The Japanese double election of 6 July 1986

63

The Japanese Double Election of 6 July 1986 TAKASHI LWGLICHI l

Institute of Oriental Culture, University of Tokyo, 7-3-l Hongo, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113, Japan

Japan’s double election to the House of Represeniatives and the House of Councillors held on 6 July 1986 was a landslide victory for the governing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). As Table 1 shows, the party won an overwhelming majority of seats in both houses. Its majority was especially strong in the House of Representatives (which is constitutionally and politically stronger than the House of Councillors); the number of LDP seats in the House of Representatives rose from 250 to 304. And the dissolution of the New Liberal Club and its return to the LDP fold in August 1986 pushed the number of LDP seats up further, to 309. All seats in the House of Representatives (5 12) and half (126) of the House of Councillors were up for election. There were plenty of signs before the elections that the LDP would make a strong showing, including the findings of nationwide opinion polls. But virtually no one expected the LDP to notch up such an outstanding victory. The Lead-up

to the Election

Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone was the instigator of the double election. The statutory term for members of the House of Representatives is four years, but the Prime Minister has power to call an election if the conduct of his government seems to need the endorsement of the entire electorate. In this case the Prime Minister called an election because the Supreme Court had ruled in the earlv spring of 1986 that the Election to Public Offices Law was unccnstitutional; the reason for this ruling was that there was a serious imbalance in electoral representation in the House of Representatives between the densely populated urban districts and the sparsely populated rural areas. This

* The paper was completed when I was a senior research fellow at the Australia- Japan Research Centre, Australian National University, JulySeptember 1986. I am grateful for comments on earlier drafts made by David Butler, Ikuo Kabashima, S. Hayden Lesbirel and Joji Watanuki. Janet Healey helped me to refine the manuscript.

disparity, which favoured rural representation, was subsequently modified in the National Diet, and the electoral representation from 15 districts where the imbalance was extreme was made more equitable. But on the whole the revision of the law was kept to a minimum, and most of the imbalances remained uncorrected. The Prime IMinister then called an election for the House of Representatives, declaring that it would be unconstitutional not to put all the seats in the House of Representatives to the vote under the revised law instead of allowing members to keep their seats until their four-year term expired at the end of 1987. Election to half the seats in the House of Councillors comes around every three years in early summer. Since 1986 was such a year, Nakasone decided to call an election for the House of Representatives on the same day as that for the House of Councillors: 6 July 1986. He was apparently encouraged by the single precedent: the double election held on 22 July 1980, which had also produced a landslide for the LDP. The marked Liberal rise on that occasion in the mobilization of voting strength in electorates that were conservatively inclined but normally politically apathetic was widely thought to be the result of holding the two elections on the same day; though another influential factor was the sudden dramatic death of Prime Alinister Masayoshi Ohira at the height of the electoral campaign. IMore fundamentally, the various opinion polls had consistently shown very strong support for the LDP during the 1980s especially since Nakasone became Prime Minister in 1982. Thus it was no wonder that Nakasone took advantage of this situation to reinforce his position of power, especially since pressure was slowly mounting within the LDP to elevate him further-namely, to persuade him to retire after two terms as President of the Party. This was probably Nakasone’s key motivation for calling an election. There are three so-called ‘new leaders’: Kiichi Miyazawa, representing his own faction, Shintaro Abe, representing his own faction, and Noboru Takeshita, representing the Tanaka faction: and they have been ready for some time to succeed Nakasone. Party rule prescribed at most two consecutive years of

Ti,e Japanese Double Election

64 TABLE

1. Japan: distribution of seats in the Diet at 21 July 1986 (figures in parentheses are those before the election). House of Councillors (total 252 seats, of which 126 were up for election)

House of Representatives (total 5 12 seats) LDP Tanaka Miyazawa Abe Nakasone Komoto Independent LDP Total

86 60 56 61 28 13

(65) (51) (46) (47) (27) (14)

304 (250)

JQ’

86 57 27 26 6 4 2

CGP

JCP DSP NLC UDSP Independent New Politics Club (HC)

(111) (59) (27) (37) (8) (3) (5)

New Wage Earners’ Party (HC) Niin Club (HC)

54 30 26 17 6 10

(55) (29) (25) (10) (7) (12)

