoted to multilateral aid was reduced by two thirds in 5 years (and was expected to diminish further). Although the financial terms of ODA tended to improve, the percentage of aid tied to procurement within Italy

*The members of the Development Assistance Committee, one of the specialized committees of the OECD, are the following: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Commission of the European Community.

of the jght

against

nw-ld

The Italian fight against world hunger was founded on the belief that insufficient production of food, and its acute shortage in emergency situations, were the main causes of world hunger [64]. The problems of food distribution within communities was largely ignored. Accordingly, it was thought that hunger would be reduced by accelerating agricultural production in developing countries. Emergency situations, mainly caused by adverse weather conditions or by massive migration (due to famine, natural disasters or wars), would require the shipment of food aid, although it was recognized that such aid could produce many negative effects (dependency on external aid, decrease of local food production, etc.). The link between undernourishment, poor health and death, overlooked in the initial food-oriented analysis of world hunger, became acknowledged in 1982, prompting the inclusion of health among the priority sectors of Italian cooperation [65]. Below we report on two specific examples of Italian aid in the fight against world

60 -

50 -

LM.D. a 40‘;;, a .$ 30-

average: 25%

% *

20-

10 -

Fig. 5. Tying status of ODA for selected countries, 1987. I.M.D. = internationally minded donors. Source: OECD. 1988 issue.

Italian development aid Table 2. Distribution

of FAI bilateral

aid by sector of intervention Amount (million Lit.)

Planning and building management Economic and social infrastructure Transportation storage water Health Miscellanea Agriculture Intensive Extensive Fishery Land conservation Other Miscellanea Adapted

from Fanciullacci,

42.409 295.620 59,628 123,653 36, I35 33,562

116,700 50,375 60,825 16,790 35,861 65.261

% 4.4 56.8 30.6 6.2 12.8 3.7 3.5 29.0 12.1 5.2 63 1.7 3.7 6.7

1988 [48].

hunger, one bilateral and one multilateral, both of which were the object of formal evaluations. 4.1. Bilateral projects: the FAI experience. Public Law No. 73 of 1985 allocated a substantial part of funds to the fight against world hunger, to be spent in countries characterized by ‘endemic emergency’. The chief objective was to save people living in the poorest regions of the world from starvation and malnutrition, through an integrated approach to assure food and health services [34]. Funds were to be committed and largely spent within 19 months, the tine-frame assigned by Law 73 to FAI. In order to respect the deadline, FAI identified projects and allocated funds on the basis of simplified procedures, often without adequate feasibility studies. Participation of the local communities. which would have required lengthy negotiations, was bypassed. By November 1986, a total of 977 billion lire (approx. $490 million at 1985 exchange rate) had been committed to bilateral programs, with about half for large-scale infrastructural projects (imTable 3. Qualitative

Country Burkina Faze Ethiopia Gambia Djibouti Kenya Mali Mozambique Niger Rwanda Senegal Sierra Leone Somalia Sudan

Number of projects 2 3 2 4 3 2 4 2

I I I 5 3

Provision of structures/ commodities +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++

+++ +++ +++ +++* +++

615

plemented almost entirely by four large Italian construction firms), and another one third for engineering projects. No official evaluation of the FAI bilateral projects has been made public. However, an evaluation of the adherence of the projects to common principles of good aid practice, of the appropriateness of the technology employed, and of the costs, was performed by a group of experts on the basis of FAI reports submitted to Parliament [48]. This evaluation, commissioned by the Independent Left group of the Chamber of Deputies, is to our knowledge the only technical evaluation of Italian aid published to date, together with the administrative evaluation of 119 projects commissioned by the new Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1993 [61]. Data from this report are used in the analysis that follows. The distribution of FAI bilateral aid by sector is shown in Table 2. Provision of economic and social infrastructure, especially in the area of transportation, represented more than half of the commitments, while 29% was devoted to agriculture. The report carried out a more qualitative appraisal of individual projects by rating each project according to immediate satisfaction of basic needs of the poorest strata of the population, sustainability, participation/training of local communities, attention to South-South cooperation, provision of structures or commodities, improvement of local organizational/management capabilities, and finally transfer of appropriate technologies or use of local knowledge (Table 3). All 33 projects but one consisted of capital intensive infrastructural projects, the construction of roads being the main single component. Six projects also aimed at improving local managerial capability and organization, 3 took into account the problems

appraisal

of FAI bilateral

Improvment of local management

Appropriate technology

Immediate satisfaction basic needs

++(I) +(I)

