The personality of populists: How the Big Five traits relate to populist attitudes

Personality and Individual Differences 139 (2019) 138–151

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The personality of populists: How the Big Five traits relate to populist attitudes

T

Matthias Fatke LMU Munich, Department of Political Science, Oettingenstr. 67, 80538 Munich, Germany

ARTICLE INFO

ABSTRACT

Keywords: Personality Big Five Populist attitudes Party identification United Kingdom Germany

Recent years have witnessed striking successes of populist movements. Yet, while populism on the supply side is fairly well studied, we know surprisingly little about individuals who hold populist views. This article attempts to shed light on how populist attitudes are shaped on the demand side by taking a person's personality structure into account. Drawing on the framework of the Big Five personality traits, we first propose relationships between each trait and populist attitudes. Second, we suggest a more dynamic perspective by considering which personality trait might make a person more susceptible to adopting populist views throughout an election campaign, particularly if she identifies with a populist party. We test the relationships in two distinct contexts making use of the internet panel of the 2015 British Election Study and the campaign panel of the 2017 German Longitudinal Election Study. Regression results show that some traits are significantly associated with populist attitudes, but relationships differ between countries. Moreover, change in populist attitudes appears to be largely independent from personality traits and their interaction with being close to populist parties. The findings not only contribute to our understanding of populism among voters, but also enrich the debate on political implications of personality.

1. Introduction The objective of this article is to investigate associations between personality traits and populist attitudes. With striking gains in recent elections around the world, populist movements are increasingly at the center of both public and academic debates. In order to identify factors, which can explain the appeal of populist parties and candidates, Bakker, Rooduijn, and Schumacher (2016) suggest populist voting grows out of psychological roots. While the personality structure of individuals is assumed to determine political behavior to some degree (Mondak, 2010), the relationship between personality traits and voting for populist parties is not uncontested (Schimpf & Schoen, 2017). Specifically, the argument relies on the assumption of the congruency model of political preference (Caprara & Zimbardo, 2004), linking voters to candidates with corresponding personalities. Accordingly, Van Assche, Dhont, et al. (2018) and Van Assche, Van Hiel, et al. (2018) show that psychological characteristics such as authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, prejudice, and cynicism predict support for populist parties. But it does not address the fundamental question of how to account for the prevalence of populism on the individual level. Therefore, Hawkins et al. (2017: 280) make the case that “further study is needed, especially studies that connect to populist attitudes per se and not just

behavioral outcomes.” This article attempts to heed this call. In particular, it wishes to provide answers to three questions. First, which personality traits are associated with populist attitudes? Second, do these relationships differ between country contexts? And third, are personality traits also associated with becoming more populist throughout an election campaign, conditional on identifying with a populist party? 1.1. Populism and personality An emerging consensus defines populism as a “thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonte générale (general will) of the people” (Mudde, 2004: 543). Important for the argumentation below, populism implies a strong intergroup element. Based on this minimal definition, Akkerman, Mudde, and Zaslove (2014) construct eight statements covering the precedence of the will of the people (over elected officials), the distinction between the people and the elite, and its Manichean nature. Empirical evidence on the relationship between personality and populist attitudes is scarce. Apart from analyses of voting and preferences for populist parties (e.g., Aichholzer & Zandonella, 2016;

E-mail address: [email protected]. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2018.11.018 Received 20 June 2018; Received in revised form 4 October 2018; Accepted 10 November 2018 0191-8869/ © 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

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Barbaranelli, Caprara, Vecchione, & Fraley, 2007; Bakker, Rooduijn, & Schumacher, 2016; Caprara, Schwartz, Capanna, Vecchione, & Barbaranelli, 2006; Schoen & Schumann, 2007; Van Assche, Dhont, et al., 2018; Van Assche, Van Hiel, et al., 2018; Vecchione et al., 2011), there are only few studies on adjacent questions that may inspire hypotheses about the psychological underpinnings of populist attitudes. According to Rico, Guinjoan, and Anduiza (2017), levels of populist attitudes among Spanish voters are driven by the negative emotion of anger but not by fear, which are in turn correlates of personality. Federico and Aguilera (2018) find the traits of conscientiousness and openness to be associated not only with racial resentment, but also with its change during election campaigns in the US. In fact, favoring the ingroup over the out-group figures prominently in the populist discourse. In the case of right-wing populism, out-groups refer to minorities in terms of nationality or ethnicity and ‘corrupt elites’ are blamed for the influx of non-native elements (Mudde, 2004, 2010). Accordingly, negative views of immigrants, asylum seekers, and minorities (Akkerman, 2012) and perceived cultural ethnic threat (Lucassen & Lubbers, 2012) are prevalent among voters of populist right parties. Indeed, being antiimmigration is the only appeal that unites all successful populist right parties (Ivarsflaten, 2008). Left-wing populism focuses on economic grievances rather than cultural issues (Akkerman, Zaslove, & Spruyt, 2017), blaming elites for economic and political inequalities (Rooduijn & Akkerman, 2017). Yet, supporters of populist left parties typically face competition from immigrants in the labor market, fueling their animosity against this out-group, too. In light of these findings, associations between personality and views about out-group might extend to attitudes pertaining to populism itself. To that end, Landwehr and Steiner (2017) analyze determinants of various normative conceptions of democratic decision-making among German citizens. Their results show that the traits of extraversion and conscientiousness are positively related to anti-pluralist skepticism, whereas openness and agreeableness are negatively related to populist majoritarianism.

order, attention to duty, and conservatism (Federico & Aguilera, 2018), conscientious persons might be more critical toward anyone who threatens to upset the unity of the people in general. Accordingly, conscientiousness is found to be associated with more critical attitudes toward immigrants (Gallego & Pardos-Prado, 2014). Due to their perseverance, however, they should be less susceptible to changing their views during an election campaign. Extraversion captures preferences for social interaction and includes aspects such as gregariousness, talkativeness, and assertiveness. It applies to people who are sociable, lively, and active, whereas introverts exhibit a tendency toward withdrawal, passivity, and shyness. As there is little reason to convincingly relate this trait to political behavior in general (Gerber, Huber, Doherty, Dowling, & Ha, 2010), introvert populists seem as plausible as extravert populists. With regard to changing attitudes, however, the latter could be less likely to adopt positions of the populist party they identify with than the former. After all, extraversion increases commitment to an organization (Erdheim, Wang, & Zickar, 2006) and, in some contexts, decreases the likelihood to switch parties (Bakker, Klemmensen, et al., 2016). Agreeableness also refers to the way one interacts with others. In particular, it describes agreeable persons as being warm, kind, generous, caring, altruistic, and having a strong sense of solidarity. Scoring low on this trait is found to deteriorate attitudes toward out-groups (Turner, Dhont, Hewstone, Prestwich, & Vonofakou, 2014) and increase out-group prejudice via Social Dominance Orientation (Sibley & Duckitt, 2008). And it represents the most important predictor of voting for a populist party (Bakker, Rooduijn, and Schumacher, 2016). Correspondingly, we would also expect a negative relationship with populist attitudes since believing in the corrupt, incompetent elite and the pure, good people fits a distrusting, egoistic, uncooperative, and intolerant mindset (Federico & Aguilera, 2018). At the same time, the cooperative and solidary nature of agreeable persons might be what makes them more receptive to such positions if they are close to a populist party, as they try to avoid conflict (Park & Antonioni, 2007). Neuroticism refers to disturbances in thoughts and actions resulting from experiencing unpleasant emotions. It characterizes persons who are nervous, anxious, tense, and generally dwell on what might go wrong, whereas emotionally stable persons are rather calm and relaxed. Being easily aggravated, neurotic persons are more prone to anger that fuels populist attitudes (Rico et al., 2017). As Bakker and de Vreese (2016) suspect a higher tendency to experience negative affect toward the EU, this might also apply to elites in general and anyone who opposes ‘the pure people’. Neurotics should also be more likely to intensify their populist positions while following a populist party because they are more easily swayed compared to emotionally stable persons.

