The phenomenon of innovation overload

0160-791X/92 $5.00 + .00 Copyright © 1992 Pergamon Press Ltd.

Technology in Society, Vol. 14, pp. 441--461, 1992

Printed in the USA. All rights reserved.

The Phenomenon of Innovation Overload Paul t~ Herbig and Hugh Kramer

A B S T R A C T I n f o r m a t i o n Overload is a subject of i m m e n s e debate among consumer marketers; Can too much information overload a consumer and cause poor judgment? What defense mechanisms do consumers have to control against the flow of information? A comparable phenomenon is Innovation Overload, m e a n i n g a consumer's response to the ever increasing speed o f change in information, knowledge, and innovations. In this paper, the concept of Innovation Overload is examined, as well as the potential impact of the phenomenon on manufacturers, designers, and innovators. Examples are provided. Also reviewed are the potential effects on diffusion curves and adoption patterns. Numerous r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s are p r o v i d e d for technical a n d m a r k e t i n g m a n a g e r s for handling and overcoming this phenomenon more efficiently via better design and marketing principles.

Information Overload The average American is exposed to 61,556 words in the mass media each day. This represents just under 4,000 words per waking hour, or Paul A. Herbig is Professor, Marketing Department at the College of Commerce and Business Administration for Jacksonville State University, Jacksonville, Alabama. He has received degrees from Rose Hulman Institute of Technology, the University of Notre Dame, and Indiana University. His dozens of articles have previously been published in periodicals such as Industrial Marketing Management, the Journal of Product Innovation Management, Technological Forecasting and Social Change, the Journal of Business and Entrepreneurship, Management Decisions, and the Journal of Global Marketing. His research interests include cultural Influences on innovation, reputation and signaling effects in marketing, Japanese marketing, and futuristics. Dr. Hugh Kramer is Chairman and Professor of Marketing at the College of Business Administration at the University of Hawaii-Manoa in Honolulu, Hawaii, where he has taught for over 20 years. Some of his many articles have been published in the International Journal of Consumer Marketing, Singapore Marketing Review, Management Decisions, and Industrial Marketing Management. His interests include cross-cultural negotiations

and marketing to the Japanese. 441

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about 60 words per w a k i n g m i n u t e per person per day. This massive exposure represents a growth of 151% between 1960 and 1980. Similarly, between 1960 to 1980 the supply of mass communications (in the USA) grew at an average a n n u a l rate of 6.7% per capita, while media use itself grew at just 2.1% per year. The ratio of words consumed to words supplied by 1980 had fallen to less t h a n half (from 1.4% to 0.6%), the level of 1960. Constant exposure to advertisements has become deafening, and the end result is the almost total unconscious rejection and ignoring of the messages received. Consumers are being exposed to twice as much inconsistent and contradictory information from competing ads 1 as 15 years ago, but only consciously recognize 20% more. This is the age of c o n s u m e r information overload - - a problem because it finally causes faulty decision making. The volume of information available will continue seriously to impair, if not completely inhibit consumer decision-making abilities. Consumers are faced with large amounts and a wide variety of information in the e n v i r o n m e n t . A l t h o u g h t h e y develop m e c h a n i s m s for l i m i t i n g t h e i r intake, their ability to process information can become overloaded, resulting in confusion, cognitive strain, and other dysfunctions. 2 Information overload creates two major obstacles to decision making: the inability to locate w h a t is relevant due to sheer volume, and overlooking w h a t is most critical among relevant data. The challenge to any user of information is to extract information that is strategically useful and to organize it to serve the decision-making process. 3 Greater attention m u s t be devoted to the quantity of information provided because it affects usage and decision effectiveness. 12 In one group of experiments, satisfaction with the task decreased as the n u m b e r of a l t e r n a t i v e s in the choice set grew from 5 to 25, or as the n u m b e r of attributes about which information was provided increased. However, satisfaction increased proportional to the relative attractiveness of alternatives in the choice set. While respondents experienced greater confusion as the alternatives went from 5 to 25, confusion decreased as the variability in the relative attractiveness of alternatives in the choice set i n c r e a s e d . It is i n t e r e s t i n g to note t h a t t h e i n f o r m a t i o n - l o a d effect r e m a i n e d more or less constant for 10 to 25 alternatives or for 15 to 25 attributes. A plausible explanation for this finding is t h a t u n d e r these overload conditions, the respondents did not m a k e detailed comparisons of all t he a l t e r n a t i v e s or all t he a t t r i b u t e s , b u t adopted simplifying strategies or heuristics to cope with the ranking task. 17 In the 1970s, numerous U.S. laws and regulations were enacted to protect consumers. The amount and kind of product information that consllmers received was the focus of m a n y of these statutes. Critics claim t h a t the end result is information overload, and experiments have been c o n d u c t e d to e x a m i n e t h e a b i l i t i e s of c o n s u m e r s to h a n d l e m u l t i attribute choice problems and large amounts of information. The empiri-

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cal evidence does not support the position that information on product labels should be restricted for fear of overwhelming the consumers with irrelevancies. Most subjects were quite capable of ignoring irrelevant information and concentrating on what was important. 6 Opponents of the overload theory, the flip side of the debate, indicate that in terms of the application of these techniques to studying information overload, the key fmding is that consumers stop far short of overloading themselves. They can handle large amounts of information and will not be overloaded because they are highly selective in how much and which information they access. They tend to stop well short of overloading t h e m s e l v e s , e x a m i n i n g only small proportions of the b r a n d and attribute information available. Therefore it m a t t e r s not if consumers can be overloaded in the laboratory by force-feeding large quantities of information if they generally will not permit themselves to be overloaded in the real world. 7 C h a n g e s in c o m m u n i c a t i o n s technology only a u g m e n t information overload: The print media is rapidly being replaced by television and new electronic information delivery systems. Consequently, very few consumers really comprehend what is being said, but often are afraid to look stupid by asking questions. They therefore respond by doing n o t h i n g and/or filtering out all the anxiety-creating messages. 1 H u m a n assimilation and comprehension abilities are not evolving at the same rate as information production and transmission rates, and a growing number of people are exhibiting symptoms of information overload. This is not merely a consumer phenomenon. The pace of change and the explosion of information mean that professionals are being swamped by too many new facts to absorb. Workers fmd that it takes all the energy they have just to remain qualified for their jobs, much less to acquire new skills that might allow for promotion. The half-life of job skills is rapidly decreasing. 8 The rate of obsolescence of knowledge is so great that Bell Canada has declared the half-life of a communications engineer to be five years and has set up a one-year full-time educational recycling center. 9 Information overload can also effect engineers; they call it "technophobia." Fresh graduates may enter the firm fully familiar with the use of the computer for engineering analysis and computeraided design. But those who graduated a mere few years ago have no such advantage. Information overload can also severely impact organizations, as the way in which they process information affects strategy formulation and decision making. Overload can occur when the nature of the information is u n c e r t a i n , ambiguous, novel, complex, or intense. 10 If technology know-how were to grow just 10% per year, probably a conservative estimate, it will have more than doubled by the year 2000. Information overload can cause society to be data-rich and information-poor. 11 The challenge to information technology is to develop techniques t h a t will sift

