The political geography of European minorities: past and future

Pohmol Geoprophy, Vol. 17, No. 5, pp. 517-534, 1998 0 1998 Elsevier Science Ltd All rights reserved. Printed in Great Britain 0962-6298/98 $19.00 +0 00

PII:SO962-6298(9700028-O

The political geography of European minorities: past and future VLADIMIRKOLOSSOV AND ANDREITREIVISH

of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Staromonetny per, 29, 109017 Moscow, Russia

Institute of Geography

AMTRACT. The authors distinguish

in Europe about 200 compact

ethnic areas and

assess the degree of political tension and risk in each of them using 16 variables characterizing

the number of a minority,

ation in its area, its economic political ethnic and

mobilization. minorities

analyse

reintegration

They estimate

the political

two

hypothetical

of existing

and the cultural situstatus, and the level of

the change in the number and the size of

in their areas in 1910-1993

European geopolitical minorities

the geopolitical

performance,

in Western

scenarios

and Eastern Europe

supposing

states. The conclusion

disintegration

drama has yielded the greatest ‘advantage’ for the former

in Central and Eastern Europe, but, as calculations

state model became new secession

a less effective

engenders

tool to solve ethnic

the appearance

Caucasian, and the West-European, countries.

KEYW~KDS. Ethnic minority,

show, the nation-

problems,

of new minorities.

ethnic areas are identified in Europe, which can be described East-European

and

is made that the last act of the

since each

Two types of as the Balkan, or

though the last is also characteristic

0 1998 Elsevier Science geopolitical

for large

Ltd. All rights reserved

risk assessment,

scenarios

Introduction The collapse of communist

regimes in East-Central Europe, the disintegration

of Soviet

Union and of Czechoslovakia and the war in former Yugoslavia showed that even the most dramatic geopolitical

shifts can happen.

Even before 1991, Europe was the continent

with the youngest political boundaries and, therefore, an elevated geopolitical ity’ (Foucher,

‘seismic-

199 1). Numerous changes of political boundaries and the creation of new

states only partly solved or softened ethnic problems. It is well known that partitions and the redrawing of political borders often only create new problems perpetuate

ethnic conflicts (Waterman,

firstly, using the historical retrospective of the future, we would determination

The purpose

and aggravate and

of this paper is two-fold:

of the 20th century and hypothetical

like to prove that the unlimited

and the concept

sions. Secondly, boundaries

1984).

right of peoples

along which

quantitatively the geopolitical,

to self-

of the nation-state are not a means to reduce ethnic ten-

we would like to try to define the most dangerous

in Europe

scenarios

new geopolitical

the economic,

shifts can occur,

ethno-political in estimating

and the cultural potential of the conflicts

Thepolitical geography of European minorities

518 in all European

areas of ethnic minorities,

as well as the level of their political mobiliza-

tion. As far as we know, it is the first attempt of this kind and, despite any shortcomings of our method, it can be useful for further studies. The definition

of ‘minority’

depends

greatly on the definition

of nation, state and,

indeed, of majority. This paper will apply the definition of nation in Krejci and Velimsky (1981),

with updated adjustments.

When counting the European minorities in 1910, 1930

and 1950, Krejci and Velimsky (198 1: 66) defined minorities

as

‘ethnic groups without any kind of autonomous status or partnership in such a status, and with their majority living on a more or less clearly identified territory’.

The second

portion

immigrants,

of the definition

and is the same restriction

excludes

Jews,

account minorities which have or have had an autonomous be continued

and some limits must be introduced

and guest workers/

status. The restriction should

for minimal ethnic populations:

for large states and 25 000 for small states; otherwise, minorities

Gypsies

we use for our ethnic areas, though we take into

considerably

50 000

long ‘tails’ of micro

might be identified.

Historical retrospective To study the dynamics of European minorities by using the definition, one most start with historical changes on the European political map. This analysis is confined to the twentieth century (in terms of time), Europe as far eastward as the Urals and the Armenian plateau (in terms of space), and the states populated by 50 000 or more residents (population). We begin by recalculating

the population

figures according

to these parameters

and

using different sources than those presented by Krejci and Velimsky (1981) (World Population, 1989; Minority Rights Group, 1990; Sellier and Sellier, 1991; Kolossov et al., 1992; Tarkhov and Jordan, and extended

1993). Maps l-5

(Figs Z-5) and Table 1 reflect the data corrected

both in time (the two recent dates added, divided by the same interval of

about 20 years) and in space (several more states related to our enlarged Europe, from the island of Madeira to the island of Vaigach and from Iceland to Cyprus). In the accounting, ‘leitmotif.

one can observe the process of self-determination

The number of completely

independent

as the century’s

states has doubled, and even tripled

in Central and Eastern Europe since 1910. Three states that emerged in Western Europe were thinly populated islands of Iceland, Ireland and Malta, states with almost no minorities. In Eastern Europe, the path towards the nation-state model was much more dramatic and successful,

if the number of newly created states serves as a criteria of success.

