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The perceptions of fisheries management options by Spain's Atlantic fishermen
Marine Policy 36 (2012) 1105–1111
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The perceptions of fisheries management options by Spain’s Atlantic fishermen ˜ o n, M. Dolores Garza-Gil, Manuel Varela-Lafuente Lucy Amigo-Doban Department of Applied Economics, University of Vigo, Faculty of Economic and Business Sciences, Campus de Lagoas-Marcosende s/n, 36310 Vigo, Galicia, Spain
a r t i c l e i n f o
abstract
Article history: Received 7 December 2011 Received in revised form 17 February 2012 Accepted 17 February 2012 Available online 28 March 2012
This paper analyses the perceptions of Spanish fishermen working in Atlantic fishing grounds on current fishery regulation measures and the possibility of introducing transferable rights as is established in the EC’s latest proposal to reform the Common Fisheries Policy. A survey was conducted through face-to-face interviews and ordered logistic and multiple regression models to identify which characteristics influence fishermen’s perceptions and attitudes. The results show that the fleet segments most in favour of implementing ITQs correspond to industrial fishing, while the smallerscale fisheries (artisanal, gillnets, longline and coastal trawl) are more in favour of a system involving individual effort (fishing days or kW days), transferable or otherwise. & 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Fishing resources Management Decision-making Perceptions CFP
1. Introduction The success of a regulatory system becomes more uncertain the more complex is the fishery. In general, it is more difficult to regulate multi-species fisheries, resources with complex bioecological relations and multi-fleet fisheries. Complexity also increases with the size of a fishery and the number of its members, and with the greater mobility both of the resource and of fishermen [1–6]. But, also, the possibilities of success depend on the existing institutions and on the social and political interaction within which it is applied. Fisheries administration should be credible among fishermen so that the regulatory process can be applied with a high level of legitimacy [7–10]. In this sense, if fishermen carry out their activity with a high degree of uncertainty and think that in the future they will not be able to do so (either due to changes in fishing policy, or on account of the predatory attitude of other insufficiently-controlled fishermen), they will be less respectful of the natural resource. Involving fishermen in the decision-making process is, therefore, of maximum interest [11–14]. Fishermen will have the incentive of being involved in this process as long as they are guaranteed they are the owners of fishing rights respected by other fishermen, economic agents and the administration. One possible way to advance along these lines could be the progressive implementation of individual fishing rights, both with regard
n
Corresponding author. Tel.: þ34 986 813517; fax: þ34 986 812401. ˜ o). E-mail address: [email protected] (L. Amigo-Doban
0308-597X/$ - see front matter & 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.marpol.2012.02.015
to a portion of the resource (ITQ) as well as the capacity to exercise effort (transferable effort). The use of market instruments may be a more efficient and less expensive way of reducing fishing overcapacity as the operators adapt their fleet to their fishing rights in order to achieve economic efficiency. The European Commission (EC) proposes the use of market instruments in its latest Green Paper on the reform of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) and suggests the possibility that this regulatory system could be complemented with safeguard clauses to avoid excessive concentration of ownership or possible negative effects on smaller-scale fisheries and coastal communities dependent on fishing [15]. The regulation of Spanish fisheries comes under several different bodies (European Union, central government, regional governments), which simultaneously share management responsibility. Despite the prevailing diversity, a common philosophy predominates, congruent with a system in which direct control of outputs and inputs is combined using traditional fisheries regulation mechanisms. In general, in the bodies or levels of higher rank, a framework is established whereby, at the lower levels, the regulations will have to be applied and/or developed. Habitually, the norms relating to the resource (TACs, quotas, minimum sizes, gear) are stricter than those relating to the fleet and to the distribution of quotas among fishermen, where the lower-rank bodies have a greater capacity of intervention and, therefore, influence. Furthermore, the responsibility of management (and, therefore, of the determination of operational and functional regulations) is determined according to the geographical situation of the
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fishing grounds. In third countries and international waters, the regulatory responsibility corresponds, respectively, to the relevant coastal countries and international bodies. In the first case, the coastal country establishes the fishing rights of the Spanish fleet via the concession of licences and sets global resource quotas. In the second case, the EC assigns the agreed TAC to the Member States, and the distribution of quotas among Spanish ships is the responsibility of the Spanish government. On the other hand, the European Community establishes TACs for its waters every year per species and zone and also assigns licences and quotas to the Spanish fleet according to the criteria established in the Treaty of Accession. There is a closed list of ships which may access these waters and the responsibility regarding the distribution of quotas among the vessels lies with the Spanish government. Lastly, regulation in national fishing grounds is subject to Common Fisheries Policy guidelines, particularly those regarding the species subject to TACs. Nevertheless, the Spanish government’s margin for regulation is wide, considering that a large number of species are not subject to EC quotas. In turn, the management of these waters is shared between the central government and regional governments. Assigning responsibility varies according to geographical criteria and regulatory matters. The grounds are divided up between inshore waters (zones situated between the coastline and the baselines which delimit the beginning of territorial waters) and external waters (between the base-line and the limit of the Exclusive Economic Zone). Then, regarding on the regulation of the fishing grounds exploited by the Spanish fleet there is a hierarchy of administrations, objectives and instruments. The bodies with higher rank and fishery regulatory capacity establish the priority of objectives and management instruments, to which the lower-rank bodies will be subordinate. In general, fisheries management is characterised by a combination of measures that have affected the fishery access regime: a situation of free access has now become a regime of restricted access. The imposition of the restriction has mainly brought about vessel number limitations, and impacted on catches after the establishment of TACs (and, in some cases, the subsequent implementation of annual ITQs: Spanish vessels in the Celtic Sea and swordfish fisheries), and on fishing effort (kW fishing days) in fisheries where a stock management/recovery plan has been introduced (northern hake stock and southern hake and Norwegian lobster stocks). The aim of this paper is to gauge the perception of Spanish fishermen in Atlantic fishing grounds with regard to the different regulatory measures and the role of the administrations (EC, central government and regional governments) in the management decision-making process. To this end, Section 2 presents the method, Section 3 contains the results, and lastly Section 4 shows the main conclusions.
