contemporary perspectives and implications for national development

HABITATINTL.

Vol. 18. No. 2, pp. 81-98, 1994 Elsevier Science Ltd Printed in Great Britain. 0197-3975/94 $7.00+0.00

0197-3975(94)EOO16-T

The Land Use Policy Implementation System in Cameroon: Historical/Contemporary Perspectives and Implications National Development

for

AMBE J. NJOH Transportation Statistics Ojjfice, Florida Department of Transportation, Tallahassee, Florida, USA

ABSTRACT

This paper analyses the interorganisational system for land policy implementation in Cameroon. The analysis reveals that the system has remained largely unchanged in terms of structure, organisation, composition and function since the colonial days. It is argued that this, and the fact that the system has, since independence, grown and proliferated for reasons unrelated to the task of land policy implementation, significantly inhibit its performance. Some suggestions on how the situation can be improved are proffered in the process. Particularly, it is recommended that serious efforts be made to decentralise the system, encourage interorganisational relationships amongst its members, and de-emphasise its regulatory role. The potential costs and benefits of this set of recommendations are also discussed. It is hoped that the analysis, the problems uncovered and the remedies suggested will be informative to land policy and administrative reform efforts in Cameroon in particular and developing nations in general.

INTRODUCTION

The need to conceive and formulate appropriate land development policies is becoming increasingly recognised in the development community. This recognition is manifested, by, for instance, the series of land reform programmes that have recently been carried out in less developed countries (LDCs) especially under the auspices of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (The World Bank). Often ignored, however, is the need to strengthen the institutional capacity for implementing these policies once they are enacted. Extant institutional frameworks for land policy administration in LDCs are plagued by a plethora of problems. The underlying premise of the study reported in this article is that unless these problems are fully understood and dealt with, efforts to take advantage of land as a crucial element in the development process are likely to prove abortive. The study specifically analyses the interorganisational system for land policy implementation in Cameroon with a view to identifying major aspects of the system that are, or can potentially be, antithetical to the country’s broad official development objectives. It is hoped that the analysis, the problems identified, as well as the set of recommendations proffered, will be informative to land policy reform and administration efforts in other LDCs. This is because Cameroon’s 81

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institutional problems especially as they relate to land policy administration are by no means unique. Empirical evidence attesting to the widespread nature of institutional problems in the land policy field in LDCs has been uncovered in Indonesia,1 Tanzania,2 and Nigeria,3 to mention just a few. The rest of the paper develops as follows. Initially, the need for an effective land policy implementation system in Cameroon is identified. Next, a historical background on land policy implementation in the country is presented. Then, the existing system is discussed in terms of the various institutional bodies involved, as well as the different roles they play, in the land policy implementation process. Following this, an analysis of the system is undertaken with a view to identifying real and/or potential impediments to the system’s performance. A subsequent section discusses these impediments and makes a set of recommendations geared towards improving the system’s performance. Finally, prior to concluding the paper, some plausible costs and benefits of the recommendations are discussed.

THE NEED FOR AN EFFECTIVE

SYSTEM

The need for an effective administrative system in efforts to translate development policies into action can hardly be overstated. For one thing, an effective system is necessary for the mobilisation and proper utilisation of productive resources in the development process. In LDCs this need is made more urgent by rapidly increasing levels of urbanisation and the concomitant demand for urban land. rural, the Although Cameroon, like most LDCs remains predominantly number of people living in the country’s urban centres has been growing at an unprecedented rate since the mid-1960s. In fact, between 198.5 and 1990, Cameroon’s annual urban population growth rate of 5.68% was one of the highest in Africa. 4 Between 1967 and 1988 the country’s urban population as a percentage of the total rose from 18%5 to 47%.6 Several factors including high rates of natural increase in the population and increasing in-migration (particularly from rural areas) have contributed significantly to Cameroon’s recent urbanisation experience. However, most of the growth can be traced to the series of administrative reorganisations that have occurred in the country since independence.’ These reorganisations have ensured not only the creation of new administrative headquarters and the attendant development of infrastructure and services in previously remote places, but also the choice of such places as favourable nodes by those seeking avenues with better economic opportunities. Accompanying these developments as noted earlier, has been an acute shortage of affordable land for, especially, housing development in the country’s urban centres. This situation is exacerbated by the fact that the institutions charged with implementing the country’s land policy are inherently weak. Experience has shown that weak land administration institutions not only account for problems such as market imperfections but also create opportunities for land speculation.8 The need for an effective land policy administration system in Cameroon assumes greater prominence when examined in the context of the government’s land policy programme, which is embodied in its Sixth Five-Year Development Plan (1986-1991). The rather bold and apparently over-ambitious programme calls for amongst other things? l

drawing up more appropriate urban development plans and increasing the very inadequate urban facilities: road networks, drainage, water, electricity, etc.;

The Land Use Policy Implementation System in Cameroon l l

l l

l

83

developing new layouts and undertaking a large scale low-cost and intermediate housing programme; ensuring greater security for landed property by adopting new legislation aimed at generalising the registration of all plots and the registration of all land certificates; setting up a complete and reliable geodetic network; using aerial photogrammetry to undertake a large-scale inventory and registration of plots, which should lead to the drawing of cadastral plans covering large areas; [and] computerising the registration, management and constant updating of plots and land certificates.

According to the underlying premise of the present study, attempts on the government’s part to realise this albeit well-meant programme can hardly be fruitful unless they are preceded by serious efforts to strengthen the country’s institutional system for land policy administration. The success of such efforts in turn, hinges tightly on an adequate understanding of the various institutions comprising this system, particularly in terms of their respective composition and roles as well as the factors that inhibit or are capable of inhibiting their performance. The main purpose of the next section is to attempt to promote such an understanding.

