The ontology of the natural sciences as a truncheon

0732-l 18X/91 $3 00 + 0 00 0 1991 Pergdmon Press plc

THE ONTOLOGY

OF THE NATURAL TRUNCHEON*

SCIENCES AS A

UWE LAUCKEN Institute for Research into Man-Environment Relations, Department of Psychology, University of Oldenburg, Kirkenweg 5, D-2900 Oldenburg, Germany Die Geschichte aller positiven Wissenschaften zeigt, daB sie nur momentan aus den Traumen erwachen und die Augen aufschlagen nach dem Sein des Seienden, das sie erforschen. Martin Heidegger QUALIFYING Bunge’s

“methodological

INTRODUCTORY

skepticism”

(p. 131)

REMARKS

is based

not only on methodical

any certified empirical evidence,” arguments (e.g., “so far nobody has produced objects,” p. p. 133) but also on ontological ones (e.g., “there are no immaterial 135). My commentary will be limited to considering the ontological line of argumentation. My criticism I think those

of Bunge’s use of ontological arguments does not mean at all that buildings of ideas toward which he directs them (e.g., toward

“disembodied

souls,” “telepathy,

” “clairvoyance”)

are acceptable

from a scientific

point of view. My commentary will be dealing only with a certain line of argumentation, with the way it works, and with the question of whether any other way of thinking must inevitably be regarded as unscientific. DIFFERENT If we compare between

different

These differences moda of thinking. cognition

the

MODES OF THINKING

ways of thinking

scientific

of different

disciplines),

we find

scientists

(be it within

the ways are quite

or

different.

can be made clear by subdividing them according to different Each mode of thinking is characterized by a certain method of

(the “how” of gaining

knowledge)

and by a certain

conception

of the

object to be investigated (the “what” of the analysis, the factual “there is,” the implicit or explicity ontology). In the words of Wittgenstein, tell me how you are looking, and I’ll tell you what you will find. There is an analytic connection between the respective method of cognition and the conception of the object; both are of equal origin. In other words, there is no method of cognition that is neutral with regard to its object. Scientists (cf., Herrmann, 1976, p. 104), thinking that one could well research without the object of research if only the right methods this connection. one’s research

reflections on the conception of of cognition were chosen, ignore

This can have one of two consequences: One can either base on an object-conception that fits the method but is unreflected

*Commentary on M. Bunge (1991) A skeptic’s beliefs and disbeliefs, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 131-149. 203

U. Laucken

204 (according used

that

to Heidegger are

the normal

not appropriate

case),

to the

psychology, well analyzed by Smedslund of investigating semantic (“psycho-logic”) conceived

as causal

or, what is f-ar worse,

methods

are

object.

One example from the field of habit (e.g., 1988), is the very common relations in the same way as relations

(in the sense of natural

sciences).

A further

example,

called

“naturalization of consciousness” by Husserl (1965), will be discussed in further detail below (for a more differentiated discussion of different modes of thinking and their consequences, see Laucken, 1989). The example of psychology may help to explain briefly in what way methods of cognition create their own object (and vice versa). For the psychologist looking for cause-effect relations, in the sense of the natural sciences, the world consists such as stimuli and behavior. For the of space-filling states and events, one, that is it psychologist looking for regulating rules, the world is a regulated consists of information and rules of their transformation. The psychologist interested in phenomenal analyses assumes the existence of a (phenomenal) lifeworld, containing, for example, experiences as percepts, thoughts, and feelings. The different concepts of world and of object and the different methods of analyzing cannot be mixed at random or else fruitless combinations will result. A historical example, corset

example Titchener,

of

causal

is the so-called “psychology of consciousness” 1912) which tried to force the world of phenomena thinking,

the

result

being

a “mechanics

of

(see, for into the

consciousness”

(Herbart). THE ONTOLOGY The

method

of cognition

or causal analysis,

OF NATURAL

characterizing

to which the following

SCIENCES

the natural ontology

sciences

is the conditional

(or conception

of reality

or of

The world can be broken up into isolatable units which the object) corresponds: can be measured in centimeters, grams, and seconds (which does not mean, however, that they are not more than this); between these units there are temporal dependencies (in the sense of physical concepts of time). As Bunge puts it: “The behave The

world

is composed

lawfully” (p. 135). fundamental characteristic

exclusively of

this

of concrete kind

of

(material)

