The political effects of referendums: An analysis of institutional innovations in Eastern and Central Europe

Communist and Post-Communist Studies 38 (2005) 475e499 www.elsevier.com/locate/postcomstud

The political effects of referendums: An analysis of institutional innovations in Eastern and Central Europe Simon Hug Institut fu¨r Politikwissenschaft, Universita¨t Zu¨rich, Zu¨rich, Switzerland Available online 4 November 2005

Abstract Theory suggests that the political effects of referendums should vary according to the institutional provisions that allow for direct involvement of citizens in decision-making. Relying on extant theoretical models the paper proposes initial tests of some implications for the newly democratized countries in Eastern and Central Europe. The constitutions of these countries distinguish themselves by a wide variety of institutional provisions for referendums. Taking advantage of this increased variance, the paper demonstrates effects of different institutional provisions on policy outcomes, which, so far, have only been demonstrated at the sub-national level, for example, in the United States and Switzerland. Ó 2005 The Regents of the University of California. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. Keywords: Institutions; Referendums; Satisfaction with democracy; Confidence in institutions

Introduction Most theoretical models studying referendums1 concur that such institutions can systematically affect policy outcomes. Empirical tests of propositions derived E-mail address: [email protected] I use the term ‘‘referendum’’ to designate all decision-making processes which involve citizens voting on actual policies. Butler and Ranney (1994, 1) rely on a similar definition. 1

0967-067X/$ - see front matter Ó 2005 The Regents of the University of California. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.postcomstud.2005.09.006

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from theoretical models have, however, been limited to the sub-national level in the United States and Switzerland so far, since the variation in institutional provisions for referendums was insufficient for meaningful empirical analysis. For a limited set of policies authors have been able to show that provisions for referendums bias policy outcomes toward the voters’ wishes (Gerber, 1996, 1999). Other tests show that the tax structure, the level of debt, and growth rates are affected by institutions allowing for referendums (Kirchga¨ssner et al., 1999; Sass, 2001; Matsusaka, 2004). At the end of the last millennium many countries introduced into their constitutions provisions allowing for referendums. Chief among them are the new democracies in Eastern and Central Europe (Brady and Kaplan, 1994; White and Hill, 1996; Auer and Bu¨tzer, 2001; Hug and Tsebelis, 2002). Thus, for instance among the eight new members of the European Union (EU) from this region,2 seven have provisions for some sort of referendum process. To various degrees these institutions have also been used over the last decade, including for the ratification of the accession treaties to the EU. Both the variation in institutions and the increasing use of referendums in Eastern and Central Europe allow for more challenging tests of theories on the policy effects of referendums at the national level. The lack of such tests makes the argument for extending provisions for referendums at the national level (Budge, 1996) or beyond (Abromeit, 1998; Schmitter, 2000) rather problematic. Relying on simple extrapolations from the sub-national level to demonstrate the positive effects of referendums is fraught with difficulties (Kiewiet and Szakaly, 1996, 64).3 The present paper provides some initial and tentative tests of implications from theoretical models studying the policy effects of referendums for countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Some of the empirical results support these implications, while others fail to conform to expectations. Such results are to be expected given the recent nature of these new institutions. In Section 2, I provide an overview of the referendum institutions in Eastern and Central Europe. A simple typology allows for the classification of all institutional provisions for referendums. I also briefly discuss the referendums that have occurred so far. In Section 3, I discuss theoretical models and the effect of institutions allowing for referendums and their predictions of the policy effects of these institutions. Based on tentative empirical material I suggest tests of these propositions in Section 4. I conclude in Section 5 by outlining future research and the policy effects of institutional provisions for referendums.

Referendum institutions in Eastern and Central Europe The literature on referendums contains many different typologies of institutions allowing for referendums (Hug and Tsebelis, 2002). For the purpose of studying the policy effects of referendums it is central to distinguish among referendum 2

The two remaining new members are Cyprus and Malta. Even more difficult are such extrapolations beyond the national level as some authors advocating the use of referendums at the EU-level (Abromeit, 1998; Schmitter, 2000). 3

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institutions according to which actors are able to trigger a referendum, and who the author of the proposal is to be voted on. Relying in part on a subset of dichotomous criteria proposed by Suksi (1993) I develop a fourfold typology.4 A first criterion distinguishes between required and non-required referendums. Provisions for required referendums specify a set of policy proposals adopted in the normal legislative process (for example, constitutional amendments or changes in electoral laws), which automatically are subject to a popular vote. Ballot proposals in that case correspond to policies adopted in the normal legislative process. Among the non-required referendums one has to distinguish between those triggered by the government taken in its largest sense and possible opposition groups.5 Following Suksi (1993) I call the former passive referendums, since they do not require the active involvement of actors outside government, while the latter are active referendums. The non-required/ passive referendums, as the required referendums, submit a ballot proposal determined by the normal legislative process to the citizens. Non-required/active referendums, however, can occur on proposals adopted in the normal legislative process or on policies proposed by opposition forces. Thus, this last distinction separates nonrequired/active referendums on government proposals from non-required/active referendums on opposition proposals.6 By focusing on the criteria of who triggers a referendum and who authors the ballot proposal, this fourfold classification emphasizes the differences in the strategic context of referendums. Thus, it provides a foundation for building theoretical models stressing the strategic interaction among politicians which is affected by institutions allowing for referendums. Among the 19 countries of Eastern and Central Europe considered in this study,7 17 allow for non-required/passive ones.8 Less frequent are provisions requiring referendums for certain policy domains or

