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The relationship between risk analysis and the precautionary principle
Toxicology 181–182 (2002) 127– 130 www.elsevier.com/locate/toxicol
The relationship between risk analysis and the precautionary principle Julian Morris En6ironment and Technology Programme, Institute of Economic Affairs, 2 Lord North Street, London SW1P 3LB, UK
Abstract Definitions of the precautionary principle (PP) are reviewed with particular reference to the role of risk assessment. In general, the PP is employed as a means of justifying decisions that are contrary to the conclusions of a formal risk assessment. Even where risk assessment is accepted as part of a precautionary approach, its importance in subsequent decision-making tends to be undermined by application of the PP. The implications for the future of risk assessment-based decisions in areas as diverse as environmental protection and food safety are briefly considered. © 2002 Published by Elsevier Science Ireland Ltd. Keywords: Precautionary principle; Risk; Uncertainty; Regulation; Environment; Health
1. Introduction Risk is ubiquitous and unavoidable. To a great extent, therefore, our modus operandi as human beings must involve assessment and management of risk. Much of this is informal. Directly observable risks are assessed and managed through heuristic processes. In many cases, however, direct observation is insufficient to establish the nature and extent of a risk. In such cases, we rely on other institutions, especially reputation and the rule of law. In the private sector, corporations seek to balance the costs and benefits of avoiding risks. Manufacturers and retailers have strong incentives to avoid legal actions and protect their Note: The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and not of the Institute (which has no corporate view), its Advisors, Directors or Trustees. E-mail address: [email protected] (J. Morris).
reputations, so they put in place cost-effective risk assessment and management systems that will limit their legal liabilities and reputation damage (Morris and Bate, 1999). In the public sector, by contrast, risk management is driven by different criteria. Politicians seek to maximise their chances of re-election. This means that they claim credit for good outcomes and avoid blame for bad outcomes. Ministers tend to be in thrall to the groups who will most effectively alter their chances to be elected. Agriculture ministers tend to favour farmers and so play down risks associated with farming. Environment ministers tend to favour environmental pressure groups and so willingly repeat the exaggerated risks those groups highlight. This often leads to conflicts. For example, environment ministers may be under pressure to exaggerate the risks of using pesticides, whilst agriculture minis-
0300-483X/02/$ - see front matter © 2002 Published by Elsevier Science Ireland Ltd. PII: S 0 3 0 0 - 4 8 3 X ( 0 2 ) 0 0 2 6 8 - 8
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J. Morris / Toxicology 181–182 (2002) 127–130
ters are under pressure to do the opposite. The results are often perverse. One of the main drivers of excessive pesticide use is agricultural subsidies, so the most obvious first step in reducing their use would seem to be the removal of subsidies. However, this is rarely even contemplated as an option. Instead, governments are now contemplating the imposition of taxes on pesticides whilst maintaining general subsidies.
‘‘For organizations like Greenpeace, what comes first must be the needs of the environment…the modus operandi we would like to see is: ‘Do not admit a substance unless you have proof that it will do no harm to the environment’ —the precautionary principle…the fact that proof of harm might come too late— or that proof is invariably hard to demonstrate with absolute certainty— only augments the license given to the polluters.’’ (Leggett, 1990)
2. The emergence of the precautionary principle The precautionary principle (PP) emerged in the context of this highly politicised process of risk management. In the 1970s, the German government began employing the Vorsorgeprinzip, or ‘foresight principle’, according to which a distinction is to be made between human actions that cause ‘dangers’ and those that merely cause ‘risks’. In the case of dangers, the government is to prevent these by all means; in the case of risk, the government is to carry out a risk analysis and may order preventative action if deemed appropriate. But the subjective nature of the distinction between ‘risk’ and ‘danger’ enables action to be taken on a more-or-less arbitrary basis. According to O’ Riordan (1994): ‘For the Germans…precaution is an interventionist measure, a justification of state involvement in the day to day lives of its lander and its citizenry in the name of good government. Social planning in the economy, in technology, in morality and in social initiatives all can be justified by a loose and open ended interpretation of precaution’. In the late 1970s and early 1980s academics and pressure groups promoted the application of a more formalised ‘precautionary principle’ as a justification for imposing restrictions on the use of technologies such as nuclear power. The basic precepts of this principle are: a reversal of the burden of proof, and a raising of the standard of proof. In extremis, it is averred that the developers of new technologies should have to prove their safety before they may use them. In the context of a demand for international regulation of so-called greenhouse gases, Leggett of Greenpeace asserted in 1990 that:
According to this definition of the PP, risk assessment is futile, since it is impossible to prove the absence of harm.
