The retention of knowledge workers with the unfolding model of voluntary turnover

THE RETENTION OF KNOWLEDGE WORKERS WITH THE UNFOLDING MODEL OF VOLUNTARY TURNOVER Thomas W. Lee University of Washington

Steven D. Maurer O/d Dominion

University

In the next century, the American and world economies will be firmly grounded in the information age. As such, retention of its key participant, namely, the knowledge worker, becomes critical to organizational well being. In this article, initial steps are taken toward understanding how to retain knowledge workers, with a particular focus on engineers. First, we apply a new and promising theory from the academic HRM literature (Horn & Griffeth 1995, pp. 85-861, the unfolding model of voluntary turnover (Lee & Mitchell 1994), in order to understand the four prototypical ways that knowledge workers might leave their organizations. Second, three widely accepted taxonomic types of engineers and five standard HRM practices are identified. As a conceptual tool, we created four matrices, with each corresponding to one of the four paths depicted by the unfolding model. Within each matrix, the five standard HRM functions were crossed with the three prototypical engineering types. We then ask, given the characteristics of each decision path, how might each HRM function facilitate the retention of each type of engineer? Finally, research implications are discussed.

In the last decade, managers, organizational scientists, economists, and jour-

nalists have recognized that the American and global economies have passed from the “industrial age” into the “information age,” where organizational and individual well being are tightly connected to how well knowledge can be processed (Lawler 1996). In this brave new world of information, a key player, if not the most important class of organizational participant, has been widely recognized and labeled as the “knowledge worker” (Micklethwait & WoolDirect all correspondence to: Thomas W. Lee, Department of Management and Organization, School of Business Administration, University of Washington, Box 353200, Seattle, WA 98195-3200 E-mail: ORCAS(ic U.WASHINGTON.EDU Human Resource Management Review, Volume 7, Number 3, 1997, pages 247-275 All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.

Copyright 0 1997 by JAI Press Inc. ISSN:1053-4822

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dridge, 1996). These people do not add value to the firm because of their labor per se; they do not add value to the firm because of their work histories per se; but they do add value to the firm because of what they know. Knowledge workers include, but are not limited to, computer scientists, engineers, physical scientists, consultants, social scientists, accountants, and ecologists. They are valuable precisely because they can effectively work with ideas, symbols, and other abstractions. Furthermore, it is often asserted that knowledge workers will largely determine which firms become the “stars” and which firms become the “has been’s” in the twenty-first century (e.g., Tushman & O’Reilly 1996). Thus, there is a clear organizational, if not societal, imperative for firms to retain their knowledge workers. For most of the twentieth century, managers and researchers in human resource management (HRM) have been concerned about voluntary employee turnover (Barnard 1938; March & Simon 1958). Correspondingly, numerous scientific theories on employees’ volitional quitting have appeared in the academic HRM literature over the last twenty years. Moreover, the topic remains an active area of scholarly inquiry. (See Horn & Griffeth 1995, for a comprehensive review of the turnover research.) Certainly, understanding the general properties of voluntary employee turnover is worthy of continued empirical study. Given the widely accepted value-added that knowledge workers contribute toward organizational success and given their projected value-added into the next century, however, it is surprising that HRM researchers have not focused more singularly on understanding how to retain these key organizational members. Consider the following true stories. Case 1: From Good to Better. Franklin Yee (a fictitious name) is a thirty year old computer engineer who specializes in middle-ware applications for network systems. He holds a BS in mathematics and computer science from the University of California, Berkeley, and an MS in computer science from Stanford University. Since finishing graduate school six years earlier, Mr. Yee has worked for several computer companies in California’s Silicon Valley on very technically oriented projects. He is engaged to be married; drives a new BMW; and appreciates the successful directions in the work and nonwork spheres of his life. In particular, Mr. Yee enjoys the challenge of being the best in his profession, maintaining his up-to-date technical knowledge, and working on state of the art middle-ware projects. When asked how many job offers he could generate with “modest effort,” Mr. Yee replied “12.” When asked to expand upon his answer, he said that a realistic interpretation for “modest effort” was a half hour of telephone calling and that 12 offers represented the maximum number of phone calls which he could make within 30 minutes. When asked to describe his recent departure from his last firm, Mr. Yee said that it was part of his on-going “career plan” to go to the most interesting (i.e., fun) project, regardless of which company owns the project. When asked what prompted his most recent departure, Mr. Yee said that the precipitating event was a casual conversation in which he was solicited for his current job.

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Case 2: Enough Is Enough. In February, 1976, three engineers, with a combined experience of 52 years with General Electric (GE) Corporation’s nuclear division, suddenly quit their jobs. Their departures were reactions to GE’s and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s inaction on various accidents, engineering miscalculations, and equipment failures. When these engineers realized that their warnings and arguments about fundamental safety problems (e.g., over-emphasis of theoretical models and under-emphasis of prototype and field testing) were being ignored, they quit (Fitzgerald 1990). Case 3: Time to Move On. Sammy Lew (a fictitious name) was a forty-five year old former electrical engineer who had worked for a major militarydefense company. He holds a BS in electrical engineering from San Jose State University and had worked for the same firm since graduation twentythree years earlier. For the last ten years, Mr. Lew supervised a group of twelve engineers. When asked why he left his former company to become a real estate developer, Mr. Lew said that the continual downsizing and mergers in the defense industry, coupled with his very out-dated engineer skills, led him to realize that he had minimal advancement prospects. As such, he evaluated his interests, aspirations, and available opportunities. Although he had no particular connection to his new profession, real estate development appeared, on balance, his best choice. He quit the defense company upon finding an acceptable job in real estate. When asked what precipitated his recent quit, Mr. Lew said that it was the departure from the firm of another work group member. That departure left Mr. Lew as the work group’s oldest and clearly most out-dated engineer. He knew that “it was time to move on.” Case 4: Changing Aspirations. Tom White (a fictitious name) was a 33 year old former engineer who had worked for nearly ten years as an engineer, a project engineer, and a manager in the engineering division at AT&T. When asked why he quit his job at AT&T, Mr. White said that a number of events gradually lead him to change his mind about what he wanted to do. The birth of a daughter, his well defined and company encouraged technical career path, and a growing desire to have more control over family time and choices in professional work projects combined to decrease his interest in an engineering career. As a result, Mr. White entered a Ph.D. program in HRM in order to become a business professor. These four cases represent common episodes in the knowledge workers’ quitting. Moreover, they constitute the potential for major losses to a firm’s store of human capital. Most psychological theories of voluntary employee turnover offer limited guidance on understanding these kinds of quits. Although there is some disagreement about the specific nature of their intermediate steps, most turnover theories explain quitting as induced by job dissatisfaction (e.g., Mobley 1977). In other words, people quit because they become too disaffected with their jobs, but the theorized steps between experi-