Major changes of the continental

political map during the twentieth

century resulted

from the World War I, with the Balkan wars as a prelude, the World War II, and the collapse of the Communist bloc and of some incorporated states after the Cold War. These three macroevents divide the century into four historical periods: multinationalism, nationalism,

socialism (Rugg, 1985: l l-13),

and the modern era. This latter period is yet

not clearly determined, balancing between the newest nationalism and trans-nationalism. Each period’s geopolitical and ethnic impacts are different. The era of great empires was marked by forced intrastate minorities.

ethnic

integration,

often painful for the, then, numerous

World War I allowed some of them to establish their own states (for example,

Poland, Hungary, etc.), but brought even more problems to the others (for instance, to Romania and Yugoslavia). Stalinist socialism pretended to solve those issues by creating a complicated system of ‘autonomies’ of different kind inside the ‘Eastern bloc’ using the Soviet example (in Romania and Czechoslovakia but especially in Yugoslavia). However,

VLADIMIR KOLOSSOV AND ANDREI

519

TRFJWSH

FIGURE 1. Historical dynamics of European ethnic minorities/subnations, A-dimension

of minorities by country;

number of minorities

or subnations

x-the

width of a rectangle

(in accordance

1910.

which corresponds

with the scale shown);

y-the

to the

altitude of a

to the national average of a minority’s population (in million, accord-

rectangle which corresponds

ing to the scale shown) and B-percentage

of minorities in the total population by country.

as modern history shows, these attempts also failed, followed by a new wave of conflicts, in the background

of a generally more integrated and interrelated

Eastern Europe entered the century divided between

Europe.

four empires. Only the Ottoman

empire exhibited

symptoms of erosion, as evidenced by the five Balkan states. Russia and

Austria-Hungary

were the European leaders both in number of minorities and their total

populations. continental

In 1910, the Russian empire alone accounted population.

However,

fold in terms of minority’s three-quarters co-majority’).

Austria-Hungary

average size; the minorities

of its total population

for over 40 percent of the total

exceeded

(or 60 percent,

the Russian empire two-

of Austria-Hungary

formed over

if Hungarians were considered

European Turkey still had the same percentage

of minorities

as a

(Table I).

Nine new states appeared on the European scene in the 1920s after the first geopolitical shift, notably reducing percentages of minorities and both the total and the average minorities’ numbers. The figures for average minorities’ size became almost equal in Western and in Central and Eastern Europe. However, the number of minorities and sub nations increased,

particularly

splitting a minority,

in the East. This is a result of the new boundaries

which then has to be counted

Ukrainians are a classic example of an irredentism

separately for each different

split in the 1920s between

often state.

the Soviet

Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania. In 1930, the European USSR, though lacking many western areas of its Russian empire

520

The political geograpb

of European minorities

-

0

FIGURE2. Historical dynamics of European ethnic minorities/subnations,

1930.

(See caption to figure 1 for full figure legend)

ancestor,

retained the largest number of minorities

new ‘collective’

Yugoslavian

in absolute figures, but followed the

kingdom (the European

Belgian and the Swiss Confederation

in percentage

number

two) as well as the old

terms. Furthermore,

with its minori-

ties’ share near one-third, the USSR was on a par with 1930s Poland and Czechoslovakia. The Second World War resulted in the second geopolitical greatly the figures for minorities,

shit,

but it did not affect

as it only slightly elevated the number of states. Among

new states, there was the ‘second Germany’, but at the same time, three Baltic states were incorporated

into the USSR. However, the tremendous

war and post-war losses, and the

forced transfers of millions of Jewish, French, German, Greek, and Slavonic peoples, counted. Why did these exchanges

are

not notably affect the European minorities’ totals and

averages? The intrastate shifts often had a counter-compensative majority of Central European countries,

nature. For instance, the

especially Poland, became more mono-ethnic.

The Soviet Union, by contrast, became more diverse. For example, from 1939-1945, nearly 135 000 km*, a region called Ruthenian or Galician Ukraine (the latter name coming from ancient principality of Galich) was added to the USSR. These areas were inhabited by approximately

nine million ‘double minorities’,

Ukrainians (Guts&, Poles, Transcarpathian

ethnic or confessional subgroups of Lemkys and Boykis known under the common name of Ruthenes), Magyars, and Bukovinian Romanians. Together with eastern Ukrain-

ians, Moldavians, Belorussians, Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians, significantly raised the figures for Soviet minorities.

these subgroups

Overall, a long-term and very special era of divided Europe was opened in 1950. The triple geopolitical formula, suggested by Jordan (1973) for Poland, seemed to come true for Central Europe as a whole:

VLADIMIRKo~ossov

FIGURE3.

521

AND ANDREI TREMSH

Historical dynamics of European ethnic minorities/subnations, 1950 (See caption to figure 1 for full figure legend)

strong Germany + weak Russia = German-dominated

Poland;

weak Germany + strong Russia = Russian-dominated

Poland;

strong Germany + strong Russia = no Poland. Jordan

(1973),

however,

forgot a historically

weak Russia (both disintegrated)

feasible combination:

= strong Polish or Polish-Lithuanian

weak Germany

+

state. Nevertheless.

we can expand the formula for Europe in its entirety as follows: strong West + weak East = West-dominated

Central Europe;

(weak West + strong East = East-dominated

Central Europe);

strong West + strong East = no Central Europe. The second version (in brackets)

seems to be a hypothesis

which reflects some exagger-

ated western fears of communist expansion in the 1950- 1960s. However, the final formula was accurate for the full Cold-War period, when there was almost no room for neutrals or buffers, except,

to some extent, Finland, Austria and Yugoslavia. The ethnic-national

ation inside the two systems was, paradoxically, confrontation

situ-

the most stable one. The world-wide

displaced old ethnic tensions and secessionist

intentions

from the surface

of European political geography. The confrontation between two blocs may explain the initial success of autonomization, the Soviet-shaped response to the nationalist challenge, which designated certain groups as autonomous in their traditional geographical heartlands. Few sounds of cracking along the ‘sub-state’ boundaries were heard. At the same time, the Eastern status-quo,

The political

522

geography of European minorities

FIGURE 4. Historical dynamics of European ethnic minorities/subnations, 1970.

