The role of observers' expectations in attitude attribution

JOURNAL

OF EXPERIMENTAL

SOCIAL

PSYCHOLOGY

The Role of Observers’

2.5, 168-188 (1989)

Expectations

in Attitude Attribution

D. REEDER

GLENN

Illinois State University GARTH J. 0. FLETCHER University of Canterbury AND KENNETH

FURMAN

Illinois State University Received January 12, 1988 Two studies examined the role that observers’ expectations play in producing correspondence bias in the attitude attribution paradigm. In the first study, subjects participated in groups of five. In each session, four subject observers witnessed a fifth subject (the writer) being assigned an essay topic and recorded their expectations about the likely extremity and quality of that essay. Later, the writer read her essay aloud and observers made judgments about the (actual) essay and the writer’s attitude. Results indicated that observers had earlier underestimated the extremity and quality of the writer’s essay. Partially as a result, observers then overestimated the extent to which the writer’s personal postessay attitude corresponded to the direction of the essay. This correspondence bias appears to be the result of two faulty assumptions. First, observers assumed that the preessay attitude of the writer tended to correspond to the direction of the essay. Second, observers assumed that the writer’s attitude became more extreme in the process of composing the essay. A final experiment manipulated observers’ expectations and demonstrated their effect on correspondence bias. The results are discussed in terms of a schematic model of interpersonal perception. 0 1989 Academic

A number

Press, Inc.

of writers have noted a tendency for naive perceivers

to

The authors would like to thank John Binning, Jacques Leyens, and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments. We are also grateful to Victoria Johnsson and Christine Kumph for helping to conduct these studies. Correspondence and reprint requests should be addressed to Glenn D. Reeder, Department of Psychology, Illinois State University, Normal, IL 61761. 0022-1031/89 $3.00 Copyright AI1 rights

0 1989 by Academic Press, Inc. of reproduction in any form reserved.

168

ATTITUDE

ATTRIBUTION

I

overestimate behavioral consistency (Ichheiser, 1970; Kunda & Nisbett, 1986; Mischel & Peake, 1982). Kunda and Nisbett (1986), for example, report that when observers are asked to predict an actor’s level of friendliness or honesty from one situation to the next, estimates of co~sist~~~y are greatly inflated. In our research, we explored the related possibility that observers may overestimate the consistency between an actor’s attitude and the actor’s behavior. More importantly, we sought to relate expectations about attitude-behavior consistency to the phenomenon known as co~espoude~~~ bias. Correspondence bias refers to the observers’ tendency to attribute relatively correspondent attitudes or dispositions to an actor, even when the actor’s behavior appears to have been facilitated by stro pressures (Gilbert, in press; Gilbert & Jones, 1986; Jones & Miller, 1976; Ross, 1977). The logic underlying this model is discu more fully below. A SCHEMATIC

MODEL OF DISPOSITIONAL

A~~IS~TI

The present studies were guided by a schematic model of ~spositio~~ attribution (Reeder, 1985; Reeder & Brewer, 1979). Past research indicates that the model offers a reasonably good account of attributio (Reeder & Fulks, 1980) and morality (McGraw, 1985, 1987 Spores, 1983). The current studies examine the applicab~t~ in the area of attitude attribution (Jones & Harris, 1967). The focuses on implicit schematic assumptions relating dispositions or atti positions to relevant behaviors. For example, observers make ~s~p~on§ about the kinds of essays likely to be drafted by persons holding vario attitudinal positions. These implicit assumptions may sometimes be bias or in error, and the model describes how the attribution process is lik to reflect such bias. According to the model, attitudinal attributions are guided by a set of implicit schematic assumptions. Schematic assumptions in the attitude attribution paradigm link various attitudinal positions to different behaviors (in this case, essays). Of particular relevance here is the centraB tenden a~su~~ti~~~ which involves the expectation that a writer’s personal attiux will lead the writer to compose an essay which falls within a limite range of possible essay positions. This range is typically centered aroun the attitude which the actor is believed to possess. As an example, suppose a person is believed to possess an attitude opposed to seh busing (as a means to encourage racial integration). According to central tendency assumption, such a person would be thought relatively unlikely to draft an essay in favor of busing, even when i~~~~cte do so. This assumption is depicted in Fig. 1, where it can be seen en a “‘pro” essay is assigned, a person holding an anti ~~sit~o~ on issue is expected to write a moderate essay, rather than a very

170

REEDER, ATTITUDE

FLETCHER,

AND FURMAN ESSAY

FIG. 1. Hypothesized pattern of observers’ expectations in a case where a pro essay is assigned. These expectations are constrained by a central tendency assumption.