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t h r o u g h a n d focus t h i s m a s s of i n f o r m a t i o n . Efforts to m a n a g e information overload often reflect conflicting a t t e m p t s to d i f f e r e n t i a t e a n d integ r a t e , r e s u l t i n g in tradeoffs t h a t can h a m p e r effectiveness. I n f o r m a t i o n p r o c e s s i n g is affected on m a n y fronts - - levels of d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n a n d integration, organization design, ideologies, organizational politics, and f r a m e s of reference. 10 T h e r e f o r e t h e r e s u l t s of t h e s e s t u d i e s indicate t h a t (a) i n f o r m a t i o n overload c a n h a v e a d v e r s e affects on c o n s u m e r decision m a k i n g ; (b) it r e s u l t s w h e n t h e i n f o r m a t i o n load exceeds t h e c o n s u m e r ' s p r o c e s s i n g capability; (c) m o s t c o n s u m e r s h a v e t h e ability to ignore or be h i g h l y selective of t h e i n f o r m a t i o n available; (d) its existence is l e a d i n g to a s t a t e w h e r e m a n y a d v e r t i s e r s feel t h e i r own m e s s a g e is b e i n g lost a m o n g all t h e r e s t of t h e c l u t t e r in t h e m e d i a ; a n d fmally, (e) t h e p r o b l e m goes b e y o n d c o n s u m e r s to o r g a n i z a t i o n s , technologists, a n d all u s e r s of i n f o r m a t i o n .

Innovation Overload In a r e l a t e d vein, b u t n o t y e t r e s e a r c h e d at n e a r l y s u c h levels or d e p t h of u n d e r s t a n d i n g as i n f o r m a t i o n o v e r l o a d , is t h e s u b j e c t of I n n o v a t i o n Overload. We define t h e concept as a u s e r ' s r e s p o n s e to t h e a c c e l e r a t i n g p a c e of i n f o r m a t i o n , k n o w l e d g e , a n d i n n o v a t i o n s . I n its m o s t classic s e n s e it m e a n s t h e s h e e r v o l u m e in i n f o r m a t i o n a n d i n n o v a t i v e options a v a i l a b l e will s e r i o u s l y impair, if n o t d o w n r i g h t i n h i b i t , u s e r decisionm a k i n g abilities, a n d will d e l a y d i f f u s i o n of f u t u r e i n n o v a t i o n s . As a r e c e n t issue of Business Week (April 29, 1991, p. 58) describes it: Otherwise highly competent men and women are driven to helpless frustration by the products around them . . . New systems that were supposed to make work more efficient - - computers, fax, electronic mail - - often do the r e v e r s e . . . Stress levels soar with VCRs, CDs, message machines, electronic thermostats, keypad burglar alarms, digital clocks, microwaves, programmable portable cellular phones for both the home and car, home c o m p u t e r s . . . Their lives have become a nightmarish world of blinks and beeps . . . Too many companies wind up selling complex, overloaded gadgets that consumers can't figure out. S o n y C o m p a n y , in a single s i x - m o n t h t i m e f r a m e , i n t r o d u c e d over 100 n e w audio, t a p e , a n d video p r o d u c t s in B r i t a i n alone. Apple C o r p o r a t i o n averages one new product introduction per week. Once a month, B e n n e t t o n replaces its line of clothes. T h e c l o t h i n g c h a i n of Italy m a k e s m a n y of its g a r m e n t s in a n e u t r a l color so t h a t t h e y c a n be d y e d at t h e last m i n u t e to m e e t f a s h i o n t r e n d s . T h e pace of n e w p r o d u c t s a p p e a r i n g on t h e m a r k e t is s p e e d i n g u p as n e v e r before, a n d p r o d u c t life cycles s h o r t e n as c o m p a n i e s c u t d e v e l o p m e n t t i m e a n d r e o r g a n i z e m a n u f a c t u r i n g p r o c e d u r e s . N e w p r o d u c t s are h a r d l y on t h e shelves before t h e n e x t g e n e r a t i o n , w h i c h will obsolete t h e m , is b e i n g e n g i n e e r e d , only to be out-

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dated by similar competitors. Xerox, over the last decade, has slashed its development cycle from five years to two years. Even t h a t is far too long to be competitive in the next century. Products survive in the m a r k e t for a shorter time because competitors introduce rival products at a more rapid pace. In a Tokyo store, an electronic gadget has a life expectancy of three months (Economist, April 16, 1988). Slutsker 12 discussed "Solutions without Problems ~ as another manifestation of this phenomenon, technology for technology's sake, a solution in search of a problem. He pinpointed electronic road maps for automobiles, which use satellite navigation. He reports t h a t a $3 Rand McNally road atlas and a 25-cent phone call can be equally efficient and much more cost-effective t h a n a $3,000 electronics option. The system tells how to get to the ne a r e s t Italian restaurant, but most times you w a n t to go to your favorite r e s t a ur a nt , not the nearest one. There can be no replacem e n t for h u m a n j u d g m e n t behind the wheel. Ricoh, in a survey of its fax users, determined that 95% have never used three key features it deliberately built into the machines to make them more appealing. An Ogilvy & M a t h e r survey of VCR owners found only 3% of their total TV viewing went to shows t h a t were recorded in advance using the VCR's programm i n g f e a t u r e s . 13 M a n y c o n s u m e r s feel like technological i l l i t e r a t e s , unable fully to utilize or u n d e r s t a n d the state-of-the-art devices they own. Complexity was once e q u a t e d with high-tech sophistication, but only one third of consumers believe more product features are synonymous with better quality. Now the key phrase is simplicity of use. The m a r k e t i n g implication of overwhelming consumers with these complex but rarely used features may well be that companies are not only losing the interest of their customers, but alienating them as well. Information creation and processing now account for half of all economic activity in the U n i t e d States, compared to less t h a n 18% in 1900. Scientific and technical information now increases 13% per year, which m e a n s it doubles every 5.5 years. 14 Between 6000 and 7000 scientific articles are written each day. The variety of home and office computers c ompounds the problem for a pot e ntial purchaser. In a r e c e n t Price W a t e r h o u s e s u r v e y of 300 B r i t i s h b u s i n e s s e s , 71% i n d i c a t e d t h a t although unc e r t a i nt y was not a problem five years ago, it has become a major one in trying to manage information-processing strategies today. It has become so serious that 39% of those surveyed said they are dealing with computer confusion by simply avoiding purchases of leading-edge technologies t h a t might not fit into their system strategies. 15 The serious sales slowdown encountered by the computing industry may be a direct result of the innovation overload phenomenon and the uncertainties it creates. Customers have become cynical, confused, and frugal. Innovation Overload occurs w h e n a particular innovation evolves so rapidly and the alternatives multiply so quickly t h a t the customer finds it difficult to m a n a g e the variety and m a k e direct comparisons among