1.2. Big Five traits and populist attitudes The five factor model of personality organizes individual differences into the following categories: Openness, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism (McCrae & Costa, 2003). These Big Five traits are generally found to play an important role for political behavior (Gerber, Huber, Doherty, & Dowling, 2011; Mondak, 2010). However, some argue personality traits may affect political behavior only indirectly, through political attitudes (Caprara & Zimbardo, 2004; Gallego & Oberski, 2012; Schimpf & Schoen, 2017). Therefore, it stands to reason to consider two relationships: How might each trait of the Big Five relate to populist attitudes? How might they relate to b if a person identifies with a populist party? Openness refers to being receptive toward new ideas, approaches, and experiences. Curious, perceptive, and imaginative individuals score high on this trait, while their counterparts are cautious, risk averse, and conservative. Aversion to difference and novelty encourages prejudice among the latter (Sibley & Duckitt, 2008), which can be targeted at ‘corrupt elites’ or anyone outside ‘the pure people’. And since openness to a pluralist discourse among the former is at odds with the conceptions of a general will and Manichean struggle, this trait should be negatively related to populist attitudes (Landwehr & Steiner, 2017: 795). Given the relationship between openness and vote switching (Bakker, Klemmensen, et al. (2016), however, open persons could be more susceptible to adopting populist ideas, particularly if they are close a political party that spreads populist messages. Conscientiousness comprises a dispositional component referring to reliability as well as a volitional component referring to industriousness. Conscientious persons are thorough, informed, and make plans in advance, whereas their counterparts are impatient, careless, and risk seeking. Landwehr and Steiner (2017: 795) expect them to prefer more scrutiny of elected officials. Since this trait also implies a preference for

1.3. This study One reason for the scarcity of empirical evidence has been the lack of available survey data, let alone panel data, that comprise measures of both personality traits and populist attitudes. Two novel data sets allow testing the three research questions outlined above: the internet panel of the 2015 British Election Study and the campaign panel of the 2017 German Longitudinal Election Study. In both contexts, we first regress measures of the Big Five personality traits on composite measures for populist attitudes, and second on indicators of populist attitudes separately. Using the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Polk et al., 2017), we then add salience scores of anti-establishment and anti-elite rhetoric of the party, with which a respondent identifies. This allows regressing the interactions between personality traits and salience scores on the change of populist attitudes from an earlier wave to a later one. The findings not only contribute to our understanding of populism on the demand side of individual voters, but also have the potential to enrich the debate on political implications of personality. 139

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2. Material and methods

For the Big Five traits, the BES data offers composite scores based on the TIPI inventory (Gosling et al. 2003). The GLES data includes the 15 items of the BFI-S inventory separately (Gerlitz & Schupp, 2005), which we average for each trait. Since Ludeke and Larsen (2017) point out problems with personality indicators in some countries of the most recent World Value Survey, we ensure that all separate items of the BFIS are positively and significantly correlated within each trait (which is the case). Personality variables in both data sets are standardized to have a mean of zero and standard deviation of one. To measure the degree of a party's populism, we use salience scores of anti-establishment and anti-elite rhetoric according to the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES). It consists of ratings by 337 political scientists specializing in political parties. These experts were asked to provide scores for a party's salience in terms of anti-establishment and anti-elite rhetoric with responses ranging from 0 (not at all important) to 10 (very important) (Polk et al., 2017: 3). In the Appendix, Table A2 provides descriptive statistics for all variables used in the analysis; Table A3 shows a correlation matrix.

We make use of two recent data sets from large-scale population surveys that include measures of personality as well as populist attitudes. This allows not only testing the relationships comparatively in two contexts, but also investigating the adoption of populist attitudes since those items are administered in multiple waves. 2.1. Data collection in the 2015 British Election Study (BES) internet panel The BES internet panel (Fieldhouse et al., 2017) comprises > 30,000 individuals who were eligible to vote in the 2015 general election in the United Kingdom. Participants were recruited from YouGov panel members. Since these panels are convenience samples of the population, a more representative core sample of around 21,000 respondents is defined. Participants were queried online in 13 waves between February 20, 2014 and June 23, 2017. The overall retention rate was 77% with 18% taking part in all 13 waves. Our models based on BES data include between 4219 and 5850 complete observations, resulting in sufficient power for statistically testing even for small effects.

2.4. Models and estimation strategy The analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we run regression analyses for the UK and Germany. Further regression models of the personality variables on each populism item separately can be found in Fig. A1 and Tables A5 and A6 in the Appendix. Second, we regress the interaction term between the salience scores of anti-establishment and anti-elite rhetoric of the party a respondent identifies with and each Big Five trait on the difference of populist scores from both panel waves. All models control for age, gender, and level of education of respondents. Standard errors are computed using a clustered sandwich estimator for regions, which comprise in Germany the 16 Bundesländer, and in the UK the nine Government Office Regions plus Scotland and Wales. This estimation produces more conservative results as it accounts for systematic differences in variances between the regions in which respondents are nested. We assess the robustness of the results with several alternative specifications: Factor scores (instead of means) of populist attitudes are analyzed; multilevel models (with regions as level-two units) with restricted maximum likelihood are estimated; autoregressive (instead of change score) models with measures of populist attitudes from T2 as dependent variable are estimated while controlling for populist attitudes at T1; and personality variables are interacted with probability to vote for SNP and UKIP or opinion scores of AfD and Linke (instead of a party's anti-elitism salience), which have by far the highest anti-elite salience scores. Results (shown in Tables A9 through A13 in the Appendix), by and large, indicate the robustness of the findings.