4 This typology draws on Christin and Hug (2002) and Hug (2004), and is related to a more detailed typology in terms of veto-players discussed in Hug and Tsebelis (2002). 5 This distinction corresponds to some degree to the one distinguishing between referendums triggered by a veto player and those triggered by other actors (Hug and Tseblis, 2002). 6 Suksi (1993) does not distinguish between government and opposition proposals, but uses as additional dichotomous criteria the fact whether a referendum is preregulated and whether its outcome is binding. The former is a largely legalistic distinction, while the latter is of more central importance. Many authors (Luthardt, 1994; 173f) argue, however, that most non-binding referendums are binding in reality. Thus, I refrain from using this additional distinction. 7 The countries studied are the following: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the Ukraine. In Appendix A, I give a much more detailed description of the constitutional provisions in Tables 4 and 5. A similar table appears in Hug (2004) for all countries covered by Suksi (1993), while Hug and Tsebelis (2002) provide more detail on the actors able to trigger the referendum process and to author proposals. 8 The absence of provisions for non-required/passive referendums hardly constrains governments from calling such referendums all the same. For instance, the referendums in the United Kingdom on devolution and membership to the European Community have occurred without any provisions, given the absence of a constitutional document. Since in other countries such referendums have also been held, I hardly use the distinction between countries explicitly allowing for such referendums and those that do not in the empirical analyses that follow.

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constitutional amendments, namely eight. Even fewer are the countries allowing for non-required/active referendums, whether the proposals come from government (eight out of 19) or from the opposition (five out of 19) (Table 1).9 These institutions, as Table 2 shows, have also frequently been used (C2D, Research and Documentation Centre on Direct Democracy, http://c2d.unige.ch, accessed December 5, 2004). Overall, 56 referendums have occurred in these countries between the adoption of the constitution containing the provisions for referendums presented in Table 4 and December 2004. Table 2 shows that four topics have predominated in the referendums held so far in Eastern and Central Europe. First, there are a series of ballot measures dealing with institutional issues. Second, a set of ballot proposals focus on economic problems. Third, a smaller set deals with issues of defence and armed forces, including relationships with NATO. Finally, the fourth topic covers the recent set of referendums on the accession of some countries to the European Union.

Policy consequences of referendum institutions: theories Following the path-breaking work of Romer and Rosenthal (1978, 1979) on school-bond referendums many authors have proposed models dealing with some of the institutions allowing for referendums (Denzau et al., 1981; Lupia, 1992, 1994; Steunenberg, 1992; Ursprung, 1994a,b; Feldmann, 1995; Gerber, 1996, 1999; Moser, 1996; Besley and Coate, 2001; Matsusaka and McCarty, 2001; Hug and Tsebelis, 2002; Hug, 2004). But none of these models, with the exception of Steunenberg (1992), Hug and Tsebelis (2002), and Hug (2004) allows for direct comparisons of policy effects across different institutional provisions for referendums.10 Steunenberg (1992), however, only compares in a very general manner required referendums and non-required/active referendums on opposition proposals. Hug and Tsebelis (2002), and Hug (2004) cover exhaustively all different types of referendums. Despite employing different though related typologies, their results are closely related. While Hug and Tsebelis (2002) focus mostly on the role of the agenda setter, Hug (2004) specifies more in detail the policy consequences of provisions for different types of referendums. His results suggest that policies are on average closer to the voters’ wishes in countries allowing for referendums. Provided policies can be represented in a one-dimensional space, the difference between the policy preferred by the median voter and the actual policy should be on average smaller in countries allowing referendums than in those not having provisions for popular votes. This main 9

Table 4 also illustrates the variation in institutional provisions. Prior to the adoption of the new constitution in the new democracies in Eastern and Central Europe only five countries allowed for non-required/active referendums on opposition proposals. Of these five, four also had provisions for nonrequired/active referendums on government proposals. Such distributions of provisions make it difficult to test hypotheses on the various effects of different provisions for referendums (Hug, 2004). 10 Denzau et al. (1981) look at institutional differences, but only in the sense of how much leeway citizens have in proposing a policy change.

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Table 1 Referendums in Eastern and Central Europe (date of adoption of constitutiondDecember 2004) Country

Date

Ballot measure

Croatia (1990e)

May 19, 1991

Independence

Hungary (1989e)

December 5, 2004 December 5, 2004 April 12, 2003 November 16, 1997 July 29, 1990 November 26, 1989 November 26, 1989 November 26, 1989

Referendum on the double nationality Referendum on the privatization of hospitals Adhesion to European Union NATO membership Direct election of the President Election of the President through parliament Ending the presence of political parties in businesses Disclosing the accounts and the property of the USAP Abolition of the ‘‘Workers’ Guards’’ squads in businesses

November 26, 1989

Czech Republic (1992)

June 14, 2003

Adhesion to European Union

Latvia (1922) (1998)

September 21, 2003 November 13, 1999 October 3, 1998 March 3, 1991

Adhesion to European Union Changes to the pensions law Ending facilitated naturalization Independence

Lithuania (1992)

May 11, 2003 November 20, 1996 November 20, 1996

August 27, 1994

Adhesion to European Union Purchase of agricultural land by certain legal bodies Parliamentary elections on the second Sunday of April every four years At least half the State budget going to ‘‘citizens’ social needs’’ such as health, education, social security Compensation for lost assets prior to 1990 Reducing the number of seats in parliament from 141 to 111 Implementing the law on ‘‘illegal privatizations, accounts, shares and the failure to respect protective legislation’’ Law on ‘‘illegal privatizations, devalued accounts, shares and the failure to respect protective legislation’’ (1st part) Law on ‘‘illegal privatizations’’ (2nd part) Undoing the consequences of illegal privatizations and future privatizations of state property Reimbursement for devalued accounts Indexing the value of long-term capital investments Restoring the value of devalued assets belonging to the state Concision and transparency in protective legislation

May 23, 1999

More power for the President

November 20, 1996

November 20, 1996 November 20, 1996 August 27, 1994

August 27, 1994

August 27, 1994 August 27, 1994 August 27, 1994 August 27, 1994 August 27, 1994

Moldova (1994)

(continued on next page)

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Table 1 (continued ) Country

Date

Ballot measure

Poland (1989, 1997)