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the choices available. In Hirschman's classic study, 16 innovation overload was examined as it related to child care for her new daughter. Child-care services were viewed as a set of innovations, which in addition to having complex technological components (e.g., safety features, location, hours of operation, specialized equipment), also have highly sophisticated symbolic aspects (e.g., social prestige, nurturing ability, philosophical orientation, potential for intellectual stimulation). To add to their i n h e r e n t complexity, these innovative services also have two other complicating characteristics. First, they are a rapidly evolving set of alternatives; new options (e.g., a u p a i r s ) are appearing on the market, whereas the availability of traditional alternatives is declining (e.g., grandmothers, older siblings). Thus, accurate data gathering by potential buyers is frustrated by the constantly changing set of products. Second, unlike the majority of all innovation-adoption decisions studies, the child-care product is purchased not for self-consumption, but rather for a less-knowledgeable client - - in her case, her daughter. Further, this client has needs and wants that also are characterized by continuous, rapid evolution; child care options appropriate for a month-old infant are usually not suitable for a two-year-old toddler or a four-year-old preschooler. Hirschman found that, in most instances, child-care information gathering and the actual decision itself was postponed for as long as possible --, usually until at least the eighth or ninth month of pregnancy, and often until after the child was actually born. The answer to why such otherwise thoughtful, mature, educated, used-to-planning adults seemed to put off such a decision was because the utter complexity of the task o v e r w h e l m e d t h e i r abilities to approach t h e innovation a l t e r n a t i v e s ahead of time. Therefore, they waited until they were literally forced into action by the acquisition of a novel personal role - - parenthood. Another proposition Hirschman suggested is t h a t consumers' initial conceptualization of the best child care innovation option is most often derived from their own experiences as children; thus, in most cases, a parent would like to have someone care for the child who is as much like the parent's own mother as possible. The proposition that the form of an innovation may dominate its functional characteristics in determining the likelihood of adoption is generalizable to other contexts. In a broader context it would be stated: The more an innovation option resembles in tangible structure the traditional solution to a problem, the more likely it is to be adopted, regardless of its actual ability to perform the requisite task. This is especially true for highly complex innovations containing symbolic features for which the consumer lacks confidence i n a p r i o r i evaluations. Therefore she or he must rely almost exclusively on tangible features in making a choice; these features may be nonisomorphic to the actual functional qualities of a particular option. However, consumers' prior positive experience with the traditional model (i.e., Morn) may "blind" them to the functional superiority of novel alternatives and cause

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them to focus upon a smaller set of functional characteristics or a less optimal set of functional characteristics. A fourth proposition suggested by Hirschman's child-care experiences is that social-class norms may serve as constraints on the range of innovation options considered. In the innovation adoption literature, income label of the adopter and price of the innovation are both cited as factors influencing adoption probabilities. 17 Quite often in the literature an i n n o v a t i o n is d e p i c t e d as a stable e n t i t y - - a collection of t a n g i b l e attributes t h a t the adopter need only learn about in order to reach a decision. Similarly, the adopter is generally depicted as a stable h u m a n being knowledgeable about his or her own preferences and desires. In child-care i n n o v a t i o n adoption decisions, n e i t h e r of t h e s e conditions holds true. Child care alternatives and their characteristics are truly in a rapid state of transition; new choices include a u p a i r , public and private daycare centers, centers run by companies, government-associated centers like "head start," and the senior-citizen's center's "rent-a-grandmother" service. Hours, costs, and functions associated with each of these novel options vary widely, making direct comparisons impossible. Similar proliferations of child-care innovations confront parents elsewhere. And similar situations of innovation overload confront consumers of the personal computer, compact disc stereo systems, zero-coupon bonds, adjustable rate home mortgages, and other complex, rapidly evolving innovations. Rapidly proliferating a l t e r n a t i v e s within an innovation context t h e n lower the threshold of acceptable performance for a selected alternative (i.e., consumers, when confronted with too many choices among a set of complex new options, will tend to set lower standards of acceptability for any given option). Thus, whatever option the consumer happens to adopt first has a high probability of being continued. Large levels of dissatisfaction are necessary before the option will be discontinued. Innovation Overload is applicable to any innovation, w h e t h e r social, service, or product-oriented. The Hirschman example of child care summarizes the problems involved in choosing among dynamic, ever-evolving a l t e r n a t i v e s for a s i n g l e i n n o v a t i o n . B u t t h e c o n c e p t n e e d s to be advanced one step further. Innovation Overload occurs not just within an innovation set, but among all innovations occurring at that time. If customers are unable to make direct comparisons between alternatives of a single innovation set, their difficulties are compounded when all aspects of t h e e n v i r o n m e n t are e v o l v i n g at s i m i l a r s p e e d s . For e x a m p l e , Hirschman could be confronted with day-care decisions, and simultaneously with retirement home/nursing home/care at home for her parents or in-laws, as well as a myriad of alternatives for an illness, and then what to do about a minor financial windfall. All these decisions and their resolutions would be required simultaneously. The scenario is not one with a single problem and a multitude of options, but a host of problems

