The politics of prerogatives in socialism: The case of Taizidang in China

The Politics of Prerogatives

in Socialism:

The Case of Taizk&zng in China

It has

now

systems.

become

Various

consumption,

a mere elite

and control

the conceptualization gentsia, quite

of state

prerogatives

a child

are almost their

rich

who

children can

those

higher

systems,

tends

state

officials,

the

education

too,

one of the core

in socialism is,

has been

why

offspring-received

and

how

relatively

him or her to be so in every societies.

and

are more

Those

those

strings.

But the mythical

parents

who have

In capitalist likely

little

power higher

way

money

and fame

try to

children

of the

up the ladder

of capitalism

to overshadow

possible

who have

systems,

to move

cornerstone

tends

seem

in theory

inequality society, more

managers,

with regard

which

same

to generate

prerogatives

money

by pulling

in everything

and pri\ilegeless

status

of

that everyone

the unequal

nature

of the

intelligentsia

to a “new to become

inequality

dissatisfaction

and

should

operates.

induced

abolished of its

and resentment.

scholarly ofcadres

for the issue

classes,

ideal

for

a

in sociopolitical

In addition

most

” children

important

all politics,

announced

by the differences

on which

class in formation, increasingly

have

Because

to party

effcjrts and their

of social

have

and been

inherited

stratification

socialism.’

Let us take been

constituted

intelli-

careers.

privileges,

in state

While

managers,

mechanism-that

and helping

their

of the poor.

opportunity

In socialist

focused

in socialist

in distribution,

and opportunities.

has long

by their

to all human

to succeed

afford

than

in people’s

classless

common to inherit

children

has the same

and

to be successful

universally

their

help

start

services,

of such prerogatives

reproduction

are inherited

exist

prerogatives

vary-bureaucrats,

prerogatives

the genesis

their

elites

goods, may

prerogatives

en,joy

attention.

Wishing

success

of their

and

systems

groups

While

analysed,

privileges

valuable

elite

issue

of socialist

scholarly

want

of scarce

socialism.

extensively

that

in socialist

of these

and so on-the

problems

cliche

groups

noted

the Soviet

Union

for the prevalence

for an example. of family

The

connections

Russian in job

Empire

assignments

before

1917

had

and promotions

1. Leon Trotsky, in 7‘he Revolution Helrayed, trans. by Max Eastman (New York: Merit Publishers, 1965), defined the whole party and state bureaucracy as a “cw class conducting a “dictatorship over the proletatiat ” In ~l’omenklatura: The SOL&IRultn~ Clasr (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1984), Micharl Voslensky narrowed do\\” the scope of the “cm class to those on the nomenkla~ura positions. A further reduction of’ the scope was \uggcsttxl by Alec No\,e who considered onlv the nomenklafura officials within the Central Commirtec as members of the “ew class. “Is There A Ruli”; Class in the USSR?” Souel Studir.5,Vol 27. No 4 (October. 1975), pp 615-638. For a pioneering study that depicted managers as members of the “rw class, \t.~.Jam~s Rurnham, ?‘heMana~vnnl Reaolutzon (Rloommgton: Indiana University Press, 19GO). For the intrlligentsia ah il “t’w class, xc 1\an Sxlenyi, “The Intelligentsia I” thr Class Structure of Star So&&l”.” in Michael Hurawoy and Theda Skocpol, cds., Mar& Inquirm: Sludm uflahor, Class, and Skzks (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), pp. 287-326. F or a new class in the Yugoslavia” context, see Milovan D,jilas. 7%r jveeic, Clu (NW York. Praeger, 1957). S-I L I)IES IN COMPARATXT 0039-3592/91/01

0058-19

COMMUNISM, $03.00

VOL. XXIV,

@ 1990 University

No.

1, March

of California

1991, 58- 76

Prerogatives among

noble

briefly

families.2

While

by the Revolution,

fashion,

that

social

is latent

contexts.

into strictly party, Party’s through

this

system

of the Soviet

A scholar

describes

reproduction

is in turn that

rewards

family

supposedly

halted

very

in a “neo-traditional”

were

all social

integrated managed

59

soon after

where

as material

which

were

practices

type

of command

as well

nomenklutura

reproduction

continued

of the Soviet

policy,

practices

of traditional

chains

success

personnel

ascriptive

they nevertheless

hierarchical

personal

such

carryovers

In systems

The Case in China

in Socialism:

reactivated

by the new

entities

are incorporated

by the control

of the communist

are

highly

dependent

by the system

connections

were

upon

of nomenklatura.

revived

the It is

to facilitate

the

new class.”

the relationship

between

the nomenklatura

system

and the new-class

as follows:

[W]hile

the 7lo~~n~~Q~~7Qis not a closed

of intergenerational “nomenklatured

continuity, workers”

it now appears to en,joy a high Ievel

caste

that it is unusual

in the sense

not to eventually

acquire

f’or the children

of

some le\Iel of rronenklatura status

themselves.4 Another

account

relationships are often

sarcastically

The thing

the

called

and sons-in-law

and job mutual

Union

friends

with

protection

(literally

and

and personal

of high-level

cadres

who

Youth”):

party and government

and get good jobs.

[Ejvery-

family connections.”

and

to the

from

prerogatives

eating,

promotions.

network

connections

“Golden

of all our important

regard

ranging

assignments

by family

for the children

in elite institutions

through

abound

Soviet

role played

prerogatives

roEotuya molodyozh

education

by pull,

examples in the

education “princes.

various

ftnish higher

is done

Various

and

the important

sons. daughters,

officials

officials

stresses

in facilitating

Even

(krugouaiu

of the children

clothing,

living,

the privileges are

poruka)

enjoyed

and

of high leisure

of legal by

to

leniency

the

Soviet

“6

-Furthermore, of cadres. There

the Soviet

A study

Union

on Eastern

are no social mechanisms

the offspring

of an official,

is not alone

European

state

which would

however

in having

this privileged

socialism

comments:

automatically

high his standing,

within

ensure

class of children

the placement

the hierarchy

of’

of power,

“Political Client&m in Russia: 2. For family connections in pre-1917 R ussia, see Dar&l T. Orlovsky, ” in T. H. Rigby and Bohdan Harasymiw, cds., Leadership Selection and Patron The Historical Perspective, Clienf R&ions in the USSR and Yugoslavia (I,ondon: George Allen and Unwin, 1983), pp. 174- 199. Also see “Officialdom and Bureaucratization. Conclusion,” in Pintner Walter M. Pintner and Don Karl Rowney, and Rowney, eds., Russian ~~f~c~5~dorn:The Eur~~u~ratiz~f~on of Russian S~~iefy~~~ the Seu~f~~f~ to the Twentieth Cmful_1:(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980), pp. 374-375. 11. For the hereditary aspect of the nomenklafura system in the Soviet Union, see Alec Nave, “The Class Nature of the USSR Revisited,” So&t Studies, Vol. 35, No. 3 (July, 1983), p. 302. For the influence of family “Nomenklatura: The Soviet Communist connections on the nomenklafura system, see Bohdan Harasymiw, Canadian,/ournalofPoliticalS&nce, Vol. 2, No. 4 (December, 1969), Party’s Leadership Recruitment System,” p. 509. ” in Rigby and Harasymiw, note 2, p. 5. 4. 7‘. H. Rigby, “Introduction, 5. Oleg Penkovsky, 777~Penkousky Papers (London: Fontana Books, 1967), p. 211, cited in Steven J. Staats. -February, 1972), p. 44. “Corruption in the Soviet System, ” ProbfemsojCommuriitm, Vol. 21, No. 1 (January 6. On off%ial nepotism in the Soviet Union. see Vladmir Shlapentakh, Public and PTp’wfeLiJf of the Soviet People (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 205 -208; and David K. Willis, K&s Horn Russums Reafly Liuc (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1985), pp. 133- 143. On the wccess of children of such eminent leaders as Khrushchev, Gromyko, Mikoyan, Kosygin, Andropov, Brezhnev. and Dobrynin, see Willis, i&d., pp. 137 - 138. Also see Mervyn Matthews, Priuileges in fhe.SouietUmon~ A SfudyofElife Lif-Styles under Communism (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1978), pp. 159- 163.

[However,] partly

to higher

education,

advanrcmcnt, parents Why selves

socialist

but also their four

of politics

developed

countries

rc.volution,

had

dcvclopment. stage

where

deeds

the

begin

to

with

l’he

lrrtile

to the

the

regime

discrepancies

comes

develop.”