+(I)

++(I) + + +(2)****

aid

Self-sufficiency

Training/ participation

++(I)

South-South cooperation

+(I) +(I)

+(I) +(I) +(I) +(I) ++ +(I)

++(I) f(l) + ++(I)

+++

+(I) ++(I)** +(I) +

+++

+ ++(I)

++(I) +(I)

+(I) ++(I) +

+ + +++(I) +++(I)

++(I) ++(I)***

Adapted from Fanciullacci, 1988 [48]. -Lack of the specific aspect considered. + The aspect is marginally considered. + + The aspect is a relevant part of the project. + + + The aspect is a fundamental characteristic of the project Numbers in parentheses indicate the number of projects with the given degree of the characteristic within the country, the characteristic is absent, unless otherwise specified. ‘In one of the 5 projects, the provision of structures/commodities is marginal. **Self-sufficiency is marginally considered in the remaining two projects. ***Self-sufficiency is marginally considered in the remaining two projects. ****Satisfaction of basic needs is a relevant part of the third program.

considered;

+(I)

for the remaining

projects

616

PAULAB~LLINIand MICHAELR. REICH

of appropriate technology, 4 the development of self-sufficiency, and the involvement of local communities or training of local counterparts. South-South cooperation was marginally considered in 2 projects. Short-term satisfaction of basic needs, the main focus of the law, was a relevant or fundamental characteristic of 9 out of 33 projects. NGOs received about 9% of the funds. Food aid provided by FAI consisted almost exclusively of rice, which Italy produced in surplus, but which is not part of the regular diet of the poorest people in Africa. Moreover, according to the World Food Programme (WFP), food aid was sent when it was no longer necessary. Coordination with WFP and FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization) was not pursued, even though these organizations are based in Rome. Finally, many of the projects had costs substantially higher than usual, due to poor technical choices, avoidance of manpower intensive solutions. and lack of administrative control on the real costs sustained by the implementing firms [48]. A few projects, for example in Mozambique and Mali. were considered truly innovative and potentially successful. A positive evaluation was also given to projects implemented by NGOs (concentrated in health, social development and agriculture), and to multilateral programs. In summary, Public Law 73 (which created FAI) was passed in 1984 as a political response to the famine in Africa and to the inefficient allocation of funds by DIPCO, the agency then in charge of foreign aid. But the solution created more problems. The simplified administrative procedures for FAI failed to produce increased effectiveness, and instead loosened the planning and monitoring mechanisms, thus creating a favorable environment for fraud and corruption. The short time constraint for FAl biased its interventions towards capital-intensive, infrastructural projects, with modest attention to the shortterm satisfaction of basic human needs (chiefly health and nutritional security), and created disincentives for the participation of local communities. At the same time. Italian commercial and diplomatic interests greatly influenced the nature of the projects and their implementation. 4.1 Multilateral projects: the Joint Nutrition Support Programme. The most important initiative in the field of nutrition in the 1980s and probably the largest ever performed, was the Joint Nutrition Support Programme, which was started in 1984 by WHO (World Health Organization) and UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Fund), and was funded entirely by the Italian Government. The two multilateral agencies organized JNSP to: (a) improve the nutritional well being of women and children; (b) show operational models of nutrition in primary health care at the district level; (c) provide new insights into effective multisectoral approaches to food and nutrition; and (d) help WHO expand its capacity in nutrition through country programs.