pro essay. Specifically, the central tendency assumption sets limits on the extent to which writers will be thought likely to follow an experimenter’s directions. In more general terms, the central tendency assumption reflects observers’ basic belief in the consistency of individual behavior (Kunda & Nisbett, 1986). The classical models of attribution (Jones & Davis, 1965; Kelley, 1973) assume that observers will attribute an average or modal attitude to an actor whose behavior appears to have been constrained by strong situational forces. The schematic model, in contrast, maintains that observers’ central tendency assumptions set limits on this “discounting” of the actor’s attitude. According to the central tendency assumption, persons opposed to an attitudinal position are thought unlikely to write extreme essays in favor of that position, even when they are instructed to do so. It follows, therefore, that an extreme pro-busing essay could only have been written by someone who is at least somewhat in favor of that position. This logic then prompts the observer to draw a relatively correspondent attribution about the writer’s personal attitude. Thus, a writer who drafts a pro-busing essay under conditions of constraint will be thought to be somewhat in favor of busing. In effect, the model assumes a bidirectional pattern in observers’ inferences. Expectations linking attitudes to behaviors (what we have called central tendency assumptions) determine inferences from behavior to attitude. An important series of studies by Arthur Miller and his colleagues (Miller, Baer, & Schonberg, 1979; Miller & Rorer, 1982) supports the idea that observers hold strong central tendency assumptions. Even when writers were assigned an essay position, observers expected that the writers would compose essays which were somewhat reflective of their own attitude on the issue (Miller & Rorer, 1982). For example, when a pro-busing essay was assigned, observers predicted that a writer holding an anti-busing attitude would write a moderate (rather than a pro) essay. Past studies, however, do not provide direct evidence that observers’ expectations determine attitude attributions. It is possible, for example, that such expectations are mere epiphenomena that bear no causal relation to attributions. The present experiments were designed with two goals

ATTITUDE Given Stated Expectations

FIG. 2.

Factorial

171

ATTRIBUTION Writer’s YES

Initial

Attitude NO

design involving observers in Experiment

I.

in mind. First we sought to measure observers’ expectations and determine if such expectations assume too much consistency between a writer’s attitude and the writer’s essay. Second, we attempted to manipulate observers’ expectations in an effort to determine what role, if any, they play in attitude attribution. EXPERIMENT I The primary goal of Experiment I was to measure any potential bias in observers’ expectations. In each experimental session, four observers witnessed a writer being assigned to write an essay on an attitudinal topic. As shown in Fig. 2, each of the four observers occupied one cell of a 2 (Given Writer’s Attitude) x 2 (Stated Expectations) completely crossed factorial design. IHalf of the observers were shown the writer’s actual preessay attitude on the target issue. In addition, half of the observers then recorded their expectations about the extremity and quality of the essay the writer would produce. After the writer completed her essay and read it aloud, all observers were asked to rate the extremity and quality of the essay and to estimate the writer’s personal attitude on the issue. This design accomplished two objectives. First, by asking only half of the observers to state expectations about the extremity and quality of the writer’s essay, we hoped to detect any potential reactivity that might accompany these measures, i.e., asking for these expectations might bias later judgments about the writer’s actual essay. Second, the design allowed us to check for the presence of biased expectations among those who were shown the actual preessay attitude of the and among those who were not shown this information. In both cases, we expected that observers’ assumptions about central tendency would lead them to be surprised by the essay’s extremity and quality. Among subjects who were not shown the writer’s preessay attitu we further predicted that attitude attributions would be based on essay’s extremity and quality. Given that observers hold strong central tendency assumptions about attitude-behavior consistency, attribu~io~$

172

REEDER, FLETCHER,

AND FURMAN

based on “surprisingly” extreme, high quality essays should result in correspondence bias. Although we expected that observers who were shown the writer’s preessay attitude would also hold biased expectations about essay extremity and quality, our predictions about correspondence bias were less clear. On the one hand, these observers might be expected to be very accurate in estimating the writer’s postessay attitude because of their awareness of the preessay attitude. On the other hand, we expected that these observers would be surprised by the extremity and quality of the writer’s essay. In the face of this surprise, observers would appear to have two choices. First, they might accept the fact that their own (central tendency based) expectations were in error. Alternatively, they might adhere to a strong central tendency assumption and estimate that the writer must have changed her attitude in the process of composing such an “extreme” essay. We included a variety of dependent measures to distinguish between these two possibilities. Method Subjects A total of 150 female college students participated five at a time in one of 30 experimental sessions. Subjects received credit toward a psychology course for their participation.

Procedure Role nssignments. Subjects were assigned their roles as either observers or writer by drawing straws. Subjects were then escorted into a room which contained desks which were arranged so as to allow the four observers to face the writer. The experimenter explained that, later in the semester, she would be conducting an experiment on attitudes. The purpose of the present study was to allow her to collect essays on topics that would be used in her later research concerning attitude judgment. She mentioned that she was interested in the judgments people make about other peoples’ attitudes. The person assigned the role of writer would be asked to compose an essay that would be read aloud to the observers, and the observers would subsequently make some judgments about the writer and the essay she produced. Subjects then received an initial’questionnaire on which they were to indicate their personal attitudes on the two target issues. The essay assignment. Subjects in each experimental session were then randomly assigned to focus on one of two target issues: (1) the consumption of alcohol by minors. or (2) the drafting of women into the military. In the alcohol condition, the experimenter announced to all subjects that she was collecting essays on the issue of whether l&year-olds should be prohibited from buying alcohol. Specifically, she said that she needed persuasive essays that opposed the sale of alcohol to those who were under 21 years of age. She repeated the essay assignment several times in order to ensure that all subjects understood the assignment. The procedure in the military condition was identical, except that the issue concerned whether women should ever be drafted into the military. The experimenter stated that she needed essays which favored the drafting of women. The writer then commenced to draft her essay. The experimenter collected the first questionnaire and prepared a second one based on the writer’s response to the target issue. Observers 1 and 3 then received this second questionnaire which accurately indicated the writer’s own attitude on the target issue. In addition, observers 1 and 2 were provided