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and choices, each with its own set of alternatives, all dynamic in real time. It is this environment and this rapid technological change t h a t may well o v e r w h e l m a consumer's senses and create a situation w h e r e he becomes impervious to further change. It is this situation, with its ever increasing onslaught of ne w products and alternatives, t h a t the 1990s are bringing to the consumers of the world. The user may have limits beyond which all other changes will be ignored or actively resisted. For providers of goods and services, technological overload is rapidly approaching, if not already here. It will become necessary to consider not only w h e n a customer will use the new technology, but where it is on the customer's list with all the other innovations simultaneously available. If a m a n u f a c t u r e r still wishes to proceed with the innovation, then more attention m u s t be paid to h u m a n factors, and to simplifying the product. One m u s t have a clear plan on how to break t h r o u g h the clutter, the information overload the user is experiencing, and present the product separately from the hundreds of others begging for the consumer's attention. Expenditures on R&D must be made wisely. The capability of determining up front, before introduction, w h e t h e r a product has a chance of success in t h e c u s t o m e r ' s m i n d is becoming not m e r e l y critical, but essential to the survival of the firm. Concentration on technology to the exclusion of h n m a n factors appears to be a prescription for failure in the 1990s. F a r too m a n y home and office products have become technology platforms r a t h e r t h a n machines created for h u m a n use. More important t h a n ~form follows function" is t h a t function m u s t follow usability - - because ~if I can't use it, it doesn't work." Manuals tend to impact users negatively; a good product does not require a ma nua l , whereas a poor product may require a perfect m a n u a l to succeed. I n d u s t r i a l d e s i g n e r s h a v e e s t a b l i s h e d an i n v e r s e r a t i o between the reading needed to learn how to operate a product and the use of t h a t product. Forty-four percent of the respondents in one poll found the instructions t h a t come with high-tech products either ~difficult" or ~impossible" to follow. Newness alone used to attract consumers, but lately too much newness has dulled the consumer's senses and trivialized the term. The public's e n t h u s i a s m for new products is severely declining j u s t as the costs to launch new products are skyrocketing; the companies need bigger marke t s h a r e s to finance d e v e l o p m e n t an d l a u n c h costs, but are g e t t i n g smaller shares from uninspired consumers. 18

Examples of Innovation Overload Examine, for instance, the case of the quadraphonic stereo system. In the e a rl y 1970s it was widely believed t h a t f o u r - s p e a k e r sy stems would replace two-speaker systems in much the same way two-speaker stereo

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systems had replaced single-speaker hi-fi systems. This substitution did not occur. Consumers were confronted with a huge array of competing product entries, all based on incompatible formats and requiring that records be produced specifically for that standard. Most consumers were unwilling to bet on a single standard and stuck with what they had; quadraphonics were withdrawn within a few years.19 Even today, audiophiles searching for the perfect sound eschew complexity for simplicity: less is often more. Back in 1980, t h e m a r k e t rejected Xerox Corporation's 8200 office copier. It was the first time in Xerox' history that users had balked at one of the company's copiers and no one knew why. Technologically the product was impressive, packed with plenty of on-board computer intelligence. Quality was high and performance was impressive. The problem was that the engineers had incorporated so many complex features into the copier (collating, enlarging, reducing, etc.) t h a t casual users (those who merely wanted to make one or two copies) could not make it work. People had to wade through buttons and manuals for all the features. Xerox' share of the U.S. copier m a r k e t tumbled as users abandoned complicated Xerox machines for the simpler J a p a n e s e copiers. 13 It was only w h e n the machine was redesigned from a h u m a n factors point-of-view and very clear graphic displays added t h a t it became a success. Xerox, having learned its lesson, is once again in the forefront of the copier industry. Yet another example is the response of many homemakers to modern kitchen appliances. The typical American kitchen of the 1950s contained an oven, a refrigerator, and a sink. Most of the meals were made from scratch, baked in the oven, and the dirty dishes were washed by hand in the sink. Over the last 40 years numerous innovations have come to the aid of those homemakers, making their lives easier, more efficient. These include prepared foods (some of which do not even require refrigeration); automatic ice makers, ice water dispensers, and butter warmers for the refrigerator; microwave ovens, J e n n Air grills for indoor barbecuing, dishwashers, trash compactors, garbage disposals, and small appliances such as electric woks, fondue pots, blenders, Cuisinarts, sandwich makers, and electric knives. These devices are easily available, relatively inexpensive, and most have been around for over a decade. But what does the typical kitchen of the h o m e m a k e r of the 1950s look like today? The scene will often be remarkably unchanged. Because of unfamiliarity, m a n y older citizens adamantly refuse to use such labor-saving devices, even when inexpensive and available. Add in new devices such as popcorn poppers and Vegematics and the confusion heightens. Even when given as a gift, the modern convenience appliance may quickly fred its way to the back of a high shelf. The 1950s' h o m e m a k e r may rationalize it as "it was easier the other way." Behind it all is the fear of the unknown, the untried. The

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user, especially the elderly (but not limited to seniors), can only assimilate and integrate so much at one time. It becomes a m a t t e r of which is more important, which can I understand, are the benefits superior to old ways, which are most easily learned, etc. Trade-offs abound. An affluent couple might decide on a satellite dish instead of the newest model PC for Christmas. The hidden m e a n i n g is t h a t next C hr i s t m a s it will be the PC. But t h a t is not necessarily so, because next Christmas the PC might have to compete against some new innovations with the prospect of repeated deferment. The end result is slowed adoption curves, longer diffusion times, and puzzlement of m a n y m a r k e t e e r s at why their innovation is not succeeding in the marketplace as well as the forecast indicated it would. For another example, examine the average classroom at any university in America, or Europe or that matter. A graduate retu rn in g for a 20th, or even 50th reunion would not feel out of place in the modern classroom. The mode of education is still predominantly the professor leading the class in lecture or discussion. However, the n u m b e r and n a t u r e of innovations t h a t have arisen within t h a t same period of time is astounding. Video tapes, computer exercises, custom-assembled textbooks, multimedia, etc., are all available, but their usage by m a n y professors is minimal. Why? The same innovation overload dilemma is occurring. An i n d u s t r i a l example of innovation overload was seen in the early 1980s. The rapid growth of the PC m a r k e t was evidence to m a n y that by the end of the decade, there would be a computer on every desktop at the office and one in every home. The bubble burst in the middle 1980s when growth slowed. There was just too much too soon for people to handle, to process, to evaluate. Unless one has grown up on a computer, it is not instantly user-friendly and understandable. Personal computers present a bewildering array of options to buyers, and a first-time buyer can get hopelessly confused in a sea of CPUs, RAM, megahertz, and milli/microseconds of access times. Even many of the older baby boomers were educated in t he m a i n f r a m e e r a w h e n computers were those m o n s t e r s in backrooms, presided over by t h e i r own clergy an d t e c h n i c a l experts. Many kept their distance and m a n y still do to this day. To others, the benefits have not appeared as advertised. PC sales are not anemic by any means, but neither are they at the level the overenthusiastic forecasters predicted a decade ago. Computers seem to provide classic examples of innovation overload. Ninety percent of the roughly ten million executives and professional m a n a g e r s in the U.S. today are computer illiterates, and there is no reason to indicate t h a t the situation is any different in C a n a d a and Europe. It has even been s ugge s t e d t h a t b e t w e e n 20% a n d 30% of c o m p u t e r users ma y develop "cyberphobia" - - fear of computers. The reasons for this fear are many: unfamiliarity with the machine's capabilities, previous bad experiences, the "mystery" of the computer, and the belief t h a t

