The politics of speeches, votes, and deliberations: Gendered legislating and energy policy-making in Germany and the United States

Energy Research & Social Science 19 (2016) 134–141

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Original research article

The politics of speeches, votes, and deliberations: Gendered legislating and energy policy-making in Germany and the United States Cornelia Fraune University of Siegen, Research Centre “Shaping the Future” (FoKoS), Weidenauer Str. 167, 57076 Siegen, Germany

a r t i c l e

i n f o

Article history: Received 21 February 2016 Received in revised form 20 May 2016 Accepted 8 June 2016 Available online 24 June 2016 Keywords: Gender Energy policy preferences Roll call votes Speech-giving

a b s t r a c t Empirical evidence reveals a gender difference in both energy technology preferences and environmental concern. In contrast, research on gender differences in environmental or energy policy-making is rather sparse and yields inconclusive results. But more recent research on gender in environmental policymaking provides empirical evidence that female legislators make a difference in policy outcome. This paper contributes to this research by analyzing the legislative behavior of female and male legislators in energy policy-making in Germany and the United States for both roll call votes and legislative debates. The study gives hints that there exist gender differences in energy policy-making revealed by legislators’ energy policy preferences. © 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction The aim of this paper is to explore empirically if gender differences in energy policy-making exist. Energy policy is a cross-section policy field. Due to its inherent multiplicity of objectives it is characterized by trade-offs. Ideal-typically, these trade-offs are represented by the hard path on the one hand and by the soft path on the other. These paths differ in technological, environmental, and social dimensions. Empirical research revealed gender differences in both energy technology preferences as well as environmental concern. These differences are especially significant in terms of nuclear energy technology and in terms of risk aversion of environmental damage. More recent research on gender in environmental policy-making provides empirical evidence that female legislators make a difference in policy outcome. The crucial question is therefore if the aforementioned gender differences in individual preferences also have an effect in legislative behavior. In contrast to individual preferences, legislators’ behavior in roll call voting and in speech-giving is not only determined by personal characteristics but by many other factors like party affiliation, party discipline, etc. The results are particularly relevant in the discussion about gendered vulnerabilities of climate change. Against this background, the integration of women decision-making bodies is claimed. But a core question of gender research on representation is about the impact of women entering the parliamentary arena:

E-mail address: [email protected] http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2016.06.007 2214-6296/© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Does a greater representation of women result in a genuine change or does nothing become fundamentally different? [1]. The article is organized as follows. In the first part, the complexity of energy policy objectives and the analytical concept of hard and soft paths are explained in order to reveal energy policy dimensions. Then, gender differences within these different dimensions are explored by a literature review. In the second part, hypotheses about gender differences in both energy policy roll call vote and speech-giving are inferred from research on gender in legislative behavior. Finally, female legislators’ behavior within roll call vote and speech-making activities is analyzed. The analysis is based on a dataset that covers various characteristics of both roll call vote as well as speeches given in major energy policy initiatives in the U.S. Congress (1992–2007) as well as in the German Bundestag (2000–2011). The results show that gender influences energy policy priorities and preferences but it is leveraged by party affiliation in roll call vote. Although energy policy is traditionally a rather ‘hard’ policy issue, female legislators’ activities in speech-making confirm prior research showing that female members of Parliament (MPs) compensate for underrepresentation. 1.1. Energy policy objectives and preferences Energy policy objectives are not static but contingent on political definitions of challenges, their order of priority as well as the appropriate policy measures and instruments for tackling these challenges [2,3]. Until the first OPEC oil embargo in 1973, availability of energy sources at an affordable price was determined as political task in order to meet the energy demand of economic