reality

things

that

is its space-filling

character; all other characterizations (such as materiality, mass, energy, divisibility, speed, states, and so on) presuppose this characteristic. This ontological concept can be specified in many ways. Thus, man can be understood as a neural system, as a biomechanical system, or as a system of stimuli and reactions. The world-concept of the natural sciences is causally closed. This fact is emphasized by Bunge saying that the theorem of energy conservation applies to the world. Toned down, the assertion of closedness reads as follows: Any space-filling event, provided it has been caused, has been caused by another A physiological stimulus as a space-filling event. This means for example: into an immaterial somematerial (space-filling) process cannot “be changed thing [for instance into a ‘phenomenal scene’ in the sense of Gibson, 19821 once it has reached a certain spot in the brain to then reappear after a while or in a

Natural different

spot

as a material

sciences

process

as a

again”

205

truncheon (Hering,

1870,

p. 367),

possibly

in

order to cause certain behavior. The “internal” closedness of the world-concept of natural sciences corresponds to the fact that it is completely shut off from “the outside.” The philosopher increasingly wish), but

Ernst Cassirer (1980) puts it as follows: Natural science “not only tries to suppress anything ‘personal’ (e.g., a thought, a feeling or a seeks a concept of a world that excludes anything ‘personal’ on

principle” (p. 46). This exclusion on principle becomes when one says that the ‘personal’ (e.g., a thought) cannot coordinate

system

which

is unfolded

by centimeters,

analytically necessary be represented in the grams,

and

seconds.

THE LOGIC OF CONDEMNATION We

are

founded gical

now

prepared

condemnation,

sciences

(cf.,

well

enough

for example,

p. 135).

Presenting

to understand

Bunge’s

of the hermeneutic the

facts

ontologically

or the phenomenolo-

as he does,

condemnation

logically conclusive: (a) There is nothing but material, that is, space-filling, reality. (b) Only those sciences based on this assumption are scientifically (c) Hermeneutics

for

instance,

or phenomenology,

postulates

is

legitimate. an object,

reality which cannot be presented as material, as space-filling. (d) Consequently hermeneutics and phenomenology are not scientific

a

under-

takings. “if one assumes that the concepts of cause and This conclusion is necessary effect [as used by natural sciences] are the only guidelines of cognition, and that whenever they abandon us there is nothing but darkness and ignorance” (Cassirer, 1980, p. The argumentative

101). basis

of this way of condemning

certain

approaches

as

nonscientific is the totalization of a specific kind of ontology (“everything in the universe,” p. 146). Consequently all other (nonnatural-scientific) methods of cognition must be called nonscientific because they postulate a different concept of object. By this standard of comparison spiritistic belief in the supernatural is in line with hermeneutics immaterial: disembodied

or phenomenology, souls, meaningful

for they all postulate something texts, or (subjective) experiences.

(By the way, most spiritists meet Bunge’s conception conceptualizing their “disembodied souls” as beings

of the world halfway by of etherial material, e.g.,

astral bodies; cf., Frankl, 1949, p. 12ff.) Bunge’s “materialism” is the materialism of the natural sciences. This should be emphasized, because there is a host of other concepts of materialism (cf., Bloch,

1972). REFUSAL

TO DE-CENTER

Jean Piaget has called the ability to adopt a perspective different from one’s own the ability to de-center. Certainly Bunge does not lack this ability, but obviously he is not willing to use it. His standard of comparison for the concepts of reality of all other modes of thinking is the question as to whether they are material; his standard of comparison is the ontology of the natural sciences. He

U. Laucken

206 does

not

leave

this

position.

Consequently,

he is unable

to realize

that

the

concept of a phenomenal reality (assumed as a ‘there is’ by phenornenologists) is simply insensitive with regard to the characteristic of space-filling materiality. Phenomenal facts are not imrnaterial beings; rather, the natural-scientific concept

of materiality

does

not conceive

them,

it does

not make

any sense

to

them. It would make just as little sense to inquire about the physical state of the meaning of a mathematical equation. We see that the judgment that phenomena are

immaterial

If Bunge

is a categorical

mistake.

were willing to de-center,

following

the tracks

of thinking

of certain

phenomenologists for instance, he would then ask himself of what nature their questions are. So now we will ask for him: The psychologist, for instance, thinking in terms of existential analysis inquires about the order of our waking life in the world. At any point in people’s waking existence one can ask them what they are wanting, thinking, feeling, doing, and the like. With these questions

one

addresses

(mundane-empirical, calls this something

something

that

enables

someone

to

answer.