(See caption to figure 1 for full figure legend) once achieved, was so well locked and guarded that it left no chance for purely ‘ethnic’ Eastern European Velimsky (1981) Moreover,

nations to become

somewhat

‘political’

(if the terms of Krejci and

are used). They could not establish any new official ethnic homelands.

some of the formerly

arranged homelands

were lost, as, for example,

the

Hungarian (Muresh) autonomous region which existed between 1952 and 1968 in TranSylvania, part of Romania. The partition of Cyprus in the mid-1970s is an exception, but it remains de-facto

distinct

both politically

and geographically.

Even more telling is that this

partition was (and still is, after so many recent precedents!)

not recognized

by

the international community. The Western situation of the time was not very different. Almost no single nation-state was brave enough to devolve its power. Only in the years since the 197Os, events like the creation

of a canton for Jura in Switzerland (1970-

minded Spanish Constitution,

1975), the 1978 regional autonomy-

the 1979 Scottish and Welsh referenda (which maintained

the UK integrity), and later Belgian federalist development (much less successful for the Belgian Kingdom), have marked a notable shift. A devolution of state power now seems to be possible under a much wider tendency toward regional and local self-government under such a reliable ‘supralock’ as the increasingly powerful EU framework. Forty years of such stability present many examples of the evolution of minorities mostly by their natural growth. The number of minorities did not change greatly between 1930 and 1970. Several new ethnic groups, exceeding

our symbolic limits of absolute strength and

thus added to the list of minorities, were balanced by a few cases of self-determination. Malta and Cyprus are two states that attained independence

after 1950, making the total number

VLADIMIR Ko~ossov

523

AND ANDREI TREMSH

FIGURE 5. Historical dynamics of European ethnic minorities/subnations, 1993

(See caption to figure 1 for full figure legend)

the same as in 1910. Assimilation, off&&l ignorance, and emigration were often important driving forces of ethnic structural shifts. For instance, Greek authorities and statistics do not recognize any ethnic minority, which makes our evaluation problematic. Hence, the diminishing proportion of Macedonians, Turks, Albanians and Aromuns in Greece could be an artifact of official policy, but it could also be the result of real assimilation or mimicry. The same process in Ireland and Finland was determined by lower national growth rates of English and Swedish minorities and partly by emigration, rather than assimilation. The latter was evidently the leading factor reducing the number of Hungarians and Germans in Romania, combined with the certain impact of their lower birth rates. By contrast, the three numerous Spanish minorities (Catalonians,

Basques and Galicians) were naturally increasing to

form over 25 percent of the total population in 1970. The third geopolitical shift in 198% 1995 is extremely important for Central and Eastern Europe: the reduction by one state, owing to the German re-unification, but a two-fold increase in the number of states caused by Soviet, Czechoslovakian

and Yugoslavian disinte-

grations. This causes a sharp reduction of both the absolute and relative strength of the minorities for the whole of the continent and for the East in particular. It is true that the East has a lower percentage and average population of compact minorities than the West. The latter’s minorities have increased in average and in total, in comparison with 1910. The minority-free

zone’, that zone of states below five percent of national totals, now

covers 15 states, instead of six in 1910, and forms a compact

core stretching

from the

Netherlands to Hungary and from Norway to Slovenia. The opposite pole is represented by Belgium, Switzerland and Bosnia; Bosnia is as far from a nation-state as was the whole of the

The political geography of European minorities

524 TABLE1. Population

and ethnic minorities

(subnations)

in Europe during the 20th Century

Indicator

Year

Total

Number of independent states

1910 1930 1950 1970 1993

21 30 28 30 44

12 14 14 15 15

9 16 14 15 29

Total population millions

1910 1930 1950 1970 1993

454.0 521.3 536.1 646.5 715.6

173.1 203.1 217.7 251.8 276.2

280.9 318.2 318.4 394.7 439.4

Number of minorities and subnations

1910 1930 1950 1970 1993

107 126 124 125 150

30 34 37 35 36

77 92 87 90 114

Minorities and subnations in millions

1910 1930 1950 1970 1993

140.8 107.5 114.6 142.8 92.0

25.7 27.8 30.4 36.8 40.9

115.4 79.7 84.2 106.0 51.1

Minorities and subnations as percentage of total population

1910 1930 1950 1970 1993

31.0 20.6 21.3 22.1 12.9

14.8 13.7 14.0 14.6 14.8

41.0 25.0 26.4 26.9 11.6

Average size of a minority in millions

1910

1.31

0.85

1.49

1930 1950 1970 1993

0.85 0.92 1.14 0.61

0.82 0.87 1.05 1.13

0.86 0.96 1.17 0.44

in

Western Europe

Central and Eastern Europe*

Notes. * includes Finland, the whole of Germany, and Greece in Western Europe, and the Russian Urals and ex-Soviet Transcaucasia in Eastern Europe.

Yugoslavian

Federation

before 1991. Estonia, Latvia, Ukraine and Moldova inherited the

former all-Soviet category of minorities’ share. European Russia, though a unique federation here, finds itself in a lower category. It still has the greatest number of minorities, but Russia’s total minority population is now more comparable to that of Ukraine or Spain (over 10 million in each case). A superficial view prompts a conclusion: the more numerous and the smaller the nation-states, the fewer ‘foreign bodies’ and accompanying problems. This is, however, wrong, and not necessarily beyond formal statistics. One has to mention the number of minorities growing step by step in conformity with the progressing self-determination. The total, 150, is now almost 1.4 times as high as it was in 1910 and about 1.5 times higher in Central and Eastern Europe taken alone.

