The politics of technology and the technology of politics: Issues for the U.S. Congress's third century

TECHNOLOGICAL

FORECASTING

AND SOCIAL CHANGE

36, 171-183

(1989)

The Politics of Technology and the Technology of Politics: Issues for the U.S. Congress’s Third Century EDWARD WENK. JR.

Introduction To assist the Congressional

Research Service’s study of the U.S. Congress in the Year 2000, this paper has been drafted with two goals: 1) to establish a perspective on the critical role of technology during the next 12 years in affecting U.S. society, and 2) to identify technology-related policy issues of critical concern to Congress. Because of the assignment’s breadth and the lengthy queue of issues warranting attention, I have chosen to strain out the most crucial questions by exercise of the most strenuous of life’s motivations. That test of relevance is survival in the sense of being both alive and free, of meeting threats to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.

The Context Arguments are based on several premises. First, in its connection to human affairs, technology defines the most salient dilemmas of our time, i.e., technology has a more powerful influence on contemporary social proceedings than, as in the past, philosophy and religion. It now modulates the most celebrated passages of human existence with artificial intervention in birth and in death. Technology sharply alters lifestyles and reinforces or collides with values. It is the main engine of change; and as the core of what we call progress, it also rumbles behind our most potent threats. Second, technology is related to society by structures and processes which originate in the United States Constitution, its amendments and its constantly evolving interpretations; and by the democratic political system for selecting leadership. We not only choose a president or a member of Congress, or a policy; we choose our future. A third premise in a relatively prosperous nation at peace is that people and political leadership tend to celebrate the largesse afforded by technology, especially in its contributions to material well-being. The down side may not be spontaneously examined because the political reward system accentuates the positive; crisis avoidance for long term gain has far less appeal than uncritical technological initiatives that promise short term benefits. Then, too, contemplating threats to survival is so emotionally strenuous that psychological pathways of denial are tempting. Yet, even freedom cannot be &ken for granted; it I EDWARD WENK, JR. is Emeritus Professor of En% -dneering and Public Affairs at the University Washington. ;_; 3 L f : c\%ddress repnnt request to Dr. Edward Wenk, Jr., 15142 Beach Drive, N.E., Seattle, WA 98155. 0 1989 by Edward Wenk, Jr.

of

172

E. WENK

certainly is not preserved in the genes. And as for biological survival, the magnitude of peril posed by 25,000 warheads, most as destructive as those detonated over Japan, pushes fantasies of a benign future off the scale. Yet, people spend more time weighing options for new automobiles than they do for options to reduce threats of a nuclear age. Avoidance of harm is the first principle in a strategy of survival. Questions must be probed as to where we are today, where we are going, and where we should be going. By no means, however, should such a situation analysis be interpreted as polarized toward a pessimistic view of the world or a tilt toward technophobia. Rather, choosing the futures we want and blocking or mitigating those we do not is essential to a viable social agenda. A fourth premise concerns the social dynamics of technology-intensive public policy. As essential as are scientific progress, technical imagination, ingenuity and virtuosity. they alone can neither generate the critical questions nor illuminate the solutions. Resolution of these puzzles is principally a matter of politics. Put another way, the key choices ahead-while forced and solved largely by considerations of technology-will not be made by scientists and engineers. The key choices will be made by political leadership. In that spirit, what follows may be thought of as navigation aids-to help choose the most productive paths for technology’s potential, and to avoid the rocks, shoals, and storms that can be foreseen ahead. Thus is spun one last premise. Unless one believes in divination, astrology or prophecy with external signals about the unknown, the future we grope with exists only in one’s head. Thus, the perspective which I share necessarily emerges from personal views generated through various life experiences. Technology: Some Generic Properties Technology affects every dimension of life. Indeed, technology has demonstrated an extraordinary capacity to generate wealth, to raise material standards of living. Apart from exuberant consumerism, technology has been a source of treasured freedoms: from back-breaking labor on farm and in the mines; from disability and disease; from geographic and cultural isolation; to spend more adult years on education; to plan families. Technology has given more people than ever before the freedom to choose; and it has generated more choices. Technology has created one world. With swift transportation and instant communication, events anywhere have effects everywhere. Flowing across borders are commodities, consumer products, tourists, traveler’s checks, stock market quotations, scientific discoveries, Michael Jackson’s music, blue jeans and Coca Cola. And pollution. And to underscore the technologically integrated globe, everyone is now subject to a common threat of swift extinction from nuclear weapons. Technology has a tendency to organize and concentrate wealth and power. Early in this century, major corporations wove their enterprises around a technology: Standard Oil, General Electric, AT&T, RCA, DuPont Chemicals, etc. Today, under different and often obscure labels, conglomerates still do. Most new government agencies were spawned by technology: the Federal Communications Commission, Office of Naval Research, National institutes of Health, the AEC, FAA, NASA, EPA, OSHA. Once these organizations are born, private or public, they follow patterns of institutional behavior-to expand their influence in the economic market place and in the functions mandated by public policy. In that wrestling match, there are winners and there are losers.