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computers will u n d e r m i n e one's status w i t h i n the organization. For example, the recent trend is to have managers input their own requests for data directly into the machine w thus using a keyboard, a task traditionally reserved for the lowly secretary. This, though, has caused considerable resistance throughout North America. Age can also be a factor t h a t contributes to cyberphobia. The computer room and the systems d e p a r t m e n t are often inhabited by young, well-educated "whiz kids," and many managers find asking a computer analyst half their age for help a daunting prospect. Faced with the seriousness of the fear, organizations have tried to make computers more acceptable. One firm, for example, found that it was necessary to insert a 10-second delay into t h e i r program, as an instantaneous response raised employees' defense mechanism, and users were happier with a machine that has to "think" before answering. But even though each generation of computers is more "user friendly" than the last, the answer to implementing change successfully lies with the people, not with machines, Indeed, it is generally believed that an organization should be changed by first influencing its values and norms so that personal relationships improve and a move is made toward participatory management. Structural changes will then follow more easily. 20 One complex variable in forecasting the m a r k e t for high-technology products has been characterized as consumer anxiety. Consumers can be d e t e r r e d from buying complicated products by the stress t h a t results from having too many expensive, sophisticated, high-tech choices, and the cognitive dissonance that may result if such products do not perform as anticipated. In 1984 T i m e carried an article entitled "Bothered and B e w i l d e r e d , " about t h e " t r a u m a of s h o p p i n g for a microcomputer." According to t h e article, c o n s u m e r s w e r e afraid to buy c o m p u t e r s because of apparent turmoil among manufacturers, fear of obsolescence, technological complexity, too many and too similar brands, and concerns about software incompatibility. Forecasters ignored consumers' anxiety and predicted t h a t they would buy the m a c h i n e s in record numbers. Original buyers were hobbyists or technically inclined businesses. Firsttime users h a d difficult decisions to m a k e and overwhelming choices among IBM, Clones, Apples . . . IBM alone had eight different models. Users were afraid of being obsolete within six months. The result was a paralysis among potential buyers that rocked the market in 1984. One of the major reasons for the initial success of Apple's Macintosh personal computer was its ease of use. On the desktop today, 80% of computing power is going towards ease of use, menus, windows, and pop-ups, while only 20% is actually going towards doing the job, word processing, spreadsheets, etc. Apple was the first to recognize user resistance to personal computer companies and specifically designed a product to overcome it. The arcane, character-based commands t h a t m a d e the early IBM-based programs so difficult to use provided a window of opportunity

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for the Macintosh. Its very success made its rivals eventually mimic its icons and graphics (Microsoft's Windows and IBM's OS/2). Making the personal computer more accessible to the general public was the objective. The aim is to make information easy to comprehend and hard to forget. Information and innovation overload can be minimized by guaranteeing ease of usability. Unfortunately, innovations are usually designed by engineers and scie n t i s t s , whose c o m m o n s e n s e is d i f f e r e n t from t h a t of m o s t users. Technically oriented personnel tend to think in terms of state-of-the-art and maximizing features, not ease of use and utility (more is better, the "Swiss Army Knife Effect," where a product performs so many functions you cannot remember them all). Industrial designers, who are taught in art or architecture schools, tend to focus on esthetics instead of utility. C o m p a n i e s will s p e n d millions to s i m u l a t e t h e t e c h n i c a l response, endurance, and quality of a product, but hesitate to test potential users' responses to the device. Another problem is that as the pace of technological innovations continues to speed up, their interdependence continues to grow. Previously u n r e l a t e d i n d u s t r i e s now find t h e m s e l v e s in direct competition. One example was the Southwestern Bell Electronic Yellow Pages suit filed by Datapoint (a computer firm), Texas Daily Newspapers Association, and Tandy (Radio Shack - - a retailer). Another example is in the PBX industry, where competition comes from both telecommunications vendors and computer vendors, previously independent and noncompeting entities. No longer can we isolate easily separate industries. Technologies (innovations) all too often can no longer be rated in isolation. Companies can profit by understanding the innovation overload phenomenon and recognizing the consumers' fear and resistance; or they can ignore it at their peril. A corporation's survival can depend on recognizing, understanding, and utilizing this phenomenon (like judo, using an opponent's own m o m e n t u m in one's favor), rather t h a n resisting it in favor of a pure technological push strategy.

Rationale behind the Innovation Overload Phenomenon One of the major reasons behind innovation overload and its negative effect upon adoption of many innovations is the risk factor. The degree of perceived risk is highly negatively related to the rate of diffusion. Risk is recognized as having a considerable influence on the purchase decision, especially for new products. A study of the adoption of an in-house computer indicated that "perceived risk and self-confidence" were the only two variables that significantly differentiated early and later adopters. The time elapsed before a product is adopted could be explained partially on the basis of perceived risk. 21

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Risk can be reduced in the eyes of the adopter by the degree of relative advantage, in economic terms, t h a t the innovation affords. A positive link exists between earlier receptivity and the perception of the innovation as a source of improvements in profitability, competitive position, and quality of end products, together with its perception as compatible with the firm's manufacturing system. Thus, although individual characteristics influence the degree of risk, product characteristics also determine the presence and strength of risk. Again, perception is the mending influence. The degree of risk is a function of the characteristics of the buying decision, the decision maker, and the characteristics of the decision environment of the firm.22 Risk Reduction can be accomplished by reducing the uncertainty or by reducing the consequences.23 Individuals will accept different forms of risk as well. In considering the adoption of an innovation, the customer is faced with two types of risk. The more obvious is the risk of failure or disappointment with the innovation. The other is related to the opportunity cost of rejecting an innovation that would have been highly profitable. When customers evaluate risk, they seldom have statistical analysis, and often must rely on inferences based on experience, observation, or hearsay. Slovic23 related a series of heuristic rules of risk perception: 1. Availability: An event is likely if instances are generally easier to imagine and recall than rare events; 2. Overconfidence: People are typically very confident about their judgments, and believe they can estimate with greater precision than is actually the case; and 3. Desire for certainty and tendency to deny uncertainty. Customers perceive and judge risk based upon several key factors: volu n t a r y or involuntary, controllable or uncontrollable, familiar versus new, w h e t h e r the effect is immediate or delayed, w h e t h e r the effect is k n o w n or not, c h r o n i c or c a t a s t r o p h i c , a n d c o m m o n v e r s u s rare. Perceived risk is derived from both uncertainty and the potential side effects, which cannot be completely anticipated. As adopters tend to have greater risk tendencies, the higher the risk proneness of a subject, the higher the innovation acceptance and adoption, and the shorter the rate of diffusion of a typical innovation. The more risk-averse a subject is, the lower his or her acceptance and the longer the diffusion of an innovation will take. For innovative products that require a change in consumer behavior, risk is high because consumers must be educated, and it is difficult to assess w h e t h e r the education will have the desired effect. New-to-theworld products diffuse slowly through the population because they often require a change in values and habits. Although new-to-the-world products fill c o n s u m e r needs, the c o n s u m e r m a y not have t h e ability to u n d e r s t a n d or the willingness to acknowledge the product benefit or