Communist

leaders

of politics

to take

as best

that

of a new

with

ideological

did

not,

class

the

and

simply

elites

the

process

of’

as the

existing

symbols

sociopolitical

allow

the

Zedong’s

lifetime

Cultural

Rc\~olu-

neverthclcss

of socialist

less

economic

defined

by Mao

interrupted,

in

completing to the

however,

to

problem.

place and

in the decade-long

if occasionally

for the emergence

upon

to terms

represented

culminated

took

of deradicalization

between

seem

of a new-class

led them

thrm-

“deradicaliza-

of nation-building

inevitably

over

cadres There

the

revolutions

to the phase

place,

by throwing

First,

leadership,

tasks

imperatives

politics,

question.

communist

and eventually

where

thcmsclves

not only the leading

the communist

fully

anti-bureaucratism

ground

for

which

a new class of the privileged?

the

therefore,

developmental

deradicalized

partly ~CCCSS

precondition

through

a key to the emergence

all

itself

where

fundamental

holds

post-revolutionary

deraclicalization concern

and,

and

the

for them

formal

connections

had established

become

socialism

to devote

order

of

in securing

important

personal

to the point

for this

degeneration

economic

have

prediction,

Such

bureaucratic

which

came

offspring

Marx’s

becausr

enjoy

the most

of those

countries classes

in state

to

advantages,

parents

carecr.7

explanations

Contrary

great

their

has brcome

because

their

privileged

be at least tion”

also

have

privileges

which

and

is it that

children

practical

can assist

the formcrly

tion.

their

formalized

constituted

and

their

a

privileged

children.” Second,

revolutionaries

nncipn r&gime tend revolution cadres, for

society. puts them

cratic

they

radicalization their

Such then

reinforces

enables

them This

derives

ness.

ideologically

or explicitly

echelon

presumably

friends.

the life-and-death as

their

from

from

their

with

of hierarchy

the general The

collectivism

of capable of bureau-

their to

tend

over

post-

ideological

dc-

families,

individualistic

of the new-class

the leaders

and privileges

lack

the

the

from the society

for themsclvcs,

the very basis

in

process

Subsequently,

interests

circumstances

rewards

or “alienation”

egalitarian

elitism,

test of confronting

some

hierarchy.

revolution.

private

deradicalized the system

political

independence the

to pursue

deserving along

ofthe

made

transition

mainly

to choose

survived

themselves

taken-for-grantedness,

had

pragmatism Under

who have consider

in the higher

degeneration

which

and

to

either

consciousimplicitly

that of equality

and

equity.” ‘I‘hird, inherent socialism

the

issue

of inherited

in state socialism. contribute

to the

Several

power studies

(rc)emergence

and

prerogatives

have explained of deviations,

also

has

a structural

how structural such

factors

as bribery,

cause

of state

search

for

7. Fc,-~nc Fehrr, Agxs Hcller. and C+or~y Markus, Uzctaior\hzf/o~rrV7PrJI. Anilnoiyr1~ of S’mef~~urirl~r~~(NW Kasil Klackwcll, 1983), p. 113. 8 Sw, Ibr instance, Robert C. Tucker, ?‘he ,&fuxzan Reoolu~wnary I&a (Nrw Yol-k. Lv. W. Norton ~1~1 C:onrpany. 196Y), pp. 201, 203, 214: and Zbignirw Rrzczlnski, “The So\,icr I’ollti< ;,I Syztcu- ‘l‘ranslorm;,tiot~ 1966), pp. I 15, esp. 13- 15. ” Problems ofCommunirm, Vol. 15, No. 1(January-February, or Degeneration, Chlnrse Stare,“ in Victor 9. For China’s case on this point, see Gordon White, “The Postrcvolutionary Nrv and David Mozing-o, rds., S?a~pnnd Socze~ in Contemporary China (Ithaca: Cornrll Univwsity Prrss. 1983). pp 27-52. The Nonrcwlutionary Prllitics (11 10 See Daniel N. N&on, “I> enlnists and PolitIcal Inequalitirh: and Paul Hollw~le~-. Communist Starts,” Cornpara~we P&K!, \‘ol. 14, No. 3 (April, 1982), pp. 307-308, “Research on Marxist Societies: Thp Relationship Kr~wccn Throry and l’rartlcv.” ,4nnual Keoww of Soiioky~. L’ol. 8 (198’2), p. 338. York:

Prerqyatiues in Socialism.. patrons

or protectors,

and

structural

arrangement

influences

over production

hands

of a small

influential impossible

for

to their

official

valuable

inside

and

the

by their

their

Simply they

recent

generally complicated personnel

changes

restaffing, between

efforts

tend

management

reform

necessitates

and

specialized

educational satisfy

All these the genesis studies

factors

to their

definition

or a part at

operate

While

least

goals,

power

is the main

short

subject their

backgrounds, in China

values,

interests

socialism

criteria

most

opportunities

the

and they have

in

down,

program

such

of all

the

restructuring, leaders

children.

leaders

do take

In the case

try hard

that the reform

to keep entails.

regard

to personnel

the system

of personnel

vulnerable

to the influences

of

Furthermore,

the imperative

of

selection

of the

gradually

based

children

yet clearly

as well as to its reproduction. attention

top

midst

however,

with

class

on high

of high-level

in education.”

dimension,

very little Revolution

is often

by children

of cadres,

enjoyed

In

of leadership

the Cultural

the prerogatives

the reform

where

more

which

the

of organizational

considerations.

meritocratic privileged

run.

cooptation

and therefore

personal

and factor

as a new from

of this study,

vested

in state

a context-specific

and to help their

of personnel

to help

authority

gains.‘*

of it can design

in the

be

influence

which

official

engineered

and remolding

to protect

their

with

or “princes”

in the areas

and losses

means

can

of production,

and informal

provide

a change

to keep their

of a new class in China

on the genesis

dimension.14 against

owing

and family) Youths”

successful

and other

state

socialism

is less institutionalized

connections

economic cadres

to be more

the

in state

by reforms

which the gains

from

that

of it is

that are attached

to the means own

in the the most

the means

wealth

goods”

formal

their

of “Golden

reform

both

do not have

Since

the

of and

or by the collective,

to accumulate access

been

especially

to succeed?

entailing

has control

and opportunities

leaders,

by the state

of and

goods

individual

as a whole

by the leadership

recruitment fimily

is by

redefining

initiatives

of personnel the balance

rise

induced

restaffing,

and maintain

(both

the

children

means

“borrow”

reforms

reform from

other

they

to

to the

formal

as control

and

have

services, strong

either

studies

the essential

they have are the “positional

such

the leadership

it benefits

Such

to have What

systemic

Since

system

61

of these

places

do such

do to help their

because

has contributed

formation. that

leaders

children.

to use for private

Finally, that

cadres,

focus

that

of goods,

What

in the socialist

positions,

children,

influence

of cadres.

information,

authority.

system

and distribution

number

are owned

inherited

common

in the socialist

higher-level

production

so on. I’ The

The Case in China

has been

While

contributed there

to

are several

paid to the reproduction

interpreted no study

as the struggle has yet been

in part devoted

II. SceJcanC Oi, “Communism and Client&m: Rural Politics in China,” WorldPoli&, Vol. 37, No. 2 (January, 1985), pp. 238-266 and Andrew Walder, Communist Neo-Tmditionaksm: Work and Authority m Chrnelr Industry (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986). On the Soviet Union, see Wayne D. Franc&co and Zvi Gitelman, “S oviel Political Culture and ‘Covert Participation’ in Policy Implementation,” Americm Politzcai Science Review, Vol. 78, No. 3 (Seprember, 19X4), pp. 603-621. 12. See, for instance, Ireneusz Bialecki and Michael D. Kennedy, “Power and the Logic of Distribution in Poland,” Eastern Euro@m Politzcs and Soctetia, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Spring, 1989), pp. 300-328. 13. For mrritocraric criteria of leadership selection and their continuous vulnerability to personal relationships and family connections in the Soviet Union, see The New Smzet Elite:How They 7’hink and What They Want (New \r;ork: Praeger, 1989), pp 30-31, 163-168. 14. For the gwesis dim?nsion xc Richard C. Kraus, “‘The Chinese State and Its Bureaucrars,” in Victor Nw and David Mozingo, eds., State and Society in Contemporary Chzn,a, note 9, pp. 132- 147; and Richard C. Kraus, Class Confrict in Ch’zne~e Socialurn (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981). For the reproduction dlmtmsion, see Martin K. Whyrc, “Inequality and Stratification in China,” Chzna Quarterly,. No. 64 (December, 1975), pp. 706-710; and Izu~y Wortzel, Cla.rs in China: Stratification in a Classless Society (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987).

exclusively

to analysing

Revolution

period.”

Since since

the Third

1980,

the state. the

Plenum

China

The

of

here

because

zhbhihue,

cultivating

rational,

group

and

of various

media,

spring

1989.

The

of

inequalities Plenum,

held

the issue.

“’ The

concerned” held in-June, Popular

See,

1978); Uuna

Hong

and

State

I@Xzaopq

wenxunn and

Old

Cadres

is to Sclcct

of pr-<,vlnces, 17.

For

Lcadcrs:

Xiaoping, (Selrcted diyiwei

and

of this issue,

see William

drR

6 (Novenlber-Dccrmber,

1983),

pp.

I>ynn

‘1‘. White

Victor

C.

18.

“ ‘l‘hc

Falkcnheim,

On

\ariws

Mainland 19

III,

groupings

Fur

IJJU~J

popular

of

Han

thr

Vol.

manil’cstrd

Minzhu

Chtnex Democracy Movement (Prmceton: 20 The major thrust of’ the decision includr:

&an

cadl-cs

Itom

up and doing

car\:

cil-curnvent

lo&id

inviting

problems Nrqq

business; cxressivc

guests

asso&ted Rcaw,

restructure

August

and with

cancel sendin? &wfaq

lirms

special trips qifts. ‘Sir

1989,

food

ibu.,

1988),

p.

” Prohlern,

these

off<

seven

against

1990),

Llaily),

28-Septembu

pp.

cadres, the July 3,

ol’the

srcretariv!, Future

For

an

cnrly

llfCo:ommunIrm,

pp.

208,

229-230

in Ilpyong

J.

1989),

01‘ ‘Thil-d

Vol.

Chum’>

Harding,

House.

thz

and

Kim

pp.

Echelon’

and

75-85.