POLITICS

OF TECHNOLOGY

173

Perhaps the most subtle effect of technology is its capacity to generate side effects: social, economic, political, ecological. Some may be beneficial, a form of serendipity. But many are judged harmful to some sector of the population, at some time. Every technology plays Jekyll and Hyde. And every technology carries risks: of nuclear obliteration, of a greenhouse effect raising ocean levels, of acid rain damaging lakes and forests, of crashes at overcrowded airports, of accidents at factories manufacturing nuclear ammunition. Along with the treasured benefits of technology, we face the ominous side, that technology is dangerous. Witness the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant that triggered a close shave with widespread radiation poisoning. The Challenger space shuttle explodes, notwithstanding explicit warnings. A chemical plant at Bhopal kills thousands and maims tens of thousands. The Soviets take out Korean Flight #007. The skipper of the U.S .S. Vincennes orders to be shot down what is belatedly discovered to be Iranian commercial Flight #655.

Technology as a Social Process To understand these realities, we must go beyond the hardware of technology. Technology also entails software. Technological artifacts require ensembles of organizations, linked by channels of communication, to deliver intended goods or services. In short, these systems are operated by people, through human institutions, engaging in familiar social processes. No matter how elegant the arithmetic of science and engineering, no matter how careful the designer, and notwithstanding blandishments of the experts, in all of the misadventures cited above the source of the problem was found to be the software: human ignorance, error, blunder, or folly; or it may be avarice, hubris, exhaustion, or self-delusion, To summarize, technology can be thought of as an amplifier. With lever and wheel, and nuclear weapons, it amplifies human brawn. With the computer, technology amplifies the human mind. But technology is also a social amplifier. It may expand or diminish the human spirit, equality of opportunity, quality of life, freedom and self-esteem. It amplifies wealth and the imperative for its acquisition; it spurs material appetites for comforts and conveniences; and it has increased the disparity everywhere between rich and poor. It stretches the boundaries and the volume of communication networks. It expands the number of options. It has vastly intensified complexity of social organization to deliver the hardware. And it has injected new demands on our institutions, perhaps faster than they can respond. Most significantly, in considering risk, its sources and perceptions, technology amplifies problems in its social management. Given that technology is such a powerful influence on human affairs today, and given a reality that tomorrow we will encounter more technology, not less, we confront the first major conclusion on this trail-whoever controls technology controls the future. The challenge is how to steer technology to produce socially satisfactory outcomes, the futures that collectively we want. Steering in either its mechanical or metaphoric intent is a process of decision making. Just as the ancient maxim goes: without a destination there is no favorable wind; so steering implies goals. And it requires strategies for achievement, including detours around obstacles. Given the complexity of delivery systems, the diversity of institutions involved and the requisite linkages, there is a heavy challenge to obtain coherence. That difficulty is further kindled by the fact that the hardware component of technology is conceived, developed, produced and marketed in

174

E. WENK

the United States primarily by private interests whose goals often conflict with public purpose. In this collision of values and motivations, the public must be represented by public institutions.

