The living commons of West Tyrol, Austria: Lessons for land policy and land administration

Land Use Policy 38 (2014) 16–25

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The living commons of West Tyrol, Austria: Lessons for land policy and land administration Hein van Gils a , Gerhard Siegl b , Rohan Mark Bennett a,∗ a b

UNU School for Land Administration Studies, ITC Faculty, University of Twente, Enschede 7500 AE, Netherlands Department of History and European Ethnology, University of Innsbruck, Austria

a r t i c l e

i n f o

Article history: Received 18 June 2013 Received in revised form 7 October 2013 Accepted 11 October 2013 Keywords: Alpine pastoral commons Land administration Land tenure Land policy Ostrom’s design principles

a b s t r a c t A right of commoners to pastures existed since the Early Middle Ages in Anglo-Saxon England and the European mainland, including Tyrol in Austria. Lowland commons institutions were largely dissolved by the 19th century; however, in the European Alps contiguous commons remain alive. Some two thousand alpine commons institutions are registered in the Tyrolean parcel cadaster and land registry. A specific study of West-Tyrolean commons (known as Agrargemeinschaft or AGMs), framed by Ostrom’s design principles is presented. General lessons for land policy and land administration are extracted. An interview period was split between the Inn valley and the Ötztal. Roughly half are considered independent: others are regulated by the Tyrolean Agricultural Authority. Some AGMs hold the full bundle of land rights: others only hold pastoral and forestry rights. AGMs consisted either of a single cadastral parcel or several contiguous parcels. In the Inn valley villages the pastoral commons were owned by the municipalities, while in the researched Ötztal, AGMs are frequently the full owners of the commons. AGM membership ranges between 5 and 60 farm households. The number of livestock units pastured was in most cases stipulated in approved regulations. Alpine commons larger than 200 ha are also hunting-zones: revenue is collected from the lease of hunting rights. Most of the alpine commons are designated and used as skizones. Upper portions of two alpine commons in the Ötztal are state protected natural areas. The number of farms with pastoral rights is declining at District and State level. Key lessons for land policy and land administration include: Ostrom’s design principles being a precondition rather than a panacea; commons institutions requiring one clear ownership party; both public and collective ownership producing success; publically owned commons requiring a local representative; small membership numbers being preferable; small shareholdings not being preferable; decentralized governance being beneficial; internal democratic elections being beneficial; internal boundary records being superfluous; explicit sanctions being superfluous; mixed economies being acceptable; and geography being a significant influence on the longevity of pastoral commons. © 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Introduction ‘The tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin, 1968) has informed multilateral land policy for decades (e.g. World Bank, 1975; Feder, 1985; Perrings, 1993; Deininger and Binswanger, 1999; Rohde et al., 2006; MCC, 2012). Hardin opens with an allegory, a pasture ‘open to all’ used by pastoralists who maximize individual profits resulting in a Malthusian catastrophe. Hardin recommends enclosure as a means of preventing such tragedies. However, empirical evidence of pastoral commons open-to-all and the efficacy of enclosure are not provided (Handy, 2013). In reality, pastoral village commons are often collectively held lands with restricted and individual use rights (De Vries, 1976; Dahlman, 1980; Dickel and

∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +31 053 4874 339; fax: +31 053 4874 575. E-mail address: [email protected] (R. Mark Bennett). 0264-8377/$ – see front matter © 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2013.10.011

Mietzne, 1999; Weckl, 1968). Pastoral village commons without tragedy are also recorded side-by-side with enclosed, individually held degraded pastures in the same environment (Ward et al., 1998; Rohde et al., 2006). The apparent scarcity of degraded pastoral village commons suggests mechanisms other than enclosure are preventing a tragedy. Socio-political control mechanisms, now recognized as Ostrom’s design principles, have been identified by Ostrom (1990). Further, longevity of commons institutions is associated with a modest number of commoners (Wade, 1987). Inspired by Ostrom’s design principles, new pastoral commons such as ‘community-based natural resource management’ (CBNRM) including wildlife commons on pastoral commons (Nature Conservancies) have been instituted, notably in the pastoral regions of southern Africa (Blaiki, 2006; Dressler et al., 2010; NACSO, 2013; Suich, 2010, 2013). ‘Commons’ is a familiar concept in English and American scientific literature. However, a right of commoners to pastures has

