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The politics of Japanese defense: Managing internal and external pressures
651
Reviews
open and preserve its files, and the revelations that followed, was the final act which discredited any attempt of achieving legitimacy by the reformed East German communists. It also provided a major psychological impetus for unification and the abandoning of a “Third Way.” German unification also had important implications for American foreign policy. Being able to keep a united Germany in NATO was a major coup for the Bush administration, leading to the proclamation that the West had won the Cold War. It certainly was an ideological victory that brought almost 17 million citizens of a formerly repressive communist government into the family of western democracies. While West German diplomatic activities deserve major credit for its achievements, strong and determined U.S. support, as well as Soviet flexibility played a major part in insuring a smooth transition. The United States played a unique role in this event, because it was a staunch supporter of unification almost from the beginning, when most of the other world powers had severe misgivings about the possible German unification. In fact, consulting U.S. government documents on the topic of German unification would provide a very interesting study. Professor Jarausch’s book is a great example of the importance of free and uncensored information in democratic societies. The book meets all of the other requirements of a quality, scholarly book. It contains two selected bibliographies, ample footnotes, and a very complete index. The style is clear and concise. The use of direct quotes from the press, television, interviews, and political slogans provides a glimpse into the intensity of the process and shows a very high level of sophistication, witticism, and folksy common sense that pervaded the process. It also brings the reader to the very middle of this unique historical event. SEVER BORDEIAN U General Library University of New Mexico Albuquerque, NM 87 I3 I USA
The Politics of Japanese
Jr. Armonk,
Defense:
NY, M. E. Sharpe,
Managing Internal and External Pressures. By Joseph P. Keddell,
1993. 256~. ISBN I-56324-129-3. $47.50.
Keddell’s book comes at an opportune time to test his analysis in the environment of postHosokawa coalitions being formed in Japan. Keddell’s thesis is that the Liberal Democratic Party has used three types of incremental changes over the last 30 years to manage conflicting international and domestic pressures to make Japan’s defense more independent. He categorizes these incremental changes as a) constraints on defense policy changes, b) incremental budget allocations, and c) the transfer of defense technology to the United States. Because the book focuses on developments up to 1992, it provides a background against which to project the current Japanese political flux. Based on a 1990 doctoral dissertation, this clearly written monograph contains at least 30 post- 1990 additions to its bibliography, although the extent of its text revision is difficult to determine. Keddell’s purpose is to examine the development of each of these constraints on Japanese defense policy from 1950 through the controversy over Self Defense Forces Peace Keeping operations during the Gulf War. According to Keddell, this pattern of incremental change to manage the competing pressures leads to the following scenario: first, strategic doctrine is not the prime reason for revision: second, the contents of the policy matter little: and finally, conflict is minimized or avoided, but not eliminated. However, the extent to which these incremental measures contain conflict has been affected by changes in the U.S.-Japan relationship as well as by the nature and timing of U.S. Demands on Japan. This book is especially useful in detailing the importance of z&r-analogous to caucuses-politicians who specialize in particular policy areas and thus become adept at mediating competition for scarce resources in Diet budget committees structured along zoku-ministerial jurisdictional lines. The Defense Agency (not a Cabinet post) is staffed by representatives from other agencies. As z~~l\~~ become better able to interact with bureaucrats in drafting legislation, the pressure will build to give the politicians more clout. Keddell contends that Japan’s concentration on economic growth during the postwar years, while giving equal budget shares to competing societal needs, led to greater power for the bureaucracies vis a vis politicians. The “One Percent of GNP” (ceiling) rule favors budget examiners of the Ministry of Finance. As some opposition parties moved closer to
6%
Reviews
the center, the chance tojoin a coalition government induced them to become more flexible on issues such as defense. “Co-optation of opposition demands on defense is likely to remain a characteristic of Japanese defense policy” (p. 16). No longer strictly a Liberal Democratic Party show. defense policy jockeying will have new dimensions. Keddell further looks at the constraints in terms of constitutional, political, and financial categories. Article 9 of the Constitution forbids the development of offensive forces. In the political realm, opposition party pressures, public opinion voiced through a powerful mass media, intellectual criticism, as well as fear of militarism, are factors in the belief that there is no responsible authority in Japan that can prevent re-militarization. Consensual decision making is seen as a cause of irresponsibility. In the past, political leaders dared not talk about alternatives to the defense status quo, as even discussing it granted legitimacy to the Self-Defense Forces. In recent years the Social Democratic Party has called for reducing