June 8, 2003 May 23, 1997 February 18, 1996 February 18, 1996

Adhesion to European Union Constitution Privatization program Extending the scope of mass privatization (national investment funds) Investing the profit generated by privatization in the public pension fund Financing pensions with the profit generated by privatization Privatization by means of coupons

February 18, 1996 February 18, 1996 February 18, 1996 Slovakia (1992)

April 3, 2004 May 17, 2003 November 11, 2000 September 26, 1998 May 24, 1997 May 24, 1997 May 24, 1997 May 24, 1997 October 22, 1994

Early general elections Adhesion to European Union Early elections No privatizations of strategically important enterprises Stationing nuclear weaponry Direct presidential elections NATO membership Creating military bases Retrospective disclosure of the financial transactions regarding privatizations

Slovenia (1989)

September 21, 2003 March 23, 2003 March 23, 2003 January 19, 2003 January 19, 2003 June 17, 2001 December 8, 1996

Only ten Sunday sellers per year Adhesion to European Union Adhesion to NATO No subdivision of the railroads Entire restitution of overpaid telephone fees Artificial insemination for unmarried women Electoral system for parliament

Ukraine (1996)

April 16, 2000

Reduction of Members of Parliament from 450 to 300 President may dissolve the parliament when no parliamentary majority is constituted or when the parliament fails to approve the state budget Restriction of the parliamentary immunity for people’s deputies of Ukraine Formation of second chamber of the parliament (bicameral system) representing the Ukrainian regions

April 16, 2000

April 16, 2000 April 16, 2000

result is common to most of the theoretical models mentioned above. Only under very restricted assumptions on the preferences of the actors involved do Matsusaka and McCarty (2001) and Hug (2004) find that the presence of some referendum institutions may make voters worse off. In addition Hug’s (2004) model suggests differences among institutions. While provisions for non-required/passive referendums should hardly have any policy effects, the strongest such effects are expected for required and non-required/active referendums on opposition proposals.

Confidence in Government Restr b (SE) Required Non-required/active government Non-required/active opposition GDP per capita (1999) Corruption (1999) Constant

0.15 0.15 0.15 ÿ0.00 0.03 2.45

r2 SEE n

0.09 0.31 15

a

(0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.07) (0.13) (0.25)

a

Parliament b (SE) 0.05 0.11 0.06 ÿ0.00 0.02 2.50 0.10 0.34 15

b, estimated slope coefficient; SE, standard error.

(0.27) (0.22) (0.30) (0.08) (0.15) (0.28)

EU

Restr b (SE)

b (SE)

0.12 0.12 0.12 0.02 0.00 2.64

0.05 0.17 ÿ0.02 0.02 ÿ0.00 2.66

0.14 0.26 15

(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.06) (0.11) (0.20)

0.18 0.28 15

(0.22) (0.18) (0.24) (0.06) (0.12) (0.23)

Armed forces

Restr b (SE)

b (SE)

ÿ0.22 ÿ0.22 ÿ0.22 0.07 ÿ0.19 2.99

ÿ0.06 ÿ0.05 ÿ0.12 0.06 ÿ0.16 2.91

0.34 0.27 15

(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.06) (0.11) (0.21)

0.30 0.30 15

(0.24) (0.20) (0.26) (0.07) (0.13) (0.25)

Restr b (SE)

b (SE)

0.11 0.11 0.11 ÿ0.10 0.25 1.93

0.11 0.22 0.01 ÿ0.11 0.23 1.93

0.34 0.26 15

(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.06) (0.11) (0.20)

0.49 0.25 15

(0.20) (0.16) (0.22) (0.06) (0.11) (0.21)

S. Hug / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 38 (2005) 475e499

Table 2 Effect of referendum institutions on average confidence levels

481

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Policy consequences of referendum institutions: empirical tests Direct empirical tests of these theoretically derived implications have been rare so far and almost all have focused on policies at the sub-national level either in the United States or Switzerland where there is sufficient variation in referendum institutions. Most often authors simply assess whether states or communities allowing for referendums have different policies than those without such institutions.11 While such tests often find systematic differences in policies (higher growth, lower taxes) they do not directly test the propositions of the theoretical models. Such tests require direct measurement of the preferred policy by the median voter and the policy present in the state. Gerber (1996, 1999) provides such a test and finds that the American states allowing for non-required/active referendums on opposition policies have on average laws on teenage abortions and on the death penalty which reflect more closely the voters wishes than the policies in states not allowing such votes.12 Lascher et al (1996) as well as Camobreco (1998) propose an empirical model inspired from Gerber’s (1996, 1999) work and find results contradicting the implications of theoretical models. Matsusaka (2001) convincingly argues, however, that these empirical models are misspecified, and the results do not speak to the theoretical question at hand.13 As suggested, direct tests of the implications of theoretical models require direct measurements of voter preferences as well as measures of the adopted policies. Most often both sets of measures prove hard to come by. A possible shortcut relies on the argument that if a policy is closer to the voters preferred alternative, then they should be on average more satisfied with the policy.14 This shortcut seems admissible in the present context, given what we know about explanations for confidence in particular institutions and satisfaction with democracy. While for the latter indicator often cultural explanations are advanced (Almond and Verba, 1963, 1989), Clarke et al. (1993) suggest that political economy elements contribute significantly to explaining satisfaction with democracy. While these authors focus on economic evaluations, they clearly show that citizens are more satisfied with democracy if governments are able to deliver good economic results. Similarly, Fuchs et al. (1995, 345) show that closeness to government parties increases satisfaction with democracy. Again, this seems related to the fact that being close to a government party suggests that policies adapted by the latter are closer to ones wishes. Anderson and Guillory (1997) also 11 Such empirical models appear mostly in the economic literature. Kirchga¨ssner et al. (1999) as well as Sass (2001) and Matsusaka (2004) provide useful surveys. 12 Employing the same empirical model as Gerber (1996, 1999), Gerber and Hug (1999) find similar effects for three policies affecting minorities. 13 Hug (2001) discusses various empirical models used in the literature to assess the policy effects of referendum institutions and highlights their strength and weaknesses. He also suggests an alternative model which is appropriate for analyses of policies as those analyzed by Lascher et al. (1996) and Camobreco (1998). Reanalyzing the policies studied by Lascher et al. (1996) he largely finds support for the theoretical implications. 14 Christin and Hug (2002) also employ this shortcut and discuss it in more detail for the case of European integration.