ATTITUDE

ATTRIBUTION

173

with scales upon which they were asked to state their expectations concerning the likely extremity and quality of the writer’s essay. Reading the essay. After allowing the writer approximately 20 min to complete the essay, the experimenter instructed the writer to read her essay aloud to the observers. When the writer finished reading, the experimenter reminded the observers that some of them had earlier been provided with the writer’s attitude, and she mentioned that they should feel free to refer back to it. The experimenter then passed out a third questionnaire which contained a variety of measures described below. Dependent measures. Throughout the experiment, subjects’ perceptions were measured on ll-point bipoIar scales. On the first questionnaire, subjects indicated their personal attitudes toward the target issues along scales with endpoints labeled ‘“I&year-olds should (should not) be allowed to buy alcohol” and “If there is a military draft, women should not (should) be drafted.” On the second questionnaire, expectations about essay extremity were measured on scales with endpoints labeled “An essay very strongly in favor of (opposed to) letting 1% year-olds buy alcohol” and “An essay very strongly opposed to (in favor of) drafting women.” Expectations about essay quality were measured with the endpoints “Very low quality” and “‘Very high quality”. Subjects were also asked to estimate the way a typical college student at ISU would respond to the same scales which we employed to measure the writer’s personal attitudes. On the third questionnaire, all subjects received a measure which assessed their perceptions of the writer’s postessay attitude. In addition, the two observers who had not been shown the writer’s actual preessay attitude (observers 2 and 4) were asked to estimate this preessay attitude. The endpoints of the above two scales were identical to those employed in earlier measures of these attitudes. All observers also rated the extremity and quality of the actual essay that was produced on the same scales that were earlier used to assess their expectations. Perceptions of the degree of choice experienced by the writer were measured with endpoin!s labeled “No choice” and “Free choice.” Finally, writers were asked to indicate their attitudes on the target issue for a second time.

Perceptions

Results of the Essay Assignment and Essay Characteristics

In general, observers perceived the writer to be under moderate to high constraint (M = 3.82). A 5 (role) x 2 (issue) analysis of variance (ANOVA) on ratings of constraint revealed no significant effects. It appears therefore that the writer did not perceive herself to be under greater constraint than the four observers in each session, F < I for the main effect of role. Because the four observers and the writer who participated in each experimental session shared common sources sf variance, we treated the role variable as a repeated-measures factor in all of the analyses in this report. The four observers in an experimental session each occupied one cell of a 2 (Stated Expectations) by 2 (Given Writer’s Attitude) factorial design. It is important to determine if observers’ perceptions of the writer’s essay were biased by the act of stating expectations (about its likely extremity and quality) or by having been given the writer’s preessay attitude. Three-way ANOVAs treating issue as a between-subjects factor revealed no significant effects on perceptions of either essay extremity

174

REEDER,

FLETCHER, TABLE

PREESSAY

EXPECTATIONS

QUALITY

Role

VERSUS

AND FURMAN 1

OF ESSAY

EXTREMITY

POSTESSAY

RATINGS

AND

Preessay expectations

Postessay ratings

6.43 6.80

8.30 8.47

7.23 5.80

8.00 7.60

Observer 1 Extremity Quality Observer 2 Extremity Quality

Note. Higher numbers indicate expectations and final ratings in the direction of the assigned essay (opposed to the sale of alcohol to minors and in favor of drafting’women, respectively). Observer 1 was given the writer’s actual attitude, whereas observer 2 was not. N = 30 for each observation in the table.

or essay quality. It is apparent, therefore, that the experimental variations (stating expectations and receiving the writer’s preessay attitude) did not influence perceptions of the essay itself. Expectations

about Essay Extremity

and Quality

According to the central tendency assumption of the schematic model, observers tend to assume that a writer will behave consistently with whatever attitude the writer possesses. This central tendency assumption may be biased, however, if observers have inflated consistency expectations concerning the writer. We predicted that observers would underestimate the extent to which writers would compose extreme, high quality essays in line with the essay assignment. Data collected from observers who stated their preessay expectations about essay extremity and essay quality (observers 1 and 2) allowed us to test this idea. Specifically, we compared these subjects’ preessay expectations with their postessay ratings of these same characteristics. A 2 (Measure: Expectations vs Actual Ratings) x 2 (Role: Observer 1 Was Shown the Writer’s Preessay Attitude, whereas Observer 2 Did Not Receive this Information) x 2 (Issue) ANOVA on extremity revealed only a significant effect of measure, F(1, 28) = 5.77, p < .05. As displayed in Table 1, observers underestimated the extremity of the essay the writer would compose: Preessay expectations are less extreme (M = 6.83) than are postessay ratings (M = 8.17). Regardless of whether or not they had been shown the writers’ preessay attitudes, observers apparently did not anticipate the extent to which writers would compose essays which followed the assigned essay direction.

ATTITUDE

ATTRIBUTION TABLE

PERCEPTIONS

OF THE WRITERS’

Role Writer’s Observer Observer Observer Observer

actual attitude 1 2 3 4

PREESSAY TYPICAL

175

2

AND POSTESSAY ATTITUDES

ATTITUDES

Writers’ preessay attitudes

Writers’ postessay attitudes

5.46

5.88 1.54 8.17 7.57 8.04

6.20 6.70

AND

PERGEIVED

Perceived typical attitudes

3.60 3.84 3.64 3.87

Note. Writers.indicated their own personal attitudes, whereas observers attributed attitudes to the writer. Higher numbers indicate attitudes in line with the direction of the assigned essay. Observers 1 and 2 stated expectations about the writer’s essay, whereas observers 3 and 4 did not. Finally, observers 1 and 3 were given the writers’ actual preessay attitudes, whereas observers 2 and 4 were not,