143 (138)

Total I40 (120) 90 (80) 82 (71) 78 (57) 34 (31) 23 (26) 447 (3%)

41 (42) 127 82 25 (27) 16 (14) 43 12 (14) 38 7 1 (1) 1 5 (1) 5 3 (6) 4 (plus 1 UDSL seat and 1 NLC seat) 3 (2) 3 (3)

(153) (86) (-II) (51) (9) (‘1) ~11)

Notes: Total electorate 86.43 million (84.25 million). Valid votes (HR) 60.45 million (56.78 million). Valid votes (HC) 57.94 million (46.20 million). (Figures in parentheses are those of the 1983 elections.) The dissolution of the NLC and its return to the LDP fold in August 1986 pushed the number of LDP seats above the total shown here; in the House of Representatives there are now 309 LDP seats, and in the House of Councillors there are Ii?. Sources: Yomiuri shimbun. 22 July 1986; Asalli shimbun, 8 July 1986.

leadership with the length of one term being two years. To thwart this internal pressure Nakasone gambled on a double election and won. Length

of Election

and Campaign

Style

The Election to Public Offices Law prescribes that the campaign period should be 15 days and that the ballot day must be a Sunday. During this period electoral campaigning is intensive. In the interests of equity the law places a number of constraints on candidates. the chief of which are: that there must be equal exposure for all candidates through publicly financed television advertisements, newspaper appearances, campaign postcards, street posters, pamphlets, and publicly organized joint campaign speeches; that candidates are prohibited from visiting electors’ homes so that there should be no possibility of buying votes or blackmailing voters; and

that there are restrictions on political donations and expenditure in campaign funds.* With these regulations in force during the election period, campaigning consists largely of giving brief speeches from a campaign caravan. in which candidates implore the electors to vote for them and promise to serve the constituency well in return. Also important are small gatherings. organized by grass-roots local support groups. where candidates meet people face to face and chat or shake hands with them. and campaign postcards and telephone calls soliciting votes from acquaintances of supporters. Candidates try to ensure that voters can write their names correctly on the ballot paper by calling out their names repeatedly through microphones: it has to be assumed that constituency work and other necessary mobilization of support has been done before the election period.’ The Japanese electoral process is characterized

TAKASHI LWGUCHI

by a multi-member non-transferable one-man one-vote system for the House of Representatives and half the seats in the House of Councillors, and proportional representation for the other half of the House of Councillors. Proportional repre sentation was first introduced in 1983 to replace the 126-member nationwide district system because campaign costs were high and campaigning tended to be shallow and ineffective. The entire electorate numbers 86.43 million, and the size of district electorates for the House of Representatives range roughly from 600,000 to 1,500,OOO. The number of votes necessary to win a seat in the House of Representatives ranges from just over 40,000 to as many as 200,000, despite the electoral redistribution that took place after the Supreme Court’s ruling. For the House of Councillors, for which the Election to Public Offices Law has not been revised, the number of votes necessary to win a seat ranges from 190,000 to more than a million3 These figures show that there are still serious inequities to be rectified. The electoral system has had widespread effects on the style of campaigning, the most important of which is perhaps that it is common for various_factions of the LDP to be represented within the same electoral district. Each district returns between two and five members, which means that the LDP often returns two to four members from a single electorate, especially in the basically rural districts. That means that in most districts candidates from the same party are competing for votes: they therefore need strong backing from sub-party factional organizations, of which there are two to four big ones and one or two smaller ones, depending on whether the district returns two, three, four or five members. LDP candidates normally rely on a three-tiered organization for electoral campaigning. Party headquarters has to authorize candidates to avoid splitting the vote by putting up more candidates than can be elected. Headquarters also provides significant financial assistance for the election campaign. Factions within the party compete with each other to get party authorization for their candidates, and they also help with finance. And finally, at the grass-roots level individual candidates normally have personal support organizations, which carry out virtually all the operations, including conelectioneering stituency work and the details of the campaign itself.A The heavy reliance of LDP candidates on grass-roots personal support organizations means that the core of the supporters is drawn from their own social networks and those of eminent local personalities.