2. Methodology The study has been set out to assess (i) fishermen’s perceptions of the degree to which current fisheries legislation is adequate; (ii) their perceptions as to whether the different regulatory administrations (European, central or regional) should be more or less prominent in the drawing-up of management regulations; and (iii) their assessment of new regulatory possibilities, be it via a system of individual quotas or based on effort (fishing days or kW days). In the case of new regulatory possibilities, the duration of quotas/effort (annual or pluriannual) and the possibility of transferable rights among fishermen or among producer organisations are taken into consideration. In order to do so, those interviewed were asked to reply to a series of questions relating to the research using a four-point
Likert scale. The Likert scale is frequently used in behavioural sciences in Psychology to measure fishermen’s perceptions and attitudes to certain fisheries policies and management methods [11,12,16–19]. In relation to the first topic of research, we look into fishermen’s participation in the decision-making process through their perceptions on five different levels: their perception of the degree to which gear selectivity measures are adequate, total catches, the technical characteristics of vessels, fishing licences and, finally, the adequacy of regulations regarding safety on board fishing vessels. The second and third topics of our research analyse fishermen’s attitudes on the best regulatory options for the Atlantic fisheries. Firstly, and with regard to the drawing-up of legislation, fishermen were asked to classify, using a four-point Likert scale, which public administration body should be more or less prominent in the regulatory process: at European, central or regional level. The fishermen’s opinions are stratified at 0 level—less participation, 1—the same, 2—a little more and, the final level, 3—much more. They were then asked to classify, using a fourpoint Likert scale, regulatory preferences using systems based on individual annual quotas/effort, individual pluriannual quotas/ effort or based on transferable rights (quotas or effort). In this last case, the fishermen’s opinions are stratified using the 0 level— very unfavourable, 1—quite unfavourable, 2—quite favourable and, the final level, 3—very favourable. The analysis of the data suggests that Spanish fishermen’s perceptions of regulation and the decision-making process it involves can be influenced by a large variety of factors: demographic, vessel characteristics, fishing gear. These variables are analysed with the aim of researching which specific characteristics influenced fishermen’s perceptions and attitudes with regard to the management system and, in particular, which most significantly influenced attitudes regarding the fisheries management decision-making process and the assessment of the regulatory possibilities set out in the study (through effort/individual non-transferable quotas or through transferable rights). Table 1 shows the number of vessels that operate in Atlantic fishing grounds per fleet segment and their main technical characteristics. Most of the fleet belongs to the segment corresponding to smaller vessels or smaller-scale fisheries and comprises vessels under 12 m in length with 1–3 crew members. Given that their activity is usually homogenous per fishing zone and that the vessel owners do not keep detailed accounts of activity income and costs, we have opted to directly survey the fishermen’s associations of which the vessels in each fishing zone are comprised. We then find the fleet segment operating in Spanish waters, made up of 665 vessels which use fixed gillnets, longlines, trawling and purse-seine gear. The fleet that fishes in non-Spanish European waters is made up of 243 vessels, of which 181 (longliners and trawler vessels) operate in European waters and the rest are surface longliners which also operate in international waters, following the swordfish migratory route. Lastly, 185 vessels operate in international or third country waters, to which we would have to add 33 purse seine vessels which fish for tuna. In this segment, freezer vessels in NAFO waters and international and third country waters are jointly included; and, therefore, it includes all the freezer vessels operating in the Atlantic, Pacific and Indian oceans. In any case, the vessels included in this segment are not affected by fishery regulations relating to European waters. The research was carried out using questionnaires focussed on obtaining information on participating fishermen’s perceptions and attitudes at different levels of the regulatory decision-making process. In order to do so, information was gathered on demographic characteristics (age), business characteristics (skipper/ seaman, number of crew members, vessel characteristics— length and GRT) and the type of gear the vessels use (artisanal,
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Table 1 Spanish Fleet Segments in Atlantic Grounds, 2009. Source: Own compilation from [26,27].
Smaller-scale fisheries Purse seine Surface line Coastal Long line Coastal Trawl Fixed gillnet Long line/fixed gillnet in Celtic Sea Trawl in Celtic Sea Freezer trawl Freezer surface line
Number of vessels
Tonnage (GRT)
Length (m)
Target species
Sample
5925 (142)a 308 62 131 159 67 79 102 123 98
5 54 125 76 181 42 183 208 755 763
10.5 19.3 27.0 25.8 27.5 16.8 29.0 38.1 58.3 38.8
Octopus, squid, clams, cockle, scallop, razor shell, crabs, othersb Sardine, horse mackerel, anchovy, mackerel, tuna Sword fish, sharks Hake, derbio, conger Hake, horse mackerel, mackerel, blue whiting, nephrops Hake, monkfish, horse mackerel Hake, conger, blackbelly rosefish Hake, angler fish, megrim, ray Halibut, hake, skate, prawn, blackbelly rosefish, cod Tunas, sword fish
22c 34 17 14 18 9 10 11 8 8
a
Number of Cofradı´as (fishermen’s associations) in brackets. Basically, wedge sole, cuckoo ray, shrimp, common eel, common bass, large scaled scorpion fish, Atlantic panfret, conger, poor cod, common sole, dusky grouper, allis shad, white seabream. c The cofradı´as interviewed are comprised of over 3,500 vessels. b
Table 2 Demographic and business characteristics, perceptions and attitudes of the fishermen in the study. Description of variables
Mean (standard deviation)
Demographic characteristics Age¼ respondent length (years)
39 (11.63)
Vessel characteristics Owner of boat ¼ 1, if respondent is the owner of the boat; otherwise 0 Workers boat ¼ number of workers n the boat Length of boat ¼ respondent length (m) GRT ¼respondent gross register tonnage
0.19 12.98 26.96 173.84
Frequencies of occurrence (%)
–
(0.40) (8.83) (13.35) (268.93)
20 – – –
Fleet segment Smaller-scale fishery ¼1; otherwise 0 Purse seine ¼1; otherwise 0 Surface line¼ 1; otherwise 0 Coastal long line ¼1; otherwise 0 Coastal trawl ¼1; otherwise 0 Fixed gillnet ¼ 1; otherwise 0 Long line in Celtic Sea¼ 1; otherwise 0 Trawl in Celtic Sea ¼ 1; otherwise 0 Freezer trawl ¼1; otherwise 0 Freezer surface line¼ ; otherwise 0
0.15 0.17 0.17 0.04 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.03
(0.36) (0.38) (0.38) (0.22) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.27) (0.17)
15 17 17 4 9 9 9 9 8 3
Perceptions and Attitudes on government support Fishermen’s perceptions of the adequacy of current legislation Gear selectivity ¼ 1; otherwise 0 Total catches ¼1; otherwise 0 Vessel technical characteristics¼ 1; otherwise 0 Fishing licences¼ 1; otherwise 0 Work safety¼ 1; otherwise 0
0.76 0.72 0.68 0.75 0.77
(0.43) (0.45) (0.47) (0.44) (0.42)
77 73 68 74 78
Fishermen’s attitudes on the Fisheries legislation on the Fisheries legislation on the Fisheries legislation on the
0.45 (0.50) 0.28 (0.45) 0.82 (0.38)
45 28 83
0.41 0.48 0.50 0.36 0.51 0.54
41 48 50 36 51 54
drawing-up of fisheries legislation part of the EU ¼1; otherwise 0 part of the central government¼ 1; otherwise 0 part of the regional governments¼ 1; otherwise 0
Fishermen’s attitude on the Regulatory System Individual annual effort (fishing days or kW days) ¼1; otherwise 0 Individual multiannual effort ¼ 1; otherwise 0 Individual transferable effort ¼ 1; otherwise 0 Individual annual quotas ¼ 1; otherwise 0 Individual multiannual quotas ¼1; otherwise 0 ITQs ¼1; otherwise 0
purse seine, surface longline, coastal longline, coastal trawl, fixed gillnets, Grand Sole longline, Grand Sole trawl, freezer trawler, freezer surface longline). Table 2 reflects the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis. Before putting the questionnaire into practice, we contacted port authorities, fishermen’s associations and fishermen with the aim of presenting the study proposed and requesting their collaboration. The questionnaire was then adapted and the final
(0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.48) (0.50) (0.50)
version was provided to 127 vessels and 22 fishermen’s associations, divided up according to the fishing gear they use. The faceto-face interviews were carried out by an interviewer and took place between May and June 2010, and each interview lasted an average of 20 min. In the first topic of research, fishermen’s perceptions of current fishery legislation, perceptions on the adequacy of ‘‘gear selectivity measures’’, ‘‘total catch measures’’, ‘‘measures regarding the
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technical characteristics of vessels’’, ‘‘measures regarding fishing licences’’ and ‘‘measures regarding safety requirements on board fishing vessels’’ were analysed. Due to the small sample size, for the purposes of analysis, the Likert scale was collapsed into two rather than three points: agree ¼non-existent or insufficient regulation (1), and disagree ¼sufficient (2) or excessive (3) regulation. In order to identify which of the fishermen’s individual characteristics (demographic, vessel characteristics, attitudes and perceptions) such ranges of responses influence, we proposed logistic regression models using Huber–White robust standard errors [20]. Ordered regression models are the most commonly-used models for ordinal outcomes in social sciences [21]. These models assume proportional odds (or parallel regression assumption, i.e., they assume that the coefficients describing the relationship between each pair of outcome groups are the same). As such, the proportional odds assumption needs to be tested and this is done through Brant’s Wald test (Brant test) and the likelihood-ratio test for ordinal responses. Univariate statistics were used to test for departures from neutrality for each statement in isolation, with the Wilcoxon signed-rank test using EViews 6.0 statistical package and Stata SE 10 Data Analysis and Statistical Software in the analysis.
