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The relationship between interrogative suggestibility and acquiescence: Empirical findings and theoretical implications
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTERROGATIVE SUGGESTIBILITY AND ACQUIESCENCE: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS AND THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS GISLI Dents Htll L’ntt. Bethlem
Royal
Hospital.
H. G~;DJ~XSSON Monks
Orchard
Road.
Beckcnham.
Kent.
England
Summary-This study investtgates the relationship between interrogative suggesttbiltty. as measured by the GudJonsson Suggestibility Scale (GSS) and acquiescence (i.e. the tendency to agree v,ith questionnaire statements regardless of content). Thirty Ss completed the GSS and t&o tests of acquiescence. r\cqutescence was found to correlate positwely wtth suggestibtltty. particularly after negative feedback had been applied during the Interrogation. The theoretical implications of the findings are discussed.
INTRODUCTION
This paper looks at the relationship between ‘interrogative suggestibility’ and ‘acquiescence’. The former has been extensively researched recently (Gudjonsson, 1985) and may be defined as the extent to which individuals come to accept and subsequently incorporate post-event information into their memory recollection (Powers, Andriks and Loftus, 1979). ‘Acquiescence’, on the other hand refers to the tendency of individuals to answer questions affirmatively regardless of content (Cronbach, 1946). It is evident that interrogative suggestibility and acquiescence share some common features, the most salient one being the fact that both are concerned with information obtained in response to questions. Some similarities also exist at a more theoretical level. Recently Gudjonsson (1985) presented a theoretical framework from which interrogative suggestibility could be empirically inv,estigated. According to the model presented, interrogative suggestibility is dependent upon the coping strategies that Ss can generate and implement when dealing with the uncertainty, and c.\-prctutions of the interrogative situation. ‘Uncertainty’ refers to not knowing definitely or surely the ‘correct’ answers to the questions asked and has a strong cognitive component associated with perceptual, memory and intellectual processes. ‘Expectations’ relate to the Ss’ interpretations of what is expected of them and to their individual needs. The expectation component can clearly. be altered and manipulated by the type of instructions given prior to or during questioning. For example, it may be communicated to the Ss that they are expected to know the answers to the questions asked, making it more difficult for them to give ‘don’t know’ answers to the questions they are uncertain about. In other words, experimental instructions may be manipulated in such a way as to minimize the willingness of Ss to admit to ignorance. Acquiescence is most commonly tested by questionnaires and unlike interrogative suggestibility situations, the questions are generally not structured in such a way as to suggest a ‘wanted’ or ‘desired’ answer. However, many questions requiring simple yes-no answers have an affirmative response bias in that many Ss when in doubt will answer questions affirmatively (e.g. Sigelman. Budd. Spanhel and Schoenrock, 1981). The precise mechanism for this is not discussed by these authors. Therefore as in the case of interrogative suggestibility, uncertainty is an important prerequisite for an Acquiescence Response Set (ARS) to occur and is associated with poor intellectual functioning (Sigelman, Schoenrock, Spanhel. Hromas. Winer. Budd and Martin, 1980: Sigelman ef al.. 1981). ARS also has an expectation component. For example, on many questionnaires Ss are instructed to answer all questions by giving simple yes-no answers and there is no opportunity for don’t know answers. This method of asking questions may affect the validity of measurement when Ss are uncertain about how to answer the questions and have to make arbitrary choices. When confronted with such a predicament Ss have at least three options open to them: (i) they can refuse to give simple yes-no
GISLIH GLI)IO\SSO\
136
(ii) they can give the ansvvers they think are most plausible: (iii) they, can give (or guess) ansvvers at random, The second option is most closely associated with .ARS. In view of the above it is evident that from a theoretical point ofvievv. interrogative suggestibility features which one should be able to demonstrate and acquiescence share some common euperimentally. This is u hat the present study aims io do. :tnj\\erj:
hlETHOD
The Ss vvere 30 male volunteers echo were all employ,ed was 32 yr with a standard deviation of 7.30.