Table 1 indicates also that observers underestimated the quality of the essay the writer would produce. Whereas observers expected essays of only moderate quality (M = 6.30), they found the actual essays to be of higher quality (M = 8.04), F(1, 28) = 17.93, p < 31. Evidence of Correspondence Bias Perceived preessay attitudes. Given that observers were surprised by the extremity and quality of the writer’s essay, we would predict t observers to show evidence of correspondence bias. The writers’ actual preessay attitudes are displayed in row 1 of Table 2. Estimates of these attitudes made by the two observers who were never directly shown these attitudes (observers 2 and 4) are displayed in rows 3 and 5 of Table 2. In partial support of our predictions, observers’ estimates of preessay attitudes are somewhat more in line with the essay assignment (M = 6.45) than the (actual) preessay attitudes of the writers (M = 5.46). A planned comparison in which the writer’s preessay attitude was tested against a weighted combination of the observers’ estimates obtained a marginal level of significance, F( 1, 56) = 3.15, up < . 10. Additional analyses revealed no significant effects of the attitudinal issue (alcobQ~ vs military). Perceived postessay attitudes. As shown in Table 2, writers generally held rather neutral postessay attitudes on the two issues (M = 5.88). ’ This analysis also revealed an unexpected main effect of role indicating that the observer who received the writer’s actual attitude (observer 1) gave somewhat higher estimates of quality (both when stating expectations and when rating final essay quality) than tke observer who was not shown the writer’s actual attitude (observer 2), F(1, 28) = 7.17, p < .Q5. We have no ready explanation for this pattern.

176

REEDER,

FLETCHER,

AND FURMAN

Yet observers attributed attitudes that followed the direction of the essay assignment (M = 7.83). A planned comparison testing the attributions of observer 2 and observer 4 (who were not shown the preessay attitudes of the writers) against the writers’ actual attitudes was statistically reliable, F(1, 56) = 14.36, p < .Ol. In sum, these observers showed evidence of correspondence bias when estimating the postessay attitude of the writer. Inspection of the means in Table 2 indicates that observers who were shown the preessay attitude of the writer (observers 1 and 3) also showed evidence of correspondence bias, F( 1, 56) = 8.90, p < .Ol. To investigate any possible differences between observers, perceptions of postessay attributions were analyzed as a function of whether observers stated expectations and whether they were provided with the writer’s preessay attitude. This analysis revealed no significant effects. A close inspection of Table 2 reveals that the writer’s attitude was believed to have undergone a change in the course of the experiment. Among observers 2 and 4 (who were not shown the preessay attitude of the writer) perceptions of postessay attitudes are more extreme (M = 8.11) than are perceptions of preessay attitudes (J4 = 6.45). To investigate this difference further, we conducted a 3 (Role: Observer 2 vs Observer 4 vs Writer) x 2 (Measure: Perceived Preessay Attitudes vs Perceived Postessay Attitudes) x 2 (Issue) ANOVA. This analysis revealed significant effects of role, measure, and a role by measure interaction, Fs = 5.31, 24.88, and 3.31, allps < .05. First, the effect of role indicates that observers made attributions which were more extreme than the writers’ actual attitudes. Second, perceived postessay attitudes are more extreme in the direction of the assigned essay than perceived preessay attitudes. However, the interaction indicates that this latter pattern is stronger for the observers than for the writers. Writers’ attitudes were not significantly altered as a function of composing the essay, F = 1.37, ns, whereas observers believed such a change had occurred, F( 1, 28) = 29.07, p < .OOl.

In sum, observers inferred a significant amount of change in the writer’s attitude when, in fact, very little change actually occurred. This faulty inference appears to have contributed to the overly correspondent inferences about the writer’s postessay attitude. Such a pattern of inference is not inconsistent with the operation of a central tendency assumption. As described earlier, observers may assume that writers will only compose essays that reflect their own attitudes on an issue. Thus, if observers hear an essay that is more extreme than they expect, their central tendency assumption will be violated. In response to this violated expectation, observers may make the inference that the writer’s attitude must have changed. The correlational relationships described below offer additional support for this interpretation.2 ’ An inference about change in the writer’s attitude is not, itself, part of the central

ATTITUDE

CORRELATIONS

BETWEEN

PERCEIVED

Variable Essay extremity ratings Essay quality ratings Perceived typical attitudes Writer’s actual preessay attitude

177

ATTRIBUTION TABLE

3

PREESSAY

ATTITUDES

AND

SELECTED

VARIABLES

Observer 2

Observer 4

.45” - .03 .13 .20

.54* .I6 .18 .36”

Note. Data from observers 1 and 3 do not appear in the table because they were the preessay attitude of the writer. :tzp < .05.

shown

Perceived typical attitudes. The analyses involving perceived typical attitudes (see Table 2) also indicate the presence of correspondence on the part of observers. Both perceived preessay attitudes and perce postessay attitudes are highly discrepant from the attitude attribut the typical college student, ps < .OOl. The writers in our study were believed to possess an attitude that was more in line with the assigned essay than was thought to be typical of college students in general. Correlational Analyses

Essay extremity. Below we report several correlational relationships which we believe are particularly pertinent to the goals of the study. The schematic model predicts that attributions about the writer’s persona% attitude will be based, to a great extent, upon the perceived extremity of the writer’s essay. Regardless of the constraint surrounding the essay assignment, the central tendency assumption dictates that an extreme essay should iead the observer to attribute a relatively extreme attitude to the writer. As displayed in Tables 3 and 4, perceptions of essay extremity were in fact significantly correlated with perceptions of both preessay and postessay attitudes. As noted above, observers were generally surprised by the extremity of the writer’s essay. This may have contributed to observers’ belief that the writer’s attitude underwent a change in the process of composing the essay. Data from subjects who played the role of observer 2 (who were not shown the writer’s preessay attitude and who stated expectations about essay extremity) allowed us to test this possibility. We computed an index of the extent of “surprise at essay extremity” by subtracting essay expectations from ratings of actual essay extremity. We also comtendency assumption. However, such an inference of change would allow the observers to reconcile the writer’s “extreme” essay with their own (central tendency based) expectations about the essay.