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been practiced since the Early Middle Ages in Anglo-Saxon England and the European mainland (Oosterhuizen, 2011) including Tyrol (Grimm, 1910; Wopfner, 1995). Therefore the use of the AngloSaxon term for pastoral commons to represent the numerous local names (Annex) seems conceptually appropriate and practical. These commons consist of three elements, a relatively large parcel, a collective of commoners holding rights to the parcel, and tenure rules outlining the relationship between parcel and commoners. In the northwest European lowland and the Alps, the commoners are often the owners of ancestral farms (Annex). The acreage of the farm parcels defines the use-share in the pastoral commons (pro rata parte) and is expressed in animal units (De Vries, 1976; Dahlman, 1980; Dickel and Mietzne, 1999; Vivier, 1998; Holzner, 2007). During the Middle Ages, ownership of all lands including commons was progressively claimed by feudal landlords. Toward the end of medieval feudalism in the 15th century many lowland and alpine commons had obtained written rules and regulations (Slicher van Bath, 1960; Kos, 2009; Casari, 2007; Tagliapietra, 2011; Weckl, 1968). The lowland commons institutions in Europe were largely dissolved in the 18th and 19th century. This dissolution entailed partition of the commons parcel and allocation of a piece of the parcel to each of the commoners. In other cases entire commons are sold as hunting grounds, country estates, conifer plantations, or were nationalized and subsequently transferred to municipalities (Visser, 1975; Whited, 2000). In contrast, in the European Alps contiguous commons are alive. However, tenure information on contemporary pastoral commons appears to be absent, with the exception of the iconic Swiss village (Netting, 1976; Ostrom, 1990). Beyond Europe, alpine pastoral village commons are widespread in the Himalayas (Mohammad, 1989; Jodha, 2008; Bhasin, 2011) and the Andes (Westreicher et al., 2006). In contemporary Africa lowland village commons prevail in savanna and grassland biomes (Kalabamu, 2000). However, the land rights of African, Himalayan and Andean commoners are transferred privately, locally and orally across generations until recently. Demarcation and registration of pastoral commons in Africa commenced in Botswana during the late 1960s and subsequently in neighboring countries (e.g. Kapitango and Meijs, 2010; Malatsi and Finnström, 2011; cf. Kenya, 2007). About two thousand commons have been registered in the Tyrolean parcel cadaster since the mid-19th century and in the land registry (Grundbuch) since the early 20th century by collectives of farmers (e.g. Alminteressentschaften), currently known as Agrargemeinschaft - hereafter AGM. Half of these AGMs are independent while the other half is regulated by the Tyrolean Agricultural Authority (TAA; Agrarbehörde). Regulated AGMs have no access to civil law courts, but instead to state (Landesagrarsenat; LAS) and federal (Oberster Agrarsenat; OAS) agrarian tribunals and to the constitutional court (Verfassungsgerichtshof; VfGH). Recently, regulated AGMs have been categorized as either AGMs with their own land (typical AGM) or AGMs on public land (Gemeindegutsagrargemeinschaft; VfGH, 2008; TFLG-Novelle, 2010). These categories will be referred to as independent versus municipality AGM. The independent AGM holds the full bundle of land rights, whilst the municipality AGM holds only pastoral and forestry rights: other withdrawal rights (‘Substanz’) and their revenues are appropriated by the municipality. The withdrawal rights may include hunting, overpass for ski-slopes, ski-lifts, land lease and sale for buildings, telecom towers, access roads and quarries. Estimates on the proportion of AGMs on public land vary from a quarter to 60% (Landtag Tirol, 2011; Tiroler Gemeindezeitung, 2012). The distinction between independent AGM versus AGM on public land and the financial consequences are currently contested in the agrarian tribunals and constitutional court. In the second half of the 20th century three pan-European trends affect alpine commons, namely the transformation of subsistence

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farming, the growth of outdoor-tourism especially in winter, and the expansion of protected areas for nature conservation. As a result, land in the commons is in demand for ski-infrastructure and nature conservation. Farming has been surpassed by tourism as source of income in Alpine valleys. Most commoners are part-time farmers specializing in dairy farming but otherwise directly or indirectly employed in tourism (Agrarstrukturbehebung, 1999). In the meantime, alpine pastures are identified as hotspots of botanical diversity (WWF, 2004; Holzner, 2007) and considerable expanses are designated as Natura2000 areas (cf. EU, 1992). The lack of empirical information on the contemporary tenure of the European alpine commons invites further research. Empirical information on the commons is scarce and largely deals with ‘dead’ commons or commons in pre-modern societies and economies. The remarkable longevity of the European alpine commons provides us with an opportunity to extract generalized land policy and land administration lessons for other contexts. Specifically, the commons enable testing of the design principles for sustainable pastoral commons, postulated by Ostrom, for the first time in the context of a dual use of the commons for pastoralism and outdoortourism. From a more practical perspective, the Austrian Alps appears a promising research area for commons as their presence, extent, number and boundaries appear extractable from the online cadaster (DKM, 2012). Finally, policy lessons learnt from Tyrolean commons may contribute to the discourse on the new commons, the CBNRM programs worldwide especially the well-published Communal Area Conservancy Program in Namibia (NACSO, 2013), that seem unaware of their parallels in the Alps and vice versa (Dressler et al., 2010; Lapeyere, 2010; Siegl and Schermer, 2008; Suich, 2010, 2013). The remainder of the article is structured as follows: the research design including an outline of Ostrom’s design principles is provided; the study areas are described and justified; results are presented under themes relating to the Ostrom design principles; key discussion points are covered; and finally a synthesis of key lessons is presented in accompaniment with suggestions for future research.

Research design The overarching methodology was qualitative in nature, with some additional quantitative data captured as a result of interview data compilation. Ostrom’s design principles aided both data collection activities and subsequent analysis. A case study approach was utilized: documents, interviews, and gray literature were gathered over specific locations maintaining AGMs. The data acquired was synthesized, tabulated where appropriate, and used to undertake the analysis against Ostrom’s design principles. The procedure qualitatively revealed levels of adherence to Ostrom’s design principles, and also enabled the extraction of generalized land policy and land administration lessons regarding the management of commons. Among the Austrian states, Tyrol was selected as a research site because about half of its surface, that is three quarters of the farmland is commons and a third of these commons contains winter sports’ grounds. West Tyrol shows the highest proportion of alpine pastures held by AGMs (Holzner, 2007). The interview period (08–15 October 2012) was split between the two major valleys in West-Tyrol, the Inn valley and the Ötztal, to allow detection of spatial diversity of commons tenure. Historically (Graf, 1880), the upper Inn valley is known to contain both commons on public land (Gemeindealmen) and independent commons (Interessentschaften). Within the Inn valley, the Serfaus-Fiss-Ladis area was selected for its extensive alpine commons. The upper-end of the Ötztal was chosen because the Alpine Research Station of the University of