2.2. Data collection in the 2017 German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES) campaign panel The GLES campaign panel (Roßteutscher et al., 2018) comprises > 20,000 individuals who were eligible to vote in the 2017 general election in Germany. Participants were recruited mostly online, to a lesser extent by phone from two online access panels (Respondi AG with about 70,000 active members and GapFish with about 113,000 active members). Since these panels are convenience samples of the population, quotas according to age, gender, and education were applied in order to arrive at a representative sample of the GLES panel. Participants were queried online in eight waves between October 6, 2016 and October 9, 2017. The participation rate ranged from 25% in the first to 72% in the second wave. Our models based on GLES data include between 9288 and 10,515 complete observations, resulting in sufficient power for statistically testing even for small effects. 2.3. Operationalization of key variables Measuring populist attitudes, the BES panel administered five of the eight items suggested by Akkerman et al. (2014) in waves seven, ten, and eleven. The GLES panel asked four of the item suggested by Akkerman et al. (2014), as well as four other items, in waves five and eight. Table A1 in the Appendix details the wording of each populism item. We average answers over the items into one composite score. The resulting scales show high internal consistency. For the GLES data, Cronbach's alpha is 0.82, for the BES data 0.80. Factor analyses of the items furthermore indicate in both samples one unique factor with high eigenvalues (3.0 and 2.17) and roughly equal factor loadings of the items (0.51–0.76 and 0.58–0.75).1 To calculate change in populist attitudes we subtract populist scores in the earlier wave from the ones in the latter. Range of the difference is limited to respondents who changed on average less than two points (on the five-point scale), excluding 40 outliers in the British and 63 in the German sample. While this makes for a more conservative estimation, including these outliers does not change the results either.

3. Results and discussion This section illustrates graphically the results of the analyses. Regression tables can be found in the Appendix (Tables A4 through A8). Fig. 1 presents coefficients of the Big Five traits for each country context. In both the UK and Germany agreeableness and neuroticism are significantly and positively related to more populist attitudes. While the latter is in line with the abovementioned expectation, the positive coefficient for agreeableness runs counter to what the finding by Bakker, Rooduijn, and Schumacher (2016) suggests. Moreover, the other traits exhibit inconsistent associations between contexts. Only in the UK is openness significantly related to more populist attitudes, which is again at odds with previous expectations. Coefficients for conscientiousness and extraversion, in contrast, turn significant only in the German sample. Notably, there was no apparent reason to assume that extroverts were more inclined to populist attitudes than introverts. Overall, the relationships appear only marginally substantial in size. Even the strongest coefficient indicates an increase in populist attitudes of just 0.1 points (on a five-point scale) when a respondent is one standard deviation more conscientious. Taken together, results do not

1 We also assess measurement invariance using the three indicators that were asked in both country samples (cf. Table A1 in the Appendix). Results of a multi-group CFA indicate a fair degree of equivalence. Due to the considerable sample size, differences of χ2 are an overly sensitive measure (29.4 for metric and 59.0 for scalar invariance), but differences in CFI are within the conventional cutoff of 0.01 (0.002 for metric and 0.004 for scalar invariance).

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Openness

Conscientiousness

Extraversion

Agreeableness

Neuroticism

Age

Gender Germany Education

UK -.2

-.1

0

.1

.2

Fig. 1. Personality traits and composite (mean) score of populist attitudes. Note: Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from regression models in Appendix Table A4.

corroborate unambiguously the expected associations.2 While results fail to document consistent relationships between personality traits and populist attitudes, we test in a second step whether change in populist attitudes is associated with personality, particularly when respondents identify with populist parties. To that end, Fig. 2 plots, in the left panel, coefficients for the Big Five as well as a party's anti-elitism salience without an interaction term, and, in the right panel, coefficients for the interaction terms. None of the Big Five traits is significantly related to adopting more or less populist attitudes from one point in an election campaign to another. In fact, those who are close to a populist party in the UK express less populist attitudes later in the campaign. And neither do any of the interaction terms reach statistical significance, indicating no moderation. Put differently, a person's personality structure does not make her more susceptible to developing a more populist mindset during an election campaign if she identifies with a party whose anti-establishment and anti-elite rhetoric is salient. This finding is largely reflected by the robustness tests. Fig. A2 in the Appendix (based on Tables A9 and A10) illustrates autoregressive models with populist attitudes at T2 as dependent variable controlling for populist attitudes at T1. As in the models above using change scores of populist attitudes, coefficients of interaction terms are insignificant. So are coefficients of all personality traits in the BES data, as well as coefficients of openness, neuroticism, and extraversion in the GLES data. However, in the GLES data, coefficients for conscientiousness, and agreeableness reach statistical significance: While the change score models show no association between these personality traits and changing populist attitudes from T1 to T2, the autoregressive models indicate that populist attitudes at T2 are higher among those conscientious and agreeable respondents whose populist attitudes at T1 did not differ from persons scoring low on these two traits. The

interpretation of the results refers, therefore, to a slightly different comparison, as explicated in Lord's Paradox (Lord, 1967: 304). Using probability to vote UKIP or SNP and opinion scores for AfD or Linke instead of a party's anti-elite salience results, again, in a similar pattern (Tables A11 and A12 in the Appendix). Only probability to cast one's vote for UKIP, which is only moderately correlated (r = 0.18) with UKIP's anti-elitism score, is associated with adopting more populist attitudes. Also, it significantly moderates the coefficients for openness and conscientiousness: Persons scoring high on the former adopt more populist (or rather, less non-populist) attitudes if they are likely to vote or UKIP, whereas attitudes of persons scoring high on the latter become less populist if they are likely to vote or UKIP. This result, at least, is in line with what the theoretical background on the personality of populists suggests. 4. Conclusion Given the prominence of populism in public and academic discourses, we know surprisingly little about its roots on the demand side (Hawkins et al., 2017: 280). Research on electoral behavior suggests that support for populist parties is driven by certain personality traits (Bakker, Rooduijn, and Schumacher, 2016). Against this backdrop, the article supposes relationships between the Big Five and populist attitudes and presents empirical tests with recent panel data from the UK and Germany. Although the results by and large fail to meet the theoretical expectations, they bear substantial implications and offer points of departure for further research. First and foremost, it might be of practical relevance for any political campaign addressing potential voters to know which personality trait relates to populist attitudes. The involvement of the consultancy firm Cambridge Analytica in Donald Trump's 2016 campaign signifies the growing importance of political ads that are micro-targeted to psychosocial profiles. However, additional analyses in the Appendix show that relationships with the separate indicators vary between countries. This could imply that the meaning populism is different and follows different logics depending on the political and historical background. Furthermore, the still nascent literature on measuring populist attitudes needs to account for differences between indicators and consider the potential multidimensionality. In any case, more comparative research across contexts both on the Big Five and populist attitudes is desirable. With regard to the adoption

2 A more fine-grained picture is provided by Fig. A1 in the Appendix. Only few traits are related consistently to all separate populism indicators, which is the case for neuroticism in the British sample and conscientiousness as well as extraversion in the German sample. In both contexts, however, the belief that politicians need to follow the will of the people is stronger if respondents are more open, conscientious, and neurotic. Deeming that elected officials talk too much and take too little action, is, in contrast, more widespread among agreeable respondents in the UK, but less widespread among agreeable respondents in Germany.