Electoral

65

System and Votes and Seats Relationship

As noted above, the Japanese electoral system has undergone two changes in the recent past: the electoral redistribution in 15 House of Repro sentatives electoral districts in 1986 and the introduction of proportional representation for half the seats in the House of Councillors in 1983. The first has produced only a few marginal changes. The second, as far as it affects the LDP, seems to have become a reason for mobilizing party support, since candidates must drum up the support of a large number of party members in order to be located toward the top of the party list and be elected. It is important to note that proportional representation has been introduced in the nationwide constituency of the House of Councillors and that there are now more miniparties as a result of the introduction of proportional representation in the House of Councillors. However. most of these parties did not obtain seats: only a few, such as the New Wage Earners’ Party and the Tax Party, were successful. and the numbers of seats they won ranged from one to four. In sum, these electoral reforms have brought about no major changes in the electoral configuration of political forces. To see how the votes-and-seats relationship might alter under different electoral systems, it will be useful to look at some hypothetical observations. According to Joji ivstanuki’s calculation,5 if the single-member district system were introduced for the House of Representatives. the LDP would win far more seats than it can under the current multi-member district system. Conversely, if proportional representation were introduced in the House of Representatives, the LDP, with a voting strength of 35 per cent of the whole electorate, would barely gain a simple majority of seats. The disadvantage (for the ruling party) of replacing a multi-member non-transferable one-man one-vote system with proportional representation is clear from the relationships in the 1986 election between the LDP’s votes (percentage of all votes) and its percentages of seats in the House of Representatives, in the prefectural constituencies of the House of Councillors, and in the proportional representation constituency of the House of Councillors: they are, respectively. 49% v. 59%, 45% v. 67% and 39% v. 44%.‘It shouldalso be noted that under the present system a few thousand votes can make the difference for a candidate between winning and losing: and that if those LDP candidates who lost narrowly in the 1983 election could attract a few thousand more votes (as indeed happened for most of them in 1986), the result would be (and nas) a large

swing in tavour of the ruling party. The LDP votes as a proportion of all votes ws no more than 3.7 per cent higher than its vote in the lBS3 election. The successful endorsement strategy for the LDP in the 1986 election contributed a great deal to its landslide victory in terms of seats obtained. .A look at the votes obtained by parties, prefecture by prefecture in this election, shows that the LDP and the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) were strong in the rural prefectures. whereas the Clean ~vernment Party (CGP), the Japan Communist Party (JCP) and the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) were strong in the urban prefectures.’ For instance. the LDP’s percentage over all votes in each prefecture is 78.38 per cent in Aomori. 73.90 per cent in Ishikawa, 70.30 per cent in Yamanashi. and 68.52 per cent in fiagawa. The JSP was strong in such heavily rural prefectures as Tottori. Xkita and Iware: the CGP in such urban prefectures as Osaka and Tokyo: the JCP in Kyoto and Osaka: and the DSP in Aichi. It is no wonder that the two largest parties, the LDP and the JSP. have been the biggest hindrance to a more than cosmetic electorai redistribution‘ Election

Issues

Political parties in Japan normally publish their election pledges in response to requests from several important national newspapers, whose circulations range from 4 million to 9 million. And a high proportion of the electorate claims to have studied these statements carefully before deciding how to vote.* The pledges that were most frequently mentioned in the 1986 campaign were related to economic and social issues;” for example, tax reduction, the consolidation of welfare programmes. ‘small government., and reduction of the government budget deficit. The opposition parties stressed fiscal expansion. welfare proeducational reform, augmented grammes and tax reduction. whereas the LDP placed the emphasis on fiscal balance, traditional morai values, military buildup and nationalism. although as a sort of catch-all party, the LDP did not fail to underline its no less strong concern about social weifare. tax reduction and public works. Among the opposition parties. the CGP and the JCP emphasized welfare expansion and opposition to military buildup, claiming CO represent the socially weak and disadvantaged: while the JSP, the DSP, the NLC and the United Democratic Socialist Party (UDSP) stressed tax fiscal expansion and educational reduction, reform, as representatives of a huge but sociall> fragmented and politically weak wage-earning population.