VLADIMIR KOLOSSOV AND Thus, the process hand, it converted

of self-determination

had a very contradictory

effect. On the one

a minority (and often its major portion) into a majority inside its nation

state. On the other hand, it cut the minority population multiple segments. a ‘multiplication

525

ANDP.F.I TREMSH

In other words, what happened

dwelling outside the state into

to minorities

by splitting’, a biological term for reproduction

is to be determined

as

of simple organisms. As

an example, let us consider what happened to Ukrainian irredentism? Formerly, there was only one (Soviet) populous Ukranian minority in the USSR. After the collapse, nearly 37.5 million Ukrainians

constituted

the majority in Ukraine. At the same time, 6.7 million

Ukrainians formed 14 separate minorities in other newly independent

post-Soviet states

(six of them account for over 100 000 each). In addition, two million reside, as they did before, in neighboring

European countries, Canada and USA. Naturally, a complete repatria-

tion back to the ‘motherland’

is unfeasible,

nation-state.

Initially, independent

particularly

with Russia (+llO

although the ambition is typical of a young

Ukraine gained a notably positive migration exchange,

000 in 1992)

but the declining

Ukraine soon resulted in an opposite balance (-124 In spite of the expansion adequate

growth

proportional

of states that pretend

economic

situation

in

000 in 1994). to be ‘monoethnic’;

of their share in total European

population.

there was no

The share of the first

category (up to five percent) was about l/5 in 1910 when it included France

and Italy and has become

l/4 of the total population

group (up to ten percent),

the share has increased from almost 2/5 to l/2. The dynamics

by 1993. Together with the next

are most likely a result of certain stability of such areas where the environment

is favora

ble for assimilation and dissolution. A greater growth of other minorities whose masses, shares and mobilized position make for self-preservation

is the opposite factor, that slows

down the process and determines modest results. Finally, it should be noted that all of the above developments

happened to minorities

which also include millions of Asian, African and other diasporas in Europe. When added together,

they surely make the Western minorities more numerous. In general terms, an

average minority also became more heterogeneous, spatially determined

(less compact

‘less native’ (or less rooted) and less

and local). Hence it may claim nothing above some

cultural autonomy. Three conclusions

follow from this discussion:

1, The nation-state model still is attractive for major local minorities in Europe; however, it gradually becomes

a less effective tool to solve ethnic problems

either for the

multiplying states or for the multiplying minorities themselves. Each new split engenders new minorities, new historical resentments

and new conflicts.

2. The last act of the European geopolitical drama has yielded the greatest ‘advance’ for the former minorities in Central and Eastern portions of the continent. The act is not yet over; nobody can argue that its actual ‘photo image’ is the final one, at least in several Balkan cases (Bosnia and Moldova) and in Transcaucasia. 3. If some form of a new stability is achieved eventually, one cannot exclude an East-toWest transfer of ethnic mobilization of some ethnic minorities who would become much more numerous and claim more rights. Political tensions and geopolitical

risks in European

ethnic areas

We now present an evaluation of various tensions and the risks of separatism in ethnic areas of Europe. These include specially defined areas of compact

settlement of national

minorities, where their number is more than 50 000 people and where they can aspire to a certain territorial autonomy. Such an area forms another ethnic (spatial) unit, and thus,

Thepolitical geography of European minorities

526

differs from a purely ethnic

minority.

We developed

quantitative

earlier (Rugg, 1985; University of California Press, 1989; Anderson, sociopolitical

tensions

in ethnic

methods

suggested

1990) and estimated

regions in Europe, using 16 variables which can be

divided in six groups: 1. the number (the absolute and the relative number of a minority in the country as a whole and in its area); 2. the geopolitical or nation-states,

situation (isolated or in the neighborhood in dispersed or concentrated

3. the cultural situation (the percentage status, the relationship 4. the economic

between

with ethnically close areas

settlement);

of a minority

its confession

speaking

the native tongue, its

and the religion of the titular people;

situation (the GDP with respect to a national average, the location on

the scale ‘centre-periphery’); 5. the political status (the experienced belonging

independent

statehood,

to a present state, the age of the boundaries

6. political mobilization ties and movements tions, violence

(the existence

of a national-territorial

and their influence,

the age of a minority’s

of its administrative unit and

other expressions

autonomy, of national parof nationalism:

demonstra-

and civil war).

All available sources of information on the boundaries of ethnic areas and the number of their titular and non-titular population are controversial and incomplete.

We tried to use as

many sources as possible: atlases (Poucher, 1993; Sellier and Sellier, 1991), directories (Borisov et al., 1989; Minority Rights Group, 1990), monographs

&rejci

and Velimsky, 1981;

Kolossov et al., 1992; Tarkhov and Jordan, 1993), as well as our own files. We compared various sources and tried to choose the most plausible or took the average figure. Estirnations, intrapolation, and extrapolation are inevitably sometimes needed. In order to reduce the element of subjectivism when exact figures were not available, all the values and estimations were converted into points. The total number of points for each group of variables and their general sum allowed comparison cultural macroregions

among separate ethnic areas and ‘geopolitical’ and

of Europe-Western

Europe, Central and Eastern Europe (Transcauca-

sian republics included), Catholic-Protestant

Europe, and Orthodox Europe (Figs l-5).

Despite very high index values in many ‘hot spots’ of the former Soviet Union, any version of our calculations

showed that the most dangerous is the situation in southeastern

Europe as a whole, and not in the countries

of the former USSR. This can be seen by the

war in former Yugoslavia and by the frequent changes in local geopolitical boundaries,

as well as by sharp economic

contrasts

between

tensions are especially strong along the ‘civihsational’ boundary between Muslim areas. This risk is pregnant

with consequences

structures and

neighboring

regions. The Orthodox

for both Western

and

and Eastern

Europe. What geopolitical scenario will be realized? Will the result be further disintegration, secessions, and military confrontation as a result of the attempts to build a nationstate with ‘fair’ boundaries by each ethnic group? Will the creation of new state units, such as Great Serbia and Great Albania, follow? Will integration with Western Europe occur? Or will a framework

of regional Central European organization be assumed?