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Germany

Openness

Germany

UK

Openness # Anti-elitism

UK

Conscientiousness

Extraversion

Conscientiousness # Anti-elitism

Agreeableness

Neuroticism

Extraversion # Anti-elitism

Age Agreeableness # Anti-elitism

Gender

Education Neuroticism # Anti-elitism Anti-elitism -0.05

0

0.05

-0.01

0

0.01

Fig. 2. Change in populist attitudes and anti-elite salience without (left) and with (right) interactions. Note: Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from regression models in Appendix Tables A7 and A8.

of populist attitudes future studies would be well advised to consider a longer time period. Apparently, change in populist attitudes occurring within weeks of a campaign is not enough to be driven by personality traits. Given diverging results between Germany and the UK, it also appears worthwhile to consider conditioning effects of contextual factors. When more comprehensive data on personality and populist attitudes become available cross-national studies can test more refined hypotheses, e.g., why personality traits should be related to populist attitudes when unemployment or diversity are high, but not when they are low. Another direction is to disentangle the effect of populist and

other attitudes, particularly in relation with voting for populist parties and candidates that also propagate anti-immigration and racist positions. In light of findings that authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, prejudice, and cynicism predict support for populist parties (Van Assche, Dhont, et al., 2018; Van Assche, Van Hiel, et al., 2018), it seems promising to consider moderation and mediation effects of psychological characteristics related to personality traits. Finally, the design of this article is not able to assess the causality between personality and populist attitudes. Further studies could scrutinize the causal mechanism through experimental treatments.

Appendix A Follow people's will Important decisions

Openness

Openness

Officials talk too much Represented by citizen Compromise is selling out Conscientiousness

Conscientiousness

Extraversion

Extraversion

Agreeableness

Agreeableness

Follow people's will Important decisions Officials talk too much Honest character Decision by referendum People all pull together Neuroticism

Neuroticism

Differences people/elite Shared interest, values

-.1

0

.1

.2

-.1

0

.1

Fig. A1. Personality traits and separate populism items in the UK (left) and Germany (right). Note: Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from ordered logit models in Appendix Tables A5 and A6.

142

.2

.3

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Germany

Openness

Germany

UK

Openness # Anti-elitism

UK

Conscientiousness

Extraversion

Conscientiousness # Anti-elitism

Agreeableness

Neuroticism

Extraversion # Anti-elitism

Age Agreeableness # Anti-elitism

Gender

Education Neuroticism # Anti-elitism Anti-elitism -.1

-.05

0

.05

.1

-0.01

0

0.01

Fig. A2. Autoregressive models of populist attitudes at T2 and anti-elite salience without (left) and with (right) interactions. Note: Coefficient of populist attitudes at T1 omitted; coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from regression models in Appendix Tables A11 and A12.

Table A1

Items querying populist attitudes. Wording

Variable name in GLES 2017

The politicians in the UK Parliament/German Bundestag need to follow the will of the people. The people, and not politicians, should make our most important policy decisions. I would rather be represented by a citizen than by a specialized politician. Elected officials talk too much and take too little action. What people call “compromise” in politics is really just selling out on one's principles. The political differences between the elite and the people are larger than the differences among the people. Ordinary citizens share the same values and interests. Ordinary citizens pull together. The people should ultimately decide important matters in referendums. Ordinary citizens are united by a good and honest character. Politics is ultimately a struggle between good and evil. Interest groups have too much influence over political decisions.

kpx_3103g kpx_3103f kpx_3103a kpx_3103e

Variable name in BES 2015 populism1Wx populism2Wx populism4Wx populism5Wx populism6Wx

Akkermann et al. (2014: 1331) POP1 POP2 POP4 POP5 POP7 POP3

kpx_3103h kpx_3103d kpx_3103c kpx_3103b

POP6 POP8

Note: Items were administered in waves five and eight of the GLES campaign panel and in waves seven, ten, and eleven of the BES internet panel. We use values of the tenth wave if values of the eleventh wave are missing.

Table A2

Descriptive statistics. BES data

N

Mean

Populist attitudes (mean) Change in populist attitudes Openness Conscientiousness Extraversion Agreeableness Neuroticism Age Gender Education Anti-elite salience PTV SNP PTV UKIP

7534 5228 51,235 51,237 51,238 51,237 51,235 63,625 68,625 57,999 48,876 3987 28,673

3.63 −0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 47 1.54 2.99 3.37 5.09 2.93

GLES data

N

Mean

Populist attitudes (mean) Change in populist attitudes Openness Conscientiousness Extraversion Agreeableness Neuroticism Age

13,938 12,132 18,106 18,108 18,113 18,112 18,111 22,526

3.49 −0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 46

143

St. dev. 0.69 0.54 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 17 0.50 1.34 2.62 4.36 3.76 St. dev. 0.66 0.41 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 15

Min

Max

1.00 −2.00 −3.30 −3.59 −1.94 −3.48 −1.71 15 1 0 0 0 0

5.00 1.80 2.58 1.77 2.66 2.25 2.89 116 2 5 10 10 10

Min

Max

1.00 −1.88 −3.32 −4.40 −2.82 −4.10 −2.45 18

5.00 1.88 1.88 1.81 2.11 1.92 2.72 102

(continued on next page)

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Table A2 (continued) GLES data

N

Gender Education Anti-elite salience Opinion score Linke Opinion score AfD

22,526 17,897 21,578 13,819 13,806

Mean

St. dev.