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enced dissatisfaction and quitting varies substantially across theories (Horn & Griffeth 1995). Whereas traditional turnover theories can partially explain the above cases, they do not capture the surrounding, rich context experienced by Franklin Yee, the three former GE engineers, Sammy Lew, or Tom White. As a result, traditional turnover theories may not provide strong guidance on how knowledge workers might be retained. In this article, we take initial steps toward understanding how to retain knowledge workers. First, we apply a new and promising theory from the academic HRM literature (Horn & Griffeth 1995, pp. 8%86), the unfolding model of voluntary turnover (Lee & Mitchell 19941, in order to understand the four prototypical ways that knowledge workers might leave their organizations. Second, we ask how standard HRM practices might be differentially valuable toward the retention of knowledge workers within each prototypical mode of quitting. Third, we assume that a firm has a reasonably clear idea about which knowledge workers it wants to retain and which employees it does not. Fourth, we also assume that a firm may have a problem with one or more of these prototypical ways that knowledge workers might quit. Although possible, of course, it would be unusual for a firm to experience serious problems with all four prototypical ways that knowledge workers might leave at one time. To facilitate discussion, we focus on professional engineers as our prototypical knowledge worker. In part, our choice was pragmatic because, unlike most other knowledge workers, a considerable body of scholarly writing exists on engineers. That is, we already know a great deal about them. In addition, engineers, like many other knowledge workers, can be expensive to replace and result in the loss of substantial technical knowledge. For example, Microsoft Corporation offered a $1 million signing bonus, stock options, and real estate near the software giant’s campus to Borland International’s former vice president of research and development; as a result, Borland immediately counteroffered. At the about the same time, Microsoft offered a $1.5 million signing bonus, a base salary of 150-200K, and options to 75 thousand shares of Microsoft stock to a major project chief also formerly at Borland (Wall Street Journal 1997). Certainly, not all losses of knowledge workers reach this financial magnitude. However, such offers do imply that the loss of even a few key knowledge workers can be staggering to a firm.

THE UNFOLDING

MODEL OF VOLUNTARY TURNOVER

A detailed description of the model is provided by Lee and Mitchell (1994). As such, only a summary is presented below. The unfolding model’s main components include a “shock” and the amount of psychological analysis that precedes the act of quitting. Shocks are distinct, jarring events that initiate the psychological deliberations involved with leaving the organization. These deliberative processes can vary from a quick judgment, involving minimal attributes, to a highly rational, expected-utility comparison, involving many alternatives. Be-

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low, the model’s four decision paths are described, and they represent various combinations of shock (or no shock) and the mental deliberations that follow. Decision Path 7. A shock is theorized to elicit a memory probe for the recollection of a highly similar shock, situation, and response. The recollection may derive from actual experience or vicarious learning. Further, this recollection requires thought about the circumstances, likely actions given these circumstances, and expected consequences of these actions. As noted by Lee and Mitchell (1994), decision path 1 involves a script (i.e., a pre-existing action plan). If a relevant experience, or script, is recollected, a match occurs, and the response of leaving (or staying) follows. If a script is not recollected, a match does not occur, and another decision path may be elicited. Thus, decision path l’s essential features are the presence of a shock and the enactment of a matching script. In case 1, for example, Mr. Franklin Yee enacted a pre-existing action plan for quitting (the matching script) that was prompted upon being solicited for new and more interesting project (the shock). Decision Path 2. A shock is theorized to prompt a reassessment of how much an individual wants to remain a member of the current organization. In addition, the reassessment occurs in the absence of specific job alternatives and results in the act of leaving or staying. Decision path 2 involves two psychological processes. First, the shock and corresponding situation are judged against three specific images for compatibility (Beach 1990). The first image involves one’s basic values (the value image); the second involves one’s goals (the trajectory image); and the third involves the plan in which one applies to reach these goals (the strategic image). Second, if the shock is judged as incompatible with the three images, the person simply quits. If the shock is judged as compatibility with images, the person stays. Thus, decision path 2’s essential features are the presence of a shock and image violations. In case 2, for instance, the realization that their warnings and technical arguments about nuclear safety were being ignored (the shock) produced so much abhorrence (a violation of the value image) that the three engineers simply quit. Decision Path 3. A shock is theorized to prompt an assessment of how much an individual wants to become a member of another organization. In addition, the assessment occurs in the presence of at least one specific job alternative. Decision path 3 involves three sequential sets of judgments. In the first set, the shock, situation, and three images are again assessed for compatibility. In comparison to the binary outcome in decision path 2, a judgment of compatibility in decision path 3 leads to staying. A judgment of incompatibility, however, leads to some level of disaffection, which, in turn, prompts an assessment of job alternatives. In the second set, the possible alternatives are judged against the three images. A judgment of incompatibility leads to the deletion of a possible alternative. A judgment of compatibility leads to additional evaluation of that surviving alternative. In the third set, each surviving alternative is subjected to a rational, expected-utility analysis. The person selects the alternative that maximizes attainment of one’s preferences. In short, the outcome of

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these three sets of judgments is to stay, if the current organization better meets one’s preferences, or to leave, if an alternative organization better meets one’s preferences. Decision path 3’s essential features are the presence of a shock, image violations, some disaffection, job search, evaluation of alternatives, and offers in hand. In case 3, for example, a colleague’s departure from the firm (the shock) prompted Mr. Sammy Lew to assess how much he wanted to quit his current company and to join another organization because of his age and outdated engineering skills (his incompatible images and resulting feelings of disaffection). Mr. Lew searched, found, evaluated, and chose an alternative opportunity in the real estate business. He then quit. Decision Path 4. Here, no shock occurs. Organizational life is experienced as

on-going, with few demarcating events. Gradually over time, some employees come to feel that they no longer fit their jobs, because their personal or organization’s values or goals change. It is important to note that, in the absence of shocks, these image evaluations occur slowly. From these incompatible images, some people experience so much job dissatisfaction, they simply quit. These people are said to follow path 4a, and its essential features are image violations and job dissatisfaction. Other people engage in a quitting process that is well articulated by traditional turnover theories (e.g., Horn & Griffeth 1995; Mobley 1977). These people are said to follow decision path 4b, and its essential features include image violation, dissatisfaction, job search, offers in hand, and evaluation of alternatives. In case 4, for example, Mr. Tom White found that what he wanted to do (the value and trajectory images) was no long compatible with what AT&T could offer. Over a period of nearly ten years, his images slowly became incompatible with his organizational opportunities. Feelings of dissatisfaction evolved, which then prompted his search for a doctoral program in HRM. Research Status. Because the theory is new, only one published study has tested the unfolding model. Lee, Mitchell, Wise, and Fireman (1996) reported a qualitative assessment that strongly supported the essential features of each decision path. In addition, we are aware of at least three on-going empirical studies on the unfolding model: two quantitative tests on the decision paths and another study aimed at clarify the shock construct. Thus, the theory appears to be evolving and an active stimulus for current empirical research. Because its empirical basis is evolving, applied implications from the unfolding model have received minimal attention. Albeit brief and tentative, Lee (1996) began a discussion on the unfolding model’s implications toward employee retention. In particular, he recommended that managers learn to recognize and anticipate the employees’ decision paths. Moreover, such recognition and anticipation could be based on “management by wandering around” or the direct observation of shocks and image violations. Furthermore, Lee suggested that such learning, anticipation, or observation could serve to clarify when the firm or manager should beproactive (e.g., offering challenging work assignments), reactive (e.g., make counter offers to a competitor’s bid-

Applied Status.