178

REEDER,

FLETCHER, TABLE

CORRELATIONS

BETWEEN

PERCEIVED

POSTESSAY

AND FURMAN 4 ATTITUDES

AND

SELECTED

VARIABLES

Observer Variable Essay extremity ratings Essay quality ratings Perceived typical attitude Writer’s actual postessay attitude

1

2

3

4

.47* .08 .oo .26

.69* .oo .06 .21

.57” - .09 .15 .57*

.75* .32* .29 .28

* p < .05.

puted an index of “inferred self-persuasion” by subtracting the perceived preessay attitude from the perceived postessay attitude. The correlation between these two measures is significant, r(28) = .51, and supports the idea that, upon hearing an essay that was more extreme than expected, observers assumed that the writer must have altered her own position on the issue. In general, it is apparent that observers expect that there will be a close correspondence between essay extremity and the writer’s personal attitude. Also supporting the presence of a central tendency assumption is the fact that observers expected writers who held an extreme position on an issue to write an extreme essay in the direction of their beliefs (Miller & Rorer, 1982). Subjects playing the role of observer 1 (who stated expectations about extremity and who also were told the personal attitude of the writer) expected a more extreme essay from a writer whose personal attitude already leaned in the direction of the assigned essay, Y = .39, p < .05, than from a writer who held a less extreme position. Essay quality. Against our expectations, ratings of essay quality did not correlate in any consistent manner with attitude attributions, ys ranged between - .09 and .32. Perceived typical attitudes. Attribution theorists often assume that observers will attribute a modal or typical attitude to an actor who they know little about (Jones & Davis, 1965; Jones & Harris, 1967). Thus, if observers believed that the essays contained insufficient information about the writer’s personal attitude, we would expect to find a correlation between perceived typical attitude and attitude attributed to the writer. Instead, perceived typical attitudes showed no consistent relationship with perceived attitudes, rs ranged between .OO and .29, ns. As noted above, subjects appear to have relied upon essay extremity, rather than other factors, when estimating the writer’s personal attitude (Miller, Jones, & Hinkle, 1981). Accuracy. Given that observers demonstrated evidence of correspondence bias, we wondered just how accurate our observers were in predicting

ATTITUDE

ATTRIBUTION

179

the writer’s personal attitude. Observers demonstrated at least some degree of accuracy: Correlations between attributed and actual attitudes ranged between .20 and S7. In general, the level of accuracy obtaine by our observers is equal to or higher than that reported by previous investigators (Miller et al., 1981; Snyder & Jones, 1974). Discussion

In line with our predictions, observers underestimated both the extremity and the quality of the writer’s essay. We further predicted that, when estimating the writer’s personal attitude on the target issue, observers would base their estimates on these same essay characteristics. Observers did indeed base their attitude attributions to a great extent upon the extremity of the writer’s essay, however, there is little evidence that estimates of essay quality contributed to these attributions. Finally, we expected that this process would eventuate in observers attributing attitudes to the writer that were more in line with the essay assignment than was actually the case. This prediction also received support. Observers were marginally in error when estimating the preessay attitude of the writer, and significantly in error when estimating the postessay attitude of the writer. In general, the pattern just described is consistent with the predictions of the schematic model outlined in the introduction of this article. Perhaps the most surprising aspect of the data concerns the decreased accuracy which observers displayed when estimating the writer’s postessay (as opposed to preessay) attitude. This decrease in accuracy appears to be due to observers’ erroneous assumption that the writer altered her attnude in the process of composing the essay. Although we did not specifically anticipate this “inferred self-persuasion” pattern (Brockner & Nova, 1979), aspects of the data suggest that perceptions of essay extremity played some role here. Given the “surprisingly” extreme nature of the writer’s essay, observers may have assumed that the writer herself came to be convinced by her own arguments. In addition, hearing the writer read her essay aloud may have further contributed to this perception of change, 3 ’ An alternative account of the inferred self-persuasion effect is that the observers 2 and 4 misunderstood the rating scale designed to tap perceptions of the writer’s preessay attitude. Perhaps these observers interpreted the question to be asking what they might have guessed the writer’s attitude to be had they never heard her read her essay. Such an account, however, cannot explain the tendency toward inferred self-persuasion shown by observers 1 and 3, who never estimated the writer’s preessay attitude. These observers were shown the writer’s actual preessay attitude (M = 5.46) before the essay was composed. It is rather unlikely that these observers also misunderstood the meaning of this preessay attitude. Nevertheless, after hearing the writer read her essay, observers 1 and 3 inferred a significant amount of self-persuasion when estimating the writer’s postessay attitude (M = 7.56).