JNSP also suited the evolving interests of the Italian government. First. it dealt with hunger and malnutrition, the leading theme of Italian development cooperation. Second, it was completely run by international agencies, at a time when limited technical expertise was available in Italy. And third, the program’s outline was ready when Italy had funds available for multilateral cooperation. Therefore, in 1982 Italy agreed to fund the entire program with $85 million over 5 years [66]. JNSP was implemented in 15 developing countries (2 in Asia, 8 in Africa and 5 in Latin America). Italy agreed to expand the program to Asia and Latin America, not priority countries for Italian cooperation at that time, to allow the participation of different types of countries (in terms of GNP per capita, infant mortality, availability of health services, etc.), in order to increase the potential for learning. JNSP also allowed for diverse patterns of implementation. Each country proposed its own program, and assumed responsibility for management of the program, helped by UNICEF and WHO local staff (see Table 4). Despite the potential for diversity, many country programs emphasized primary health care, with nutrition as a component. and few countries adopted a multisectoral approach to nutrition (rural credit schemes, improvement of household food security, etc.). In general. health sector activities included similar approaches of growth monitoring, immunization, oral rehydration therapy, promotion of satisfactory weaning practices, vitamin supplements. essential drugs, and in some cases deworming and control of malaria. JNSP concluded its activities in 1988, and a final evaluation was published the same year [67]. The program was considered successful in focusing the attention of national governments on nutritional issues and in strengthening the organizational capabilities of recipient countries to deal with problems of malnutrition. The program did not expect to have an immediate impact on malnutrition. However, a short-term impact on child health was reported in Tanzania, where an evaluation documented a reduction in severe malnutrition, mortality and morbidity (severe malnutrition reduced by 60%. young child deaths brought down by 30%) and an improved weight at birth--for populations involved in the program [68]. Similarly, the Bolivian program, which focused on problems of iodine deficiency, showed a 25% reduction of visible enlargement of the thyroid in three communities where epidemiological surveillance was organized [66]. JNSP was considered an innovative nutrition program, because it focused on the creation of national capability to deal with malnutrition, instead of providing short-term interventions, such as fcJd aid or medical care for severely malnourished cases. Unfortunately, no evaluation system was built into the program (timely provision of baseline data, control groups, etc.), making it difficult to determine

Italian development aid Table 4. Money allocation

and project activities

of the WHO/UNICEF

Countrv

Money allocated (thousand $1

Population directly suooorted

Burma

5630

38,000,000

Nepal

5730

I ,387,OOO

Angola

5090

497,000

Ethiopia

6892

I ,535,ooo

Mali

4750

95,000

Mozambique

4500

200,000

Ministries of Health and Agriculture

Niger

4000

466,000

Ministry

of Health

Somalia

5448

952,000

Ministry

of Health

Sudan

7950

864,000

National

Committee

Tanzania Caribbean

5660 800

250,000 -

National Ministry

Committee of Health

Haiti Nicaragua

1150 4600

5,629,OOO 172,000

Peru

4970

538,000

IDD” control (Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador)

1270

“IDD: Iodine Deficiency Disorders. Adapted from WHO and UNICEF,

National institutions involved Ministry

of Health

National

Nutrition

Committee

Ministry of Provincial Coordination Ethiopian Nutrition Institute; Technical Multisectoral Committee National Director and Technical Support Unit

Ministry of Health Nicaragua Nutritional Ministry

of Health

Ministry

of Health

1988 [67], and Paganini

and Riva,

which objectives were achieved, and to what extent. As a result, little was learned about the most effective strategies to reduce malnutrition, or about the reasons for the partial success or failures of some country programs [67]. A desk review of JNSP did not help to clarify these issues [69]. These problems in evaluation resulted in part from persistent tensions in the joint management of the program by WHO and UNICEF. JNSP, although entirely funded by the Italian government, remained separate from Italian bilateral programs in the field of nutrition, probably because its design and management were controlled largely by the two multilateral organizations. While JNSP was not intended to deal with emergencies [70], Italian cooperation for health specialized in interventions for the acute effects of famine [see 71-731. Moreover, the Italian research agency dealing with nutrition, Istituto Nazionale per la Nutrizione (National Nutrition Institute), one of the very few Italian research agencies with considerable experience in developing countries, was only marginally involved in programs funded by Italian bilateral cooperation [74]. Italy thus became the sole and generous donor for the largest nutrition program implemented in the 1980s by WHO and UNICEF. The timing of JNSP and its objectives suited Italy’s emergence as a major