Cadres

prerogatives

in

two

10,

1989 pp.

and

August

tasks

passengu

sperulation;

to bc 11.

sewn

of high-lcvrl

of small

and

stem lo-

The

children

import

bribery,

first

154&155,277.

privilegrs.

prcvcnt f&bid

1989,

of high-level

Speeches fromthe JSH!,

Z-31,36-44, and

corruption,

tasks,

party

5-8.

ial corl-uprion;

official

1983),

Priority

39.

see Harry

Paragon

corruption

f’or leading

Renmzn rihao (People’s August

inridcnt

198(J),

“MainlandChina’s

1987),

Rise

of thr

18,

chubanshe, First with

Diversifies,”

pp.

Reform

339%343.

Ixe,

6 [June.

“‘1%~

Press,

eliminate

Among-

pp

Yung

evaluations,

ofof’iicial

provision

and

Cultural

August

(The

mrrting

in China,

1985),

thr

thr

on

Renmin

Institution,

see

(On

meeting

Crie\fir Democracy Writin,~~and

with

by the

political

during

ganbu”

No.

mid-turn

the June

associated

p. 9 and

24, Change

University

abroad;

committed

dr gaigc”

(Rrijing:

A Ixadership

IS the elimination

thr

cadres’

7m 13,

Princeton

the prerogatives

Kwangtung

zhidu

Hong

Rrookings

ed.,

are

Plenum

645-683.

1981),

sw

leaders,

during

against

at adiscussion

3 (March.

(pseudonym),

the masses

to important

in

Mao /o Deng (New York: No.

various

at the Fourth

crimes”

Xiaoping)

Revolution:

21,

made

Politburo

2 July,

For

thil-d-erhclon

andS&uf&,

resentments see

on

D.C.:

OF the Chinese

with which

zhongqingnian

group,”

16-35.

Chmese Po/i/mfrum

cds.,

China,”

cadrc\’ children,

End

ofDeng

shi xuant’a

Stand Re~~olutzon.R+form ,4&r Moo (Washington

to address

lingdao

“Gcnrrational

Mills,

had to decide

pp

expanded

IJIU~J and Studir,, Vol.

of Cadres,”

in

in the

the Fourth

Students

he guojia

regions

noted

movement that

tasks

1975), to an

Iradcrship

occasionally

Chznese Cullural RcuolurGm A Cake S/u+ (Perk&y:

o/ ~hr

speech

autont~mous

as

against

promotion

Radical

Writings

translated

so intense

“economic

rapid

“Dang

dc renwu

for

leadership

demonstrators

resentment

u 1and YoungOUirials:sprech

Middle-Ag

Erhclon

“Thr

and preparing

children.“’

against

7’hp Pulitzcs

Lee,

as

were

de shi),

popular

64 (Ortobrr-I)rrrmhc~.

1’/7,G1982

“Laoganhu

the seven

their

to

understood

(roughly

has been

by the

and their

Organizations:

municipalities

Third

No.

Lre,

China

on

is supposed

the democracy

taiziduny

suo,yuanxin

only

the meaningof”third-rchelon

tt-c’atmcnt 32,

No.

hy Deng

Lcadcrshlp

280-302;

not

Yung

Quarter/y,

pp.

cadres

Yung

Hong

1h. SWtwo speeches Par-ty

qunzhong

that

third-echelon

of the suppression,

at mitigating

arose

and

out

and

leadership

generally

the

taizidang

with

What

nianqinfhua

problems.ls

during

implement

but also against

for mstanrr,

Rrvolution,”

renmin

was aimed

of taizidang,

(:ahfo~-nia,

poured aftermath

of the leading

resentment

members

with came

associated

to “fully

qijian

1989,

and corruption

1.5

resentments

decision

has been

serious

“young”

(zhuanyehua).”

(disantidui)

While

and

the call for

~eminphua),

of them-taizidarzy

very

discontent

in the immediate

(tuohao

one

has been

by the Chinese

group”

precisely

of the party

components,

placed

the scheme

posed

its culmination

and wrongdoings

reform

the third

been

and more

reforms

“specialized”

succession.

groupings,

society’s

Kong

in 1978,

for the tasks of modernizing

to have

the Chinese

and

I7 And

for the post-Cultural

“revolutionary” and

leadership

administrative

the Hong

is

has

“third-echelon

group”)-seems

While

emphasis

and even essential

consists

that

second

and well-educated.

a stab1 c political “prince

the

Congress

in the personnel

(zhishihua),

are

reproduction

and personnel

theme

corps

enormous

a so-called young

timely,

important

a cadre

attention

Party

organizational

“well-educated”

our

of class

of the Eleventh

most

establishment

bc both

phenomenon

has pursued

single

(nianqinEhua),

merits

the

related 11,

1989;

and to thr and

Prerogatives administrative China,

positions.

their

exclusively level

focus

during

and

in particular.

officials and

the

the Tiananmen

periods.

to analyse

Tuizidung:

status used

and

has

taizidanz

sarcastic

nephews

and

than

their

also

believed

to be involved

refers

rank

(rank

13)

14 are would

first

seems

timely

leader-

manifested

and worthwhile.

Second,

it will trace

both the pre-1949

perspectives Fourthly,

along

the

therefore,

is composed

along military

and

will be utilized the social

implica-

their

of’high-level political

such

as

socio-political taizidanz can be

cadres).

of high-level

and/or

designation,

relatives

In this sense,

(children

refers

military ranks

considered

of civil

Second,

cadres

who

promotions

hierarchy,

hierarchy. of cadres

analytical

central 22 The

with

of people

Along

service,

officials

of the

geographical command

to a group

officials.

as high

(juzharg)

is of little

often

connotes

of the children

taizidang and

of the children

definition

definition

crimes

a general

(and

are

backed

relationships.

26 ( rural)

the

it is simply

children

characteristics.

economic

be bureau-chiefs

(diquzhan,?)

a broad

and

generally

This

category

state,

First,

gaoganzidi

definition,

party,

(shizhaq) Such

political

for the children

privileges

oftaizidary.

period.

on high-

their

the third-echelon their

that includes

for the

behavioral

the term

and personal

to the

of 24 (urban)

above districts

specific

in various

of high-level

hierarchy

usages.

cadres.

to a specific

connections

children

of opportunity

and institutional

derogatory,

with

/n&day

According

perspective

and

in

almost

Typologies

of high-level

interchangeably

by family

of taizidarq

and

are available

cadres

against

in the post-Mao

two different often

and nieces)

rather

window

corruption

officials

will be explored.

Definitions

term

though

high-level

and typologies

psychological

of taizidanf

on official

lower-level

goal of cultivating

an analysis

definitions

63

21 Few studies

of the

resentments

an historical

Third,

the genesis

t ions of taiziday

I’he

from

of studies

relatively

the expanded

incident,

oftaizidang

prc-reform

children

popular

‘I’his study will first provide the origins

are a handful on the

by the pronounced

intense

The Case in China

and privileges.

the

Given

provided

given

thcrc

largely

corruption

in general

prerogatives ship

been

on economic

officials

ofhigh

While

has

in Socialism..

those

eaogan),

lowest heads

divisional

potential

the ranks

the

position of special

commanders

pool

above

use and the second

are

bureaucratic

who are positioned The

ministry, and

who

China’s

of taizidary,

14.“’

definition

based

on

in the People’s Kepubhr of China,” 21. Src, for insranrr. Alan P. I,iu, “The Politics of Corruption .lvwrr~un ~~~/ztz~a/SrzrrireKli,lcu~, Vol. 77, No 3 (Scpterllt,cr, 1983), pp 602 -623. I,iu found, however, that only 12.5per wnr of the official corruption reportrd has been committed by the national and provincial Icvrl olli( ials (p. 605). It seems worth noting that lowrr-level cadrrs in China have frcquen~ly been made scapegoats Ior the failures 01 ventral policy. And this practice of “ pointing the spearhead downward” M’BSnot new to contemporary China: as Frederick Wakeman Jr. notes, the Qins Dynasty had the analogous practice that “thr IOWC.I-,heqyuan wcw condemned hccausr they lackrd the moral self-control ofmetropolitan scholar-oflicials.” 7&r I~all of~Imperial Chinn (New York. Free Press, 1975), p. 193. 22. Sic “Zhonggong dry+ zhidu qiguan” (On thr Chirwsr Civil &r-vice’s Grade Systcrn). Zhen,qnvq (Contend), (February, 1981), p. 31. 23. Accordin: tu this drfinitlon, the six ofthr potential pool for tabian,~ can amount to tenaof thousands, a number which is derived from the official positions that are controlled by the two nomenklatura lists (one Iwing the “Job’l‘itle List ofCadres Managed by the Party Central Committee” and the other being the “I,ist 01 Cxlrr Positions to Rc Reported to the Party Central Committee”) ofthr Central Committee of the CCP. Assurnin!: that the maximum of 100 000 oflicials on thesr lists have tw’cochildren, the potential size oflaizidaq, is 200 000 or only 0.04 per rrnt of the total Chinesr labor force, which is still very small enough fo bc a privilcqcd class. For the position lists and numbers, ser John P. Burns, “China’s Nomenklatura System,” ~&J//,NIL qf Communwrt, Vol. 36, No. 5 (Sepwmber-October. 1987), pp. 40, 47

64

S-NJ~IES IN COMPARATIVE

specific

behavioral

related

definitions,

an economic

characteristics which

definition:

in the business the Fourth this category that

One

of a Beijing

businessmen.24

party The

end of the high officials.

