The role of Social Value Orientation in response to an unfair offer in the Ultimatum Game

Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 120 (2013) 228–239

Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect

Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/obhdp

The role of Social Value Orientation in response to an unfair offer in the Ultimatum Game q Gokhan Karagonlar a,⇑, David M. Kuhlman b a b

School of Business, Dokuz Eylul University, Izmir, Turkey Department of Psychology, University of Delaware, Newark, DE, USA

a r t i c l e

i n f o

Article history: Received 28 December 2011 Accepted 24 July 2012 Accepted by Eric van Dijk, Craig D. Parks and Paul A.M. van Lange Keywords: Social Value Orientation Ultimatum Game Unfairness Cognition Emotions Emotion regulation Altruistic punishment

a b s t r a c t Two studies examined the influence of Social Value Orientation (SVO) on the decision to accept or reject an unfair offer in the Ultimatum Game (UG). In both studies, participants with different SVOs (Prosocials, Individualists and Competitors), measured about 3 weeks prior to the UG, responded to an offer of ‘‘$8 for Proposer, $2 for Participant’’, believing it came from a human Proposer. In both studies Prosocials accepted the offer more frequently than Individualists and Competitors, who did not differ. Further, we found that SVO differences in positive emotions in response to the offer (Study 1), and positive cognitions toward the offer and the proposer (Study 2) underlie the SVO effect on UG decision, suggesting a role for SVO differences in the utilization of emotion regulation strategies. Implications of the present findings for ‘‘altruistic punishment’’ and ‘‘emotions/self-regulation’’ accounts as motivators of UG decisions are discussed. Ó 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Introduction Imagine two strangers interact to decide how to divide a sum of money, with roles determined by chance such that one is to be the ‘‘Proposer’’ (P) and the other to be the ‘‘Recipient’’ (R). The P proposes a division of the money to R, who then decides to accept or reject it. If R accepts, each person receives what was offered; if R rejects, both persons receive nothing. Known as the ‘‘Ultimatum Game’’ (Güth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982), this simple scenario has received considerable attention from researchers in economics and social psychology. Findings of many Ultimatum Game (UG) studies show that in general, equal division is seen as the fair offer given equal (zero) inputs of each party, and is almost never rejected. But what about responses to ‘‘unfair’’ offers, specifically where R is offered considerably less than P? Response to unfairness in the UG relates to a more general issue concerning what considerations above and beyond pure self interest influence utility evaluations of bargaining outcomes. Here there

q The research reported in this article was conducted as part of the first author’s Doctoral Dissertation submitted to the University of Delaware. A part of this research was presented in the 14th International Conference on Social Dilemmas (Amsterdam, July 6–9, 2011). ⇑ Corresponding author. Address: Dokuz Eylul Universitesi, Isletme Fakultesi, Kaynaklar Yerleskesi, Buca, Izmir 35160, Turkey. E-mail address: [email protected] (G. Karagonlar).

0749-5978/$ - see front matter Ó 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2012.07.006

are two theoretical views. First, on the assumptions that individuals are generally rational, with only self-regarding preferences, and that the utility of money increases monotonically, the average recipient would be expected to accept any positive offer as it is the self-interest maximizing choice (Rubinstein, 1982). A second view argues that utility evaluations for outcomes are guided not only by self interest, but also in part by judgments of fairness (Loewenstein, Thompson, & Bazerman, 1989; Messick & Sentis, 1985; Walster, Berscheid, & Walster, 1973). In support of this view research provides converging behavioral and neurological evidence that individuals engage in fairness judgments due to various motives such as concern for social image (Andreoni & Bernheim, 2009), concern for reciprocity (Rabin, 1993), or mere inequity aversion (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Tricomi, Rangel, Camerer, & O’Doherty, 2010). By this view fairness should play an important role in UG decision making. As will be seen, this ‘‘fairness camp’’ can be further divided into those who argue that UG rejection is a form of pro-social behavior which seeks to enforce the norm of fairness, and others who argue that being treated unfairly produces a more personal, aggressive, and retaliatory reaction. Whether the reaction to unfairness is the pro-social enforcement of the fairness norm or aggressive retaliation (or both), research demonstrates that unfairness does influence UG decision making. Specifically, as UG offers become increasingly unfair to R, rejection frequencies increase as well (Camerer & Thaler, 1995; Handgraaf, Van Dijk, & De Cremer, 2003); offers of 20% of the total

G. Karagonlar, D.M. Kuhlman / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 120 (2013) 228–239

money for R are rejected about half of the time and offers proposing 10% are very frequently rejected (cf. Camerer, 2003). These results show little variation across different amounts of money being divided (Hoffman, McCabe, & Smith, 1996) and different cultures (Roth, Prasnikar, Zamir, & Okuno-Fujiwara, 1991). Of course, individuals may differ for a variety of reasons in their tolerance for an unfair offer, leading some to reject and others to accept it. For example, Mellers, Haselhuhn, Tetlock, Silva, and Isen (2010) found that in the UG individuals differed in their judgments concerning acceptability of an unfair offer even though they generally agreed that equal division was the fair offer, leading these authors to advocate an individual difference approach to UG decision making. While such research is limited (Handgraaf et al., 2003), a few recent studies have indicated that individual differences such as self-control (Crockett, Clark, Lieberman, Tabibnia, & Robbins, 2010) and feedback negativity (Hewig et al., 2011) explain significant variance in responses to unfair offers. The major goals of the present work are to examine the role of an individual differences variable (Social Value Orientation, or SVO) in responses to unfair UG offers and further to examine the emotional and cognitive processes that may underlie those responses. As will be explained in greater detail below, SVO corresponds to stable individual differences in the concern for (1) other’s outcome and (2) fairness in outcomes in interdependent situations (Van Lange, 1999). Comparing reactions to unfairness by Recipients who differ in SVO may enhance our understanding of the factors that influence UG decision making. The following section describes the theories proposed to account for UG decision making. This is followed by a review of the SVO literature and its implications for the role of SVO in response to unfair offers. Mechanisms underlying UG rejections Ultimatum Game research suggests that rejection of unfair offers is more strongly attributed to reactive/retaliatory actions directed at the agentic source of the offer than to inequality aversion ‘per se’. For instance, Blount (1995) showed that recipients were more likely to reject an unfair offer from a human with self-interest in the game than they were to reject an identical offer generated by a random mechanism. Similarly, identical unfair offers made by human proposers from a set of available offers were more likely to be rejected if more fair alternatives were available, than if only more unfair alternatives were available (Falk, Fehr, & Fischbacher, 2003), suggesting the importance of perceptions concerning the proposer’s intentions. Two theoretical views of this reactive UG decision process have been suggested. One, known as altruistic punishment (Fehr & Gächter, 2002), suggests that rejection is a reaction to the intentional violation of a social fairness norm (Camerer & Thaler, 1995; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003). By this view, recipients enforce the norm of fairness by punishing a norm violator. Punishment is viewed as altruistic because even in a single anonymous interaction without an opportunity for indirect reciprocity (through reputation building) the recipient punishes a norm violator at an opportunity cost to self (i.e., giving up a positive offer) so as to benefit others by teaching the norm violator to be fair and cooperative in the future (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003). Thus, rejection is a pro-social act, intended to promote the general welfare. In support of the altruistic punishment hypothesis, Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) found that a substantial proportion of individuals who were endowed with real money as third parties to an Ultimatum Game were willing to spend their money to punish proposers for unfair offers when their own payoffs were unaffected by the norm violation. Further, there is evidence that altruistic punishment is most likely among those who commit to the societal norms of fairness and cooperation. For example, the work by Fehr and Gächter (2002) shows that

229

about 74% of punishments in one-shot anonymous public good games were done by above-average cooperators on free riders. Along these lines, other research suggests that altruistic punishment is motivated by strong reciprocity, which, by definition, is a predisposition to reward cooperative and fair, norm-abiding behavior, and impose sanctions on norm violations (cf. Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Fehr, Fischbacher, & Gachter, 2002). Moreover, research has proposed that negative emotions may develop in response to violation of the fairness and cooperation norm, and may operate as a proxy mechanism leading to punishment (Fehr & Gächter, 2002). In contrast to the notion of altruistic punishment, a second approach emphasizes the role of self-centered emotions in UG decisions, independent of enforcement of a fairness norm (Civai, Corradi-Dell’Acqua, Gamer, & Rumiati, 2010; Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996). Specifically, the emotions account argues that a low offer challenges one’s integrity and self-worth, and acceptance of a low offer communicates that one is weak and easily exploitable, leading to rejection as a personal statement of one’s potency. Consistent with this view, in a modified version of the UG (a.k.a. Impunity Game) where rejection did not influence the proposer’s share while reducing only the recipient’s share to zero, Yamagishi et al. (2009) found that the rejection rates of unfair offers were still much higher than game theoretic predictions. The authors argued that enforcement of a fairness norm could not explain these results because rejection increased unfairness in this case. Instead, they argued that emotions acted as a commitment device to preserve the self-image. Likewise, Xiao and Houser (2005) found that rejection of unfair offers is reduced when responders communicate their anger through written messages, suggesting that rejection behavior aims to demonstrate that one is not a person who accepts unfair treatment faint heartedly. In addition, there is neural and behavioral evidence that self-regulation is associated with response to unfair offers. First, several neuroimaging studies have demonstrated that rejection is associated with increased activation in the brain areas prominently involved in the expression of negative emotions (i.e., anterior insula), while acceptance is associated with increased activation in areas integral for deliberative thinking, self-control, and emotion regulation (i.e., right ventrolateral and dorsolateral prefrontal cortices) (Koenigs & Tranel, 2007; Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2003; Tabibnia, Satpute, & Lieberman, 2008; but see Knoch, Pascual-Leone, Meyer, Treyer, & Fehr, 2006). Second, van’t Wout, Chang, and Sanfey (2010) showed that participants instructed to engage in emotional reappraisal by adopting a neutral attitude and trying to come up with possible reasons why a proposer might make a certain offer were more likely to accept unfair offers than participants who received either an instruction to suppress their emotions or no instruction at all. Moreover, increased self-control (Crockett, Clark, Lieberman, et al., 2010), and harm aversion associated with increased moral judgment (Crockett, Clark, Hauser, & Robbins, 2010) have been shown to be positively associated with the probability of accepting an unfair offer, suggesting that rejection may be an impulsive act intending to inflict harm on the proposer, while acceptance may be a more deliberative and pro-social behavior. In the following section we review the SVO literature, upon which our hypotheses are based. As will be seen, it is reasonable to expect an SVO effect. However the two approaches to UG decision making just described (‘‘altruistic punishment’’ and ‘‘emotion/ self regulation’’) make different predictions as to what the nature of that SVO effect should be. Social Value Orientation Since the classic work of Messick and McClintock (1968) an ever growing body of research has demonstrated stable individual