But mhat emerged as the central electoral issue was the degree of confidence in the Nakasone government at a difficult time of slower economic growth. a rising population of aged people, probiems of diplomatic management associated with tighter integration with US security strategy and an increased interdependence with the world economy: these latter two problems are fraught vvirh risks and uncertninties. The opposition parties. particularly the Chairman of the JSP. hlasatsugu ishibashi. focused their criticisms on Nakasone. calling him a big liar who cannot be trusted. and aliuding unfavourably to his handling of the revision of the Election to Public Offices Law and the calling of the double election. But Sakasone replied by bringing the confidence issue to the forefront of his campaign. asking the electorate to judge which part!- could be entrusted with poxer in the light oi the LDP’s 30.year record of bringing peace and prosperity to Japan. Nakasone’s qualities oi leadership seemed to loom large in the final judgements of many voters. Principal

Factors

in the LDP \-icrory

X number of factors gave the LDP a clear adva,ttaqe over the opposition par&s. the most important being the rise of consenatism in the 1980s.“-’ After the immediate turmoil of the first oil crisis was over, people realized that the kind of economic improvement that had marked the 1960s would not repeat irseii. and lower economic expectations naturally bred economic comer\-atism. It was in mid-19:s. some five years after the 1973 oil crisis. that the decline of opinion poll support for the LDP bottomed out. B1; the second oil crisis (1979-801 the Japanese economy; had been able to adapt to changes in prices relatively smoothly, and the incipient upward movement of support ifir the LDP gathered momentum in the 19SOs. Slower grouth and a Ion; rate of intlation (recently verging _ - on deflation) have encouraged economic conservatism (that is, lower economic aspirations and loner spending) because most people thought that they had achieved a reasonahi:: high standard oi lising and wanted to preserve it. The economic conservatism has been reinforced b;. two trends: iirsrlv. social Kelfare expenditure has been stea&ly cut and. secondly, person& taxation has gradually increased. Such economic conservatism translates easily into political conservatism-that is. continuation of the status quo. represented by LDP rulesince many people wanted to hang on to Fhat they already had without lookins for more. Traditional moral values like thriir. perseverance and hard work have been reactivated in the minds

TAKASH~

of many people, and this must have helped the transition from economic to political conservatism. In the early 1980s there was a tele vision drama portraying the life of a woman born into a poor family in a snow-bound prefecture; she overcame destitution to become the successful owner of a chain of supermarkets in Tokyo through hard work, perseverance and entrepreneurial skill. The show recorded one of the highest audience ratings in Japan throughout its year of daily transmission. It was indicative of the resurgence of the conservative spirit in the 1980s that each episode was daily watched by about 50 million people.” Not only conservatively inclined but many ‘independent’ voters, especially those female voters in their twenties whose rate of abstention was very high in the previous 1983 general election, voted overwhelmingly for the LDP in the 1986 election.‘? The fundamental orientation of most LDP voters towards the status quo was ‘neatly’ captured by the LDP’s campaign slogan: assurance (anshin), security (anzen) and stability (antei). A further contribution to the resurgence of conservatism in the 1980s came from the strengthening tide of what is called ‘internationalization’-the greater ease with which goods, money and persons can move into and out of Japan. The trade liberalization and financial deregulation of the 1980s contributed greatly to this trend. But this internationalization also involved increasing exposure to international vicissitudes, both economic and political; hence the volatile exchange rate of the yen and Japan’s participation in the US Strategic Defense Initiative programme, events which have given Japanese voters a sense of unease about the future.t3 It is important to note that Prime Minister Nakasone’s diplomatic missions, as they have been reported in Japan, seem to have calmed some of these apprehensions and satisfied the national pride of many voters. Nakasone is unusual for a Japanese politician in that he speaks out boldly and does not hesitate to boast about his own performance. He is widely regarded as the leader who can guide Japan safely through the hazardous jungles of international relations and the global economy. It has often been claimed that in Japanese elections personal qualities carry more weight than policy issues. Rather than appealing to voters from a platform of welfare, defence, tax or education policies, it is said, candidates, tend to emphasize personal ties with their constituents and devotion to their interests. Perhaps much of this is true when one looks at electoral campaigning from the vantage point of a candidate. From the viewpoint of electors, it is clear from various opinion surveys that electors pay a great deal of