180

REEDER,

FLETCHER,

AND FURMAN

In any case, the data are consistent with the idea that observers in the attitude attribution paradigm hold biased expectations about the kinds of essays a writer will produce. Moreover, aspects of the data suggest that these biased expectations partially account for the correspondence bias that follows when observers estimate the personal attitude of the writer. One obvious limitation of this research is that observers’ expectations were not directly manipulated in our first study. It is possible, therefore, that factors other than biased expectations may have produced the correspondence bias we observed. We designed a second experiment in order to provide a stronger test of our hypotheses. EXPERIMENT

II

In an effort to directly test the impact of biased expectations (or what we have called central tendency assumptions), we manipulated these assumptions in Experiment II and measured the effects on attitude attributions. Half of our subjects (those in the strong central tendency assumption condition) were led to expect a strong relationship between a writer’s personal attitude and the kind of essay such a writer would produce. In contrast, the remaining subjects (those in the weak central tendency assumptions condition) were led to expect a weak relationship between a writer’s personal attitude and his or her subsequent essay. All subjects then participated in a second “unrelated” experiment in which they were asked to attribute attitudes to writers who produced essays under conditions of constraint. We predicted that observers in our strong assumptions condition would show the greatest evidence of correspondence bias. There is a potential threat of experimenter demand in this study. That is, subjects may come to realize that we are studying the impact of manipulating central tendency assumptions and respond in a cooperative manner. We took several precautions to try to minimize this potential problem. Subjects participated in two purportedly unrelated experiments. The first experiment accomplished the manipulation of central tendency assumptions, whereas the second experiment included the measure of attitude attribution. This second experiment was conducted by a new experimenter, was described as having a separate purpose, and dealt with a new attitudinal issue. Finally, at the conclusion of the second experiment, subjects were probed for suspicion4 4 After completing ah dependent measures except the manipulation check item, subjects were asked to describe what they personally believed to be the purpose of the experiment. Subjects who mentioned any possible connection between the two experiments were considered suspicious, and their data were not analyzed.

ATTITUDE

ATTRIBUTION

181

Method Sul.+ects and Design Forty-seven college students of both sexes participated in the study. Three subjects expressed suspicion about the purposes of the research and their data were deleted. The design of the study is a 2 (Strength of Central Tendency Assumptions) x 2 (Essay Direction) factorial. There are repeated measures on the essay direction factor.’

Manipulation

of Central Tendency Assumptions

Subjects received a booklet indicating that the purpose of the study was to determine reasons why students write various sorts of essays. The instructions stated that sometimes the writers might be reluctant to disclose their real reasons and, therefore. the experimenter was asking the subjects to try to judge the nature of these reasons. Our intent was to lead subjects in the strong central tendency assumptions condition to believe that writers would compose essays that supported their own personal position on an issue, regardless of the direction of the essay that they were assigned to write. Accordingly, subjects read about a student who was assigned to compose an essay arguing against the use of busing to integrate the schools. Prior to actually writing the essay, the student had indicated his or her personal attitude on the issue by checking a 16point scale with the endpoints “Personally, I am strongly in favor of (against) busing.” Subjects were shown a scale upon which the writer had checked the far extreme indicating a favorable attitude toward busing. Thus, the student’s personal attitude was in conflict with the direction of the assigned essay. The next page of the booklet contained an essay, of approximate!y 200 words, which took a strong stand in favor of busing. It was apparent, therefore, that the writer bad ignored the direction of the assignment and followed his or her own attitude when drafting the essay. To reinforce this interpretation, subjects were told that a panel of English professors had also read the writer’s essay and that they had rated its extremity. The subjects were shown a scale on which the panel had checked the extreme point indicating a favorable attitude on &he writer’s part. Following this, the instructions asked subjects for an explanation of why they believed the writer composed this kind of essay. Subjects received information about nine additional writers. For each writer, subjects were told the essay assignment, the writer’s personal attitude. and the panel’s rating of the essay, but were not shown the actual essay. The different writers were shown to have a range of attitudes distributed evenly across the scale. Further, writers’ attitudes were not systematically related to the nature of the essay assignment. For each writer. the panel’s rating was always within two scale points of the writer’s own attitude. Across the IO sets of stimulus materials, then, it was apparent that the direction of the resulting essay was more a function of the writer’s own attitude than of the assigned essay direction. Finally, subjects were asked to explain why each writer composed an essay of this sort. The procedure within the weak central tendency asslamptions condition was very similar. The essays that were described in this condition, however, did not necessariiy correspond closely to the writers’ own attitudes. Rather, the 200-word essay, and the ratings provided by the panel, suggested that the essays followed the assigned essay direction. in particular, writers who were given the pro (anti)-busing assignment were shown to have composed essays receiving ratings within two scale points of the pro (anti)-busing end of the scale. the

’ The design also included a variation in which half of the subjects received the target attribution question as the first dependent measure, whereas other subjects received this target question as the last measure. This variable produced no significant effects and is not discussed further.

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In all other respects, the procedure was exactly the same as that of the strong assumptions condition.

Measurement

of Attitude

Attributions

After receiving information about the 10 student writers, subjects were thanked by the experimenter and informed that the experiment was over. Because extra time remained, the experimenter mentioned that he would be asking them to participate in a “second” experiment that was being offered in another part of the building. The experimenter said he did not know what the experiment was about, but said he was aware that the woman who was running the study needed all the subjects she could find. The subjects were then led to a room where the second experimenter waited. The second experimenter described a task in which subjects would be asked to estimate the attitudes of students who had written essays in an earlier study on the topic of U.S. involvement in El Salvador. The written stimulus materials described two writers, each of whom composed an essay under conditions of constraint. One of the writers was described as having written in favor of U.S. involvement in El Salvador, the other as having written against such involvement. The major dependent variable required subjects to estimate the true attitude of each writer on a scale with the endpoints “Extremely against (in favor of) U.S. involvement in El Salvador.” Finally, subjects were probed for suspicion about the purposes of the experiment.