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advantage. Likewise, high-investment spending is required to launch a new-to-the-world product; reinforcement and repetition of message and consumer education are needed to change behavior patterns, and these are costly. With the m u l t i t u d e of innovations present to choose from, the consumer will likely prioritize the set, choose the most important one or several to investigate, review in depth those alternatives, and choose from the set. The consumer's need is to m i n i m i z e risks, but postpone for future adoption most of the innovations envisioned, as well as making cost-effective choices for those chosen.

Course of Action A n u m b e r of studies have shown that the first individuals to adopt an innovation can be identified by characteristics such as age (generally younger t h a n later adopters); education (usually educated to a higher level); income (usually higher), and so on. Beyond that, it is questionable just how useful the concept of adopter categories really is. The labels given to the various categories, for example, are problematic in t h a t "Innovator," in innovation and diffusion studies, should apply only to the i n d i v i d u a l s or o r g a n i z a t i o n i n t r o d u c i n g t h e innovation, t h a t is, the source of the innovation. To apply this label to an adopter merely causes unnecessary confusion. The other labels also tend to be r a t h e r valueladen. For example, "Laggards" serves to imply that those who do not adopt an innovation must be rather small-minded, and are slow because of some irrational resistance to change. This fails to consider the possibility that at the time of its initial introduction, the majority do not see the value in the innovation; the cost-benefit ratio to t h e m has yet to approach a point for consideration and further interest. The late adopter may differ very little from the early adopter except that he or she was not in a position to adopt an innovation until much later. 24 That the Laggard may be the object of Innovation Overload has not been considered by many gurus of the faith. Many characteristics have been identified that appear to influence consumer acceptance of innovation. 25 Among them are:

Relative Advantage: This is the degree to which potential consHmers perceive the innovation as superior to existing substitutes. It can also be expressed as the intensity of the reward or penalty of adopting or rejecting the technology. Factors involved could include economic profitability, low initial costs, lower perceived risk, decrease in discomfort, savings in time and effort, and immediacy of reward. Preventive innovations are slow to diffuse and have a low rate of adoption due to the immediacy of reward factor. The seat belt makes sense

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and should be accepted by the consumer. But if it were just another product, not a controversial life-and-death issue, and consumers h a d the option on w h e t h e r or not to install it in their cars based upon its benefits versus its costs, it probably would have died off long ago. Relative advantage has been found to be positively related to the diffusion rate. A crisis emphasizes relative advantage and quickens its diffusion rate. Compatibility: This is the degree to which potential consumers feel t h a t the innovation is consistent with their socio-cultural norms or is consistent with existing values, experiences, and needs. Previously introduced ideas will impact the adoption of any new innovation. The rate of adoption is affected by the old idea it s u p e r s e d e s . . , the more compatible it is with the previous idea, the less change it represents. Compatibility is positively related to the diffusion rate. Complexity: This is the degree to which the innovation is perceived as difficult to comprehend or use. Complexity is also related to the number of decisions required, as well as the number of decisions that must be repeated. 26 Those that require frequent repeated decisions may be less attractive than those that require one or infrequent decisions. Complexity is highly negatively correlated to the rate of diffusion. Trialability: (Divisibility) This is the degree to which a new product is capable of being tried or used experimentally on a limited basis by consumers. Trialability is positively related to diffusion rate. Observability: This is the ease w i t h which a product's benefits or attributes can be observed, imagined, or described to others. This is also positively related to the diffusion rate. These five traits have been tested and found to be related but low in correlation. According to one study of consumer decision process in the adoption of solar energy systems, it was found that although adopters h a v e d i f f e r e n t d e m o g r a p h i c s from n o n a d o p t e r s , a d o p t e r s a n d t h e knowledgeable nonadopters are very similar (the only major difference is t h a t n o n a d o p t e r s are wary and skeptical); and the adopters have these same attributes on innovative perception (but not observability or trialability, because as they became more familiar with t h e studied technology - - solar energy systems, it became less novel and hence less observable to them). Ostlund 27 indicated that compatibility and relative advantage dominate as predictors of purchase for a low-ticket food product, whereas relative advantage and perceived risk have the highest importance for others. Other studies have shown Compatibility, relative advantage, and perceived risk rating to have a consistent significant impact for several durable and non-durable categories, and appear to be the most robust factors in determining diffusion. 28 An important point that needs to be emphasized is that any attempt to determine how an innovation compares with these attributes in an abso-

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lute sense is irrelevant; the crucial point is how potential adopters perceive an innovation. In this respect the main concern of this article is perceived attributes of innovations. Equally important is that it is the perceptions of potential adopters that are important from the point of view of the rate of adoption of innovations. Various studies indicate that between 49% and 89% of the variance in the rate of adoption can be explained by the innovation attributes falling into the five generalized headings suggested by Rogers and Shoemaker. For a m a r k e t e r of a new innovation, these five attributes must be examined closely, and the m a r k e t i n g of the new product oriented to follow more closely those attributes that are more attuned to the product's features, benefits, or selling points. Another course of action available to the vendor is to press for a standard. A standard speeds the diffusion of an innovation by lowering risks to both consumers and producers. 29 A standard reduces consumer uncertainty and lessens the risks of purchases. Setting standards ensures that consumers will not end up with an orphan product made obsolete by the d o m i n a t i o n of a c o m p e t i n g design. Reducing c o n s u m e r u n c e r t a i n t y increases the likelihood of purchase and speeds it as well. Setting standards is most important for innovations that use complementary products: VCRs require tapes, printers require computers and communications links. Without the presence of standards, diffusion of an innovation will be retarded by the large uncertainties and risks present. A major reason for the computer industry's current (1990-1992) sales slowdown is the lack of industry standards (Operating system, microprocessor, user interface, etc.). Many more options exist t h a n users wish. One wrong choice and many information managers believe their company's entire information strategy may be at risk. In this age of rapid technological advances, it is all too often technological push and not marketing pull that is advocated. Technology champions believe that the existence of a technology alone is often enough justification for its existence and its usage by the world in general. Many " b e t t e r m o u s e t r a p s " h a v e u l t i m a t e l y failed to be m a r k e t successes because they were unwanted or unneeded by the consumer for any of a h u n d r e d d i f f e r e n t r e a s o n s , one of w h i c h was probably i n n o v a t i o n overload. The concept of user overload m u s t be f u r t h e r studied. The tremendous rapidity of technological advances is forcing an often unfamiliar spearhead of change upon the potential users of new technologies.