230

G. Karagonlar, D.M. Kuhlman / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 120 (2013) 228–239

differences in SVO, defined as an individual’s preferences regarding the distribution of outcomes between self and others. Messick and McClintock’s original definition of SVO corresponds to the weights individuals assign to (1) outcomes for the self and (2) outcomes for others. Decades of research on SVO consistently finds that most people can be classified as one of three SVO types: (1) Prosocials assign positive weight to both their own and others’ outcomes, and thus attempt to maximize joint outcomes, or collective welfare. Van Lange (1999) has argued that the definition of this group should be expanded to allow for the possibility that in addition to concern with collective welfare, Prosocials may also be concerned with fairness in the distribution of collective welfare over individuals. (2) Individualists assign positive weight to their own outcomes but show little or no concern with the outcomes of others. (3) Competitors assign positive weight to their own outcome and negative weight to the outcomes of others, so they attempt to maximize the relative (algebraic) difference between their own and others’ outcomes (Kuhlman & Marshello, 1975; McClintock & Liebrand, 1988; Messick & McClintock, 1968; Van Lange, 1999; Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994). The great majority of studies on SVO have adopted this fundamental typology, frequently combining Individualists and Competitors as Proselfs, for two reasons: (1) in many studies they show similar non-cooperative behavior, and (2) the proportion of Competitors in the general population is quite small (for reviews, see Au & Kwong, 2004; Bogaert, Boone, & Declerck, 2008). SVO: Previous findings and their implications for UG decision making While previous UG research has provided evidence on the role of SVO in terms of proposer behavior (Van Dijk, De Cremer, & Handgraaf, 2004), we are not aware of a published study that has examined the role of SVO in recipients’ responses to unfair UG offers. Below we review the literature on SVO to develop our hypotheses. Consistent with Prosocials’ positive concern for others and their motivation to maximize joint outcomes, prior research has shown that they show greater cooperation than Proselfs (i.e., Individualists and Competitors) in various social dilemma games, including public goods (e.g., De Cremer & Van Vugt, 1999), the resource dilemma (Kramer, McClintock, & Messick, 1986), the two person prisoner’s dilemma (Kuhlman & Marshello, 1975), and a variety of other two-person mixed motive games, such as Chicken (McClintock & Liebrand, 1988). Further, in real life Prosocials are more likely than Proselfs to donate money to noble causes (Van Lange, Bekkers, Schuyt, & Van Vugt, 2007), and prefer travelling by public transportation to travelling by car for the community welfare (Van Vugt, Meertens, & Van Lange, 1995). Thus there is considerable evidence that Prosocials are generally more cooperative than Proselfs. However, research also shows that the cooperation of Prosocials is conditional; given clear evidence that the other is intentionally behaving uncooperatively, Prosocials reciprocate by becoming uncooperative themselves (De Cremer & Van Lange, 2001; Kuhlman & Marshello, 1975; McClintock & Liebrand, 1988; Sattler & Kerr, 1991; Van Lange, 1999), a pattern called behavioral assimilation (Kelley & Stahelski, 1970). Another way to describe the conditional cooperation of Prosocials is that they follow the norm of ‘‘strong reciprocity’’ (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003). One way to view such reciprocity in Prosocials is in terms of enforcing a norm of fairness. While there are mixed findings regarding the relative effects of joint outcome maximization vs. fairness considerations on Prosocials’ behavior in social dilemmas (e.g., Eek & Gärling, 2006; Murphy, Ackermann, & Handgraaf, 2011), research suggests that they seem to endorse a true norm of fairness, while for Proselfs such concerns appear to be strategic

and motivated by self interest. For instance, a UG study by Van Dijk et al. (2004) found that Proselfs tended to make equal offers only when they had reason to fear that recipients would reject a low offer, while Prosocials made equal offers even when they had no apparent reason to fear that low offers would be rejected. Similarly, Stouten, De Cremer, and van Dijk (2005) assessed emotional reactions toward a violator of the equality rule in a public goods dilemma. They found that Prosocials showed emotional reactions to a fairness violator whether or not the group succeeded in providing the public good. However, Proselfs experienced negative emotions toward the violator only if the group failed to provide the public good, pointing to Proselfs’ conditional, self-interested endorsement of fairness. More recently, an fMRI study by Haruno and Frith (2010) demonstrates Prosocials’ more general sensitivity to fairness compared to Proselfs. Activation in the amygdala was significantly higher for Prosocials than for Individualists in response to absolute discrepancies in hypothetical money divisions between self and another person. Given that altruistic punishment would be most likely among those with the strongest commitment to the norm of fairness, these results suggest that in a one-shot UG, where there is no opportunity to strategically punish unfair behavior, Prosocials would be more likely to reject an unfair UG offer than Proselfs (Hypothesis 1a). However, findings in the SVO literature also suggest an opposite effect, namely that Prosocials would be more likely to accept an unfair offer than Proselfs. Specifically, research suggests that Prosocials show higher positive regard for others in negotiation than do Proselfs, that they may be more likely to extend the benefit of the doubt, and be less likely to act impulsively as decision makers. For example, De Dreu and Van Lange (1995) found in a multi-issue negotiation task that Prosocials demanded less and conceded more than Proselfs. They further showed that Prosocials more than Proselfs rated the negotiation partner as fairer and more considerate, suggesting that compared to Proselfs, Prosocials may extend the benefit of the doubt to the other person. In a multi-issue negotiation context (such as the one above) fairness criteria may be ambiguous, and so may result in different judgments of outcome fairness among participants with different SVOs. However, when there is a clear and easily justifiable criteria for fairness, such as the equal division of resources as in the UG (Messick, 1995), individuals’ fairness judgments concerning the division of a resource tend to be less influenced by their SVOs (Van Dijk, Wit, Wilke, & De Kwaadsteniet, 2010). Thus, in the UG we do not necessarily expect an SVO effect on individuals’ judgments of the fairness of an offer. This similarity in fairness judgments notwithstanding, we can reasonably expect an SVO effect for UG decisions. Specifically, Prosocials may engage in cognitive reappraisal more than Proselfs, and therefore be less likely to harm the proposer for his or her low offer (Crockett, Clark, Hauser, et al., 2010; van’t Wout et al., 2010). Cognitive reappraisal is an antecedent-focused emotion regulation strategy occurring early in the emotion generative process, and is defined as ‘‘. . .a cognitive-linguistic strategy that alters the trajectory of emotional responses by reformulating the meaning of a situation’’ (Goldin, McRae, Ramel, & Gross, 2008, p. 577). As opposed to response related strategies, such as expressive suppression, which occur later in emotion generative process, cognitive reappraisal alters emotional experience (i.e., inhibits negative emotions and induces positive emotions) (Goldin et al., 2008; Gross, 2002), thus leading to higher tolerance for unfair UG offers (van’t Wout et al., 2010). Emotion regulation research on participants in early adulthood demonstrates the role of developmental factors, such as secure attachment with primary caregivers (e.g., Colle & Del Giudice, 2011), and has identified temperament and repeated life experiences as antecedents to utilization of effective emotion regulation