doin g labouring
jobs. Their mean
age
The Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale (GSS) was used to monitor interrogative suggestibility, The scale has been well-documented in previous papers in this journal (Gudjonsson. 1984; Gudjonsson and Singh. 1984; Singh and Gudjonsson, 1984) and therefore only a brief description shall be given here. Basically. the scale employs a narrative paragraph which is read out to the Ss prior to the interrogation, a recall procedure (i.e. the S is asked to tell all he remembers about the story). a set of 20 questions (15 are subtly leading) that are asked twice about the content of the story and standardized scoring criteria. The GSS measures tvvo separate aspects of interrogative su,,Uoestibilitv._ Firstly. the extent to vvhich Ss ‘Yield’ to subtly leading questions and secondly, how Ss respond to negative feedback instructions. The latter measures how much Ss ‘Shift’ their answers once interpersonal pressure has been applied. Thus Yield I indicates how many leading questions the Ss give in to prior to negative feedback. Yield 2 shows how often they give in to leading questions after feedback is applied and Shift indicates on how many of the questions the Ss altered their answers after the feedback. Total suggestibility is obtained by addin, 0 together the Yield I and Shift scores. The validity of the GSS has been demonstrated in several experiments (Gudjonsson, 1985).
Two separate tests were administered, both employed the item-reversal technique. That is, the tests consisted of matched pairs of logically opposite items and the degree acquiescence was rated according to how many items the S agreed affirmatively to for both items. The two tests involved different complexity. Test I was designed to measure acquiescence to simple questions, whereas the reverse was true on Test 2. This made it possible to study the effects of the differential level of ‘uncertainty’ upon responding. (i) Tesr I. This test is similar to that developed by Sigelman et ul. (1981) except that it had a larger number of matched pairs. The five matched pairs of logically opposite items used uere as follows:
of
I.
(i) (ii) -. 7 (i) (ii) 3. (i) (ii) 1. (i) (ii) 5. (i) (ii)
I I I I I I I I I I
am happy most of the time am sad most of the time usually tell the truth usually tell lies like to gossip at times never like to gossip have deliberately said things that hurt people’s feelings have never deliberately said somethin, 0 that hurt someone‘s always try to practise vvhat I preach don’t usually practise what I preach.
feelings
Only the first pair was taken from Sigelman et ul. (198 I). Ss who contradicted themselves by The scores that SS could responding ‘yes’ to both questions in a pair were scored as acquiescing. obtain therefore ranged from 0 to 5.
(II) Tesr 2 This test of acquiescence \vas more complex than Test I and \\as de\elopsd bq W’inkler. Kanouse and N’are (1982). It consists of I2 pairs of logically opposite items measuring the Ss. attitudes tokvard drugs. doctors and health care. An XRS score \vas calculated by assigning a value of I in sbery instance that a .S answered afFirmati\,ely an item and its logical opposite. Thus, each S could obtain a score from 0 to 12. On this test it is also possible to check for a tendenc? to disagree with logically opposite items, but Winklsr er al. (1981) found that this tendency occurred much less frequently and could not be reliably measured using the matched-pairs method. Esamples of the matched pairs are as follows: “Prescription drugs frequently do more harm than “When a treatment involves risks, drugs are almost ahcays helpful”: good” vs “Prescription doctors al~vays discuss those risks ivith a patient” vs “Doctors don’t aluays explain to their patients the risks invol\,ed in certain treatments”. Procedure
The GSS was presented to the Ss as a memory task and was administered as recommended by Gudjonsson (1984). There was an approx. 50-min delay between immediate and delayed recall during which the acquiescence tests were administered. During this interval two further tests \vere administered. These were the Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices (RSPM; Raven. 1960) and the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (SDS; Crowne and Marlowe, 1960). The former was administered in order to measure the intellectual capacity of the Ss as this is theoretically related to the ‘uncertainty’ component of the model of Gudjonsson (1985). The Marlowe-CroLvne served t\vo purposes. First, to monitor the tendency of the Ss to present themselves in a socially desirable \vay, which, if in the extreme, might be correlated with the Suggestibility and Acquiescence scores. Second, the five pairs of logically opposite items measuring acquiescence on Test I could be conveniently interspersed at random among the 33 Marlowe-Crowne items which touched similar themes.