Politics: Policy and the Art of Governance Given the need to resolve fragmentation, disparity of purpose, and conflict in values, choices on the grand issues of our times must be made by government. This assertion flies in the face of a myth about technology, that most decisions are made in the marketplace. As said before, technical artifacts are catered by the private sector. Indeed, we depend on alert and adroit entrepreneurship, ingenuity and manufacturing dexterity to meet human needs and wants. The profit motive is alive and well. But when we consider the plurality of goals for technology and needs to balance public with private interests, we discover another feature of technology as amplifier: a blossoming of government. Government plays six major roles. First are aids to the private sector: subsidies, tax writeoffs, bailouts of faltering industrial giants as Lockheed and Chrysler, and more recently, savings and loan institutions. Since our country’s origins, there have been subsidies to the merchant marine, land grants to railroads, grants for agricultural research, education and price supports for farmers, geological mapping for miners, and depletion allowances for oil well speculators. Second, government is principal sponsor of research and development, the leading edge of technological progress. In the aftermath of the 1957 Soviet space surprise, the federal government funded over three quarters of all research, albeit now only one half. A third role is as major customer of high-tech hardware, mostly for military applications. The fourth role of government concerns its nurture of economic infrastructure that, through fiscal and tax policies, influences availability and cost of venture capital for new technological enterprise. A fifth role is as sponsor of public works, either directly as in the case of hydroelectric dams, or indirectly through grants-in-aid to states for highways, sewerage plants and hospitals. A sixth role is as regulator of technological enterprise, to protect the public from excesses of entrepreneurship and threats to human health and safety, and to conserve resources and the natural environment.

The Public-Private Dyad From its origins, the United States has depended upon a public/private partnership. Industry has needed government to protect it against untoward risk, to help open foreign markets, and to assure political and economic stability. Government has looked to the private sector to stimulate economic activity and create jobs, affording both domestic tranquility and a copious tax base. And it has expected industry to generate products that enhance the quality of life or contribute to military security. The problem arises from the disparity in purpose. Private interests seek profit, power, property rights, and growth. Public purposes are served by a government dedicated to service, high integrity, human rights, public order, and protection of natural resources. From our beginnings, the electorate has demanded higher ethical standards for public servants than for those in commerce. Thus, when the doctrine of collaboration blurs distinction in goals and in style, dangers surely arise to our most basic creed.

POLITICS

OF TECHNOLOGY

175

The Politics of Technology As to government’s involvement with technology, consider a sample of relevant legislation: the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899; the Pure Food Act of 1906; the Communications Act of 1934; the Atomic Energy Act of 1946; the National Science Foundation Act of 1950; the Federal Highway Act of 1956; the National Space Act of 1958; the Arms Control and Disarmament Act of 1961; the National Environmental Policy Act of 1970; ratification of SALT-l treaty for arms control in 1972; the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978; the Acid Rain Act of 1980; the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982; authorization of the B- 1 bomb& in 1983. In short, we discover that not only have technology and government grown together; they have grown because of each other.

Institutional Dangers Recognizing this role of government makes many people uncomfortable. A major reason is that people have lost confidence in all contemporary institutions, government included. Institutions and their leaders are perceived as driven by narrow self-interest, indifferent to wreckage of side effects from their initiatives. Wealth and power, not merit, seems to dominate motivation, with too little respect for law, much less common virtues of honesty and integrity. Headlines are engraved with the sleaze factor and names of offenders: North, Poindexter, Deaver, Nofziger, Boesky, Swaggart, Bakker; and Johns Manville, DuPont, General Electric and others. Within organizations, all too often top management cultivates group-think, intolerance and punishment for dissent. On the flip side, there is hubris, and the fear of exposed misjudgment or dishonesty by an inquisitive media; thus, strenuous attempts are made to control the news. Equally serious is evidence that all these institutions display a pathology of the short run. The reward systems in industry and in politics all favor decisions focused on immediate payoff, which is not surprising. Our entire culture is obsessively driven by demands for instant gratification-the bumper sticker of “Me, now.” In a technological arena of more choices, more complexity, more risks, plus the fevers of economic imperatives, of exercising power or, in a litigious atmosphere, of protecting one’s behind, time and energy are in short supply to deal with the commonweal and with the future. With consequences of poor choice so potentially harmful, rational behavior would suggest that more time be spent to look ahead, to flush out options and test their potency, and to anticipate and then head off effects we do not want or cannot tolerate. Instead, in the hurly burly and chaos of political life, amidst the noise and shouting of lobbyists and other purveyors of information tainted by self-interest, only a small fraction of a day is spent by tbe deciders in thought about decisions ahead. Even less time is devoted to the most critical ingredient of effective choice; that missing ingredient is foresight. Under such battlefield conditions, it is small wonder that choice capitulates to squeaking wheels and influences that favor instant benefits. There seems no political counterpart to preventative medicine, defensive driving, or posting military sentries. Such sins of omission, however, are matched by sins of commission. Evidence increases that government lies, covers up accidents at its nuclear production facilities, dissembles about the health of presidents, and conceals from the public although not from a potential adversary how fragile is control over our nuclear arsenal. Small wonder public confidence withers, apathy grows, and patience expires to deal with the complexities and subtleties of public process.