3. International precaution Much of the focus of those who promote the PP has been on creating international agreements that limit the use of technologies. The reasons for this are twofold. First, environmentalists claim that the risks associated with modern technologies are global in nature, so any solution to these problems must also be global. Second, in many cases it has been difficult to obtain restrictions nationally because of the kind of competitive dynamic in policymaking described above. So, pressure groups have sought to elevate their cause to an international sphere, where there is less competition over policy formation. International environmental treaties are typically negotiated by environment ministers, who are, as noted, more sympathetic to the lobbying efforts of environmental groups (Rabkin and Sheehan, 1999; Morris, 2000b). But even environment ministers are not entirely in thrall to the environmentalists. In contrast to the extreme version of the PP promoted by environmentalists, policymakers have generally favoured a much looser definition. Consider Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration (the Ministerial Declaration of the UN Conference on Environment and Development, 1992), perhaps the most widely cited definition of the PP:
J. Morris / Toxicology 181–182 (2002) 127–130
‘Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation’. (UNCED, 1992)
This definition is wonderfully vague. On the one hand, it can be used to justify a risk– benefit approach in which the seriousness and probability of damage is first assessed and appropriate action then taken. On the other hand, it might also be used to justify taking action against almost any threat regardless of its probability of occurrence as long as the action taken is nominally ‘costeffective’. To see how problematic even this weak definition of the PP might be, consider the problem of protecting the Earth from the threat of an asteroid. One course of action that might be taken to prevent such an impact would be to develop an array of orbiting satellites containing nuclear missiles that are capable of blowing such an asteroid off course. However, there is also a possibility that the missile guidance system would either accidentally or intentionally target the missiles at earth, killing the entire human population (Rubin, 2000). In other words, the PP applied to mere possibilities of harm, or ‘threats of harm’, demands both action and inaction, which is clearly contradictory. The crux of the problem with the Rio definition of the PP is the unacknowledged subjective and contextual nature of ‘seriousness’, which makes the principle inherently unworkable. Consider biotechnology: people in rich countries by and large do not want for food, clothing or shelter, so they have little reason to be enthusiastic about a technology that might shave a few percentage points off their shopping bill. In the absence of positive reasons to support biotechnology, and in the context of generally good nutrition but heightened fears about food, it is not surprising that environmental and consumer groups were able to generate a panic over genetically modified organisms (GMOs). In reality, of course, the future benefits of agricultural biotechnology are likely to be significant and the results of failing to adopt it
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could be serious, including not only reduced economic output but also unemployment. Inasmuch as both unemployment and reduced income are significant harms, resulting in depression and even suicide, as well as lower life expectancies, it could plausibly be argued that the PP militates in favour of adopting agricultural biotechnology. For poor countries the benefits are more obvious— including higher yields, enabling many to escape from the penury of subsistence. Environment and consumer groups, however, argue that uncertainties over the potential adverse impacts of agricultural biotechnology mean that application of the PP justifies banning its use. The PP itself provides no guidance as to which view is correct, so its application can only lead to arbitrary decisions. In the context of a powerful environmental lobby and weak opposition, the PP has been employed as a justification for restrictions on trade in GMOs through the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety.