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Innsbruck in Obergurgl could provide expertise and contacts with neighboring landlords. Ten interviews were planned. Although this number may seem low, the authoritative literature on commons is often without evidence of any concrete case (e.g. Hardin, 1968; Dahlman, 1980) and historical research (e.g. Netting, 1976; Whited, 2000; Kos, 2009) and court cases often deal with one or a few commons. Consequently, ten cases are suggested to provide a contribution to the knowledge about commons. The interviews themselves were semi-structured and used Ostrom (1990) design principles as thematic areas for inquiry. In no specific order these were: (P-1) the group boundary definition; (P-2) the alignment of rules governing collective use of goods and local conditions; (P-3) the rule modification processes and the role of those impacted by the rules; (P-4) the recognition of self-management by external authorities; (P-5) group behavior monitoring processes; (P-6) graduated systems of sanctions; (P-7) low-cost conflict resolution mechanisms; and (P-8) the existence of nested governance enterprises where the commons form part of larger systems. Justification for utilization of Ostom’s paradigm lies in its widespread recognition in the field of common pool resource management, and its consideration of issues central to both land policy and land administration – the central focus of the research. The Inn valley municipalities (n = 3) received questionnaires in German in advance. Simultaneously, questionnaires were mailed to AGMs (n = 2) traceable on the web (Serfaus; Ladis). Short semi-structured interviews were granted by the Serfaus and Fiss municipalities (n = 2) and the AGM in Ladis (n = 1): the outline of the questionnaire was followed as much as practical. Remaining questions were answered by both municipalities from March to May 2013. In the Ötztal, the Alpine Research Station contacted the neighboring AGMs (n = 8) and the municipality (n = 1) for an interview. As a result seven (n = 7) questionnaires were mailed to AGMs. Upon our arrival in the valley the potential interviewees (n = 10) were telephoned to arrange a date, time and venue for an interview. Four AGMs (n = 4) in the Ötztal completed the questionnaire and could be interviewed each for an hour; the information on a fifth was provided through the neighboring AGM. Between interviews a time-slot was reserved for spontaneous provision of information beyond the questionnaire. All interviews were conducted in German by the first author. The metadata of the interviews (n = 8) are provided in Table 1. DKM (2012) was used to extract cadastral and municipal boundaries, parcel numbers, point locations of pastoral commons (Almen), forest types, ski-zones, hunting zones and nature conservation areas. Our questionnaire survey was complemented and cross-checked by analysis of census and spatial data of the commons. The census-based land use statistics per municipality (Statistik Austria, 2012) provide the number and extent of full-time and part-time individual farm and forest enterprises as well as the number of juridical persons running a farm or forest enterprise. The Alm-cadaster (Almkataster, 1986) contains the number of alpine pastures per municipality. The shareholders of the ski-infrastructure companies are provided by FirmenABC (2013). Further, laws, case law, statutes and pertinent publications of local and regional government were consulted.

Fig. 1. Location map covering the southern portion of West-Tyrol, Austria. Shown are the municipalities of Ladis, Fiss, Serfaus and Sölden, the river Inn and its tributary the Ötztaler Ache.

Research area

Results

Research was undertaken at two sites in West-Tyrol, firstly at three contiguous municipalities in the upper Inn valley (Serfaus, Fiss and Ladis) and secondly in the string of villages and hamlets at the apex of the Ötztal, from Zwieselstein to Obergurgl in the Sölden municipality (Fig. 1). Serfaus and Fiss each have around one thousand inhabitants, Ladis, Zwieselstein and Obergurgl about half

As per the research design, key results are presented using themes that closely relate to Ostrom’s design principles. In order, these include: group boundaries; rules governing land uses; membership and rule modification; interconnectedness with outside authorities; and monitoring behaviors, sanctioning, and dispute resolution.

Administrative boundaries and rivers generalized from DKM (2012).

that number. Over 4000 people live in the thirty or so villages and hamlets of the municipality of Sölden. The population of Serfaus, Fiss and Ladis declined from 1869 onwards but has grown since the 1960s. Sölden’s population was stagnant from 1869 onwards but growth started earlier in the 1930s (Statistik Austria, 2012). Currently cattle are grazed on the commons at both sites in shortdistance summer pastoralism (<15 km). In addition, long-distance sheep pastoralism is practiced at the Ötztal site, also across the Italian border. Our commons in the Ötztal are partly situated within the ‘Ötztaler Alpen’ Nature2000 protected area. A small (20 ha) nature reserve (Zirbenwald) is included. Further, the alpine commons are seamlessly zoned as hunting grounds (Jagdkataster (DKM, 2012)). Chamois (Gams) occurs in all, while Ibex is limited to the Masner and Lader Heuberg commons in Serfaus. The montane forest in the Inn valley and Ötztal are coniferous and consist largely of spruce (P. abies) mixed with larch (L. decidua), both commercial timbers. Scots pine (P. sylvestris) dominates at lower elevations in the Inn valley. Sandwiched between the alpine pastures and the spruce belt are Swiss pine (P. cembra) forests. Forest is typically zoned as ‘protection forest (Schutzwald)’ for control of avalanches, landslides and rock falls, implying prohibition of clear-cutting, but permitting sustainable logging and fuel wood harvesting. None of the forests in the research sites is state or federal property, but summits and glaciers are.