Future Research

Future research of interest revolves around five major areas. The first is the concept of consumer overload, that is, the upper limit on the capability of the consumer to understand and accept newness or change. Does it

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really exist? Is it applicable to the species as a whole or only to certain individuals? Is there a limit to an individual's ability to adapt? At what point does overload show up? What does this mean? What exactly will happen at the overload point? A second area of possible future research is that of the resistance of industrial organizations to innovation. Innovations tend to change and disrupt established routines. 30 Not only do potential users resist change, but very often it is the potential manufacturers themselves who cannot accept change, handle the new innovation, or survive the technological change. Reviewing particular reasons for some organizations' ability to survive and thrive under change while others succumb is an interesting topic for future work. In addition, reviewing organizations that are technically arrogant (push style of innovation, pro-change bias) versus those that take the time to do customer marketing/acceptance would prove to be an interesting dichotomy. A third area would be to review labor (Workforce) and its resistance to innovation. This would be look at union versus non-union cultural modes and to a t t e m p t to ascertain reasons and success rates for avoiding or f i g h t i n g n e w technological innovations. An a t t e m p t to d i s c r i m i n a t e among groups on their acceptance or tolerance to technological innovations would be most interesting. A fourth area, and probably the most potentially fruitful and fascinating, is to examine an in-depth view of the cultural differences in innovation adoption. Cultural discontinuity of innovations can be caused both by traditions and social norms, w h y is innovation approved by one culture and s h u n n e d by another? w h a t aspects within the culture determine their acceptance levels or tolerance levels to new ideas, to technological innovations? Can various factors be found that would enable one to predict acceptance and diffusion based upon generic cultural factors? Lastly, the whole notion of risk and acceptance can be examined further in depth. Is risk a single attribute or a composite of many items? It is clear from the literature and from this study that a direct relationship holds for risk and acceptance/usage. But what of the various attributes of risk? Does one or several have a particularly severe w e i g h t i n g t h a t would tend to relate to risk as a whole?

Marketing a n d Design Implications

How can a company resolve the dilemma of Innovation Overload? First, its existence must be accepted. This would likely mean that as the influx of innovations continues at its steadily increasing rate, adoption of individual innovations and their diffusion rates will necessarily slow down due to risk, finances, and time r e q u i r e m e n t s to make an appropriate decision. This slower diffusion rate, and perhaps lower numbers of final

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adopters, must be taken into account in any financial considerations of the product. Product planners should conservatively forecast new products, new technologies, and innovations, so as to take into account the phenomenon. The more radical the innovation, the more complex the technology and the more expensive the product, the longer its diffusion time will tend to be. Second, up-front market research is needed prior to the development and marketing of the innovation: Does the consumer really need or want the device? What other innovations would it be competing against? What benefits or advantages does it have over its substitute innovation rivals? If it has no real advantages or superior functions or features to set it off against other innovations competing for the consumer's attention, serious review must be made of the merit of spending the money to develop or introduce such an innovation. Customer barriers to acceptance or usage of any technology or innovation include the consumer's free will, consumer's inability to u n d e r s t a n d (not know capabilities or potential benefits of the innovation), external stakeholders that exist (governmental agencies, consumer advocates, and to certain extent legal constraints limiting manufacturers ability to produce), and incompatibility of the i n n o v a t i o n w i t h existing workflows. 31 As any one of t h e s e b a r r i e r s declines or falls, the rate of acceptance or usage increases. M a r k e t researchers m u s t begin to pay special attention to customer benefits, usage, and potential barriers that may exist. With the phenomenon of innovation overload increasingly present, market researchers must concentrate on needs and wants that are unfulfilled. Third, a few design principles can make the difference between a product that intimidates and one that is not just accessible, but enjoyable and financially successful as a result. Such products become comprehensible, manageable, and likely to succeed. Break the rules and machines will drive people away, taking sales and customer good will with them. These rules boil down to one thing: Be obvious. A machine should be designed so that buyers can look at it, understand it, and quickly figure out how to use it. One should clarify its functions and provide feedback that guides the user through all the operations. One may not be able to wish away innovation overload, but one certainly can minimize its effects through proper design of the product. Research and Development must review its primary focus within the organization and switch from concentrating on technological development and state-of-the-art advances to one of providing usable, inexpensive, quality products that solve customer problems and provide needed customer benefits. Designers can espouse the use of "natural design," which means using principles like visibility to create products that we understand intuitively, without having to think about how they work and "natural mapping," w h i c h m e a n s a r r a n g i n g controls so t h e i r f u n c t i o n s are clear. The a r r a n g e m e n t of the controls should match the a r r a n g e m e n t of things

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being controlled. Another natural design principle that, although simple, is not utilized as often as it should be is feedback, providing the operator with some signal to indicate the project was completed successfully. 31 Fourth, too little time and too much stress is a major reason why many people are so unhappy with the complexity of everyday products in their lives. C o m p l e x i t y in p r o d u c t s m e a n s w a s t e d t i m e for m o s t of us. Simplicity will be the keyword for the 1990s. Companies must simplify rather t h a n complicate their products. Those who succeed in doing so will succeed in business; those who do not will fail. Promotional tactics should reorient themselves away from new bells and whistles towards the simplicity and usability of the product. Product planners and development engineers must keep this axiom in mind. Fifth, be creative but not forceful in overcoming these customer barriers and resistance to the phenomenon of innovation overload. Possible tactics a company could use include free trials or the use of a systems approach (whole operation) or i n t e g r a t i n g into a previous product or activity. The innovation m u s t have value, and needs a strong performance/price ratio vis-a-vis the existing substitute alternatives, or there will be no incentives to change. Another proposed solution to the resistance to innovation problem with consumers is to provide testimonials that are credible due to their expert-witness status. Trial samples and testimonials from users will positively affect acceptance of an innovation and quicken its diffusion. Conversely, negative publicity or media reports will detract from its acceptability and deter its diffusion. Marketers, in resolving the innovation overload phenomenon, must remember that it is pull, not technology push, that usually wins the game and must keep in mind customer benefits, problem solving, and satisfying wants over technological fLxations. In summary, one must determine a customer need for a new product or service and attempt to fill a market segment that is underdeveloped by your company; one must be certain that technological advancements are focused on improved and acceptable consumer benefits; one can not rationalize a unique selling feature that will not exist in the consumer's mind; one must use common sense and j u d g m e n t when reviewing statistical analysis; one can not rely on advertising execution alone to sell a new product to consumers; one must realize the benefits and limitations of consumer research; one must guarantee that the new product attributes have clear-cut end benefits to the consumer; and one must beware of over-analysis because it can delay new product development and interfere with better understanding of the consumer. The use of "ergonomics," the fitting of products to the h u m a n body, has been well accepted in design circles. What seems to be needed now is the fitting of products to the constraints of the h u m a n mind. Information/innovation overload can cause society to be data-rich and information-poor. The challenge to information technology is to develop