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output and rising standards of living. Policy measures dealt with individual energy resources, energy supply and demand were not perceived as coherent system [4,5]. The OPEC oil embargo revealed that dependency of resource imports was not only a theoretical but a real threat to Western democracies. Beyond the smooth flow of fossil fuels and the operation of the energy grid, economic and political ramifications of energy import dependency emerged on the energy policy agenda. In consequence, beyond energy security energy independence became an objective of energy policy [6,7]. Since the early 1980s, a fundamental ideational change took place—from ‘plan to market’ [8]. Against the background of excess supply in oil, gas, and electricity, the liberal paradigm was also implemented in the energy sector. Energy services were no longer perceived as public but as private good. Therefore, deregulation and privatization of the energy sector were enforced [2,3]. At the same time, climate change appeared on the political agenda. There was a robust international consensus on its major contributor, namely carbon dioxide emissions primarily caused by the combustion of fossil fuels [9,10]. Climate change also became an objective of energy policy. Due to the limited availability of fossil fuels the objective of climate change is often intertwined with sustainability [6]. In the 1990s, detrimental ramifications of the liberal paradigm became obvious. At the international level, energy security and energy independence were threat by a new rivalry in both supply and demand between the established Western countries and emerging Asian ones [2]. At the national level, energy security became a challenge again due to actual or imminent short comings of supply as well as black outs [11]. The reasons were manifold: decreasing infrastructural robustness, insufficient diversity of energy sources, or insufficient reliability [6]. In consequence, the organizational principle of the energy market changed: “As a result, the market mechanism started to become contested and was complemented by other organisational principles, making the entire system more polycentric. The state’s role, finally, was no longer one of a mere rule setter and enforcer; rather, it was perceived to be a stakeholder of ‘public interest’, with an active mandate to safeguard the latter” ([2], p. 203). Moreover, the discussion on reducing carbon dioxide emissions shifted from merely saving energy by increasing energy efficiency to transform energy systems to low carbon [2]. Beyond the definition of energy policy objectives as well as their priority order, energy policy deals also with the design and implementation of policy measures in order to achieve its objectives. Allocation and distribution of energy services are not only linked to the actual governance mechanism but also the technical and institutional setup of the energy system. Traditionally, energy systems are rather large technical systems, energy is provided by few large business concerns. In contrast, the utilization of renewable energy sources for energy provision predominantly evolved in small-scale, decentralized systems [12]. Beyond energy provision, technical properties of grids are a major challenge for allocation and distribution [13,14]. Finally, aggregate social utility depends on the quality and reliability of energy services provided by the energy system [6,15]. Energy sources available differ in achieving social demands: “The economic, political, and social value of energy corresponds to the readiness and efficiency with which joules, kilowatt-hours, or BTU can be applied to a particular task. Therefore accessibility, transportability, storage, and stability are critical to the value of an energy source as are impacts of its use like greenhouse gas (GHG) and particulate emissions” ([6], p. 780). Energy policy is a cross-section policy field. It is characterized by an inherent multiplicity of objectives and therefore by trade-offs. Energy policy preferences are critical for the definition of energy policy objectives and their priority order. Analytically, the technical and social differences of energy sources and the related energy systems are grasped by the ‘hard’

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versus ‘soft’ path paradigm introduced by Amory Lovins in 1976 [16]. Albeit the single dichotomy between hard and soft energy paths is an over-simplification, the ‘hard’ versus the ‘soft’ paths paradigm is still of analytical value today since it integrates technical and social dimensions of energy systems [17,18]. The hard path relies on energy supply by fossil fuels and nuclear power. Energy is provided by centralized, large-technical systems that are operated by some powerful actors. Renewable energy sources harnessed by small-scale and decentralized technologies are the basis of the soft path. Energy conservation and energy efficiency are characteristics of both paths but are induced by price in case of the hard one and by policy in case of the soft one. Moreover, both paths differ according to their safety hazards as well as their intensity or reversibility of environmental impact [16,19,20]. Lovins [16] clearly favored for the soft path. He argued that this is sustainable, environmentally friendly and more egalitarian. In dependence on energy policy objectives, there are also reasons to favor the hard path. Mainly, it is argued that further nuclear energy development is needed in order to achieve the objective of energy security. Moreover, nuclear energy is seen as an appropriate energy technology to fight climate change [21]. Another reason is path dependency. Although features of the soft paths are existent, current energy systems are still predominantly reliant on hard-path sources. Energy system transformations are characterized by uncertain ramifications for energy supply, especially security of supply as well as international competitiveness [22]. It is a matter of political dispute which path is more qualified for meeting future energy challenges. 1.2. Gender and energy policy preferences In a nutshell, both the hard and the soft energy paths differ in technological, environmental, and social dimension. Actually, there exists a certain amount of empirical evidence of gender-related differences in preferences on energy technologies and environmental concern. In order to explain gender differences in energy policy preferences and attitudes, this research is now reviewed. The most unambiguous results display studies on public opinions and attitudes toward nuclear energy. They provide evidence that men are more likely to support nuclear energy whereas women are more likely to oppose it. These results are stable over time and space [20,21,23–27]. Recently, Sundström and McCright [28] show that this gendered pattern of attitude towards nuclear energy is also revealed among elected officials in Sweden. Moreover, their results demonstrate that this pattern is also robust across different polity levels even when controlling for factors like party affiliation. In contrast, Jensen [29] who conveyed a comparative study of legislators in Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden conclude that differences in attitudes to nuclear power are rather explained by ideology than by gender. For other energy technologies, empirical results are less unambiguous. Concerning fossil fuels, the results of the study of Longstreth et al. [20] provide evidence for the existence of a gendered pattern of attitude similar to nuclear power. On the other hand, the results of Greenberg [26] display women to be more likely to support fossil fuels. Paradoxically, the study also revealed that women are more likely to support renewable energy. DevineRight [30] reports that women tend to support the development of renewable energy to a greater extent than men. At the same time, their support of wind farms is lesser than those of men. In this context, Krohn and Damborg [31] find out that women and men yield different priorities concerning scales of wind energy production: “Women prefer groups of 2–8 turbines over larger parks and single standing turbines. Men prefer parks of 10–50 turbines over smaller parks and isolated turbines” ([31], p. 95). More recently, fracking came to the attention of the public. Davis and Fisk [32] reveal that female respondents are to some extent more likely to