The

not the transcendental-philosophical) pheno~nenologist the “(phenomenal) life-world.” It is its reality that he

postulates. According to this concept of reality we do have (“there really are”), for example, pains, expectancy, feelings, intentions, etc. Fundamental characteristics of this phenomenal existence are: (a) phenomenal existence is the ~vay in which the world we live in is given to us. Every attempt to escape this WOI-ld ends in this world; (b) phenomenal existence stands on its ow11, it does not describe, indicate,

or- reflect

anything

lying “behind”

or “underneath”

it; (c) l~henomenal

existence is structured in a referential (not causal) way, meaning that individual phenomena are dependent components of a phenomenal structure and are by the number constituted by this structure (just as the number “7” is constituted system-it is something of its own within it and nothing without it). for instance, understood as components of our life-world, are Feelings, meaningful in themselves and are found in a context of life that is constitutive for them (the feeling of pride, for instance, is experienced in the context of a “pride story;” without such a story there is no pride; cf., Weiner, Graham, 8c (%ar~dler,

1982).

It may be interesting

for phenomenalists

to look for the orders

of life-world which are constitutive for special feelings. Kesearch of this kind can be conducted in a methodically strict and falsifiable mariner. Bunge is very reluctant to admit the pherlonlenological concept of reality as point of view, for one permissible and open to research from a scientific “emotions are furlctions of the limbic system” (1~. 136). “F~~nctionalisln” as defined by Putnam cannot be mearlt here (which presupposes nail-physical“immaterial’‘-functional states of the brain): for Bunge the cited sentence means that ernotions themselves are material processes within phenomena are brain processes,” p. 131). Indeed, natural-scientific thinking, an emotion can be nothing but this filling event) or it is nothing. ‘That is tautologically true. There is no doubt that it can be very instructive to study processes is not

the

in the frarne point

here.

of the research The

point

(because “melltal the framework of (or another emotions

spaceas brain

program of the natural sciences. But this is to show that there is a here, rather,

Natural sciences phenomenological emotion

research

is something

progra”,

different,

207

as a truncheon and

a phenomenal

that

within

this

fact, a component

articulated life-world whose structure may be strictly ‘l‘he ref‘usal to de-center becomes very obvious: Bunge ontology of’ the natural sciences. Since phenomenally

f‘ramework

an

of’s specifically

explicated. accepts nothing but the conceived emotions 01

feelings, have neither spatial dimension, nor mass, nor speed, nor . . . , etc.; they simply do not exist f’or a person thinking in terms of’ science. Anybody thinking in different terms is a pseudo-scientist. FAILED Somebody

saying that anything

ANNEXATION

real is to be regarded

as space-filling

(material)

reality obviously reckons with the objection of’ where and lww OLN experiences, our consciousness, OLII- feelings, etc., fit into this concept of‘ reality. ,4 temptingly simple answer to this objection is the statement that OLII- consciousness is a “spatio-tempoI-al

~lrrarigenierit”

(Sperry,

19X7,

p. 49)

or that

“mental

phen-

omena are brain processes” question is simply included

(Kunge, p. 134); in other words, the ot?ject in in the materialistic conception of reality. This,

however,

such

has consequences,

as the

following.

It‘the sorrow felt about the loss of’ a f‘riend, thejealousy of‘s rival, the pride in one’s achievements, etc., is identical with certain brain processes, then it must be possible to express these feelings as frlcts of experience iri tcw2s of brain j~l~y~iolo~~~. If‘ experiences consist of‘ space-filling events, it must be possible to express them as s~~cli (e.g., measured in centimeters, grams, and seconds) and not as something parallel to material processes. ‘l‘he materialistic annexation, sensu Kunge, presupposes that for instance a feeling we experience can be expressed, for example, in neurochemical terms. We see, the assertion that feelings and physiological processes are identical is a new case of’ “conceptual muddle” (criticized by Bunge elsewhere, p. l/5). Without question, it may be amusing to read Henry Miller’s assumption that love is nothing but a Boogie-Woogie of’ hormones; this “realization,” however, does not give LIS arly understanding of’ love as a fact of’ our life-world. Husserl (1965) talks about the “absurdity of’ natul-ali/.ation”: “A phenomenon is . not a ‘substantial’ unity, it does not have ‘real qualities’, it does not know real parts, real changes, sciences; research

no causality: all of’ these words understood in the sense of’ the natural attributing a certain material nature to phenomena and carrying out into their causal connections is sheer absurdity; no better than