RESULTS Table I gives the mean and standard deviation scores for the GSS and acquiescence scales. The GSS scores are somewhat higher than that reported for the initial standardization sample (Gudjonsson. 1984). which is undoubtedly related to the poorer intellectual and memory capacity of the present sample. The degree of acquiescence was significantly greater on Test 2 than Test I (I = 5.1. df= 28, P < 0.001) which was expected in view of the greater complexity of the former matched pairs. The average IQ equivalent score for the sample was 95 (SD = 8.8) and the MarlobveCrowne mean score was 15.8 (SD = 5.5). Table 2 gives the correlations between the Suggestibility and the Acquiescence scores. It is evident that all the correlations are positive, although more are significant on Test 2 than on Test I. The GSS Shift scores did not correlate significantly with the Acquiescence scores. and it is noteworthy that the Acquiescence scores correlated most strongly with the Yield 2 scores. There \vas a small negative correlation (-0.31. P < 0.05) between the Total GSS and IQ as measured by RSPM. Significant correlations Lvere also found between IQ and the acquiescence tests (Test I -0.32. P < 0.05; Test 2. -0.5-I. P < 0.01). The Marlowe-Crowne SDS scores did not correlate significantly with Suggestibility and Acquiescence scores.
lP < iI IIS. one-ullsd
DISCUSSION and acquiescence are positively, The present findings shovv that interrogativ-e su ggestibilitv correlated. but the relationship is rather vveak. The relationship was particularly vvsak vvith respect to Test I. This may have been due to the low range of scores obtained on this particular test. Presumably, the logically opposite pairs uere too easy for the intellectual level of the present sample. This type of acquiescence test may therefore be more applicable to Ss who are mentally less sophisticated [e.g. as in the study of Sigelman em al. (I981)]. The range of scores were clearly better distributed on Test 2, which was a more complex test and required a greater level of intellectual processing. This is illustrated by the highly significant correlation found between IQ and the Acquiescence score on Test 3. The results support Gudjonsson’s (19S5) theoretical argument that interrogative suggestibility has a strong cognitive component related to uncertainty. The finding that acquiescence correlated most strongly with suggestibility after the nepativc feedback had been applied on the GSS raises interestin, u theoretical issues. First. it suggests that the Ss most receptive to suggestive influences after negative feedback are those prone to give an mechanism. Third. it would seem ARS on questionnaires. Second, it SLI,,OUests a related underlving that this mechanism is unrelated to the number of times Ss ‘shift’ their answers after the negative feedback is given and is specifically related to increased susceptibility to ‘leading’ questions. These findings support the proposition of some kind of an ‘anxiety relief mechanism’ which helps the S to cope with uncertainty and reduced self-esteem. The theoretical reasoning for this argument is as follovvs. Once the negative feedback IS applied on the GSS cognitive uncertainty is increased. That is. the Ss learn that many of their answers are considered to be wrong by the interrogator who requests them to try again. and it is emphasized of an ‘expectation’ that this time they are expected to be more accurate (pointin g to the importance component in the process). Unfortunately from the Ss’ point of view, they are not informed which of their 20 answers on the GSS are considered to be wrong. Neither do they know how many’ of their answers they need to alter in order to improve their accuracy. Consequently, the Ss have to reflect back to their previous answers and consider if and how they could improve their performance. There arc of course, considerable individual variations in the extent to which this causes additional uncertainty among 5’s uhich relates to such factors as the strength of their internal frame of reference (i.e. how clearly they remember the content of the story) and the disruptive etfects of the negative feedback on the retention and retrieval processes of the existing material. There is evidence that negative feedback on the GSS significantly affects mood-related variables (Tata. 1983). Self-esteem variables, particularly those related to perceptions of ‘competence’ and ‘potency’. are clearly indicated in the suggestion process (Gudjonsson and Lister. 1951; Singh and Gudjonsson, 1984). There is theoretical and empirical evidence (e.g. Graf, I97 I) that under circumstances of decrease in feelings of self-worth people tend to behave in a manner that tends to reduce negative information about themselv.es in order to restore their self-esteem. It can be argued that the negative feedback on the GSS produces a mismatch between present and previous self-concepts and it is this accompanied by a reduction in self-esteem. that motiv,ates SS to take action that improves their self-evaluations. Such a mismatch may also to some extent be present prior to the negative feedback on the GSS in that the Ss are asked questions about objects and events that vvere not mentioned in the story but might have been. which lead many Ss to believe 1985). This heightens the Ss’ that their memory is vv.orse than they had espected (Gudjonsson, and present self-concepts, vvhich becomes further perceptions of mismatch between previous
exacerbated b) the subsequent negative feedback. Although a negative feedback procedure \vas not use on the acquiescence tests used in this study. the realization of the Ss that they do not fully understand the content of some of the questions may affect their self-esteem similar to that described above with reference to the GSS. According to the above theoretical reasoning. both uncertainty and self-concept evaluations are relevant to suggestibility and acquiescence. The uncertainty and reduced self-esteem produce a negative state of psychological arousal. similar to that seen in the arousal properties of dissonance manipulations (Kiesler and Pallak. 1976). This arousal motivates the Ss to reduce the uncertainty and to restore or improve their self-image. The reasons why arousal is reduced by means of an afhrmative response bias are not fully understood. At least two explanations can be offered. Firstly. affirn1ativ.e ans\vers are perceived to be more acceptable to the interviewer and are consequently less likely to be challenged than ‘no’ and ‘don’t know’ answers. Second, affirmative answers are more easily incorporated into the 5s’ memory recollection than ‘no’ and ‘don’t know’ answers. thus reducing doubts and uncertainties. Both explanations are consistent with the comprehensive account of the question-and-answer process given by Richardson, Dohrenwend and Klein (3965) and provide testable hypotheses for future research.