3. Results Table 2 shows that the average fisherman is 39 years old. Most of the fishermen are not skippers, only 20%, approximately. The average number of crewmen per vessel is 12.98, the average length of vessels is 26.96 m and the GRT, 173.84. Most of the fishermen said they favoured greater regulation on the part of the regional government, followed by the European Union. The disaggregated analysis of demographic factors and vessel characteristics in terms of fishing regime (Table 3) shows that surface longline has the lowest average fisherman’s age, 28, and a high number of workers per vessel, 18. On the other hand, the trawl gear regime and artisanal fisheries are those which reflect older average ages, more than 40, but where the average number of workers per vessel is lower. The descriptive statistics for the replies to the Likert-scale items are presented in Table 4. The logistic and ordered logistic regression models, which research attitudes towards the implementation of individual quotas and effort (non-transferable and transferable), are shown in Table 5. Fishermen’s perceptions as to regulatory measures on gear selectivity indicate that a significant majority of fishermen are
Table 3 Technical characteristics of sample for the Fishing regime. Fleet segment
Age Mean (SD)
Workers boat Mean (SD)
Length boat (m) Mean (SD)
GRT Mean (SD)
Smaller-scale fisheries Purse seine Surface line Coastal long line Coastal trawl Fixed gillnet Celtic Sea long line Celtic Sea trawl Freezer trawl Freezer surface line
42 34 39.2 35.6 45.7 36.6 38.8 40.4 43.3 28
2.87 10.4 12.2 13.2 11.3 18.7 16.3 15.9 25.1 18.3
9.59 20.6 26.4 25.9 28.6 18.8 24.3 29.9 59.7 36.3
5.72 52.2 114.4 86.3 174.4 44.5 176.9 184.5 750.2 768.3
(9.31) (9.33) (12.76) (13.89) (13.02) (18.7) (8.62) (4.79) (8.95) (1.41)
(11.37) (2.57) (2.35) (2.92) (3.53) (19.81) (2.01) (2.54) (9.80) (4.04)
(1.77) (2.77) (3.29) (5.08) (5.24) (5.70) (3.97) (2.86) (15.72) (4.05)
(2.26) (20.09) (36.23) (40.57) (75.19) (28.59) (35.12) (21.03) (463.32) (548.19)
Table 4 Descriptive statistics and reliability analysis (Cronbach’s alpha) to Likert-type statements designed to quantify fishermen’s perceptions. Individual statements were tested for departure from neutrality with the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. Likert-scale items
% Responses Disagree
Mean (7 SD)
Wilcoxon signed-rank test
1.99 1.89 1.60 1.86 1.84
Z¼ 7.52, p o 0.001 Z¼ 5.77 po 0.001 Z¼ 0.97, p ¼ 0.386 Z¼ 6.12, p o 0.001 Z¼ 7.85, p o 0.001
Agree
Fishermen’s perception of the level of sufficiency of current legislationa Gear selectivity 23 77 Total catches 27 73 Vessels’ technical characteristics 32 68 Fishing licences 26 74 Work safety 22 78
(0.71) (0.84) (0.84) (0.89) (0.71)
Fishermen’s attitude on whether to increase and who should increase the level of adequacy when drawing up legislationb EU 55 45 1.61 (0.96) Z¼ 5.89, p o 0.001 Central administration (Madrid) 72 28 1.25 (0.79) Z¼ 7.11, p o 0.001 Regional governments 17 83 2.45 (0.87) Z¼ 1.80, p ¼ 0.426 Fishermen’s attitude on the Regulatory Systemc Individual annual effort 59 Individual multiannual effort 51 Individual transferable effort 50 Individual annual quotas 64 Individual multiannual quotas 49 ITQs 46
41 49 50 36 51 54
1.39 1.58 1.91 1.21 1.82 2.17
(0.58) (0.85) (0.69) (0.80) (0.71) (0.61)
Z¼ 0.98, Z¼ 2.93, Z¼ 1.82, Z¼ 0.96, Z¼ 4.80, Z¼ 5.12,
p ¼ o0.001 p ¼ o 0.001 p ¼ 0.286 p ¼ 0.521 p ¼ o0.001 p o 0.001
a Statements were measured on a four-point Likert-scale, subsequently dropped to a two-point Likert-scale for Participation in the decision-making process: Disagree (¼ 0 non-existent legislation, ¼ 1 inadequate), Agree (¼ 2 adequate legislation, ¼3 excessive legislation); SD: standard deviation. b Statements were measured on a four-point Likert-scale, subsequently dropped to a two-point Likert-scale for Attitudes on the decision-making process: Disagree (¼ 0 less participation, ¼1 the same), Agree (¼ 2 a little more, and ¼3 much more); SD: standard deviation. c Statements were measured on a four-point Likert-scale, subsequently dropped to a two-point Likert-scale for attitudes on the decision-making process: Disagree (¼ 0 very unfavourable, ¼1 not very favourable), Agree (¼2 quite favourable, and ¼3 very favourable); SD: standard deviation.
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Table 5 Logistic regression model estimates. Variables
Individual annual Individual effort multiannual effort
Individual transferable effort
Individual annual Individual quotas multiannual quotas
ITQs
Coef.
Coef.
Coef.
S.E.
Coef.
S.E.
S.E.
S.E.
Coef.
S.E.
Coef.
S.E.