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oppose fracking than male ones. Moreover, women are more likely to take position for stricter regulation and for the promulgation of chemical disclosure rules. Similar patterns of gender differences in public attitudes and preferences were found in studies on environmental concern. These studies reveal that female respondents are more concerned about the environment than their male counterparts [33,34]. Xiao and McCright [33,35] explain that this result is robust over different empirical studies although environmental concern is operationalized via different items [33,35]: environment/economic trade-offs, participation in pro-environmental activities, pro-environmental attitudes and/or ecological worldview, perceived seriousness of different types of environmental problems, or environmental policy preferences (for a detailed review see Refs. [33,35,36]). Environmental policy preferences were analyzed by Konisky et al. [36]. They find that women are more supportive of regulation to deal with pollution issues than men but they do not find similar gender differences concerning resource issues, i.e. protection of natural and biological resources [36]. Concerning members in parliament, research reveals that ideology rather than gender explains differences in attitudes on environmental concern [29,34]. The empirical results on gender differences in both energy production technology and environmental concern are consistent. Most of them refer theoretically to the so-called “safety concern hypothesis” [37] or “concerns about health and safety” hypothesis [38]. After these hypotheses have gained some empirical support, as explained above, research is recently more focused on validating theoretical explanations for the association between gender and environmentalism. Xiao and McCright [33] find weak support for the gender socialization argument and no support for the social roles argument [33]. Both arguments refer to gender differences in empathy for the needs and welfare for other people. According to this reasoning, women acquire greater empathic concern during their socialization and then cultivate it due to gender role expectations and experiences [39]. But Xiao and McCright [33] revealed consistent support for the gendered risk perception hypothesis [33]. Milfont and Sibley [39] find some support for the link between empathy and social dominance orientation as explanation for gender differences in environmental concern. It is argued that women and men differ in their pro-environmental engagement because they acquired different levels of empathy and social dominance as a result of differences in gender roles and socialization [39]. A common critique on this branch of research is its rather simple and poor theoretical explanation. It is argued that the dominant quantitative approach of this branch of research rather consolidate than explain gender differences in both energy production technology and environmental concern [40]. In general, genderrelated energy research has shown that a more interpretative qualitative approach offers important insights about gender differences in energy preferences that are hidden by merely quantitative approaches. In this context, research has shown that gendered dimensions of energy use exist. In a simplistic manner, men’s preferences in energy services are rather characterized by economic and technological interests while women’s preferences in energy services are rather characterized by cultural norms on the provision of care and comfort [41–43]. Though theoretical explanations are rather poorly developed yet, the literature review shows that there exists some empirical evidence about gender differences in energy policy preferences concerning both the technological and the environmental dimension. Concerning the social dimension empirical evidence is rather sparse and yields also inconclusive results. On the one hand, it seems that women support rather small-scale renewable energy plants in contrast to men who support rather large-scale ones [30,31]. On the other hand, more recent research reveals that

concerning energy security decentralizing energy systems were gauged rather less important across both genders [44].

2. Women in energy policy-making The literature review presented in the last preceding paragraph revealed that there exist gender differences in individual attitude and preferences concerning energy production technology and environmental concern. According to these results, women rather prefer the soft policy path whereas men rather prefer the hard one. But it is a political and not a private task to decide which energy path to take. Or, as Goldthau [2] puts it “For a paradigm to have an impact, and slightly to paraphrasing Kuhn here, it needs to be shared among a community of crucial actors. In the case of energy these are notably national lawmakers, members of government and public bureaucrats, on a domestic level as well as in international organisations such as the International Energy Agency” ([2], p. 200). Therefore, the crucial question is if a gender difference in energy policy preferences is also existent in legislative behavior, a research gap that is addressed by Ergas and York [45] and Sundström and McCright [28] in their recommendations for future research. Yet, research on gender differences in environmental or energy policy-making is rather sparse and yields inconclusive results. Jones [46] shows that gender does not explain legislator’s priority to commit himself to environmental policy, neither in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies nor in the United States House of Representatives. Similarly, Tremblay [47] does not find any relevant gender differences concerning environment as area of interest of Canadian member of parliaments. Reingold’s [48] study on state legislators in Arizona and California confirms these results for both legislators’ preferences and policy priorities. In contrast, more recent research on gender in environmental policy-making provides empirical evidence that female legislators make a difference in policy outcome. Norgard and York [49] point out that women’s representation in parliament is a highly significant predictor of environmental treaties ratification. Rachel’s Network [50] analysis on environmental voting records in Congress reveals that gender explains voting behavior in environmental protections and policies. Likewise, Fredriksson and Wang [51] report for roll-call voting on environmental policy issues that female legislators of the U.S. House of Representatives favor stricter environmental policies than their male counterparts. Ergas and York [45] indicate that in nations where women’s status measured by seats in parliament held by women, number of years women had the right to vote, and women in ministerial government is higher, CO2 emissions are lower. This paper contributes to this research by analyzing the legislative behavior of female and male legislators in energy policymaking in Germany and the United States compared for both roll call votes and legislative debates. Energy policy is a distinctive policy field because it consists of both soft as well as hard policy dimensions. As explained, hard and soft energy paths describe different approaches to consider energy supply. Both paths rely on different energy resources (fossil/conventional, large-scale versus renewable, small-scale). Beyond technological differences, hard and soft energy policy paths also advocate different approaches to understand energy systems, i.e. relations between ecological, technological and social dimensions of energy supply and consumption [16]. These larger differences are also revealed by political discourse: “Arguments advocating hard paths are based on the idea that energy is a matter of national interest, largely use technoscientific rhetoric, and propose a deficit representation of the public as lacking knowledge of capacities for dealing with – and interesting in – such difficult issues. On the contrary, arguments in favor of soft paths are based on representations of energy as an ecological resource that should be saved, insist on the idea that energy sys-