allege

that the Huaxia

the Handicapped

(for which

yuan

in mid-1988

Deng

Pufang

of 8 million was 800 The ment

specific

positions,

that

were

to speedy

While

in Table

are their

high

other

educational

no-so-obvious

taizidang members involved

in agricultural

color

which

range

from

premier

positions

through

in leadership

promotion,

for

150 000 in which

made

a windfall

sets at a price

a group

to important to municipal

that

levels,

valuable

goods

and the leadership’s

of people

high-level bureau

a combination

at various

to provide

son,

Fund

Corporation

in nature:

promoted

enough

Welfare was fined

television

of the

Xiaoping’s

to have

a

price.2”

been

chief.

of factors privileged ranging

sympathy

who,

governThese

such as the family

from

back-

privileged

with their

hardship

era.

data are available, characteristics

credentials characteristics, industry,

of well-known

strong

however.

national

or ideological

profiles

are discernible.

and very

are of a very prestigious

and technology,

brand

have

1 .2h Several

Kanghua

of taizidung is political

Revolution

no comprehensive

are listed

science

job

the Cultural

River

purchasing

and

to foreign

to the children

of the China

at of

group”

secrets

Deng

was reported

officials,

change strong

The

involved

10 000 Yellow

political

state

Pufang,

to

activities

Garrison

was the director-in-chief), books.

deeply

definition

for a generational

during

erotic

Deng

a subsidiary

Pufang

the original

hold important

education

two

by selling

of high-level

and party

grounds

Deng

for publishing

higher than

second

children call

yuan

around

related

of a “prince

with selling

is

tasks decided

Municipal

of taizidung is not limited

rumors

closely

the deviant

on the arrest

One

who are involved

is most

concerning

were charged

Two behavior-

one of the seven

of the Beijing

Company,

was also allegedly

yuan

as children

Publishing

definition

is the report

category The

here.

can be provided.

of high officials

which

abound

commissar They

economic

lower

exclusive,

This

against

example

secretary.

for our purpose

of children

Examples

a son of a political

useful

mutually

trade.

corruption

was aimed.

of taizidang.

included

niece

and foreign

of economic

Plenum

more

taizidang is a group

of commerce

the phenomenon

seems

are by no means

COMMUNISM

nature. defense,

matters.

family

First, Most

taizidung members two most visible

backgrounds.

the

of their

culture,

27 Second,

The

positions

more

held

positions

and foreign

ones

There

are

by these

are related affairs;

importantly,

to

none there

is

is a

24. “Beijing pohuo taizi xiemi,jituan” (Beijing E:xposes a Secret-Leaking Prince Group), Zhen,pq (October, 1988), p. 11. 2.5. “Dalushehui de minfen” (Popular R esentment in the Mainland China), Zhen,pty (August, 1988), p. 15. For detailed reports on the scandal around the Kanghuacorporation, see Zhenping (November, 1988), pp. 15-16, 88-89. 26. Th’.1s 1’1st ‘. ‘IIus .trative purpose as no lists on this sort of issue ran bc complete by any 1s mc.I” d e d on Iy for 1 insane.‘The table does not include tazzidang members who are nieces (e.g., Wan Shaofen, deputy director of the CC’s United Front Work Department and Wan Li’s niece) and nephews (e.g., Yang Xizong, first party secretary of Henan Province and Yang Dezhi’s nephew) of high-level officials. The table also excludes those taizidan~ members who assume relatively lower (though potentially quite lucrative) positions, such as Bo Xicheng who is son of Bo Yibo and director of Beijing Tourism Bureau. 27. It is also worth noting that many mrmbers of the group previously have been (e.g., Ye Xuanping as mayor of Guangzhou,I.iu Yuan as vice-mayor of Zhrngzhou, Chen Haosu as vice-mayor of Bei,jing, and Xi Jinping as vice-mayor of Xiamen) or currently assume mayoral or vice-mayoral positions (e.g., Yu Zhengsheng), indicating an implicit urban bias in elite job training as well as highlighting the significance of mayoral positions as a stepping stone to higher offices. On this point, see Cheng Li and David Bachman, “Localism, Elitism and Immobilism: Elite Formation and Social Change in Post-Mao China,” M/or/d Politics, \‘<,I. 42, No. 1 (October, 1989), p. 66.

Prerogatives in Socialism: The Case in China TABLE

Name

Age

1. Profiles of Select Members

of Taizidang.

Position

Education

Family background

Li Penga

62

PB/CC/Premier

University

Ye Xuanpingh Peng ShiluC Zou Jiahuad

65 65 63

University (D/O) University (D/O) Universitv , (D/O) \

Ding Henggaoe Chen Guangyif Li Changanc Li Tieyingh Song Ruixiang’ Liao Huir

59 56 55 54 51 49

CC/Governor Vice-Minister CC/Minister/ State Councillor CC/Minister CC/Provincial Secretary Minister PB/CC/State Councillor Governor CC/Vice-Minister

University University University University Unknown Unknown

Zhang Boxingk Buhe’ Wu Shaozum Chen Haosu” Qao Zonghuai” He Pengfeip Chen Yuanq Liu Yuan’ Xi Jinping’ Yu Zhengsheng’

? ? ? 48 3

CC/Provincial Secretary CC/Governor CC/Minister Vice-Minister cc Major General Vice-Minister Vice-Governor District Party Secretary Vice-Mayor

Unknown Unknown Unknown University Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown

46 ? ? ? 45

65

(0)

(D) (0)

Zhou Enlai and Deng Yingchao Ye Jianying (S) Peng Pai (S) Ye Jianying (SL) Nie Rongzhen (SL) Xi Zongxun (SL) Li Fuchun (S) Li Weihan (S) Song Renqiong (S) Nie Rongzhen (SL) and Liao Chengzhi (S) Peng Zhen (SL) Ulanfu (S) W” Yunfu (S) Chen Yi (S) Q;ao Guanhua (S) He Long (S) Chen Yun (S) Liu Shaoqi (S) Xi Zhongxun (S) Zhang Aiping (SL)

Notes: All positions are as of November, 1989, unless noted otherwise. Biographical information is from Zhonssonp renmin& (Who’s Who in Communist China) (Taibei: Guoli zhengzhi daxue, 1983), Wolfgang Bartke, Who’s Who in the People’s Republic ofChina, 2nd ed. (New York: K. G. Saw, 1987), and China Dzrectory 1990 (Tokyo: Radio Press, November, 1989). PB and CC stand for Politburo and Central Committee members; 0 and D for attendance at universities overseas or domestically; and AS, S and SL for adopted son, son, and son-in-law. Li Peng attended Moscow Power Institute and is the natural son of revolutionary martyr, Li Suoxun. In April, 1988, Li assumed the concurrent position of chairmanof the State Commission for Restructuring Economic System (t&iwei). Ye Xuanping, governor of Guangdong, attended the Yanan College of Natural Sciences and also studied in the USSR in 1951- 1954. For Ye’s profile, see “Ye Xuanping shilue” (A Profile of Ye Xuanping), Zhon~~on~yanjiu (Study of Chinese Communism), Vol. 24, No. 11 (November, 1990), pp. 90-98. Peng Shilu, vice-president with the rank of vice-minister at the China State Shipbuilding Corporation, attended St. Joseph’s University in Hong Kong as well as the Yanan College of Natural Sciences. Zou Jiahua, State Councillor and minister of the State Planning Commission, was the minister of the Machine-Building and Electronics Commission. For an official report on his career, see Beijing Xinhua, December 26, 1989, in Foreign Broadcast InfDrmalion Seruice: Daily Report-China (hereafter FBZS), January 19, 1990, p. 3. Ding Henggao is the minister of the State Commission of Science, Industry, and Technology for National Defense. Chen Guangyi graduated from the Northeast Engineering Institute and has been the first party secretary of Fujian Province since March, 1986. Li Changan, formerly governor of Shandong, is deputy secretary-general of the State Council as well as vice-chairman of the State Tourism Commission. Li Tieying, State Councillor as well as the chairman of the State Education Commission, graduated from Charles University in Czechoslovakia. Also see “Zhonggong zhengzhiju zuinianqing de chengyuan Li Tieying” (Li Tieying: The Y oungest Member of Communist China’s Politburo), Guan+zo+ng yuekan (Magnifying Glasses Monthly), September, 1988, pp. 86-88. Song Ruixiang had been governor of Qinghai Province until April, 1990, when he was replaced by Jin Jipeng. See Zhonfongyanjiu, Vol. 24, No. 10 (October, 1990), p. 30. Liao Hui is director of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Department under the State Council. Zhang Boxing, for whom no background information is available, has been the first party secretary of Shaanxi Province since September, 1987.