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Table 1 The alpine pastoral commons (Almen) in the apex of the Ötztal from Zwieselstein to Obergurgl (1–5) and in the upper Inn valley: Serfaus-Fiss-Ladis (6–8). Listed are the function of the interviewee (first column); the name of the commons as in Almkataster (1986) and the topographic map (second column); the municipality of the ancestral farms and the municipality of the pastoral commons (third column); and the cadastral parcels within the commons (last column). Function

Commons parcel

MUNIa/b

Parcel ID

1 2 3 4 5 6

CEO AGMc CEO AGM Secr. AGM CEO AGM CEO AGM CEO AGM

7

Dep. Mayor

8

Office Head Municipality

Rotmoos-Kippele Angerer Alm Gaislachalpe Timmeltalalpe Verwallalpe Lawens/Lader Lader Urg Wanne/Kuhalm Platzör Frommes Schöngamp Komperdell Kerb Masner Heuberg

Sölden/Sölden Sölden/Sölden Sölden/Sölden Sölden/Sölden Sölden/Sölden Ladis/Serfaus Ladis/Fiss Fiss/Fiss Fiss/Fiss Fiss/Fiss Fiss/Fiss Serfaus/Serfaus Serfaus/Serfaus Serfaus/Serfaus Ladis/Serfaus

5325/1;5323;5324;5326; 5327 4929/1; 4928/1 1501/1; 1501/2; 1501/4;6400/1; 1679 4905/1; 4910/1; 4906 5133; 5220/1 2323/1; 2115/2; 2115/4; 2115/5 2166 2158/1; 2143/1;2166 2160/1; 2160/2 2146/3; 2149 2159; 2160/1 2369; 2114/1 and others 2114/1 2326 2321

MUNIa/b , (a) municipality of the wintering farms/(b) municipality of the pastoral commons. CEO AGMc , Chief Executive Officer (Obmann) of the commons cooperative (Agrargemeinschaft).

Group boundaries Commons consisted either of a single cadastral parcel or several contiguous parcels (Tables 1 and 2) in a spatially nested hierarchy with the municipality (Figs. 2 and 3). The commons are generally situated in the municipality of the ancestral farms except for Ladis (Tables 1 and 2) with commons in Fiss and Serfaus. The ancestral farms are grouped in compact villages and hamlets surrounded by hay-meadows. Upslope of the villages stretches a coniferous forest belt and alpine pastures unfold upwards from 1800 m (Figs. 4 and 5). The parcel boundaries of the pastoral commons were known by all interviewees from the online cadaster (DKM, 2012) as well as on the ground. Although incompletely demarcated on the ground, boundaries of commons are respected by the neighbors as testified by all informants.

municipality to a hunting cooperative (Genossenschaftsjagd) of resident parcel owners (Serfaus: surface area minus Masner, Heuberg and Urg; Fiss: entire municipality; Timmelstalalpe). All our interviewees report revenue from the lease of hunting rights (Table 2).

Rules governing land uses The number of livestock units pastured on the commons during summer was in most cases stipulated in the AGM regulations approved by the TAA. For example on the Timmelstalalpe, 87 cattle units were statutorily allowed (I-4). In all except one case (I-3) unused livestock shares of members were taken up for a fee by farmers from neighboring villages (Table 2). Consequently contemporary livestock numbers on the alpine pasture corresponded to the level stipulated in the AGM regulations of decades ago (I-4; I-6). In addition to cattle, two commons in the Ötztal accommodated sheep and goat herds of non-members for a fee (I-4 and I-5). Members do not pay grazing fees (Table 2). The Ladis AGM (I-6) reported that the maximum allowed stocking density in a dry summer resulted in untimely depletion of the pasture and subsequent premature descent of the cattle to their winter quarters. Further, the high cost of bush control, was spontaneously mentioned by the same interviewee. Regulators of livestock numbers at the alpine commons were reported at three levels. Two interviewees (I-1; I-2) emphasized self-regulation by the AGM, while others (I-3; I-5) mentioned state regulation (TAA). A third, more indirect control was found to be a maximum stocking density stipulated in the context of an EU subsidy (I-3). One AGM, the smallest, appears unregulated for livestock numbers (Table 2: I-5). The alpine commons larger than 200 ha (Table 2) are also hunting-zones (Eigenjagd: Masner, Lader Heuberg, Lader Urg, Gaislach, Rotmoos-Kippele, Verwall, Angerer). The hunting right may be leased to third parties. Parcels smaller than 200 ha are consolidated in contiguous hunting grounds and mandatorily leased by the

Fig. 2. The location of the studied pastoral commons in the southern portion of the municipality Sölden in the Ötztal: Gaislachalpe, Timmeltalalm, Angerer Alm, Verwallalpe oder Verwall (alpe) and Rotmoos-Kippele Alpe. Cadastral boundaries, rivers, village and hamlet locations generalized from TirisMaps (2012).