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provide evidence that citizens evaluate economic performance, but in addition being close to an opposition party decreases satisfaction with democracy mostly in majoritarian systems. In the latter, the wishes of the ‘‘losers’’ can more easily be ignored. Finally, the results, obtained by Waldron-Moore (1999) probably provide the strongest support for the approach chosen here. She shows that satisfaction, contrary to support for democracy, is based ‘‘on short-term evaluations of the outputs of the democratic system’’ (Waldron-Moore, 1999, 51). This strong link with policy outputs is probably still stronger if particular institutions are evaluated by respondents. Thus, the results of these recent studies on explaining the satisfaction with democracy and particular institutions justify the shortcut proposed here, namely to presume that to study policy effects of referendums in Eastern and Central Europe. Thus, to measure voter assessments of democracy and particular institutions I rely on two sources, the World Values Survey carried out in 199515 and the Central and East European Barometer carried out between 1990 and 1997. Both surveys cover a series of countries in Eastern and Central Europe and have the advantage of using the same survey questions in all countries. The first attempt to assess the possible effect of referendums appears in Table 2 and relies on data from the World Values Survey. This survey contains a question asking how much confidence respondents have in various institutions. I regress the average level of confidence for four institutions on a series of independent variables. First I only include a dichotomous variable equalling one for all countries having provisions for either required or non-required/active referendums (Table 2: restr) and as controls the GDP per capita and the level of corruption in 1999.16 Second, I allow the effect of referendums to vary across institutions by estimating the effects for three different dichotomous variables. The results reported in Table 2 are not too encouraging. While most coefficients have the expected sign, none of them are large or significant. Exceptions to this rule appear for the confidence in the European Union and the armed forces. Surprisingly, having institutions allowing for referendums is associated with lower confidence in the European Union. In the case of confidence in the armed forces, it appears that provisions for non-required/active referendums on government proposals increase the level of confidence. On the other hand the coefficients for two control variables suggest that higher levels of GDP per capita are associated with lower confidence, while higher levels of corruption (smaller values on the transparency index) are associated with lower levels of confidence in the armed forces. For the other three institutions the relationships are in the opposite direction, except for confidence in the EU, which increases with higher levels of corruption. The fact that confidence in the armed forces stands apart relates to the information displayed in Table 2. As noted, several referendums have occurred on military issues, 15

This survey covered, among others, the following 15 countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Croatia, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Russia, Serbia, Slovenia, and Ukraine. 16 I use these rather recent figures because they cover the largest set of countries. In Appendix A, I list for all variables their sources and descriptive statistics.

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most notably on NATO membership. The results reported here seem to indicate that the effect of referendum institutions might only come to the forefront, once some ballot measures have taken place in some issue areas. The weak results reported in Table 2 relate, however, also to the small number of cases. One way to increase this number is to consider the changes both of the institutions allowing for referendums and of the people’s opinion. The Central and East European Barometer allows for tracking at least the level of satisfaction with the development of democracy in several countries over 8 years between 1990 and 1997. Since during the same time most constitutions underwent changes and started to allow for referendums, this data can also be used to study the effects of referendum institutions over time. Table 3 reports the results of such an analysis for 16 countries covered in some of the surveys of the Central and East European Barometer.17 In these analyses I used the same variables for the referendum institutions as before, but this time taking into account variations over time.18 I control again for economic effects by using the GDP per capita to control for differences between countries and in addition by also introducing the GDP growth rate to assess its effect both over time and space. The structure of the data is a classical time-series cross-section, however, with rather short timeseries panels which are in addition unbalanced. Given these complications and the tentative nature of these empirical explorations I correct for these problems only by calculating panel-corrected standard errors (PCSEs) as suggested by Beck and Katz (1995, 1996) and by allowing an autoregressive (AR1) process in the error terms. The results suggest a considerable effect of referendum institutions on average levels of satisfaction with the development of democracy. The results from the first model (Table 3, column 2 restr) suggest that the presence of institutions allowing for required or non-required/active referendums increase the level of satisfaction with democracy.19 On the other hand the economic variables hardly affect the degree of satisfaction in this specification which includes an autoregressive term. The same result holds up even when the possible problem of autocorrelation is ignored (Table 3, column 4 restr). When distinguishing between the three types of institutions allowing for required and non-required/active referendums, it appears that the effects are strongest for non-required/active referendums both on government and opposition proposals. Especially the effect of the latter type of referendums is largely congruent with the expectations derived from the theoretical model. Its effect pales, however, compared to the one of non-required/active referendums on government proposals. Most likely, this larger effect is due to the fact that referendums allowing opposition forces to submit proposals have not yet been used very frequently in Central and Eastern Europe.

17 I excluded all countries with fewer than five time points in the surveys. In Appendix A, I report results of analyses including additional countries with fewer timepoints but still at least two. 18 I coded all institutions as absent before the adoption of the constitutions listed in Table 5. 19 Given the coding in the survey, higher levels on the dependent variables reflect lower satisfaction.