Results and Discussion Manipulation Check Following the second experiment, and after completing all other dependent measures, subjects were asked to think back on the first experiment in which they participated and to indicate the most important influence on the actual essays that were written. This scale contained the endpoints “The type of essay assigned” and “The student’s private attitude,” respectively. As expected, subjects in the strong central tendency condition perceived the writer’s attitude as a more important determinant of the essay (M = 8.64) than subjects in the weak central tendency condition (M = 2.02), F(1, 42) = 110, p < .OOl. Attributed Attitudes Figure 3 indicates that subjects in all conditions of the study showed at least some evidence of correspondence bias. That is, writers who wrote in favor of U.S. policy in El Salvador were attributed more favorable attitudes on the issue (M = 6.34) than writers whose essays opposed that policy (M) = 3.10), F(1, 42) = 44, p < .OOl. Our expectation was that subjects exposed to our weak central tendency assumption condition would show decreased evidence of correspondence bias compared to those in our strong central tendency condition. A significant interaction between assumptions and essay direction supports this expectation, F(1, 42) = 6.93, p < .02. Specifically, the bias is attenuated in the weak central tendency condition (MS = 5.83 vs 3.87) compared to the strong central tendency condition (MS = 6.87 vs 2.33).

ATTITUDE

ATTRIBUTION

183

CENTRAL TENDENCY ASSUMPTIONS FIG. 3. Mean attributed attitude as a function of central tendency assumptions and essay direction: Experiment II. Higher numbers indicate more favorable attitudes toward U.S. involvement in El Salvador.

Attributed

Choice and Essay Characteristics

We sought to determine if the pattern obtained on the attitude attribution measure could be explained in terms of differential perceptions of writers’ choices and essay characteristics. Overall, writers were thought to have exercised little choice in determining the direction of their essays (n/r = 1.58). The essays were perceived as being of moderately high quality (M = 7.48), and writers who took the pro El Salvador position were thought to have w.ritten more favorable essays (M = 7.55) than writers who took the opposite position (M = 2.07), F(1, 42) = 164, p < .O Further analyses of the choice, quality, and essay extremity scales produced no additional significant effects for any of the factors in the design. It is apparent, therefore, that our manipulation of central tendency assumptions did not alter perceptions of the writers’ choices or perceptions of essay characteristics. GENERAL DISCUSSION The present studies were designed as preliminary tests of a schematic model of dispositional inference in the area of attitude attribution. A basic tenet of the model is that observers hold implicit expectations about the kinds of behaviors that are likely to be emitted by persons who hold particular dispositions or attitudinal positions. Further, these expectations are held to play a key role in the attribution process. As applied to the attitude attribution paradigm, the model proposes that observers adhere to a biased central tendency assumption, such that observers expect writers to compose essays that correspond to their personal attitudinal positions on an issue. As a consequence of this expectation, observers in the attitude attribution paradigm are often confronted by writers’ essays which are more extreme and of higher quality than expecte Given their prior expectations, observers make the inference that the

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writer of the essay must hold an attitude corresponding to the direction of the essay. In Experiment I of this article, observers sat face-to-face with a writer who was assigned a particular essay topic. Observers indicated their expectations about the kind of essay the writer would compose and, only at a later time, heard the writer read her essay aloud. In accord with our predictions, observers’ prior expectations about the essay were systematically biased: Observers underestimated both the extremity and the quality of the essay the writer would compose. Partly as a result, observers also manifested a significant degree of correspondence bias when estimating the personal attitude of the writer. Supporting this line of reasoning, observers apparently relied upon the extremity of the essay when making their attitude attributions. This first study suggests that biased expectations about essay extremity contributed to correspondence bias in two different ways. First, upon hearing an essay that was more extreme than expected, observers tended to infer that the preessay attitude of the writer leaned in the direction of the assigned essay. Second, observers inferred that a shift had taken place in the writer’s personal attitude during the time the essay was prepared and read aloud. Observers’ estimates of the writers’ postessay attitudes were significantly more extreme in the direction of the essay than estimates of preessay attitudes. One possible explanation is that observers inferred that the writer somehow became convinced by her ownextremearguments. Thisinferenceof“self-persuasion”wasmistaken, however,andresultedinobserversdrawingoverlycorrespondentinferences about the writers’ postessay attitudes. This inferred self-persuasion tendency may be stronger in our study than in previous studies. Our procedure is unique in that observers spent roughly 20 min watching the writer compose her essay. Having witnessed the extended process of essay composition, observers might be more inclined to believe that a change in the writer’s attitude could occur during this period. Our last experiment further supported our model by directly manipulating central tendency assumptions. Observers who were led to adopt a strong central tendency assumption (expecting a high degree of consistency between the writer’s personal attitude and the writer’s subsequent essay) were more prone to correspondence bias than observers who were led to adopt a weak central tendency assumption. Taken together, we believe these two studies provide strong evidence that observers’ expectations play an important role in the attitude attribution paradigm. Our focus in this article has been on observers’ expectations about attitude-behavior consistency. This focus on expectations differentiates the present approach from alternative perspectives on correspondence bias. Alternative theoretical models describe processes in which the salience of behavior, as opposed to the situation (Heider, 1958), or an anchoring