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Table 2 Summary of interview responses and document analysis. Interview

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Valley Municipality Commons parcel (Alm/Alpe)

Ötztal Sölden Rotmoos-Kippele

Ötztal Sölden Angerer

Ötztal Sölden Gaislach

Ötztal Sölden Timmeltal

Ötztal Sölden Verwall

Inn Ladis Lader Urg Lawens Heuberg

Inn Serfaus Komperdell Kerb Masner

Alm/Alpe ha

1100

630

900

1100

660

720 370 720

Village/Hamlet Owner Hunting lease Ski-Infra lease Land lease/sale No. of membersb,c Transfer use shares Annual assembly AGM/external fee Herders Stock density limit Regulator Grazing rules Sanctions

Obergurgl AGM AGM AGM AGM 7 (6) Yes Yes No/yes None Yes AGM Yes No

Angerer AGM AGM AGM AGM 15 Yes Yes No None Yes AGM Yes No

Z-steina AGM AGM AGM AGM 43 (41) No Yes No Yes Yes EU/TAA Yes Yes

Z-stein AGM AGM AGM None 13 Yes Yes No Yes Yes None Yes No

Pirchhütt AGM AGM AGM AGM 5 Yes No No None No TAA No No

Ladis MUNI AGM MUNI MUNI 67 (27) Yes na No/yes No info No info No info No info No info

Inn Fiss WanneKuhalm Platzör Schöngamp Frommes 420 400 400 170 Fiss MUNI MUNI MUNI MUNI 40 No info No info No info 4 No info MUNI No info No info

a b c

450 250 860 Serfaus MUNI AGM MUNI MUNI 60 Yes Yes No info 7-8 No No info No info No

Z-stein, Zwieselstein. In round brackets (00): number of farm owners (some natural persons own 2 farms). In square brackets [00]: farming members.

Most of the alpine commons are designated and used as skizones for part of their surface. The exceptions are the Lader Urg and Heuberg commons (DKM, 2012) in the Serfaus municipality (Table 2 and Fig. 3). The ski-infrastructure (ski-lifts, restaurants) is built and owned by local shareholder companies (Ltd; GmbH). The companies have a few large shareholders in the Ötztal (Hochgurgler Lift GmbH; Ötztaler Gletscherbahn GmbH), many small shareholders in Fiss (Fisser-Bergbahnen GmbH) or the municipality as majority shareholder in Serfaus (Seilbahn Komperdell

GmbH). All our informants report lease revenues received from skiinfrastructure companies (Table 2). In the Inn valley revenue flows to the municipality, in the Ötztal to the AGM. In the same way land lease and land sale of the commons is autonomously managed by the AGMs in the Ötztal and directly (Fiss) or indirectly (Serfaus; Ladis) via the AGM by the municipalities in the Inn valley. The upper portions of two alpine commons in the Ötztal (Table 1: Rotmoos-Kippele and Verwall; Fig. 2) are included in the Ötztaler Alpen Natura2000 protected area. At the lower end of the Rotmoos-Kippele commons the Nature Monument Zirbenwald is situated. The lower portions of all commons are ski-zones (Schigebiet) supporting ski-infrastructure. Evidently, ski-zones and protected areas are mutually exclusive. The two AGMs of pastoral commons including Natura2000 areas did not report any constraint caused by the protection status of their lands (I-1; I-5). As the protected patch of Swiss pine forest was considered unsuitable for fuel wood or timber production by the AGM (I-1), its conservation status was accepted. In this regard, some of the commons appear to exhibit characteristics of a public private partnership (PPP). That is, a government activity is being financed and operated through a partnership of government agencies and the AGMs.

Membership and rule modification

Fig. 3. The location of the studied pastoral commons in the Serfaus, Fiss and Ladis municipalities in the Inn valley. Boundaries and rivers generalized from DKM (2012).

Membership of the AGMs ranged between 5 and 60 farm households. Only farmers held pastoral entitlements. The number of farms (full- plus part-time) with pastoral rights to the commons in the Inn valley villages (Serfaus, Fiss and Ladis) were stable between 1995 and 1999, while numbers are declining at District and State level (Statistik Austria, 2012). A similar trend analysis cannot be made for the researched Ötztal villages and hamlets, because the statistics are aggregated at the wider municipality level (Sölden). Some AGMs reported institutional members including the municipality (I-8) or a school and church (I-6) without pastoral rights. Not all farming members participate in summer pasturing (I-1: 4 out of 6; I-4: 2 out of 13) as cattle farming is only for a small minority of members the principal source of income. Nearly all farming

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Fig. 4. Elevation profile of the land use and cover in the upper Inn valley. From left (west) to right (east), Furgler summit, Komperdell Alm, forested slope, plateau with Serfaus village surrounded by fields, steep forested slope and the river Inn (between Ried and Tösens). Horizontal scale factor: 0.5. Prepared with the profile tool and data of Tirol Atlas (2012).

members are part-time farmers with full-time off-farm employment. Further, the survey showed that the elected chief executive officer (Obmann) of AGMs serves a renewable five-year term of office. The smallest AGM (5 members) informally selected a chief executive (Table 2). Half of the AGMs hired herders (Table 2). Relationship with outside authorities The two research sites each represent an alternative form of tenure for pastoral commons (Table 2). In the Inn valley municipality AGMs are found. In the Serfaus AGM, the municipality is an AGM member and is represented on the executive committee. The municipal representative ratified land transactions. Further,