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ding), or non-active (e.g., not offering challenging work assignments or not counter-o~er~ng~ in the retention of valued employees (e.g., knowledge workers1. In the present article, we continue and expand Lee’s (1996) discussion by addressing the unfolding model’s implications toward the retention of knowledge workers via standard HRM practices. It should be recognized that not all four decision paths are assumed (or likely) to occur within a single firm at one time. As such, we offer the manager who has diagnosed a particular tu~over problem among engineers and other knowledge workers (i.e., occurrence of one or more of the protot~ical decision paths) a menu of possible in~~entions.

HOW STANDARD HRM PRACTICES CAN ENCOURAGE RETENTION OF ENGINEERS (AND OTHER ~N~~E~E ~R~~RS~ Standard HRM Practices Under the label, standard HRM practices, we mean those traditional, common functions that are routinely conducted in most inves~r-o~ed~ privatelyheld, or public organizations. In addition, these practices are fully described in virtually every introductory textbook on HRM. They are as follows. First, s~~~~ includes the personnel activities of emplo~e~t planning (or forecasting), recruitment, and hiring. Second, ~o~~e~su~~o~ refers to the administration of salary and benefits. Third, grieuance procedures include dispute resolution processes from both formal collective bargaining agreements and less formal internal company anon-unions mechanisms, Fourth, ~~u~~~~g alzd deueltrpmentinclude more formal (e.g., ENI3A programs) and less formal (e.g., reimbursements for technical college courses) learning mechanisms. Fifth, career planning refers to long term and mutually beneficial Career services (e.g., outplacement resources). Engineer Types Von Ghnow (1988) describes five general characte~i$tics of professionals in high technology firms, which includes, of course, engineers and other knowledge workers. First, they are expert in some abstract knowledge base that was acquired over a long period of time, Second, these professionals perceive a basic right to work in an autonomous fashion. Third, these knowledge workers identify with their chosen profession and other members of that profession. Fourth, they hold an ethically based responsibility to help their clients (or employers). Fifth, knowledge workers value a collective standard (i.e., code of professional conductf and feel committed to enforcement of that standard. More specific to our focus on engineers (and other ~~ledge workers in general), Von Glinow’s (1988) generic characteristics can be further separated into at least three career-based prototypes. Allen and Katz (1986,19951 identify the folIo~ng as common taxonomic types of engineers. In particular, they

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estimate that 48% of all engineers follow a project-based career; 20% follow a technically-based career; and 32% follow a management-based career. Engineers. These people are primarily project-oriented. They can be described as more involved with and attached to a specific project than the profession of engineering or employing organization. Moreover, they are often nomadic in that they frequently move across projects, companies, and physical locations. Applying a sports analogy, they are the “free agents” of knowledge workers. From Case 1, Mr. Franklin Yee is practicing a project-based career. Project

Engineers. These people are primarily profession-oriented. They can be described as more involved with and attached to the professional norms and ethics, and the role of engineering than a specific project or employing organization. In particular, their affective and normative commitment (Meyer & Allen 1997) to the profession of engineering is stronger than their emotional attachments and felt obligations to a specific project or firm. From Case 2, the three former GE engineers appear to be following profession-based careers. Professional

Management Engineers. These people are primarily oriented toward a managerial career. They can be described as more involved with and attached to the

role of manager than a specific project or employing organization. In particular, their affective and calculative commitment (Meyer & Allen 1997) to the role of manager is greater than their emotional attachments to and perceived ratio of benefits-to-costs for a specific project or employing organization. From Case 3, Mr. Sammy Lew appears to be following a management-oriented career, though he is no longer a practicing engineer. Summary and Preview

In sum, project engineers focus on their job’s technical aspects. Professional engineers focus on their occupational (or vocational) role implications. Management engineers focus on career advancement. In the following sections, we discuss how (a) standard HRM practices affect (b) the three taxonomic types of engineers who follow (c) each of the unfolding model’s prototypical decision paths in order to (d) increase the likelihood of their retention. Thus, four 3 x 5 matrices can be created, which are shown in Tables 1-4, respectively. Each matrix corresponds to a particular decision path; each row in each matrix corresponds to a particular engineering type (i.e., project, profession and management); and each column in each matrix corresponds to a standard HRM practice (i.e., staffing, compensation, grievance procedures, training & development, and career planning). In addition to assuming that managers have diagnosed problems with one or more decision paths, it also assumed that firms have concerns about the retention of one or more taxonomic type of engineers within these decision paths as well. DECISION

PATH 1: SCRIPT DRIVEN QUITTING

In general, decision path 1 suggests that an employee will voluntarily quit in order to carry out a previously developed action plan (or script). Further, it

ManagementOriented

ProfessionOriented

ProjectOriented

Engineer Type

Offer Successive and Increasingly Challenging Project Contracts. Offer Successive and Increasingly Challenging Assignments. Offer Realist Job Previews about Managerial Opportunities.

Staffing

Pay for Learning New Knowledge, Skills and Abilities. Maintain Competitive Market Rates.

Pay for Innovation and Targeted Completion.

Compensation

(Not as applicable)

(Not as applicable)

(Not as applicable)

Grievance Procedures

-

Offer Oppo~unity to Earn an MS in Engineering or Joint MS-MBA Degree. Offer Oppo~unity to Earn an MBA, EMBA, or Executive Certificate.

Offer Project-Specific Learning.