Demographic age
0.071
0.026
0.751
0.425
0.007
0.0576
0.039
0.046
0.872
0.5786
0.028
0.010
Vessel characteristics Owner of boat Workers boat Length of boat GRT
0.481 0.865 0.871n 0.256n
0.156 0.358 0.175 0.018
0.281 0.845 0.548n 0.645n
0.015 0.238 0.056 0.1456
0.856 0.468 0.089n 0.189n
0.486 0.154 0.475 0.616
0.771 0.4835 0.478n 0.698n
0.869 0.238 0.147 0.357
0.561 0.875 0.276n 0.198n
0.111 0.357 0.085 0.007
0.594 0.8641 0.822n 0.916n
0.254 0.679 0.145 0.358
0.521 0.367 0.126n 0.723 0.649 0.269 0.268n 0.667 0.369 0.901
0.021 0.239 0.489 0.225 0.189 0.254 0.186 0.437 0.268 0.652
0.002 0.379 0.855 0.260 0.682n 0.5712 0.371 0.476 0.572 0.451
0.246 0.002 0.258 0.356 0.554 0.6001 0.019 0.122 0.208 0.198
0.705n 0.389 0.642 0.724 0.441 0.834n 0.238 0.681 0.482 0.461
0.045 0.201 0.218 0.465 0.317 0.059 0.198 0.505 0.302 0.283
0.501 0.135 0.268 0.685n 0.369 0.421 0.234 0.236 0.316 0.495
0.320 0.378 0.054 0.476 0.155 0.019 0.079 0.476 0.525 0.731
0.426 0.279 0.5835 0.469 0.5785 0.256 0.379 0.477 0.368 0.645n
0.035 0.012 0.531 0.134 0.653 0.324 0.142 0.215 0.092 0.114
0.891 0.761n 0.874 0.971 0.829 0.205 0.761 0.821n 0.754n 0.8142
0.191 0.004 0.553 0.772 0.4521 0.090 0.308 0.438 0.016 0.079
0.352 0.041 0.661n 100 0.14
0.107 0.015 0.452
0.635 0.224 0.742n 100 0.12
0.123n 0.478 0.241 100 0.16
0.614 0.248 0.103
0.392n 0.271 0.309n 100 0.15
0.205 0.169 0.216
0.192 0.510 0.851n 100 0.14
0.003 0.112 0.357
0.516n 0.351 0.391 0.125 0.644n 0.572 100 0.18
Fishing regime Smaller-scale fishery Purse seine Surface line Coastal long line Coastal trawl Fixed gillnet Longline in Celtic Sea Trawl in Celtic Sea Freezer trawl Freezer surface line Attitudes and perceptions Drawing up of EU legislation Drawing up of central government legislation Drawing up of regional government legislation No. of observations Pseudo R2
0.124 0.014 0.216
p o0.10. Each regression represents fishermen’s attitudes on the regulatory system: Individual annual licences; individual multiannual licences; individual transferable licences; individual annual quotas; individual multiannual quotas, and ITQs. Each regulatory option was dichotomised (agree or otherwise) and the logistic regression calculated. This procedure was selected due to the impossibility of estimating an ordinal logistic regression model on account of the violation of the parallel regression assumption. Robust standard error is estimated by the Huber–White method. n
a
satisfied with existing regulations, 77%, with 23% considering that regulations are non-existent or insufficient. The results regarding their perception of the regulatory measures which affect catches follow similar lines, with 73% of fishermen of the opinion that current regulations are sufficient, 27% considering that regulations are not sufficient. In relation with their perception of regulations on fishing licences, the results obtained show that 74% of fishermen consider them to be sufficient, only 26% considering them to be insufficient. The results regarding fishermen’s perceptions of safety on board vessels show that 78% consider them to be sufficient as opposed to 22% who believe them to be insufficient. The highest percentage with regard to dissatisfaction with the adequacy of existing regulations corresponds to the measures that affect the technical characteristics of vessels; 32% of fishermen consider them to be insufficient. With regard to fishermen’s attitudes towards the idea of increasing regulatory measures and which jurisdiction (European, central or regional) should be responsible for such regulations, the results show that the majority, 83%, had a positive attitude towards significantly increasing the role of the regional governments in drawing up fishery regulations. However, fishermen are divided as to their perception of rule-making by the European Community; 45% are in favour of slightly increasing EC regulations. On the contrary, fishermen are significantly negative when it comes to increasing regulations at national level, that is, on part of the central administration (the Spanish government), with 72% of fishermen not in favour of increasing state intervention in fisheries regulation. In relation with fishermen’s attitude towards creating a regulatory system via the implementation of a catch quota or fishing
effort system (fishing days or kW days), a significant number of fishermen (54%) view the implementation of ITQs positively. The results of the logistic regression model reflect that fishermen’s attitudes do not significantly depend on the demographic factor considered. Furthermore, we can observe that their perceptions depend fundamentally on the size and characteristics of vessels. Fishermen show greater support for an individual effort system where smaller vessels with a lesser GRT are concerned (smallerscale fisheries, fixed gillnetters, surface longliners, Celtic Sea longliners and coastal trawlers). And, on the contrary, there is greater support for ITQs for larger vessels such as freezer surface longliners, freezer trawlers and Grand Sole trawlers. In particular, the results reveal that fishermen in the surface longline and Grand Sole trawling segments are more in favour of an individual annual effort system. Only the coastal trawl fishermen are more in favour of an individual pluriannual effort system, whereas the fishermen using fixed gillnets and artisanal gear are interested in a transferable effort system. Contrary to this, we find the fishermen in the purse seine, Grand Sole trawl and freezer trawler segments; the results reflect that they are statistically more significant with regard to a system of ITQs. We can also observe a preference for individual transferable quotas for the coastal trawl and surface trawl segments, annual and pluriannual, respectively. Therefore, we can gather the idea that fishermen in European Union waters and international waters show, in general, a greater preference for a system of ITQs. On the other hand, the level of acceptance of a system of individual quotas or effort varies considerably according to fishermen’s perceptions as to which Administration (European, central or regional) should assume a greater degree of fisheries
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management. The fishermen who perceived the need to increase fisheries regulation at regional level were also in favour of a regulatory system involving individual quotas, transferable or otherwise. The fact that the fishermen professed the need to significantly increase regulation at regional level could be interpreted as a perception that they distance themselves from the decisions taken by the Spanish authorities and, to a lesser extent, the European authorities, along with a perception that they are prevented from participating in the management decisions taken with regard to their activity. This perception that they are not consulted and are not able to participate is also true of other EU countries, such as France, the UK, the Netherlands and Denmark [16]. In any case, the results of the estimations of the logistic regression models are heterogeneous with regard to more favourable attitudes towards a system of individual effort and quotas in terms, basically, of the activity’s very characteristics, that is, the vessel’s characteristics and the type of gear used. The results obtained suggest that fishermen assess the establishment of a system of ITQs positively, especially where the industrial fisheries are concerned. In this context, fisheries literature considers the implementation of a rights-based management system as an optimum option, given that individual assignments favour the rationalisation of fishing effort through the coordination of collective solutions, and the transferability of quotas promotes economically efficient solutions to the problem of excess capacity [22–25]. Some recent experiences ratify those results [15]. Furthermore, the smaller-scale fisheries are more in favour of an effort system (fishing days or kW days), which can be justified by the wide variety of target species the vessels of these fisheries catch (see Table 1) and, in turn, the lesser number of species subject to TACs.
4. Conclusions Among other questions, the EC’s latest CFP reform proposal establishes the possibility of implementing a rights-based management system, while safeguarding the possible negative effects of such a system on coastal fishing communities. For its part, the success or failure of management measures also depends on the greater or lesser involvement of fishermen in the decision-making process, be it with regard to the management of marine resources or to the possibilities of suitably organising fishing activity. In this paper, we have analysed the perceptions of Spanish fishermen working in Atlantic fishing grounds as to the different fisheries regulatory measures currently in place, their perceptions of which Administration should increase (or not) the degree of fisheries management and what their perception of the possibility of introducing transferable rights, as is established in the EC’s latest CFP reform proposal, is. The results obtained are heterogeneous with regard to more favourable attitudes on a system of individual effort or quotas according, basically, to the characteristics of the activity, that is, those corresponding to the vessel and the type of fishing gear used. In general, the industrial fisheries are the fleet segments most in favour of implementing ITQs. The explanation for this is that these fleets fish for species which, in the main, are subject historically to catch restrictions through TACs and, furthermore, they could have a greater financial capacity to participate in a possible rights-based system. The exception is to be found in the coastal trawl segment, where fishermen are more in favour of a system based on individual transferable effort. The explanation for this could be that this fleet fishes in a mixed-stock fishery whose main target species (southern hake stock) is subject to a recovery plan and, thus, a relatively low TAC with respect to the fleet’s historical catches, shortening not only the fishing season when the TAC is
reached but also increasing hake discards because it is looking to other target species. For their part, the smaller-scale fisheries (artisanal, fixed gillnets, longlines) are also more in favour of an individual effort system (fishing days or kW days), transferable or otherwise. This can be explained by the hugely wide variety of target species these fleets fish for and, in turn, the lesser number of species subject to TACs, especially in the case of the artisanal fleet. Lastly, and in relation with the governance system, the majority of the fleet segments would prefer the respective regional governments to increase their regulatory level to the detriment of the central government, which presently holds the authority with respect to fisheries regulation. Fishermen operating in Atlantic grounds are also in favour of the EC increasing its regulatory level, although to a lesser extent than in the case of the regional governments.
Acknowledgements This study was made possible thanks to the financial support from the Ministry of Science and Innovation (ECO2009-10324), Xunta de Galicia (CN 2011/020) and FEDER.
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[22] Quiggin J. How to set catch quotas: a note on the superiority of constant effort rules. J Environ Econ Manage 1992;22:199–203. [23] Hannesson A. Optimum fishing capacity and international transfer of excess allowable catches. Land Econ 1994;70:330–44. [24] Homans FR, Wilen JEA. Model of regulated open access resource use. J Environ Econ Manage 1997;32:1–21.