THE SYSTEM IN HISTORICAL

PERSPECTIVE

An understanding of Cameroon’s land policy implementation system can be significantly enhanced by retracing its historical evolution. Thus, in this section, a brief review of the historical background of land policy implementation in the country is undertaken. This review takes place under the following four broad headings: the pre-colonial system, the German system, the French/English system, and the immediate post-independence system. The pre-colonial system

Prior to the German annexation of Cameroon in 1884, the rules that governed the ownership, development and alienation of land were implemented through what may be considered a purely African traditional system.‘0 This system recognised the extended family as the basic functional unit of society and that it is this unit that owns land. The rights of the unit with regards to alienating the land under its control was in turn based on the values and rules sanctioned by the wider community of which it was part. The sale of land was forbidden. In fact, as Mabogunje notes, the relationship of an individual to land under such a system was no more than that of trustee with rights of beneficial use (or usufruct) as long as he lives, but with no power to alienate the land from the ownership of the family.11 Although the sale of land was not allowed, the granting of user rights over parcels of unallocated or unoccupied land to strangers or members of families that have outgrown their own land, was allowed only with the consent and approval of the communal head or village chief. The chief and elder statesmen as well as family heads also ensured that the rules governing the relationships of individuals to land were observed. Thus, the chief, elder statesmen and family heads were the main actors in the pre-colonial system for land policy implementation in Cameroon.

Amhe .I. Njoh

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The German system A major preoccupation of the German colonial administration in Cameroon was to modernise the country’s land tenure system as the traditional system of land tenure was considered incompatible with colonial development objectives.12 This modernisation effort entailed amongst other things, the introduction of Western land policy administration systems. Thus, in 1896, when the decree converting all so-called ‘vacant and ownerless’ native lands into ‘Crown property’ was passed, 26 land commissions corresponding to the 26 administrative districts of the territory were also created. 13 The main task of these commissions was to demarcate the ‘Crown lands’ and recommend ‘native reserves’ in their respective districts.14 A land commission in any district was directly answerable to the colonial administrator in that district. The colonial district administrators were in turn answerable to the governor of the entire territory, who was in turn answerable to the chancellor in Berlin. Among other things, this new system seriously weakened and undermined the powers of the family, family heads, elder statesmen, and the chiefs in matters relating to land rights. The French/English

system

Following the defeat of Germany in the First World War, the United Nations (then, the League of Nations) decided to divide the Cameroonian territory into two unequal parts of one-fifth and four-fifths on 10 July 1919. The smaller portion of the territory was placed under the trusteeship of Britain while the larger part was placed under that of France. The two colonial powers (France and Britain) were different in their approach to colonial administration. While Britain employed a strategy of indirect rule, which relied heavily on existing local institutions, France favoured a contrary strategy designed to do away with everything non-French. In effect one part of the territory was subjected to a completely different system of administration from the other. The most relevant difference between the two systems relates specifically to attitudes towards traditional chiefs and indigenous institutions. In British Cameroon the policy of indirect rule accorded chiefs and traditional institutions significant powers. In fact, the policy effectively returned to traditional chiefs and indigenous institutions most of the powers they had local lost during the German colonial era. In this regard, native authorities, government entities comprised of democratically-elected members, were placed in charge of implementing land policy throughout the British Cameroons. The main function of these entities in the land policy field was to control land use as well as land mortgaging; record and file documents relating to land transactions; prohibit, restrict or regulate the cutting or destruction of trees on communal land; and protect vegetation along highways. ls In French Cameroon, the efforts to speedily do away with the traditional structure for land policy implementation initiated by the Germans was effectively continued. One way by which the French set out to accomplish this objective was to appoint individuals supportive of their colonial mission to positions of regional chiefs while ignoring the ‘genuine’ indigenous leaders. These appointed regional heads were then placed in charge of local matters including the implementation of land policy. They were directly answerable to the colonial administrators, who were in turn accountable to the home government in Paris. Despite the enormous efforts expended, none of the colonial administrations beginning with the Germans, was successful in completely doing away with the traditional system of land policy implementation in Cameroon. Thus, when the country gained political independence in 1960 and eventually became reunited in 1961, the system for land policy administration the new leaders assumed was a hybrid of Cameroonian. German, British and French.

The Lund Use Foficy I~ple~le~tation

The immediate post-independence

System

in ~amero#~

85

system

During the years immediately following independence, Cameroon’s indigenous leaders appeared very undecided about how to organise the country’s land policy implementation system. This was most evident with respect to two important questions: (1) what status should be conferred on the governmental body in and (2) under what federal ministerial charge of land policy implementation? department should such a body be placed. 7 This indecision was manifested through the frequent reorganisation of the country’s institutional system for land policy implementation during the 1960s and 1970s. The first post-independence federal governmental body in the land policy field, the Federal Land Development Council (FLDC) was established on 16 July 1962. The main function of this body was to develop a federal land policy as well as co-ordinate the activities of all other institutions with interest in the land policy field. This council was abolished about 3 yr later and on 28 August 1965 a governmental body with the status of a directorate was created and placed under the then newly re-organised Minist~ of Economic Affairs and Planning. The functions of this body included mainly ensuring the development and proper implementation of land policy in accordance with the country’s broad development objectives. On 22 March 1969, the directorate of Lands within the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Planning was transferred to the Ministry of Planning, where its status was reduced to that of a sub-directorate. Its main function remained however, unchanged. Two years later, on 12 March 1971, the status of this governmental body was once again changed and it became the Division of Land Development under the Directorate of Planning. Again, its functions remained unaltered. The last major change with respect to this body occurred on 15 November 1979, when a major administrative reorganisation caused it to be transferred from the Ministry of Planning to the Ministry of Town Planning and Housing, where it became the Division of Lands. It has since remained part of this ministry, which was reconstituted by Presidential Decree number 79/474 of 15 November 1979. About the same time, a number of para-public agencies, special commissions and boards were established to undertake specific land policy implementation roles in the country. These agencies, special commissions and boards continue to be active today and will be discussed in the following section, which is devoted to an analysis of the contemporary system for land policy implementation in the country. THE CONTEMPORARY SYSTEM

The various institutional bodies comprising the contemporary system for land policy implementation in Cameroon are diagramatically presented in Fig. 1. As Fig. 1 shows, most of the public and para-public institutional bodies fall under the ministerial jurisdiction of the Ministry of Town Planning and Housing. According to Presidential Decree No. 841029 of 4 February 1984, the Ministry of Town Planning and Housing comprises a central administrative unit and several external or regional agencies. The latter and former constitute part of a highly centralised pyramidal organisational structure. The central administrative unit, which is the apex of this pyramid includes one secretariat and five directorates namely, the General Secretariat; the directorates of: General Administration; Surveys; Urban Development; Land; and Housing and Architecture. The regional or external services include ten provincial delegations (that is, one in each of the country’s 10 provincial headquarters), divisional services (one in each of the country’s 42 administrative divisional headquarters), and sub-district services (in administrative sub-divisions where necessary).