As for the post-Soviet geopolitical space, the results demonstrate the essential role of two groups of variables: the economic situation and the cultural-historical identity of a people living in an area. The cultural-historical

identity includes the spread and the status

of the titular language, the contrast in religions held by the majority and the recognized minority, and the experience of statehood. These two groups of variables are ‘responsible’ for 41 percent of the total political tension index variation (Table 2). Cultural factors are most important in ethnic areas of the Baltic countries.

In contrast,

VLWIWRKo~ossovAND ANDREITREMSH TABLE2. The most

populous

‘Newly Independent States’ (formerly ethnic areas) according to the first scenario)

of

New country

Country origin

Scotland Protestant Ulster Galicia Euskera Catalonia Sardinia Flanders Wallonia Free Brussels Serbian Krajna Kosovo Muslim Bosnia Serbian Bosnia Transylvania Transcarpathia Central Novorossia Crimea Transdniestria Tatarstan Bdshkortostan Chechnia Kumyk Dagestan

UK UK Spain Spain Spain Italy Belgium Belgium Belgium Croatia Yugoslavia Bosnia Bosnia Romania Ukraine Ukraine Ukraine Moldova Russia Russia Russia Russia

Evaluations: Evaluations: political general mobilization* ethnic tension

A E E H H H VH E E VH ExH E VH VH VH E VH VH H E ExH H

Xotes. A, circa the average; E, elevated;

while

the major conflict

527

Million of total population

New majority CK,I

4.8 1.1 3.0 2.0 5.9 1.7 5.3 3.5

62 76 60 50 80 72 98 95 none 50 86 60 68 none none 50 57 none 49 none 85 none

A H A VH H E H A A VH ExH VH VH E A A VH VH H E ExH H

1.2 1 .o I.9 2.2

1.4 ;t.8 I.3 22.1 2.8 I.3 3.6 -1.0 1.1

1.o

H, high; VH very high; ExH, extremely high.

in Transdniestria

does

not have a purely

ethnic

character,

the

weight of the national identity factor for Moldova is minimal. An unfavorable economic situation was the major factor for Russian and Belorussian ethnic areas, most of which are located in peripheral,

backward parts of their countries.

The most evident is the case of the North Caucasian republics, ranked last in the Russian Federation

according

mortality, the relative number of kindergartens

which have long been

to most social indicators

such as infant

and hospitals, and the relationship between

the rise in prices and average incomes. One of the areas with the highest conflict potential is northeast Estonia, the region, where tensions are high (22 points). This area of a Russian-speaking population is the only ethnic area there, but owing to the ethnic minority size and share in the population of the country, Estonia has the highest rank among former Soviet republics by these indicators. The geopolitical situation on the Russian-Estonian

borderland

and the poor state of its economy

(by

national measures) increase the risk of a conflict. In Latvia and Lithuania. the geopolitical situation of their ethnic areas, the spatial concentration of the minorities, and the sharp cultural contrast between ethnic and titular populations also raises the general index of the potential political tension. However, political mobilization

of both Russian-speaking

and

other minorities in the Baltic countries remains relatively limited (Chinn and Kaiser, 1996). Generally speaking, the conflict potential still is more significant in the well-known ‘old hot spots’ like Nagorno-Karabakh, Georgia, and Moldova. In Ukraine, the number and the share of ethnocultural areas are especially considerable, and their situation is one of

The political geographyof Europeanminorities

528

important factors causing geopolitical risks. Thus, ethnic relations between Russians and Ukrainians remain peaceful (Tishkov, 1993; Kolstoe, 1995; Chinn and Kaiser, 1996). For the Russian Federation, the most acute ethnopolitical conflict has touched its territory in Chechnia, and the neighboring Ossetian and Ingush republics. These areas have the maximum general estimations of tension, at the level of 18-20 points. The war in Chechnia represented

the sharpest conflict;

however,

its geopolitical

and especially economic

background was relatively moderate. This level is high also in the other areas of North Caucasus (12- 16), which represents a compact and uninterrupted zone of high risk of ethnic conflicts. In the areas of the Karachaevi, Cherkessian, Balkar, and Dagestani peoples, the important values of the general index are combined with a high political mobilization. Nevertheless,

the average level of political tension in Russian ethnic areas (making up

about half of their total number in the former Soviet Union) is considerably lower than in the post-Soviet space as a whole (10.6 versus 13.2). However, this is not a consolation prize, if we take into account the many latent conflicts and the situation of the Russianspeaking population outside Russian borders. Scenarios for the future When history, geography, ethnicity and politics dominate the redrawing of an existing map, the actors and spectators our speculations

are allowed to speculate about the outcome.

Of course,

differ owing to our personal and professional skills, and to the degrees

of freedom and responsibility accepted.