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[25] Danielson A. Efficiency of catch and effort quotas in the presence of risk. J Environ Econ Manage 2002;43:20–33. ˜ olas de aguas Europeas Atla´nticas. [26] IEO. Atlas de las flotas de pesca Espan ˜ ol de Oceanografı´a; 2011. Madrid: Instituto Espan [27] MARM. Anuario de estadı´stica. Madrid: Ministerio de Medio Ambiente y Medios Rural y Marino; 2010.
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Marine Policy journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/marpol
The perceptions of fisheries management options by Spain’s Atlantic fishermen ˜ o n, M. Dolores Garza-Gil, Manuel Varela-Lafuente Lucy Amigo-Doban Department of Applied Economics, University of Vigo, Faculty of Economic and Business Sciences, Campus de Lagoas-Marcosende s/n, 36310 Vigo, Galicia, Spain
a r t i c l e i n f o
abstract
Article history: Received 7 December 2011 Received in revised form 17 February 2012 Accepted 17 February 2012 Available online 28 March 2012
This paper analyses the perceptions of Spanish fishermen working in Atlantic fishing grounds on current fishery regulation measures and the possibility of introducing transferable rights as is established in the EC’s latest proposal to reform the Common Fisheries Policy. A survey was conducted through face-to-face interviews and ordered logistic and multiple regression models to identify which characteristics influence fishermen’s perceptions and attitudes. The results show that the fleet segments most in favour of implementing ITQs correspond to industrial fishing, while the smallerscale fisheries (artisanal, gillnets, longline and coastal trawl) are more in favour of a system involving individual effort (fishing days or kW days), transferable or otherwise. & 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Fishing resources Management Decision-making Perceptions CFP
1. Introduction The success of a regulatory system becomes more uncertain the more complex is the fishery. In general, it is more difficult to regulate multi-species fisheries, resources with complex bioecological relations and multi-fleet fisheries. Complexity also increases with the size of a fishery and the number of its members, and with the greater mobility both of the resource and of fishermen [1–6]. But, also, the possibilities of success depend on the existing institutions and on the social and political interaction within which it is applied. Fisheries administration should be credible among fishermen so that the regulatory process can be applied with a high level of legitimacy [7–10]. In this sense, if fishermen carry out their activity with a high degree of uncertainty and think that in the future they will not be able to do so (either due to changes in fishing policy, or on account of the predatory attitude of other insufficiently-controlled fishermen), they will be less respectful of the natural resource. Involving fishermen in the decision-making process is, therefore, of maximum interest [11–14]. Fishermen will have the incentive of being involved in this process as long as they are guaranteed they are the owners of fishing rights respected by other fishermen, economic agents and the administration. One possible way to advance along these lines could be the progressive implementation of individual fishing rights, both with regard
n
Corresponding author. Tel.: þ34 986 813517; fax: þ34 986 812401. ˜ o). E-mail address: [email protected] (L. Amigo-Doban
0308-597X/$ - see front matter & 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.marpol.2012.02.015
to a portion of the resource (ITQ) as well as the capacity to exercise effort (transferable effort). The use of market instruments may be a more efficient and less expensive way of reducing fishing overcapacity as the operators adapt their fleet to their fishing rights in order to achieve economic efficiency. The European Commission (EC) proposes the use of market instruments in its latest Green Paper on the reform of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) and suggests the possibility that this regulatory system could be complemented with safeguard clauses to avoid excessive concentration of ownership or possible negative effects on smaller-scale fisheries and coastal communities dependent on fishing [15]. The regulation of Spanish fisheries comes under several different bodies (European Union, central government, regional governments), which simultaneously share management responsibility. Despite the prevailing diversity, a common philosophy predominates, congruent with a system in which direct control of outputs and inputs is combined using traditional fisheries regulation mechanisms. In general, in the bodies or levels of higher rank, a framework is established whereby, at the lower levels, the regulations will have to be applied and/or developed. Habitually, the norms relating to the resource (TACs, quotas, minimum sizes, gear) are stricter than those relating to the fleet and to the distribution of quotas among fishermen, where the lower-rank bodies have a greater capacity of intervention and, therefore, influence. Furthermore, the responsibility of management (and, therefore, of the determination of operational and functional regulations) is determined according to the geographical situation of the
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fishing grounds. In third countries and international waters, the regulatory responsibility corresponds, respectively, to the relevant coastal countries and international bodies. In the first case, the coastal country establishes the fishing rights of the Spanish fleet via the concession of licences and sets global resource quotas. In the second case, the EC assigns the agreed TAC to the Member States, and the distribution of quotas among Spanish ships is the responsibility of the Spanish government. On the other hand, the European Community establishes TACs for its waters every year per species and zone and also assigns licences and quotas to the Spanish fleet according to the criteria established in the Treaty of Accession. There is a closed list of ships which may access these waters and the responsibility regarding the distribution of quotas among the vessels lies with the Spanish government. Lastly, regulation in national fishing grounds is subject to Common Fisheries Policy guidelines, particularly those regarding the species subject to TACs. Nevertheless, the Spanish government’s margin for regulation is wide, considering that a large number of species are not subject to EC quotas. In turn, the management of these waters is shared between the central government and regional governments. Assigning responsibility varies according to geographical criteria and regulatory matters. The grounds are divided up between inshore waters (zones situated between the coastline and the baselines which delimit the beginning of territorial waters) and external waters (between the base-line and the limit of the Exclusive Economic Zone). Then, regarding on the regulation of the fishing grounds exploited by the Spanish fleet there is a hierarchy of administrations, objectives and instruments. The bodies with higher rank and fishery regulatory capacity establish the priority of objectives and management instruments, to which the lower-rank bodies will be subordinate. In general, fisheries management is characterised by a combination of measures that have affected the fishery access regime: a situation of free access has now become a regime of restricted access. The imposition of the restriction has mainly brought about vessel number limitations, and impacted on catches after the establishment of TACs (and, in some cases, the subsequent implementation of annual ITQs: Spanish vessels in the Celtic Sea and swordfish fisheries), and on fishing effort (kW fishing days) in fisheries where a stock management/recovery plan has been introduced (northern hake stock and southern hake and Norwegian lobster stocks). The aim of this paper is to gauge the perception of Spanish fishermen in Atlantic fishing grounds with regard to the different regulatory measures and the role of the administrations (EC, central government and regional governments) in the management decision-making process. To this end, Section 2 presents the method, Section 3 contains the results, and lastly Section 4 shows the main conclusions.