176

E. WENK

Dangers in the Politics of Technology The first obligation of government is to provide national security. Since the Civil War, and most conspicuously in World War 11. military enterprise depended on the elements of ingenuity, production capacity, and strategic surprise afforded by innovative technology. The most compelling example is with successful development of the atomic bomb. Modem deterrence is based on the concept of mutually assured destruction, so we and our Soviet adversaries have built a stockpile of nuclear weapons so huge and diversified that it is possible to obliterate each other many times over. The cost has been enormous. The national debt doubled in the last eight years over what had been accumulated in the previous 180. To stabilize the economy, the United States attracted foreign capital but was insensitive to interest payments which may grow to a time when money is our largest cash export. Moreover, no one has estimated the opportunities lost in the civilian economy by the investment of funds and scarce technical talent to procurement of weapon systems. As troubling as is that potential economic disability. there are two other side effects. The first is the uncertainty about safety of the nuclear arsenal, considering the potential hazard of unintentional destabilization of the arms race or of accidental ignition. This is the deadliest possible game, and inadvertence thrives in many different scenarios. For example, with such swift missile delivery of warheads, time for making that fateful decision to launch by a president is no greater than 6 minutes. Errors could occur in radar identification, or in interpretation, or in communications in several stages before alerting a president. Or if the president is asleep, exhausted by other concerns, walking a tightrope in dealing with domestic anxiety, with his own place in history, or perhaps with prior lack of exposure to such tension. the quality of judgment could be undermined. Almost all books written by former White House staff confirm this peril. Equally disturbing are experiences in command and control that is presumed to be concentrated in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief. Henry Kissinger admits that, without ever waking President Nixon to discuss threatening talk by the Soviets over the Israeli-Egyptian contest, he called the National Security Council and gained their approval to put the nuclear arsenal on a launch alert. In 1981 when President Reagan was shot, he was in pain or under sedatives and unable to function for several days. There was no presidential or vice-presidential hand on the nuclear helm. Meanwhile, the Congress has tacitly accepted extinction of their shared war-making powers asserted in the U.S. Constitution. There is yet a third feature of this politics-technology marriage that must be examined. This is the increasing influence of the military-industrial complex about which President Eisenhower warned the nation on the eve of his departure. The evidence lies in the lack of control over military procurement; the continuing revolving door between the Pentagon and the contractors; the poor performance of weapons systems when subject to acceptance testing; and the inability to choose among them such that all are supported even if redundant or defective. This working model of a corporate state also partly explains support for Star Wars. President Reagan’s proposal was a dream without prior confirmation of technical feasibility. Yet, because subcontractors reside in every Congressional district, there has been great political difficulty in saying no. In a siege of international tension, the bald truth is that decision making becomes fragile. Survival by protection against nuclear attack depends far more on stability under stress, images of reality, mature judgement and experience of a president or vice president, than on the illusion of a high-tech shield.

POLITICS OF TECHNOLOGY

177

There are innumerable examples of technology-intensive legislation becoming law to enormous benefit of the nation. In every case, the initiative had to survive the adversarial process, the publicity of the hearing process, the stress of political bargaining, the reconciliation of conflicting views, and the compromises. Yet, as just delineated, the politics of technology has its down side. In short, socially satisfactory performance of technology depends less on its technical virtuosity than on political behavior of leaders and followers.