G. Karagonlar, D.M. Kuhlman / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 120 (2013) 228–239

strategies (i.e., cognitive reappraisal), as opposed to less effective ones (i.e., expressive suppression) (John & Gross, 2004). Along these lines, SVO research has demonstrated SVO differences consistent with the notion that Prosocials are more likely than Proselfs to utilize cognitive reappraisal. Specifically, such research has shown more favorable developmental experiences and secure attachments to primary caregivers in Prosocials (Van Lange, Otten, De Bruin, & Joireman, 1997), higher trust in interdependent others (McClintock & Liebrand, 1988; Van Lange et al., 1997), higher empathy (Declerck & Bogaert, 2008), higher agreeableness (Koole, Jager, van den Berg, Vlek, & Hofstee, 2001), and stronger capacity for self-regulation resulting from repeated exercise of self-control in social relationships (Balliet & Joireman, 2010). Further, due to the assumed similarity bias (Kuhlman & Wimberley, 1976) Prosocials tend to believe that interdependent partners also endorse a pro-social motivation. Consequently, in one-shot Ultimatum Games Prosocials may be more likely than Proselfs to attribute the proposer’s unfairness to factors other than his or her intentions (i.e., extend the proposer the benefit of the doubt), thus facilitating cognitive reappraisal. Therefore, according to the emotion/self regulation hypothesis of UG decision making, Proselfs should reject an unfair offer more frequently than Prosocials (Hypothesis 1b). Further, based on previous research on the role of emotions in the UG (i.e., anger; Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996, happiness; Tabibnia et al., 2008, pleasure; Mellers et al., 2010, and satisfaction; Suleiman, 1996) it was expected that Prosocials’ and Proselfs’ emotional response to an unfair offer would differ (Hypothesis 2). Importantly, the nature of this difference should depend on whether the SVOdecision effect supports Hypothesis 1a (altruistic punishment) or 1b (emotion/self regulation). For altruistic punishment, there should be more negative and/or less positive emotion in Prosocials than Proselfs, and for emotion/self-regulation there should be less negative and/or more positive emotion in Prosocials than Proselfs. Finally, and as mentioned above, it is common practice in SVO research to combine Individualists and Competitors into a single group called Proselfs. This practice is to some degree justified by research reviewed above, showing that Individualists and Competitors have a common non-cooperative tendency, leading them to behave quite similarly in social dilemmas. In addition, this practice is frequently necessitated by the fact that Competitors account for only around 10% of the general population compared to Individualists who are at least three times more common (Au & Kwong, 2004), leading to large differences in the number of Individualists and Competitors included in the study. All this notwithstanding, it remains an important and as yet un-examined possibility that Individualists and Competitors may differ in their response to disadvantageous inequality (that is, an unfair UG offer). For example, because Individualists do not have an apparent concern for other’s outcome, they may be more tolerant of an unfair offer than Competitors who, by default, aim to maximize advantageous inequality between outcomes for the self and others (McClintock & Liebrand, 1988; Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994). In the present study, participants were chosen from a very large group of students pretested for SVO weeks before the actual UG study. This allowed for an approximately equal number of Prosocials, Individualists, and Competitors enabling an exploratory comparison of UG decisions made by the two types of Proselfs.

Overview of the present studies Two studies were conducted to investigate the relationship between recipients’ SVO and their UG decisions in response to an unfair offer, and the mediating role of SVO differences in emotions (Study 1) and cognitions (Study 2) in response to the offer. In both studies participants played a one-shot Ultimatum Game as recipi-

231

ents, deciding to accept or reject an ostensible ‘‘proposer’s’’ offer of ‘‘$8 for the proposer, $2 for the recipient’’. This offer was selected as it has been shown to produce an approximate 50/50 accept/reject decision rate (cf. Camerer, 2003). The studies differed only in terms of measures taken after the participant’s decision. In Study 1 participants reported their emotional reactions to the UG offer. Study 2 was designed based on the findings of Study 1. In Study 2 participants were asked to report their attitudes towards rejecting the offer, and to indicate their beliefs as to the reasons for the proposer’s offer. Study 1 Study 1 tested our hypotheses for the SVO effect on UG decision (H1a vs. H1b). Further, it aimed to test the hypothesis concerning the role of self-reported emotions in the SVO/UG decision relationship (H2). Method Participants and SVO Participants were selected from a large pool of students completing a research requirement in introductory psychology, who had completed a 12-item version of the ‘‘Ring Measure’’ (Liebrand, 1984) of SVO as part of an online ‘‘pretesting’’ questionnaire administered at least 3 weeks prior to the UG study. In this measure, participants make choices in a series of two choice decomposed games with each choice providing points to the decision maker and to another person described as someone the decision maker would never knowingly meet or communicate with. Further, as is common practice in SVO research, participants were instructed to imagine that the points to self and other had value, in the sense that the more of them that are accumulated, the better. To be classified as Prosocial, Individualist or Competitor, a participant’s ‘‘choice consistency index’’ had to equal at least 0.6. Four participants reported suspicion about the existence of a real partner in the experiment and one could not complete the experiment due to computer problems. These five participants were omitted. The final sample consisted of 88 participants: 31 Prosocials (13 Males), 33 Individualists (15 Males) and 24 Competitors (12 Males). Sex was controlled for in statistical analyses and reported in results only when it had significant main or interaction effects. Procedure Each experimental session involved 7–10 participants. In each session the same experimenter, blind with respect to participant’s SVO, greeted participants and handed each an envelope containing a $2 participation gratuity which was theirs to keep regardless of their decision to participate. Each participant’s name and a two-digit code were written on the front of the envelope. Each participant was seated at a computer in a large computer laboratory, such that his/ her screen was visible only to him/herself. The experimenter announced that the study was being conducted in two different rooms simultaneously, and that once the experimenter in the ‘‘other room’’ (Room A) indicated they were ready, the study would begin. To increase believability, a few minutes after this announcement, another experimenter pretending to be coming from Room A arrived along with a ‘‘participant’’ (confederate). The Room A experimenter walked to the middle of the room with the confederate, and said so that all the participants could hear: ‘‘We are ready to start in Room A, but there is a slight problem. This student came to Room A; but she appears to be on this room’s participant list.’’ Then, the Room B experimenter found an envelope with the confederate’s name on it, and seated her after apologizing for the mistake. The Room A experi-

232

G. Karagonlar, D.M. Kuhlman / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 120 (2013) 228–239

menter then stated ‘‘OK, now we are ready to start in just a minute’’ and left the room. About a minute later the Room B experimenter informed the participants that the study would begin. After reading the document of informed consent and choosing to participate, participants listened to tape-recorded instructions, stating they would play a game called Ultimatum. The rules of the standard version of the game were explained using several examples. Next they were told that based on a prior random drawing, participants in the current room (B) would be Recipients, and those in Room A would be Proposers. Instructions stated that every recipient in Room B would be randomly paired with a different proposer in Room A, with whom they would play the Ultimatum Game for a total stake of $10 to be divided by Proposer. Instructions stated that 20% of all proposer–recipient pairs would be randomly chosen, and receive actual monetary payoffs following completion of the study. Participants were assured that (1) they would play the game in complete anonymity, identified to the other player only by the code numbers on their envelopes, and (2) that neither player would ever know the actual identity of the partner. Finally, participants responded to several computer-administered questions testing their comprehension, with correct answers and explanations following each incorrect answer. Upon the experimenters’ clarification of any further questions the study began. The study was computer controlled and consisted of a series of consecutive screens. On the first screen participants entered their two digit code numbers and then completed the remaining part of the experiment at their own pace. Measure of expectations of proposer’s offer: On the next screen, participants were shown their ‘‘partner’s’’ two-digit ID code, and the eleven possible divisions of $10 that could be proposed, in $1 increments. They were told their partner was seeing these same 11 divisions, from which one would be selected as the offer. Participants indicated on a six-point scale (1: Highly Unlikely, 6: Highly Likely) how likely they thought each division would be chosen as the offer. Decision to reject or accept: On the next screen, participants saw the proposer’s offer in this format: ‘‘I decided on the following offer: $8 for me, $2 for you’’, and were asked to decide to accept or reject it. Post decision measures of emotional reaction to the unfair offer Following their decision to accept or reject, participants stated on a 100 point scale (0: did not feel at all, 100: felt strongly), to what extent they experienced each of the following emotions when they saw the proposer’s offer: Anger, Happiness, Satisfaction, and Pleasure. Prior research suggests that asking about specific emotions following the proposer’s offer and prior to the participant’s decision could bias that decision (Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996; Srivastava, Espinoza, & Fedorikhin, 2009). In the present study it could have also reduced the credibility of our deception that the participant was playing with another person in real time. Therefore, we made a judgment call and measured emotions experienced in response to the offer immediately following the participant’s accept/reject decision. Following completion of the study, participants were thanked and asked not to discuss the study with anyone. Study debriefing was delivered in the form of emails, which were sent after all study sessions had been completed. At this time 20% of participants who had been determined via a random drawing were also contacted with instructions as to how they could receive payment, which was $2 regardless of their UG decisions. Results SVO and UG decision A 3 (SVO: Prosocial, Individualist, Competitor)  2 (Decision: Accept or Reject) saturated log linear model was tested. In keeping with standard practice in the SVO literature, the 2df effect for SVO

Table 1 Ultimatum Game decision across SVO for Study 1 and Study 2. SVO

Study 1 Reject/n (%)

Study 2 Reject/n (%)

Study 1 and 2 combined Reject/n (%)

Prosocial Individualist Competitor

8/31 (26) 18/33 (55) 11/24 (46)

14/44 (32) 17/32 (53) 17/28 (61)

22/75 (29) 35/65 (54) 28/52 (54)

Total

37/88 (42)

48/104 (46)

85/192 (44)

Notes: SVO: Social Value Orientation; n represents total number of subjects within an SVO category; (%) denotes percentage of those who rejected within an SVO category.