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Ambe J. Njoh

Agencies I

directly

Other important

involved agencies

in land policy implementation (mostly

playing

the rote of overseers).

Fig. I. Scheme of the interorganisational system for Cameroon’s

lad

use policy implementation

All but three of these agencies, the General Secretariat, the directorates of General Administration, and Housing and Architecture, are directly involved in land policy implementation, and are included in what, for the purpose of this discussion, is called the interorganisational system for land policy implementation in the country. A number of agencies drawn from other ministerial bodies and the para-public sector also constitute part of this system. The system further comprises a number of commissions and boards created to deal with specific land policy problems. The specific agencies comprising the interorganisational system for land policy implementation in Cameroon can, therefore, be conveniently discussed under three broad categories: (1) government ministerial departments; (2) para-public agencies and programmes; and (3) special commissions and boards. Government rn~n~steri~~ departments

The following are included in this category: (1) the Directorate of Lands; (2) the Directorate of Urban Development (Town Planning); (3) the Directorate of Surveys; (4) Senior Divisional Office (Prefecture); (5) Divisional Office (Sous-Prefecture); (6) Local Government Councils; and (7) the Public Health Department.

The Larld Use Policy Implementation System in Cameroon

87

The Directorate of Lands. As stated earlier, the Directorate of Lands is a unit of the Ministry of Town Planning and Housing. Through its external departments (provincial, divisional and sub-district), this unit acts as the custodian of all state lands in the country. The unit is also responsible for ensuring the effective management and mobilisation of especially urban land. One of its most important roles in this regard is documenting private interest in land and “. . . ascertaining that all buildable land is duly registered . . .“.16 Furthermore, it is responsible for the constant updating of the national land registry, and playing the lead role in processing applications for land entitlements and ownership certification. The Directorate of Urban Development ~Town Planning), This is another unit of the Ministry of Town Planning and Housing, whose land-related functions are executed mostly by its external agencies. These functions include controlling and managing urban land development. In this regard, the external agencies of this directorate are directly responsible for overseeing the building authorisation process as well as the implementation of all government decrees aimed at controlling the activities of private developers in urban areas. These decrees include, for example, zoning ordinances aimed at regulating building activities, and subdivision regulations, which prescribe the minimum requirements that developers at the fringe of urban areas must meet. Additionally, these agencies are responsible for: (1) regulating all transactions involving the transfer and/or alienation of rights in urban land; (2) protecting the public right of way in urban areas; (3) protecting all urban land from undesirable and/or illegal uses, including squatter housing development; and (4) controlling the urban land use activities of utility services such as those dealing with water, telephone and electricity. The Directorate of surveys. This is yet another unit of the Ministry of Town Planning and Housing. The main functions of this unit can be divided into two main groups namely technical and administrative. Its technical responsibilities include: (1) surveying and triangulating the national territory; (2) producing land use maps; (3) demarcating land for registration and entitlement purposes; (4) producing site plans; and (5) setting up a modern and standardised geodetic network for the entire country. Its administrative functions include: (1) accounting for and classifying all developed and undeveloped land in the country; (2) facilitating the management of rural and urban land; and (3) collecting, storing and disseminating topographic and survey data necessary to facilitate land registration and entitlement or the settlement of disputes relating to land rights. Senior Divisional Ojjice. This agency is a unit of the Ministry of Territorial Administration. Politically, it is the most powerful of all the agencies discussed here, as it oversees the activities of all governmental and non-governmental agencies at the administrative divisional level. Its position in the land policy field is equally powerful. According to Decree No. 76-167 of 27 April 1976, this agency is the legal custodian of all state lands within its area of jurisdiction, namely, the administrative division. Chapter I, Article 3, Section 1 of the decree stipulates that “Any public service wishing to have state land allocated to it shall address an application to the Senior Divisional Officer of the division in which the land in question is situated”. The Senior Divisional Officer also appoints members of, and chairs, the Land Consultative Board, also another important actor in the country’s land policy field (see below). D~v~sio~~l Ofice or ~~b-D~visionQl Ofice. This is also another agency of the Ministry of Territorial Administration directly answerable to the Senior Divisional Officer. Its main responsibility in the land policy field is to make preliminary reviews of applications for, and recommend necessary action with respect to, the conversion of occupancy or exploitation rights over state lands into land certificates. In collaboration with other relevant agencies, it makes

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recommendations, in its capacity as a member of the Land Consultative Board, regarding land entitlement applications in its local area of jurisdiction. Local government councils (LGCs). Local government councils, formerly known as native authorities in the anglophone provinces and commune administration in the francophone provinces of the country, fall under the ministerial jurisdiction of the Ministry of Territorial Administration. In collaboration with the divisional departments of Town Planning and Housing, LGCs are responsible for regulating especially urban land use activities. In this connection, LGCs are active participants in the building authorisation process and are directly responsible for inflicting relevant sanctions on defaulters of building by-laws. They are also responsible for implementing fiscal land use control measures such as property taxes. Public Health Department. The Public Health Department is an agency of the Ministry of Public Health. Its major functions in the land policy field is to protect land against uses that can be hazardous to human health and/or detrimental to the environment. As part of the network of agencies responsible for inflicting relevant sanctions on defaulters of building by-laws. use and zoning ordinances dealing with minimum distances between housing units; waste disposal facilities and housing and housing-related facilities such as drinkable water wells; residential units and industrial areas; and building heights amongst others.