485

S. Hug / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 38 (2005) 475e499 Table 3 Satisfaction with development of democracy (1990e1997) Variable

Restr b (PCSE)

b (PCSE)

Restr b (PCSE)

b (PCSE)

Required referendum Non-required/active referendum government Non-required/active referendum opposition GDP per capita (1999 in $1000 PPP) GDP growth rate Constant

ÿ0.28 (0.04) ÿ0.28 (0.04)

0.01 (0.08) ÿ0.17 (0.09)

ÿ0.26 (0.03) ÿ0.26 (0.03)

ÿ0.01 (0.03) ÿ0.14 (0.04)

ÿ0.28 (0.04)

ÿ0.06 (0.09)

ÿ0.26 (0.03)

ÿ0.06 (0.03)

ÿ0.00 (0.00) ÿ0.02 (0.01) 3.11 (0.10)

ÿ0.01 (0.02) ÿ0.00 (0.00) 2.95 (0.18)

ÿ0.02 (0.01) ÿ0.01 (0.00) 3.13 (0.06)

ÿ0.01 (0.01) ÿ0.01 (0.00) 2.99 (0.07)

r r2 n Countries

0.57 0.85 100 16

0.72 0.87 100 16

0.31 100 16

0.19 100 16

Conclusion While the theoretical literature has largely come to an agreement that institutions allowing for referendums affect policy outcomes in a systematic way, empirical tests have been limited in several ways, so far. First, several empirical tests assessed whether states or communities allowing for referendums had different policy outcomes. Since the theoretical models suggest that the policy outcomes under provisions for referendums should be biased toward the preferences of the median voter, such empirical results only partly test the theoretical implications. Second, given that variation in referendum institutions was heavily limited at the national level, most studies focused on the sub-national level. There, some empirical analyses demonstrated largely the theoretically expected effects of referendum institutions. With the spreading of referendum institutions, particularly in the newly democratized countries of Eastern and Central Europe, I argued in this paper that tests of the theoretical models become possible at the national level. Countries of that region of the world have adopted new constitutions, often containing various provisions for direct popular involvement in decision-making, over the last 15 years. I discussed these provisions and demonstrated their increasing use. Drawing on models proposed in the literature I presented results from tests of implications relating institutions allowing for referendums to policy effects. These effects vary across institutions and are strongest for non-required/active referendums on opposition proposals. While ideally these implications should be tested on the basis of direct measurements both of the preferences of the voters and of the policy outcome, I proposed alternative tests. Relying on survey-based evidence on the level of confidence in various institutions and the level of satisfaction with democracy, I found some support for the theoretical models. First, confidence in the armed forces appears to be related to the presence of referendum institutions, more precisely to the presence of provisions allowing for non-required/active referendums on government proposals. This result is most likely

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Table 4 Institutions for referendums Country Armenia Azerbaijan Belarus Bulgaria Croatia Estonia Georgia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Macedonia Moldova Poland Romania Russia Slovakia Slovenia

Required

Non-required active government proposal

Non-required active opposition proposal

X X X X X X

X X X X

X X X X X

X X

X

X X

Non-required passive X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

related to the fact that various countries in Eastern and Central Europe have held referendums on military issues, most notably NATO membership. Second, I found that over time the level of satisfaction with the development of democracy is positively affected by the presence of required and non-required/active referendum institutions. Especially the presence of provisions allowing required and nonrequired/active referendums on opposition proposals increase the level of satisfaction. This latter effect resonates well with the theoretical implications of my model. However, these latter results also raise an important issue of institutional choice, which might cause problems of endogeneity in the analyses I presented in this paper. Future research has to determine whether there is an explanatory factor for institutional choice, which might affect the empirical results. Future research should also attempt to test the propositions derived in this paper for specific policy issues. Nevertheless, the institutional development in the area of referendums in Eastern and Central Europe will remain an important testing ground for theoretical propositions which have been tested so far only at the sub-national level.

Appendix A In this appendix I present more details on the institutional provisions allowing for referendums (Tables 4 and 5)20 and information on the data used and additional analyses. 20

Source: Blaustein and Flanz (1971).

Table 5 Institutions for referendums in the constitutions Country

Required

Albania 1998

Non-required active government proposal

Non-required active opposition proposal

Art. 150, laws parliament 50,000 voters parliament

Armenia 1995

Art. 111, for constitutional matters. President in agreement with the majority of the parliament, the parliament Art. 112, for legislative matter parliament, government Art. 95, 109 President parliament (83 members out of 125) Art. 74, 84 President, parliament majority of both chambers

Azerbaijan 1995 Belarus 1996 Art. 74 450,000 nationals 6.25%): at least 30,000 in every region and the town of Minsk Bulgaria 1971 Croatia 1990

Art. 135, for the association of the Republic of Croatia in alliances with other states, after passage in parliament by a twothirds majority vote.

Art. 84 decision taken by the parliament (national assembly) Art. 80, 81, 87 proposed by the Chamber of Comitats; decision taken by the Chamber of Representatives; asked for by the government; decision taken by the President of the republic with the countersignature of the president of the government house of representatives

487

(continued on next page)

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Art. 150, laws parliament 50,000 voters parliament Art. 177, constitutional amendments one-fifth of members of parliament twothirds majorities in parliament

Non-required passive

Required

488

Table 5 (continued ) Country

Non-required active government proposal

Non-required active opposition proposal

Estonia 1992

Art. 74 20,000 voters Art. 102, constitution 200,000 citizens

Hungary 1989

Latvia 1922 (1998)

Art. 76, 77, amendments to articles 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, or 77 of the constitution, after passage by two-thirds majority in parliament

Art. 72, 74, legislative one-tenth of the voters, provided law is not adopted by a three-fourths majority parliament

Lithuania 1992

Art. 148, amendments to art. 1, chapters 1 and 14 of the constitution, after passage by two-thirds majority in parliament

Art. 9, laws 300,000 nationals

Art. 78, constitution one-tenth at least of the voters can present a draft revision completely elaborated) of the constitution to the president, who submits it to the parliament; if the parliament amends it, a referendum must be held Art. 147, constitution 300,000 nationals; one quarter of the parliament, provided amendment deals with art.1 or chapters 1 and 14