REFERENCES Cronbach L. J. (19-16)Response sets and test balidtty. E&c. p.~j,chol. .~Iea.~trr. 6, 475494. Croune D. P. and \larloue D. (1960) A new scale of social desirability independent of psychopathology. J. corts~lr. f.~j,c/rol. 21. 3499351. Graf R. G. (1971) Induced self-esteem as a determinant of behoviour. J. sot. P~~~chol. 85, 213-217. Gudjonsson G. H. (1984) X new scale of interrogative suggestibility. Person. mrlrcid. Og‘ 5, 303-314. Gudjonsson G. H. (I9Sj) A theoretical model of interrogative suggestibility. In preparation. Gudjonsson G H. and Lister S. (1984) Interrogative suggestibility and its relationship with self-esteem and control. J ~~~rcn.v. Scl Sot. 2.4 99-I IO. Gudjonsson G. H. and Singh K. K. (1981) Interrogative suggestibtltty and delinquent boys: an empirical validation study Per.son. r/l&r/cl. of]: 5, 425330. Kteslrr C. A. and Pallak M. S. (1976) Arousal properties of dissonance manipulations. Psycho/. Bull. 83, 1014-1025. Powers P. .A., Andriks J. L. and Loftus E. F. (1979) Eyewitness accounts of females and males. J. appl. Pswhol. 64, 3399347 Raven J. C. (1960) G~itke 10 the S~rrndwd Progrexr~ ,Malrice.s. Lewis. London. Richardson S. A.. Dohrenwend B. S. and Klein D. (1965) Interciewing: IIS Forms and Fuirncrwns. Basic Books, London. Sigelman C. K.. Schoenrock C. J., Spanhel C. L.. Hromas S. G., Winer J. L.. Budd E. C. and Martin P. W. (1980) Surveying mentally retarded persons: responsiveness and response validity in three samples. Am. J. ment. De$c. 84, 479386. Sigclman C. K.. Budd E. C.. Spanhel C. L. and Schoenrock C. J. (1981) When in doubt say yes: acquiescence in interviews with mentally retarded persons. :\lenl. Rercrrrf. 19, 53-58. Singh K. K. and GudJonsson G. H. (1984) Interrogative suggestibility, delayed memory and self-concept. Person idkid. Ditf: 5, 203-209. Tatn P. R. (1983) Some effrcts of stress and feedback on interrogative suggestibility: an experimental study. M.Phil. Dissertation. Univ. of London. Winkler J. D., Kanouse D. E. and Ware J. E. (1987) Controlling for acquiescence response set in scale development. J. uppI. P:ychd. 67. 555-561.
Royal
Hospital.
H. G~;DJ~XSSON Monks
Orchard
Road.
Beckcnham.
Kent.
England
Summary-This study investtgates the relationship between interrogative suggesttbiltty. as measured by the GudJonsson Suggestibility Scale (GSS) and acquiescence (i.e. the tendency to agree v,ith questionnaire statements regardless of content). Thirty Ss completed the GSS and t&o tests of acquiescence. r\cqutescence was found to correlate positwely wtth suggestibtltty. particularly after negative feedback had been applied during the Interrogation. The theoretical implications of the findings are discussed.