Para-public agencies and programmes The para-public agencies and programmes having direct roles in the land policy field in Cameroon include: (1) the Cameroon Housing Fund (or Credit Fancier du Cameroun (CFC); (2) the Cameroon Development Bank (or Banque Camerounaise du Developpement (BCD)); (3) the Special Council Support Fund (or le Fond Special d’Equipement et d’invetissement Intercommunal (FEICOM)). Cameroon Housing Fund (CFC). This is a public financing programme that was established in 1977 and placed under the supervisory authorities of the Ministry of Town Planning and Housing and the Ministry of Finance. Its main responsibility is to provide medium and low-income families with loans for urban land development projects such as residential building construction. Although not explicitly stated, the government hopes that through funding programmes such as this, it can have more control especially over urban land use activities in the country. The Cameroon Development Bank (BCD). This is a state-owned commercial bank that has as one of its major responsibilities, the provision of stateguaranteed loans to qualified private individuals interested in undertaking land development projects such as residential and commercial building construction. The Special Council Support Fund (FEICOM). Like the Cameroon Housing Fund, FEZCOM is a public financing programme. However, its mission is to provide funding for land development projects undertaken by local government councils or municipal authorities as opposed to individuals or families. Special land development commissions Apart from the agencies and programmes land policy implementation bodies often are also players in the land policy field in (1) the Commission for the Development (lu Mission d’Amenagement et de Gestion the Commission for the Development and

discussed above, a number of special alluded to as commissions or boards Cameroon. Included in this group are: and Management of Industrial Zones des Zones Industrielles (MAGZZ)); (2) Equipment of Urban Land (la Mission

The Land Use Policy Implementation System in Cameroon

d’Amenagement

d’Equipement

des Terrains Urbains et Ruraux (MAETUR));

89 (3)

the Littoral Development Commission (LDC); (4) the Benoue Upper Valley Commission (BUVC); and (5) the Land Consultative Board (LCB). The Commission for the Development and Equipment of Industrial Zones (MAGZZ). This commission was established by a decree on 1 March 1971 which

was rescinded by another decree on 25 August 1973, itself modified by a decree on 19 January 1976. MAGZZ has as its main function, managing industrial land and addressing the need for improved co-ordination of industrial dispersion by providing industrial developers suitable land throughout the country. The Commission for the Development and Equipment of Urban Land (MAETUR). This commission was also established in the 1970s. Particularly, it was created by Decree No. 77-193 of 23 June 1977. MAETUR falls under

the supervisory authority of the Ministry of Town Planning and Housing and is directly responsible for: l7 (1) (2) (3)

preparing studying ensuring approved

and servicing and setting up that all such town planning

urban land for residential development; sites and services projects; and projects are executed in accordance with the and architectural designs.

The Littoral Development Commission (LDC). This is one of two special commissions that were established by a decree of 17 July 1972 to study and develop zones defined by the national social, economic and cultural development plan. The particular task assigned to the Littoral Development Commission is dealing with the plethora of land use problems stemming from the increasing immigration of people into the City of Douala, and problems associated with the shipping industry, which threatens to saturate the port of Douala, the country’s most important seaport. The Benoue Upper Valley Commission (BUVC). This is the other special commission created by the decree of 17 July 1972. Its main responsibility is to develop and deal with the land use problems arising from the Lagdo dam situated in the northern part of the country. The Land Consultative Board (LCB). Land consultative boards exist in every administrative division in the country. The members of any of these semi-autonomous bodies are appointed by the Senior Divisional Officer (prefet) of the d ivision in which the board is located. The members are drawn from all public, para-public, private, and indigenous institutions with interest in land in the local area. Its main functions are: (1) to make recommendations to the prefect on matters relating to land grants; (2) examine applications for land certificates on occupied as well as exploited lands. l8 According to Chapter IV, Article 14 of Decree No. 76166 of 27 April 1976, the board is also responsible for overseeing and participating in the management of government-owned or national lands in the country.

“In this capacity, it assembles and analyses relevant information concerning the management of national lands, and periodically transmits its recommendations to the minister in charge of lands.“19

ANALYSIS

Given that more than three decades have elapsed since Cameroon gained independence, one would expect to see significant differences between its contemporary development policy implementation systems and those of the

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colonial administration. This is however, not the case. For instance, the country’s contemporary system for land policy implementation is more alike than different from the colonial system it replaced. The major similarities and key singular difference between the country’s colonial and post-colonial systems for land use policy implementation are briefly discussed below.

Similarities between the systems The similarities between the contemporary system for land policy implementation and the colonial system it replaced can be discussed under four broad headings namely, structure, organisation, composition, and function. Structure. Cameroon’s land policy implementation system is part of the country’s overall administrative machinery. As argued elsewhere,20 this machinery is not only a legacy of the country’s colonial past, but was actually tailored after the Western or Weberian model of public administration. Thus, just as the colonial system, the contemporary system is pyramidal in structure (see Fig. 1) and highly centralized in terms of decision making. In effect, all decisions regarding land rights and/or the alienation thereof, are confined to the central departments located in the national capital, Yaounde. Only the most trivial action may be possible at any other level. This was also the case during the colonial era except that the centre then was somewhere in Europe. Centralisation as a feature of administration is by no means unique to Cameroon. It is indeed, as Timsit*i has observed, the most common characteristic of administration in erstwhile colonies. According to Timsit The most characteristic feature of the administration in developing countries is the overconcentration of power, i.e. a constant disproportionate strengthening of a set-up designed to oversee local authorities and public enterprises rather than to ensure their autonomy vis-a-vis the central government - everything conspires on the contrary to subordinate these authorities and enterprises to the state and to remove any such liberty. This may explain why, as noted above, every external (i.e. divisional, provincial, etc.) agency in the country’s land policy field is directly answerable to a central ministerial department as well as the Senior Divisional Officer (prefet) of the local area within which it (the agency) operates.23 Organisation. The external or field services of Cameroon’s land policy implementation system are organised according to administrative divisions that have very little, if anything, to do with the country’s traditional ethnic divisions. Thus, for instance, one may talk of a Divisional Service of Lands with jurisdiction over native lands previously under the auspices of the indigenous chiefs, village heads, and elder statesmen of areas with different native laws and customs relating to the ownership and alienation of land. It is difficult not to notice how the institutional arrangement wherein a traditional system is overlaid by a ‘Western’ one, strikingly resembles the colonial system of the Germans and French. The English of course, as noted earlier, employed the strategy of ‘indirect rule’ which ensured that the traditional system was, to a significant degree, left intact. Composition. As implied above, the existing system for land policy implementation in Cameroon began with a nucleus inherited from the colonial era and has undergone little change. Among the many features that have been maintained almost without alteration are land development commissions. Land development commissions, which constitute a fundamental component of the contemporary system, it would be recalled, were first introduced as part of the system for land policy administration in the country by the Germans.