66

STWIES IN

COMPAKATIVECOMMUNISM

’ Kuhr has been governor of Inner Mongolia smw April, 1983. “’ Wu Shaozu, minister of the State Physical Culture and Sports Commission and vice-president ofthc China Nuclear SoGety, was formerly vice-ministerofthe State Commissmn of Sciencr, Technology and Industry for National Defense. ” Chen Haosu, who had been vice-minister of Telecommunication, was transferred to the position of vicepresident of the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries in February, 1990. ” Qao Zonghuai, an alternate member of the Central Committee, is deputy secretary-general of Hong Kong branch of the New China News Agency. ” Hc Peng-fei is director of the PLA General Staff’s Armament Department. Hc is the youngest major general in China. Also see “Junfang shangjiang nianling laohua jieban wenti wanzhong zhumu” (The Issue of Aging and Leadership Succession in the Military Attracts Popular Concern) in Guan~~zaojing _yuekan, October 1989, p. 22. ‘i Chen Yuan, vice-governor of the People’s Bank of Ch’ IIN, was formerly a member of the standing committer of Beijing Municipal Party Committee. ’ I,iu Yuan, vice-governor of Henan, was formerly vice-mayor of Zhengzhou. ’ Xi Jinping had been a party secretary of Ningde District until he was promoted to the position of party accrrtary of Fuzhou City in April, 1990. Zhon~pn~yqzu, Vol. 24, No. 10 (October, 1990), p 30. ’ Yu Zhengsheng, vice-mayor of Qngdao, was formerly mayor of Yantai of Shandong. See “Yantai shizhang Yu Zhengsheng” (Mayor of Yantai, Yu Zhengsheng), Guaqjzqin~yuekan (September, 1989), pp 82-83.

“Jump had

component

remained

them

held

” in the careers

politically

prestigious

the high leadership

positions group.

who was seemingly adversely of them

were

Different capable

with

people

may

a good

Haosu

Army

mayor

of Beijing.

tion.‘”

In nine

How, 1980s

(rank then,

explicitly

Youth

members

which

they

most

of

all had risen

to

in the case of Chen

in detail

popular

later,

Haosu

no one has been

resentments

against

many

from

from stage

National

and

who

subjective,

connections.

The

college

in 1978

Congress.

case of Chen

in 1964.

from

us

Chen

His name

for the People’s

In 1981 he became

a secretary

to the position

to vice-minister

not

provides

as a deputy

he was assigned

he jumped

are

the most

of taizidung members.

an unidentified

promoted,

to 1987,

are

of Telecommunication,

only

in 1984

he was again 1978

family

promotion

People’s

and

who is highly

of vice

of Telecommunica-

a simple

nobody

to a vice-

8). can we account

emphasizes

paid to the “children tive measure

except

regarding

strong

speedy

political

League

In 1987 years

their

and graduated

of the

to the Fifth

constituted

the genesis

all of these during

ten years

such judgment

vice-minister the

for this rapid

of taizidung members’

has

which

opinions

to have been

in 1942

of the Communist

denominator

that,

to be discussed during

While

concerning

at the center

minister

While period

in less than

noting

different

Yi and formerly

example

was born

Liberation

have

seems

son of Chen

appears

incident

ta22idun~ members.

criterion

Haosu,

princes.

manifested.28

among

objective

of engineers, for reasons

by the June

of these

in the pre-1980

It is also worth

demoted

affected

of many

inconspicuous

an

essential

promotion

policy

that in cultivating

imply.

further

We will begin

which

is an important

?l(l We know that the personnel framework

the third-echelon

of old revolutionaries”

of taizidung goes both would

careers..

for

such

leadership,

(luogeming de zinu).

back

as well as deeper

by looking

at historical

promotions, attention

It seems,

than

common

reform

must

however,

a simple

precedents

of the which be that

administrain exploring

28. On the basis of the available information, three (Zou Jiahua, Yu Zhengsheng, and Xi Jinping) were promoted and all but Song Ruixiang and Chen Haosu have maintained their pre-June incident positions. For Chrn Haosu’s drmotion, see Zhongpo tonpmshe, February 23, 1990, in FBZS, February 27, 1990, p. 16. No background informatlon is available for the case of Song Ruixiang. Haosu zhuosheng yinqi fengpuo” (Chen Haosu’s 29. Zhhon~p~ renmin~~lu (1983), p. 583 and “Chen Promotion Generates A Stormy Reaction), Dongxtnng (Trend), September, 1987, p. 9. 30. Song Ruixiang ofqinghai, for instance, had not worked as vice-governor before he became governor.

Prerogatives

in Socialism:

The Case in China

what factors are likely to have been involved in making existence

67

such a framework

come into

in the first place.

Taizidang

in Historical

Perspective

China is generally recognized as a society that places enormous importance on the notion of family. In traditional China, where the Confucian examination system was the most honorable channel of upward mobility, an individual’s success with the examination was always regarded as honor for his family. But examination success was not the only way to the exclusive membership

of the gentry class. There were two other peculiar

ways of becoming a member of the gentry: through purchase and through hereditary inheritance. What merits our attention is the second method of becoming a gentry member gentry

without through

Another gentry

taking

the civil service

hereditary

influence,

way of entrance members

sideration

of services

one generation were fourth above,

into the gentry was

were known

as yinsheng.

rendered

one of their progenitors.

examination. a historian

provided

that

undergone

rank or above, officials

civil officials

These

the title in eon-

on behalf of, the state by

that such titles could be bestowed

in the provinces

into the

century:

privilege.

were granted

only on one son of the civil and military

and military

the entrance

in the 19th

the yin or inheritance They

to, or suffering

Regulations

Concerning

notes

officials

in the capital

for who

who were third rank or

who were second rank or above.3’

Would it be a mere coincidence that the yinsheng system looks so much like the promotions of taizidanz? Many taitidang members are the descendants of old revolutionaries whose contributions to the Chinese Revolution and whose sufferings under the “dictatorship by the Gang of Four” are highly appreciated under the Deng regime. Either

by coincidence or by design after the traditional practice, the emergence of should be understood in part as some sort of compensation to the old revolutionaries who are categorized as either revolutionary martyrs or revolutionary cadres. One significant difference stands out between those yinsherzg and taizidang members, however. While yinsheng, despite their official positions and status, had constituted taizidang

largely a minor and powerless fraction of officialdom, taitidang members rary China seem to provide a somewhat reversed situation.

Precedents in Pre-1978

A prototype

Communist

taizidang existed

in contempo-

China

before 1978. Examples

are rarely found in the 1950s and

early 1960s simply because the children of high officials then were not yet old enough to assume important positions. From the mid-1960s, however, we begin to see some outstanding examples. First of all, two relatives of Mao Zedong himself can be pointed out. Mao Yuanxin, son of Mao Zemin (Mao Zedong’s brother and revolutionary martyr), played an important political role in the last few years of Mao’s rule. Soon after graduating from the Harbin Military Engineering Institute in 1965, Mao Yuanxin, then in his late twenties, became the person in charge of the Shenyang Infantry School. In 1971 he became a deputy secretary of Liaoning Provincial Party Committee and simultaneously the vice director of the Shenyang Military Region’s General Political 31. Chung-li Chang, University of Washington

The Chinese Gentry: Studies on Their Role in Nineteenth-Cenlury Chinese Society (Seattle: Press, 1955), pp. 13- 14.

68

SIXII)IES

Department. Political stage

In 1973 he became

Commissar

of politics

Another

until

from

which

became until and

as the person

an assistant

minister

there

who

crucial

promoted

from

college.

clearly

promotions been

post-Mao

two different

environment

tion

reform

in the long

aforementioned gr0up.j’

The

is, of course, children

four group

that

of revolutionary and mostly

Second,

compensating

of the Cultural

strong

while

cadres,

director

family

in 1945

Qnghua

after

First, their

connection

of

all three

graduation

can substitute

and accumulated

seems

martyr

office

Department.“”

examples.

seniority

nepotism

First,

there

leading

to best

(Mao

and

explain

Zemin)

the

may

also

Perspectives

at various

carrying

levels

are too

out the moderniza-

of the third-echelon

benefited

are young,

and well-educated

from

such

revolutionary and

of

understanding

has led to the introduction

the members

conspicuously

a combination

is a general

cadres

for effectively

an understanding

of which

three

and

of the general

of ta~zidung represents

of the currently unsuitable

School

and Institutional

leadership.

for selecting

engineer

she

she assumed

Yuanxin.

Psychological

has most

was

In 1972

who was born

Middle

live years

for the revolutionary

Such

taizidung, members

educational decade

run.

criteria

as an she

a position

of the Operation

less than

for the emergence

that many

deputy

such as party

Second,

and therefore

Ministry

bureau.

Lin Biao,

8th

director

that having

of the current

the leadership

old and uneducated,

after

Institute

Revolution,

protocol

out from the above

of promotion

China:

rationales

became

for the rise of Mao

in Post-Mao

Hairong,

Language

Foreign

vice-minister,

Beijing

positions

indicates

a consideration

Tuizidung

Liguo

sympathy

the

Cultural

son of Marshall

and deputy

experience.

of all three,

in 1974

prestigious

central

requirements

Foreign

she entered the

Wang

1977.“”

can be pointed

to important

professional

among

the

committee,

features This

for the general

The

in January,

Beijing

of

and in 1975 at the center

1976.”

niece.

of the Ministry’s

and again

from

party

were

1967 tumult

in charge

At the age of 22 Lin

the Air Force

have

power

In

years’

is the case of Lin Liguo,

graduated

University.

proven

three

in October,

Zedong’s

attended

Province

He was very active

of Four

Mao

College,

of Liaoning

Region.

the Gang

in 1966.

