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The Relation Between the Conscious Mind and the Brain: a Reply to Beck
J. theor. Biol. (1996) 181, 95–96
L E The Relation Between the Conscious Mind and the Brain: a Reply to Beck it remains to be shown that the human organism is a conservative material system, and the law of conservation of energy does not in itself rule out that psychical conditions can determine the moment at which energy is transformed. Also Popper (1984) discusses a number of objections to the thermodynamic argument. The most thought-provoking is perhaps that ‘‘there seem to be empty pilot waves that can interfere with non-empty (energy-piloting particles and energy-carrying) waves’’; a theory that, if corroborated, would suggest ‘‘that physics itself allows for the possibility of non-energetic influences upon energetic processes’’ (Popper, 1984, p. 22). We do not find it necessary to postulate an intermediate field of probability amplitudes. This does not mean, however, that we reject Beck’s idea of a probabilistic approach to the problem of the relation between the conscious mind and the brain. To analyse this relation in terms of probabilistic changes of brain microdynamics is also completely in line with Popper’s theory of mind. Popper argues:
Friedrich Beck (1996) suggests that our interpretation (Lindahl & Ärhem, 1994) of Popper’s interactionistic hypothesis about the relation between the conscious mind and the brain (Popper et al., 1993) ought to include an intermediate field of probability amplitudes. Beck’s main reason for this is that the interaction between the conscious mental processes and the neuronal processes would otherwise, in his view, violate the strong conservation laws of physics. He further supports his suggestion to include such a probability field, by referring to Wigner’s (1967) account of the role of consciousness in quantum theory. And, finally, Beck emphasises that an inclusion of quantum processes in brain dynamics opens up exciting perspectives for new experimental endeavours in neuroscience. We agree with what we understand to be Beck’s general position, that quantum processes may have an explanatory value in the development of a viable interactionistic mind-brain theory. However, when arguing for an intermediate field of probability amplitudes, Beck seems to have a partly different point of departure than we have in our analysis. And, in referring to Wigner, Beck also seems to support a different interpretation of quantum theory than Popper. Beck (1996) discusses what the consequences would be if we assume that conscious mental intensities (i.e. phenomena of World 2) are immaterial and electromagnetic fields (i.e. phenomena of World 1) are material. In our analysis (Lindahl & Ärhem, 1994), we leave this ontological issue an open question. We do not go further than viewing the World 2 phenomena as subjective and the World 1 phenomena as objective. (Indeed, this could also be seen as an ontological distinction, but it is a different one from the immaterial–material dualism.) We do not believe that interactionism necessarily implies an immaterial– material dualism. And, even if one adopts the view that the phenomena of World 2 are immaterial and the phenomena of World 1 are material, the relevance and power of the thermodynamic argument is controversial. As already pointed out by Taylor (1903), 0022–5193/96/130095 + 02 $18.00/0
. . . we might conceive of the openness of World 1 to World 2 somewhat on the lines of the impact of selection pressures on mutations. [. . .] In the brain there may at first arise purely probabilistic or chaotic changes, and some of these fluctuations may be purposefully selected in the light of World 3 [i.e. the world of the theoretical products of the human mind] in a way similar to that in which natural selection quasi-purposefully selects mutations. (Popper & Eccles, 1977, pp. 540–541; see also Lindahl & Ärhem, 1994, p. 117).