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tems can be decentralised, give value to lay knowledge and propose a view of the public as active environmentally and environmentally concerned” ([18], p. 39). Recent energy policies initiatives in the United States and in Germany include both measures reflecting the hard path as well as measures reflecting the soft path [10,52]. Against the background of the women’s representation research underlying assumption that female legislators are better equipped to represent the interests of women than their male counterparts [1,53], it is suggested that female and male legislators vote differently within energy policy-making. Prior research pointed out that due to the existing gender regime female legislators are more concerned with “people” while male legislators are more concerned with “things” [54]. In consequence, it is assumed that female and male legislators act differently since they yield different priority orders of energy policy’s objectives—security of supply, environment and social issues. H1 . In energy policy-making, female and male legislators vote differently. Beyond socially constructed gender differences, other factors may have an influence on women’s and men’s energy policy’s priorities. Prior research points out the influence of political systems and their specific configurations on women’s representation in parliaments [55]. As will be explained in the next section, the United States and Germany are quite different concerning both – political opportunity structures and their overall energy policy paths. If gender makes a difference in policy-making due to socially constructed gender differences, this difference exists independent from political opportunity structures for women’s representation as well as independent from the overall energy policy path. H2 . A gender difference in energy policy voting behavior exists independent from country effects, therefore female and male legislators vote differently within both U.S. and German energy policy-making initiatives. Beyond structural factors, personal characteristics are also important in shaping legislators’ behavior. Within research, legislator’s ideology – mainly reflected in party affiliation – is seen as an important explanation for parliamentary behavior [56,57]. Parties differ concerning the priority order of energy policy objectives [12,58]. Moreover, it is shown that party ideology also shapes female legislators’ attitude towards women’s issues [59]. In contrast, the theory of the politics of presence argues that women’s interests are best represented by female legislators because women’s everyday experience are different to men’s [60,61]. This assumption is empirically undergirded by the above mentioned research on gendered dimension of energy consumption [41–43]. In order to test the assumption of shared gendered everyday experiences, it is hypothesized that female legislators yield different energy policy priorities than men independent from party affiliation. H3 . Gender differences in voting behavior exist independent from party affiliation. Roll call vote is a rather passive legislative activity. In contrast, speech-making is more proactive: “In the days before a vote comes to the floor, members must be proactive if they wish to play a part in the deliberations” ([56], p. 52).” Recently, Bäck et al. [62] asked “who takes the floor”. Their results show that there exists a gendered distribution of labor within parliaments, the gender of a MP and the topic of a parliamentary debate are correlated when it comes to legislative speeches. This gendered distribution of labor reflects the empirically observed pattern that female legislators are more concerned with “people” while male legislators are more concerned with “things” [54]. Since energy policy consists of both soft policies as well as hard policies, it is suggested that female legisla-

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tors are as active in speech-making in energy policy debates as their male counterparts. Thus, it is hypothesized that female legislators take the floor proportionately to their share of parliamentary seats. H4 . The share of speeches given by female MPs is proportional to their share of parliamentary seats. Pearson and Dancey [63] argued recently, that being more active than their male counterparts is female legislators’ strategy to compensate for their numerical underrepresentation in parliament. Their results show that women are more active in legislative speech-making than men. As explored, energy policy consists of hard and soft policy dimensions. Due to historical and policy contexts, the hard dimensions are more entrenched than the soft dimensions. Against the background that women are more active than men in order to compensate gendered imbalances in policymaking, it is argued that women give longer speeches than men. H5 . The word count of speeches given by female legislators is larger than those of speeches given by male legislators. 3. Gender differences in energy policy-making The literature review presented in section 1.2 revealed that gender differences in individual energy policy preferences are stable over time and space. In order to analyze gender differences in legislators’ energy policy priorities, roll call votes and the respective debates on energy policy initiatives in Germany and the United States are explored. Both countries have adopted comprehensive energy legislation in the context of the challenges of energy security and climate change. Moreover, these countries are similar regarding the gendered division of labor. But they are different concerning their political systems. These differences are an important explanatory factor for differences in women’s representation. 3.1. Method and data gathering Data were gathered from roll call votes as well as political debates on energy policy initiatives in the United States and Germany. Both countries implemented comprehensive energy legislation in light of the ‘new energy paradigm’ [3]. Although they present archetypes of different approaches to state-society relations, i.e. gender-class intersections, particularly implemented by welfare regimes [64], there exists a similar gendered division of labor. Women are the primary caregivers at home in both countries [54,65] although the German welfare system emphasizes traditional gender roles, whereas the U.S. welfare system emphasizes equal opportunities. Thus, the ascribed ‘shared experiences of women’ are similar which are said to be the cause of gender differences in legislative behavior. Moreover, the political systems of both countries are different. Germany is a parliamentary democracy. The Bundestag consisted of five major parties when the energy policy initiatives considered were implemented: a conservative party (a merger of the Christian Democratic Union [CDU] and Christian Social Union [CSU]), a social democratic party (Social Democratic Party [SPD]), a green party (Alliance 90/The Greens party [Bündnis 90/Die Grünen]), a liberal party (Free Democratic Party [FDP]) and a left party (Left Party [Die Linke]), successor of Party of Democratic Socialism [PDS]. Members of the Bundestag are elected by a combination of direct and proportional representation. The United States is a presidential democracy with a two-party system: one center-left Party (Democrats) and one right party (Republicans). Members of the Congress are elected by a majoritarian electoral system [54]. Prior research has shown that differences in political systems are important explanatory factors for differences in women’s representation [1,55]. The U.S. energy laws analyzed in the study were enacted by the 102nd, the