Project

617 Joint Nutrition

Support

Programme

Proiect activities Creation of I5 nutrition units; training; primary health care Primary health care; child care centers; literacy campaign; basic food production; women occupation Immunization; infant feeding; water and sanitation; home gardens; grain storage Training; home gardens; agricultural extension; credit for women; primary health care Wells; small animals husbandry; home gardens; grain storage; market/family food production Credit for women; home and gardens; grain storage, agricultural extension; reforestation Immunization; home food production; small animal husbandry; water/reforestation Oral rehydration; primary health care; nutritional education; water Primary health care; training reforestation; agricultural extension Primary health care Training of health workers; primary health care Oral rehydration therapy Nutritional surveillance; health education; agriculture and small animal husbandry Credit for fishermen; agriculture and animal husbandry; maternal and child health; essential drugs lodation of salt; quality control; training support of small producer cooperation; public education

1988 [66]

multilateral donor. Italy’s willingness to provide $85 million of funding over 5 years created the JNSP. However, the impact of JNSP on the prevention of malnutrition in the selected countries, as well as on WHO’s and UNICEF’s ability to deal with malnutrition with a more comprehensive approach, were not formally evaluated. As a consequence, the lessons learned and the potential lessons of this major program remain largely undocumented. DISCUSSION

This analysis of Italian aid in the 1980s shows how the political and bureaucratic context in Italy transformed the fight against world hunger into programs that served political, commercial, and diplomatic interests more than development goals. Several broad patterns are evident. First, the formulation of Italian aid policy in the 1980s was shaped by political competition among parties. The problem of world hunger was introduced into political debate and championed by the Radical Party. While the Radical Party can claim credit for placing the Third World on the political agenda of the country and Parliament, the party did not provide a thoughtful or effective assessment of the basic problems to be solved. Italian politicians quickly

618

PAOLA

BOLLINI and MICHAEL R. REICH

learned the development vocabulary (basic needs, self-sustained development, appropriate technology, etc.), but their political discourse remained superficial, confused, and charged with emotional overtones [34]. As a consequence, aid policy became focused on unrealistic goals, and little attention was paid to effective implementation or monitoring. The main opposition party, the Italian Communist Party, proved relatively ineffective in redirecting the goals of aid policy or assuring public accountability for aid projects, as illustrated by events around the creation and implementation of FAI. The Radical Party’s political definition of the fight against world hunger and malnutrition. although based on questionable assumptions, became officially adopted in government documents and policy. Insufficient production of food was identified as the main cause of world hunger, and an increase in production became the main solution. Aid policy tended to ignore problems in the distribution of resources in the recipient countries, and the vulnerability of the poorest groups in the community (with the exception of generic mention of women and children). Similarly, the involvement of the local communities in agricultural development projects was not considered a priority. The Italian approach to world hunger contrasts sharply with the view that starvation and famine are caused by the lack of entitlement of the poorest members of a community, in the prevailing legal system of institutional rights, to adequate means of survival. Generation of public employment, delivery of health care, stabilization of food prices, provision of drinking water, rehabilitation of the rural economy, and target support to vulnerable groups are currently considered of paramount importance in implementing successful countermeasures [20, 75,761. The commodity-oriented analysis of the causes of world hunger decreased the effectiveness of the Italian aid program. The intimate association of Italian bilateral aid with foreign policy heavily conditioned Italian cooperation. All Italian aid agencies (DIPCO. FAI and DGCS) were located within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and senior diplomats occupied the key positions in the agencies. Tension between foreign policy and aid policy exists in all donor countries, with each donor trying to further its political interests and vision through aid. When aid is closely associated with foreign policy. two common problems arise: diplomatic objectives can take priority over developmental ones, and interventions can be spread to an unmanageable number of countries. These problems occurred in Italian aid, at least to some extent [34,44.47. 771. But the most important reason behind the large failure of Italian development aid is to be found within the Italian agency in charge of aid policy, which suffered from a lack of both technical expertise and managerial skills. For example, the agency did