INTRODUCTION
This paper looks at the relationship between ‘interrogative suggestibility’ and ‘acquiescence’. The former has been extensively researched recently (Gudjonsson, 1985) and may be defined as the extent to which individuals come to accept and subsequently incorporate post-event information into their memory recollection (Powers, Andriks and Loftus, 1979). ‘Acquiescence’, on the other hand refers to the tendency of individuals to answer questions affirmatively regardless of content (Cronbach, 1946). It is evident that interrogative suggestibility and acquiescence share some common features, the most salient one being the fact that both are concerned with information obtained in response to questions. Some similarities also exist at a more theoretical level. Recently Gudjonsson (1985) presented a theoretical framework from which interrogative suggestibility could be empirically inv,estigated. According to the model presented, interrogative suggestibility is dependent upon the coping strategies that Ss can generate and implement when dealing with the uncertainty, and c.\-prctutions of the interrogative situation. ‘Uncertainty’ refers to not knowing definitely or surely the ‘correct’ answers to the questions asked and has a strong cognitive component associated with perceptual, memory and intellectual processes. ‘Expectations’ relate to the Ss’ interpretations of what is expected of them and to their individual needs. The expectation component can clearly. be altered and manipulated by the type of instructions given prior to or during questioning. For example, it may be communicated to the Ss that they are expected to know the answers to the questions asked, making it more difficult for them to give ‘don’t know’ answers to the questions they are uncertain about. In other words, experimental instructions may be manipulated in such a way as to minimize the willingness of Ss to admit to ignorance. Acquiescence is most commonly tested by questionnaires and unlike interrogative suggestibility situations, the questions are generally not structured in such a way as to suggest a ‘wanted’ or ‘desired’ answer. However, many questions requiring simple yes-no answers have an affirmative response bias in that many Ss when in doubt will answer questions affirmatively (e.g. Sigelman. Budd. Spanhel and Schoenrock, 1981). The precise mechanism for this is not discussed by these authors. Therefore as in the case of interrogative suggestibility, uncertainty is an important prerequisite for an Acquiescence Response Set (ARS) to occur and is associated with poor intellectual functioning (Sigelman, Schoenrock, Spanhel. Hromas. Winer. Budd and Martin, 1980: Sigelman ef al.. 1981). ARS also has an expectation component. For example, on many questionnaires Ss are instructed to answer all questions by giving simple yes-no answers and there is no opportunity for don’t know answers. This method of asking questions may affect the validity of measurement when Ss are uncertain about how to answer the questions and have to make arbitrary choices. When confronted with such a predicament Ss have at least three options open to them: (i) they can refuse to give simple yes-no
GISLIH GLI)IO\SSO\
136
(ii) they can give the ansvvers they think are most plausible: (iii) they, can give (or guess) ansvvers at random, The second option is most closely associated with .ARS. In view of the above it is evident that from a theoretical point ofvievv. interrogative suggestibility features which one should be able to demonstrate and acquiescence share some common euperimentally. This is u hat the present study aims io do. :tnj\\erj:
hlETHOD
The Ss vvere 30 male volunteers echo were all employ,ed was 32 yr with a standard deviation of 7.30.
doin g labouring
jobs. Their mean
age
The Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale (GSS) was used to monitor interrogative suggestibility, The scale has been well-documented in previous papers in this journal (Gudjonsson. 1984; Gudjonsson and Singh. 1984; Singh and Gudjonsson, 1984) and therefore only a brief description shall be given here. Basically. the scale employs a narrative paragraph which is read out to the Ss prior to the interrogation, a recall procedure (i.e. the S is asked to tell all he remembers about the story). a set of 20 questions (15 are subtly leading) that are asked twice about the content of the story and standardized scoring criteria. The GSS measures tvvo separate aspects of interrogative su,,Uoestibilitv._ Firstly. the extent to vvhich Ss ‘Yield’ to subtly leading questions and secondly, how Ss respond to negative feedback instructions. The latter measures how much Ss ‘Shift’ their answers once interpersonal pressure has been applied. Thus Yield I indicates how many leading questions the Ss give in to prior to negative feedback. Yield 2 shows how often they give in to leading questions after feedback is applied and Shift indicates on how many of the questions the Ss altered their answers after the feedback. Total suggestibility is obtained by addin, 0 together the Yield I and Shift scores. The validity of the GSS has been demonstrated in several experiments (Gudjonsson, 1985).