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Function. It is worth noting that a major function or preoccupation of the existing system for land policy implementation in Cameroon is land use regulation. This assertion is attested to by among other things, the many land use decrees that have been enacted since independence. Allusions have already been made to some of these decrees (see above). This preoccupation effectively reduces the system’s function to one of domination - a function that served as an instrument of power during the colonial era. Differences between the systems Despite the similarities depicted above, some differences do exist between Cameroon’s contemporary system for land policy implementation and the colonial system it succeeded. For one thing, the contemporary system has undergone a complete ‘indigenisation’ process in which the colonial officials have been replaced by nationals. For another, the system has grown and proliferated since independence. This latter difference is specifically relevant for the purpose of the present discussion. The size of the present system. In comparison with the colonial system for land policy implementation, the contemporary system has grown by leaps and bounds since independence. Thus, currently, the land policy field in Cameroon is comprised of several, sometimes disparate, agencies. This relatively gigantic size as well as the other features alluded to earlier, act as constraints on the system. In the next section we will discuss how this is possible. The discussion will be permeated with suggestions on how these constraints can be eliminated.

DISCUSSION

AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The most important theme underlying the preceding analysis can be summarised as follows. Cameroon’s contemporary system for land policy implementation is unsuitable for dealing with the country’s complex land problems. This is because the system has undergone very little change since it was originally established during the colonial era, when its mission was not only narrower, but also different from that which it is presently expected to accomplish. Furthermore, the few changes that have taken place as far as the system is concerned have been for reasons entirely unrelated to the task of land policy implementation. At least four of the system’s main features operate as impediments to its performance and deserve further discussion. The features include: (1) overconcentration of power in the centre; (2) the system’s preoccupation; (3) excessive institutional actors; and (4) functional duplication and fragmentation. Overconcentration of power One feature of the classical Weberian model of administration with the most far-reaching implications for land policy implementation for a developing country such as Cameroon is ‘centralisation’. The main purpose of this feature as originally conceptualised by Max Weber, is to ensure supervision through a carefully defined hierarchy of superiors .24 In systems tailored after the Weberian model of administration, decisions are viewed as commands that must be obeyed with limited or no resistance. This means amongst other things that ‘a superior is never wrong’. One problem with this is that, given such unrestrained powers, superior officials in developing countries often use their offices for their own personal gains since their authority can hardly be challenged by anyone. In fact, DeLanceyzs has observed that most of the land laws enacted in Cameroon since independence are slanted in favour of the economically powerful and that the

country’s leaders have often used state and national land as a form of political patronage. That such actions are diametrically opposed to the country’s official development objective of improving the living conditions of all Cameroonian+ can never be overstated. As the executive director of the United Nations Commission for Human Settlements (UNCHS) accurately puts it, state-owned land “. . . should A be used as a resource, rather than a . . . basis for political patronage”? considerable portion of the land in Cameroon is owned by the state. Used appropriately, this can be a tremendous asset to the government since it is obviously easier to earmark and develop such land for public purposes or purposes that can benefit the population at large. Another related problem is the fact that centralisation tends to overconcentrate power in the hands of few bureaucrats in the centre, thereby allowing only trivial decisions to be made at the field level. In this connection, LL.. . final decisions concerning for example, land entitlement must be taken in Yaounde”.‘* Among other things, this means that officials in the centre are often inundated with the enormous burden of completing minor tasks that could otherwise be executed by field officials. 29 For a client of the system such as an individual applying for a land certificate, this translates into lengthy and frustrating waiting periods as well as tedious journeys to the national capital. A possible strategy for dealing with this problem include three major steps. The first entails deconcentration in which relevant administrative units are relocated from the national capital to the field (administrative divisions and sub-divisions). To a large extent, this step has already been taken. The second step entails administrative decentralisation wherein authority is shifted from the national capital to field offices, upon which decision making authority within guidelines established at the national level must also be conferred. The third and fina step entails political decentralisation, wherein decision making is taken over by locally-established bodies at the divisional or sub-divisional level. Upon accomplishing this final step the system will approximate the native authority system that existed in the anglophone provinces during the colonial era. This strategy will, amongst other things, empower (or ‘reempower’ in the case of anglophone provinces) local governments to tax land use activities and transactions in land with a share of the proceeds going to the national government and the rest retained. In Brazil and Colombia for instance, local governments are permitted to retain a fair portion of added-value tax revenue.30 Yet another related problem has to do with the concept of hierarchicat authority and control embedded in the Weberian model. This feature places emphasis on the vertical dimension or relationship between levels of administration. In so doing, it places very little emphasis on equally important horizontal intraorganisational relations and completely fails to recognise interorganisational relations. Yet, as empirical evidence reveals, interorganisational relations are crucial to organisational effectiveness especially in resource-scarce economies such as Cameroon.“i Officials must, therefore, seek to promote such relations in the land policy field as a means of promoting their effectiveness. The system’s preoccupation It has already been observed that the contemporary system for land policy implementation in Cameroon is preoccupied with land use regulation. Yet, given the rapidly evolving land market characteristics of developing nations, the country’s land policy implementation system cannot afford to be almost exclusively concerned with land use regulation. This is because the implementation of land policy entails a lot more than simply regulating land use activities. It entaiIs inter alia, translating official government statements regarding the