The Future is Dangerous However uncertain the future, the present is attended by projections of high credibility concerned jointly with technology and politics. Consider continuing challenges to military security from potential adversaries abroad, terrorism and accident, with mismanaged processes of weapons procurement. Consider threats to economic security from the growing national debt, imbalance in trade, relative loss in industrial competitiveness, an attraction to a permanent war economy, breakdowns in management of complex technosystems, and excessive illiteracy. Domestically, there are homeless, dispossessed, disenfranchised and jobless, the high cost and unequal access to quality medical care, widespread drug addiction and crime attending its commerce, and neglect of the mentally ill. The quality of life seems to be slipping, with indifference to outrageous ethical lapses, loss in a sense of community, invasions of privacy, traffic gridlock, racism, unsteady support for women’s rights. Attention to nature conservancy and environmental protection has lost its momentum; non-renewable resources are being rapidly depleted. Economic, political and social interactions on a global scale, including strenuous competition for wealth and power, are not matched by vision, institutional structures or processes to deal with transnational issues. With more technology in the future will come more side effects, usually attended by high economic or social costs for their neglect. Yet, the pathologies of the short run continue to infect all sectors of the American culture, intensified by the stresses of modem life. Absent the capacity for early warning, the willingness to balance long with short run benefits, and the liquidity of resources to facilitate defensive anticipatory response, the probability increases of conflict, loss in elan, unrealized potential and evaporation of freedom. Notwithstanding some awesome portents, a future ignored is a future lost. Just as we have argued that technology has become more political, there is an obverse condition. Politics has become more technological. And as before, technology plays Jekyll and Hyde; the technology of politics may threaten freedom.

The Technology of Politics What we mean by the technology of politics is utilization of modem technological means, principally of electronic media, to influence the political stage and to bolster goals of those seeking political office and in exercising power. This is not a new phenomenon. Franklin D. Roosevelt thrilled radio listeners with his inaugural address amidst economic crisis; “We have nothing to fear but fear itself.” Then through fireside chats, he sought to boost morale and tutor a nation on its recovery. Both Adolf Hitler and Winston Churchill employed that technology of politics to great effect, albeit toward opposite moral ends. The 1960 Kennedy-Nixon debates bared the potency of this medium to influence voters. In presidential elections that followed, television has become ever more influential, mostly through commercials to advertise candidates at all levels. In the precepts of Marshall McCluhan, the medium has become the message; with its own grammar and artificial intimacy, television has insinuated the campaigns into every home. At first glance, that might be a salutary use of technology. But by 1988 the techniques

178

E. WENK

had been so finely polished that even the public tumbled to the unpalatable truth that, whatever the native talents of candidates for office, their moral vision and qualifications, the public persona was that of an actor, with a script, well-rehearsed lines and a synthetic backdrop to heighten the drama. The political consultants and hucksters operated from a cynical premise that the public could be manipulated best by ignoring issues and concentrating on entertainment in resonance with prevailing biases about “feeling good about America.” Everything was telegenic image, accompanied by sound bites of two minutes, thus relieving the audience of the tedium of thought and the candidate of the stress of authentic leadership to understand an issue, or then to carefully delineate it and explain their position. To sharpen the impact, the handlers of candidates used another technology-to market-test the script in advance with captive audiences in order to discover individual reaction to every nuance, so as to identify most persuasive words and images. When “commercials” were aired, further audience reaction was polled so that the final product was fashioned by what the public loved rather than what the candidate believed or what the country needed. Whatever television journalists thought, the media industry went along with it, capturing enormous profits of purchased time, at rates far higher than charged their regular commerical clients. Even more insulting to the public, after each television program, the press was captured by the “spin doctors,” the same people who produced the candidate’s show, shouting in the boiler rooms what the candidates meant! Clearly, the hoopla and hype had not contributed one whit to public understanding. People seem to have yielded to the same tactics that sold deodorants and flea powder. The point is that there may be a significant disparity between technologically generated images and reality; and for that disparity no knob on the television set permits correction. Because the process had been so transparent, voters excused themselves from intellectual if not actual participation by declaring there was no difference. Thus was displayed the worst voting performance of any democracy. In relation to the vice-presidential debates, viewers did not seem to ask critically, “What might happen, if?” Commentators hardly mentioned the statistical 1 in 5 chance wherein a tragic succession of vice president is necessitated by death, resignation, or inability to discharge Constitutional power and duties of the President. The country had forgotten its experience with Spiro Agnew as Vice President, and his publicly demonstrated incompetence and lack of integrity. The power of technology in politics carries another potential for harm. It was signalled by the Orwell novel 1984. That book was not meant as prophecy. Rather, it was a metaphor for the future, a warning that unless society learns to manage technology, some people will find ways to use it to manage us. Orwell opened with a gang already in power, using television to engrave a mode of group-think congenial to the powermasters, with a population that had unwittingly lost its freedom. Not revealed in the book is how it all began. Suppose we guess what that gang did in order to capture democratic, free institutions by non-violent means. Imagine a 1974 and the decade which preceded Orwell’s 1984. A government tired of nagging criticism by the press, especially when its lies were exposed, quietly formed an ideologically congenial alliance with invisible power brokers who also profited by their relationship. Government increased the handouts to reporters too busy to write their own material, and punished the independent thinkers by denying them access to top officials