Two separate tests were administered, both employed the item-reversal technique. That is, the tests consisted of matched pairs of logically opposite items and the degree acquiescence was rated according to how many items the S agreed affirmatively to for both items. The two tests involved different complexity. Test I was designed to measure acquiescence to simple questions, whereas the reverse was true on Test 2. This made it possible to study the effects of the differential level of ‘uncertainty’ upon responding. (i) Tesr I. This test is similar to that developed by Sigelman et ul. (1981) except that it had a larger number of matched pairs. The five matched pairs of logically opposite items used uere as follows:
of
I.
(i) (ii) -. 7 (i) (ii) 3. (i) (ii) 1. (i) (ii) 5. (i) (ii)
I I I I I I I I I I
am happy most of the time am sad most of the time usually tell the truth usually tell lies like to gossip at times never like to gossip have deliberately said things that hurt people’s feelings have never deliberately said somethin, 0 that hurt someone‘s always try to practise vvhat I preach don’t usually practise what I preach.
feelings
Only the first pair was taken from Sigelman et ul. (198 I). Ss who contradicted themselves by The scores that SS could responding ‘yes’ to both questions in a pair were scored as acquiescing. obtain therefore ranged from 0 to 5.
(II) Tesr 2 This test of acquiescence \vas more complex than Test I and \\as de\elopsd bq W’inkler. Kanouse and N’are (1982). It consists of I2 pairs of logically opposite items measuring the Ss. attitudes tokvard drugs. doctors and health care. An XRS score \vas calculated by assigning a value of I in sbery instance that a .S answered afFirmati\,ely an item and its logical opposite. Thus, each S could obtain a score from 0 to 12. On this test it is also possible to check for a tendenc? to disagree with logically opposite items, but Winklsr er al. (1981) found that this tendency occurred much less frequently and could not be reliably measured using the matched-pairs method. Esamples of the matched pairs are as follows: “Prescription drugs frequently do more harm than “When a treatment involves risks, drugs are almost ahcays helpful”: good” vs “Prescription doctors al~vays discuss those risks ivith a patient” vs “Doctors don’t aluays explain to their patients the risks invol\,ed in certain treatments”. Procedure
The GSS was presented to the Ss as a memory task and was administered as recommended by Gudjonsson (1984). There was an approx. 50-min delay between immediate and delayed recall during which the acquiescence tests were administered. During this interval two further tests \vere administered. These were the Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices (RSPM; Raven. 1960) and the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (SDS; Crowne and Marlowe, 1960). The former was administered in order to measure the intellectual capacity of the Ss as this is theoretically related to the ‘uncertainty’ component of the model of Gudjonsson (1985). The Marlowe-CroLvne served t\vo purposes. First, to monitor the tendency of the Ss to present themselves in a socially desirable \vay, which, if in the extreme, might be correlated with the Suggestibility and Acquiescence scores. Second, the five pairs of logically opposite items measuring acquiescence on Test I could be conveniently interspersed at random among the 33 Marlowe-Crowne items which touched similar themes.
RESULTS Table I gives the mean and standard deviation scores for the GSS and acquiescence scales. The GSS scores are somewhat higher than that reported for the initial standardization sample (Gudjonsson. 1984). which is undoubtedly related to the poorer intellectual and memory capacity of the present sample. The degree of acquiescence was significantly greater on Test 2 than Test I (I = 5.1. df= 28, P < 0.001) which was expected in view of the greater complexity of the former matched pairs. The average IQ equivalent score for the sample was 95 (SD = 8.8) and the MarlobveCrowne mean score was 15.8 (SD = 5.5). Table 2 gives the correlations between the Suggestibility and the Acquiescence scores. It is evident that all the correlations are positive, although more are significant on Test 2 than on Test I. The GSS Shift scores did not correlate significantly with the Acquiescence scores. and it is noteworthy that the Acquiescence scores correlated most strongly with the Yield 2 scores. There \vas a small negative correlation (-0.31. P < 0.05) between the Total GSS and IQ as measured by RSPM. Significant correlations Lvere also found between IQ and the acquiescence tests (Test I -0.32. P < 0.05; Test 2. -0.5-I. P < 0.01). The Marlowe-Crowne SDS scores did not correlate significantly with Suggestibility and Acquiescence scores.