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development and mobilisation of land into action. The effective execution of this enormous task depends in part on the implementation of the recommendations made above. In this connection, Catherine Farvacque, who co-manages (with Patrick McAusland) the Urban Management Program (UMP) of the UNCHS suggests that serious efforts be made to revamp extant land policy implementation systems in developing countries - systems that have been operating for decades without attempts to make them more adaptable or sculpted to accommodate the rapidly changing circumstances with which they are currently required to deal. 32 This, according to Farvacque means clarifying responsibilities between the public and private sector’s . . monopoly over land management; auditing regulatory frameworks and institutional arrangements to ensure their effectiveness , . . .33 Excessive institutional actors As noted earlier, the number of institutional actors in Cameroon’s land policy field has grown and proliferated since independence. A relatively small part of this increase can be explained by the fact that the system’s responsibilities have also grown since independence. However, most of the growth is explainable by other factors having nothing to do with the task of land policy implementation. Rather, it is a function of the fact that since independence, indigenous leaders have regularly used the creation of albeit artificial jobs in the national bureaucracy as a means of dealing with the country’s menacing unemployment problem and above all, as a means of preventing potential political unrest. This problem, as Timsits has noted, is commonplace in developing countries all over the world. He observes for instance, that in Latin American countries, “. . . the bureaucracy provides the ruling group with patronage and support for the regime, and the middle groups with employment . . .“35 The negative factors associated with too many institutional actors operating in any given policy field cannot be exaggerated. For one thing, such a situation is likely to be costly both to the state and individuals seeking services rendered by these actors. The burden to the state can be seen in terms of the cost of maintaining the institutions (employee salaries, cost of equipment and infrastructure, etc.). The burden to individuals seeking services (i.e. the clientele of these institutions) can be seen in terms of costs involved in visiting too many offices in order to obtain any given service. For instance, an individual seeking to convert occupancy or exploitation rights over state land into a land certificate in Cameroon must visit at least four offices as follows: (1) a sworn surveyor’s office (to have the land in question demarcated); (2) the local Department of Surveys (to obtain an official cadastral plan and specially marked boundary pillars); (3) the local Divisional Office (to submit the application dossier); (4) the Directorate of Lands in the national capital (to obtain the official land certificate). In short, when an excessive number of institutional actors operate in any particular policy field, they are unlikely to be effective. In Nigeria for instance, Okpala 36 has remarked that the involvement of as many as half a dozen different disparate agencies in any given aspect of urban management results in inefficiency, ineffectiveness, waste and disorder in the management and delivery of urban public services. 37The same can be said of the Cameroonian land policy field. Reversing this situation will entail serious efforts on the part of the leadership to streamline the system particularly by significantly reducing the number of institutional actors in the land policy field. Such efforts have never been given serious thought by the leadership - that is, the minority stakeholders bent not only on preserving the status quo, but also on promoting their own personal HAG 18:2-G

94

At&e I. Nioh

interests regardless of the impact such behaviour the people.

may have on the majority of

The task of land use policy implementation is certainly complicated, thus necessitating some degree of functional fragmentation and duplication. However, as evidenced by the roles assigned to the numerous institutional bodies in Cameroon’s land policy field, the current level of functional fragmentation and duplication within this field is far in excess of what reason dictates. To appreciate this problem, one needs only take a closer look at the respective roles or functions of the main institutional actors in the country’s land policy implementation field. In this connection, we note for instance that the function of ‘custodian of state-owned lands’, which falls under the administrative jurisdiction of the Senior Divisional Office, a unit under the Ministry of Territorial Administration, is also an important function of the Divisional Service of Lands, which is a unit of the Directorate of Lands itself, a department under the Ministry of Town Planning and Housing. The unnecessary fragmentation and duplication of function, often an upshoot of excessive institutional actors in the development policy field (see above), can, as Okpalass has shown in the case of Nigeria, be a source of waste and confusion; hence, inefficiency and the costly delivery of public services. Dealing with this problem entails some serious institutional revamping efforts, which must significantly go beyond simply reducing the number of institutional actors in the country’s land policy field. To be successful, such efforts must involve re-charting the jurisdictional terrain of the few land policy organisations left following the streamlining phase of the revamping process. This and other solutions that have been suggested here are certainly not costless. However, we contend that these costs are pale in significance when compared with the potential benefits of the suggested solutions. POTENTIAL COSTS AND BENEFITS OF RECOMMENDATIONS The set of recommendations made above may be restated thus: (1) decentralising the land policy system; (2) promoting interorganisational relations amongst land policy agencies; (3) de-emphasising the system’s regulatory role; and (4) reducing the number of institutional actors comprising the system. Decentralising the land policy system

Decentralisation is by no means cost-free. One cost of decentralisation can be seen in terms of the amount of resources that must go into setting up offices and the infrastructure necessary for the operation of offices away from the centre. Such a move is also likely to entail additional staffing. Another cost of decentralisation can be seen through the eyes of the bureaucratic elite in the centre who worry about losing some of their powers to local or provincial officials. In fact, the Mao regime’s effort to re-exert central control in China in the 1960s is said to have resulted from a fear of the growing power of regional leaders during periods of decentralisation.sg These possible costs not withstanding, decentralisation bears the potential of making an enormous contribution to national development efforts in a developing country such as Cameroon. One possible direct benefit of the genre of decentralisation recommended here is that it would permit local officials to undertake a more meaningful routine and detailed tasks such as