But, to base the analysis on Wigner’s (1967) account of the role of consciousness in quantum theory would not be relevant to Popper’s theory. Wigner’s idea, that the collapse of the wave function is dependent upon the consciousness of an observer, is based on a subjectivist interpretation of quantum theory—implying, among other things, that probability is a matter of lack of knowledge (understood as a state of mind). Wigner says: ‘‘it is the entering of an impression into our consciousness which alters the wave function because it modifies our appraisal of the probabilities for different impressions which we expect to receive in 95
7 1996 Academic Press Limited
96
the future’’ (Wigner, 1967, pp. 175–176). This subjectivist view is not compatible with Popper’s realistic interpretation of physics, including quantum theory. In his realistic interpretation of quantum theory, Popper understands probability as ‘‘a real physical property of any concrete unique physical situation’’ (Popper, 1982, p. 72; see also Popper, 1990). Popper illustrates this with a pin board: A propensity is thus a somewhat abstract kind of physical property; nevertheless it is a real physical property. To use Lande´’s terminology, it can be kicked, and it can kick back. Take, for example, an ordinary symmetrical pin board, so constructed that if we let a number of little balls roll down, they will (ideally) form a normal distribution curve. This curve will represent the probability distribution for each single experiment with each single ball of reaching a certain possible resting place. Now let us ‘kick’ this board; say, by slightly lifting its left side. Then we also kick the propensities—the probability distribution— since it will become slightly more probable that any single ball will reach a point towards the right end of the bottom of the board. And the propensity will kick back: it will produce a differently shaped curve formed by the balls if we let them roll down and accumulate. (Popper, 1982, p. 72)
Popper argues that ‘‘the ‘reduction of the wave packet’ is not an effect characteristic of quantum theory: it is an effect of probability theory in general’’ (Popper, 1982, p. 74). We fully agree with Beck, that concentrating on the possible role of quantum processes in brain dynamics opens up exciting perspectives. It brings a whole range of ongoing studies of the levels of complexity into focus. For example, studies of exocytosis and channel gating in molecular and atomic detail (see Beck & Eccles, 1992; Johansson & Ärhem, 1994); studies of the stochastic nature of channel kinetics (Liebovitch & Toth, 1991); and studies of the principles for amplification mechanisms and self-organization (see Kelso & Haken, 1995). Concerning the specific role of electromagnetic fields for neuronal activity as proposed by Popper, we have in a previous paper (Lindahl & Ärhem, 1996) suggested experimental ways to test this idea. These would make use of well-known cerebral slice preparations and the patch
clamp method, and would consist in certain field manipulating procedures. This paper was written within a project financially supported by the Swedish Council for Research in the Humanities and Social Sciences (F 375/94). B. I. B. L Department of Philosophy, University of Stockholm, S-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden P A The Nobel Institute for Neurophysiology, Karolinska Institute, S-171 77 Stockholm, Sweden (Received on 20 March 1966; Accepted on 20 March 1996)
REFERENCES B, F. (1996). Mind-brain interaction: comments on an article by B. I. B. Lindahl & P. Ärhem. J. theor. Biol. 180, 87–89. B, F. & E, J. C. (1992). Quantum aspects of brain activity and the role of consciousness. Proc. natn. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 89, 11357–11361. J, S. & Ä, P. (1994). Single-channel currents trigger action potentials in small cultured hippocampal neurons. Proc. natn. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 91, 1761–1765. K, J. A. S. & H, H. (1995). New laws to be expected in the organism: synergetics of brain and behaviour. In: What is Life? The Next Fifty Years: Speculations on the Future of Biology. (Murphy, M. P. & O’Neill, L. A. J., eds), pp. 137–160. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. L, L. S. & T, T. I. (1991). A model of ion channel kinetics using deterministic chaotic rather than stochastic processes. J. theor. Biol. 148, 243–267. L, B. I. B. & Ä, P. (1994). Mind as a force field: comments on a new interactionistic hypothesis. J. theor. Biol. 171, 111–122. L, B. I. B. & Ä, P. (1996). The mental force field hypothesis: a reply to Libet. J. theor. Biol. 178, 225–226. P, K. R. (1982). Quantum Theory and the Schism in Physics. London: Unwin Hyman. P, K. R. (1984). Critical remarks on the knowledge of lower and higher organisms, the so-called sensory motor systems. In: Sensory-Motor Integration in the Nervous System. (Creutzfeldt, O., Schmidt, R. F. & Willis, W. D., eds), pp. 19–31. Berlin: Springer–Verlag. P, K. R. (1990). A World of Propensities. Bristol: Thoemmes. P, K. R. & E, J. C. (1977). The Self and Its Brain: An Argument for Interactionism. Berlin: Springer–Verlag. P, K. R., L, B. I. B. & Ä, P. (1993). A discussion of the mind-brain problem. Theor. Med. 14, 167–180. T, A. E. (1903). Elements of Metaphysics. London: Methuen. W, E. P. (1967). Symmetries and Reflections: Scientific Essays of Eugene P. Wigner (Moore, W. J. & Scriven, M., eds), Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
L E The Relation Between the Conscious Mind and the Brain: a Reply to Beck it remains to be shown that the human organism is a conservative material system, and the law of conservation of energy does not in itself rule out that psychical conditions can determine the moment at which energy is transformed. Also Popper (1984) discusses a number of objections to the thermodynamic argument. The most thought-provoking is perhaps that ‘‘there seem to be empty pilot waves that can interfere with non-empty (energy-piloting particles and energy-carrying) waves’’; a theory that, if corroborated, would suggest ‘‘that physics itself allows for the possibility of non-energetic influences upon energetic processes’’ (Popper, 1984, p. 22). We do not find it necessary to postulate an intermediate field of probability amplitudes. This does not mean, however, that we reject Beck’s idea of a probabilistic approach to the problem of the relation between the conscious mind and the brain. To analyse this relation in terms of probabilistic changes of brain microdynamics is also completely in line with Popper’s theory of mind. Popper argues:
Friedrich Beck (1996) suggests that our interpretation (Lindahl & Ärhem, 1994) of Popper’s interactionistic hypothesis about the relation between the conscious mind and the brain (Popper et al., 1993) ought to include an intermediate field of probability amplitudes. Beck’s main reason for this is that the interaction between the conscious mental processes and the neuronal processes would otherwise, in his view, violate the strong conservation laws of physics. He further supports his suggestion to include such a probability field, by referring to Wigner’s (1967) account of the role of consciousness in quantum theory. And, finally, Beck emphasises that an inclusion of quantum processes in brain dynamics opens up exciting perspectives for new experimental endeavours in neuroscience. We agree with what we understand to be Beck’s general position, that quantum processes may have an explanatory value in the development of a viable interactionistic mind-brain theory. However, when arguing for an intermediate field of probability amplitudes, Beck seems to have a partly different point of departure than we have in our analysis. And, in referring to Wigner, Beck also seems to support a different interpretation of quantum theory than Popper. Beck (1996) discusses what the consequences would be if we assume that conscious mental intensities (i.e. phenomena of World 2) are immaterial and electromagnetic fields (i.e. phenomena of World 1) are material. In our analysis (Lindahl & Ärhem, 1994), we leave this ontological issue an open question. We do not go further than viewing the World 2 phenomena as subjective and the World 1 phenomena as objective. (Indeed, this could also be seen as an ontological distinction, but it is a different one from the immaterial–material dualism.) We do not believe that interactionism necessarily implies an immaterial– material dualism. And, even if one adopts the view that the phenomena of World 2 are immaterial and the phenomena of World 1 are material, the relevance and power of the thermodynamic argument is controversial. As already pointed out by Taylor (1903), 0022–5193/96/130095 + 02 $18.00/0
. . . we might conceive of the openness of World 1 to World 2 somewhat on the lines of the impact of selection pressures on mutations. [. . .] In the brain there may at first arise purely probabilistic or chaotic changes, and some of these fluctuations may be purposefully selected in the light of World 3 [i.e. the world of the theoretical products of the human mind] in a way similar to that in which natural selection quasi-purposefully selects mutations. (Popper & Eccles, 1977, pp. 540–541; see also Lindahl & Ärhem, 1994, p. 117).