1.53 3.36 1.99 4.68 3.00

0.50 1.17 2.50 3.11 3.06

Min

Max

1 1 0 1 1

2 5 10 11 11

Table A3

Correlation matrix of variables. Populist attitudes (mean) BES data Change in populist attitudes Openness Conscientiousness Extraversion Agreeableness Neuroticism Age Gender Education GLES data Change in populist attitudes Openness Conscientiousness Extraversion Agreeableness Neuroticism Age Gender Education ⁎ ⁎⁎

Change in populist atti- Openness tudes

Conscientiousness

Extraversion

Agreeableness

Neuroticism

Age

Gender

−0.36⁎⁎ −0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04⁎⁎ 0.06⁎⁎ 0.05⁎⁎ 0.01 −0.25⁎⁎ −0.37

−0.05⁎⁎ 0.02 −0.00 0.02 −0.01 0.05⁎⁎ 0.03⁎ −0.09⁎⁎

0.08⁎⁎ 0.29⁎⁎ 0.08⁎⁎ −0.12⁎⁎ −0.12⁎⁎ 0.00 0.18⁎⁎

0.03⁎⁎ 0.24⁎⁎ −0.34⁎⁎ 0.14⁎⁎ 0.01 0.01⁎

0.04⁎⁎ −0.14⁎⁎ 0.01 0.06⁎⁎ 0.02⁎⁎

−0.25⁎⁎ 0.14⁎⁎ 0.18⁎⁎ −0.05⁎⁎

−0.15⁎⁎ 0.15⁎⁎ −0.04⁎⁎

−0.10⁎⁎ −0.23⁎⁎

−0.01

−0.02 −0.02 −0.02⁎ 0.01 0.00 0.01 −0.02⁎ 0.01

0.31⁎⁎ 0.33⁎⁎ 0.13⁎⁎ −0.12⁎⁎ −0.02⁎ 0.11⁎⁎ 0.12⁎⁎

0.28⁎⁎ 0.32⁎⁎ −0.22⁎⁎ 0.14⁎⁎ 0.13⁎⁎ −0.02

0.04⁎⁎ −0.31⁎⁎ 0.04⁎⁎ 0.07⁎⁎ 0.02

−0.18⁎⁎ 0.12⁎⁎ 0.15⁎⁎ −0.01

−0.20⁎⁎ 0.19⁎⁎ −0.09⁎⁎

−0.06⁎⁎ −0.09⁎⁎

−0.03⁎⁎

⁎⁎

0.03⁎⁎ 0.19⁎⁎ 0.11⁎⁎ 0.08⁎⁎ −0.03⁎⁎ 0.18⁎⁎ −0.02⁎ −0.23⁎⁎

p < 0.05. p < 0.01.

Table A4

Regression with populist attitudes (mean) as dependent variable (cf. Fig. 1).

Openness Conscientiousness Extraversion Agreeableness Neuroticism Age Gender Education Constant N R2

GLES data

BES data

−0.01 (0.00) 0.11⁎⁎ (0.01) 0.05⁎⁎ (0.01) 0.02⁎ (0.01) 0.04⁎⁎ (0.01) 0.01⁎⁎ (0.00) −0.08⁎⁎ (0.02) −0.12⁎⁎ (0.01) 3.74⁎⁎ (0.05) 10,515 0.11

0.02⁎ (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.02⁎ (0.01) 0.05⁎⁎ (0.01) 0.00 (0.00) −0.03 (0.03) −0.13⁎⁎ (0.01) 4.04⁎⁎ (0.06) 5850 0.07

Note: Standard errors (clustered for regions) in parentheses. ⁎ p < 0.05. ⁎⁎ p < 0.01.

144

Personality and Individual Differences 139 (2019) 138–151

M. Fatke

Table A5

Ordered logit regressions with populist attitude items as dependent variables (UK sample, cf. left panel of Fig. A1). BES data

Follow people's will

Important decisions

Officials talk too much

Represented by citizen

Compromise is selling out

Openness

0.07⁎⁎ (0.02) 0.06⁎ (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) 0.09⁎⁎ (0.03) 0.07⁎⁎ (0.03) 0.00 (0.00) −0.19⁎⁎ (0.06) −0.23⁎⁎ (0.03) −6.45⁎⁎ (0.24) −4.20⁎⁎ (0.13) −2.48⁎⁎ (0.13) 0.09 (0.15) 5755 12,469 12,535 −6224

0.06⁎ (0.03) −0.01 (0.03) 0.04 (0.02) 0.08⁎⁎ (0.03) 0.13⁎⁎ (0.03) −0.00⁎⁎ (0.00) −0.11 (0.06) −0.25⁎⁎ (0.02) −4.60⁎⁎ (0.14) −2.39⁎⁎ (0.13) −1.12⁎⁎ (0.13) 0.70⁎⁎ (0.12) 5638 15,907 15,973 −7943

0.09⁎⁎ (0.03) 0.09⁎⁎ (0.02) −0.01 (0.02) 0.05⁎ (0.02) 0.15⁎⁎ (0.03) 0.00 (0.00) −0.15⁎ (0.07) −0.23⁎⁎ (0.03) −5.63⁎⁎ (0.18) −3.65⁎⁎ (0.19) −2.09⁎⁎ (0.16) 0.29⁎ (0.14)

0.08⁎ (0.03) −0.01 (0.03) 0.02 (0.03) 0.03 (0.02) 0.09⁎⁎ (0.03) −0.00 (0.00) −0.12 (0.07) −0.22⁎⁎ (0.02) −4.77⁎⁎ (0.18) −2.37⁎⁎ (0.12) −0.84⁎⁎ (0.12) 0.98⁎⁎ (0.10)

−0.01 (0.02) 0.05⁎ (0.03) 0.09⁎⁎ (0.02) 0.00 (0.03) 0.11⁎⁎ (0.03) 0.00⁎ (0.00) 0.04 (0.06) −0.35⁎⁎ (0.02) −4.59⁎⁎ (0.23) −2.02⁎⁎ (0.13) −0.61⁎⁎ (0.14) 1.44⁎⁎ (0.16)

Conscientiousness Extraversion Agreeableness Neuroticism Age Gender Education cut1 cut2 cut3 cut4 N AIC BIC Log-likelihood

5743 13,247 13,314 −6614

5486 15,104 15,171 −7542

5539 14,957 15,023 −7469

Note: Standard errors (clustered for regions) in parentheses. ⁎ p < 0.05. ⁎⁎ p < 0.01.