LuocucHl

67

attention to policy differences between partiesI In the 1986 election such policy issues as taxation, welfare cuts and macroeconomic management loomed large. But many would agree that the confidence issue was unusually important in the 1986 election-confidence that Nakasone and his government were competent to govern the country and had the ability to guide the nation in what was perceived as an increasingly uncertain world-and that the people of Japan gave the Nakasone government an overwhelming vote of confidence. Many people felt apprehenstve about the future, both on economic grounds (slower growth, deflation, welfare cuts, and increased taxation) and in terms of the nation’s course (the drastic appreciation of the yen, economic difficulties with the rest of the world, and Japan’s growing integration with the security strategies of the United States). It was generally felt that in order to resolve Japan’s economic troubles with foreign countries Nakasone had tried to enhance ‘international cooperation through domestic reforms’ by changing procedures and practices that had presented too high a barrier to foreign participation in trade, finance, investment and many other matters. Thirdlv. the importance of the mobilization of organiza
T/,e Japanese Double Election

6S

endorsed only about 300 candidates, to avoid the risk of an LDP candidate’s chances being damaged by another LDP candidate in the same district.‘” The opposition parties fared badly:” the union-based parties, the JSP and the DSP. were especially hard hit. Union membership, now 28 per cent, has been in steady decline-it was 33 per cent in the early 1970s. The manufacturing sector, where unions were strong. has been badly affected as the economy has shifted more to the service and high-technology sectors. The public sector, where unions also used to be strong, was seriously damaged by Nakasone’s administrative reforms, which reduced the size of the public sector in the 1980s. On the other hand. the CGP and the JCP managed to retain most of their seats, largely because of the strong party loyalty of their political cadres and the financial strength of their organizations.

of integration with US security strategies and associated policies: for instance. Japan’s participation in the US Strategic Defense Initiative programme. and the rising level of administrative access to and control over personal information. Fourth. and this is perhaps the most direct threat to the party, the LDP could generate much fiercer internal factional strife if it became so selfconfident as to try and push unpopular policies. But the next general election is in all likelihood four years aKay. Notes and References Curtis, Election Campaigning Japanese Style, (New York: Columbia Uni-

1 Gerald

: 4

Prospects With this resounding victory, Nakasone, the President of the LDP. would now be able to remain Prime Minister for longer than prescribed by the .old Party Rule. The new Party Rule includes a clause which permits the one-year extension after two consecutive terms with the length of one term being two years. It was widely predicted that Nakasone would try to retain his influence as a ‘king maker’. even after new leaders have risen to power. As for policy, it was expected that he would continue to follow his two main directions: administrative and fiscal reform-a smaller public sector, reduction of the budget deficit and stronger emphasis on defence, foreign aid and science and technology;lx and structural reform in the interests of international harmony-reduced barriers across foreign borders, taxation and other legal reforms, and enhanced contributions in the international arena.‘” Though some components of these policies are mutually contradictory, the fact that no opposition party proposed reform programmes like these with any credibility certainly helped Nakasone to gain his electoral victory. However, the LDP had some continuing problems. First, and most important, resistance to fiscal retrenchment seemed to be growing stronger both within and outside the party, especially with the threat of large-scale indirect tax increases.“’ Secondly, the steady opening up society-and the conservative of Japanese resistance to it-could strengthen the voice of nationalism as a constraint on the present line of Nakasone’s foreign policy. Thirdly, the very strongly pacifist feelings of the Japanese public seem likely to collide with the increasing degree

5

6 7 8

versity Press, 197 1). Ibid. Main&i shimbun (evening edition), 8 July 1956. Daily activities of twelve House of Representatives members from Ibaraki prefecture are systematically analysed in Chapter Two of Inoguchi Takashi and Iwai Tomoaki, Zotu giin: Jiminto rieki yudo no se& keizai gaku (Caucus Japanese Style: The Political Economy of LDP Interest Guidance), (Tokyo: Nihon keizai shimbunsha, April 1987). ivatanuki Joji, personal communication, 12 August 1986. See also hlainicbi shimbun, 9 July 1986. Nishihara Shigeki, ‘Is This LDP’s \‘ictory?‘, Yom&i shimbun. 7 July 1986. ~yiljon keizai shimbun. 8 Julv 1986. Q*atanuki Joji, Mivake Ichiro. Inoguchi Takashi and Kabashjma Ikuo. hi’honjin no senk_vo kodo (Japanese Electoral Behavior), [Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press. 1986); Pectoral Behavior in the 1983 Japanese Elections. (Tokyo: Institute of International