But, to base the analysis on Wigner’s (1967) account of the role of consciousness in quantum theory would not be relevant to Popper’s theory. Wigner’s idea, that the collapse of the wave function is dependent upon the consciousness of an observer, is based on a subjectivist interpretation of quantum theory—implying, among other things, that probability is a matter of lack of knowledge (understood as a state of mind). Wigner says: ‘‘it is the entering of an impression into our consciousness which alters the wave function because it modifies our appraisal of the probabilities for different impressions which we expect to receive in 95
7 1996 Academic Press Limited
96
the future’’ (Wigner, 1967, pp. 175–176). This subjectivist view is not compatible with Popper’s realistic interpretation of physics, including quantum theory. In his realistic interpretation of quantum theory, Popper understands probability as ‘‘a real physical property of any concrete unique physical situation’’ (Popper, 1982, p. 72; see also Popper, 1990). Popper illustrates this with a pin board: A propensity is thus a somewhat abstract kind of physical property; nevertheless it is a real physical property. To use Lande´’s terminology, it can be kicked, and it can kick back. Take, for example, an ordinary symmetrical pin board, so constructed that if we let a number of little balls roll down, they will (ideally) form a normal distribution curve. This curve will represent the probability distribution for each single experiment with each single ball of reaching a certain possible resting place. Now let us ‘kick’ this board; say, by slightly lifting its left side. Then we also kick the propensities—the probability distribution— since it will become slightly more probable that any single ball will reach a point towards the right end of the bottom of the board. And the propensity will kick back: it will produce a differently shaped curve formed by the balls if we let them roll down and accumulate. (Popper, 1982, p. 72)
Popper argues that ‘‘the ‘reduction of the wave packet’ is not an effect characteristic of quantum theory: it is an effect of probability theory in general’’ (Popper, 1982, p. 74). We fully agree with Beck, that concentrating on the possible role of quantum processes in brain dynamics opens up exciting perspectives. It brings a whole range of ongoing studies of the levels of complexity into focus. For example, studies of exocytosis and channel gating in molecular and atomic detail (see Beck & Eccles, 1992; Johansson & Ärhem, 1994); studies of the stochastic nature of channel kinetics (Liebovitch & Toth, 1991); and studies of the principles for amplification mechanisms and self-organization (see Kelso & Haken, 1995). Concerning the specific role of electromagnetic fields for neuronal activity as proposed by Popper, we have in a previous paper (Lindahl & Ärhem, 1996) suggested experimental ways to test this idea. These would make use of well-known cerebral slice preparations and the patch
clamp method, and would consist in certain field manipulating procedures. This paper was written within a project financially supported by the Swedish Council for Research in the Humanities and Social Sciences (F 375/94). B. I. B. L Department of Philosophy, University of Stockholm, S-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden P A The Nobel Institute for Neurophysiology, Karolinska Institute, S-171 77 Stockholm, Sweden (Received on 20 March 1966; Accepted on 20 March 1996)
REFERENCES B, F. (1996). Mind-brain interaction: comments on an article by B. I. B. Lindahl & P. Ärhem. J. theor. Biol. 180, 87–89. B, F. & E, J. C. (1992). Quantum aspects of brain activity and the role of consciousness. Proc. natn. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 89, 11357–11361. J, S. & Ä, P. (1994). Single-channel currents trigger action potentials in small cultured hippocampal neurons. Proc. natn. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 91, 1761–1765. K, J. A. S. & H, H. (1995). New laws to be expected in the organism: synergetics of brain and behaviour. In: What is Life? The Next Fifty Years: Speculations on the Future of Biology. (Murphy, M. P. & O’Neill, L. A. J., eds), pp. 137–160. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. L, L. S. & T, T. I. (1991). A model of ion channel kinetics using deterministic chaotic rather than stochastic processes. J. theor. Biol. 148, 243–267. L, B. I. B. & Ä, P. (1994). Mind as a force field: comments on a new interactionistic hypothesis. J. theor. Biol. 171, 111–122. L, B. I. B. & Ä, P. (1996). The mental force field hypothesis: a reply to Libet. J. theor. Biol. 178, 225–226. P, K. R. (1982). Quantum Theory and the Schism in Physics. London: Unwin Hyman. P, K. R. (1984). Critical remarks on the knowledge of lower and higher organisms, the so-called sensory motor systems. In: Sensory-Motor Integration in the Nervous System. (Creutzfeldt, O., Schmidt, R. F. & Willis, W. D., eds), pp. 19–31. Berlin: Springer–Verlag. P, K. R. (1990). A World of Propensities. Bristol: Thoemmes. P, K. R. & E, J. C. (1977). The Self and Its Brain: An Argument for Interactionism. Berlin: Springer–Verlag. P, K. R., L, B. I. B. & Ä, P. (1993). A discussion of the mind-brain problem. Theor. Med. 14, 167–180. T, A. E. (1903). Elements of Metaphysics. London: Methuen. W, E. P. (1967). Symmetries and Reflections: Scientific Essays of Eugene P. Wigner (Moore, W. J. & Scriven, M., eds), Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.