Table A6

Ordered logit regressions with populist attitude items as dependent variables (German sample, cf. right panel of Fig. A1). GLES data

Follow people's will

Important decisions

Officials talk too much

Honest character

Decision by referendum

People all pull together

Differences people/ Shared interest, elite values

Openness

0.05⁎⁎ (0.01) 0.16⁎⁎ (0.03) 0.04⁎⁎ (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 0.04⁎⁎ (0.02) 0.02⁎⁎ (0.00) −0.50⁎⁎ (0.04) −0.01 (0.02) −4.52⁎⁎ (0.19) −3.07⁎⁎ (0.17) −0.68⁎⁎ (0.16) 0.91⁎⁎ (0.14) 10,422 25,333 25,420 −12,654

0.04⁎⁎ (0.01) 0.17⁎⁎ (0.02) 0.07⁎⁎ (0.02) −0.04 (0.02) 0.09⁎⁎ (0.02) 0.01⁎⁎ (0.00) −0.14⁎⁎ (0.04) −0.25⁎⁎ (0.02) −3.76⁎⁎ (0.15) −2.22⁎⁎ (0.15) −0.50⁎⁎ (0.14) 0.64⁎⁎ (0.15) 10,436 30,044 30,131 −15,010

−0.01 (0.02) 0.20⁎⁎ (0.03) 0.04⁎ (0.02) −0.05⁎⁎ (0.02) 0.15⁎⁎ (0.02) 0.01⁎⁎ (0.00) −0.06 (0.05) −0.20⁎⁎ (0.02) −4.88⁎⁎ (0.20) −3.27⁎⁎ (0.13) −1.19⁎⁎ (0.11) 0.48⁎⁎ (0.11) 10,479 26,018 26,106 −12,997

−0.04⁎ (0.02) 0.24⁎⁎ (0.03) 0.14⁎⁎ (0.02) 0.13⁎⁎ (0.03) −0.00 (0.02) 0.01⁎⁎ (0.00) −0.31⁎⁎ (0.05) −0.20⁎⁎ (0.02) −4.05⁎⁎ (0.14) −2.58⁎⁎ (0.13) −0.07 (0.11) 1.91⁎⁎ (0.12) 10,471 25,632 25,719 −12,804

−0.00 (0.01) 0.25⁎⁎ (0.03) 0.13⁎⁎ (0.02) 0.01 (0.03) 0.13⁎⁎ (0.02) 0.01⁎⁎ (0.00) −0.10⁎ (0.05) −0.29⁎⁎ (0.02) −3.82⁎⁎ (0.17) −2.56⁎⁎ (0.15) −1.09⁎⁎ (0.15) 0.06 (0.15) 10,478 29,109 29,196 −14,542

−0.04⁎⁎ (0.01) 0.24⁎⁎ (0.02) 0.15⁎⁎ (0.02) 0.09⁎⁎ (0.02) 0.02 (0.03) 0.00 (0.00) 0.02 (0.04) −0.33⁎⁎ (0.02) −3.27⁎⁎ (0.20) −1.65⁎⁎ (0.18) 0.27 (0.18) 1.79⁎⁎ (0.20) 10,487 28,979 29,066 −14,477

0.02 (0.02) 0.20⁎⁎ (0.04) 0.09⁎⁎ (0.02) 0.04 (0.02) 0.11⁎⁎ (0.02) 0.02⁎⁎ (0.00) −0.26⁎⁎ (0.04) −0.17⁎⁎ (0.02) −3.71⁎⁎ (0.17) −2.19⁎⁎ (0.12) −0.42⁎⁎ (0.13) 1.28⁎⁎ (0.12) 10,432 27,080 27,167 −13,528

Conscientiousness Extraversion Agreeableness Neuroticism Age Gender Education cut1 cut2 cut3 cut4 N AIC BIC Log-likelihood

Note: Standard errors (clustered for regions) in parentheses. ⁎ p < 0.05. ⁎⁎ p < 0.01.

145

−0.05⁎⁎ (0.02) 0.26⁎⁎ (0.03) 0.14⁎⁎ (0.02) 0.06⁎⁎ (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) 0.01⁎⁎ (0.00) −0.10⁎ (0.04) −0.31⁎⁎ (0.02) −3.38⁎⁎ (0.14) −1.89⁎⁎ (0.13) 0.20 (0.12) 1.90⁎⁎ (0.13) 10,431 28,079 28,166 −14,028

Personality and Individual Differences 139 (2019) 138–151

M. Fatke

Table A7

Regressions with interaction terms between personality and anti-elitism salience (UK sample, cf. Fig. 2). BES data

Without interaction

#Openness

#Conscientiousness

#Extraversion

#Agreeableness

#Neuroticism

Openness

−0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) −0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00) 0.03 (0.01) −0.03⁎⁎ (0.01) −0.01⁎⁎ (0.00)

0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) −0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00) 0.03⁎ (0.01) −0.03⁎⁎ (0.01) −0.01⁎⁎ (0.00) −0.00 (0.00) −0.11 (0.05) 4219 0.01

−0.01 (0.01) 0.02 (0.02) 0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) −0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00) 0.03 (0.01) −0.03⁎⁎ (0.01) −0.01⁎⁎ (0.00) −0.00 (0.00) −0.11 (0.05) 4219 0.01

−0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) −0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00) 0.03 (0.01) −0.03⁎⁎ (0.01) −0.01⁎⁎ (0.00) −0.00 (0.00) −0.11 (0.05) 4219 0.01

−0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) −0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00) 0.03⁎ (0.01) −0.03⁎⁎ (0.01) −0.01⁎⁎ (0.00) −0.00 (0.00) −0.11 (0.05) 4219 0.01

−0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) −0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00) 0.03 (0.01) −0.03⁎⁎ (0.01) −0.01⁎⁎ (0.00) −0.00 (0.00) −0.11 (0.05) 4219 0.01

Conscientiousness Extraversion Agreeableness Neuroticism Age Gender Education Anti-elitism Anti-elitism # Personal trait Constant Observations R2

−0.11 (0.05)

4219 0.01

Note: Standard errors (clustered for regions) in parentheses. ⁎ p < 0.05. ⁎⁎ p < 0.01.

Table A8

Regressions with interaction terms between personality and anti-elitism salience (German sample, cf. Fig. 2). GLES data

Without interaction

#Openness

#Conscientiousness

#Extraversion

#Agreeableness

#Neuroticism

Openness

−0.01 (0.00) −0.01 (0.01) −0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) −0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) −0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00) −0.00 (0.00)

−0.00 (0.01) −0.01 (0.01) −0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) −0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) −0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00) −0.00 (0.00) −0.00 (0.00) −0.05 (0.03) 9288 0.00

−0.01 (0.00) −0.01 (0.01) −0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) −0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) −0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00) −0.00 (0.00) −0.00 (0.00) −0.05 (0.03)

−0.01 (0.00) −0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) −0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) −0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00) −0.00 (0.00) −0.00 (0.00) −0.05 (0.03) 9288 0.00

−0.01 (0.00) −0.01 (0.00) −0.00 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) −0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) −0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00) −0.00 (0.00) −0.00 (0.00) −0.05 (0.03) 9288 0.00

−0.01 (0.00) −0.01 (0.01) −0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) −0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) −0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00) −0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) −0.05 (0.03) 9288 0.00

Conscientiousness Extraversion Agreeableness Neuroticism Age Gender Education Anti-elitism Anti-elitism # Personal trait Constant N R2

−0.05 (0.03)

⁎⁎

9288 0.00

⁎

Note: Standard errors (clustered for regions) in parentheses. ⁎ p < 0.05. ⁎⁎ p < 0.01.