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techniques that can sift through and focus this mass of information. As information technology permeates society, new attitudes and desires will be created, and successful businesses m u s t be able to respond to these changes. We are having great difficulty absorbing all the newness that seems to be accelerating around us. This speed of technical advances hinders our ability to adjust to innovations and our capability to realize and utilize their benefits. This in turn leads to a tendency to m a x i m i z e the negative aspects relative to any gain that could result.

References 1. Michael P. Sullivan, "Is Marketing Failing to Communicate?~ United States Banker, Vol. 95, no. 1 (January 1984), pp. 34, 36. 2. Naresh K. Malhotra, "Reflections on the Information Overload Paradigm in Consumer Decision Making," Journal of Consumer Research, Vol. 10 (March 1984), pp. 436--437. 3. Robert I~ Elliott, ~l~he Data Dilemma, ~ World, Vol. 22, no. 2 (Spring 1988), pp. 44-45. 4. Kevin Lane Keller and Richard Staellin, "Effects of Quality and Quantity of Information on Decision Effectiveness, ~ Journal of Consumer Research, Voi. 14, no. 2 (September 1987), pp. 200-213. 5. Naresh K. Malhotra, "Information Load and Consumer Decision Making, ~ Journal of Consumer Research, Vol. 8 (March 1982), pp. 419-430. 6. David M. Grether and Louis L. Wilde, "Consumer Choice and Information: New Empirical Evidence," Information Economics and Policy, Voi. 1, no. 2 (1983), pp. 115-144. 7. Jacob Jacoby and Naresh K. Malhotra, UPerspectives on Information Overload]Reflections on the Information Overload Paradigm in Consumer Decision Making, ~ Journal of Consumer Research, Vol. 10 (March 1984), pp. 432-440. 8. Nancy Gibbs, "How America has run out of Time,~ Time (April 24, 1989), pp. 58-67. 9. F. D. Barrett, ~rechnology the Permanent Wave," Business Quarterly, Vol. 50 (Spring 1985), pp. 43--52. 10. Susan C. Schneider, "Information Overload: Causes and Consequences," Human Systems Management, Vol. 7, no. 2 (1987), pp. 143-153. 11. Robert Reck, "Implications of Transition from an Industrial Era to One of Information," Industrial Management and Data Systems, Jan/Feb 1987, pp. 3-4. 12. Gary Slutsker, "Solutions Without Problems, ~ Forbes (April 1, 1991), p. 120. 13. Bruce Nussbaum, "I Can't Work this Thing!" Business Week (April 29, 1991), pp. 50-56. 14. John Naisbitt, Megatrends (New York: Warner Books, 1982). 15. Douglas K. Hawes, (1987), "The Role of M a r k e t i n g in F a c i l i t a t i n g the Diffusion of Microcomputers and the Information Society," Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, Vol. 15, no. 2 (1987), pp. 83-90. 16. Elizabeth Hirschman, "Adoption of an Incredibly Complex Innovation: Propositions from a Humanistic viewpoint,~ Advances in Consumer Research, Vol. XIV (1987), in M. Walendorf and P. Anderson (eds.), Association for Consumer Research, pp. 376-377. 17. E. M. Rogers, The Diffusion of Innovations, (New York: The Free Press, 1983.) 18. Joshua Levine, ~Vhy 'new' is old hat," Forbes (July 22, 1991), pp. 302-304. 19. Barry Nathan Rosen, Steven Schnarr, and David Shane, "A Comparison of Approaches for setting Standards for Technological Products," Journal of Product Innovation Management (June 1988), pp. 129--139. 20. J. Wright (1984), "Computer, Change and Fear: An Unholy Trio, ~ Management Decision, Vol. 22, no. 2 (1984), pp. 31-35. 21. Anita Kennedy, "Development, Adoption & Diffusion of New Industrial Products, ~ European Journal of Marketing, Vol. 17, no. 3 (1983), pp. 31-87. 22. Robert Shoemaker and Robert Shoal, "Behavioral Changes in the Trial of New Products, ~ Journal of Consumer Research, Vol. 2 (September 1975). pp. 104-109.

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23. Paul Slavic, Bar& Fischhoff, and Sarah Licbtenstein, “Rating The Risks,” Environment, Vol. 3 (April 1979), pp. 31. 24. G. A Lancaster and C. T. Taylor, “A Study of Diffusion of the Innovations in Respect of the High Speed Rain,” European Journal ofMarketing, Vol. 22 (March 1988). pp. 2148. 25. E. M. Rogers and F. F. Shoemaker, The Communications of Innovations: A Cross Cdtural Approach (New York: The Free Press, 1971). 26. Arthur P. Hurter and Albert H. Rubenstein, “Market Penetration by New Innovations, Technological Literature, “Techndogid Forecasting and Social Change (1977), pp. 197-221. 27. L. E. Osthmd, ‘Perceived Innovation Attributes as Predictors of Innovativeness,’ Journnl of Consumer Research, Vol. 10974). pp. 23-29. 28. Susan L. Holak, Donald R. Lehmann and Fareena Sultan, ‘The Role of Expectations in the Adoption of Innovative Consumer Durables: Some Preliminary Evidence,” Journal of Retailing, Vol. 3 (Fall, 1987). pp. 243-259. 29. T. S. Robertson and H. Gatignon, YCompetitive Effects on Technology Diffusion.” Journd of Marketing, Vol. 50 (July 19861, pp. 1-12. 30. Jagdish N. Shetb and S. Ram, Bringing Innovation to Market: How lo Break Corporate and Customer Barriers, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1987). 31. Richard Wolkomir, “Falling into the Gadget Gap,” Smilhwnian, Vol. 22, no. 7 (October 19911, pp. 64-75.