was partitioned into two a priori Helmert contrasts. The first compares Prosocials with Proselfs (the mean of Individualists and Competitors); the second compares Individualists with Competitors. The left-most portion of Table 1 shows the frequency of rejection in Study 1. Log linear analysis showed that decision did not have a main effect, Z = 1.54, p = .12, suggesting that the overall rejection rate (42%) was not significantly different from 50%, which has been reported for similar size offers in prior research (e.g., Camerer, 2003; Crockett, Clark, Hauser, et al., 2010). Regarding effects of SVO, the Individualist/Competitor contrast was not significant (Z = .65, p = .52); Individualists (55%) and Competitors (46%) did not differ. However, the significant Prosocial/Proself contrast, Z = 2.17, p = .03, demonstrates that Prosocials were less likely than Proselfs to reject the $2 offer (26% and 51%, respectively), thus supporting Hypothesis 1b. Role of expectations As stated above, prior to seeing the offer, participants were asked to indicate how likely they thought each possible offer was. These measures were taken to allow us to see if (1) Prosocials, Individualists, and Competitors had different expectations concerning offers at least as unfair as the one they were about to receive, and (2) such expectations were related to the UG decision. There is behavioral and neuropsychological evidence suggesting that people’s context dependent expectations concerning offers predict their UG decision independently of their fairness considerations (Chang & Sanfey, 2011). Therefore, measuring expectations allowed for a more stringent test for the effect of SVO differences in response to unfairness, controlling for the potential effect of SVO differences in response to violations of expectations. A composite score was created by averaging participants’ expectations concerning the likelihoods of nothing, $1, and $2 as the proposer’s offer for them (referred to as expectations from now on).1 A 3 (SVO)  2 (Sex) between subjects ANOVA on expectations was performed. Sex had a main effect, F(1, 82) = 9.54, p = .003, g2p ¼ :104, with females (M = 3.38, SD = 1.67) considering an offer of $2 or less more likely than males (M = 2.38, SD = 1.36), and so, its effect was controlled for. The same two a priori contrasts used above (Prosocial/Proself and Individualist/Competitor) revealed no main effect for SVO (ps > .56). The means for Prosocials, Individualists, and Competitors were 3.10 (SD = 1.55), 2.87 (SD = 1.71), 2.78 (SD = 1.59), respectively. Next we examined the effect of participants’ expectations for offers of $2 or less on the decision to accept or reject. To do this, decision was regressed on expectations, SVO (which was coded as the same two a priori Helmert contrasts), and their interactions. Overall, expectations for an offer of $2 or less were positively related to the proba1 We used this composite score in our analyses for expectations rather than only the expectation for $2, because a low expectation for $2 may be due to either expectations for a higher offer or expectations for a lower offer, which may lead to different UG decisions for an offer of $2. Thus using a composite score corresponding to the expectations for $2 or less enabled a more robust test for expectations. However, all the analyses involving expectations produce identical results regardless of whether the expectation for only $2 or the expectation for $2 or less is used.

G. Karagonlar, D.M. Kuhlman / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 120 (2013) 228–239

233

bility (standardized) of accepting the offer, b = 1.01, Exp(b) = 2.74, Wald = 8.57, p = .003. However, the effect of the contrast comparing Prosocials with Proselfs was significant above and beyond the effect of expectations, b = 1.07, Exp(b) = 2.90, Wald = 4.77, p = .029. Moreover, SVO was not found to moderate the effect of expectations on UG decision (ps > .064). Thus, these results suggest that the effect for SVO on UG decision does not appear to result from direct effects of violations of prior expectations in the three SVO groups. Emotional reactions A factor analysis with principal axis factoring and oblique rotation suggested that happiness, satisfaction, and pleasure formed a single factor (Cronbach’s a = .90). Due to its low communality and factor loading, anger was treated as a separate factor. Emotional reactions and UG decision. We first examined the effects of positive emotion (the average of reported happiness, satisfaction and pleasure), anger, and their interaction on UG decisions. We entered positive emotion, anger, and their product for the interaction term as predictors, and decision (1: Accept, 0: Reject) as the dependent variable in a binary logistic regression model. Following Jaccard (2001)’s recommendation for standardizing continuous variables for ease of interpretation of interactive effects, we standardized all predictors. Results revealed a significant main effect for positive emotion, b = 1.70, Exp(b) = 5.46, Wald = 10.63, p < .001. Specifically, as reported levels of positive emotion decreased, the likelihood of the offer’s acceptance decreased as well. There was neither a main effect for anger, b = .53, Exp(b) = .59, Wald = 1.93, p = .17, nor an effect for the anger  positive emotion interaction, b = .748, Exp(b) = .47, Wald = 1.76, p = .19. SVO and positive emotion. That positive emotion, and not anger, appears to influence the UG decision makes one wonder what these participants had to be happy about. In that regard it’s important to note that emotions were reported on a 100 point scale with 0 = ‘‘did not feel at all’’ and 100 = ‘‘felt strongly’’. The overall average of positive emotion was less than 20, indicating that no-one was feeling particularly happy. This low level of positive emotion notwithstanding, a one way ANOVA found that Prosocials reported relatively higher levels (M = 18.8, SD = 19.5) than Individualists (M = 10.5, SD = 11.1) and Competitors (M = 10.8, SD = 17.6) combined, t(85) = 2.22, p = .029, g2p ¼ :055. Individualists and Competitors did not differ, t(85) = .07, p = .94.

Fig. 1. Self-report of anger as a function of SVO and UG decision (Study 1). Decision was related to self reports of anger for Prosocials, but not for Individualists and Competitors, who did not differ.

SVO and anger. Participants’ self-reports of anger did not differ with regard to SVO, t(85) = 1.44, p = .15, g2p ¼ :024 for the Prosocial/Proself contrast; and t(85) = .92, p = .36, g2p ¼ :001 for the Individualist/Competitor contrast. Means were 27.3 (SD = 26.2), 33.03 (SD = 27.2), and 40.1 (SD = 28.8) for Prosocials, Individualists, and Competitors, respectively. For a closer examination of the relationship between SVO and anger, we examined this relationship as a function of UG decision. As shown in Fig. 1, decision had a main effect, F(1, 82) = 3.96, p = .05, g2p ¼ :046, as those who rejected the offer (M = 39, SD = 30.1) reported more anger than those who accepted (M = 28.6, SD = 26.8). More importantly, there was a significant Prosocial/Proself contrast  Decision interaction, t(82) = 3.34, p = .001, g2p ¼ :12. To delineate the nature of this interaction we examined the SVO and anger relationship within accept and reject decisions separately. Accordingly, within those who accepted the offer Prosocials (M = 16.7, SD = 15.6) reported lower anger than Proselfs (M = 38.3, SD = 30.2), F(1, 82) = 8.22, p = .005, g2p ¼ :091. However, within those who rejected the offer Prosocials (M = 57.9, SD = 27.3) reported higher anger than Proselfs (M = 33.8, SD = 30), F(1, 82) = 4.26, p = .042, g2p ¼ :049. Individualists and Competitors did not differ in their reports of anger regardless of whether they accepted or rejected the offer (ps > .13). These findings suggest that anger was related to UG decision only for Prosocials, with lower anger being associated with acceptance, and higher anger with rejection. Study 2

Mediating role of positive emotions. The above findings concerning (1) the direct effect of SVO (Prosocial vs. Proself) on decision, (2) the relation of SVO (Prosocial vs. Proself) with self-reports of positive emotion, and (3) the relation of positive emotion with UG decision suggest that positive emotion may mediate the effect of SVO on UG decision. Following Baron and Kenny (1986) we performed an additional logistic regression analysis where decision was regressed on SVO (Prosocial = 1, Proself = 0) and positive emotion simultaneously. The results demonstrated that positive emotion was still associated with decision, b = 1.55, Exp(b) = 4.73, Wald = 11.82, p = .001, while the effect of SVO disappeared, b = .849, Exp(b) = 2.34, Wald = 2.41, p = .12, suggesting a completely mediated effect. To test for the significance of this mediated effect we used the bootstrapping procedure developed by Preacher and Hayes (2008), which also corrects the standard errors of beta coefficients for binary outcomes based on the recommendations of MacKinnon and Dwyer (1993). We calculated the bias-corrected and accelerating bootstrap 95% confidence interval over 20,000 iterations. The resultant confidence interval (lower bound = .05, and upper bound = 2.12) did not include zero, indicating that the mediating influence of positive emotion was statistically significant.

The findings of Study 1 supported the emotion/self regulation hypothesis (1b) that Proselfs were more likely than Prosocials to reject the $2. As predicted by Hypothesis 2, there was an SVO effect for positive emotion, and of the sort that would be expected by emotion/self regulation rather than altruistic punishment: Prosocials reported higher positive emotion than Proselfs. Further, the mediation analyses support the notion that emotions were driving the SVO effect on UG decisions. Thus, consistent with the notion that Prosocials are more likely than Proselfs to utilize cognitive reappraisal in the UG, Study 1 suggests that Prosocials were better than Proselfs at managing their emotions in response to the unfair offer, leading to higher acceptance. These findings led to the development of a new set of predictions which were tested in Study 2. Research on the antecedents of emotion formation points out a role for the actor’s cognitions regarding the situation and the target object (Lazarus, 1982; Russell, 2003). Further, research in this stream also suggests that effective regulation of emotions requires cognitive reappraisal where one develops more positive attributions concerning the situation and the object out of the many possible attributions that can be made (e.g., John & Gross, 2004, 2007). Thus, based on the findings of Study 1, and prior research on

234

G. Karagonlar, D.M. Kuhlman / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 120 (2013) 228–239

emotion regulation (e.g., John & Gross, 2004, 2007) and SVO (e.g., Balliet & Joireman, 2010; De Dreu & Van Lange, 1995; Declerck & Bogaert, 2008; Kuhlman & Wimberley, 1976; McClintock & Liebrand, 1988; Van Lange et al., 1997) we reasoned that Prosocials may develop more positive cognitions than Proselfs regarding an unfair offer and the proposer making this offer, enabling them to manage their emotions in a more effective way. Specifically, we predicted that Prosocials would be more likely than Proselfs to give the Proposer the benefit of the doubt, and less likely than Proselfs to attribute the Proposer’s unfairness to their competitive intention and view rejection in a positive regard, leading them to be less likely to choose rejection as a retaliatory response. Further, Study 2 also aimed to rule out the alternative explanation that the observed SVO effect on the UG decision was due to SVO differences in participants’ perceptions regarding the fairness of the offer.