Relations, Sophia University. 1986). Inoguchi Takashi, ‘Dojitsusen no seisaku kozu (The Framework of the Double Election)‘, Mainicbi shimbun. 30 June 1986; Takashi Inoguchi. ‘Public Policies and Elections’. Paper prepared for presentation at the Symposium on Information and Its Functions, University of Tokyo. 6-l 1 October 1986. 10. Inoguchi Takashi, Gendai hi‘bon seiji keizai no kozu (Contemporary Japanese Political Economy), (Tokyo: Toyo keizai shimposha, 19S3): Takashi Inoguchi. ‘The Political Economy of Conservative Resurgence under Recession: Public Policies and Political Support in Japan, 1977-1983‘, forthcoming in T. J. Pempel (editor). One Party 9

D ominunce

69

TAKASHI LUOCUCHI 11. This drama, Oshin, named after its heroine, was also transmitted in China and widely watched there as well. 12. Watanuki Joji, personal communication, 3 September 1986. 13. Some of these sentiments are analysed in Takashi Inoguchi, ‘Trade, Technology and Security: Implications for East Asia and the West’, paper presented at the 28th Annual Conference of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Kyoto, 8- 11 September 1986; a revised version will be included in Robert O’Neill (editor), l% Ash, The West and Internutionul Security: Prospects /or Peace. 14. Takashi Inoguchi, ‘Public Policies and Elections’. 15. Tokyo shimbun, 5 June 1986. Needless to say, there are a great deal of overlapping members. It seems that there is a marked rise in the degree to which people attach importance to their own groups, associations, organizations in terms of defending these collective interests, according to the opinion poll carried out after the 1986 election by the Association for Promoting Clean Elections. Watanuki Joji, personal communication, 3 September 1986.

The Irish Referendum

16. See Mainichi shimbun, 28 May 1986 for the historical relationship between the number of LDP candidates officially endorsed and the percentage of LDP seats (House of Representatives). 17. See my ‘the dav after’ commentary on the 1986 election ‘in Asahi shimbun, 8 July 1986. 18. The Provisional Research Council of Administrative Reform presided by Toshio Doko issued a series of major documents outlining policy priorities and policy actions to adapt to changed economic, social and demographic realities along the line of ‘small government’. 19. The Advisory Committee on Economic Structural Adjustment for International Harmony presided by Haruo hlaekawa produced a report calling for major domestic would transform the reforms which Japanese economy and society into one far more compatible with the global trends of trade liberalization and financial deregulation. 20. Minister of Finance, Kiichi Miyazawa, one of the three ‘new leaders’, is known for his strong belief in the need for more expansionary macroeconomic management.

on Divorce

(1986)

CORNELIUSO’LEARY Tile Queen

2 University of Becfast, Bevast BT7 INN, Northern Ireland

The Irish Constitution, adopted by popular referendum in June 1937. established a parliamentary political system on the British model and also contained a section on fundamental rights, which was obviously based on Catholic social and moral principles-for example, the recognition of the family as ‘the natural primary and fundamental’ unit of society (Art 41.1.1); the inalienable rights of the parents as educators of their children (Art 42.1): and the provision, ‘No law shall be enacted providing for the grant of a dissolution of marriage’ (Art 4 1.3.2). In the (The two main parties in the Dail, Fianna Fail and Fine Gael, originated through a split in the independence movement (Sinn Fein) in 1922. In the European Parliament Fine Gael is affiliated to the Christian Democratic group, Fianna Fail to the Progressives.)

1930s and 40s the enshrining of the Catholic moral code in the public law of a state where more than 90 per cent of the population were practising Catholics did not arouse controversy. In the 1960s. however. with rapid economic growth Ireland had become ‘somewhat belatedly a typical post-Second World War affluent society’.’ With affluence came a questioning of traditional values. especially in the urban areas. As the 1970s wore on, an active campaign to legalize contraception (prohibited by an Act of 1935) led to the Family Planning Act of 1979, allowing the sale of contraceptives to married couples. The next stage was a campaign to decriminalize abortion, which led to the Abortion Referendum of 1983. Since these events were to a great extent replicated in the divorce controversy three years later. it is desirable to devote