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issuing land ownership certificates. In turn, this would not only make officials in the centre more effective by relieving them of such rather mundane tasks, but would also eliminate the enormous amounts of ‘red tape’ often encountered by anyone seeking official land documentation within the country’s current highly centralised bureaucratic land policy system. Another possible benefit of such decentralisation is that it would permit closer contact between government officials and the people they profess to serve, the citizens. Such contact would in turn make it possible for public officials to obtain the quality and quantity of information necessary for formulating a land policy capable of contributing positively to national development. Yet another possible benefit is that meaningful decentralisation of the country’s land policy system would increase political and administrative support for the national land policy at the local level, where this policy has at best, been greeted with a lot of skepticism and at worst, undermined especially by rural residents. The benefits of decentralisation, as well as why such a strategy works in the context of land policy administration, are best illuminated by land reform efforts in Asia and Latin America about which Rondinelli,da citing Montgomery,41 writes: Land reforms in Asian and Latin American countries seem to have worked better when they were decentralized because devolution allowed easier access to information, better communications among various levels of organization, and increased community solidarity and support. Promoting interorganisational relations

Interorganisational relations (IOR) as a strategy for promoting institutional effectiveness certainly involves some costs especially to participating agencies as these agencies must spent time and other viable resources establishing and/or maintaining linkages with one another. Chambers,42 one of those who have argued along these lines, holds that in developing countries IOR “can have high costs in staff time spent in meetings and in deahng with paperwork”. In Cameroon, as in other developing nations, where bureaucratic rivalry is commonplace, the cost of IOR can also be seen in terms of the power participating agencies give up when they share information and other resources they would otherwise jealously guard and use when necessary to influence the decisions of one another. Thus, in recommending IOR as a strategy for improving the effectiveness of the land policy implementation of Cameroon, we do not imply that they are without costs. Rather, we contend that the potential costs of IOR are far outweighed by their potential benefits. The potential benefits of IOR include inter alia, the fact that they can provide participating agencies with an opportunity to expand their resource bases by making it possible for them to borrow from one another or commonly utilise otherwise scarce resources. An implicit benefit in this case is the fact that the cost of operating development agencies is reduced as resources are shared or jointly utilised. Furthermore, IOR, even if they entail no more than agencies in a common policy field such as land simply talking to one another, reduce organisational uncertainty and improve an agency’s capacity to better respond to the needs of its clientele. This is because when agencies talk to one another they are more likely than not to exchange vital info~ation about their individual activities and problems, thereby learning from one another and promoting their understanding of the larger environment of which they are just a small part. me-ern~~~isi~g

the system’s regulatory role

As stated earlier, the Cameroonian occupation with land use regulation

land policy implementation system’s preeffectively reduces the task of land policy

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96

implementation to one of domination. In the colonial days the regulatory function of the state in any policy field, served as an instrument of power. Today, little has changed. Thus, on the one hand, a possible cost of de-emphasising this role in the land policy field as in any other field, can be measured in terms of the loss of an important source of power to the state and agents acting on its behalf. On the other hand, the benefits can be better appreciated when one considers the fact that the system has a limited inventory of resources at its disposal and must operate within the context of a rapidly evolving land market. Thus, de-emphasising the system’s regulatory role would free up resources for use in dealing with other important aspects of national land policy administration such as land management, which entails among other things, the collection and dissemination of vital information regarding land use, land ownership, and land availability throughout the national territory. Reducing the lubber

of ~~stit~tion~~ actors

As noted above, the contemporary system for land policy implementation in Cameroon has grown and proliferated since the country gained political independence in 1960. The rationale for this growth has little, if anything, to do with the albeit, complex task of land policy administration. In fact, most of the growth can be explained by the governments desire to create employment opportunities for its citizenry. It follows, therefore, that a very likely negative impact of reducing the size of the system would be the loss of jobs for a significant portion of those currently employed by the many public and parastatal agencies operating in the country’s land policy field. To the state, such a reduction would mean the loss of an important source of political patronage. Furthermore, the loss of jobs concomitant with such reductions may spell political unrest in the country. However, these problems pale in magnitude besides the many long term benefits that can accrue from following through with the recommendation. Institutional bodies are expensive entities to operate. Therefore, their reduction translates into enormous savings in costs. Additionally, such a reduction would go a good way in eliminating the possibility of confusion, unnecessary fragmentation and/or duplication of functions, and waste prevalent in the held.

SUMMARY

AND CONCLUSION

Land policy is becoming increasingly recognised as an important element in the development process. This recognition is attested to by, for instance, recent World Bank-led efforts to reform land policies in developing nations. Conspicuously absent from these efforts, however, are attempts to strengthen the institutional capacity for implementing these policies once they are enacted. The underlying premise of the study reported here is that unless the institutional capacity for implementing these policies is improved, attempts to take advantage of land as a viable resource in the development process in LDCs are likely to fail. The study, thus, examined the extant system for land policy implementation in one LDC, Cameroon. The aim was to uncover features of the system that inhibit or bear the potential to inhibit the system’s performance. Principal amongst the features uncovered in this regard are the system’s structure, organisation, composition and function - all features whose roots are traceable to the colonial era. How these aspects of the system, as well as its size which has grown enormously since independence, impede its effectiveness, is discussed. The discussion is punctuated with suggestions on how the situation can be ameliorated. Prominent amongst the suggestions

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made are, administrative decentralisation including the devolution of power from the centre; the promotion of interorganisational relationships amongst agencies within the system; the de-emphasis of the system’s regulatory role; and the reduction of the number of institutional actors comprising the system. The potential costs and benefits of these recommendations were discussed. It is hoped that the analysis, the questions answered as well as those raised, and the set of recommendations made in this article will be useful not only to officials in Cameroon but also to those involved in land policy reform efforts in particular, and institutional strengthening efforts in general, throughout the developing world. Acknowledgements - The author will like to sincerely thank the following individuals in Cameroon for furnishing some of the data necessary for completing this study: Mr Zachary Nsutebu (formerly, Provincial Delegate for Town Planning and Housing, Buea) presently at the University of Cameroon, Buea; Mr Rene Ndemguia, Divisional Chief of Service, Surveys, Kumba; and Mr Emmanuel Taniform Ndifor, Provincial Delegation of Town Planning and Housing, Buea.

NOTES 1,

2.

3.

4.