the AGM reportedly relinquished land for public use on request to the municipality at compensation costs for lost pasture rather than at market rates. In addition to the full bundle of withdrawal (substance) rights, the Serfaus municipality owns the dairy on the Komperdell Alm. In Fiss, the AGM transferred ownership and management of the alpine commons to the municipality in the 1970s and retained only the pastoral and forest use rights. The Fiss AGM was converted to a user cooperative (Interessentschaft). The two Inn valley AGMs (Serfaus and Ladis) transferred revenues resulting from the withdrawal (substance) rights to municipalities. In contrast to the Inn valley, four among five alpine commons in the Ötztal were found to be independent AGMs holding the full bundle of land rights. Consequently, these four AGMs in the Ötztal did have not to transfer revenues to the municipality (Sölden). Our sample included an AGM (I-3) that disagrees with the municipality’s (Sölden) claim on the ownership of the substance rights in their pastoral commons. However, money had not been transferred by the AGM to the Sölden municipality at the time of the interview. The contested tenure of this AGM (Gaislachalpe) as identified in the survey is reflected in official publications. It is listed as municipality AGM (Tiroler Gemeindezeitung, 2012), but absent as such from another inventory (Landtag Tirol, 2011). Regarding cross-border interactions (e.g. Italy), no specific issues were reported by the interviewed AGMs. However, interviews were not undertaken with the sheep owning AGMs of South-Tirol, Italy. Monitoring behaviors, sanctioning, and dispute resolution

Fig. 5. Elevation profile of the land use and cover in the upper Ötztal. From left (west) to right (east), the river (Gurgler Ache), Untergurgl/Angern hamlet surrounded by fields, forested slope, Angerer Alm, glacier, water divide = Austrians-Italian border and glacier at the Italian side. Horizontal scale factor: 0.5. Prepared with the profile tool and data of Tirol Atlas (2012).

The AGM pasture manager (Alpmeister) and hired herders monitored adherence to AGM and external regulations every second to third day during the summer pasturing season. In addition, cattle owners (I-6) visit their cattle during weekends. Occasionally, trespassing of a (unfenced) pasture boundary by cattle was observed, the neighboring AGM notified and strayed cattle driven back (I8). Sanctions for trespassing were considered superfluous by all informants. A case of diseased livestock delivered for summer pasturing was reported to the Veterinary Inspectorate for sanctioning (I-3) (Table 2). Otherwise, the interviewees did not recount any

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violation by commoners or sanctions against commoners. The two available AGM statutes (I-4; I-6) do not foresee fining by the AGM of its members. Instead, the AGM may petition the regulator (TAA) to collect receivables when a member negates on contributions in kind (labor) or cash and fine members for violations of AGM statute, AGM regulations or management plan. Discussion Discussion points are synthesized using a number of themes: adherence to Ostrom’s design principles; the numbers game; the role of geography; tenure reclassification and insecurity; mixed economies and commons; and the last of the Marken? These themes summarize the findings with respect to the original aims of the paper, but, also highlight revealed points of interest or unexpected findings.

decline. A continued growth in tourism could ultimately result in a very small number of commoners with an interest in the pastoral commons. Four scenarios may be envisaged. AGMs may voluntarily dissolve following the example of Fiss, transfer their land to the municipality and continue as user cooperative of dairy farmers holding pastoral and/or forestry rights on public land. A second option seems that a few members acquire neighboring ancestral farms with pastoral rights on their commons (I-4), thus achieving economies of scale. As a third alternative, commons may be offered for sale to local ski-lift companies as these have a substantial economic interest in the alpine commons. Finally, enclosure of the commons into paddocks suitable for sheep grazing may be viable from a farming perspective, although the resulting fragmentation and fencing may be considered unfortunate for their use as winter sport ground. The role of geography

Adherence to Ostrom’s design principles The commoners in Tyrol do not report a Malthusian tragedy for people, pasture or stock. The AGMs generally conform to the first three of Ostrom’s eight (8) design principles, while internal behavior monitoring (P-5) and graduated sanctions by the AGM against members (P-6) seems currently redundant. Informal, social sanctions seem sufficient within the small villages and hamlets. However, self-determination within the AGM (P-4) beyond pastoralism and forestry has been weakened since the 1990s for an unknown and contested number of AGMs on public land: subsequently the cost of external conflict resolution (P-7) increases. The increasing number of contested AGMs on public land suggested the interconnected system of nested governance tiers (P-8) is experiencing change or is fragmenting. Consequently, following the Ostrom design principles, the sustainability of the Tyrolean commons is at risk. On the other hand, the commons in northwestern European lowland were governed following the same principles as currently in Tyrol and have been abolished nonetheless. Consequently, Ostrom’s design principles may be a precondition for longevity of alpine commons, but is not in itself a sufficiently robust explanation.

The continuity of contiguous medieval highland commons till today in the Alpine countries (Austria, Switzerland, Italia and France) suggests the triumph of geography over governance as a guarantee for longevity. In the highlands, the extent of haymeadows and crop fields providing feed in winter is limited by mountainous conditions (cold climate, relief and shallow soils), year-round livestock numbers are constrained by winter feed and consequently premature depletion of summer pastures is prevented. In addition, the Alps have been peripheral to urban agricultural commodity markets up to the mid-20th century hampering development of market-oriented farming. Instead of a ‘tragedy’, the commons in Tyrol are the resource base for a mix of market-oriented livestock farming and outdoor-tourism. Employment and investment opportunities in tourism allowed population growth in villages and hamlets thus counteracting the rural depopulation and poverty found in many mountain ranges. Arguably, the commons have facilitated the corporate investment in skiinfrastructure: local investors could lease land for the infrastructure from a single institution rather from a large number of farm parcel owners. Tenure reclassification and insecurity