the Self-Defense Forces to a minimum. The 1994 review of defense policy enables the Social Democratic Party to show the voters they are indeed cutting the military’s size. Conservatives in the coalition would presumably scrap the defense policy review if the seven-party coalition fractures. In terms of financial constraints, the military budget is not under politically accountable control. There is no separate committee in the Diet for defense, and all budget issues are dealt with together in budget committees. The thread of continuity described in Keddell’s book may be seen in Hosokawa’s decision last winter to select a private panel composed of business men. a college professor. and former government officials to review the National Defense Program Outline (1976). This blueribbon panel, charged to report in summer 1994 on Japan’s needs and capabilities in the post-Cold War environment. will in turn be advised by a private advisory panel of defense experts and scholars headed by a former Defense Agency Vice Minister. A streamlined Self-Defense Force. emphasizing sophisticated weaponry and perhaps providing for a separate unit to participate in U .N. peacekeeping operations during fiscal 1995, may emerge. Budgetary adjustments are again the treatment of choice. The Cabinet in February 1994 approved a 9 percent increase in the defense budget. the smallest rate of increase in 34 years. The fiscal realities of a recession dictate cutting both troop strength and the number of army bases. developments which are acceptable both to the left (downswing in strength) as well as to the right (more emphasis on electronic defense). Enhanced by a bibliography of secondary sources, the text is buttressed by tables/figures reprinted from Japanese governmental statistical sources not widely available outside Japan such as the Boci Htrtdohrrr(krr (Defense Handbook), Boci Nctzkcttt (Defense Yearbook), Anzetl Hoslw HtrtulohrrkXt~ (National Security Handbook), the Bori Htrl\1rsl10 (Defense White Paper), Keimi Yorcrtz (Economic Handbook), Zuisci T&i (Financial statistics, Budget Bureau. Finance Ministry), and Nihotl tto Boei (Defense of Japan). Keddell has made the case for the importance of the “pervasive influence of opposition parties on defense policy-making,” which he claims has been ignored by scholars. This book goes a long way toward giving those who are interested in Japanese defense policymaking the analytic tools to understand the complicated situation there. Gracefully written for a dissertationbased book, it is consistently edited. If subsequent editions arc undertaken, this reviewer hopes that they will provide more detail on the back-room maneuvering, perhaps tracing a particular policy‘s history. Factors laid out in this way offer a common vocabulary of understanding. A revised edition might also alert users that Japanese names are cited initially in the customary Japanese fashion (surname name first, then given name) and subsequently according to western custom, while the index uses western protocol only. The work is timely and essential for academic collections. HELEN HEITMANN IVES The American University Library Washington, DC 20016 USA
The Cold War 19451991. Vol. 1: Leaders and Other Important Figures in the United States and Western Europe, 535~. ISBN o-8103-8927-4. Vol. 2: Leaders and Other Important Figures in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and the Third World, 379~. ISBN o-8103-8928-2. Vol. 3: Resources: Chronology, History, Concepts, Events, Organizations, Bihlioigraphy, Archives, 354~. ISBN O-81038929-0. Edited by Benjamin Frankel. Detroit, Washington, London: Gale Research Inc., 1992. $250.00/set.
Reviews
open and preserve its files, and the revelations that followed, was the final act which discredited any attempt of achieving legitimacy by the reformed East German communists. It also provided a major psychological impetus for unification and the abandoning of a “Third Way.” German unification also had important implications for American foreign policy. Being able to keep a united Germany in NATO was a major coup for the Bush administration, leading to the proclamation that the West had won the Cold War. It certainly was an ideological victory that brought almost 17 million citizens of a formerly repressive communist government into the family of western democracies. While West German diplomatic activities deserve major credit for its achievements, strong and determined U.S. support, as well as Soviet flexibility played a major part in insuring a smooth transition. The United States played a unique role in this event, because it was a staunch supporter of unification almost from the beginning, when most of the other world powers had severe misgivings about the possible German unification. In fact, consulting U.S. government documents on the topic of German unification would provide a very interesting study. Professor Jarausch’s book is a great example of the importance of free and uncensored information in democratic societies. The book meets all of the other requirements of a quality, scholarly book. It contains two selected bibliographies, ample footnotes, and a very complete index. The style is clear and concise. The use of direct quotes from the press, television, interviews, and political slogans provides a glimpse into the intensity of the process and shows a very high level of sophistication, witticism, and folksy common sense that pervaded the process. It also brings the reader to the very middle of this unique historical event. SEVER BORDEIAN U General Library University of New Mexico Albuquerque, NM 87 I3 I USA
The Politics of Japanese
Jr. Armonk,
Defense:
NY, M. E. Sharpe,
Managing Internal and External Pressures. By Joseph P. Keddell,
1993. 256~. ISBN I-56324-129-3. $47.50.