Training & Development

~~~ Functions

TABLE 1 Decision Path 1: Script Driven Quitting

Within the Firm, Specify-in-advance the Successive Project Contracts. Within the Time, Specify-in-advance the Successive Assignments. Slot into Virtually Any Upward Career Path.

Career Planning

8 R g

H

$

3

9

Staffing

At the Firm Level, Precisely Model Staffing Levels; at the Individual Level, Renegotiate the Psychological Contract.

Offer Realistic Job Previews about the Engineer’s Role within the Firm.

At the Firm Level, Identify Managerial Career Paths; at the Individual Level, Set Realistic Expectations about Career Progress.

Type

ProjectOriented

ProfessionOriented.

ManagementOriented.

Engineer

(Not as applicable)

(Not as applicable)

(Not as applicable)

Compensation Offer a Very Quick Response and Resolution to the Shock. A Pre-existing Internal Mechanism Should Be in Place. Allow for Formal and Preexisting Mechanisms to Resolve Conflicts Involving Engineering Codes of Conduct and Standards. Allow Quick and Easy Access to Senior Managers in Order to Respect and Resolve the Shock.

Grievance Procedures

(Not as applicable)

(Not as applicable)

(Not as applicable)

Training & Development

HRM Functions

TABLE 2 Decision Path 2: Shock Driven Quitting

(Not as applicable)

(Not as applicable)

(Not as applicable)

Career Planning

Staping

(Not as applicable)

(Not as applicable)

(Not as applicable)

Engineer Type

ProjectOriented

ProfessionOriented

ManagementOriented

Emphasize Consistency and Market Fairness. Emphasize Consistency and Market Fairness. Emphasize Consistency and Market Fairness.

Comclensation

(Not as applicable)

(Not as applicable)

(Not as applicable)

Griewance Procedures

Offer Opportunity to Earn an MBA, EMBA, or Executive Certificate.

Offer Opportunity to Earn an MS in Engineering or a Joint MS-MBA.

Negotiate an individual Learning Package.

Training & ~~elopment

Establish Managerial Career Ladder.

Establish Technical Career Ladders.

Establish Technical Career Ladders

Career Planning

w B

--

HRM Functions

--___

f

TABLE 3 Decision Path 3: Shock Induced Evaluations

4 3

(Not as applicable) (Not as applicable)

(Not as applicable)

ManagementOriented

Staffing

ProjectOriented ProfessionOriented

Engineer Type

(Not as applicable)

(Not as applicable)

(Not as applicable)

(Not as applicable) (Not as applicable)

Grievance Procedures

(Not as applicable)

Compensation

Refocus Toward Alternative Technical Directions. Refocus Toward Nontechnical Directions or Sabbaticals. Refocus Toward Public Service Roles or Sabbaticals.

Training & Development

HRM Functions

TABLE 4 Decision Path 4: Gradual Withdrawal

Encourage Voluntary Quitting. Encourage Voluntary Quitting or Mentoring Role. Encourage Voluntary Quitting or Public Service Roles.

Career Planning

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presupposes that the decision and act of changing jobs, which is part of the larger action plan, is prompted by a shock event. Application of decision path 1 to the retention of engineers (and other knowledge workers) directs attention primarily to the shocks (and only secondarily to scripts) that may cause these engineers to depart. Amongproject engineers, shocks and scripts likely focus on issues surrounding the project, and the engineer’s volitional leaving the organization typically occurs upon the project’s completion. Thus, a shock can be a project’s targeted or actual completion date, or it can be an unsolicited job feeler. For example, Mr. Franklin Yee from Case 1 commented, ‘My plan has always been to move on at the end of each project.” Amongprofessional engineers, shocks and scripts likely focus on issues surrounding the norms, ethics, and activities of being an engineer. These people do not focus primarily on a project per se. Instead, they focus on the professionalism of work assignments. They tend to value the work itself and the norms surrounding how that work is actually conducted within the firm. Thus, a shock can be the arrival of a planning “milestone” such as a pre-planned departure date that prompts an existing action plan (e.g., a script to begin full time study toward earning a doctorate in engineering). Among management engineers, shocks and scripts likely focus on issues of traditional upward career mobility, both within and across firms. The engineering work itself or the norms and standards surrounding how that work is actually conducted become one of many issues which is only part of their primary concern with upward career mobility. Thus, a shock can be missing an expected promotion, or it can be a previously set date on “the time to get into management”. When taken together, decision path 1 suggests that these engineers leave in order to follow pre-existing scripts, which involve project opportunities, professional advancement, or managerial progression. It also infers that HR practices designed to lessen the likelihood of a triggering shocks (and thereby enacting scripts) may be more effective than those intended to alter the preexisting scripts themselves. Thus, the following question arises. How can shocks be affected by HR practices to prevent voluntary quits among the three kinds of engineers? As summarized in Table 1, only grievance procedures are not seen as helpful toward managing shocks in decision path 1.

Compensation Decision path 1 helps explains why engineers, especially those in later career stages, sometimes take jobs at equivalent or lower pay levels to work on a cutting edge assignment (project engineers), pursue opportunities for additional technical training (professional engineer), or enter lower levels of management (management engineers; Kleingartner & Anderson 1987). Because altering scripts is likely to be much more difficult than affecting shocks, managers should strive to minimize the likelihood of compensation related shocks. More specifically, compensation specialists should tailor systems to reward and make salient those factors held as meaningful by each engineer type (e.g.,

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Miljus & Smith 1987; Milkovich 1987). As such, shocks should become less jarring and thereby less likely to prompt a pre-existing script. Recall, project engineers are singularly focused on their projects. What forms of compensation might fit with their scripts? In a nutshell, compensation should be tied to project success. At the firm level, pay and benefits might be based, for example, on tangible project innovations, early completion of the project, or meeting projected completion targets. At the individual level, managers should emphasize that compensation goes to those people who stay until the work’s successfully done. Professional engineers are focused on the norms and standards that surround how their work is actually conducted. What forms of compensation might fit with their scripts? Simply put, compensation should be based on learning more engineering. Knowledge (or skill) based pay systems are advocated (Lawler 1996). In addition, these people tend to stay within a single firm more so than project engineers. Any knowledge based learning need not be specific to a particular project or assignment. Rather than pay for specific performance (e.g., the project-oriented engineer), reward should be contingent on the acquisition of new broad-based engineering knowledge, skills, and abilities that might apply across work assignments and projects within the firm. Management engineers are focused on upward career mobility, within and across firms. Likely shocks involve, for example, the discovery that one’s compensation is below a “fair market value.” As a result, firms should focus their compensation schemes on external markets and strive to maintain competitive market rates. Pay systems should simultaneously differ between internal technical jobs (i.e., an issue of internal equity) and should be comparable with external positions (i.e., an issue of external equity). In sum, compensation strategies aimed at managing decision path 1 turnover should minimize the onset of likely shocks. Staffing

Whereas compensation strategies for decision path 1 should seek to minimize the likelihood of shocks rather than alter scripts, staffing strategies may be effective at both. Recall, it is the intrinsic challenge from the technical aspects of the work itself that drives the project engineer. They often seek out and move toward more advanced projects because it is part of their “game plan” (i.e., script; e.g., Mr. Yee’s comment about fun). Thus, managers and firms should strive to influence the project engineers’ scripts by structuring employment such that “project hopping” is seen as best done within the firm. For example, they might strive to offer project-oriented engineers, to the extent possible, successive and increasingly challenging project contracts. The intrinsic challenges of working simultaneously within the norms and standards of the larger engineering profession and employing organization drive the professional engineer, These people often seek out and move toward those work assignments that optimize their challenge and compatibility with