There are also a variety of styles of the so-called

scientific provision, more ‘real’ or ‘optimal’ (which goes much better with politics or planning) and more logically emphasized (though perhaps more fantastic or even absurd), in order to stress different versions of future, to reveal their impact, and to compare them. What a reader finds below is the latter type of ‘geographic speculation’. The key question asked is about the relationship between geopolitical and ethnic integrity, or, differently phrased, about the two concepts of disintegration and of re-integration. The two corresponding versions of the future are principle-based rather than time-based. Nonetheless, they may be symbolically taken as the two successive steps, with an essential restriction: there will be no dates, and therefore no general demographic dynamics (as a background), or secondary effects of the first scenario for the second one (such as mass migration flows and related change in birth and death rates, etc.). The early 1990s’ picture of ethnic/subnation

areas, as analyzed and described above, is

taken as the fixed starting point called Scenario 0. The stable parameters are combined and then recombined according to the proposed changes on the political map for the first and second scenarios. Scenario I:general ethnic disintegration (mass secession of ethnic areas) The situation in compact ethnic areas, in which values of both summary scores of ethnic tensions and scores of political mobilization exceed the European average, may develop towards the secession of the area in question from the country it actually makes up a part. As for the mean value used (about 13 points for general totals), it can be illustrated by the Scottish area in the UK. It is one point more than the average and exhibits the lowest level of tension in the list of cases associated with the scenario. The list includes 48 such ‘experimentally created new states’, or about 30% of the total number of ethnic areas. Below, one can find a short description of their major representatives (populated by 1 million or more). The so-called countries, of course, with their very artificial names are presented (Table 3).

529

VLADIMIRKOLCISSOV AND ANDREITREMSH TABLE3. Scenario

1: the results of map redrawing by European macroregions

I>zdicutor

Scenario

Total

We&

SE”

Former USSR

Number of actual and ‘new’ states

0 1

44 92

26 40

12 22

6 30

Number of minorities’ (subnations’) ethnic (confessional) areas

0

154

63

28

63

1

198

66

45

87

Population of minorities/subnations in their areas (millions)

0

81.2

40.7

11.8

28.8

1

71.6

23.0

11.0

37.6

in total population

0 1

11.4 10.0

9.1 5.1

16.2 15.1

14.8 19.1

Population of a minority (subnation) on average (millions)

0

0.53

0.65

0.42

0.45

1

0.36

0.34

0.24

0.43

Their percentage

Notes. * Catholic and Protestant (western) Europe which embraces the Baltic states of the former USSR, Hungary, Slovenia and Croatia. ** Orthodox and Muslim (Southeastern) Europe (or the Balkans) including Moldova.

The twedozen

cases examined in Table I illustrate simply different degrees of probability

and the ‘effectiveness’

of disintegration. The less populated areas are more numerous but

similar in variety. Nagorno-Karabakh in Armenia, though ten times less populous, can compete, however, with Yugoslavian Kosovo as a leader in ethnic tension and mobilization. Figzrre

6 shows the ethno-political

map which corresponds

to the scenario.

Western

Europe does not appear changed, but the Balkans and Caucasus exhibit an extraordinary mosaic! Furthermore, both the geopolitical

separatism and disintegration

seems to be useless in these areas in

and the ethnic sense. The impossibility

of dividing Bosnia and Dag-

estan (owing to their striped ethnic settlement)

is symbolic

represent.

with the use of violence,

Attempts to reach political objectives

tion and ethnic cleansing,

leads only to the escalation

for the larger regions the)

of violence

with deporta-

and the extension

of a

conflict. In the Caucasus, a number of contemporary conflicts are caused or were deepened by Stalinist deportations; Bosnia represents quite fresh evidence that the use of violence exerts an extremely long-term and negative influence on inter-ethnic relations. The western case that might be compared,

to some extent, with Bosnia and Dagestan is that of IJlstcr.

The same general distribution

between

macro-regional

East and West is indicated by the incorporation

of

totals (Table 3).

The ‘effectiveness’

of the scenario

for Western Europe is seen from the fact that 14

ethnic areas, but twice the absolute, proportional, and average figures of ethnic (areal) population. Ten more states in Southeastern Europe additional

‘states’

add only three

more

bring thirty new areas but very modest changes in their parameters, except the mean population size. This region is the best example of minorities multiplying in a form of partition. Finally. the scenario of disintegration looks least effective for the former Soviet Union, where 24 symbolically established states include an equal number of ethnic areas, the same average, but yielding a notable increase in their absolute population and percentage. We hope that nobody takes this game seriously and implements it in practice. However.

The politicalgeography of European minorities

530

.o-

a’0

I

FIGURE 6. Scenario 1: General ethnic disintegration. A-newly

formed minority population (symbolized by the size of a circle and number of minorities/

subnations) and B-percentage our scenarios

of minorities.

coutd seem now much more only an intellectual

exercise

for Western

European ethnic areas than for Eastern European ones. This is based, firstly on the fact that many states are not involved in a risky game at alI, owing to low ethnic-areal sions. They are four of the five Nordic countries,

the Netherlands,

(a unique, quiet European multinational federation),

ten-

Germany, Switzerland

Austria, the Czech Republic, Poland,

Hungary and Slovenia. Some other states get off with minimal losses; Corsica, Sardinia and Tyrol could claim their expected

independence

from France and Italy. There are only

three states that are slated to suffer notably from secessions:

Great Britain, Belgium and

Spain. Among them, only Belgium eventually disappears from the scene. In Southeastern

Europe, the situation is different. Only Greece,

Macedonia and Turkey

(beyond their mutual painful relations which are another matter) are potential non-losers here. At the same time, the preconditions

of a complete

collapse are quite real for Bosnia

and for the remainder of the former Yugoslavia. Within the former USSR, there is only Belarus (as far as the Baltic states are counted with West Europe) that has no chance of losing a minority’s

area because of a very important

uniform mixture of its basic minori-

ties. Ukraine offers a distinct case, as it risks the loss of three of its areas, including the greatest European one (the half-Russian, eastern portion, or the sclcalled ‘Novorossia’). Do the results mean that the East may stay calm while the West has to make some urgent efforts to prevent ethnic disintegration? Not at all! We speak only of the rational impact of similar events, but the very events are too often caused by emotional factors which have nothing to do with a calculation like this. The chain reaction of disintegration can go on spontaneously in the East and remain dormant in the West, especially under the EU roof.