inquiring about causal qualities or dependencies etc. of’ numbers. It is the absurdity of’ naturalization” (p. 3.5f). A phenomenon as a part of’ the life-world cannot be annexed as such by the materialistic conception of‘ reality. It may be far as the concerned, “eliminative

interesting in this connection that Bunge’s materialistic position, as identification of’ “mental phenomena” with “brain processes” is is opposed to another variant of materialism: Paul Churchland’s materialism.” Churchland (e.g., 1985) clearly distinguishes between the “intentional idiorn” of’ the phenomenal world and statements about brain processes. There is no identity-relation; on the contrary, progress in neurophysiology will replace the “intentional idiom,” and will eliminate it. It is remarkable

U. Laucken

208 that Churchland,

just

like Bunge,

does not recognize

the categorical

difference

between the language of life-world and the language of physiology; otherwise it would not be possible to say, as Churchland said (p. 162), that he discovered the inappropriateness of the “intentional idiom” for conceiving brain processes empitically. The inappropriateness is not empirically but analytically true. “It is truth that no description no matter how complete, intentional

attitude”

of the physical structure and operations of the brain, will say anything about rational thought or indeed

(Madell,

ON THE NATURAL-SCIENTIFIC

1989,

p.

118).

NONREALI.I‘Y

OF -I-HE NATURAL

SC:IENC:ES

One might, of course, say that one is indeed willing to accept different modes of thinking and that each mode of thinking has its own concept of reality, of object. From this point of view the natural-scientific mode of thinking is nothing but one of many. All this, however, would by no means disprove the statement that natural-scientific thinking is the only scientific mode of thinking. This is true, but so far the point has only been to follow the lines of Bunge’s ontological argumentation. Let me now reflect on the justifiability of his monopoly claim. This can be done in different scientific and try to show

ways. For instance, that, for example,

I could set up criteria

of what is

a psychologist thinking and researching in terms of information processing (cf., Simon, 1990) also does scientific work. But this is not the line of argumentation I want to adopt here;

rather, I want to show that Bunge openly negates ably underhand as the basis of the negation. In the following, therefore, I shall no longer

what he accepts deal

with the

unquestion-

inner

logic

of

Bunge’s ontological line of argumentation (which is tautologically correct, as we have seen), but I shall apply the ontological argumentation of Bunge to Bunge’s way of thinking itself. I am really against this kind of reflective mirroring, because I believe that any mode of thinking can presuppose an Archimedian point outside the respective mode of thinking for the person thinking within its frame. Certainly the person doing so should be aware of it taking care to avoid totalizations which then care in his article, quite

fall back on him as well. But Bunge does not take this the contrary-he vehemently and absolutely advocates

the monopoly claim of the world-concept ontology as a truncheon against anybody

of the natural sciences. He uses their thinking differently in this respect. By

giving examples I would now like to show how Bunge thereby also breaks to pieces the pedestal on which he stands. (a) Whoever says that only material (space-filling) reality exists, whoever therefore asks for symbols to be translated into “amino acids” (p. 143) cannot say consistently for instance: “we judge a physical theory by its logical consistency” (p. 145), for there are no logical relations between material units such as amino acids in which physical theories as symbol systems should be translated. “Logical does not appear as part of the ontology of the natural sciences; consistency” does not however, if there exists only material reality, then “logical consistency” exist. (b) Whoever says that cannot at the same time

phenomena speak about

are brain processes (e.g., experiences) “empirical evidence” (p. 133) which is

Natural “checked

with

between

material

new

sciences (p.

experiences”

processes

(which

as a truncheon

131),

for

“experiences”

there

209 can

be causal

are according

relations

to Bunge),

but

there cannot be comparative operations between them. (c) Whoever derides texts and their interpretation which necessarily are “highly personal or subjective” (p. 144) (that means: nonscientific) should not write scientific texts, at least not in his function as a scientist. On what am I “really” writing a commentary, if I agree with Bunge on nothing complicated pattern of printer’s ink (that may be described in geometrical that thanks to a certain adhesive power sticks to the paper?

but a terms)

When applied to themselves natural sciences disappear as what characterizes them as sciences. I have already said that, in my view, this argument of selfapplication can be instructive as an argument against materialistic dogmatism only. Self-reflexive physicists such as Werner Heisenberg (e.g., 1984, p. 276) are far from this way of thinking. Science is a symbolic enterprise. The mode of thinking which establishes science offers the natural sciences their

as science is a different one from objects. If the object conception

that which of natural

sciences is totalized by saying that there is nothing but space-filling material reality, then there is no natural science and, even less, there is no “empirical evidence” either.