Keddell’s book comes at an opportune time to test his analysis in the environment of postHosokawa coalitions being formed in Japan. Keddell’s thesis is that the Liberal Democratic Party has used three types of incremental changes over the last 30 years to manage conflicting international and domestic pressures to make Japan’s defense more independent. He categorizes these incremental changes as a) constraints on defense policy changes, b) incremental budget allocations, and c) the transfer of defense technology to the United States. Because the book focuses on developments up to 1992, it provides a background against which to project the current Japanese political flux. Based on a 1990 doctoral dissertation, this clearly written monograph contains at least 30 post- 1990 additions to its bibliography, although the extent of its text revision is difficult to determine. Keddell’s purpose is to examine the development of each of these constraints on Japanese defense policy from 1950 through the controversy over Self Defense Forces Peace Keeping operations during the Gulf War. According to Keddell, this pattern of incremental change to manage the competing pressures leads to the following scenario: first, strategic doctrine is not the prime reason for revision: second, the contents of the policy matter little: and finally, conflict is minimized or avoided, but not eliminated. However, the extent to which these incremental measures contain conflict has been affected by changes in the U.S.-Japan relationship as well as by the nature and timing of U.S. Demands on Japan. This book is especially useful in detailing the importance of z&r-analogous to caucuses-politicians who specialize in particular policy areas and thus become adept at mediating competition for scarce resources in Diet budget committees structured along zoku-ministerial jurisdictional lines. The Defense Agency (not a Cabinet post) is staffed by representatives from other agencies. As z~~l\~~ become better able to interact with bureaucrats in drafting legislation, the pressure will build to give the politicians more clout. Keddell contends that Japan’s concentration on economic growth during the postwar years, while giving equal budget shares to competing societal needs, led to greater power for the bureaucracies vis a vis politicians. The “One Percent of GNP” (ceiling) rule favors budget examiners of the Ministry of Finance. As some opposition parties moved closer to
6%
Reviews
the center, the chance tojoin a coalition government induced them to become more flexible on issues such as defense. “Co-optation of opposition demands on defense is likely to remain a characteristic of Japanese defense policy” (p. 16). No longer strictly a Liberal Democratic Party show. defense policy jockeying will have new dimensions. Keddell further looks at the constraints in terms of constitutional, political, and financial categories. Article 9 of the Constitution forbids the development of offensive forces. In the political realm, opposition party pressures, public opinion voiced through a powerful mass media, intellectual criticism, as well as fear of militarism, are factors in the belief that there is no responsible authority in Japan that can prevent re-militarization. Consensual decision making is seen as a cause of irresponsibility. In the past, political leaders dared not talk about alternatives to the defense status quo, as even discussing it granted legitimacy to the Self-Defense Forces. In recent years the Social Democratic Party has called for reducing the Self-Defense Forces to a minimum. The 1994 review of defense policy enables the Social Democratic Party to show the voters they are indeed cutting the military’s size. Conservatives in the coalition would presumably scrap the defense policy review if the seven-party coalition fractures. In terms of financial constraints, the military budget is not under politically accountable control. There is no separate committee in the Diet for defense, and all budget issues are dealt with together in budget committees. The thread of continuity described in Keddell’s book may be seen in Hosokawa’s decision last winter to select a private panel composed of business men. a college professor. and former government officials to review the National Defense Program Outline (1976). This blueribbon panel, charged to report in summer 1994 on Japan’s needs and capabilities in the post-Cold War environment. will in turn be advised by a private advisory panel of defense experts and scholars headed by a former Defense Agency Vice Minister. A streamlined Self-Defense Force. emphasizing sophisticated weaponry and perhaps providing for a separate unit to participate in U .N. peacekeeping operations during fiscal 1995, may emerge. Budgetary adjustments are again the treatment of choice. The Cabinet in February 1994 approved a 9 percent increase in the defense budget. the smallest rate of increase in 34 years. The fiscal realities of a recession dictate cutting both troop strength and the number of army bases. developments which are acceptable both to the left (downswing in strength) as well as to the right (more emphasis on electronic defense). Enhanced by a bibliography of secondary sources, the text is buttressed by tables/figures reprinted from Japanese governmental statistical sources not widely available outside Japan such as the Boci Htrtdohrrr(krr (Defense Handbook), Boci Nctzkcttt (Defense Yearbook), Anzetl Hoslw HtrtulohrrkXt~ (National Security Handbook), the Bori Htrl\1rsl10 (Defense White Paper), Keimi Yorcrtz (Economic Handbook), Zuisci T&i (Financial statistics, Budget Bureau. Finance Ministry), and Nihotl tto Boei (Defense of Japan). Keddell has made the case for the importance of the “pervasive influence of opposition parties on defense policy-making,” which he claims has been ignored by scholars. This book goes a long way toward giving those who are interested in Japanese defense policymaking the analytic tools to understand the complicated situation there. Gracefully written for a dissertationbased book, it is consistently edited. If subsequent editions arc undertaken, this reviewer hopes that they will provide more detail on the back-room maneuvering, perhaps tracing a particular policy‘s history. Factors laid out in this way offer a common vocabulary of understanding. A revised edition might also alert users that Japanese names are cited initially in the customary Japanese fashion (surname name first, then given name) and subsequently according to western custom, while the index uses western protocol only. The work is timely and essential for academic collections. HELEN HEITMANN IVES The American University Library Washington, DC 20016 USA
The Cold War 19451991. Vol. 1: Leaders and Other Important Figures in the United States and Western Europe, 535~. ISBN o-8103-8927-4. Vol. 2: Leaders and Other Important Figures in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and the Third World, 379~. ISBN o-8103-8928-2. Vol. 3: Resources: Chronology, History, Concepts, Events, Organizations, Bihlioigraphy, Archives, 354~. ISBN O-81038929-0. Edited by Benjamin Frankel. Detroit, Washington, London: Gale Research Inc., 1992. $250.00/set.