After

secretary

Military

Hairong,

Normal

she graduated

her fall from

Two

his fall with

in 1970

Finally,

a provincial

is Wang

Bei.jing

intern-translater. identified

COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM

of the Shenyang

example

graduating from

IN

selection by virtue

specialized

of the

leadership criteria of being

due to their

high

backgrounds.“”

those

children

Revolution

seems

of cadres

who

to be a “hidden

were agenda”

persecuted in pursuing

during

the

a change

32. Zhonpsloq renmin& (1978), p. 100. 33. Zhonpgong renminglu (1983), p. 58. 34. Lin Liguo is alleged to have organized an independent political group called “Joint Fleet” composed also ofchildren of high officials. See Yao Ming-le (pseudonym), The ConspiracyandDeath ofLin Biao (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1983), pp. 27-28, 32. Also see “Fang Lin Liguo yifei Zhang Ning” (On Zhang Ning, Lin Liguo’s Widow), Guangjimjingyuekan (August, 1988), pp. 7 -8. 35. Susan Shirk interprets this rationale as the economic basis for the post-Mao transition from a “virtuocratic” system of recruitment to a “meritocratic” one. See “Decline of Virtuocracy in China,” in James L. Watson, ed., Class and Social Strattficafion m Post-Reuolulion China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 56-83. 36. While their high educational credentials, derived mainly from their privileged family backgrounds, enable &zidanp members to be qualified for the criteria of well-educated and specialized, their high-level cadre family backgrounds provide them with a distinct edge in terms of the revolutionary criterion. On this point, see Hong Yung Lee, “Mainland China’s Future Leaders,” pp. 43, 52-53.

Prerogutives

toward niunqinghua.

in Socialism:

The most persistently

The Case in China

69

carried out, yet least acknowledged,

which the Deng regime has been committed

is the persecution

of the backbone

task to followers

of’ the Gang of Four and the beneficiaries of the Cultural Revolution. Given that the rrmjority of the current leadership is composed of those who suffered hard times during the Cultural Revolution and also had their children suffer a great deal, it seems rather natural to devise an institutional framework to compensate for their children’s damaged careers.“’ But how is this broad

policy

framework

actually

implemented

to facilitate

the

promotion of taizidurrg? It seems necessary first to look at the formal institutional arrangements of personnel management. First, recommendations for promotion can be made by the subordinate

party committees,

the superior

party committees,

or even

individual leading cadres on the functional line. High officials, if they wish, may be able to exert pressures on concerned party committees or they may even directly recommend someone in their families or their friends’ children.“8 Once the recommendation is made, the person under recommendation approved by the appropriate party committees ment when the positions concern the leadership and the ministerial

and the Central at the provincial

and bureau levels at the center.ln

should be

Organization Departand prefectural levels,

If the person under recommenda-

tion has a family background strong enough to pressure the Central Organization Department, this stage will not be hard to pass. In fact, the offtcial arrangements for the recruitment of the third-echelon leadership group, as manifested in the 1983 Central Organization Department Handbook, encourage the participation of veteran cadres4” Let us once again consider the case of Chen Haosu’s promotion. According to a report, he was originally supposed to be promoted into the Ministry of Culture. Despite the pressures from Chen’s

patrons,

such as Bo Yibo and Hu Qaomu,

the Ministry, notably Wang Meng, managed choice was the Ministry of Telecommunication

leading cadres in

to resist the recommendation. The next whose prestige was regarded as lower

than that of the Ministry of Culture. According to the report, someone in charge of the Central Organization Department along with a person affiliated with the State Council Personnel Department visited Ai Zhisheng, Minister of Telecommunication. The initial response by Ai was that he would discuss the issue with his vice-ministers and his party

group.

The

problem

Ai had was that the Ministry

had already

decided

on

promoting somebody from within. The result was, however, that Chen was promoted to the vice-minister position instead of the internal promotion. Unlike the Ministry of Culture, the Ministry of Telecommunication succumbed to the pressures from the elders and the Central Organization Department, thus generating dissatisfactions within the Ministry.“’ One interesting aspect of Chen Haosu’s

case is that Chen,

whose father was already

37. Deng XiaoIjing himself had a miserable experience with his son, Pufang, who was paralysed from mistreatment by Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution. See Uli Franz, ILvz< Xiaoping, trans. by Tom Artin (Boston: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1988), pp. 205, 207-210. 38. Melanie Manion, “The Cadre Management System, Post-Mao: The Appointment, Promotion, China Quark+, No. 102 uune. 1985), p. 214. ‘I‘rrmsfrr, and Removal of Party and State Cadres,” 39. Ibrd., p. 218. 40. See the transiation of select part of Dung de turhtpon~zrru me&z (Questions and Answers on Party Organization Work) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe. 1983) in Melanie Manion, ed., “Cadre Recruitment and Management in the People’s Republic of China, ” Chinese Lam and Gouemmm~, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Fall, 1984), p. 30. For China’s personnel management system based on personal recommendations that is highly vulnerable to nepotism, see John P. Burns, “China’s Nomenklatura System,” note 23, p. 50. 41. “Chen Haosu zhuosheng yinqi fengpuo,” note 29, pp. 9- 10.

70

STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM

dead at the time of promotion, had other elders as his patrons. What accounts for this concern on the part of the elders? Definite evidence is not available, but it may be that the painful experience and constant fear of “falling down” might have generated certain networks for the children of old cadres. In other words, the “Cultural “safety-net” Revolution Experience Group” has developed a system of “mutual care for the children of old comrades-in-arms,

old work-mates,

old superiors,

and old subordinates”

zhaogu laozhanyou laotongshi laoshangji laobuxia de tin~).~~ Such a safety-net network among high officials is also characterized

(huxiaq

by intermarriage

(fiwciang l~any~n)among the families ofhigh officials. Yu Qiuli had two daughters

married

to the sons of Huang Hua and Lin Hujia, and a son married to a daughter of Xu Shiyou. Yang Chengwu’s daughter married Zhang Tingfa’s son. Geng Riao and Fang Yi, and Li Desheng and Ulanfu also had intermarriage relationships.*” The cited examples may represent only a tiny fraction of the widespread intermarriages among high official families.

There

can be three

rationales

behind

huxiang

lianyin.

First,

the marriage

network can be used during times of trouble, a safety-net popularly referred to as “mutual protection among high officials” (cuanguan xianghu).44 Second, the comfort of the married child can be largely guaranteed under the protection of high-of~ciai parentsin-law. In socio-economic terms, too, children of high-level cadres are the most preferred category of mate choice in China. 45 And thirdly, there seems to be a mutual understanding among high officials that their offspring are as capable as themselves of handling

things,

a tendency

dragon and phoenix

aptly captured

in the popular expression

“dragon

from

from phoenix.“46

Tuitidang in Chinese Society: Societal Implications The life cycle of taizidang embodies the largest contradiction of the “classless” society that the Chinese Revolution was meant to create. They lived in luxurious houses that were sarcastically called “prince mansions” (gongzilou). They were provided servants, private tutors, and cars for commuting to school. There were special schools for cadre children such as Number 81 Primary School and Number 101 Junior-High School. They also had enough good food even during crises like the one immediately after the Great Leap fiasco.47 The Cultural Revolution

shattered

all these special privileges,

but children of cadres

42. On this point, see “Zhonggong taizidang bude rcnxin” (China’s Prince Group Gains No Popularity), Dongxiang (October, 1987), p. 23. 43. “Zhongguo tequan jiecheng goutu” (The Structure of China’s Privileged Class), Qishzniandai (Seventies), (August, 1983), p. 65. (Does China Have a Privileged Class?), Zhhengmin,~ 44. “Zhongguo youmeiyou tequan jiecheng” guanxihu guanxiwang de waifeng” (On (December, 1981), pp. 54-55; and Zhang Jipeng, “L un zhonggong China’s Connection Networks), Z~~~~~#~~~u~~~~, Vol. 21, No. 7 (July, 1987), pp. 28, 30. Choice and Status Group in Contemporary China,” in 45. On this point, see Elisabeth Croll, “Marriage *James L. Watson, ed., C&a and Social St7at~~cat~o~ in ~ost-Re~o~~6~ff~ China, note35, pp. t87- 188. 46. This line ofthinking can be regarded as a new version of “bloodline theory. ” In the initial phase of the Cultural Revolution, Red Guard membership could be attained only by the children of the “five red categories” who were presumably endowed with a “natural redness. ” The new version seems to presume that the children ofhigh officials are endowed with “natural expertise” and therefore better qualified for the leadership reserve. For the original bloodline theory, see Richard C. Kraus, Class Conflict in Chinese Socialism, note 14, pp. 120-1‘22. 47. During the post-Leap crisis, cadres above the rank 14 received special coupons for grain, meat, and so on. “Lun ganbu fuhua yu sigejianchi de guanxi” (On the Reiationship Between Official Corruption and Four Cardinal Pripciples), ZhengmGzg (August, 1988), p. 32.