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109th, and the 110th Congress. The 102nd Congress consisted of 435 members, 35 of them were female; the 109th Congress consisted of 538 members, 85 of them were female, and the 110th Congress consisted of 539 members, 90 of them were female. The German energy laws analyzed in this study were implemented during the legislature of the 14th–17th German Bundestag. During the 14th legislation, 207 out of 669 members were female. The 15th Bundestag consisted of 603 members, 199 of them were female; the 16th Bundestag consisted of 614 members, 194 of them were female, and the 17th Bundestag consisted of 620 members, 204 of them were female. From a descriptive representation point of view, the German political system favors the political representation of women more than the U.S. system [55]. The discussion on substantive representation goes beyond the question of the gendered distribution of seats and is concerned with the representation of women’s interests by female legislators [1]. In this respect, this paper explores if female legislators behave different in energy policy-making by analyzing the impact of gender in roll call votes as well as in legislative debates. Therefore, floor procedures are of special interest. In both parliaments, Congress and Bundestag, the fundamental character of bills is prepared in parliamentary committees [66,67]. In the German Bundestag, speaking time is distributed among the parties in proportion to their relative strength. Within this framework, parties not only determine which members speak but also allocate speaking time [66]. In the U.S. Congress, speaking time is equally distributed between the parties. Each party determines a floor manager who chairs the debate and controls time [67]: “If there are more requests than time, floor managers determine which members speak. Nonetheless, most members are accommodated, and all members are able to submit remarks during debate” ([63], p. 92). Thus, in Congress representatives have more autonomy than in the Bundestag in regard to both speech-making as well as length of their speech. This is also true in roll call votes since party discipline is much more pronounced in the Bundestag than in Congress [68,69]. Roll call votes give information about legislators’ partyaffiliation, gender,1 and vote. From the debates, the following information was gathered and coded: Law, SpeakerSurname, SpeakerSex, SpeakerWordCount, and SpeakerPartyAffiliation. For both countries, the most important energy policy acts were analyzed. In case of the United States, the final results of roll call votes of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (102nd Congress)2 , the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (109th Congress) (EPA 2005), and the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (110th Congress) (EPA 2007) were analyzed.3 Beyond these three acts, the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA) also belongs to most important U.S. energy policy acts [70]. Unfortunately, roll call vote tallies are only available since 1989/1990, therefore only EPA 1992, 2005, and 2007 were analyzed. In case of Germany, the final results of roll call votes of four laws were scrutinized: The Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG) 2000, the EEG 2009, the Atomic Energy Act (AtG) 2010, and

1 Due to reasons of simplification, legislator’s sex is equated with legislator’s gender within this paper. 2 A roll call vote was only conducted by the House of Representatives; the Senate conducted a voice vote. 3 Sources: Energy Policy Act 1992: “Final Vote Results for Roll Call 474” (http://clerk.house.gov/evs/1992/roll474.xml); Energy Policy Act 2005: “Final Vote Results for Roll Call 445” (http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2005/roll445. xml); “U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 109th Congress—1st Session, Vote no. (http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll call lists/roll call vote cfm. 213” cfm?congress=109&session=1&vote=00213); Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007: “Final Vote Results for Roll Call 1177” (http://clerk.house.gov/evs/ 2007/roll1177.xml); “U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 110th Congress—1st Session, Vote no. 430” (http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll call lists/roll call vote cfm. cfm?congress=110&session=1&vote=00430).