VLADIMIRKo~ossov

AND

ANDREI

531

TREMSH

Another problem can be analyzed as a special topic. What are the chances of survival in an ‘autonomous

navigation’ for those who are brave enough to start?

Scenario 2:general German

ethnic f-e-integration

reunification

is perhaps not as outstanding

normally viewed as being, for contemporary Bosnia and in Nagorno-Karabakh

and unique an experience

European peripheries,

are influenced

of Cyprus could take place only in connection

by similar aspirations. The 20-year story

with somewhat more than simple support

coming from Greece and Turkey. In fact, it was a sort of latent reunification the respective

as it is

at least. The wars in

of them with

parts of the divided island. Finally, the goal of the IRA in Ulster, or of the

Popular Front in the post-Soviet Moldova, is the same determination

to join their neigh-

boring ‘relatives’. The crucial dilemma of real policy in cases like these focuses on tactics and strategy. It is convenient

to decorate your final desire with the much more traditional

slogans of struggle for independence,

though for how long?

For our second scenario, however, the question is different: are there more prerequisites for living alone or for reunification

with somebody

who is very close? How does one

measure the strength of ‘family ties’? It is evident that historical, and geopolitical

similarity has to be taken into account.

we have decided to depart from our quantitative hypothetical

approach,

second step by using our expert knowledge

We suggest the above-mentioned

linguistic, confessional

Nevertheless,

strictly speaking,

to approach the extremely

and techniques

of estimation.

geographical cases as very probable for the scenario. At

times, we were troubled by such problematic

associations as ‘Lusitania’ (i.e. Portugal plus

‘former’ Spanish Galicia, based on their original Lusophonie, though it has been lost by many Galicians) or as ‘Great Cherkessia’ and ‘Nakh Confederation’ in Russian and partly in Georgian (Abkhazia in the first case) and Azerbaidjan Caucasus (united Lazistan as part of the second confederation).

These doubts were based on the fact there would be no dominating major-

ity, nor one nation in some cases, but rather common outer enemies. Flanders unified with the Netherlands,

and Wallonia incorporated

into France, with

‘Free Brussels’ as the EU capital and a memorial of Belgium, or ‘Great Hungary’ restoring its historical

rule over Transylvania,

Upper (Slovak) Hungary, Transcarpathia

(after its

separation from Ukraine) and Hungarian Vojvodina (after its partition), seem to represent the middle of the corresponding

ranking list.

In several cases, we restored recently disintegrated countries and areas: Russia plus Novorossia, Crimea, Northern ‘Russian-Nag’ Dagestan and ‘Narva republic’ in Russian-speaking Estonia; Ukraine plus Moldovian Transdniestria and ‘Gagauzia’ in Southern Moldova; ‘New Yugoslavia’ formed by different pieces of ‘independent

Serbia’ and Montenegro.

Figure 7 gives a general outlook of the scenario. The European political map appears less fragmented,

especially

in Eastern Europe, but seems even stranger and more risky

than in the first scenario. It is understandable minorities together,

that newly aggregated states bring different

thereby diminishing their number and other parameters,

except that

of average strength. However, sometimes the process may be just the opposite. Table 4 includes all three scenarios. Simple comparison leads to a statement that the shifts are much more radical in the East than in the West. The number of states is diminishing by nearly three-fold in both the Balkans and the ex-URSS. Moreover,

in Southeastern

Europe, the second version of the political map suggests the minimal number of actors if compared with the initial point. The Western fluctuations are less impressive. There is no effect of the number of ethnic areas for the whole of the West, while in the East they become

less numerous

than in the previous scenario.

The political geography of European minorities

532

FIGURE 7. Scenario 2: General ethnic re-integration (See caption to figure 6 for full figure legend)

The other three figures indicate the process of ‘optimization’ step by step for Southeastern Europe in particular.

The redrawn

map makes the states more and more ethnically

homogenous, and ethnic areas less and less populous. However, the map itself indicates the price paid for such ‘progress’: the loss of compactness and the inevitable mutual enclaves of Slavic or Muslim populations in former Yugoslavia. In Western Europe, the newly aggregated nations also provide some improvement of the totals, percentages and means. In this scenario, the worst situation is characteristic recombination

makes the states less monoethnic

of the former Soviet republics. Any

in comparison

with the rest of Europe.

The area recovers its primary position, in terms of total population of ethnic areas, and the difference in their shares goes up. Consequently,

the present status-quo

cally far from being stable) looks much more acceptable

(paradoxi-

for this portion of Europe.

As for European Russia, the interest is more in disintegration than in re-integration, since the latter scenario elevates as much as twice the total of its non-Russian population located in their homelands. Together, with its large number of such homelands, the role of the major European non-melting pot is guaranteed, while the first scenario promises to solve many problems, at least with the Caucasian zone. One or both of the scenarios may or may not come true, whether they are expected or not, and in either order. Furthermore, there could be some third way or any given number of ways besides the two, especially beyond the nation-state model as a base, like multinational integration Unions (EU and CIS). Beyond fantasies (perhaps less surrealistic than those developed and secessionism.

above), they could serve the best ‘outer locks’ for ethnic claims

A Europe of regions or localities (either ethnic, economic,

social or

533 TABLE

4. Scenario 2: the results of map redrawing

Indicator

Scenario

Number of actual and new states

Number of minorities’ (subnations’) ethnic (confessional) areas

Population of minorities (subnations) (millions)

Population of a minority (subnation) on average (millions)

Wesf

Former USSR

44 92 52

26 40 33

12 22 8

6 30 11

154

63

28

63

198 162

66 66

45 30

z

SE-

0

81.2

40.7

11.8

28.8

1 L

71.6 70.2

23.0 27.6

11.0 5.6

37.6 37.0

0 1 2

11.4 10.0 9.8

9.1

16.2 15.1 8.5

14.8 19.1 18.9

0

0.5:

0.65

0.42

0.45

1 2

0.36 0.43

0.34 0.41

0.24 0.18

0.43 0.56

7

Their percentage in total population

Total

5.1 6.1

Notes. *, ** For definitions, see Table 3.

natural), as well as a Europe of one or two superpowers, resolutions.

suggest well-known

alternative

The former sounds new, while the latter appears as emerging from history.