146

9288 0.00

Personality and Individual Differences 139 (2019) 138–151

M. Fatke

Table A9

Autoregressive models with interaction terms between personality and anti-elitism salience (UK sample, cf. Fig. A2). BES data

Without interaction

#Openness

#Conscientiousness

#Extraversion

#Agreeableness

#Neuroticism

0.71⁎⁎ (0.01) −0.01 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00) 0.03 (0.02) −0.07⁎⁎ (0.01) −0.00 (0.00)

0.71⁎⁎ (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00) 0.03 (0.01) −0.06⁎⁎ (0.01) −0.00 (0.00) −0.00 (0.00) 1.03⁎⁎ (0.11) 4219 0.52

0.71⁎⁎ (0.01) −0.01 (0.01) 0.02 (0.02) 0.01 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00) 0.03 (0.02) −0.07⁎⁎ (0.01) −0.00 (0.00) −0.00 (0.00) 1.03⁎⁎ (0.11) 4219 0.52

0.71⁎⁎ (0.01) −0.01 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00) 0.03 (0.01) −0.06⁎⁎ (0.01) −0.00 (0.00) −0.00 (0.00) 1.03⁎⁎ (0.11) 4219 0.52

0.71⁎⁎ (0.01) −0.01 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00) 0.03 (0.01) −0.07⁎⁎ (0.01) −0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 1.03⁎⁎ (0.11) 4219 0.52

0.71⁎⁎ (0.01) −0.01⁎ (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00) 0.03 (0.02) −0.07⁎⁎ (0.01) −0.00 (0.00) −0.00 (0.00) 1.03⁎⁎ (0.11) 4219 0.52

Populist attitudes (T1) Openness Conscientiousness Extraversion Agreeableness Neuroticism Age Gender Education Anti-elitism Anti-elitism # Personality trait Constant

1.03⁎⁎ (0.11) 4219 0.52

N R2

Note: Standard errors (clustered for regions) in parentheses. ⁎ p < 0.05. ⁎⁎ p < 0.01.

Table A10

Autoregressive models with interaction terms between personality and anti-elitism salience (German sample, cf. Fig. A2). GLES data

Without interaction

#Openness

#Conscientiousness

#Extraversion

#Agreeableness

#Neuroticism

Populist attitudes (T1)

0.75⁎⁎ (0.01) −0.01 (0.00) 0.02⁎⁎ (0.00) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01⁎ (0.01) 0.01 (0.00) 0.00⁎⁎ (0.00) −0.02⁎ (0.01) −0.03⁎⁎ (0.00) 0.01⁎⁎ (0.00)

0.75⁎⁎ (0.01) −0.01 (0.01) 0.02⁎⁎ (0.00) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01⁎ (0.01) 0.01 (0.00) 0.00⁎⁎ (0.00) −0.02⁎ (0.01) −0.03⁎⁎ (0.00) 0.01⁎⁎ (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.86⁎⁎ (0.06) 9288 0.65

0.75⁎⁎ (0.01) −0.01 (0.00) 0.02⁎ (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01⁎ (0.01) 0.01 (0.00) 0.00⁎⁎ (0.00) −0.02⁎ (0.01) −0.03⁎⁎ (0.00) 0.01⁎⁎ (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.86⁎⁎ (0.06) 9288 0.65

0.75⁎⁎ (0.01) −0.01 (0.00) 0.02⁎⁎ (0.00) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01⁎ (0.01) 0.01 (0.00) 0.00⁎⁎ (0.00) −0.02⁎ (0.01) −0.03⁎⁎ (0.00) 0.01⁎⁎ (0.00) −0.00 (0.00) 0.86⁎⁎ (0.06) 9288 0.65

0.75⁎⁎ (0.01) −0.01 (0.00) 0.02⁎⁎ (0.00) 0.01 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 0.01 (0.00) 0.00⁎⁎ (0.00) −0.02⁎ (0.01) −0.03⁎⁎ (0.00) 0.01⁎⁎ (0.00) −0.00 (0.00) 0.86⁎⁎ (0.06) 9288 0.65

0.75⁎⁎ (0.01) −0.01 (0.00) 0.02⁎⁎ (0.00) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01⁎ (0.01) 0.01 (0.00) 0.00⁎⁎ (0.00) −0.02⁎ (0.01) −0.03⁎⁎ (0.00) 0.01⁎⁎ (0.00) −0.00 (0.00) 0.86⁎⁎ (0.06) 9288 0.65

Openness Conscientiousness Extraversion Agreeableness Neuroticism Age Gender Education Anti-elitism Anti-elitism # Personality trait Constant N R2

0.86⁎⁎ (0.06) 9288 0.65

Note: Standard errors (clustered for regions) in parentheses. ⁎ p < 0.05. ⁎⁎ p < 0.01.

147

148

−0.06⁎ (0.03) 9205 0.00

−0.00 (0.01) −0.01 (0.01) −0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) −0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) −0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00) −0.00 (0.00) −0.00 (0.00)

−0.06⁎ (0.02) 9205 0.00

−0.01 (0.00) −0.01 (0.01) −0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) −0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) −0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00) −0.00 (0.00) −0.00 (0.00)

#Conscientious

Note: Standard errors (clustered for regions) in parentheses. ⁎ p < 0.05. ⁎⁎ p < 0.01.

Observations R2

Constant

OS AfD #Personality trait

OS AfD

OS Linke # Personality trait

OS Linke

Education

Gender

Age

Neuroticism

Agreeableness

Extraversion

Conscientiousness

Openness

#Openness

−0.06⁎ (0.03) 9205 0.00

−0.01 (0.00) −0.01 (0.00) −0.00 (0.00) 0.01 (0.01) −0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) −0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00) −0.00 (0.00) −0.00 (0.00)

#Extraversion

−0.06⁎ (0.02) 9205 0.00

−0.01 (0.00) −0.01 (0.01) −0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) −0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) −0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00) −0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)

#Agreeableness

Regressions with interaction terms between personality and opinion score (OS) of Linke and AfD.