Judgments about the motivation of the proposer. Next, on a six-point scale (1: strongly disagree, 6: strongly agree) participants responded to three items, each representing a potential motivation/reason which may have led the proposer to make the offer he or she did: ‘‘The proposer wanted to get as much for him or herself as possible without an actual intention to hurt me’’ (individualism), ‘‘The proposer wanted to maximize the difference between what he or she got and what I got’’ (competition), ‘‘It may well be that the proposer had good and valid reasons to make the offer he/she did that do not involve being selfish, greedy, or aggressive’’ (benefit of the doubt). Fairness perceptions. Participants rated the fairness of the Proposer’s offer on a six-point scale (1: very unfair, 6: very fair). We asked this question at the end to avoid priming fairness prior to responses to the preceding questions.

Method Results and discussion Participants and SVO As in Study 1, participants were selected from a large pool of students completing a research requirement in introductory psychology, who had completed the same measure of SVO as part of an online ‘‘pretesting’’ questionnaire administered at least 3 weeks prior to the second study. As in Study 1, to be classified as Prosocial, Individualist, or Competitor a participant’s ‘‘choice consistency index’’ had to equal at least 0.6. Five participants were omitted due to suspicion concerning the existence of a real partner. The final sample of Study 2 consisted of 104 participants: 44 Prosocials (23 Males), 32 Individualists (15 Males) and 28 Competitors (13 Males). As in Study 1, sex was controlled for in statistical analyses and reported in results only when it had significant main or interaction effects. Further, unless stated otherwise all statistical effects involving SVO were tested using the same two a priori Helmert Contrasts, comparing Prosocials with Proselfs (i.e., the mean of Individualists and Competitors), and Individualists with Competitors. Procedure The procedure was the same as that in Study 1 except for the post decisional measures used, which are described below. Post-decisional measures Positive attitude toward rejecting the offer. As soon as participants made their decision concerning the offer, they were presented with five items adapted from Larrick and Blount (1997), which involved potential arguments towards or against rejecting the offer (i.e., Rejecting the offer would be fair, rational, wasteful, justifiable, reasonable). On a 4 point scale (1: did not consider at all, 4: considered strongly), participants indicated the extent to which they considered each argument as they were making their decisions. As with the emotions measure in Study 1, to avoid a possible UG decision bias, we chose to ask these questions following participants’ decisions. Factor analysis (employing principal axis factoring and oblique rotation) yielded a scree plot suggesting a single factor that accounted for 55% of the total variance. One item (Rejecting the offer would be wasteful) with a negative factor loading was reversed before creating a composite scale so that higher scores indicated a more favorable attitude toward rejecting the offer (Cronbach’s a = .79). Further, following participants’ responses to the above question, we presented the same items, this time asking to what extent participants agreed with each item even if they had not considered them as they were making their decision (1: strongly disagree, 6: strongly agree). A similar composite involving the same items was created indicating the degree of participants’ agreement with the arguments. The consideration and agreement scales were positively and highly correlated, r(104) = .84, p < .001, indicating that participants’ consideration of these arguments also reflected their agreements.

SVO, expectations and UG decision A log linear analysis examining the relationship between SVO and the UG decision produced identical results with those in Study 1: Decision did not have a main effect, Z = .32, p = .75. Most importantly, in support of Hypothesis 1b Prosocials rejected less frequently than Proselfs (32% vs. 57%), Z = 2.50, p = .012, while Individualists and Competitors did not differ, Z = .59, p = .56 (see Table 1).2 Further, the relationship of expectations for an offer of $2 or less with SVO and UG decision was analyzed in the same manner as in Study 1. The analyses for expectations produced identical results with those of Study 1 (all ps > .1).3 Positive attitude toward rejecting the offer In a one-way ANOVA, we found that Prosocials (M = 2.38, SD = .80) reported less positive attitude toward rejecting the offer than Proselfs (M = 2.71, SD = .75), t(101) = 2.15, p = .034, g2p ¼ :044. However, positive attitude toward rejecting the offer did not differ between Individualists (M = 2.69, SD = .71) and Competitors (M = 2.72, SD = .80), t(101) = 14, p = .89, g2p ¼ :00019. Further, participants’ positive attitude toward rejecting the offer increased the probability of rejection, unstandardized b = .2.71, Exp(b) = .06, Wald = 26.94, p < .001, and explained a significant portion of variance in decision, v2 (1, N = 104) = 54.57, p < .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .55. Mediation. The above significant relationships between SVO (Prosocial vs. Proself), positive attitude toward rejecting the offer, and UG decision suggest that positive attitude toward rejecting the offer mediated the SVO effect on decision. Accordingly, follow2 A joint analysis for the SVO effect on decision in both studies was also performed. There was no effect for Study, so the two samples were combined (N = 192). The joint analysis of the combined studies produced the same results (see the right-most portion of Table 1): Decision did not have a main effect, Z = 1.35, p = .18. Regarding effects of SVO, Individualists and Competitors did not differ in their rejection rates (54% each), Z = .05, p = .96. More importantly, in strong support of Hypothesis 1b Prosocials were less likely than Proselfs to reject the $2 offer (29% and 54%, respectively), Z = 3.27, p < .001. 3 The same analyses for expectations were performed on the joint samples from two studies (N = 192). The results were identical with those in each separate study regardless of whether the expectation for $2 or the expectation for $2 or less was considered. We also examined expectations for an equal offer. Males (M = 5.18, SD = 1.02) had higher expectations for an equal offer than females (M = 4.78, SD = 1.11), t(186) = 2.44, p = .016, g2p ¼ :031. However, SVO had no main or interaction effects on the expectation for an equal offer (all ps > .57). The mean expectation for an equal offer was 4.91 (SD = 1.14), 4.95 (SD = 1.04), and 5.06 (SD = 1.07) for Prosocials, Individualists, and Competitors, respectively. Further, there was neither a main effect of expectations for an equal offer nor an Expectation for an equal offer  SVO interaction on decision (all ps > .54).

G. Karagonlar, D.M. Kuhlman / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 120 (2013) 228–239

ing Baron and Kenny’s (1986) causal steps approach, in an additional logistic regression model decision (accept = 1, reject = 0) was regressed simultaneously on SVO (Prosocial = 1, Proself = 0) and positive attitude toward rejecting the offer. Consistent with mediation, the previously significant effect of SVO (Prosocial vs. Proself) on decision became non-significant, unstandardized b = .89, Exp(b) = 2.45, Wald = 2.60, p = .11, whereas the effect of positive attitude toward rejecting the offer remained significant, unstandardized b = 2.71, Exp(b) = .067, Wald = 25.4, p < .001. The significance of the mediated effect was tested in the same way as in Study 1 by calculating the bias-corrected and accelerating bootstrap 95% confidence interval over 20,000 iterations. The resultant confidence interval (lower bound = .034, and upper bound = 1.91) did not include zero, indicating that the mediating effect of positive attitude toward rejecting the offer was significant, consistent with a full mediation effect. Motivation of the proposer A multivariate ANOVA with SVO as the independent variable examined the measures of individualism, competition, and benefit of the doubt as reasons for the proposer’s offer. This MANOVA yielded a significant multivariate effect for SVO, Wilks’ k = .88, F(6, 198) = 2.14, p = .05, g2p ¼ :061. Univariate F tests revealed significant effects for the Prosocial/Proself contrast on competition, t(101) = 2.63, p = .01, g2p ¼ :065, and benefit of the doubt, t(101) = 2.04, p = .044, g2p ¼ :04. Consistent with our prediction, Prosocials tended to judge the proposer’s motive underlying the unfair offer as less competitive (M = 3.73, SD = 1.44), and they extended more benefit of the doubt to the Proposer (M = 4.18, SD = 1.32) than Proselfs (M = 4.41, SD = 1.19 for competition; M = 3.61, SD = 1.50 for benefit of the doubt). Individualists did not differ from Competitors on either competition or benefit of the doubt (p’s = .73 and .34, respectively). There were no effects for SVO on judgments of individualism as motivating the unfair offer. SVO, decision and fairness perceptions A 3 (SVO)  2 (Sex)  2 (UG decision) between subjects ANOVA on participants’ ratings regarding the fairness of the offer revealed a main effect for sex, F(1, 92) = 7.42, p = .008, g2p ¼ :075, in which males (M = 1.98, SD = .93) rated the offer less fair than females (M = 2.34, SD = .78). The ANOVA also yielded a main effect for decision, F(1, 92) = 9.76, p = .002, g2p ¼ :096. Those who rejected the offer (M = 1.85, SD = .62) rated it less fair than those who accepted it (M = 2.43, SD = .97). No other main or interactive effects, including those involving SVO, were significant (ps > .05). Participants generally agreed that the offer was unfair (Means are 2.30, 2.09, 2.03 for Prosocials, Individualists, and Competitors, respectively). Thus, these results suggest that the observed SVO difference in UG decision in the present studies cannot be explained by SVO differences in participants’ perceptions of fairness; rather it may be explained by SVO differences in the tolerance for unfairness. And, the above results for Proposer’s motivations suggest that such tolerance was based on explanations of Proposer’s unfairness as a function of participants’ SVOs (i.e., Prosocial vs. Proself).4 General discussion Two independent studies demonstrate that SVO, measured approximately 3 weeks prior to each study, influenced UG decisions to accept or reject an unfair offer. Specifically, Prosocials were 4 We also repeated the same proposer-motivation analyses controlling for participants’ UG decision in a saturated MANOVA model. However, no main or interactive effects involving decision were found (p’s > .05), and univariate tests results for the SVO effect did not change.