P7mptiues

i7z Sncidism:

ThheCase in China

71

still had a relatively easy time compared to the hardship ofthe ordinary Red Guards who were later sent down to the countryside. had been sent to the countryside

And even those children

of high officials who

were the first to come back to the cities when a partial

recait was made in the early 1970s. Besides, during the Cultural Revolution decade a new leadership was formed at all levels at the expense ofthe old cadres and the practice of “going backdoors” in entering the party and getting job assignments among the new “princes’ ’ was allegedly worse than in the pre-Cuituraf Revolution years.*s When the new regime was formed under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, the good old days of the 1950s also came back. When the pre-Cultural Revolution college admissions practices were revived in 1977, children of high officials were the first to enter. Not only were strings pulled from influential

cadre families,

but also the children

of cadre backgrounds who were able to afford tutors at home during the Cultural RevoIution decade had a distinct edge in the new enrollment system.“” They were also the first to get wind ofthe new policy. They were the first to go abroad for study and to take prestigious and often Lucrative positions at foreign-trade firms in Shenzhen and Hong Kong. The quick access to “inside information” is one of the most valuable assets of the children of high officials. Added to these were the newly developed institutional framework for promoting them to the leadership reserve, and the expanded policy. Hence the temptations for corrupopportunities created by the “opening” tion.‘” Their privileges work even when they face government investigations and indictments. First, as long as possible, they are kept away from the government investigation because being subject to investigation in China often implies guilt.‘” Second, if they are indicted, then strings are pulled to make sure they get lenient sentences. An anecdote well illustrates the way law does not operate equally in China. Ye Zhifeng, daughter of Ye Fei, vice-chairman imprisonment.

of the National

The younger

People’s

Congress,

Ye, a deputy departmental

was sentenced

to 17 years’

chief of the State Economic

Commission’s Import and Export Bureau, was charged with disclosing state secrets on automobile imports to a Hong Kong businessman. However, Ye’s accomplice, who was believed to be acting more on her instructions than on his own initiative, received a death penalty.“’ Ye Zhifeng’s level member.

arrest was the first incident

to involve a child of a Central

This was a strong warning for taizidang members

Committee

engaged in corruption,

put in the form of “killing the chickens to scare the monkey.” This startling arrest and the subsequent crackdown on economic corruption in 1986 is allegedly to have been staged by Hu Yaobang. And some relate his Iater fall in part to his harsh measures

72

STUDIES IN CO~~PARA~‘IVE

against ~aizidun~, thus highlighting patrons of tuizidung members.53

the magnitude

COMMWISM

of the resistance and protection

by the

Despite the lack of explicit criticisms and reports on the problems associated with taizidang, the populace have known, from the “little media” (x~~~g~a~g~o), how they got to the top and what they do. What the masses are most displeased with is taizidang members’ abuse of power for personal gains and their privileged opportunities in job assignments and promotions which they often consider unfair and unjustifiable.54 The contrast between the unpopular images of tai~jda~g and yet their successful careers makes the populace further frustrated. While criticism of the members of taizidung in the pre-Tiananmen period had been limited to informal arenas or to those who had not yet been well placed in high positions, of 1989 revealed distributed.

that resentments

manifestations against

during the Democracy

taitidang

were quite

intense

Movement and widely

As a matter of fact, before theJune incident there were some criticisms even within the official circle about the wrongdoings associated with taixidang members. With regard to the economic crimes committed by taizidang, a Beijing newspaper reported in early 1986: The

more senior

themselves. personal

the leading

cadres,

A small number

gains

the stricter

the standards

of leading cadres

they should set for

have abused their power for

[and] have even gone so far as to abet their childwn in violating

law and disciplinary

codes.

[emphasis

the

added15s

however, in most cases did not materialize into concrete measures of investigation or indictment due to sophisticated networks of personal relationships, strong protection, and numerous obstructions and resistance from high-level officials

Warnings,

themselves.56

Official

criticisms

were often voiced even against the prerogatives

asso-

ciated with political promotions of the children of cadres. A 1986 circular issued by the Central Committee commented, for instance: The selection most

and use of cadres

notably

that

organizational feudalistic

concept

today,

leading

and personnel

however,

cadres

affairs.

of family relationship.

have

the organizational

anybody.

. much less should they encourage

the

leadership,

associated investigations

to demand however,

only with lower were

always

and personnel “official

these

levels

posts”

problems

of personnel

directed

against

are affected disobeyed

by certain party

problems,

principles

for

. They have selected people based on the . , . The leading cadres themselves must

not instruct

or other relatives To

certain

affairs

departments

and support

to promote

their children,

by using their position of cadre management.

district

selection

spouses,

or influcnce.“7

and

promotion

were

And that is why occasional

and county

levels.

The leadership’s

53. South China Morning Post, August 27, 1988. Also see Parris H. Chang, “The Changing -Nature of Elite Conflict in Post-Mao China, ” in Bpyong J. Kim and Victor C. Falkenheim, eds., Chtnese FoI~t~c~~u~ Moo to Oaf, note 17, p. 128. 54. According to a 1986 survey conducted by the State Council’s Institute of Research on Restructuring Economic System tiingjitizhi~ai~eyanjiusuo) on 2555 people from 20 cities, “power abuse for personal interests”, (yiquan mow) and “pwsonnel management through family and personal connections” (rewen meiqin) ranked the first and the third on the list of “things that the populace were most dissatisfied with,” while inflation marked the second. See_linsi; yanjiu (Economic Studies), (July, 1987), p. 20. 55. Guangming ribao, February 6, 1986, in FLUS, February 21, 1986, pp. KZ-3. 56. See, for instance, Rtmnin ribao, February 1, 1986. 57. See “Circularon Selectingand UsingCadres Strictly in Accordance with Party Principles,” in Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service, February 1, 1986 translated in FRIS, February 3, 1986, pp. K3-7.

Prerogatives typical

position

the impartial

regarding

the higher-level

and objective

ing excerpt

in Socialism:

nature

The Case in China

personnel

of its handling

management

of personnel

How was the list of the third-echelon

leadership

created?

understandable. channels

The list of the third-echelon

and according

articulate

opinions

personnel

organ

have

from

and fourth,

These

already

discussed

can

bypassed

sequently,

criticism reported

Cadres

and interceding

by high-level

problem

of “suppressing

leading

on their

popular

were

it has taken include doing

some

aware

business

of the fallen

Zhao

Con-

rihao, for

Rennin

privileged

to be promoted

cadres

to

cadres concerned, should

take

the lead

unqualified

Ziyang.

process

involved

promoted

but also

through

for the jobs.“”

string

Concerning

had the following

this

response:

and their careers tend to bc affected when

to make specific analyses

controversial

to determine

by

whether

for the job.“’

to mitigate Fourth

ofthe

Even when a cadre is considered

manifested

as well as criticisms

leader,

“strict”

cadres.

and demand

who were

the leadership

during

of the seriousness

measures

the aforementioned

nature

of those

deemed

real talents,”

resentment

and

high-level

continued.

children

All leading

Many

it is still very necessary

highly

channels

from

practices.“”

the cadre is really unqualified The

organization

cadres have racked their brains and resorted

Some cadres are often labeled controversial

leadership

“normal”

a note, paying a visit to the leading

they appear in gossip columns. the majority,

by the

from the concerned

In order to get their children

promoted.

officials

examinations

by the superior

management

not only with the unfair

who were

normal

the mass line to

stages to pass.“”

pressures

with their old acquaintances.

was concerned

with the people

these

by

not dote

as writing

such corrupt

in eliminating

how

And this is

through

1988:

should certain

such malpractices

through

by approvals

the supervision

in personnel

for their children.

and transferred

pulling

detail

in November,

at all levels

treatment

third,

are the essential

adjusted

of nepotism

second,

units;

through

in or

first, by implementing

sectors;

four channels

standards

be

various

on this issue has not

have been generated.

leaders was produced

to strict standards:

of the appropriate

party committees; departments.

Criticism

to stress

as the follow-

Some say that was decided

It seems that our propaganda

been quite enough so that some misunderstandings

instance,

was merely

recruitment

illustrates:

solely by some leading cadres.

We

73

the June

of the problems

the resentment

Plenum’s of economic

decision crimes

Q If past experiences

incident,

however,

associated

made

with taizidang.

on the part of the populace, to prevent allegedly

children committed

are any guide,

the And

which

ofcadres

from

by the sons

the prospects

for

58. “Guanyu disantidui” (On the Third-Echelon Leadership), Liaowanf (Outlook), November 17, 1986, p. 1. 59. Renmin ribao, November 26, 1988. 60. An opinion voiced in early 1989 by Xie Xiaoqing, the head of the Beijing Personnel Evaluation and practices in the appointment and promotion of Examination Center, is illustrative of this point. “Corrupt cadres and the suppression of real talents are two deep-seated problems of the [current prrsonnel management] system. Although public opinion was also solicited and the final decision often was made by a collective See Chzna Daily, January 14, 1989 in leadership, persona1 likes and dislikes still could hardly be avoided.” FBI& January 18, 1989, pp. 21-22. 61. Renmin ribao, February 27, 1989. 62. See FBZS, August 10, 1989, pp. 1l- 12. In addition, after the Fourth Plenum of 1989, a decision was made,jointly by the Central Committee and the State Council to suspend the provision of food and car perks such as the Kanghua Developfor high officials and their families. Furthermore, the formerly “untouchables”

3rurxes

74 success

are

economic some

not

rapid

in August,

level

leaders

actual

1989,

and

even

promotions

measures

in

prerogatives

which

of such

and

involve

gossips

adopted

their

only

Chcn Further-

preventing

personnel

children,

the

has also made

to be ignored.

guidelines

with

spouses,

which

succeed,

leadership

of taizidunp- by demoting

interfering

guidelines,

should

The

with too many

and nine provinces

participating

implementation

if those

was tainted

l3eijing

COMUUNISM

be circumvented.

political

promotion

from

dismissals,

And

of ta2tidun,~ would

in circumventing

whose

more,

encouraging.

privileges

gestures

Haosu

IN COMPAKATIVE

high-

appointments,

or relatives.“”

are by no means

new,

The

remains

to be

seen. While

I have

throughout

very loosely

this article,

and administrative attempts group

positions)

to identify

more

While

attempts

it is quite

possible

evolved

into

a faction

Nor does

it seem

particular

person because

to have

no concrete

manifested.“” and prestige

different

generations

Liao

and Liu current

and

tuiziduny

not to form

success,

that

groups Two

within

the

resented

into

political

hypothetical

group

not fit into

a strict

cleavages

between

be rather

natural

largely

this

political

groups

because,

the

older

at this

by its members. organized

around

generational

its members given

by those

such as Li Peng where

it must

have

group.