2. Methodology The study has been set out to assess (i) fishermen’s perceptions of the degree to which current fisheries legislation is adequate; (ii) their perceptions as to whether the different regulatory administrations (European, central or regional) should be more or less prominent in the drawing-up of management regulations; and (iii) their assessment of new regulatory possibilities, be it via a system of individual quotas or based on effort (fishing days or kW days). In the case of new regulatory possibilities, the duration of quotas/effort (annual or pluriannual) and the possibility of transferable rights among fishermen or among producer organisations are taken into consideration. In order to do so, those interviewed were asked to reply to a series of questions relating to the research using a four-point
Likert scale. The Likert scale is frequently used in behavioural sciences in Psychology to measure fishermen’s perceptions and attitudes to certain fisheries policies and management methods [11,12,16–19]. In relation to the first topic of research, we look into fishermen’s participation in the decision-making process through their perceptions on five different levels: their perception of the degree to which gear selectivity measures are adequate, total catches, the technical characteristics of vessels, fishing licences and, finally, the adequacy of regulations regarding safety on board fishing vessels. The second and third topics of our research analyse fishermen’s attitudes on the best regulatory options for the Atlantic fisheries. Firstly, and with regard to the drawing-up of legislation, fishermen were asked to classify, using a four-point Likert scale, which public administration body should be more or less prominent in the regulatory process: at European, central or regional level. The fishermen’s opinions are stratified at 0 level—less participation, 1—the same, 2—a little more and, the final level, 3—much more. They were then asked to classify, using a fourpoint Likert scale, regulatory preferences using systems based on individual annual quotas/effort, individual pluriannual quotas/ effort or based on transferable rights (quotas or effort). In this last case, the fishermen’s opinions are stratified using the 0 level— very unfavourable, 1—quite unfavourable, 2—quite favourable and, the final level, 3—very favourable. The analysis of the data suggests that Spanish fishermen’s perceptions of regulation and the decision-making process it involves can be influenced by a large variety of factors: demographic, vessel characteristics, fishing gear. These variables are analysed with the aim of researching which specific characteristics influenced fishermen’s perceptions and attitudes with regard to the management system and, in particular, which most significantly influenced attitudes regarding the fisheries management decision-making process and the assessment of the regulatory possibilities set out in the study (through effort/individual non-transferable quotas or through transferable rights). Table 1 shows the number of vessels that operate in Atlantic fishing grounds per fleet segment and their main technical characteristics. Most of the fleet belongs to the segment corresponding to smaller vessels or smaller-scale fisheries and comprises vessels under 12 m in length with 1–3 crew members. Given that their activity is usually homogenous per fishing zone and that the vessel owners do not keep detailed accounts of activity income and costs, we have opted to directly survey the fishermen’s associations of which the vessels in each fishing zone are comprised. We then find the fleet segment operating in Spanish waters, made up of 665 vessels which use fixed gillnets, longlines, trawling and purse-seine gear. The fleet that fishes in non-Spanish European waters is made up of 243 vessels, of which 181 (longliners and trawler vessels) operate in European waters and the rest are surface longliners which also operate in international waters, following the swordfish migratory route. Lastly, 185 vessels operate in international or third country waters, to which we would have to add 33 purse seine vessels which fish for tuna. In this segment, freezer vessels in NAFO waters and international and third country waters are jointly included; and, therefore, it includes all the freezer vessels operating in the Atlantic, Pacific and Indian oceans. In any case, the vessels included in this segment are not affected by fishery regulations relating to European waters. The research was carried out using questionnaires focussed on obtaining information on participating fishermen’s perceptions and attitudes at different levels of the regulatory decision-making process. In order to do so, information was gathered on demographic characteristics (age), business characteristics (skipper/ seaman, number of crew members, vessel characteristics— length and GRT) and the type of gear the vessels use (artisanal,
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Table 1 Spanish Fleet Segments in Atlantic Grounds, 2009. Source: Own compilation from [26,27].
Smaller-scale fisheries Purse seine Surface line Coastal Long line Coastal Trawl Fixed gillnet Long line/fixed gillnet in Celtic Sea Trawl in Celtic Sea Freezer trawl Freezer surface line
Number of vessels
Tonnage (GRT)
Length (m)
Target species
Sample
5925 (142)a 308 62 131 159 67 79 102 123 98
5 54 125 76 181 42 183 208 755 763
10.5 19.3 27.0 25.8 27.5 16.8 29.0 38.1 58.3 38.8
Octopus, squid, clams, cockle, scallop, razor shell, crabs, othersb Sardine, horse mackerel, anchovy, mackerel, tuna Sword fish, sharks Hake, derbio, conger Hake, horse mackerel, mackerel, blue whiting, nephrops Hake, monkfish, horse mackerel Hake, conger, blackbelly rosefish Hake, angler fish, megrim, ray Halibut, hake, skate, prawn, blackbelly rosefish, cod Tunas, sword fish
22c 34 17 14 18 9 10 11 8 8
a
Number of Cofradı´as (fishermen’s associations) in brackets. Basically, wedge sole, cuckoo ray, shrimp, common eel, common bass, large scaled scorpion fish, Atlantic panfret, conger, poor cod, common sole, dusky grouper, allis shad, white seabream. c The cofradı´as interviewed are comprised of over 3,500 vessels. b
Table 2 Demographic and business characteristics, perceptions and attitudes of the fishermen in the study. Description of variables
Mean (standard deviation)
Demographic characteristics Age¼ respondent length (years)
39 (11.63)
Vessel characteristics Owner of boat ¼ 1, if respondent is the owner of the boat; otherwise 0 Workers boat ¼ number of workers n the boat Length of boat ¼ respondent length (m) GRT ¼respondent gross register tonnage
0.19 12.98 26.96 173.84
Frequencies of occurrence (%)
–
(0.40) (8.83) (13.35) (268.93)
20 – – –
Fleet segment Smaller-scale fishery ¼1; otherwise 0 Purse seine ¼1; otherwise 0 Surface line¼ 1; otherwise 0 Coastal long line ¼1; otherwise 0 Coastal trawl ¼1; otherwise 0 Fixed gillnet ¼ 1; otherwise 0 Long line in Celtic Sea¼ 1; otherwise 0 Trawl in Celtic Sea ¼ 1; otherwise 0 Freezer trawl ¼1; otherwise 0 Freezer surface line¼ ; otherwise 0
0.15 0.17 0.17 0.04 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.03
(0.36) (0.38) (0.38) (0.22) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.27) (0.17)
15 17 17 4 9 9 9 9 8 3
Perceptions and Attitudes on government support Fishermen’s perceptions of the adequacy of current legislation Gear selectivity ¼ 1; otherwise 0 Total catches ¼1; otherwise 0 Vessel technical characteristics¼ 1; otherwise 0 Fishing licences¼ 1; otherwise 0 Work safety¼ 1; otherwise 0
0.76 0.72 0.68 0.75 0.77
(0.43) (0.45) (0.47) (0.44) (0.42)
77 73 68 74 78
Fishermen’s attitudes on the Fisheries legislation on the Fisheries legislation on the Fisheries legislation on the
0.45 (0.50) 0.28 (0.45) 0.82 (0.38)
45 28 83
0.41 0.48 0.50 0.36 0.51 0.54
41 48 50 36 51 54
drawing-up of fisheries legislation part of the EU ¼1; otherwise 0 part of the central government¼ 1; otherwise 0 part of the regional governments¼ 1; otherwise 0
Fishermen’s attitude on the Regulatory System Individual annual effort (fishing days or kW days) ¼1; otherwise 0 Individual multiannual effort ¼ 1; otherwise 0 Individual transferable effort ¼ 1; otherwise 0 Individual annual quotas ¼ 1; otherwise 0 Individual multiannual quotas ¼1; otherwise 0 ITQs ¼1; otherwise 0
purse seine, surface longline, coastal longline, coastal trawl, fixed gillnets, Grand Sole longline, Grand Sole trawl, freezer trawler, freezer surface longline). Table 2 reflects the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis. Before putting the questionnaire into practice, we contacted port authorities, fishermen’s associations and fishermen with the aim of presenting the study proposed and requesting their collaboration. The questionnaire was then adapted and the final
(0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.48) (0.50) (0.50)
version was provided to 127 vessels and 22 fishermen’s associations, divided up according to the fishing gear they use. The faceto-face interviews were carried out by an interviewer and took place between May and June 2010, and each interview lasted an average of 20 min. In the first topic of research, fishermen’s perceptions of current fishery legislation, perceptions on the adequacy of ‘‘gear selectivity measures’’, ‘‘total catch measures’’, ‘‘measures regarding the
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technical characteristics of vessels’’, ‘‘measures regarding fishing licences’’ and ‘‘measures regarding safety requirements on board fishing vessels’’ were analysed. Due to the small sample size, for the purposes of analysis, the Likert scale was collapsed into two rather than three points: agree ¼non-existent or insufficient regulation (1), and disagree ¼sufficient (2) or excessive (3) regulation. In order to identify which of the fishermen’s individual characteristics (demographic, vessel characteristics, attitudes and perceptions) such ranges of responses influence, we proposed logistic regression models using Huber–White robust standard errors [20]. Ordered regression models are the most commonly-used models for ordinal outcomes in social sciences [21]. These models assume proportional odds (or parallel regression assumption, i.e., they assume that the coefficients describing the relationship between each pair of outcome groups are the same). As such, the proportional odds assumption needs to be tested and this is done through Brant’s Wald test (Brant test) and the likelihood-ratio test for ordinal responses. Univariate statistics were used to test for departures from neutrality for each statement in isolation, with the Wilcoxon signed-rank test using EViews 6.0 statistical package and Stata SE 10 Data Analysis and Statistical Software in the analysis.