RELATIONS The

following

BETWEEN

argumentation

DIFFERENT

is independent

refusal does not logically imply the refusal these considerations because Bunge rails

MODES

OF THINKING

of the one above.

Therefore,

its

of the foregoing. I have included against the “metaphysical sin of

upholding psychoneural dualism” (p. 138). In other words he rails against the notion of “mind-body dualism” (p. 138) which implies that “immaterial entities” (p. 138) had “causal power” (p. 138) over material entities. In his opinion this is the way of thinking

of psychosomatics

the “psychoneuroendocrinoimmunology” Dualistic conceptions are based

which on

he contrasts

(p. 138). an understandable

with the thinking wish:

There

of are

phenomenal objects, and there are material objects. If both exist and the world is only one coherent world, then it suggests itself to inquire about the relations The so-called interactive dualism for between these two modes of reality. instance asserts that there is a causal relation of to and fro (cf., Eccles, 1990: “psychon-dendron interaction”). This way of presenting the problem and this kind of solution fail to recognize that modes of reality can develop only within the framework of certain modes of “Facts can only be acknowledged in a certain framework of thinking. judgment which, in its turn, depends on certain logical conditions” (Cassirer, 1980, p. 17). Consequently, assertions of reality must not be separated from their context of thought, for they make sense in that context only. With regard to psychology I (Laucken, 1989) have distinguished three modes of thinking: mode of thinking which includes, for example, (1) the pheno~~u~hical approaches

of existential

psychology;

U. Lauckerl

210

(2) the

logogrq!J~i~~~l mode

of thinking

which

includes,

for example,

cognitive

or

information processing approaches; (3) the jd~y~icogruphicul mode of thinking which includes, for example, psychobiological or certain behavioristic approaches. Each of these modes of’ thinking has its own method of cognition and its own conception of reality. While the phenographical mode of thinking asserts that there is a (phenomenal) there is a world of l,hysicographical mode

life-world, the logographical mode of thinking mind (e.g., of information, of symbols), and of thinking assumes a space-filling (material) world.

the tvay, by no means does this trinity further modes of thinking sho~~ld no; reality. After all, even the physicographical known

today

is a thought

product

1980.) Each of these realities or worlds are no lines of coherence lvhich

imply ;m end. ‘I‘here is no reason and thus Ilt‘W co11cepts be conceived, mode of thinking so obtrusi\,ely of’ the

17th

century

only:

says

the (I%) wht of’

well-

cl‘., (Ltssirer.

is conceptually closed. ‘l‘his means that there break off in one reality to be continued in

another reality. This is not an empirical statement but a cor~ce~~tL~~~l-;~t1~~i~~tic_al one. We have already talked about this in connection with the material world (cf., the quotation by Hering), but the s;mle is true for the life-world ant1 the mind\vorld. ‘I‘he philosopher J.G. Fichte asserts that it is unthinkable that (material) matter should be able “to walk into co11scioL1sIiess”. , arid it is just as inconcei\,able that information (in the sense of information processing) “enters aw2irc’liess” coiisciousness, (Kieuwenhuyse, Offenberg, X: Frijda, 1987, p. 27 1). Even alvareness, the life-world there is no entering or ‘l‘his conceptual (a) An intrwc.tizv Fvorld

concepts

conceived). (b) ‘I‘heories

(as I prefer leaving the

closedness d~di,s~~

cannot

to say) life-world

is a (conceptually) closed world; for rlon-t~~lerlotnenal entities.

has several consequences: in the sense of a causal to and

be conceived

of idr~li&~l saying,

conclusi\~ely

for example,

that

f’ro

(lxcause

the reality

bet\\een

they

are

differelit as they

of the life-world

are is

identical with some neuronal reality make no sense: How ~‘a11 two things be identical if neither of the two is said to have the qualities of the other? How ca11 ml experience be a neurochemical process which is said ilot to be an experience? (c) Theories of mqmcr asserting that one world (e.g., the life-\vorld) is the emerging product of another world (e.g., the space-fillirig world) cannot be coherently conceived either. How cim a system that is conceived as space-filling essentially produce units that are anything but space-filling? ‘1‘0 think this way would contravene the natural-scientific postulate of’causal closedness. Asserting relations of emergence uithiu one world concept (such as the natura-scientifc about assertions of one) is a completely different thing; here we are talking emergence c~nlong differently conceived worlds only. (d) It is not very informative to ascertain that the phenographer postulates an immaterial reality (the life-world), because materiality in the sense of the physicographical mode of thinking is simply not suitable to characterize the mode of thinking. To the phenographer objects of the phenographical s&ements of immateriality are insignificant; likewise a physicist is not affected