4. The wider implications of precautionary thinking General application of the PP may prevent people from being exposed to some new risks, but it also prevents them from reducing their exposure to existing risks. New technologies generally provide net benefits; if they did not, there would be little incentive to produce them. Examples of such benefits include higher crop yields; speedier communication; better medicine; and better, less polluted, water (Morris, 2000a). To be sure, new technologies bring with them new challenges and often result in the displacement of old jobs. In this process of ‘creative destruction’ some people lose out and that is unfortunate. But the benefits of creation generally outweigh the costs of destruction. Who would deny that the replacement of coal fires with gas central heating was a net benefit, though it came at the cost of unemployed miners, coal merchants, and chimney sweeps? (In addition to its benefits in terms of convenience, improved protection from the elements, and lower pollution, central heating of course led to the creation of jobs in the gas, plumbing and boiler-making industries.) And
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even those who are obsessed with protecting jobs cannot deny that technological stasis reduces mankind’s capacity to cope with the many things that are not under his control. Droughts, floods, earthquakes, volcanoes, and other natural events cause disruptions that may require humans to adapt or die. In Ethiopia, two years of drought mean crop failure, malnutrition, disease and death. In technologically more advanced (and hence wealthier and more resilient) Australia, two years of drought mean little more than an increase in food imports and some additional whingeing from farmers. That new technologies have provided net benefits to humanity is obvious from long term trends in available food supplies, infant mortality, access to safe water and sanitation, and life expectancy, all of which have improved remarkably over time (Goklany, 1999, 2000a). As a result, mankind is now better nourished, less frequently exposed to water-borne pathogens and air pollution, and less likely to die or suffer ill effects as a result of disease (Goklany, 2000b). A second result is a generally higher quality of life, resulting from lower cost, better quality goods and services of all kinds. The general point is that although new technologies usually bring new risks, they often replace technologies that pose greater risks, or reduce the cost of technologies (such as fresh fruit and vegetables— micronutrient delivery systems) that enable us to reduce our exposure to certain risks (such as cancer). Applying the PP may prevent the adoption of technologies that would make the world a safer place.
5. Conclusion Risk assessment proceeds from an assumption that risks can be assessed probabilistically, employing a combination of statistical evidence and scientific understanding of causal relationships. By contrast, the PP proceeds from an assumption that probabilistic assessments of risk are inadequate and must be supplemented or replaced by other criteria. Whilst it is true that not all threats can be assessed probabilistically
and whilst it is desirable to supplement risk assessments with other decision criteria when managing risk, it is not clear that the PP offers appropriate guidance in this context. Applying the PP might have devastating consequences: retarding technological development, undermining trade, slowing economic growth, and ultimately exposing people to higher levels of risk. Political management of risk involves the balancing of many competing interests and ideas. Biasing this process by mandating that political decision-makers follow the PP would force those decision-makers to give more weight to the misanthropic views of environmentalists and other undemocratic pressure groups who claim to speak for the public.
References Goklany, I.M., 1999. ‘The Future of the Industrial System.’ International Conference on Industrial Ecology and Sustainability. University of Technology of Troyes, France, September 22 – 25. Goklany, I.M., 2000a. Economic Growth and Human Wellbeing, Working Paper. Political Economy Research Center, Bozeman, MT. Goklany, I.M., 2000b. Applying the Precautionary Principle to Genetically Modified Crops. Center for the Study of American Business, Washington University, St. Louis. Leggett, J. (Ed.), 1990. Global Warming: The Greenpeace Report. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Morris, J., 2000a. Defining the precautionary principle. In: Morris, J. (Ed.), Rethinking Risk and the Precautionary Principle. Butterworth-Heinemann, Oxford, pp. 1 – 21. Morris, J., 2000b. International environmental agreements: developing another path. In: Anderson, Miller (Eds.), The Greening of US Foreign Policy. Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, CA. Morris, J., Bate, R. 1999. Fearing Food. Oxford. ButterworthHeinemann. pp. 16 – 33. O’ Riordan, T., 1994. Introduction. In: O’ Riordan, T., Cameron, J. (Eds.), Interpreting the Precautionary Principle. Earthscan, London. Rabkin, J., Sheehan, J., 1999. Global Greens, Global Governance. Institute of Economic Affairs, London. Rubin, C., 2000. Asteroid collisions and precautionary thinking. In: Morris, J. (Ed.), Rethinking Risk and the Precautionary Principle. Butterworth-Heinemann, Oxford, pp. 105 – 127. UNCED, 1992. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Declaration. United Nations, New York.