235

more likely to accept than Individualists and Competitors (i.e., Proselfs). Further, SVO influenced (a) self-reported emotions (Study 1), and (b) self-reported positive attitudes toward rejecting the offer and also perceptions concerning the proposer’s motives (Study 2). The post decisional self-reports suggest that differences in emotional and cognitive responses to the offer underlie the SVO difference in UG decisions. Finally, consistent with prior research Individualists and Competitors did not differ in terms of their UG decision, experience of emotions, and cognitions. The present findings highlight the role of stable individual differences in SVO, and contribute to the SVO and UG literatures. First, unlike prior SVO research where outcomes were often assessed immediately following the measurement of SVO (e.g., De Dreu & Van Lange, 1995; Stouten et al., 2005; Van Dijk et al., 2004), the present work separated SVO assessment and the UG by a 3 week interval. Thus, the present research reduces concern for inflated effects due to common source variance, and provides for the first time (to our knowledge) strong support regarding the trait-like influence and predictive validity of SVO in the ultimatum bargaining context. Furthermore, since participants’ UG decisions had real monetary consequences for the self and other, our findings provide some support for the potential impact of individual differences in SVO on behavior in real-life interdependent situations. Moreover, in both studies the sample sizes of Individualists and Competitors were reasonably large, and comparable. That we found no evidence of a difference between these two SVO’s helps to justify the common practice of combining them into a single category of Proselfs, which is a result of the small percentage of Competitors in the general population (e.g., Au & Kwong, 2004). The present studies also contribute to the on-going discussion of altruistic punishment vs. self-centered emotions and self regulation as explanations for UG rejections. As argued above, if altruistic punishment is construed as a personally costly enforcement of a fairness norm, then it should be most likely to occur among those who endorse it. And, considerable prior research (e.g., De Cremer & Van Lange, 2001; Stouten et al., 2005; Van Dijk et al., 2004; Van Lange, 1999) has shown that Prosocials endorse a true norm of fairness, while Proselfs adhere to the norm strategically, when doing so maximizes their self-interest. Thus while altruistic punishment implies that Prosocials should be more likely than Proselfs to reject, we find just the opposite. Our results appear to be more consistent with research suggesting that UG rejection is an impulsive act (Crockett, Clark, Lieberman, et al., 2010) that is mainly motivated by self-centered emotions and that involves vengeance and spite (Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996; Yamagishi et al., 2009). Our results also suggest differences between Prosocials and Proselfs in terms of utilization of emotion regulation strategies. The role of emotion regulation Across two studies, each employing independent samples, we provide converging evidence based on emotions in Study 1 and valence-laden cognitions (i.e., attitudes toward rejection and perceptions regarding the Proposer) in Study 2 that Prosocials’ orientation towards an unfair offer and to the proposer making this offer was more positive than Proselfs’, leading to higher acceptance rates for Prosocials. Further, since in both studies Prosocials and Proselfs had similar expectations and fairness perceptions concerning the offer, differences in their rejection rates can be more confidently attributed to differences in how they managed emotions in response to the unfair offer. In other words, our results suggest that Prosocials are more likely than Proself to utilize cognitive reappraisal when responding to an unfair UG offer. Because it alters emotional experience (e.g., inhibits negative emotions and induces positive emotions), cognitive reappraisal is considered a healthy strategy associated with psychological well-

236

G. Karagonlar, D.M. Kuhlman / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 120 (2013) 228–239

being and self-regulation (Goldin et al., 2008; Gross, 2002). In UG research, cognitive reappraisal has been found to increase acceptance rates for unfair offers (e.g., van’t Wout et al., 2010). Our findings that (1) Prosocials extended the benefit of the doubt to the proposer more than Proselfs, and (2) ascribed the reason for the offer to competitive motives less than Proselfs are indications of Prosocials’ higher efforts to reformulate the meaning of the unfair act. Further, the finding in Study 1 that those Prosocials accepting the offer reported the lowest level of anger and highest level of positive emotions is also consistent with their utilization of cognitive reappraisal, leading to higher acceptance rates. Our results also suggest that the primary emotion regulation strategy adopted by Proselfs was expressive suppression, a response-related strategy impacting the emotion generative process after emotions arise. Suppression aims to reduce expression of negative emotions, but fails to reduce actual experience of (negative) emotions, leading to less desirable psychological outcomes (Goldin et al., 2008; Gross, 2002). Suppression has been reported as being less effective than reappraisal in reducing the frequency of rejections of unfair UG offers (van’t Wout et al., 2010). Further, prior research using the facial action coding system (FACS) to measure emotional reactions in the UG found that Prosocials expressed more positive and negative emotions than Proselfs in response to unfair offers (Schug, Matsumoto, Horita, Yamagishi, & Bonnet, 2010), suggesting that Proselfs exert efforts to suppress emotion expression more than Prosocials. In terms of the present research, the findings that (a) Proselfs’ acceptance rate was lower than Prosocials’, (b) Proselfs’ experience of anger in response to the offer was the same for acceptance and rejection (that is, anger was not related to decision), and (c) Proselfs who accepted the offer reported more anger than Prosocials who accepted the offer, taken together, are consistent with Proselfs’ utilization of expressive suppression as their primary emotion regulation strategy. Prior studies on self-control and impulsiveness in the UG and Prisoner’s Dilemma support our argument that rejections of the unfair offer in the present studies were associated with a lack of effective emotion regulation. Specifically in a UG study (Crockett, Clark, Lieberman, et al., 2010), reduced self control induced by serotonin depletion was positively related to the tendency to make impulsive choices in a delay discounting task, and at the same time was found to increase rejections of unfair UG offers. In another study (Yi, Johnson, & Bickel, 2005), individuals who made impulsive choices in the delay discounting task were more likely to defect in a subsequent iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Game. Taken together, these studies suggest that both rejection in the UG and defection in the PDG have similar underlying motivations, which are not altruistic. More specifically, and consistent with the work of others (e.g., Nowak & Highfield, 2011; Rand, Dreber, Ellingsen, Fudenberg, & Nowak, 2009), rejection in the context of the UG seems more strongly driven by greed, aggression and vengeance than by altruism; perhaps ‘‘spiteful punishment’’ might be a better phrase. Moreover, the motivation for Prosocials’ and Proselfs’ acceptance of the offer may also differ. While Proselfs who accepted the offer may have done so simply to maximize their self-interest (that is, gaining $2), Prosocials’ acceptance may have, at least partly, been driven by an aversion of harming the Proposer (Crockett, Clark, Hauser, et al., 2010), as is likely caused by Prosocials’ positive other- regarding orientations (De Dreu & Van Lange, 1995; Messick & McClintock, 1968; Van Lange, 1999) and tendency to evaluate the moral consequences of their actions in interdependent relationships (Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994). In fact, a recent study (Nelissen, van Someren, & Zeelenberg, 2009) that used a modified UG paradigm where the rejection of an equal offer yielded a higher payoff to the recipient than its acceptance while reducing the proposer’s share to zero showed that Prosocials were

less likely than Proselfs to reject the offer to maximize their selfinterest. This finding suggests that harm aversion plays a role in Prosocials’ response to UG offers, and thus is also likely to facilitate their reappraisal of an unfair act in the UG, leading to increased acceptance of unfair offers. Concern for fairness and altruistic punishment On the other hand, the findings of the present research do not force the conclusion that altruistic punishment has no impact on any individual’s rejection of an unfair offer. For instance, rejection by Prosocial participants may, at least partly, reflect reactions to a violation of the fairness norm and thus, may be driven by a motive for truly altruistic punishment. Indirect support for this possibility is provided by our finding that Prosocials who rejected the offer experienced significantly higher anger than rejecting Proselfs, which may be a result of Prosocials’ reactions to a norm violation in addition to the perceptions of personal insult communicated by the offer. Unfortunately, the validated and most frequently used measures of SVO, including the measure used in the present research, cannot determine the relative weights Prosocials assign to the concern for fairness in outcomes and concern for joint gain. Thus, it remains a possibility that the Prosocials who rejected the offer in the present studies are those with a higher concern for fairness in outcomes than for joint gain, whereas the Prosocials who accepted the offer are those with a higher concern for joint gain than for fairness in outcomes. Future research might examine this possibility using a newly developed measure of SVO, the SLIDER (Murphy et al., 2011), which can distinguish Prosocials based on whether they more highly value joint gain maximization or fairness in outcomes. At the present time however it appears justified to say that the majority of Prosocials do not appear to be altruistic punishers. Limitations and future research Some limitations of the current research need mention. First, although our findings suggest that the SVO effect for the UG decision was driven by Prosocials’ and Proselfs’ adoption of different emotion regulation strategies, we did not directly manipulate emotion regulation. Thus, current results cannot assure that emotion regulation has a causal role in the SVO and UG decision relationship. Therefore, future research might directly manipulate cognitive reappraisal and suppression in participants with different SVOs. Further, the present study examined SVO differences in behavior, emotions, and cognitions in a one-shot game. Given that today’s socio-economic interactions have been increasingly characterized as one-shot interactions with anonymous partners rather than long-lasting traditional relationships (cf. Nowak & Sigmund, 2005) this is to some degree justified. However, future research should also examine SVO differences in repeated UG interactions. It may well be that Prosocials would perceive repeated unfairness from a proposer in the UG as exploitation and thus might become as likely as Proselfs to reject after a few rounds. Also, in the present work all participants were presented with a single offer of $8 for the proposer and $2 for the participant. This was based on the finding in prior UG research that such an offer produces an approximately equal proportion of accept and reject decisions, and so seemed well suited for the identification of individual differences. However, it remains to be seen if SVO differences would persist had the offer been more unfair, ($1 and $9) or more nearly equal ($4 and $6). Future research should seek to determine the range of unfairness for which SVO differences matter. Moreover, our present argument that the majority of our participants’ one-shot UG rejections are not truly altruistic may be limited to relationships involving only two people. For instance, it may