the AtG 2011.4 Beyond these four acts, the AtG 2002 and the EEG 2004 also belong to the most important German energy policy acts [71]. In both cases, it was voted by show of hands. The final debates of the following acts were analyzed for the United States EPA 1992, EPA 2005, and EPA 2007 and for Germany EEG 2000, AtG 2002, EEG 2004, EEG 2009, AtG 2010, and AtG 2011.5 For the United States it was differentiated if speaker gave an input to the debate or were concerned with debate coordination issues. The former was coded as speaker the latter were coded as coordination. Finally, the dataset was adjusted by removing the variables ‘independent’, ‘fraktionslos’ (German equivalent to independent) and ‘enthalten’ (German equivalent to ‘not voting’) because variance for a whole level was missing in each case. Independent/fraktionslos had no variance in sex. In case of the ‘enthalten’ votes, there were no observations for one German party (SPD). Missing observations for whole factor levels would lead to biased confidence intervals and therefore these cases were removed from the data set. Finally, the voting data set consists of 3646 observations, whereof 881 observations are votes given by female legislators, and 2765 observations are votes given by male legislators. Data were analyzed by a logistic regression model implemented in R. The debate data set consists of 461 observations, whereof 70 observations are debate contributions given by female MPs, and 391 observations are debate contributions given by male MPs. Data were analyzed by parametric tests implemented in R. 3.2. Distribution of votes between women and men Although the energy policy initiatives under review include both measures reflecting the hard path as well as measures reflecting the soft path [10,52], it was hypothesized in H1 that women and men vote differently because they yield different priority orders of energy policy dimensions. In order to test this hypothesis a logistic regression analysis (Model 1) with vote as dependent and legislators’ gender as independent variable was run (Table 1). The results confirm H1 since they are highly significant (p-value < 0.001). But the model reduces the null deviance only slightly from 4216.0 to 4206.4 (AIC). In order to control the influence of political system differences as well as the influence of overall energy policy paths, the result of gender differences in vote was validated by analyzing the roll call vote results in dependence of the factor sex as well as the factor country (H2 ). The results of the logistic regression (Model 2) reveal that the gender differences in voting behavior are significant even when controlling for country effects (p-value 0.002). According to the AIC the model with two independent variables is slightly superior to the single variable model (AIC 4203.3)6 (Table 1). Since party affiliation is an important factor influencing legislators’ energy policy priority order, it was hypothesized in H3 that gender makes a difference in voting behavior independent from party affiliation. A logistic regression analysis with the independent variables sex and party affiliation (Model 3) reveals strong

4 Sources: EEG 2000 (http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btp/14/14091.pdf); EEG 2009 (http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/16/16167.pdf); AtG 2010 (http://dip21. bundestag.de/dip21/btp/17/17068.pdf); AtG 2011 (http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/ btp/17/17117.pdf). 5 Sources: EPA 2005 (https://www.congress.gov/congressional-record/2005/ https://www.congress.gov/congressional-record/2005/07/29); EPA 07/28, 2007 (https://www.congress.gov/congressional-record/2007/12/18, https:// www.congress.gov/congressional-record/2007/12/13); EEG 2000 (http://dipbt. bundestag.de/doc/btp/14/14091.pdf); AtG 2002 (http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/ btp/14/14209.pdf); EEG 2004 (http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/15/15103. pdf); EEG 2009 (http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/16/16167.pdf); AtG 2010 (http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/17/17068.pdf); EEG 2012 (http://dipbt. bundestag.de/doc/btp/17/17117.pdf). 6 Beyond the AIC, the BIC was also computed. The results are also robust for BIC.

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Table 1 Summary logistic regression models. Predictors

Dependent Variables Model 1

(Intercept) female USA CDU/CSU Democrats DIE LINKE FDP Republicans SPD Observations AIC Family

OR 0.33 1.37

Model 2 CI 0.30–0.36 1.16–1.62

p <0.001 <0.001

3646 4206.400 binomial (logit)

OR 0.36 1.32 0.84

Model 3 CI 0.32–0.40 1.11–1.56 0.71–0.98

3646 4203.275 binomial (logit)

p <0.001 0.002 0.024

OR 0.61 1.13

CI 0.44–0.85 0.94–1.36

0.51 0.36–0.73 0.45 0.32–0.65 3.14 2.06–4.83 0.64 0.42–0.97 0.56 0.39–0.80 0.36 0.25–0.52 3646 4034.043 binomial (logit)

p 0.003 0.197 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.037 0.002 <0.001

Source: Own calculation.

and significant effects of party affiliation and the AIC is reduced to a great extent (AIC 4034) but the effect of sex is no longer significant when controlled for party affiliation (Table 1). This finding opens up another question: does gender make a difference in terms of party affiliation? The roll call vote results show that women and men differ in their affiliation to parties. These differences were tested for significance with a chi-square-test and the result is highly significant C2 (6, n = 3646) = 358.5, p < 2.2e-16. In consequence, the results show that gender makes a difference in legislator’s energy policies voting behavior. But they also reveal that party affiliation influences the impact of gender. 3.3. Speech-giving by female and male legislators Giving speeches in the parliament is an important vehicle for female legislators to express women’s interests [63]. Since energy policy cannot be allocated according to the gendered division of labor within parliaments anymore, it was argued in H4 that the share of speeches given by female MPs is proportional to their share of parliamentary seats. Women’s share of parliamentary seats is measured as share of female legislators participating in roll call vote activities in the energy policy initiatives under consideration. In Germany, women’s share of seats in parliament is on average 31%, the share of energy policy speeches given by female legislators is only 25%. But a proportion test shows that this difference is not significant (p-value = 0.3001). This means that fewer women are giving speeches in energy policy debates in Germany than their representation in Bundestag would suggest but we cannot rule out that this effect is just random. In the United States, women’s share of seats in Congress is on average 13%. The share of energy policy speeches given by female MPs is nearly equal. For the U.S. we can therefore conclude that women participate in the debates about energy policies according to their representation in Congress. Thus, H4 is confirmed for both countries. These results may indicate that energy policy is not a classical hard policy field anymore because in hard policy fields, we would expect women to be underrepresented in speech giving activities due to the gendered division of labor in parliaments. Research has shown that women compensate for a lower share in parliamentary seats by being more active in speech-making than men [63]. Since the soft dimensions of energy policy are less entrenched than the hard ones as well as women’s interests in energy policy are rather “uncrystallized” [72], it was argued in H5 that female legislators compensate for these disadvantages by giving more detailed speeches in terms of word count. The results yield the existence of important country differences. In Germany, female legislators (mean word count: 838) give less detailed speeches than men (mean word count: 1116) on average. The t-test shows that