Art. 105, legislative parliament, parliament Art. 162, constitutional amendments three-fifths majority in parliament, parliament Art. 74 president Art. 102, constitution the president; at least half of the of each chamber of the parliament Art. 19, 30a parliament shall have the right to call a national referendum. A majority of twothirds of the votes of the members of parliament present is required to pass the law on national referenda. President has the right to initiate national referenda Art. 72, 74, legislative one-tenth of the voters, provided law is not adopted by a three-fourths majority parliament

Art. 9, laws parliament

S. Hug / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 38 (2005) 475e499

Georgia 1995

Non-required passive

Macedonia 1991

Art. 141, 142, 143, constitutional amendments regarding the sovereignty, independence and unity of the state, as well as those regarding the permanent neutrality of the state. After passage by a twothirds majority in parliament

Art. 68, 73 150,000 nationals

Art. 68, 73 majority of deputies

Art. 141, 142, constitution (provisions regarding the sovereignty, independence and unity of the state, as well as those regarding the permanent neutrality of the state) 200,000 citizens (8.5%) covering at least a half of the nation’s districts and municipalities, and in their turn each of those districts and municipalities must be represented by at least 5,000 registered signers in support of the initiative or one-third of the parliament

Art. 120, entering, leaving supranational organization proposed by the President of the republic, the government or at least 40 deputies; decision taken by majority of two-thirds of the deputies majority of two-thirds of the deputies Art. 66, 75, 88 President, parliament

Art. 141, 142, constitution (provisions regarding the sovereignty, independence and unity of the state, as well as those regarding the permanent neutrality of the state)

489

(continued on next page)

S. Hug / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 38 (2005) 475e499

Moldova 1994

Art. 74, 120 changes of borders or association with or dissociation from a union, after passage by parliament with twothirds majority

Required

Poland 1989 (1997)

Non-required active government proposal Art. 235, revision of the chapters I, II or XII of the constitution one-fifth of the deputies House of Representatives (Sejm)

Art. 147, constitutional amendments after passage by both chambers by two-thirds majority, or in case of disagreement, by a three-fourths majority of members of both chambers

Non-required active opposition proposal

Non-required passive Art. 235, revision of the chapters I, II or XII of the constitution President, senate one-fifth of the deputies House of Representatives (Sejm) by a majority of at least two-thirds of votes in the presence of at least half of the statutory number of deputies, and by the senate by an absolute majority of votes in the presence of at least half of the statutory number of senators Art. 125, 144 art. 90, on sovereignty President in agreement with the senate, the parliament (absolute majority, at least half of the deputies being present) Art. 90 President after having asked the parliament’s advice

Art. 146, constitution two-thirds majorities in both chambers, or three-fourths majority in joint session

S. Hug / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 38 (2005) 475e499

Romania 1991

490

Table 5 (continued ) Country

Russia 1993 Slovakia 1992

Art. 7, 93, international treaties, entering a state alliance after passage of a constitutional law by three-fifths in parliament

Art. 170, constitution at least 30 (out of 90) deputies

Art. 90 II, 97 I, 99 II, legislative 40,000 nationals, one third of deputies

Art. 86, 93, 95, 96, 102 President declares the referendum if the National Council proposes resolution presented by the deputies of the National Council or the Government) Art. 168, 169, 170, constitution government

Art. 168, 169, 170, constitution 30 deputies 30,000 voters Ukraine 1996

Art. 156, amendments to chapters I, III and XIII of the constitution, after passage by two-thirds majority in parliament

Art. 72 II 3,000,000 citizens (signatures collected in no less than two-thirds of the oblasts, with no less than 100,000 signatures in each oblast) 3,000,000 citizens (signatures collected in no less than twothirds of the oblasts, with no less than 100,000 signatures in each oblast)

Art. 72 I President, parliament, parliament

S. Hug / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 38 (2005) 475e499

Slovenia 1989

Art. 93, 95, 98, 102 President declares the referendum if 350,000 nationals sign petition

491

492

S. Hug / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 38 (2005) 475e499

Data and additional analyses Tables 6, 7, 8, and 9 provide the sources and descriptive statistics of the data employed in the analyses presented in the paper. Tables 10, 11, and 12 report results of additional analyses.

Table 6 Sources and descriptive statistics for World Values Survey (WVS) data (1995) Variables and sources

Minimum

Mean

Maximum

SD

N

Mean confidence government (WVS 1995) Mean confidence parliament (WVS 1995) Mean confidence armed forces (WVS 1995) Mean confidence Euro Union (WVS 1995) GDP per capita (in $1000 PPP, 1999)a Corruption (1999) (transparency international) Required referendum (see Table 5) Non-required/active referendum on government proposal (see Table 5) Non-required/active referendum on opposition proposal (see Table 5) Non-required/passive referendum (see Table 5) Required or non-required/active referendum (see Table 5)

1.70 2.08 1.98 2.15 1.77 1.70 0.00 0.00

2.62 2.80 2.34 2.55 4.15 3.28 0.33 0.40

3.05 3.08 2.93 3.15 10.90 6.00 1.00 1.00

0.29 0.25 0.28 0.29 2.52 1.35 0.49 0.51

15 15 15 15 15 13 15 15

0.00

0.40

1.00

0.51

15

0.00 0.00

0.80 0.60

1.00 1.00

0.41 0.51

15 15

a

Source: The World Factbook 2000, http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/indexgeo.html (accessed August 10, 2001).