The numbers game From within the sampled AGMs (Table 2), those on public land, found in the Inn valley (42.3; SD 13.6; n = 3), appear to have more member farms than the independent AGMs found in the Öetztal (17.6; SD 4.1; n = 4)1 (Table 2).The number of members of the living commons in Tyrol (5–60 member farms) found in this research is within the range (9–77) reported for historical commons (marken) in the Netherlands (De Moor and Weeren, 2012) and Italy (Stoeckle, 2009). The membership of the Tyrolean commons is low compared to the several hundred or even thousands of members per Nature Conservancy (NACSO, 2013). Further, the European commons have a set number of member farms. Currently, farmers represent a minority (<5%) among the employed in the Tyrolean municipalities. In addition most Tyrolean commons include regulated livestock numbers. In the Namibian Conservancies all residents are member (Republic of Namibia, 1996; NACSO, 2013) and stock numbers appear unregulated. Whilst relatively small membership numbers appear to have benefits, they also pose a potential threat – particularly if a declining trend is evident. It remains to be seen whether the low number of commoners bringing cattle to the pastures is stabilizing or in

1 Whilst Table 2 lists 5 independent AGMs, the ownership of one is currently contested (Gaislach) and not included in the calculations.

AGMs with land holdings recently reclassified as public land (in 2010) face insecurity of tenure and income. The reclassification appears not always clear-cut from the cadaster or land registry. Ambiguity prevails on whether hunting and commercial forestry is a component of the pasture and forest use rights or count as withdrawal rights. In the latter case, the municipality could appropriate additional revenues. The consequences of revenue transfer from the AGM to municipality for management of the commons for the dual purpose of pastoralism and tourism (e.g. access roads and bush control) add to the uncertainty. Will municipalities take up the estate management responsibility of AGMs cost-effectively? Will AGMs be allowed to withhold realistic management fees from their revenues? Additionally, the number of AGMs affected by these changes is not known. The ramifications of this issue have yet to be translated into policy or legislation for limitation of collateral damage to the commons and the wider economy (TFLG-Novelle, 2010). As an urgent matter of policy, the cadastral and land registry entries of all regulated AGMs may need to be systematically compiled, compared and reassessed. The alternative is a clarification by judicial proceedings for individual commons over a considerable time period. The current dispute also suggests a policy of registering the full bundle of land rights of commons explicitly at first opportunity. This might prevent ambiguities as novel land uses emerge, such as ski-tourism. The same issue applies with regards to safari tourism in Africa in the

H. van Gils et al. / Land Use Policy 38 (2014) 16–25

20th century, or wind turbine placement for electricity generation in other contexts. 5. The mixed economy of contemporary commons In both the Tyrolean commons and the southern African pastoral and wildlife commons, a contemporary trend is observed from subsistence pastoralism to a dual economy of market-oriented livestock production and outdoor-tourism. Tyrolean commons are managed as multi-sector estates of pastures, forests, hunting and sport grounds including access roads. The wildlife (Namibian Conservancies) and pastoral commons (Traditional Authority), for example, co-exist as two independent cooperatives on the same land. Further, pastoral commons and protected areas (Natura2000) overlap in Tyrol (and exhibit the characteristics of a PPP as discussed), while the Namibian wildlife commons and State Protected Areas are mutually exclusive (NACSO, 2013). The hypothesis regarding PPPs is suggested as an area for further investigation: lessons from the extensive literature body on PPPs may be transferrable to the realm of pastoral commons management.

6.

7.

8.

The last remnants of the Marken? 9. The contemporary Tyrolean pastoral commons display striking institutional similarities to historical commons in northwestern Europe reinforcing the unifying commons terminology of this paper. In both cases, pastures are held collectively while grazing rights are held individually by the owners of a set of ancestral farms. These grazing shares are proportional to farm size and expressed in animal units. Further, the commons parcels occur in a spatially nested hierarchy with the territories of municipalities in both areas. These institutional similarities of the Tyrolean and northwest European pastoral commons appear too fundamental and particular to be coincidental. Therefore, we suggest that the Germanic tribes colonizing the Alps, and England, after the collapse of the Roman Empire imported their tenure template for pastoral commons from the northwestern European lowlands. Indeed, the Tyrolean pastoral commons are historically known as ‘Marken’ (Grimm, 1910) as are their equivalents in northwestern Europe till today (e.g. Dickel and Mietzne, 1999). Further research could investigate this hypothesis. Conclusions This paper aimed to assess whether a living commons exhibiting multi-purpose land uses adhered to Ostrom’s design principles. Further, it aimed to extract new land policy and land administration lessons for the management of commons. In this regard, the following twelve (12) summarizing remarks are presented: 1. Ostrom a precondition not a panacea (see section “Adherence to Ostrom’s design principles”). 2. One commons. One owner. It appears pertinent to allocate overarching ownership rights of commons with a single party, be it the municipality or the collective of the commoners, and legally allow for both options. 3. Both public and collective ownership can work. Both public (municipality) and collective private ownership (AGM) of shared pastures land can be sustainable in terms of allowing for economic development, and dual pastoral and out-door tourism use. 4. Public ownership? Local presence needed. The owner needs a local presence, be it the municipality or the collective of the commoners. This is the case in West-Tyrol where public land ownership implies municipal ownership. However, in Africa

10. 11.

12.