In fact, the two are rather interrelated

and complementary.

Some conclusions First, let us emphasize examination

once more the hope that what is expected

of the unexpected,

may never occur;

at least, can prevent us from a surprise. ‘Knowledge itself

is power’; Francis Bacon’s words justify human curiosity but warn against careless games with knowledge. Europe is too old and too crowded for a new geopolitical catastrophe. That is why we must know more about any possible geopolitical Neither

the fall of empires,

divorce of multiethnic

nor the occurrence

countries

mishaps.

of bloody wars, nor the ‘peaceful’

could solve social and economic

problems

ethnic areas. The term ‘national state’ is quite different from a monoethnic the east of the continent,

the problem

is by which

related to

state, and for

means to break the relationship

between these hvo notions in the mentality of people. First, it is necessary to use all wellknown leverages, such as cultural autonomy, the creation of territorial units crossing ethnic boundaries, representation.

of special legislative and electoral systems, and of special minorities’

It is also possible

to develop flexible forms of associations

state and regions at all territorial levels, of the federal, confederal

between

the

or of some intermedi-

ate type, based on multi- or bilateral agreements, etc. (as in the Russian case). Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the general number of people belonging to national minorities in their ethnic areas in the post-Soviet space has been reduced by

Thepoliticalgeography of European minorities

534

several times. This is true for most former Union republics, with the important exception of Russia. At the same time, as in Europe as a whole during the past remaking of its political map, the number of ‘area’ minorities has multiplied. The new nation-states leave to each other, as a kind of hostages, their important (or small, but militant) ethnic groups. It is worthwhile

to recall the presence of Russians in Ukraine, of Ukrainians in Russia, of

both groups in the self-proclaimed Transdniestrian Republic of Moldova, and of Armenians in Karabakh (Azerbaidjan). It is possible to distinguish two types of ethnic areas. The first type consists of small, but contiguous

and overlapping areas with a high conflict potential and strong political

mobilization of minorities. This type may be described as ‘Balkan’ or ‘Caucasian’. The other type of ethnic area includes minorities which are large by all measures,

often

represented in several ethnic areas, and are difficult to mobilize. This second form is typical of large, vast countries with a large population, like Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. These ethnic areas are more similar to Western European minorities and ethnic areas than those of the ‘Balkan’ or ‘Caucasian’ type. Finally, Western Europe and the former Soviet Union turned out similar under the re-integration scenario which looks ‘non-efficient’ in terms of general minority dynamics. The difference consists in the fact that in the East, further disintegration still is quite possible as a continuation

of the last wave. As for the West, the question probably could be

solved without too many painful losses, if (once again) it manages to find the right way by avoiding the negative eastern experience.

Acknowledgements The authors would like to thank sincerely John O’Loughlin for his helpful comments, benevolence

and assistance in the preparation

patience,

of this paper.

References Anderson, A. B. (1‘990). Ethnic Nationalism and Regional Autonomy in Canada and Western Europe. In Secessionist Movements In ComparativePerspective, eds. R. R. Pramadas, S. V. Samarasingheand and A. B. Anderson. Pinter, London. Borisov, V. A _,Bruk, S. 1. and Sinelnikov, A. B. (1989) World Population, A Demographic Data-book. Mir Puhlishers, Moscow (in Russian). Chinn, J. and Kaiser, R. (1996) Russians as the New Mfnorf~. Westview Press, Boulder. Foucher, M. (1991) Fnwzts et Frontiers. Un Tour de Monde Geopolitique. Fayard, Paris. Foucher, M. (ed.) (1993) Fragments d’Europe. Fayard, Paris. Jordan, T. G. (1973) The European CuItureA?x?a:A Systematic Geography. Harper and Row, New York. Kolossov. V., Glezer. 0. and Petrov, N. (1992) Ethnoterrftorfal Conf7icts in the Former USSR, lnternational Boundaries Research Unit Briefing N 2, IBRU. Durham, UK. Kolstoe, P. (1995) Russians In the Former Soviet Republfcs. Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indiano polis. Krejci, J. and Velimsky, V. (1981) Ethnic and Politfcal Nations in Europe. Croom Helm, London. Rugg, D. S. (1985) Eastern Europe. longman, London. Sellier, A. and Sellier, J. (1991) Atlas des Peuples d’Eumpe Centrule. Ia Decouverte, Paris. Tatkhov, S. and Jordan, P. (1993) Ethnic structure of Eastern Europe and Caucasia around 1990. In Atlas ofEustern and Southeastern Europe. Osterreichisches Ost- und Sudosteumpa Institut Vienna (ii English and German). Tlshkov, V. A. (1993) The strategy and mechanisms of the national policy in the Russian Federation (in Russian). The Ethnographic Review 5, 12-34. University of California Press (1989) Qualitative andQuantftaNve Strutegies. University of California Press, Berkeley. Waterman, S. (1984) Partition: a problem in political geography. In hiftfcal GeogruphyRecent Advances and Fuhtre Dfmctfons, eds. J. W. House and P. J. Taylor, pp. 98-116. Croom Helm, London. Minority Rights Group (ed.) (1990) WorldLHtecfoty ofMinoritfes. Longman, London.