3. Results Table 2 shows that the average fisherman is 39 years old. Most of the fishermen are not skippers, only 20%, approximately. The average number of crewmen per vessel is 12.98, the average length of vessels is 26.96 m and the GRT, 173.84. Most of the fishermen said they favoured greater regulation on the part of the regional government, followed by the European Union. The disaggregated analysis of demographic factors and vessel characteristics in terms of fishing regime (Table 3) shows that surface longline has the lowest average fisherman’s age, 28, and a high number of workers per vessel, 18. On the other hand, the trawl gear regime and artisanal fisheries are those which reflect older average ages, more than 40, but where the average number of workers per vessel is lower. The descriptive statistics for the replies to the Likert-scale items are presented in Table 4. The logistic and ordered logistic regression models, which research attitudes towards the implementation of individual quotas and effort (non-transferable and transferable), are shown in Table 5. Fishermen’s perceptions as to regulatory measures on gear selectivity indicate that a significant majority of fishermen are
Table 3 Technical characteristics of sample for the Fishing regime. Fleet segment
Age Mean (SD)
Workers boat Mean (SD)
Length boat (m) Mean (SD)
GRT Mean (SD)
Smaller-scale fisheries Purse seine Surface line Coastal long line Coastal trawl Fixed gillnet Celtic Sea long line Celtic Sea trawl Freezer trawl Freezer surface line
42 34 39.2 35.6 45.7 36.6 38.8 40.4 43.3 28
2.87 10.4 12.2 13.2 11.3 18.7 16.3 15.9 25.1 18.3
9.59 20.6 26.4 25.9 28.6 18.8 24.3 29.9 59.7 36.3
5.72 52.2 114.4 86.3 174.4 44.5 176.9 184.5 750.2 768.3
(9.31) (9.33) (12.76) (13.89) (13.02) (18.7) (8.62) (4.79) (8.95) (1.41)
(11.37) (2.57) (2.35) (2.92) (3.53) (19.81) (2.01) (2.54) (9.80) (4.04)
(1.77) (2.77) (3.29) (5.08) (5.24) (5.70) (3.97) (2.86) (15.72) (4.05)
(2.26) (20.09) (36.23) (40.57) (75.19) (28.59) (35.12) (21.03) (463.32) (548.19)
Table 4 Descriptive statistics and reliability analysis (Cronbach’s alpha) to Likert-type statements designed to quantify fishermen’s perceptions. Individual statements were tested for departure from neutrality with the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. Likert-scale items
% Responses Disagree
Mean (7 SD)
Wilcoxon signed-rank test
1.99 1.89 1.60 1.86 1.84
Z¼ 7.52, p o 0.001 Z¼ 5.77 po 0.001 Z¼ 0.97, p ¼ 0.386 Z¼ 6.12, p o 0.001 Z¼ 7.85, p o 0.001
Agree
Fishermen’s perception of the level of sufficiency of current legislationa Gear selectivity 23 77 Total catches 27 73 Vessels’ technical characteristics 32 68 Fishing licences 26 74 Work safety 22 78
(0.71) (0.84) (0.84) (0.89) (0.71)
Fishermen’s attitude on whether to increase and who should increase the level of adequacy when drawing up legislationb EU 55 45 1.61 (0.96) Z¼ 5.89, p o 0.001 Central administration (Madrid) 72 28 1.25 (0.79) Z¼ 7.11, p o 0.001 Regional governments 17 83 2.45 (0.87) Z¼ 1.80, p ¼ 0.426 Fishermen’s attitude on the Regulatory Systemc Individual annual effort 59 Individual multiannual effort 51 Individual transferable effort 50 Individual annual quotas 64 Individual multiannual quotas 49 ITQs 46
41 49 50 36 51 54
1.39 1.58 1.91 1.21 1.82 2.17
(0.58) (0.85) (0.69) (0.80) (0.71) (0.61)
Z¼ 0.98, Z¼ 2.93, Z¼ 1.82, Z¼ 0.96, Z¼ 4.80, Z¼ 5.12,
p ¼ o0.001 p ¼ o 0.001 p ¼ 0.286 p ¼ 0.521 p ¼ o0.001 p o 0.001
a Statements were measured on a four-point Likert-scale, subsequently dropped to a two-point Likert-scale for Participation in the decision-making process: Disagree (¼ 0 non-existent legislation, ¼ 1 inadequate), Agree (¼ 2 adequate legislation, ¼3 excessive legislation); SD: standard deviation. b Statements were measured on a four-point Likert-scale, subsequently dropped to a two-point Likert-scale for Attitudes on the decision-making process: Disagree (¼ 0 less participation, ¼1 the same), Agree (¼ 2 a little more, and ¼3 much more); SD: standard deviation. c Statements were measured on a four-point Likert-scale, subsequently dropped to a two-point Likert-scale for attitudes on the decision-making process: Disagree (¼ 0 very unfavourable, ¼1 not very favourable), Agree (¼2 quite favourable, and ¼3 very favourable); SD: standard deviation.
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Table 5 Logistic regression model estimates. Variables
Individual annual Individual effort multiannual effort
Individual transferable effort
Individual annual Individual quotas multiannual quotas
ITQs
Coef.
Coef.
Coef.
S.E.
Coef.
S.E.
S.E.
S.E.
Coef.
S.E.
Coef.
S.E.