If,

the “capacity

of Chinese groups

given

many

and

fact

cadres.

older

that

and Ye Xuanping

officials

their

Resides,

a

model power, there

are

on the one hand,

on the other.

a visible

is to develop game

is a political

does

tuizidcq

Yuan

a faction articulated

that

circumstances

condemned,

the

been

interests

a clique,

may

how

Therefore,

that tuizidun~ has not yet

Tuiziduq

policy

This have

Hui

dominates

become

members,

one or more

suggests

has not become policy

of finding

unavailability

is unknown.“”

formed

at least

T’uizidmy

the task

general

taiziduy

political

As in all similar

observations.

had already

of any distinct

elites, ofthe

of taiziduq

with high

necessary.

socialist

obstacle

well-known

information

as its leader.f”

position,

Under

the

a few hypothetical

or a clique.

the members those

seems

at what positions

that tuizidunf

we are not aware

and

the relatively

available

juncture,

been

actor

among

are placed

to provide

our knowledge,

either,

group

groupings

Resides

without

have

to describe

of taizidun~ faces a formidable

data.

simply

group

of taizidung (especially

as a political

with what backgrounds

study

the term

appraisal

political

characteristics

of the relevant

applied

a brief

politics,

is quite

observations

the

been

political

however, to form the

possible,

prerogatives

a well-calculated the

“prudential”

alliances

within

transformation

of tuiziduny

move

on the rule

the peer

of tuiziduy

are

part

of

for political group,”

still

as categoric

if not inevitable.“’

can be provided

with regard

to the potential

nature

of

ment Corporation and four other giant corporations ~~rr subjected to investigations xxi audits. Scr Begzn,< Re&eiu, August 28%September 3, 1989, pp. 16 11 and November I:$- 19, 1989, pp. 18-23; and Long Fei, (The Current Anti-Corruption Movcmrnt in Crlmmunis! “Dangqian zhonggong de qingfu huodong” China), Z/wzgo~,~~yarzjiu, Vol. 23, No. 9 (September. 1989), pp. 32-43. 6% FRIS, August 14, 1989, p. 46. 64. For most of the younger radrcs of the third-echelon leadership in general, detailed or even sketch) given thr sensitivity biographicill data are not available. Even if official information wcrr released, surrounding the ~nzrzrlnn~ issue, family backgrounds would very likrly bc concralcd. Thcretixc. while, i~t this point, there is no concrrtr evidence to refute the common understanding that numerically la2r~@~ con?titutts a very tiny fraction, such a conception needs to be accepted with critical reservation. 65 For the definitions of faction and cliqur, SEC‘Alan P. Liu, HOW Chma Is Ruled (En+vood Cliffs: I’rcntire-Hall, 1986), p. 232. 66 For a somewhat grncral dcsuiptwn ofthe gcnrrational model, set Michael Yahuda, “Poht~cal Grncr;~tions 111China,” China Quarterly, No. 80 (Dtcember, . 1979), pp. 793-805. Lqitmacy, and Cot@ 67. For the prudenrial rules in Chinese politics, xc Frederick C. ‘I’eiwrb, Lmdmhip, in Chma. From a Chartrrnatlr Mao to the Polttzcs ufSuccmzon (Armonk. M Ii. Sharpc, 1984), p. 95

Prerogatives group

formation

important antagonism political

by taizidang

interest

or

toward

functional

could

taizidang

members from

develop

into

nature

and their

the

group.

ample

formal

time as well

‘O A

require

a longer

for

group

personnel

the

of their

patrons,

definite

of their

some

common

become reform

own

somefavoring

power

with

could

quickly

of the

political

taizidang

characterization

time-frame,

their

Second,

taizidang may

an

a collective

to undermine

on the basis

cultivation

constitute

on

officials.“s

the accelerated

as political

more

could

largely

designed

of high

In conclusion,

With

groupings.

of taizidang may

move

interest

criteria.“”

biological

is based

the children

a bureaucratic

categoric

unity

75

as a whole

taizidang

egalitarian

being

or other

than a mere

assistance

whose

from

form

specialization

more

First,

group

“ultra-leftist”

derived

taizidang members thing

any

legitimacy

members.

opinion

The Case in China

in Socialism:

however.

Conclusion Nepotism

and favoritism

Inherited

privileges

and

socialist

systems,

traditional

China

exception.

of children

in job

But

in both

and

China.

to which

resentment

and

criticism

seems

egalitarian

class

struggle

has

analysis.

The

”

“virtuocratic” tional

prevailing system

change

of individualistic

the widespread Chinese

to the emergence sacrificed

the low profile

dissatisfaction

new

China.

of pulling

of the Cultural

one.

near-abolition and

the

no

popular

The

of

less class

transition

from

a

And the need for genera-

and political product

strings

for children’s

atmosphere

and

arrangements.‘t

of deradicalization

decade whose

was

generated

as the

of those

in both

China

the “feodocratic”

Revolution

composed

capitalist

and

inequality

facilitated

ideological

has revived

pragmatism

Maoist

of “more has

in both

Union,

of prerogatives

to post-Mao

rationale

system

practice

experience

egalitarian

of time or place.

existed

the Soviet

to a “meritocratic”

of taizidang largely

by the radical

Despite spread

the

with the deradicalized

The

the unique

Even

regardless have

and

the situation

economic

of a retirement

prevalence

quite

created

the introduction precipitated

Russia

the reproduction

ofrecruitment

combined

are ubiquitous

and promotions

traditional

socialist

the degree

by elites

assignments

promotions.

has And

has also contributed

earlier

careers

had been

egalitarianism. in the Chinese

and resentment

official

among

press

of the taizidang

the population

have proven

problem,

wide-

to be a serious

68. Formation of what Jurgen Domes has called a “proto-secondary” group based on the Cultural Revolution experience is very plausible, which agrees on the prevention of radical “leftist” takeover by all means. For the term, see The Government and P&tics ofthe PRC: A Time of? ransitton (Boulder: Westview, i985), p. 82. It is quite possible that the Tiananmen crisis actually strenghtrned the initially weak ties among the taizidan.~members. 69. An example might be a group formation among military-related taizidang members such as Zou ,Jiahua, Ding Henggao, Wu Shaozu and He Pengfei as well as Deng Nan (Dens Xiaoping’s daughter), Yang Shaojing (Yang Shangkun’s son), Nie Li (Nie Rongzhen’s daughter), and Zhang Pin (Zhang Aiping’s son) who share the work experience at the State Commission of Science, Industry and Technology for National Defense. Or a group could be formed on the basis of the same educational background such as the Yanan College of Natural Sciences or studying in the Soviet Union. For the primary-group formation on the bzlsis of common organizational or educational background, see Zhid., p. 81. 70. The evolution of groups with weak linkages toward formal groups with clearly articulated interests is noted in Tang Tsou, “Prolegomenon to the Study of Informal Groups in CCP Politics” (originally in China Quarterly) in Tang Tsou, The Cultural Reuolution and Post-Mao Reforms (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), p. 98. 71. Feodocracy refers to the system of recruitment where roles are assigned according to ascriptive status. See Susan Shirk, Competitive Comrades, note 49, p. 10, footnote 23. For a cultural argument on China’s feodocratic arrangement, see Simon de Beaufort, Yellow Earth, Green ,Jade. Constants in Chinese Political Morer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), especially pp. 26-30.

76

SKIDIES

test

for China’s

secondary

regime

importance.

mitigate

the

IN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM

stability. More

Whether

important

or not

is probably

ta&fun,~

is a new

the issue

of how to solve or at least

ta2zidun~

dilemma.

Would

China’s

control

organs

resolving

this

problem?

Would

Chinese

leaders

endanger

the

offspring?

The

whole

guardians? leaders

themselves

The

may

post-Mao means

considered

to have

have

come

ship’s

be able

the

is closely to elicit

be noted,

related

to these

programs

be of

engage of their

ofwho by those

economic

of the rule.

in own

will guard other

populace,

those

in official

positions.

the

than

popular

successful support

in the coming

as the

regime

the

positions

these resolution

the Beijing

perceptions of this regime

most

which

on the other

To what extent

the gap between that

reforms

communist

The

benefiting privileged

will bridge however,

to how much

for its reform

considered

Mao’s

as unfairly

access

measures

It should

has

actively careers

dilemma

on the leaders

may

to the dilemma.72

legitimacy

during

to view the reforms

to the age-old

of checks

solution

leadership

plummeted

post-Tiananmen

down

system

to enhance

who have unfair

to be seen. problem

comes

be the only

Chinese

important

offspring

question

An institutionalized

class

was hand,

and their the leaderremains important is going

to

years.

72. This point IS closely related to the issue ot’dcmocracy. Even in a democratic system there arc plenty of appointed positions which are often given out on the basis of personalrelationships and family connrctions. Rut the institutionalization of democracy based on electoral representation, the politics of‘responsibility, and the full activation ofthe checks on the guardians by the guarded, are capable ofat lrast mitigating thr politics of prrrogatives. The issue is, after all, to substitute individual authoritv with institutional authority.