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professional norms and standards. As a result, managers and firms should strive to mitigate shocks associated with fears of losing one’s professional identity or technical competency. For example, they might offer, to the extent possible, promotion opportunities that provide increasing technical challenge and professional status. The challenges associated with managing, as opposed to engineering issues, drive the management engineer. They often seek out and move toward those assignments, projects, and jobs that optimize their upward mobility. Unlike the project-oriented or profession-oriented persons, managers and firms might likely influence the scripts held by management-oriented engineers through setting their expectations about advancement opportunities within the firm. Thus, setting expectations about the likelihood and speed of managerial career advancement within the firm should be managed with realistic job previews (Turbin & Rosse 1990). In sum, staffing strategies may be effective in managing the project and management engineers’ shocks and the professional engineers’ scripts. Training and Development Like compensation strategies, training and development may be more effective at minimizing the likelihood of shocks than altering scripts. Project and professional engineers are oriented toward continuous updating of their technical skills. However, the form of their preferred form of continuous education differs. For example, the project engineer may prefer short term instruction in order to gain knowledge for a specific project (or anticipated stream of projects). As a result, the project engineer might favor financial assistance and schedule flexibility to attend occasional university courses, engage in self directed study, or participate in external workshops. In contrast, the professional engineer may prefer long term programs focused on gaining additional professional credentials (e.g., Professional Engineer’s license) or advanced academic degrees (e.g., Master of Science in engineering). As such, the professional engineer might favor (paid or partially funded) leaves of absence to pursue formal certification. A straightforward strategy aimed a minimizing the effects of potential training and development related shocks is to make such learning opportunities as readily available, accessible, and wide-known as possible. For example, Mr. Franklin Yee (case 1) asserted that he often judged the quality of his employers by their willingness to enhance his (considerable) technical talents. By keeping his technical talents updated, the likelihood of a decision path 1 shock is lessened. The training and development orientation for management engineers involves re-training on managerial topics. In contrast to project or professional engineers, these people may need to be educated in business, as opposed to engineering, schools. Thus, management engineers likely require substantial support to purse their re-tooling process. Both degree (e.g., MBA, EMBA) and non-degree (e.g., seminars, Certificates in Management) programs must be

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seen as viable options. In sum, these practices, perhaps supplemented with formal contractual agreements, are key to minimizing the likelihood of training and development related shocks. Career Planning Like the practices associated with compensation, and training and development, career planning may be more effective at managing the shocks than altering scripts. Both project and professional engineers are oriented toward continued access to technical training in engineering. In order to minimize these shocks, career planning must focus on their technical career progressions and on how a particular work assignment fits within that progression. For project and professional engineers, managers and firms might offer successive contracts that involve an increasing level of technical challenge, which would insulate against shocks. For management engineers, upward mobility is a dominant theme. They are likely to be quite sensitive to perceptions that one is not “upwardly bound.” As a result, shocks can be avoided by realistically previewing their viable opportunities for advancement into available managerial openings within the firm. Note that, in contrast to project- or professionoriented engineers, virtually any managerial career path would likely serve to enhance their retention. Grievance Procedures As shown in Table 1, grievance-based HRM practices appear less useful for the retention of knowledge workers who follow decision path 1. When the triggering shock is a positive event (e.g., returning to school), the notion of a grievance may not apply at all. When the shock is negative, (e.g., failure to gain an expected promotion), these persons elect to enact the pre-existing script, rather than pursue a pre-existing grievance procedure.

DECISION PATH 2: SHOCK DRIVEN QUllTlNG Although initiated by a shock, decision paths 1 and 2 differ in three interrelated, though fundamental different, ways. First, shocks in decision path 1 can be positive, neutral, or negative. In contrast, shocks in decision path 2 are typically abhorrent events, such as a substantial reduction in a project’s funding (project engineer), a compromise to accepted engineering practices (professional engineer), or demotion (management engineer>. Second, decision path 1 has a pre-existing script, whereas decision path 2 has no such action plan. Third, whereas the script in decision path 1 may unfold quickly or slowly, the abhorrent event common to decision path 2 leads to an almost immediate quit with no specific alternative in mind. Application of decision path 2 to the retention of engineers (and other knowl-

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edge workers) directs attention, again, to managing (abhorrent) shocks. In comparison to decision path 1, a different set of HRM strategies are suggested for managing decision path 2 quitting. As summarized in Table 2, staffing and grievance procedures are asserted to be most effective toward managing decision path 2 departures. Although not necessarily inconsequential, the other HRM strategies are not seen as effective. For instance, a well developed and implemented process for career planning could serve to soften the impact of an abhorrent event because an individual may already see him- or herself moving on to the next assignment anyway. Similarly, a well developed and implemented program for training and development might serve to attenuate abhorrent shocks by reducing fears of one’s technical obsolescence. A compensation system that maximizes external equity and minimizes internal inequity can also help to lessen the impact of an abhorrent event. Nevertheless, these potential interventions are seen as less easily planned and administered than those suggested by staffing and grievance procedures (Table 2). Staffing The primary effect of staffing strategies on decision path 2 quitting is to decrease the likelihood for abhorrent shocks through HRM planning and hiring strategies. (Recall, scripts do not exist in decision path 2.) Among project engineers, shocks tend to be “job-based” or associated with a project’s progress. Because most projects are team based, for example, a jarring shock could be the discovery that the team’s other members are poorly trained. These shocks may be avoided by applying methods of stochastic modeling in order to enhance employee forecasting and placement. Although certainly not fail-safe, such techniques maximize the likelihood that the project’s jobs are filled with qualified persons. In short, staffing strategies for project engineers should facilitate a project’s technical functioning. Among professional engineers, shocks tend to be “role-based” or associated with violations of engineering ethics, standards, and accepted practices. These shocks may be minimized by setting realistic expectations, and thereby avoiding misconceptions, about the role and autonomy of engineers within the organization. For example, accurate information about reporting relationships, backgrounds of key decision makers, and financial support for external professional activities (e.g., attending conferences) may be necessary for the professional engineer to gauge his or her likely professional autonomy. In essence, staffing strategies for these persons should facilitate their larger professional roles and responsibilities as professional (presumably licensed) engineers. Unlike project and professional engineers, shocks among management engineers are likely to be career-based, as opposed to job- or role-based. In other words, one focuses on upward mobility, instead of the engineering work itself or the norms and standards surrounding how that work is conducted. At the firm level, HRM planning and forecasting techniques might be applied to identify viable managerial career paths. At the individual level, realistic job pre-

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views during hiring should set reasonable expectations on the likelihood of upward mobility. Given their technical training, application of Markov models might be well received because they describe in qualztitatiue terms the potential for such upward mobility. In addition, assessment centers might used to provide qualitative information about one’s potential within the firm. Grievance Procedures In decision path 2, the shock is seen as an abhorrent event. Correspondingly, the employee’s decision to leave and act of quitting follow the shock very quickly. Because of this quickness, an organization might lessen decision path 2 departures by having a pre-existing grievance process. However, even the best planned grievance systems are not perfect. Conflicts about the project’s progress or challenges to the engineer’s autonomy remain possible sources of shocks. Among project engineers, an informal grievance mechanism that allows fast, easy, and receptive access to the project’s decision makers should be in place. Because speed of resolution is a key factor, any dispute resolution mechanism should be in place and well known to all persons before a shock occurs. Among professional engineers, abhorrent shocks usually center on perceived or actual threats to engineering standards and practices. Indeed, the history of engineering unionism in the United States reveals that engineers have often banded together in order to gain a voice in dealing with such threats to their professional role within the organization and to provide a formalized mechanism to redress their grievances. Furthermore, professional engineers tend to be highly sensitive to issues of procedural equity. Unlike that recommended for the project engineer, the dispute resolution mechanism recommended for the professional engineer should be formal (instead of informal), and it might be built around formal codes of conduct and standards for engineers (instead of access to a project’s key decision makers). Among management engineers, the abhorrent event is likely career related. As a result, both informal and formal dispute resolution mechanisms should be in place and well known to all parties. In particular, these mechanisms should allow the “rank and file” engineer quick, easy, and receptive access to the senior managers who clearly have the authority to resolve (quickly and decisively) these career related shocks. In sum, an accessible grievance system may most effectively management decision path 2 quits. Comment For decision paths 1 and 2, managing withdrawal focused on shocks. In particular, HRM practices that lessened the magnitude of shocks or preempt their occurrences were recommended. Only in the case of staffing practices applied to project engineers in decision path 1 was advice directed toward affecting scripts. For decision paths 3 and 4, however, comparisons among