5 6. 7.

8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13.

14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21.

22. 23.

J. Silas, “The Kampung Improvement Programme of Indonesia: A Comparative Case Study of Jakarta and Surabaya”, in G.K. Payne (ed.), Low-Income Housing in the Developing World: the role of Sites and Services and Settlement Upgrading (John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1984). in G.K. Payne (ed.), Low-Income Housing J. Mghweno, “Tanzania’s Surveyed Plots Programme”, in the Developing World: the role of Sites and Services and Settlement Upgrading (John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1984). T. Aiken Aina, “Land Tenure in Lagos”, Habitat International 16, (1) (1992), pp. 3-15. G.I. Nwaka, “Development Control and Shelter Provision in Nigerian Cities”, Habitat International 16, (1) (1992). pp. 95-111. G.T. Kurian (ed.1. Encyclopedia of the Third World (Fourth Edition) (Facts On File, New York/Oxford, 1992). ’ . . I.. Tandan. “Urbanization and Pooulation Redistribution Trends in Cameroon”, in J.I. Clarke and L.A. Kosinski (eds), Redistribution’ of Population in Africa (Heinemann, London, 1982). A.S. Neba, Modern Geography of the Republic of Cameroon (Neba Publishers, Camden, NJ, 1987). An urban centre by Cameroonian standards is any human settlement with a population of 5,000 or more oeonle. G.T. Kurian (ed.), op. cit. L. Tandap, 1982 (see note 5). _ “Land Issues in Low-Income Housing” in G.K. Payne (ed.) Low-Income Housing in the R. Zetter, Developing World: the role of Sites and Services and Settlement Upgrading (John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1984), p. 225. Republic of Cameroon, Vlth Five Year Economic, Social, and Cultural Development Plan 1986-1991 (National Printing Press, Yaounde, 1986), pp. 16%164. For a brief description of such a system, see for example A.I. Mabogunje, The Development Process: a Snatial Perspective (Holmes and Meier, New York, 1981). A.;. Mabogunje, op.‘ cit. p. 74. A.J. Njoh, “The Institutional Framework for Housing Policy Administration in Cameroon”, Habitat International 16, (3) (1992b). The 26 administrative districts of Cameroon during the German colonial era included (Mbuagbaw et al., 1987): Duala, Victoria, Jaunde, Ossidinge, Dschang, Edea, Kirbi, Limie, Jabassi, Ebolowa, Dume, Johann Albrechtshohe, Bare, Jukaduma, Banyo, Ukoko (Muni), Ikelemba (Lower Sanga), Bamenda, Wolo, Ntem. Middle Sanga, Upper Sanga, Logone, Iwindo, Mora, Garua, and Ngaundere. T.E. Mbuagbaw, R. Brain and R. Palmer, A History of the Cameroon (Longman, Hong Kong, 1987). Colonial Office, Cameroons Under the United Kingdom Administration: Report for the Year 1959 (Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, London, 1961). A.J. Nioh, 1992b (see note 12), p. 46. A.J. Njoh, 1992b (see note 12). p. 47. Reoublic of Cameroon, Land Tenure and Stare Lands (National Printing Press, Yaounde). A.J. Njoh, 1992b (see note 12), p. 47. A.J. Njon, 1992b (see note 12). G. Timsit. “Public Administration and Socio-cultural Environment in the Developing Countries”, in Public Administration and Management: Problems of Adaptation in Different Socio-Cultural Contexts (UNESCO. Hans Raj Gupta & Sons, New Delhi, 1982). G. Timsit, op. cit. p. 39. Here, the prefer. as in the French integrated prefectoral system of administration, serves as the ‘eyes and ears’ of the Head of State in the field or administrative division.

Ambe J. Njoh

98 24. 25.

W.P. Browne, Politics, Programs and Bureaucrats (National University Press, Port Washington. New York, 1980). M.W. DeLancev, “The Construction of the Cameroon Political Svstem: The Ahidio Years. 195&1982”. Journal of Contemporary

26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31.

32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42.

African Studies 6, 3-24 (1989), p. 62.

.

Republic of Cameroon, Vlth Five Year Economic, Social, and Cultural Development Plan J986-1991 (National Printing Press, Yaounde, 1986). Executive Director, UNCHS, “improvement of Municipal Management; Report of the Executive riyeqftor, United Nations Commission on Human Settlements” Habitat International 17, (1) (1993), A.J. ‘Njoh, “Institutional

Impediments

to Private Residential

Development

in Cameroon”,

Third

Wurfd P~annjng Review 14, (I) (1992a), p. 31. ibid. Executive Director, UNCHS, op. cit.

A.J. Njoh, “The Effectiveness Theory of Interorganizational Relations Explored in the Context of a Developing Nation”. International Review of Administrative Sciemes 59, (2) (19V3). A.J. Njoh, “Interorganizational Relations and Effectiveness in Housing Policy Administration: The institutional Development of the Housing Delivery System in Cameroon”, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis. University of London, 1990. In fact, based on empirical evidence uncovered in the two preceding studies, agencies that interact more frequently are more effective in terms of satisfying their clients than those that interacted less frequently. Quoted in “Land Management”, The Urban Edge, January/February, 1992. The Urban Edge, op. cit., p. 4. G. Timsit. op. cit. G. Timsit, op. cit., p. 44. D.C.I. Okpala, “The Institutional Element in the Effective Management of Urbanization in Nigeria”, Planning and Admin~strafion 2 (1986), pp. 39-47. For more of such examples, see Njoh (1990), (1992a), (1992b). op. cit. D.C.I. Okpala, op. cit. D.A. Rondinelli, Development Projects as Policy Experiments: An Adaptive Approach to Development Administration (Methuen & Co., London, 1983). D.A. Rondinelli, op. cit. J. Montgomery, “Allocation of Authority in Land Reform Programs: A Comparative Study of Administrative Processes and Outputs”, Administrative Sciences Quarterly ( 17)) 62-75. R. Chambers, Rural Development: Putting the Last First (Wiley. New York, 1983).