this difference is highly significant (t (47) = 2.76, p = 0.008). In the United States, female legislators (mean word count: 569) give more detailed speeches than men (mean word count: 557) on average. The t-test yields that this difference is not significant (t (68) = −0.12, p = 0.903). These results also seem to undergird the assumption that energy policy is more and more enhanced by soft dimensions. 3.4. Discussion Concerning the question if female legislators yield different policy preferences than their male counterparts in energy policymaking, the results are mixed. The roll call vote results displayed that female and male legislators voted differently on energy policy laws. Moreover, these differences were also significant when controlling for country effects. However, the results have also shown that the effect of legislator’s sex is no longer significant when controlling for party affiliation. Thus, party affiliation affects legislator’s energy policy priorities more than legislator’s gender. These findings are in line with more recent research on the impact of gender in legislative behavior [59,73,74]. Jenkins [73] showed that gender does not distinguish the roll call voting of male and female MPs even on issues like education, health, or welfare when controlling for party affiliation and ideology. She argues that the influence of gender in roll call voting behavior is primarily through ideology and party due to its nature. Roll call voting is a “dichotomous choice” and “in the end, there is no female or male way to vote yes” ([73], p. 431). Therefore, gender differences in legislative behavior are rather indirect when it comes to roll call vote behavior. On the other hand, the results also show that female and male legislators differ significantly in their affiliation to parties. Beyond party ideology, a reason for this difference might be explained by internal party rules promoting women’s representation in parliament to a different extent. In Germany, the Green Party and the Left Party have a formal 50% quota which was also adopted by the SPD in 2011 (before the SPD’s quota varied between 40 and 50%). The CDU has a soft 30% quota. But, like the CSU and the FDP, it rather promotes women by recruiting (prominent) ones to political office without a standardly necessary period of service in the party organization [75,76]. The rather quantitatively oriented promotion of women by the Green Party and the Left Party since the 1980s might explain the relatively high proportion of female MPs affiliated to these parties in the Bundestag. Compared to German parties, American parties are weak organizational institutions. Party institutions have rather weak influence on the candidate selection process. The Republican Party promoted women by crediting members recruiting and supporting women. The interest group- or constituency-based nature of the Democratic Party facilitated women’s recruitment [77].

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Beyond voting behavior, female legislators’ speech-making activities were ascertained. In this context the influence of institutional factors was revealed since the results are partly different for the United States and Germany. Concerning speech-making, institutional factors are less important. Although floor rules are different – speakers are determined by parties in Germany whereas speakers act more autonomously in the U.S. – speeches given by female legislators on energy policy were similar to their share in parliament in both countries. But country differences concerning the word count of speeches given by female MPs are revealed. While no gender differences in average word count exist in the U.S., in Germany the average word count of speeches in energy policy is quite gendered. Female legislators give less extensive speeches than male legislators. On the one hand, these results might be traced back to differences in floor rules. In Germany, speaking time is much more determined by parties than in the United States. On the other hand, these findings are in line with research on gender in speech giving activities. The United States and Germany differ in their overall energy policy paths. Soft energy policy dimensions are given a higher priority in Germany than in the United States. Thus, country differences in female MPs’ speaking time might undergird and enhance the compensation argument of Pearson and Dancey [63]. It seems that women not only compensate for their numerical underrepresentation but also for underrepresentation of their policy priorities and interests in political debates. Given the gendered division of labor in parliament [62], female MPs activities in both speech-giving and word count are far from being self-evident since energy policy is still characterized as a rather hard policy field. Catalano [78] provides evidence that the presence of women in parliament is likely to push policy debate toward issues that women give greater importance [78]. It is argued that women tend to focus on relations with others and contextual factors when solving problems due to their women’s gender role socialization [79]. In this context, the German case seems to show that there exists an inverse relationship of descriptive and substantial representation on the substantial policy level. If issues that give women greater importance are integrated, female MPs are less prone to hurdle the gendered division of labor in parliament.