Table A11

−0.06⁎ (0.03) 9205 0.00

−0.01 (0.00) −0.01 (0.00) −0.00 (0.01) 0.01⁎⁎ (0.01) −0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00) −0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00) −0.00 (0.00) −0.00 (0.00)

#Neuroticism

0.00 (0.00) −0.00 (0.00) −0.06⁎ (0.03) 9192 0.00

−0.01 (0.01) −0.01 (0.01) −0.00 (0.01) 0.01⁎ (0.01) −0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) −0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00)

#Openness

0.00 (0.00) −0.00 (0.00) −0.06⁎ (0.03) 9192 0.00

−0.01 (0.00) −0.00 (0.01) −0.00 (0.01) 0.01⁎ (0.01) −0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) −0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00)

#Conscientious

0.00 (0.00) −0.00 (0.00) −0.06⁎ (0.03) 9192 0.00

−0.01 (0.00) −0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01⁎ (0.01) −0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) −0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00)

#Extraversion

0.00 (0.00) −0.00 (0.00) −0.06⁎ (0.03) 9192 0.00

−0.01 (0.00) −0.01 (0.01) −0.00 (0.01) 0.02⁎ (0.01) −0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) −0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00)

#Agreeableness

0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) −0.06⁎ (0.03) 9192 0.00

−0.01 (0.00) −0.01 (0.01) −0.00 (0.01) 0.01⁎ (0.01) −0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00) −0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00)

#Neuroticism

M. Fatke

Personality and Individual Differences 139 (2019) 138–151

149

−0.08 (0.14) 593 0.06

−0.04 (0.03) −0.01 (0.02) 0.03 (0.02) −0.00 (0.02) 0.00 (0.03) 0.00 (0.00) 0.06 (0.05) −0.06⁎⁎ (0.02) −0.02⁎⁎ (0.01) 0.00 (0.00)

−0.08 (0.14) 593 0.06

−0.04 (0.02) −0.03 (0.04) 0.03 (0.02) 0.00 (0.02) 0.00 (0.03) 0.00 (0.00) 0.06 (0.05) −0.06⁎⁎ (0.02) −0.02⁎⁎ (0.01) 0.00 (0.01)

#Conscientious

−0.08 (0.14) 593 0.06

−0.04 (0.02) −0.01 (0.02) 0.03 (0.03) −0.00 (0.02) 0.00 (0.03) 0.00 (0.00) 0.06 (0.05) −0.06⁎⁎ (0.02) −0.02⁎⁎ (0.01) 0.00 (0.00)

#Extraversion

Note: Standard errors (in models with PTV UKIP clustered for regions) in parentheses. ⁎ p < 0.05. ⁎⁎ p < 0.01.

Observations R2

Constant

PTV UKIP # Personality trait

PTV UKIP

PTV SNP # Personality trait

PTV SNP

Education

Gender

Age

Neuroticism

Agreeableness

Extraversion

Conscientiousness

Openness

#Openness

−0.08 (0.14) 593 0.06

−0.04 (0.02) −0.01 (0.02) 0.03 (0.02) −0.00 (0.03) 0.00 (0.03) 0.00 (0.00) 0.06 (0.05) −0.06⁎⁎ (0.02) −0.02⁎⁎ (0.01) 0.00 (0.00)

#Agreeableness

Regressions with interaction terms between personality and Probability to vote (PTV) SNP or UKIP.

Table A12

−0.08 (0.14) 593 0.06

−0.04 (0.02) −0.01 (0.02) 0.03 (0.02) −0.00 (0.02) 0.01 (0.04) 0.00 (0.00) 0.06 (0.05) −0.06⁎⁎ (0.02) −0.02⁎⁎ (0.01) −0.00 (0.01)

#Neuroticism

0.01⁎⁎ (0.00) 0.00⁎ (0.00) −0.19⁎⁎ (0.05) 4068 0.01

−0.03 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) −0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00) 0.03⁎ (0.01) −0.02⁎ (0.01) ⁎⁎

#Openness −0.02 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) −0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00) 0.03⁎ (0.01) −0.02⁎ (0.01)

−0.02 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) −0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00) 0.03⁎ (0.01) −0.02⁎ (0.01)

0.01⁎ (0.00) −0.00⁎ (0.00) −0.19⁎⁎ (0.05) 4068 0.01

0.01⁎ (0.00) −0.00 (0.00) −0.19⁎⁎ (0.05) 4068 0.01

⁎

#Extraversion

⁎

#Conscientious

0.01⁎ (0.00) −0.00 (0.00) −0.19⁎⁎ (0.05) 4068 0.01

−0.02 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) −0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00) 0.03⁎ (0.01) −0.02⁎ (0.01) ⁎

#Agreeableness

0.01⁎ (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) −0.19⁎⁎ (0.05) 4068 0.01

−0.02⁎ (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) −0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00) 0.03⁎ (0.01) −0.02⁎ (0.01)

#Neuroticism

M. Fatke

Personality and Individual Differences 139 (2019) 138–151

Personality and Individual Differences 139 (2019) 138–151

M. Fatke

Table A13

Regressions of same items only, factor scores, and using multilevel models. GLES data

Openness Conscientiousness Extraversion Agreeableness Neuroticism Age Gender Education Constant Variance components Ln(σregions)

BES data

Same items

Factor scores

Multilevel

Same items

Factor scores

Multilevel

0.01 (0.01) 0.09⁎⁎ (0.01) 0.03⁎⁎ (0.01) −0.01 (0.01) 0.05⁎⁎ (0.01) 0.01⁎⁎ (0.00) −0.10⁎⁎ (0.02) −0.08⁎⁎ (0.01) 3.92⁎⁎ (0.06)

−0.00 (0.01) 0.14⁎⁎ (0.01) 0.08⁎⁎ (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 0.05⁎⁎ (0.01) 0.01⁎⁎ (0.00) −0.09⁎⁎ (0.02) −0.17⁎⁎ (0.01) 0.37⁎⁎ (0.08)

−0.00 (0.01) 0.10⁎⁎ (0.01) 0.05⁎⁎ (0.01) 0.02⁎ (0.01) 0.04⁎⁎ (0.01) 0.01⁎⁎ (0.00) −0.08⁎⁎ (0.01) −0.12⁎⁎ (0.01) 3.77⁎⁎ (0.05)

0.03 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.03⁎ (0.01) 0.05⁎⁎ (0.01) −0.00 (0.00) −0.04 (0.03) −0.11⁎⁎ (0.01) 4.19⁎⁎ (0.06)

0.03 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01) 0.07⁎⁎ (0.01) 0.00 (0.00) −0.04 (0.04) −0.16⁎⁎ (0.01) 0.51⁎⁎ (0.07)

0.02⁎ (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.02⁎⁎ (0.01) 0.05⁎⁎ (0.01) 0.00 (0.00) −0.02 (0.02) −0.12⁎⁎ (0.01) 4.04⁎⁎ (0.05)

⁎

Ln(σindiviuals) Observations Groups R2 AIC BIC log (res.) likelihood

10,515

10,234

0.05

0.11

−2.39⁎⁎ (0.21) −0.47⁎⁎ (0.01) 10,515 16 20,135 20,215 −10,057

⁎

⁎

5840

5143

0.05

0.07

−3.10⁎⁎ (0.33) −0.40⁎⁎ (0.01) 5850 11 12,055 12,128 −6016

Note: Standard errors (except in multilevel models clustered for regions) in parentheses. ⁎ p < 0.05. ⁎⁎ p < 0.01.

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