Demographic age
0.071
0.026
0.751
0.425
0.007
0.0576
0.039
0.046
0.872
0.5786
0.028
0.010
Vessel characteristics Owner of boat Workers boat Length of boat GRT
0.481 0.865 0.871n 0.256n
0.156 0.358 0.175 0.018
0.281 0.845 0.548n 0.645n
0.015 0.238 0.056 0.1456
0.856 0.468 0.089n 0.189n
0.486 0.154 0.475 0.616
0.771 0.4835 0.478n 0.698n
0.869 0.238 0.147 0.357
0.561 0.875 0.276n 0.198n
0.111 0.357 0.085 0.007
0.594 0.8641 0.822n 0.916n
0.254 0.679 0.145 0.358
0.521 0.367 0.126n 0.723 0.649 0.269 0.268n 0.667 0.369 0.901
0.021 0.239 0.489 0.225 0.189 0.254 0.186 0.437 0.268 0.652
0.002 0.379 0.855 0.260 0.682n 0.5712 0.371 0.476 0.572 0.451
0.246 0.002 0.258 0.356 0.554 0.6001 0.019 0.122 0.208 0.198
0.705n 0.389 0.642 0.724 0.441 0.834n 0.238 0.681 0.482 0.461
0.045 0.201 0.218 0.465 0.317 0.059 0.198 0.505 0.302 0.283
0.501 0.135 0.268 0.685n 0.369 0.421 0.234 0.236 0.316 0.495
0.320 0.378 0.054 0.476 0.155 0.019 0.079 0.476 0.525 0.731
0.426 0.279 0.5835 0.469 0.5785 0.256 0.379 0.477 0.368 0.645n
0.035 0.012 0.531 0.134 0.653 0.324 0.142 0.215 0.092 0.114
0.891 0.761n 0.874 0.971 0.829 0.205 0.761 0.821n 0.754n 0.8142
0.191 0.004 0.553 0.772 0.4521 0.090 0.308 0.438 0.016 0.079
0.352 0.041 0.661n 100 0.14
0.107 0.015 0.452
0.635 0.224 0.742n 100 0.12
0.123n 0.478 0.241 100 0.16
0.614 0.248 0.103
0.392n 0.271 0.309n 100 0.15
0.205 0.169 0.216
0.192 0.510 0.851n 100 0.14
0.003 0.112 0.357
0.516n 0.351 0.391 0.125 0.644n 0.572 100 0.18
Fishing regime Smaller-scale fishery Purse seine Surface line Coastal long line Coastal trawl Fixed gillnet Longline in Celtic Sea Trawl in Celtic Sea Freezer trawl Freezer surface line Attitudes and perceptions Drawing up of EU legislation Drawing up of central government legislation Drawing up of regional government legislation No. of observations Pseudo R2
0.124 0.014 0.216
p o0.10. Each regression represents fishermen’s attitudes on the regulatory system: Individual annual licences; individual multiannual licences; individual transferable licences; individual annual quotas; individual multiannual quotas, and ITQs. Each regulatory option was dichotomised (agree or otherwise) and the logistic regression calculated. This procedure was selected due to the impossibility of estimating an ordinal logistic regression model on account of the violation of the parallel regression assumption. Robust standard error is estimated by the Huber–White method. n
a
satisfied with existing regulations, 77%, with 23% considering that regulations are non-existent or insufficient. The results regarding their perception of the regulatory measures which affect catches follow similar lines, with 73% of fishermen of the opinion that current regulations are sufficient, 27% considering that regulations are not sufficient. In relation with their perception of regulations on fishing licences, the results obtained show that 74% of fishermen consider them to be sufficient, only 26% considering them to be insufficient. The results regarding fishermen’s perceptions of safety on board vessels show that 78% consider them to be sufficient as opposed to 22% who believe them to be insufficient. The highest percentage with regard to dissatisfaction with the adequacy of existing regulations corresponds to the measures that affect the technical characteristics of vessels; 32% of fishermen consider them to be insufficient. With regard to fishermen’s attitudes towards the idea of increasing regulatory measures and which jurisdiction (European, central or regional) should be responsible for such regulations, the results show that the majority, 83%, had a positive attitude towards significantly increasing the role of the regional governments in drawing up fishery regulations. However, fishermen are divided as to their perception of rule-making by the European Community; 45% are in favour of slightly increasing EC regulations. On the contrary, fishermen are significantly negative when it comes to increasing regulations at national level, that is, on part of the central administration (the Spanish government), with 72% of fishermen not in favour of increasing state intervention in fisheries regulation. In relation with fishermen’s attitude towards creating a regulatory system via the implementation of a catch quota or fishing
effort system (fishing days or kW days), a significant number of fishermen (54%) view the implementation of ITQs positively. The results of the logistic regression model reflect that fishermen’s attitudes do not significantly depend on the demographic factor considered. Furthermore, we can observe that their perceptions depend fundamentally on the size and characteristics of vessels. Fishermen show greater support for an individual effort system where smaller vessels with a lesser GRT are concerned (smallerscale fisheries, fixed gillnetters, surface longliners, Celtic Sea longliners and coastal trawlers). And, on the contrary, there is greater support for ITQs for larger vessels such as freezer surface longliners, freezer trawlers and Grand Sole trawlers. In particular, the results reveal that fishermen in the surface longline and Grand Sole trawling segments are more in favour of an individual annual effort system. Only the coastal trawl fishermen are more in favour of an individual pluriannual effort system, whereas the fishermen using fixed gillnets and artisanal gear are interested in a transferable effort system. Contrary to this, we find the fishermen in the purse seine, Grand Sole trawl and freezer trawler segments; the results reflect that they are statistically more significant with regard to a system of ITQs. We can also observe a preference for individual transferable quotas for the coastal trawl and surface trawl segments, annual and pluriannual, respectively. Therefore, we can gather the idea that fishermen in European Union waters and international waters show, in general, a greater preference for a system of ITQs. On the other hand, the level of acceptance of a system of individual quotas or effort varies considerably according to fishermen’s perceptions as to which Administration (European, central or regional) should assume a greater degree of fisheries
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management. The fishermen who perceived the need to increase fisheries regulation at regional level were also in favour of a regulatory system involving individual quotas, transferable or otherwise. The fact that the fishermen professed the need to significantly increase regulation at regional level could be interpreted as a perception that they distance themselves from the decisions taken by the Spanish authorities and, to a lesser extent, the European authorities, along with a perception that they are prevented from participating in the management decisions taken with regard to their activity. This perception that they are not consulted and are not able to participate is also true of other EU countries, such as France, the UK, the Netherlands and Denmark [16]. In any case, the results of the estimations of the logistic regression models are heterogeneous with regard to more favourable attitudes towards a system of individual effort and quotas in terms, basically, of the activity’s very characteristics, that is, the vessel’s characteristics and the type of gear used. The results obtained suggest that fishermen assess the establishment of a system of ITQs positively, especially where the industrial fisheries are concerned. In this context, fisheries literature considers the implementation of a rights-based management system as an optimum option, given that individual assignments favour the rationalisation of fishing effort through the coordination of collective solutions, and the transferability of quotas promotes economically efficient solutions to the problem of excess capacity [22–25]. Some recent experiences ratify those results [15]. Furthermore, the smaller-scale fisheries are more in favour of an effort system (fishing days or kW days), which can be justified by the wide variety of target species the vessels of these fisheries catch (see Table 1) and, in turn, the lesser number of species subject to TACs.
4. Conclusions Among other questions, the EC’s latest CFP reform proposal establishes the possibility of implementing a rights-based management system, while safeguarding the possible negative effects of such a system on coastal fishing communities. For its part, the success or failure of management measures also depends on the greater or lesser involvement of fishermen in the decision-making process, be it with regard to the management of marine resources or to the possibilities of suitably organising fishing activity. In this paper, we have analysed the perceptions of Spanish fishermen working in Atlantic fishing grounds as to the different fisheries regulatory measures currently in place, their perceptions of which Administration should increase (or not) the degree of fisheries management and what their perception of the possibility of introducing transferable rights, as is established in the EC’s latest CFP reform proposal, is. The results obtained are heterogeneous with regard to more favourable attitudes on a system of individual effort or quotas according, basically, to the characteristics of the activity, that is, those corresponding to the vessel and the type of fishing gear used. In general, the industrial fisheries are the fleet segments most in favour of implementing ITQs. The explanation for this is that these fleets fish for species which, in the main, are subject historically to catch restrictions through TACs and, furthermore, they could have a greater financial capacity to participate in a possible rights-based system. The exception is to be found in the coastal trawl segment, where fishermen are more in favour of a system based on individual transferable effort. The explanation for this could be that this fleet fishes in a mixed-stock fishery whose main target species (southern hake stock) is subject to a recovery plan and, thus, a relatively low TAC with respect to the fleet’s historical catches, shortening not only the fishing season when the TAC is
reached but also increasing hake discards because it is looking to other target species. For their part, the smaller-scale fisheries (artisanal, fixed gillnets, longlines) are also more in favour of an individual effort system (fishing days or kW days), transferable or otherwise. This can be explained by the hugely wide variety of target species these fleets fish for and, in turn, the lesser number of species subject to TACs, especially in the case of the artisanal fleet. Lastly, and in relation with the governance system, the majority of the fleet segments would prefer the respective regional governments to increase their regulatory level to the detriment of the central government, which presently holds the authority with respect to fisheries regulation. Fishermen operating in Atlantic grounds are also in favour of the EC increasing its regulatory level, although to a lesser extent than in the case of the regional governments.
Acknowledgements This study was made possible thanks to the financial support from the Ministry of Science and Innovation (ECO2009-10324), Xunta de Galicia (CN 2011/020) and FEDER.
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