The relationship between risk analysis and the precautionary principle Julian Morris En6ironment and Technology Programme, Institute of Economic Affairs, 2 Lord North Street, London SW1P 3LB, UK
Abstract Definitions of the precautionary principle (PP) are reviewed with particular reference to the role of risk assessment. In general, the PP is employed as a means of justifying decisions that are contrary to the conclusions of a formal risk assessment. Even where risk assessment is accepted as part of a precautionary approach, its importance in subsequent decision-making tends to be undermined by application of the PP. The implications for the future of risk assessment-based decisions in areas as diverse as environmental protection and food safety are briefly considered. © 2002 Published by Elsevier Science Ireland Ltd. Keywords: Precautionary principle; Risk; Uncertainty; Regulation; Environment; Health
1. Introduction Risk is ubiquitous and unavoidable. To a great extent, therefore, our modus operandi as human beings must involve assessment and management of risk. Much of this is informal. Directly observable risks are assessed and managed through heuristic processes. In many cases, however, direct observation is insufficient to establish the nature and extent of a risk. In such cases, we rely on other institutions, especially reputation and the rule of law. In the private sector, corporations seek to balance the costs and benefits of avoiding risks. Manufacturers and retailers have strong incentives to avoid legal actions and protect their Note: The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and not of the Institute (which has no corporate view), its Advisors, Directors or Trustees. E-mail address: [email protected] (J. Morris).
reputations, so they put in place cost-effective risk assessment and management systems that will limit their legal liabilities and reputation damage (Morris and Bate, 1999). In the public sector, by contrast, risk management is driven by different criteria. Politicians seek to maximise their chances of re-election. This means that they claim credit for good outcomes and avoid blame for bad outcomes. Ministers tend to be in thrall to the groups who will most effectively alter their chances to be elected. Agriculture ministers tend to favour farmers and so play down risks associated with farming. Environment ministers tend to favour environmental pressure groups and so willingly repeat the exaggerated risks those groups highlight. This often leads to conflicts. For example, environment ministers may be under pressure to exaggerate the risks of using pesticides, whilst agriculture minis-
0300-483X/02/$ - see front matter © 2002 Published by Elsevier Science Ireland Ltd. PII: S 0 3 0 0 - 4 8 3 X ( 0 2 ) 0 0 2 6 8 - 8
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J. Morris / Toxicology 181–182 (2002) 127–130
ters are under pressure to do the opposite. The results are often perverse. One of the main drivers of excessive pesticide use is agricultural subsidies, so the most obvious first step in reducing their use would seem to be the removal of subsidies. However, this is rarely even contemplated as an option. Instead, governments are now contemplating the imposition of taxes on pesticides whilst maintaining general subsidies.
‘‘For organizations like Greenpeace, what comes first must be the needs of the environment…the modus operandi we would like to see is: ‘Do not admit a substance unless you have proof that it will do no harm to the environment’ —the precautionary principle…the fact that proof of harm might come too late— or that proof is invariably hard to demonstrate with absolute certainty— only augments the license given to the polluters.’’ (Leggett, 1990)
2. The emergence of the precautionary principle The precautionary principle (PP) emerged in the context of this highly politicised process of risk management. In the 1970s, the German government began employing the Vorsorgeprinzip, or ‘foresight principle’, according to which a distinction is to be made between human actions that cause ‘dangers’ and those that merely cause ‘risks’. In the case of dangers, the government is to prevent these by all means; in the case of risk, the government is to carry out a risk analysis and may order preventative action if deemed appropriate. But the subjective nature of the distinction between ‘risk’ and ‘danger’ enables action to be taken on a more-or-less arbitrary basis. According to O’ Riordan (1994): ‘For the Germans…precaution is an interventionist measure, a justification of state involvement in the day to day lives of its lander and its citizenry in the name of good government. Social planning in the economy, in technology, in morality and in social initiatives all can be justified by a loose and open ended interpretation of precaution’. In the late 1970s and early 1980s academics and pressure groups promoted the application of a more formalised ‘precautionary principle’ as a justification for imposing restrictions on the use of technologies such as nuclear power. The basic precepts of this principle are: a reversal of the burden of proof, and a raising of the standard of proof. In extremis, it is averred that the developers of new technologies should have to prove their safety before they may use them. In the context of a demand for international regulation of so-called greenhouse gases, Leggett of Greenpeace asserted in 1990 that:
According to this definition of the PP, risk assessment is futile, since it is impossible to prove the absence of harm.