Table 7 Sources and descriptive statistics for 7th Central and East European Barometer (CEEB) data (1996) Variables and sources

Minimum

Mean

Maximum

SD

N

Average satisfaction with democracy (CEEB 7: Q06) Average satisfaction with respect for human rights (CEEB 7: Q07)

1.98

2.86

3.43

0.34

20

2.11

2.74

3.38

0.34

20

Table 8 Sources for CEEB (1e8) data Variables

Sources

Average satisfaction with democracy Required referendum Non-required/active government Non-required/active opposition Required or non-required/active referendum GDP per capita in $1000 PPP GDP growth rate

CEEB: 1 very satisfied, 4 not at all satisfied Table 5 Table 5 Table 5 Table 5 CIA World Factbook IMF World Economic Outlook, October 1998, Washington

493

S. Hug / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 38 (2005) 475e499 Table 9 Descriptive statistics of CEEB (1-8) data Minimum

Mean

Maximum

SD

N

Albania Average satisfaction with democracy Required referendum Non-required/active government Non-required/active opposition Required or non-required/active referendum GDP per capita in $1000 PPP GDP growth rate Year

2.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.65 ÿ28.00 1991.00

2.51 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.65 0.30 1993.5000

2.79 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.65 9.60 1996.00

0.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 15.35 1.87

6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6

Armenia Average satisfaction with democracy Required referendum Non-required/active government Non-required/active opposition Required or non-required/active referendum GDP per capita in $1000 PPP GDP growth rate Year

3.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.90 ÿ52.60 1992.00

3.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.90 ÿ9.72 1994.00

3.42 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.90 6.90 1996.00

0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 25.51 1.58

5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5

Belarus Average satisfaction with democracy Required referendum Non-required/active government Non-required/active opposition Required or non-required/active referendum GDP per capita in $1000 PPP GDP growth rate Year

3.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.30 ÿ12.60 1992.00

3.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.30 ÿ7.50 1994.00

3.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.30 2.80 1996.00

0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.03 1.58

5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5

Bulgaria Average satisfaction with democracy Required referendum Non-required/active government Non-required/active opposition Required or non-required/active referendum GDP per capita in $1000 PPP GDP growth rate Year

2.66 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.30 ÿ11.70 1990.00

3.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.30 ÿ5.44 1993.50

3.46 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.30 2.10 1997.00

0.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.51 2.45

8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8

Croatia Average satisfaction with democracy Required referendum Non-required/active government Non-required/active opposition Required or non-required/active referendum GDP per capita in $1000 PPP GDP growth rate Year

2.43 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 5.10 6.00 1995.00

2.55 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 5.10 6.40 1995.50

2.67 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 5.10 6.80 1996.00

0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.57 0.71

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

(continued on next page)

494

S. Hug / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 38 (2005) 475e499

Table 9 (continued ) Minimum

Mean

Maximum

Czech Republic Average satisfaction with democracy Required referendum Non-required/active government Non-required/active opposition Required or non-required/active referendum GDP per capita in $1000 PPP GDP growth rate Year

SD

2.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 11.70 ÿ8.50 1992.00

2.68 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 11.70 1.02 1994.50

2.77 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 11.70 6.40 1997.00

0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.12 1.87

6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6

Slovakia Average satisfaction with democracy Required referendum Non-required/active government Non-required/active opposition Required or non-required/active referendum GDP per capita in $1000 PPP GDP growth rate Year

2.90 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 8.50 ÿ8.50 1992.00

2.99 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 8.50 2.12 1994.50

3.06 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 8.50 6.90 1997.00

0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.58 1.87

6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6

Estonia Average satisfaction with democracy Required referendum Non-required/active government Non-required/active opposition Required or non-required/active referendum GDP per capita in $1000 PPP GDP growth rate Year

2.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.60 ÿ21.60 1991.00

2.77 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.60 ÿ2.90 1994.00

2.94 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.60 10.90 1997.00

0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.75 2.16

7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7

Hungary Average satisfaction with democracy Required referendum Non-required/active government Non-required/active opposition required or Non-required/active referendum GDP per capita in $1000 PPP GDP growth rate Year

2.87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.80 ÿ11.90 1990.00

3.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.80 ÿ1.13 1993.50

3.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.80 4.40 1997.00

0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.15 2.45

8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8

Latvia Average satisfaction with democracy Required referendum Non-required/active government Non-required/active opposition Required or non-required/active referendum GDP per capita in $1000 PPP GDP growth rate Year

2.67 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 4.20 ÿ35.20 1991.00

2.89 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 4.20 ÿ7.17 1994.00

3.06 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 4.20 6.50 1997.00

0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 14.83 2.16

7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7

N

495

S. Hug / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 38 (2005) 475e499 Table 9 (continued ) Minimum

Mean

Maximum

SD

N

Lithuania Average satisfaction with democracy Required referendum Non-required/active government Non-required/active opposition Required or non-required/active referendum GDP per capita in $1000 PPP GDP growth rate Year

2.40 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 4.80 ÿ21.30 1991.00

2.69 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 4.80 ÿ5.61 1994.00

2.94 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 4.80 5.70 1997.00

0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.72 2.16

7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7

Macedonia Average satisfaction with democracy Required referendum Non-required/active government Non-required/active opposition required or Non-required/active referendum GDP per capita in $1000 PPP GDP growth rate Year

2.62 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 3.80 ÿ9.10 1992.00

2.71 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 3.80 ÿ2.83 1994.00

2.86 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 3.80 0.80 1996.00

0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.33 1.58

5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5

Moldova Average satisfaction with democracy Required referendum Non-required/active government Non-required/active opposition Required or non-required/active referendum GDP per capita in $1000 PPP GDP growth rate Year

2.76 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.20 ÿ29.70 1992.00

2.76 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.20 ÿ29.70 1992.00

2.76 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.20 ÿ29.70 1992.00

Poland Average satisfaction with democracy Required referendum Non-required/active government Non-required/active opposition Required or non-required/active referendum GDP per capita in $1000 PPP GDP growth rate Year

2.36 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 7.20 ÿ7.20 1990.00

2.64 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 7.20 2.18 1993.50

2.92 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 7.20 7.00 1997.00

0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.92 2.45

8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8

Romania Average satisfaction with democracy Required referendum Non-required/active government Non-required/active opposition required or Non-required/active referendum GDP per capita in $1000 PPP GDP growth rate Year

2.46 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 3.90 ÿ12.90 1991.00

2.72 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 3.90 ÿ1.73 1994.00

2.93 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 3.90 6.90 1997.00

0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.60 2.16

7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7

. . . . . . . .