POLITICS

OF TECHNOLOGY

179

and thus coercing their cooperation. Meanwhile, private interests subtly manipulated owners of the media. Then in the presidential campaign, the candidate never thought the thoughts expressed by the words he spoke. No press conferences were permitted, so that the public never gained authentic insights into what was at stake. The staged marionette was on invisible strings, lulling a complacent and apathetic nation. After winning, the media consultants who pulled the strings continued their employment in the White House. They extended the manipulatory techniques that won, now to facilitate entrenchment of a national security state, intimidating citizens by an artfully crafted but non-existent enemy. By 1984, the deed was done. The hypothetical 1974 setting of the stage for Orwell’s fictional enslavement bears a resemblance to the real 1988.

A Restatement as Four Vital Questions During World War II when we developed the atom bomb to gain technological leverage on victory, the question was: “Can we do it?’ That same theme dominated the post-war era, capped by a second imperative to land men on the moon. Next, sparked by Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring, another question appeared. Concerned over the poisonous effect of pesticides on birds, then. the side effects of other technological enterprises on the natural environment and on people, the question was: “Ought we do it?’ That notion was powerful enough to support the 1963 Nuclear Test Ban which was one of the most important socio-technical decisions in history. By 1970, the United States passed the National Environmental Policy Act with its requirement to estimate future impacts. By the 198Os, another pair of questions emerged about technology. One was: “Can we afford it?‘; arising from the huge national debt. The other was: “Can we manage it?‘, triggered by disappointing performance of various technological systems: health care delivery, urban infrastructure, banking, manufacturing of consumer products and their marketing worldwide. Add to those symptoms the accidents with commerical aircraft, nuclear power and fuel production plants, chemical plants, and manned spacecraft. All too often that question was addressed narrowly to the design and production of hardware, decisions by a cadre of corporate managers, generally using criteria of economy and efficiency, and speed of product marketability. Paralleling that concept of industrial management is a social management of technology. This process also involves decisions, but it is decisions by political leaders and citizens on the basis of good information, using criteria of “life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.” This leads to the notion that the quality of the future depends on the quality of governance. To be sure, our system of governance has proven itself in respecting freedom, dignity, self-esteem and potential of the individual. It has withstood shocks of fate with resilience. But what we have inherited is provisional and in need of perpetual stewardship. In a technological era, the past is no longer prologue. Technologies tend to be user-friendly. Given the threats to survival that loom ahead, and given the role of the United States in world leadership, a new dedication may be necessary to the exercise of foresight and the restoration of public confidence and public interest in governance. It is here that technology that seeds danger may also be a protection. I refer to the

IX0

E. WENK

role of information and its new social potency leveraged affected by technology should be made aware in advance tradeoffs that are inevitable. Then they can test estimates their values. Every technology raises ethical questions. therefore, in the social management of technology is the

Summary of Premises About the Future Imbedded in these key arguments are premises future. between 1988 and 2000.

l l

l

l

0 l

0 0 l

l

0

0

0

0 l

0

l

by technological means. Those of the benefits, but also of the of future consequences against The most important principle, exercise of moral vision.