ATTITUDE

ATTRIBUTION

heuristic (Jones, 1979; Quattrone, 1982) underlies correspondent attributions. According to one influential account (Jones, 1979), the observer tends to focus on an actor’s behavior (perhaps due to its salience), and infer a tentative correspondent attitude or disposition before considering the impact of situational constraints on the actor. The observer may then consider the importance of situational forces and make adjustments away from correspondence, but the adjustment is typically insufficient (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Preconceived schemata or expectations are not considered by such models. Despite this difference, our theoretical approach would appear to complement, rather than compete with, alternative models of correspo~de~e~ bias. For example, observers’ biased expectations may have been shape by a lifetime of experiences in which behavior is more salient than situational factors (Heider, 1958) and anchoring tendencies are ubiquitous (Jones, 1979). Moreover, at any given time, a variety of factors may contribute to correspondence bias, including the salience of behavior: anchoring tendencies, cultural beliefs (Fletcher & Ward, in press), a& biased expectations. In any case, the tendency toward c~~esponde~ce bias in the attitude attribution paradigm seems likely to involve more than one cognitive mechanism. The present perspective enables a plausible account of certain anom findings in the attitude attribution area. For example, researchers have manipulated the salience of situational constraints cm the writer have sometimes had to go to extraordinary lengths to decrease correspondence bias (Miller, 1976; Snyder & Jones, 1974). Further, a study conducted by Johnson et al. (1984) suggests that even when subjects are aware of powerful situational constraints operating on an actor, they are still prone to correspondence bias (see also Miller, Schmidt, Meyer & Colella, 1984). This pattern is consistent with the idea that observers hold a central tendency assumption that (in part) dictates the relative correspondence of behavior emitted under constraint. The schematic perspective also offers a nice account of the so-called “foot dragging” phenomenon (Jones, Worchel, Goethals, & Grumet, 1971; Miller & Rorer, 1982), whereby observers infer an attitude opposed to the direction of a weak essay produced under constraint. For example, when a writer is assigned to take a pro position on an issue, an essay that leans just slightly in the pro direction leads observers to infer that the writer holds an anti position on the issue. This tendency cann interpreted in terms of salience because the inferred attitude is direction opposite of the writer’s essay. Such a tendency, however: is entirely consistent with the central tendency assumption. As sbow~ in Fig. 1, only persons who are personally opposed to the direction of an assigned essay are expected to draft a weak or moderate essay under conditions of constraint.

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The Question of Accuracy

Much of the evidence for correspondence bias is of uncertain generality because studies of attitude attribution have typically employed situational constraints of low salience and a questionable criterion for inferring the presence of error or bias (Funder, 1987; Harvey, Town, & Yarkin, 1981; Reeder, 1982). Experiment I of this article, however, goes some way toward overcoming these obstacles. Observers in Experiment I sat faceto-face with the writer and were provided with exactly the same information as the writer. It is difficult to imagine a procedure that would more “realistically” represent the strength of the situational constraints to the observers. Even a procedure which allows the observers to serve as writers and personally experience these constraints apparently will not completely eliminate correspondence bias (Miller et al., 1981; Snyder & Jones, 1974). Moreover, the provision of writers’ own attitudes as a criterion of error is probably as good a criterion as we are likely to find. Finally, in addition to being exposed to the actual content of the writer’s essay, observers in the present study listened as the writer read her essay aloud. We might expect that in the process the writer would provide certain nonverbal cues, either facially or in voice inflection, that would help observers to determine the writer’s attitude. The presence of correspondence bias in this “informationally rich” environment provides further evidence for the robust nature of this phenomenon, at least in a laboratory setting (Fletcher, Bull, & Reeder, 1988; Fletcher, Grigg, & Bull, in press; Harrington & Miller, 1987). REFERENCES Brockner, J., & Nova, M. (1979). Further determinants of attitude attributions: The perceived effects of assigned behavior on post-behavior attitudes. Personaliry and Social Psycho/ogy Bulletin, 5, 311-315. Fletcher, G. J. O., Bull, V., & Reeder, G. D. (1988). Bias andaccuracy in trait attribution: The role of attributional complexity. Unpublished manuscript. University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand. Fletcher, G. J. O., Grigg, F., & Bull, V. (in press). Organization and accuracy of personality impressions: Neophytes versus experts in trait attribution. New Zealand Journal of Psychology. Fletcher, G. J. O., & Ward, C. (in press). Attribution theory and processes: A crosscultural perspective. In M. H. Bond (Ed.), The cross-cultural challenge to social psychology. Beverly Hills: Sage Pub. Funder, D. C. (1987). Errors and mistakes: Evaluating the accuracy of social judgment. Psychological Bulletin, 101, 75-90. Gilbert, D. T. (in press). Thinking lightly about others: Automatic components of the social inference process. In J. S. Uleman & J. A. Bargh (Eds.), Unintended thought: Limits of awareness, intention, and control. New York: Guilford. Gilbert, D. T., & Jones, E. E. (1986). Perceiver-induced constraint: Interpretations of selfgenerated reality. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 50, 269-280. Harvey, J. H., Town, J. P., & Yarkin, K. L. (1981). How fundamental is “The fundamental attribution error”? Journal of Persona/iv and Social Psychology, 40, 346-349.

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