not have the capacity to carry out adequate analyses on the causes of underdevelopment, on appropriate strategies to address solvable problems, or on the implementation capabilities of Italian cooperation. FAI agricultural projects exemplified these problems. Until recently, the ultimate (and only) control over policy design and implementation was assigned to Parliament, which also lacked adequate technical expertise on evaluating aid projects [34]. The rapid increase in resources of the 1980s affected not only the quality of Italian cooperation but also management capabilities. DIPCO’s structure was not expanded to keep up with the increased amount of resources, and the management of funds remained a problematic issue for over 10 years. First. funds were spent too slowly. leading to the extremely simplified procedures by FAI; then the new procedures resulted in ovcrcommitment, leading to a freeze of all expenditures in 1989. The relative lack of expertise in development issues, the need to spend money quickly, and the inadequate technical and administrative control over the expenses favoured the allocation of money to large infrastructural projects, much to the advantage of Italian industry. The widespread practice of tied aid contributed to the inflation of expenses and to the decrease of cffectiveness, although it is difhcult to determine to what extent. It is within this context of limited technical expertise and lack of administrative control that corruption could originate and thrive. In summary, our analysis of Italian aid showed that the political and bureaucratic environments in which aid policy was conceived and implemented were not conducive to the achievement of developmental goals. The effectiveness of the programs to fight hunger and malnutrition was hampered by inappropriate bureaucratic incentives, as in the FAI case, and by the lack of technical expertise in planning and evaluating development projects (seen to a different extent in both FAI and INSP). Repeated institutional changes. prompted by poor developmental effectiveness of previous policies, ironically resulted in strengthening the same mechanisms that made the policies ineffective. Corruption and bribery contributed to the waste of resources. The political parties that denounced the inadequacies of development cooperation were unable to propose an effective reform, and never introduced institutional mechanisms to assure continuous evaluation and accountability. As a result, the Italian tight against world hunger finished far below accepted standards of good aid practice. On the basis of the present analysis, three changes could be implemented to improve the current performance of Italian cooperation. First, aid should be untied from the procurement of goods and services in Italy, to reach the standard of internationally minded donor countries. This does not mean that Italy’s domestic industry would not participate in aid projects, but rather that such participation would be

Italian development aid subordinated to development objectives. Second, we believe that the Italian agency in charge of development cooperation should be headed and staffed by specialists in development cooperation, in order to design, implement, and monitor development programs according to sound principles, and to allow for independent accounting that can reduce the opportunities and probability of corruption. Third, the agency should preferably become independent from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in order to reduce the influence of foreign policy objectives over developmental goals. This does not mean that foreign policy should be divorced from aid policy, but that an aid policy primarily concerned with humanitarian objectives should be conducted in the framework of the foreign policy pursued by the country. The paper’s analysis of the bureaucratic and political context of Italy’s aid policy suggests that the proposed changes will not be easy to achieve. The many political and commercial interests vested in Italian cooperation represent a major obstacle to positive change in the aid system. However, there are two conditions which hold the potential for substantial change. First, the ongoing political scandals have produced a great reaction in Italy’s public opinion, and major political reform is foreseen. The ‘clean sweep’ could bring an end to the corruption and undue influence of political parties in development aid, and could allow the construction of an effective anti-corruption monitoring system. Second, over the last ten years, Italy has accumulated much experience and expertise in development issues. Within NGOs, trade unions and also opposition parties there is growing awareness of current problems and possible solutions. These forces may be able to generate sufficient political pressure to redirect Italian aid policy toward the accomplishment of humanitarian and developmental goals. Acknowledgements-The authors wish to acknowledge Professor Leon Eisenbertz. Dr Thomas Chalmers, Dr Francesco Branca, and two anonymous reviewers for their useful comments on the manuscript.

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