about the near-term

technological

The future will entail more technology, not less. Because all technologies generate side effects, greater attention will be required to prevent or mitigate risks. Cultural preferences will have more to do with technological choice than elegance, novelty or virtuosity of the hardware. Acting as an organizing presence, technology will promote concentration of wealth and power. Globalization will influence all techno-economic processes. The modern state will increasingly define the political space for technological choice. Trends will become more pronounced toward the “corporate state,” modeled after the military-industrial-high-tech complex. The international military competition will continue for novelty and sophistication in weapons. The disparity of technological benefits in society will grow, with more pronounced identity of the “haves” and the “have nets,” globally and domestically. Conflicts between winners and losers will become more strenuous in an era of resource scarcity, global economic competition, increasing populations, increasing energy costs, and larger-scale threats to human health and the environment. The capacity to innovate, manage information, and nourish knowledge as a resource will dominate the economic domain as natural resources, capital, and labor once did. The increased complexity of technological delivery systems will heighten perplexity in management, requiring an enhanced capacity for holistic and lateral conceptual thinking. Social decision making and consensus building will also become more difficult because of increases in number and diversity of interconnected organizations, their distinct identities and values, disruptions in historical behavior, and unpredictability under stress. Mass media will play an increasing role in keeping all interests in the system informed. As a consequence, temptation by the power establishment will increase to control information and to manipulate the electorate. Emphasis will grow on the importance of an enhanced literacy of the electorate, and of the need for authentic information as to technological initiatives that affect people’s lives and threaten freedom. Given the critical choices ahead, moral vision and political accountability will be

POLITICS

181

OF TECHNOLOGY

increasingly comes.

crucial in delivering

technology

to produce socially satisfactory

out-

Selecting Key Issues The formal methodology for selecting key issues depended upon identifying principal roles of government; defining issues in public policy; defining the subset of technologyintensive issues; and defining the techniques of explicit selection. Roles of government were taken as obligations to: 1) build the common defense; 2) assure economic vitality; 3) uphold the Constitution; 4) rank social priorities; 5) allocate public resources; 6) organize social, economic and political activity; and 7) seek resolution of conflicts. Issues in public policy were defined as: 1) unsettled questions of vital concern; 2) susceptible to a solution on the political stage by public policy; 3) triggers for conflict among vested interests and stakeholders; 4) incentives to explore facts, future and lateral repercussions, and options; and 5) sustained or heightened media attention for an extended time. Within policy issues lies a subset particularized by their technical ingredients. They exhibit: 1) factual content and expert knowledge; 2) changes in technical base more swiftly than in demographic, institutional or cultural context; 3) numerous alternatives to meet social objectives; 4) complex delivery systems of ensembles of organizations and communication networks; 5) high initial investments; 6) irreversible physical plant; 7) diverse side effects; 8) influences that cross political boundaries; 9) institutional imperatives; and 10) correctives that are economically costly, politically strenuous, or ecologically impossible. Based on a fundamental theme of strategies for survival, issues were selected by: 1) identifying threats and estimating severity of consequences, timetable, and feasibility of technical or political intervention to prevent or mitigate adverse effects; 2) interpreting social indicators that reveal pronounced trends in demography or in value preferences likely to influence future social choices, from polls, a count of headlines in the New York Times, content analysis of unfinished Congressional business, unsatisfied advocacy and persistence of conflict; 3) forecasting new spikes of technological change through scientific discovery, engineering innovation, industrial entrepreneurship, or social events; and 4) viewing world futures. The Issues’ MILITARY

SECURITY

1. *Reduce the threat of a nuclear holocaust by accelerating arms control, considering bans on testing and on space-based weapons, limiting proliferation and exports of high technology, and strengthening verification. 2. *Reduce risks of accidental or unauthorized launch or of defective choice by strengthening effectiveness of command and control over nuclear weapons, including review of permissive action links on naval vessels. 3. *Investigate problems of too little “bang for the buck” due to mismanagement of defense procurement: imprudent selection of weapons systems, poor weapons

‘Issues marked by an asterisk are considered

of highest priority.

E. WENK

182

performance, lack of compatibility between technical capability and human factors, fraud, bribery and weak accountability. 4. Assure adequacy of research on conventional weapons, on the industrial base for a buildup, and on the role of chemical and biological weapons. 5. Investigate potential for enhanced intelligence gathering by technical means. especially regarding terrorism and surreptitious use of economic forces. HEALTH

AND SAFETY

1. Increase efforts to combat AIDS by medical and epidemiological research. 2. *Accelerate war on drugs by research on psychological and physiological factors in addiction, and by use of stronger technical means to interdict supply. 3. *Contain cost of medical care, improve uniformity of access, and increase emphasis on health maintenance and disease prevention. 4. Review policy implications of biotech-related ethical dilemmas of intervention in natural birth and death, organ transplants, artificial organs, etc. 5. Accelerate research on mental health, evaluating causes and care, federal standards, and assistance programs. ECONOMIC 1.