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

(continued on next page)

496

S. Hug / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 38 (2005) 475e499

Table 9 (continued ) Minimum

Mean

Maximum

Russia Average satisfaction with democracy Required referendum Non-required/active government Non-required/active opposition Required or non-required/active referendum GDP per capita in $1000 PPP GDP growth rate Year

SD

3.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.20 ÿ19.40 1990.00

3.28 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.20 ÿ9.43 1993.00

3.41 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.20 ÿ4.80 1996.00

0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.70 2.16

6 7 7 7 7 7 6 7

Slovenia Average satisfaction with democracy Required referendum Non-required/active government Non-required/active opposition Required or non-required/active referendum GDP per capita in $1000 PPP GDP growth rate Year

2.57 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 10.90 2.80 1992.00

2.70 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 10.90 3.82 1994.50

2.80 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 10.90 5.30 1997.00

0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.98 1.87

6 6 6 6 6 6 5 6

Ukraine Average satisfaction with democracy Required referendum Non-required/active government Non-required/active opposition Required or non-required/active referendum GDP per capita in $1000 PPP GDP growth rate Year

3.10 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 2.20 ÿ22.90 1992.00

3.22 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 2.20 ÿ15.26 1994.00

3.31 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 2.20 ÿ10.00 1996.00

0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.99 1.58

5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5

Georgia Average satisfaction with democracy Required referendum Non-required/active government Non-required/active opposition required or Non-required/active referendum GDP per capita in $1000 PPP GDP growth rate Year

2.66 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.30 ÿ44.80 1992.00

2.87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.30 ÿ10.83 1994.25

3.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.30 10.50 1996.00

0.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 24.39 1.71

4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4

Kazakhstan Average satisfaction with democracy Required referendum Non-required/active government Non-required/active opposition required or Non-required/active referendum GDP per capita in $1000 PPP GDP growth rate Year

2.98 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.20 ÿ12.60 1994.00

3.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.20 ÿ6.77 1995.00

3.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.20 0.50 1996.00

0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.67 1.00

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

N

497

S. Hug / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 38 (2005) 475e499 Table 9 (continued ) Minimum Yugoslavia Average satisfaction with democracy Required referendum Non-required/active government Non-required/active opposition Required or non-required/active referendum GDP per capita in $1000 PPP GDP growth rate Year

Mean

Maximum

2.69 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.80

2.69 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.80

2.69 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.80

1996.00

1996.00

1996.00

SD

N 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1

Table 10 Explaining average satisfaction with democracy in 19 countries Variable

Restr b (PCSE)

b (PCSE)

Restr b (PCSE)

b (PCSE)

Required referendum Non-required/active on government proposal Non-required/active on opposition proposal GDP per capita (1999 in $1000 PPP) GDP growth rate Constant

ÿ0.29 (0.05) ÿ0.29 (0.05)

ÿ0.06 (0.09) ÿ0.14 (0.11)

ÿ0.27 (0.03) ÿ0.27 (0.03)

ÿ0.04 (0.03) ÿ0.12 (0.04)

ÿ0.29 (0.05)

ÿ0.04 (0.10)

ÿ0.27 (0.03)

ÿ0.05 (0.03)

ÿ0.02 (0.01) ÿ0.00 (0.00) 3.12 (0.07)

ÿ0.01 (0.02) ÿ0.00 (0.00) 2.99 (0.15)

ÿ0.02 (0.01) ÿ0.00 (0.00) 3.13 (0.04)

ÿ0.01 (0.01) ÿ0.01 (0.00) 3.01 (0.05)

r r2 n Countries

0.51 0.84 109 19

0.67 0.87 109 19

0.31 109 19

0.18 109 19

Table 11 Satisfaction with development of democracy (1996) 7th CEEB Variable

Restr b (SE)

b (SE)

Restr b (SE)

b (SE)

Required Non-required/active on government proposal Non-required/active on opposition proposal GDP per capita (1999) Corruption (1999) Constant

ÿ0.30 (0.16) ÿ0.30 (0.16)

ÿ0.06 (0.19) ÿ0.22 (0.21)

ÿ0.30 (0.15) ÿ0.30 (0.15)

ÿ0.04 (0.18) ÿ0.17 (0.20)

ÿ0.30 (0.16)

0.08 (0.22)

ÿ0.30 (0.15)

0.03 (0.21)

0.03 (0.05) ÿ0.11 (0.11) 3.25 (0.28)

0.03 (0.05) ÿ0.13 (0.13) 3.18 (0.33)

ÿ0.01 (0.03)

ÿ0.01 (0.03)

3.07 (0.19)

2.96 (0.21)

SEE r2 n

0.33 0.22 19

0.38 0.11 19

0.33 0.19 20

0.37 0.06 20

498

S. Hug / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 38 (2005) 475e499

Table 12 Satisfaction with human right record (1996) 7th CEEB Variable

Restr b (SE)

b (SE)

Restr b (SE)

b (SE)

0.01 (0.18) 0.01 (0.18)

0.01 (0.19) ÿ0.10 (0.21)

ÿ0.02 (0.16) ÿ0.02 (0.16)

0.01 (0.17) ÿ0.09 (0.19)

Required Non-required/active on government proposal Non-required/active on opposition proposal GDP per capita (1999) Corruption (1999) Constant

0.01 (0.18)

0.27 (0.21)

ÿ0.02 (0.16)

0.24 (0.20)

ÿ0.00 (0.05) ÿ0.04 (0.12) 2.88 (0.31)

0.00 (0.05) ÿ0.07 (0.13) 2.89 (0.32)

ÿ0.02 (0.03)

ÿ0.02 (0.03)

2.84 (0.20)

2.79 (0.20)

SEE r2 n

0.37 0.03 19

0.37 0.15 19

0.36 0.02 20

0.36 0.11 20

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