3. International precaution Much of the focus of those who promote the PP has been on creating international agreements that limit the use of technologies. The reasons for this are twofold. First, environmentalists claim that the risks associated with modern technologies are global in nature, so any solution to these problems must also be global. Second, in many cases it has been difficult to obtain restrictions nationally because of the kind of competitive dynamic in policymaking described above. So, pressure groups have sought to elevate their cause to an international sphere, where there is less competition over policy formation. International environmental treaties are typically negotiated by environment ministers, who are, as noted, more sympathetic to the lobbying efforts of environmental groups (Rabkin and Sheehan, 1999; Morris, 2000b). But even environment ministers are not entirely in thrall to the environmentalists. In contrast to the extreme version of the PP promoted by environmentalists, policymakers have generally favoured a much looser definition. Consider Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration (the Ministerial Declaration of the UN Conference on Environment and Development, 1992), perhaps the most widely cited definition of the PP:
J. Morris / Toxicology 181–182 (2002) 127–130
‘Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation’. (UNCED, 1992)
This definition is wonderfully vague. On the one hand, it can be used to justify a risk– benefit approach in which the seriousness and probability of damage is first assessed and appropriate action then taken. On the other hand, it might also be used to justify taking action against almost any threat regardless of its probability of occurrence as long as the action taken is nominally ‘costeffective’. To see how problematic even this weak definition of the PP might be, consider the problem of protecting the Earth from the threat of an asteroid. One course of action that might be taken to prevent such an impact would be to develop an array of orbiting satellites containing nuclear missiles that are capable of blowing such an asteroid off course. However, there is also a possibility that the missile guidance system would either accidentally or intentionally target the missiles at earth, killing the entire human population (Rubin, 2000). In other words, the PP applied to mere possibilities of harm, or ‘threats of harm’, demands both action and inaction, which is clearly contradictory. The crux of the problem with the Rio definition of the PP is the unacknowledged subjective and contextual nature of ‘seriousness’, which makes the principle inherently unworkable. Consider biotechnology: people in rich countries by and large do not want for food, clothing or shelter, so they have little reason to be enthusiastic about a technology that might shave a few percentage points off their shopping bill. In the absence of positive reasons to support biotechnology, and in the context of generally good nutrition but heightened fears about food, it is not surprising that environmental and consumer groups were able to generate a panic over genetically modified organisms (GMOs). In reality, of course, the future benefits of agricultural biotechnology are likely to be significant and the results of failing to adopt it
129
could be serious, including not only reduced economic output but also unemployment. Inasmuch as both unemployment and reduced income are significant harms, resulting in depression and even suicide, as well as lower life expectancies, it could plausibly be argued that the PP militates in favour of adopting agricultural biotechnology. For poor countries the benefits are more obvious— including higher yields, enabling many to escape from the penury of subsistence. Environment and consumer groups, however, argue that uncertainties over the potential adverse impacts of agricultural biotechnology mean that application of the PP justifies banning its use. The PP itself provides no guidance as to which view is correct, so its application can only lead to arbitrary decisions. In the context of a powerful environmental lobby and weak opposition, the PP has been employed as a justification for restrictions on trade in GMOs through the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety.