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alternative choices in one’s life and job are at their heart. As such, a different tact must be taken. Rather than focusing on shocks, managing withdrawal in decision path 3 and 4 must focus on the evaluations among alternatives. Correspondingly, any HRM practices must serve to direct these evaluation processes.

DECISION

PATH 3: SHOCK INDUCED EVALUATIONS

In decision paths 1 and 2, the impetus for quitting was a shock that “pushed” the engineer into action. In contrast, the impetus for decision path 3 quitting is a “pull” by attractive external alternatives. (Recall the three sets of judgments constituting decision path 3.) To an employer, decision path 3’s pull mechanisms are of particular concern because those with high potential or proven records are more likely to be enticed with attractive external alternatives. Moreover, those people with attractive external alternatives may also be the most difficult to replace (e.g., again, recall Mr. Franklin Yee’s story). For example, prior and existing shortages of qualified engineers are well documented (Turbin & Rosse 1990); predictions for continued shortages are common (Bell 1990); stories of “pirating” engineers from other companies are widespread (Kleingartner & Anderson 1987); and empirical evidence suggests that engineers are exposed to numerous pull forces by their normal work contacts (Von Glinow 1988; recall Mr. Franklin Yee’s story). Fortunately, decision path 3 processes unfold more slowly than those in decision paths 1 or 2. Managerial efforts can be aimed at influencing the evaluation processes of these alternatives. Whereas our recommendations for decision paths 1 and 2 centered primarily on shocks and secondarily on scripts, our recommendations for retention practices in decision path 3 focus on the evaluations of these (presumably attractive) external alternatives. Given the projected demands for engineers and other knowledge workers, these evaluations will likely involve both financial and technical opportunities between the current organization, and one or more attractive alternative firms (e.g., Mr. Sammy Lew in case 3 and Mr. Tom White in case 4). As summarized in Table 3, our recommendations about retention practices for decision path 3 are opposite that for decision path 2. Whereas staffing and grievance strategies were recommended for decision path 2, they are not seen as effective for decision path 3. Instead, compensation, training and development, and career planning are seen as most effective. Compensation

At first glance, offering a lucrative and an enticing financial packages to current and potential employees would appear unavoidable in managing decision path 3 quitting. However, the routine offering of individual wage adjustments (e.g., “sweetheart deals”) is ill-advised for all three types of engineers.

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There are at least three reasons to recommend against entering into such “bidding wars.” First, active counter-offerings (or bidding wars) are more often than not an administrative nightmare. In particular, such a strategy invites fractional inconsistencies to the existing wage structure that can only be resolved by countervailing and upwardly moving wage adjustments. Moreover, serious problems with employees’ perceptions about internal wage inequity become quite likely. Second, such an approach is often times strategically counter-productive. Counter-offers serve to reward and encourage others knowledge workers to seek and obtain outside offers. In our experiences, these external offers are obtained often times solely for the purpose of attracting a pay increase from the current employer. Ironically, such counter-offers can actually stimulate turnover by prompting an unresolvable abhorrent shock due to inequity (i.e., creating decision path 2 situations). Third, and most importantly, financial enticements play only a relatively minor role in the departure decisions of knowledge workers. Attempts to retain them through financial adjustments simply do not often work. Von Glinow (1988, p. 79) summarized the research on knowledge workers (including engineers) in high tech industries by noting : Overall, the most important sources of. . . retention of high technology and professional employees [e.g. engineers, brackets added] derive from the professional rewards associated with the work itself, from the career planning process, and from organizational processes. . Important sources do not include financial or economic rewards of either a short-term or long-term nature.

Instead of potentially disruptive bidding wars, employers should focus on persuasive communications, turnover disincentives, and controlled flexibility to project, professional, and management engineers. For example, a competitive employer might forestall or counter competing enticements through publication of its wage data. As a result, concerns about the firm’s comparability with other employers and consistency with national wage trends can be lessened. Similarly, compensation specialists should strive to respond to everyone’s wage questions as quickly as possible and to provide fact-based arguments in response to particular elements of counter offers. With reference to specific firm tactics applicable to all three types of engineers, “golden handcuff” incentives should be influential during decision path 3 evaluations. Long term “sweeteners,” such as sabbatical leaves after a prespecified number of service years or accelerated contributions to retirement plans, might be built into a firm’s compensation structure. Additionally, those project engineers who work under individual contracts might have disincentives written directly into their contracts that can be invoked by premature departures (e.g., penalty clauses or wage repayment clauses). Finally, controlled flexibility can be built into the existing compensation system by conducting continuous (e.g. quarterly or semi-annual) wage surveys and, if necessary, initiating wage adjustments. A standing “wage review committee” of

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engineers and HR specialists might be created to review individual wage adjustment requests, oversee wage levels of individual contracts, and offer wage scale recommendations. In sum, an effective compensation strategy in dealing with decision path 3 quitting should not be designed to meet individual counter-offers. Instead, it should focus on reaching, maintaining, and communicating widely an existing compensation system’s consistency and market fairness. For all three types of engineers, decision path 3 can be most effectively influenced by an emphasis on effective communication of the merits of the existing system, judicious use of disincentives, and design of a sensibly responsive wage adjustment mechanism. Training and Development The expected “half-life” of a technical education in engineering is about 3 years (Miljus 8~Smith 1987). Among project and professional engineers, issues about technical training are likely enter into decision path 3 quitting. As such, employers must develop a training and development strategy that enhances the perceived advantages of remaining with the present firm. A key element of an effective training and development strategy in dealing with decision path 3 leaving is the availability of an on-going, a visible, and a substantive learning program. Firms should offer a variety of opportunities for in-house technical courses and training seminars by professional societies, universities, and “distance learning” programs. Furthermore, the training strategy must provide meaningful support for these learning opportunities, in the form of work scheduling, release-time arrangements (e.g. temporary leaves or sabbaticals), and financial assistance (tuition reimbursement, payment of program fees). Although expense, a thoughtful, an organized, and a visible technical training strategy should greatly affect decision path 3 evaluations and quitting behaviors. Given the nature of knowledge work, such learning opportunities would likely become cost effective in a very short time, not only through their effects on decision path 3 quitting but also on the job performance of the project and professional engineers. Like their project and professional counterparts, management engineers are also attracted to new learning opportunities. Rather than prevent “erosion” of one’s technical knowledge, however, management engineers would be drawn to learning management knowledge. As a result of this difference in addressing decision path 3 departures, training should expanded to include a variety of formal programs (e.g. MBA’s, Executive MBA’s), seminars (e.g. American Management Association courses), and in-house offerings. It is worth reiterating that the difference in training content does not alter the strategic need to provide learning opportunities on a continuing basis. Because management training courses are usually pursued by those eager to move away from technical careers into a management career path, it is important that the employer’s management education strategy be closely con-