2.

3. 4. 5.

6. 7. 8. 9. HUMAN

SECURITY

*Develop policies to strengthen industrial productivity: permitting joint R&D ventures, using tax credits to motivate private R&D, introducing incentives to foster a balance of long with short run profits, and restricting mergers. Facilitate legitimate and open government/industry partnerships to strengthen international competitiveness, including study of a Department of Industry and Technology. *Make peace profitable with government incentives for reconversion of existing high-tech resources now predominantly devoted to defense. Investigate options for stability in supply and cost of energy, including policies for conservation. Examine human resource problems of various modes of illiteracy, need for retraining, and for fellowships to increase graduate engineering enrollments among native-born men, women, and minorities. Investigate policies for computer security. Review policies underpinning health of civil aviation. Investigate weakness of policies relating the oceans to national economic and political interests. Investigate role of technology to strengthen the health of domestic agriculture. RIGHTS

1. *Monitor threats to a free press, and attempts to government and private interest cover ups. 2. Set limits to computer invasion of privacy. 3. *Monitor pernicious trends toward a corporate state, the military-industrial-technical complex, and from the public service. 4. *Explore policies which treat the future as a public awareness of Constitutional guarantees for progeny. QUALITY

control

media to facilitate

from excessive influence of deterioration of integrity of trust, by increased

public

OF LIFE

1. *Accelerate social science research on causes of criminality decision making and critical thinking.

and violence and on

POLITICS

183

OF TECHNOLOGY

2. Facilitate relief of urban congestion, and study substitution of cable communications for commuting. 3. Provide low-cost housing by equalizing subsidies. 4. Strengthen consumer protection and penalties in product liability. 5. Investigate support structure and role of technology for an aging population. IMPROVING

THE PUBLIC PROCESS

1. *Strengthen availability of policy related information to the general public, using the Library of Congress as the hub of a network with local libraries. 2. *Strengthen technology advisory apparatus at all levels, to introduce systematic foresight and impact analysis including functions of the long defunct National Resources Planning Board, and to establish uniform principles for risk assessment. 3. Review goals, balance among fields, and decision processes for federally funded R&D, including such topics as space exploration and adequacy of social sciences research. 4. Investigate opportunities to use technology in the interest of foreign policy when dealing with the Third World. 5. Review national preparedness through flexible responses and liquidity of resources to meet natural disasters and other surprises. PROTECTING

THE GLOBAL

ENVIRONMENT

1. *Strengthen domestic policies and treaties to protect the natural environment against long-term harm, such as from a greenhouse effect, ozone layer depletion, ocean dumping, loss of wetlands and tropical forests. 2. Investigate broad and long-term issues deserving of federal intervention, such as of arid land research to meet world hunger. 3. Make choices on disposal of radioactive waste.

The Emerging Challenge Whatever the virtues of this particular list, a critical question remains as to whether the legislative process will move. History teaches that most legislative acts originate in response to crisis or to pressure of powerful vested interests. A few policies may be stimulated by public outcry or exposure of a dangerous situation by the media. In even fewer cases, issues have been identified and then moved to action simply by vision of political leadership, and by the investment of political capital to educate others in the decision process, and the electorate, so as to generate a consensus. Whether anything happens depends on the general atmosphere and on the most pronounced cultural values of the time. They will change for the better during the next 12 years if society becomes more aware of the longer-term penalites of short-term technological choices, and especially if it restores a balance between self-interest and social interest, between getting and giving, and between economic measures and progress and social measures. These are the most powerful factors influencing the politics of technology. The obverse is also crucial. The 1988 presidential election opens serious questions as to whether the democratic process has become disabled by the technology of politics. If confidence in democratic government is not restored to levels during the three decades from 1933 to 1963, this predicament will itself deserve the highest priority of legislative inquiry. For only in that healthy political atmosphere attending a technological age can a nation choose the futures it wants and deter those it does not.

References 1.

EdwardWenk, Jr., i’kadeofs.Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.