23

public usually means national or state ownership: too far away to interact meaningfully with commoners. Small membership is beautiful. Membership numbers up to a maximum of one hundred, or so, appear to work better. Small shareholdings are not beautiful. The membership boundary of the group should be clearly defined and limited to those who have a share in a given, limited amount of land (ancestral farm). This avoids individual shares becoming too small (e.g. half a cow) as land is split over generations. Decentralized governance helps. Land policy, legislation, or regulation decisions appear to work better when decentralized to the subnational (state) level (Tyrol) and implemented at the municipal level. Such subnational approaches are not present in the published African examples mentioned in the Introduction (e.g. Namibia, Botswana). Arguably, in these contexts, governments are concerned about regions breaking away from the patchwork nation: decentralization is not allowed. Internal democratic elections help. Use internal democracy for the election of the CEO of the AGM. As the membership base grows this will tend to lead toward municipal land ownership. Smaller membership bases tend to collective private ownership. Such internal democracy is not distinguishable in the Africa examples. Internal boundary records are superfluous. The external spatial boundaries of the group are more important to define than the internal. Only external spatial boundaries of the commons need be registered in a state or national cadastre/land registry: on-ground demarcation and high precision surveying seem unnecessary and are of low priority for sustainability. Explicit sanctions are superfluous. Explicit, financial sanctions by the commons institution seem largely superfluous. Mixed economies can grow organically. Formal or informal partnerships between public institutions and commoners can develop organically. Public-private partnerhsips are active and successful in West-Tyrol at the local level between municipalities and the commons institutions. State legislation neither actively promoted nor prevented the partnerhsips. The triumph of geography. It appears the geographic location of an AGM largely actively determines the longevity of a pastoral commons.

Finally, regarding future research, the hypotheses regarding (1) the transferability of lessons from PPPs literature, and (2) the historical importation by Germanic tribes of their own tenure templates from the European lowlands, could inspire further research activities. Acknowledgements The Alpine Forschungsstelle Obergurgl (University of Innsbruck) in the person of Dr. Klaus Schallhart facilitated the interviews and subsequently the composition of the co-author team. The interviewed municipal officials and AGM executives are kindly remembered for their friendly willingness to answer questions and complete questionnaires. However, any misinterpretation of the quoted information is solely the responsibility of the authors. Frederick Yirilabuo (Elected District Council member, Ghana) selected and shaped the ‘Tyrolean Alpine Commons’ as MSc thesis theme at the University of Twente to identify parallels and contrast with African pastoral commons. This paper hopefully helps to design a policy for sustainable commons. Prof. Tine de Moor (University of Utrecht) is acknowledged for stimulating questions and discussions in particularly on the issue of sanctions and for information on the number of members of eight commons in the Eastern Netherlands.

24

H. van Gils et al. / Land Use Policy 38 (2014) 16–25 Table A.2 (Continued)

Appendix A.

Municipality

See Tables A.1 and A.2.

Juridical persona No

AGMb

AGMc

No

No

Alpine Pastured No

Frommes Schöngamp Platzör Lader Urg (Ladis)

Table A.1 Historical indigenous names for pastoral commons on the European continent. Commons; land parcel

Location; current country

Allmende Alpe or Alm Dorfmarken Feld Gemeinsgrund Gemein/Gemain Gemeindeweide Gemene gronden Mark(e) Markegronden Meent(gronden) Montagne Monte (Vecin˜ al en Man Com´ un)

Austria, Germany, Switzerland Austria, Switzerland, Germany, Italy (Südtirol) Austria Germany Germany Austria Netherlands; Germany Belgium, Netherlands Germany, Netherlands Netherlands Netherlands, Belgium France Spain

Commoners; natural persons Alpgenossen Eigengeërfden Erfgooiers Geerfden Markgenossen Markgenoten Teiler

Switzerland Netherlands Netherlands Netherlands Germany Netherlands Switzerland

Commons institution; juridical person Agrargemeinschaft Austria Alpgenossenschaft Switzerland; Germany Alpgeteilschaft Switzerland (Alp) Interessentschaft Italy (Südtirol), Austria Boermarke Netherlands Communes France Gemeinheit Germany Marke(genootschap) Niederlande Markgenossenschaft Germany, Austria Nachbarschaft Austria Italy Riordinamento delle associazioni agrarie Commons statute Alpbrief Carte di regola Einung Markeboek Regulierungsbescheid Schaarbrief Wilkeuren

Austria Italy Switzerland Netherlands Austria Netherlands Netherlands

Ancestral farms with pastoral rights to commons Erf Netherlands Stammsitzliegenschaft Austria Volle hoeve Netherlands

Table A.2 Number of juridical persons owning a farm or forest enterprise, AGMs on public land (municipalities) and alpine pastures per municipality in the researched Inn valley municipalities according to various sources. Municipality

Juridical persona No

AGMb

AGMc

Alpine Pastured No

Alpine pasturee

No

No

Serfaus

2

1

3

7

Komperdell Kälbermais Kerb Masner high & low Heuberg (Ladis) Lawens (Ladis)

Fiss

1

0

1

4

Wanne Kuhalm

Alpine pasturee

Ladis

3

1

1

0

None

a

Number of Farm & Forest enterprises owned by a juridical person (Agrarstrukturbehebung, 1999); the juridical person may be an AGM or municipality. b AGM on public land; Landtag Tirol; Anfrage 385/11 (2011). c AGM on public land; Tiroler Gemeindezeitung (2012); includes AGMs of neighboring municipalities with forest/access rights. d Number of ‘alpine pastures’ (Almen; Almkataster, 1986). e Alpine pastures (Almen); point locations in TirisMaps (2012).

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