Natural

sciences

as a truncheon

211

in his way of thinking if people tell him that they do not experience the table in front of them as an “atomic dodder-cloud” (as Schrddinger once said). The traditional belief (stemming from the ancient Greek philosophers) in a united universe, however, closedness of the different

is not simply satisfied with statements about the world conceptions. Again and again the question is

raised whether some sort of coherence can be made. By asking this question take the position of a “transversal” (Welsch, 1987) thinker. From this position

we the

following can be said for instance: - “The ideational [the mind-world] exists only to the extent that it somehow manifests itself materially and physically, embodying itself in this manifestation” (Cassirer, 1980, p. 43). - “(A) machine is an abstract system of states physically realized in a variety of ways” (Ashby,

and transitions 1956, p. 52).

that

can be

Both statements form a relationship between two different concepts of world. However, they do so in a specific way. I have called it an “(inter-world) relation of making possible” (cf., Laucken, 1989, p. 87: “L;rrnii~lictlun,beziehung”). Although concepts

the relation of making possible does not open to each other (they maintain their closedness)

relationship independent

by saying that the one world needs the other to make its existence possible. ‘I-hat means, we are speaking, here, about ontic,

not about modal possibility. It does not follow from this relationship makes the other one possible creates possible. ‘I‘he chemical and physical the process statements relationship implication structure neuronal dent; there structures.

the different world it does establish a

that

the analysis

of the world

that

or produces the contents of the world made analysis of a painting (one can even include

of production or the looking at the painting) will never result in about its information content. ‘I-he kind of dependence the of making possible refers to is a different one. By showing an this becomes evident: The empirical question can be asked which of the life-world requires structures. Both structures is no causal

(in the sence

for its existence the as such are conceived of natural

sciences)

existence of which as totally indepen-

to and fro between

the

Today it suggests itself prototypically to illustrate the relationship of making possible by means of the relationship between software and hardware. Between hardware and software there is no to and fro in the sense of something breaking off on the one side and continuing on the other. But from a transversal point of view it can be said that the software needs hardware as its basis of being possible, and it can be empirically asked whether one and the same software cannot be made possible by (materially) different hardware systems. But it is absolutely clear that pure (space-filling) hardware analysis will never produce software results. ‘rherefore, making possible theoretical questioning always starts with the analysis of the something that is to be made possible. Subsequent to this prototypical explanation the following is to be emphasized: Software is an object variant of the logographical mode of thinking, not of the phenographical one. I am mentioning it here because sometimes it is said that the software concept is an appropriate equivalent to the concept of life-world

212

U.

(consciousness, not “matter “experience”

awareness). or energy” (Kurtzman,

Here,

Laucken

the following

applies:

Information

is not just

(Wiener, 1961, p. 155), it is not a phenomenal 1987, p. 55), either. The search schema of information

terminology will not find experiences cosmos created by this terminology. The relationship of making possible

anyway,

for these

do not belong

is anti-reductionistic

to the

and anti-eliminative,

because (a) it always starts from the point of giving something to be made possible, (b) it never leaves this starting point, and (c) it excludes any kind of substitutional thinking. Moreover the relationship of making possible is antiemergentistic, because it questions “from top to bottom” (assuming that the material world concept is metaphorically “the bottom”). The relationship of making possible may be called materialistic if, in the sense of Cassirer, this means that the prerequisite embodiment; it is not

for the existence of the ideational materialistic as defined by Bunge.

is

the

material

In conclusion, then, let us return to Bunge: His materialistic totalization not only seems inconsequent to me (e.g., from a reflective point of view) but also extremely questions

unfruitful from a heuristic point of view. A variety of interesting (e.g., making possible questions) that can be dealt with methodically

strictly are unnecessarily buried emphasize again that by saying

or banished as so-called so I am not defending

attacked for different reasons by Bunge. The only ontological argumentation and its conclusiveness.

pseudoscience. Let me the research directions point

here

was Bunge’s

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