G. Karagonlar, D.M. Kuhlman / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 120 (2013) 228–239

be that the presence of a single partner was not sufficient to make collective interests as salient as in an N-person public goods dilemma, where a free-rider hurts not only the self, but also other members of the group benefiting from the public good. Thus, while Prosocials may view punishment in the one-shot UG as self-centered, they may be more likely to view punishment in a one-shot Public Goods Dilemma as serving the group, leading to increased punishment by Prosocials at a cost to self. Indeed, the finding by Fehr and Gächter (2002) that the majority of punishments in a public goods game were conducted by above-average cooperators on below-average cooperators is consistent with this possibility. Therefore, future research might examine whether our findings in the context of the one-shot UG may generalize to other social dilemmas involving more than two persons. Further, we measured participants’ emotions and cognitions following participants’ UG decision. Thus, it is possible that our self-report results reflect participants’ self justification of their decisions. However, this procedure has precedent in prior research, in which self-reported measures followed the UG so that the behaviors of participants in the game would not be biased by the self-report (e.g., Bonini et al., 2011; Leliveld, van Beest, van Dijk, & Tenbrunsel, 2009; Srivastava et al., 2009; Van Dijk et al., 2004). Beyond this, and more importantly, our findings are supported by theory and are also consistent with prior neuropsychological research using more objective measures of emotions and cognitions (e.g., Sanfey et al., 2003; Tabibnia et al., 2008). Although the Ring Measure (RM) used in the present studies is one of the most frequently used and validated measures of SVO, it is important to note a limitation of this measure. The RM produces inconsistent SVO scores for participants who are motivated by mere inequality aversion. Following the general practice in the SVO research (e.g., Au & Kwong, 2004) in our studies we recruited only consistent subjects from a large subject pool. Thus, our samples in the present studies do not contain participants with a pure inequality aversion motive. However, our hypotheses are based on theory and are supported by prior research which has predominantly used the traditional conceptualization of SVO (Messick & McClintock, 1968; Van Lange, 1999) as in the present research and which has utilized the SVO measures (e.g., the RM and decomposed games) that are consistent with this conceptualization. Based on this conceptualization decades of SVO research has demonstrated the temporal stability, construct, and convergent validity of the SVO construct, both in studies employing an explicit experimental gaming paradigm and non-gaming paradigms as well (e.g., see Bogaert et al. (2008) for a review). Thus, this inability of the RM to classify mere inequality aversive subjects does not undermine the validity of our results. At the same time, however, it is important to indicate some limitations with the traditional conceptualization of SVO. SVO can, and we think should, be regarded as a special case of a larger set of ‘‘social preferences’’ or ‘‘other regarding preferences’’ many of which (including pure inequality aversion) are not explicitly considered by the traditional SVO model. An early and important example is the work of MacCrimmon and Messick (1976), an economist and psychologist respectively, who pointed out a large number of ways that the traditional SVO model could be expanded. As one example, there may be more to cooperation than the preference to maximize the sum of self and other’s outcomes; for those concerned with the distribution of these outcomes, preferences would follow ‘‘proportional cooperation’’, or the product of self/ other outcomes. With regards to competition these authors propose an alternative to the traditional maximization of the algebraic Self minus Other difference. Specifically, those concerned with the ratio of Self to Other would show preferences for ‘‘proportional competition’’. More recently, economists have defined models for a number of social preferences that go beyond the SVO model,

237

and that allow for the assessment of individual differences. As already mentioned, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) have developed a model for inequity aversion. Charness and Rabin (2002) have developed a model for two person games that includes a change in the weight assigned to other’s outcome as a function of his/her prior misbehavior. Similarly, Levine (1998) has proposed a utility model in which individuals’ attitudes regarding an unfair (or uncooperative) opponent determines their retaliatory responses. Related to this work, and as mentioned in the introduction, is Rabin’s (1993) model for reciprocity. The model of Kamas and Preston (2012) allows for the detection of inequity aversion and a form of cooperation called ‘‘compassionate surplus maximizing’’ in which the weight assigned to others with low outcomes is larger than that for those with high outcomes. Kamas and Preston (2012) have related their model to reactions to unfairness in the Ultimatum Game. We feel a very important direction for research is to determine the relationships between the traditional SVO model and the more recent economic models. This could only help to increase the generality of the approach to social preferences in the SVO literature, and the connection between psychology and economics. Acknowledgments This research was supported in part by a fellowship from Dokuz Eylul University and by a dissertation award from the Psychology Department at the University of Delaware granted to the first author. The funding institutions did not have any role in the conduct of this research or the write-up of this manuscript. We would like to thank Chad Forbes for his helpful comments on an earlier version of this manuscript. We also would like to thank Laura Doherty and Hannah Karasick for their assistance in data collection. References Andreoni, J., & Bernheim, B. (2009). Social image and the 50–50 norm, a theoretical and experimental analysis of audience effects. Econometrica, 77, 1607–1636. Au, W. T., & Kwong, J. Y. Y. (2004). Measurements and effects of social-value orientation in social dilemmas: A review. In R. Suleiman, D. V. Budescu, I. Fischer, & D. M. Messick (Eds.), Contemporary psychological research on social dilemmas (pp. 71–98). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Balliet, D., & Joireman, J. (2010). Ego depletion reduces proselfs’ concern with the well-being of others. Group Processes and Intergroup Relations, 13, 227–239. Baron, R. M., & Kenny, D. A. (1986). The moderator–mediator variable distinction in social psychological research: Conceptual, strategic, and statistical considerations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51, 1173–1182. Blount, S. (1995). When social outcomes aren’t fair: The effect of causal attributions on preferences. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 63, 131–144. Bogaert, S., Boone, C., & Declerck, C. (2008). Social value orientation and cooperation in social dilemmas: A review and conceptual model. British Journal of Social Psychology, 47, 453–480. Bonini, N., Hadjichristidis, C., Mazzocco, K., Demattè, M. L., Zampini, M., Sbarbati, A., et al. (2011). Pecunia olet: The role of incidental disgust in the ultimatum game. Emotion, 11, 965–969. Camerer, C. F. (2003). Behavioral game theory: Experiments in strategic interaction. NJ, USA: Princeton University Press. Camerer, C., & Thaler, R. (1995). Ultimatums, dictators and manners. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9, 209–219. Chang, L. J., & Sanfey, A. G. (2011). Great expectations: Neural computations underlying the use of social norms in decision-making. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/scan/nsr094 (online first publication). Charness, G., & Rabin, M. (2002). Understanding social preferences with simple tests. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117, 817–869. Civai, C., Corradi-Dell’Acqua, C., Gamer, M., & Rumiati, R. I. (2010). Are irrational reactions to unfairness truly emotionally-driven? Dissociated behavioral and emotional responses in the ultimatum game task. Cognition, 114, 89–95. Colle, L., & Del Giudice, M. (2011). Patterns of attachment and emotional competence in middle childhood. Social Development, 20, 51–72. Crockett, M. J., Clark, L., Hauser, M. D., & Robbins, T. W. (2010). Serotonin selectively influences moral judgment and behavior through effects on harm aversion. PNAS Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 107, 17433–17438. Crockett, M. J., Clark, L., Lieberman, M. D., Tabibnia, G., & Robbins, T. W. (2010). Impulsive choice and altruistic punishment are correlated and increase in tandem with serotonin depletion. Emotion, 10, 855–862.