4. The wider implications of precautionary thinking General application of the PP may prevent people from being exposed to some new risks, but it also prevents them from reducing their exposure to existing risks. New technologies generally provide net benefits; if they did not, there would be little incentive to produce them. Examples of such benefits include higher crop yields; speedier communication; better medicine; and better, less polluted, water (Morris, 2000a). To be sure, new technologies bring with them new challenges and often result in the displacement of old jobs. In this process of ‘creative destruction’ some people lose out and that is unfortunate. But the benefits of creation generally outweigh the costs of destruction. Who would deny that the replacement of coal fires with gas central heating was a net benefit, though it came at the cost of unemployed miners, coal merchants, and chimney sweeps? (In addition to its benefits in terms of convenience, improved protection from the elements, and lower pollution, central heating of course led to the creation of jobs in the gas, plumbing and boiler-making industries.) And
130
J. Morris / Toxicology 181–182 (2002) 127–130
even those who are obsessed with protecting jobs cannot deny that technological stasis reduces mankind’s capacity to cope with the many things that are not under his control. Droughts, floods, earthquakes, volcanoes, and other natural events cause disruptions that may require humans to adapt or die. In Ethiopia, two years of drought mean crop failure, malnutrition, disease and death. In technologically more advanced (and hence wealthier and more resilient) Australia, two years of drought mean little more than an increase in food imports and some additional whingeing from farmers. That new technologies have provided net benefits to humanity is obvious from long term trends in available food supplies, infant mortality, access to safe water and sanitation, and life expectancy, all of which have improved remarkably over time (Goklany, 1999, 2000a). As a result, mankind is now better nourished, less frequently exposed to water-borne pathogens and air pollution, and less likely to die or suffer ill effects as a result of disease (Goklany, 2000b). A second result is a generally higher quality of life, resulting from lower cost, better quality goods and services of all kinds. The general point is that although new technologies usually bring new risks, they often replace technologies that pose greater risks, or reduce the cost of technologies (such as fresh fruit and vegetables— micronutrient delivery systems) that enable us to reduce our exposure to certain risks (such as cancer). Applying the PP may prevent the adoption of technologies that would make the world a safer place.
5. Conclusion Risk assessment proceeds from an assumption that risks can be assessed probabilistically, employing a combination of statistical evidence and scientific understanding of causal relationships. By contrast, the PP proceeds from an assumption that probabilistic assessments of risk are inadequate and must be supplemented or replaced by other criteria. Whilst it is true that not all threats can be assessed probabilistically
and whilst it is desirable to supplement risk assessments with other decision criteria when managing risk, it is not clear that the PP offers appropriate guidance in this context. Applying the PP might have devastating consequences: retarding technological development, undermining trade, slowing economic growth, and ultimately exposing people to higher levels of risk. Political management of risk involves the balancing of many competing interests and ideas. Biasing this process by mandating that political decision-makers follow the PP would force those decision-makers to give more weight to the misanthropic views of environmentalists and other undemocratic pressure groups who claim to speak for the public.
References Goklany, I.M., 1999. ‘The Future of the Industrial System.’ International Conference on Industrial Ecology and Sustainability. University of Technology of Troyes, France, September 22 – 25. Goklany, I.M., 2000a. Economic Growth and Human Wellbeing, Working Paper. Political Economy Research Center, Bozeman, MT. Goklany, I.M., 2000b. Applying the Precautionary Principle to Genetically Modified Crops. Center for the Study of American Business, Washington University, St. Louis. Leggett, J. (Ed.), 1990. Global Warming: The Greenpeace Report. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Morris, J., 2000a. Defining the precautionary principle. In: Morris, J. (Ed.), Rethinking Risk and the Precautionary Principle. Butterworth-Heinemann, Oxford, pp. 1 – 21. Morris, J., 2000b. International environmental agreements: developing another path. In: Anderson, Miller (Eds.), The Greening of US Foreign Policy. Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, CA. Morris, J., Bate, R. 1999. Fearing Food. Oxford. ButterworthHeinemann. pp. 16 – 33. O’ Riordan, T., 1994. Introduction. In: O’ Riordan, T., Cameron, J. (Eds.), Interpreting the Precautionary Principle. Earthscan, London. Rabkin, J., Sheehan, J., 1999. Global Greens, Global Governance. Institute of Economic Affairs, London. Rubin, C., 2000. Asteroid collisions and precautionary thinking. In: Morris, J. (Ed.), Rethinking Risk and the Precautionary Principle. Butterworth-Heinemann, Oxford, pp. 105 – 127. UNCED, 1992. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Declaration. United Nations, New York.