4. Conclusion Energy policy is not only about choices of technological features of energy supply but also comprises of choices about environmental and social issues. There exists a relevant amount of empirical evidence on gender differences in individual attitudes and preferences on technological, environmental, and social issues of energy supply (see Section 1.2). This article shows that these gender differences in attitudes and preferences on energy supply do not only exist on the individual level but are also evident in parliament. Female MPs yield different energy policy preferences in roll call voting and speech giving activities than their male counterparts. Therefore, the study undergirds research on both gender differences in energy behavior as well as in parliamentary behavior. It is argued by the theory of the politics of presence that women’s interests are best represented by female legislators because women’s everyday experience is different to men’s [60,61]. This seems to be especially important in the context of energy. Due to the culturally and socially determined gendered division of labor, women and men differ in their daily practices. Research has shown that these differences are especially important in the context of energy use [42,43]. But they are neither obvious nor they are captured by conventional energy research by now. Moreover, research on substantive representation dealing with the impact of female MPs on the expression as well as implementation of women’s inter-

ests within policy-making is mainly focused on so-called women’s issues, e.g. education, health, etc. This study shows that gender differences in preferences also exist in the context of issues that are not defined as women’s issues and that these are also relevant in legislative behavior. In order to analyze gender differences both research on energy as well as research on legislative behavior has to go beyond mere quantitative analysis. Rather, quantitative approaches have to be complemented by qualitative ones. For instance, the study does not provide insights about the substance of gender differences in energy policy preferences. In order to shed light on the character of these gender differences the speeches given by female and male legislators in energy policy debates have to be analyzed by content analysis. Such analyses will also be able to explain the interaction of gender and party affiliation in depth. The crucial question is if female legislators express other energy policy priorities than male legislators irrespective of their party affiliation. These questions refer to impact of gender differences in parliament: do female MPs just take over certain areas from their male colleagues and nothing changes fundamentally, or do they challenge established policy paradigms and therefore contribute to a “genuine change”? [1]. Acknowledgements I gratefully acknowledge financial support from the North Rhine-Westphalian Ministry for Innovation, Science and Research (funding program gender research) as well as both the Research Center “Shaping the future” (FoKoS) and the Rectorate of the University of Siegen for the research project “Gendered Effects of the German Energy Transformation in Südwestfalen” (GAES). I would like to thank Daria Johanna Schneider and Lisa Isabelle Tönges for their support in data gathering. Moreover, I would like to thank Prof. Benjamin K. Sovacool and the reviewers as well as the participants of the section “Gender and Governing” of the Midwest Political Science Association’s 2015 conference for valuable comments on my manuscript. References [1] L. Wängnerud, Women in parliaments: descriptive and substantive representation, Ann. Rev. Political Sci. 12 (2009) 51–69. [2] A. Goldthau, From the state to the market and back: policy implications of changing energy paradigms, Glob. Policy 3 (2012) 198–210. [3] D. Helm, The new energy paradigm, in: D. Helm (Ed.), The New Energy Paradigm, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007, pp. 9–35. [4] L.N. Lindberg, The energy syndrome: comparing national responses to the energy crisis, Lexington Books, Lexington, Mass, 1977. [5] W.R. Lowry, Disentangling energy policy from environmental policy, Soc. Sci. Q. 89 (2008) 1195–1211. [6] S.R. Littlefield, Security, independence, and sustainability: imprecise language and the manipulation of energy policy in the United States, Energy Policy 52 (2013) 779–788. [7] T. Saretzki, Energiepolitik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949–1999: Ein Politikfeld zwischen Wirtschafts-, Technologie- und Umweltpolitik, in: U. Willems (Ed.), Demokratie und Politik in der Bundesrepublik 1949–1999, VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden, 2001, pp. 195–221. [8] R. Mayntz, Soziale Dynamik und politische Steuerung: Theoretische und methodologische Überlegungen, Campus, Frankfurt/Main, 1997. [9] A.M. McCright, R.E. Dunlap, Defeating Kyoto: the conservative movement’s impact on U.S. climate change policy, Soc. Problems 50 (2003) 348–373. [10] H. Weidner, L. Mez, German climate change policy: a success story with some flaws, J. Environ. Dev. 17 (2008) 356–378. [11] S. Hegelich, C. Fraune, D. Knollmann, Point predictions and the punctuated equilibrium theory: a data mining approach—U.S. nuclear policy as proof of concept, Policy Stud. J. 43 (2015) 228–256. [12] R. Mautz, A. Byzio, W. Rosenbaum, Auf dem Weg zur Energiewende.: Die Entwicklung der Stromproduktion aus erneuerbaren Energien in Deutschland, Universitätsverlag Göttingen, Göttingen, 2008. [13] W. Ströbele, M. Heuterkes, W. Pfaffenberger, Energiewirtschaft Einführung in Theorie und Politik, 3rd ed., Oldenbourg, München, 2012. [14] C. Fraune, C. Hefeker, S. Hegelich, Regionale Auswirkungen des Netzausbaus. In: S. Habscheid (ed.) Schaut auf diese Region!: Südwestfalen als Fall und Typ Mit zahlreichen Abbildungen (2013), p. 73–84.

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