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netted to a firm’s human resource planning efforts and an individual’s career planning activities. Such connections are key to managing decision path 3 quitting. Formal human resource planning, as well as individual career planning, provide information about the management engineer’s probability of career advancement with the existing employer. By tying training efforts to career and human resource planning, the employer provides a level of certainty that should diminish the appeal of outside offers. At the same time, this approach will limit training expenses to those with an expressed interest in pursuing management openings and, perhaps to a lesser extent, preclude unrealistic expectations of those who may lack the aptitude and/or opportunities for advancement into management positions. Career Planning

In their assessment of key issues facing high technology organizations, Miljus and Smith (1987, p. 123) observed that “It is increasingly recognized that individualized career planning opportunities are essential . . . to retain knowledge workers.” Research suggests that career planning strategies should be sufficiently flexibility to meet the differing needs of project, professional, and management engineers. For instance, Bailyn (1982) studied career planning of over 1000 MIT engineering graduates at their midcareer stage. Bailyn noted that the primary purpose of career planning among project and professional engineers was to enable these “idea generators” and “internal entrepreneurs” to participate in the decision making of the company, “. . . particularly in technical matters which concern them most.” Furthermore, their career planning should be geared to precluding perceptions of technical obsolescence by assuring that project and professional engineers are assigned to new and interesting projects, which otherwise tend to be given to recent graduates. Among management engineers, Bailyn suggested that their career plans tend to be most closely connected to organizational reward and planning systems. Based on the larger body of research, it is suggested here that career planning may be particularly important to reducing decision path 3 turnover. Among all types of engineers, career-related interests and anxieties can heavily enhance or diminish the attractiveness of an alternative job offer. For more than two decades, a common strategic response to the diverse career interests of all types of engineers has been the dual career ladder. More specifically, a technical career ladder is created to parallel the “traditional” management career ladder. In principle, knowledge workers would have the opportunity to advance vertically into increasingly responsible technical roles and earn commensurably increasing salaries. It is commonly asserted that turnover among technically oriented individuals should be reduced, because the technical career ladder offers the opportunities to (a) pursue technical interests, (b) achieve greater organizational power, and (c) attain higher compensation, without moving into management positions-which are presumed to be ill-fitting. Despite its intuitive appeal, dual career ladders often fail to meet the career objectives of project and professional engineers. Often times,

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technical career ladders are seen as a dumping ground or consolation prize for engineers deemed unsuited to managerial advancement (Allen & Katz 1995). To influence decision path 3 turnover in a meaningful fashion, technical career paths must be established as legitimate alternatives to management advancement. Alternative career roles must be developed for and accepted by project and professional engineers. Bailyn suggested that a suitable role for such technical employees can be created only when organizations remove the sense of failure associated with “non-promotion” and recognize that all employees, not just those headed to the top of the organization, need to be developed.

DECISION

PATH 4: GRADUAL WITHDRAWAL

In comparison to three others, decision path 4 is fundamentally different. It has no shock, and it represents how most HRM researchers have typically depicted the process of voluntary employee turnover. Specifically, decision path 4 quitting is attributed to feelings of job dissatisfaction (or some other negative attitude). Overall, decision path 4 evolves more slowly than the other decision paths. Its gradual onset is due to a slower evolution of job dissatisfaction and the subsequent time required to search for and evaluate alternatives. Whereas our recommendations for decision paths 1 and 2 centered on shocks and whereas our recommendations for decision path 3 centered on evaluations of attractive external alternatives, our recommendations for retention practices in decision path 4 focus on coping with long term feelings of job dissatisfaction, general alienation, and gradual withdrawal. Unique to decision path 4, perhaps, these knowledge workers may be experiencing disaffected feelings due to burn-out, changes to their basic values and interests, or overall declining health (e.g., Mr. Tom White in case 4). Thus, our general question becomes, “What does one do?” As summarized in Table 4, the most likely means of affecting decision path 4 withdrawal is through career planning, and training and development. Career Planning

Although these departures can occur earlier in one’s career (e.g., beginning almost at the time of graduation from college), the withdrawal processes and decisions depicted by decision path 4 more likely occur among mid-life engineers who have gradually discovered that they are no-longer motivated by their work. Other values and interests may have supplanted their technical interests. In her study of mid-life engineers, Bailyn (1982) identified this phenomenon among project and professional engineers and described them as the employer’s “major lost resource.” To retain this resource, Bailyn observed that flexibility and imagination in career planning are required, because project and professional engineers typically do not value the rewards or incentives offered by traditional organizational career paths. Thus, Bailyn suggests, for example,

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that employers consider an outside consulting arrangement. Over time, the individual would agree to work intensively with the company for a negotiated and pre-designated duration. At the end of that period, the employee begins to withdraw gradually. Thus, a process of controlled withdrawal is envisioned for an employee who might otherwise become quite unproductive (i.e., “dead wood))). In contrast to their project and professional counterparts, management engineers may be attracted to opportunities to learn a new body of knowledge. These, otherwise gradually withdrawing, individuals might be retained, if not re-energized, by a “radical” redirection of their technical expertise. For example, they might be moved away from engineering design and into “technical sales,” where they may interface with the regular sales force as technical advisors (e.g., a translator between product research and development, and sales). In decision path 4, the strategic tactics for dealing with all three kinds of engineers tend to be similar. However, the orientation and accrued skills of the management engineer may afford a slightly larger range of alternatives. For instance, Bailyn (1982) notes that such individuals might be reinvigorated by a sabbatical leave as part of a plan to prepare for entry (or re-entry) into the firm’s management. Further, she notes that such individuals might be used as a outside consultant who would have the necessary distance from the company to provide an “insider’s outside perspective”. Bennis (1976) labels such roles as “variance sensor” and “scanner”. In the long term and across a firm, however, it may not be economically, logistically, or otherwise practically feasible to redirect many engineers in decision path 4. As a result, a firm may be well advised to encourage this individual to quit the firm. Training and Development

Like decision path 3, attempts to address decision path 4 withdrawal through additional training and development should be performed in conjunction with an overall career planning strategy. Although the simple act of offering training to “disillusioned” decision path 4 engineers may be an important signal of interest in the employee, failure to tie training to career planning efforts will likely lead to greater training costs with minimal returns. Although varying by individual, a project engineer would likely be inclined to remain technical in his or her general orientation. Rather than another project involving one’s current types of specific knowledge, skills, and abilities, it may be advisable to redirect this individual toward another topic in engineering. To the extent practically feasible, for example, this project-oriented engineer might shift from electrical engineering and the design of military aircraft to civil engineering and the design of water and sewer systems, which we recently witnessed. Correspondingly, the employing firm might provide retraining toward this new technical direction by subsidizing tuition for college courses and paying for professional books and journals. In the short term, a professional engineer would likely be inclined to move