238

G. Karagonlar, D.M. Kuhlman / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 120 (2013) 228–239

De Cremer, D., & Van Lange, P. A. M. (2001). Why prosocials exhibit greater cooperation than proselfs: The roles of social responsibility and reciprocity. European Journal of Personality. Special Issue: Personality and Economic Behavior, 15, 5–18. De Cremer, D., & Van Vugt, M. (1999). Social identification effects in social dilemmas: A transformation of motives. European Journal of Social Psychology, 29, 871–893. De Dreu, C. K. W., & Van Lange, P. A. M. (1995). The impact of social value orientations on negotiator cognition and behavior. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 21, 1178–1188. Declerck, C. H., & Bogaert, S. (2008). Social value orientation: Related to empathy and the ability to read the mind in the eyes. The Journal of Social Psychology, 148, 711–726. Eek, D., & Gärling, T. (2006). Prosocials prefer equal outcomes to maximizing joint outcomes. British Journal of Social Psychology, 45, 321–337. Falk, A., Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2003). On the nature of fair behavior. Economic Inquiry, 41, 20–26. Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2003). The nature of human altruism. Nature, 425, 785–791. Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2004). Third-party punishment and social norms. Evolution and Human Behavior, 25, 63–87. Fehr, E., Fischbacher, U., & Gachter, S. (2002). Strong reciprocity, human cooperation, and the enforcement of social norms. Human Nature, 13, 1–25. Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2002). Altruistic punishment in humans. Nature, 415, 137–140. Fehr, E., & Schmidt, K. (1999). A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114, 817–868. Goldin, P. R., McRae, K., Ramel, W., & Gross, J. J. (2008). The neural bases of emotion regulation: Reappraisal and suppression of negative emotion. Biological Psychiatry, 63, 577–586. Gross, J. J. (2002). Emotion regulation: Affective, cognitive, and social consequences. Psychophysiology, 39, 281–291. Güth, W., Schmittberger, R., & Schwarze, B. (1982). An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 3, 367–388. Handgraaf, M. J. J., Van Dijk, E., & De Cremer, D. (2003). Social utility in ultimatum bargaining. Social Justice Research, 16, 263–283. Haruno, M., & Frith, C. D. (2010). Activity in the amygdala elicited by unfair divisions predicts social value orientation. Nature Neuroscience, 13, 160–161. Hewig, J., Kretschmer, N., Trippe, R. H., Hecht, H., Coles, M. G. H., Holroyd, C. B., et al. (2011). Why humans deviate from rational choice. Psychophysiology, 48, 507–514. Hoffman, E., McCabe, K. A., & Smith, V. L. (1996). On expectations and the monetary stakes in ultimatum games. International Journal of Game Theory, 25, 289–301. Jaccard, J. J. (2001). Interaction effects in logistic regression (Sage University papers series on the quantitative applications in the social sciences, series no. 07-135). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. John, O. P., & Gross, J. J. (2004). Healthy and unhealthy emotion regulation: Personality processes, individual differences, and life span development. Journal of Personality. Special Issue: Emotions, Personality, and Health, 72, 1301–1333. John, O. P., & Gross, J. J. (2007). Individual differences in emotion regulation. In J. J. Gross (Ed.), Handbook of emotion regulation (pp. 351–372). New York, NY, US: Guilford Press. Kamas, L., & Preston, A. (2012). Distributive and reciprocal fairness: What can we learn from the heterogeneity of social preferences? Journal of Economic Psychology, 33, 538–553. Kelley, H. H., & Stahelski, A. J. (1970). Social interaction basis of cooperators’ and competitors’ beliefs about others. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 16, 66–91. Knoch, D., Pascual-Leone, A., Meyer, K., Treyer, V., & Fehr, E. (2006). Diminishing reciprocal fairness by disrupting the right prefrontal cortex. Science, 314, 829–832. Koenigs, M., & Tranel, D. (2007). Irrational economic decision-making following ventromedial prefrontal damage: Evidence from the Ultimatum Game. Journal of Neuroscience, 27, 951–956. Koole, S. L., Jager, W., van den Berg, A. E., Vlek, C. A. J., & Hofstee, W. K. B. (2001). On the social nature of personality: Effects of extraversion, agreeableness, and feedback about collective resource use on cooperation in a resource dilemma. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 27, 289–301. Kramer, R. M., McClintock, C. G., & Messick, D. M. (1986). Social values and cooperative response to a simulated resource conservation crisis. Journal of Personality, 54, 576–592. Kuhlman, D. M., & Marshello, A. F. (1975). Individual differences in game motivation as moderators of preprogrammed strategy effects in prisoner’s dilemma. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 32, 922–931. Kuhlman, D. M., & Wimberley, D. L. (1976). Expectations of choice behavior held by cooperators, competitors, and individualists across four classes of experimental games. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 34, 69–81. Larrick, R. P., & Blount, S. (1997). The claiming effect: Why players are more generous in social dilemmas than in ultimatum games. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 72, 810–825. Lazarus, R. S. (1982). Thoughts on the relations between emotion and cognition. American Psychologist, 37, 1019–1024. Leliveld, M. C., van Beest, I., van Dijk, E., & Tenbrunsel, A. E. (2009). Understanding the influence of outcome valence in bargaining: A study on fairness

accessibility, norms, and behavior. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 45, 505–514. Levine, D. K. (1998). Modeling altruism and spitefulness in experiments. Review of Economic Dynamics, 1, 593–622. Liebrand, W. B. (1984). The effect of social motives, communication and group size on behaviour in an N-person multistage mixed-motive game. European Journal of Social Psychology, 14, 239–264. Loewenstein, G. F., Thompson, L., & Bazerman, M. H. (1989). Social utility and decision making in interpersonal contexts. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57, 426–441. MacCrimmon, K. R., & Messick, D. M. (1976). A framework for social motives. Behavioral Science, 21, 86–100. MacKinnon, D. P., & Dwyer, J. H. (1993). Estimating mediated effects in prevention studies. Evaluation Review, 17, 144–158. McClintock, C. G., & Liebrand, W. B. (1988). Role of interdependence structure, individual value orientation, and another’s strategy in social decision making: A transformational analysis. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 55, 396–409. Mellers, B. A., Haselhuhn, M. P., Tetlock, P. E., Silva, J. C., & Isen, A. M. (2010). Predicting behavior in economic games by looking through the eyes of the players. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 139, 743–755. Messick, D. M. (1995). Equality, fairness, and social conflict. Social Justice Research, 8, 153–173. Messick, D. M., & McClintock, C. G. (1968). Motivational bases of choice in experimental games. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 4, 1–25. Messick, D. M., & Sentis, K. P. (1985). Estimating social and nonsocial utility functions from ordinal data. European Journal of Social Psychology, 15, 389–399. Murphy, R. O., Ackermann, K. A., & Handgraaf, M. J. J. (2011). Measuring social value orientation. Judgment and Decision Making, 6, 771–781. Nelissen, R. M. A., van Someren, D. S. I., & Zeelenberg, M. (2009). Take it or leave it for something better? Responses to fair offers in ultimatum bargaining. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 45, 1227–1231. Nowak, M. A., & Highfield, R. (2011). Super cooperators: Altruism, evolution and why we need each other to succeed. New York: Free Press. Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K. (2005). Evolution of indirect reciprocity. Nature, 437, 1291–1298. Pillutla, M. M., & Murnighan, J. K. (1996). Unfairness, anger, and spite: Emotional rejections of ultimatum offers. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 68, 208–224. Preacher, K. J., & Hayes, A. F. (2008). Asymptotic and resampling strategies for assessing and comparing indirect effects in multiple mediator models. Behavior Research Methods, 40, 879–891. Rabin, M. (1993). Incorporating fairness into game theory and economics. The American Economic Review, 83, 1281–1302. Rand, D. G., Dreber, A., Ellingsen, T., Fudenberg, D., & Nowak, M. A. (2009). Positive interactions promote public cooperation. Science, 325, 1272–1275. Roth, A. E., Prasnikar, V., Zamir, S., & Okuno-Fujiwara, M. (1991). Bargaining and market behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An experimental study. American Economic Review, 81, 1068–1095. Rubinstein, A. (1982). Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model. Econometrica, 50, 97–109. Russell, J. A. (2003). Core affect and the psychological construction of emotion. Psychological Review, 110, 145–172. Sanfey, A. G., Rilling, J. K., Aronson, J. A., Nystrom, L. E., & Cohen, J. D. (2003). The neural basis of economic decision-making in the ultimatum game. Science, 300, 1755–1758. Sattler, D. N., & Kerr, N. L. (1991). Might versus morality explored: Motivational and cognitive bases for social motives. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 60, 756–765. Schug, J., Matsumoto, D., Horita, Y., Yamagishi, T., & Bonnet, K. (2010). Emotional expressivity as a signal of cooperation. Evolution and Human Behavior, 31, 87–94. Srivastava, J., Espinoza, F., & Fedorikhin, A. (2009). Coupling and decoupling of unfairness and anger in ultimatum bargaining. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 22, 475–489. Stouten, J., De Cremer, D., & van Dijk, E. (2005). All is well that ends well, at least for proselfs: Emotional reactions to equality violation as a function of social value orientation. European Journal of Social Psychology, 35, 767–783. Suleiman, R. (1996). Expectations and fairness in a modified ultimatum game. Journal of Economic Psychology, 17, 531–554. Tabibnia, G., Satpute, A. B., & Lieberman, M. D. (2008). The sunny side of fairness: Preference for fairness activates reward circuitry (and disregarding unfairness activates self-control circuitry). Psychological Science, 19, 339–347. Tricomi, E., Rangel, A., Camerer, C. F., & O’Doherty, J. P. (2010). Neural evidence for inequality-averse social preferences. Nature, 463, 1089–1091. Van Dijk, E., De Cremer, D., & Handgraaf, M. J. J. (2004). Social value orientations and the strategic use of fairness in ultimatum bargaining. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 40, 697–707. Van Dijk, E., Wit, A. P., Wilke, H. A. M., & De Kwaadsteniet, E. W. (2010). On the importance of equality in social dilemmas. In R. M. Kramer, A. E. Tenbrunsel, & M. H. Bazerman (Eds.), Social decision making: Social dilemmas, social values, and ethical judgments (pp. 44–69). New York: Routledge. Van Lange, P. A. M. (1999). The pursuit of joint outcomes and equality in outcomes: An integrative model of social value orientation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77, 337–349.

G. Karagonlar, D.M. Kuhlman / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 120 (2013) 228–239 Van Lange, P. A. M., Bekkers, R., Schuyt, T. N. M., & Van Vugt, M. (2007). From games to giving: Social value orientation predicts donations to noble causes. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 29, 375–384. Van Lange, P. A. M., & Kuhlman, D. M. (1994). Social value orientations and impressions of partner’s honesty and intelligence: A test of the might versus morality effect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 126–141. Van Lange, P. A. M., Otten, W., De Bruin, E. M. N., & Joireman, J. A. (1997). Development of prosocial, individualistic, and competitive orientations: Theory and preliminary evidence. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 73, 733–746. Van Vugt, M., Meertens, R. M., & Van Lange, P. A. M. (1995). Car versus public transportation? The role of social value orientations in a real-life social dilemma. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 25, 258–278.

239

van’t Wout, M., Chang, L. J., & Sanfey, A. G. (2010). The influence of emotion regulation on social interactive decision-making. Emotion, 10, 815–821. Walster, E., Berscheid, E., & Walster, G. W. (1973). New directions in equity research. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 25, 151–176. Xiao, E., & Houser, D. (2005). Emotion expression in human punishment behavior. PNAS Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the Unites States of America, 102, 7398–7401. Yamagishi, T., Horita, Y., Takagishi, H., Shinada, M., Tanida, S., & Cook, K. S. (2009). The private rejection of unfair offers and emotional commitment. PNAS Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 10, 11520–11523. Yi, R., Johnson, M. W., & Bickel, W. K. (2005). Relationship between cooperation in an iterated prisoner’s dilemma game and the discounting of hypothetical outcomes. Learning and Behavior, 33, 324–336.