lP < iI IIS. one-ullsd
DISCUSSION and acquiescence are positively, The present findings shovv that interrogativ-e su ggestibilitv correlated. but the relationship is rather vveak. The relationship was particularly vvsak vvith respect to Test I. This may have been due to the low range of scores obtained on this particular test. Presumably, the logically opposite pairs uere too easy for the intellectual level of the present sample. This type of acquiescence test may therefore be more applicable to Ss who are mentally less sophisticated [e.g. as in the study of Sigelman em al. (I981)]. The range of scores were clearly better distributed on Test 2, which was a more complex test and required a greater level of intellectual processing. This is illustrated by the highly significant correlation found between IQ and the Acquiescence score on Test 3. The results support Gudjonsson’s (19S5) theoretical argument that interrogative suggestibility has a strong cognitive component related to uncertainty. The finding that acquiescence correlated most strongly with suggestibility after the nepativc feedback had been applied on the GSS raises interestin, u theoretical issues. First. it suggests that the Ss most receptive to suggestive influences after negative feedback are those prone to give an mechanism. Third. it would seem ARS on questionnaires. Second, it SLI,,OUests a related underlving that this mechanism is unrelated to the number of times Ss ‘shift’ their answers after the negative feedback is given and is specifically related to increased susceptibility to ‘leading’ questions. These findings support the proposition of some kind of an ‘anxiety relief mechanism’ which helps the S to cope with uncertainty and reduced self-esteem. The theoretical reasoning for this argument is as follovvs. Once the negative feedback IS applied on the GSS cognitive uncertainty is increased. That is. the Ss learn that many of their answers are considered to be wrong by the interrogator who requests them to try again. and it is emphasized of an ‘expectation’ that this time they are expected to be more accurate (pointin g to the importance component in the process). Unfortunately from the Ss’ point of view, they are not informed which of their 20 answers on the GSS are considered to be wrong. Neither do they know how many’ of their answers they need to alter in order to improve their accuracy. Consequently, the Ss have to reflect back to their previous answers and consider if and how they could improve their performance. There arc of course, considerable individual variations in the extent to which this causes additional uncertainty among 5’s uhich relates to such factors as the strength of their internal frame of reference (i.e. how clearly they remember the content of the story) and the disruptive etfects of the negative feedback on the retention and retrieval processes of the existing material. There is evidence that negative feedback on the GSS significantly affects mood-related variables (Tata. 1983). Self-esteem variables, particularly those related to perceptions of ‘competence’ and ‘potency’. are clearly indicated in the suggestion process (Gudjonsson and Lister. 1951; Singh and Gudjonsson, 1984). There is theoretical and empirical evidence (e.g. Graf, I97 I) that under circumstances of decrease in feelings of self-worth people tend to behave in a manner that tends to reduce negative information about themselv.es in order to restore their self-esteem. It can be argued that the negative feedback on the GSS produces a mismatch between present and previous self-concepts and it is this accompanied by a reduction in self-esteem. that motiv,ates SS to take action that improves their self-evaluations. Such a mismatch may also to some extent be present prior to the negative feedback on the GSS in that the Ss are asked questions about objects and events that vvere not mentioned in the story but might have been. which lead many Ss to believe 1985). This heightens the Ss’ that their memory is vv.orse than they had espected (Gudjonsson, and present self-concepts, vvhich becomes further perceptions of mismatch between previous
exacerbated b) the subsequent negative feedback. Although a negative feedback procedure \vas not use on the acquiescence tests used in this study. the realization of the Ss that they do not fully understand the content of some of the questions may affect their self-esteem similar to that described above with reference to the GSS. According to the above theoretical reasoning. both uncertainty and self-concept evaluations are relevant to suggestibility and acquiescence. The uncertainty and reduced self-esteem produce a negative state of psychological arousal. similar to that seen in the arousal properties of dissonance manipulations (Kiesler and Pallak. 1976). This arousal motivates the Ss to reduce the uncertainty and to restore or improve their self-image. The reasons why arousal is reduced by means of an afhrmative response bias are not fully understood. At least two explanations can be offered. Firstly. affirn1ativ.e ans\vers are perceived to be more acceptable to the interviewer and are consequently less likely to be challenged than ‘no’ and ‘don’t know’ answers. Second, affirmative answers are more easily incorporated into the 5s’ memory recollection than ‘no’ and ‘don’t know’ answers. thus reducing doubts and uncertainties. Both explanations are consistent with the comprehensive account of the question-and-answer process given by Richardson, Dohrenwend and Klein (3965) and provide testable hypotheses for future research.
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