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toward a non-engineering orientation. Rather than another project or work assignment involving one’s current knowledge, skills, and abilities, it may be advisable to redirect this individual toward another profession altogether. To the extent practically feasible, for example, this (formerly) profession-oriented engineer might cross train in a very different function (e.g., HRM or advertising) or related function (e.g., interface between sales and product development). Correspondingly, the employing firm might provide retraining toward this new non-technical direction by subsidizing tuition, professional books, and journals, or alternatively, paying for a sabbatical. In the short term and on a case by case basis, a management engineer would seem unlikely inclined to move toward another line or staff function within the organization. Rather than another project, work assignment, or business-oriented profession (e.g., HRM or sales), it may be advisable to redirect this individual toward a non-business, though still valued, contribution. To the extent practically feasible, this (formerly) management-oriented engineer might be assigned to represent the firm in its public service commitments. For example, this individual might become that firm’s full time representative to the United Way or similar combined fund drives. Alternatively, this individual might represent the firm full time to several service organizations (e.g., Chamber of Commerce, Urban League, public advisory boards, American Management Association). Comment In decision paths 1-3, the HRM practices were asserted to result in retention. Although the HRM practices recommended for decision path 4 may result in retention, encouraging voluntary turnover may often times be the more functional course of action. In the longer term, both firms and individuals might be better served if the decision path 4 engineer were identified and presented with the opportunity to move on as quickly as possible.

SUMMARY, RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS In the twenty-first century, the knowledge worker is widely recognized as perhaps the most important organizational member. As such, the retention of knowledge workers becomes a critical issue for individuals and firms, if not the larger American society as well. Although well developed and an active topic of empirical research, the traditional theories in HRM on voluntary employee turnover do not offer strong guidance toward knowledge worker retention. As such, a new theory to the HRM literature, the unfolding model of voluntary turnover, was examined for its implications toward knowledge worker retention. The unfolding model depicts the process of volitional leaving organizations via four distinguishable paths. In order to focus our discussion, we selected professional engineers as our particular type of knowledge worker. Their selection was based both on the substantial amount of readily available infor-

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mation on professional engineers and our intrinsic interest with the engineering profession itself. As such, five standard HRM functions that are routinely practiced in most American business organizations were identified, namely, staffing, compensation, grievance procedures, training and development, and career planning. Moreover, three prototypical types of engineers were also identified. As a conceptual tool, we created four matrices, with each corresponding to one of the four paths depicted by the unfolding model. Within each matrix, the five standard HRM functions were crossed with the three prototypical engineering types. We then asked, given the characteristics of each decision path, how might each HRM function facilitate the retention of professional engineers? Under conditions of decision path 1, all HRM practices, except grievances procedures, were suggested to be useful toward knowledge worker retention. With decision path 2, none of the HRM practices were seen as effective, though staffing and grievances procedures may be the best among a poor set. In decision path 3, only career planning appeared effective. In decision path 4, both career planning, and training and development were recommend.

Research Implications Overall Construct Validity. To the extent that (a) knowledge workers are judged as a critical asset going into the next century and (b) this article’s recommendations appear reasonable, empirical research aimed at testing the model’s construct validity becomes imperative. It cannot be overemphasized that application of the unfolding model of voluntary turnover must presume its validity. That is, the four decision paths must be actual prototypes for broad classes of quitting. Thus, the most important research implication is for additional empirical testing on the unfolding model. At this stage of development, future research directed at falsifying or at improving the construct validity of the four decision paths would be most valuable. Such empirical efforts behoove both the manager and academician. Thus, the following discussion on additional research implications assumes at least some construct validity for the four decision paths (Lee et al. 1996). Moreover, space constraints limit our remarks to what appear to us to be the most salient research ideas for each specific decision path.

Decision Path 1. Under conditions theorized as decision path 1, two testable differences are immediately suggested. First, the staffing intervention suggests that increasing intrinsic challenge should increase retention among project and professional engineers, but have minimal effect on the retention of management engineers (Table 1). Second, the intervention for training and development suggests that offering opportunities for formal degreed certification should increase retention for professional and management engineers, but have minimal retention effects for project engineers (Table 1). Thus, the following is proposed.

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Proposition 1. Under path 1 conditions, intrinsic challenge is positively related to retention among project and professional engineers, but intrinsic challenge is unrelated to retention for management engineers. Proposition 2. Under path 1 conditions, offering the opportunity to earn a formal degree is positively related to retention among professiox+l and management engineers, but offering the opportunity to earn a formal degree is unrelated to retention for project engineers.

Decision Path 2. Under conditions theorized as decision path 2, the intervention for grievance procedures suggests that the perception of a standing and readily available grievance mechanism should increase retention for the three engineer types (Table 2). Although the specific natures of these three grievance procedures differ across engineer types, the following is proposed. Proposition 3. Under path 2 conditions, the perception of a readily available grievance mechanism is positively related to retention.

Decision Path 3. Under conditions theorized as decision path 3, two testable differences are also suggested. First, the intervention for training and development suggests that offering opportunities for formal degreed certification should increase retention among professional and management engineers, but have minimal retention effects for project engineers (Table 3). Second, the career planning intervention suggests that technical career ladders should increase retention for project and professional engineers, but have minimal effect on the retention of management engineers. Thus, the following is proposed. Proposition 4. Under path 3 conditions, offering the opportunity to earn a formal degree is positively related to retention among professional and management engineers, but offering the opportunity to earn a formal degree is unrelated to retention for project engineers. Proposition 5. Under path 3 conditions, the availability of technical career ladders is positively related to retention among project and profession engineers, but the availability of technical career ladders is unrelated to retention for management engineers.

Decision Path 4. Under conditions

theorized as decision path 4, the career planning intervention suggests that the disaffected and disengaged employee should be encouraged to quit (Table 4). As a result, work group performance should be enhanced because the employee in question is unlikely to be performing well. Thus, the following is proposed. Proposition 6. Under path 4 conditions, encouraged departure is positively related to work group effectiveness.

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In closing, it should be reiterated that our suggestions presuppose that managers have diagnosed a problem with one or more turnover paths and among one or more types of engineers. It was assumed that not all four decision paths nor all three types of engineers are problematic. Our suggestions, then, offer a menu of possible interventions that the manager might consider for more specific conditions.

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In Organizational Issues in High Technology Management, edited by L. GomezMejia and M. Lawler. Greenwich, Connecticut: JAI Press. Tushman, M. L. and C. A. O’Reilly. 1996. Winning Through Innouation. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press. Von Glinow, M. A. 1988. The New Professionals. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger. Wall Street Journal. 1997. (May 8): A3, A16.