The role of the SAFER in agricultural restructuring

The role of the SAFER in agricultural restructuring The case of the LanguedocRoussillon, France

Alun Jones

Studies of agricultural change under the European Community’s CAP often fail to deal adequately with the structure, activities and performance of agricultural institutions operating in local settings. This article examines the role of an internationally renowned and respected land management institution, the SAFER. Particular attention is oiven to the role of this institution in the process of agricultural diversification in a region of Mediterranean France which is highly specialized in the production of table wine. The article demonstrates how farmer conservatism, opposition from other institutions and the lack of viable alternative agricultural products has hindered the SAFER’s activities. Dr Jones is a lecturer in the Department of Geography, University College London, 26 Bedford Way, London, WCIH OAP, UK.

‘A. Jones, ‘The role of institutions in agricultural despecialisation in the Languedoc-Roussillon’, unpublished PhD thesis, University of Leicester, Leicester, UK, 1986; A. Jones, ‘The reform of the EC’s table wine sector: agricultural despecialisation in the Languedoc’, Geography, Vol 74, No 1, 1989, pp 29-37. ‘European Commission, Perspectives for fhe Common Agricultural Policy, Green Europe 33, Brussels, Belgium, 1985. 3lbid.

0264-8377/89/03249-13$03.00

The European Community (EC) does not have the power to intervene directly in the affairs of its member states, although its regulations and directives are legally binding upon the activities of individuals, companies and institutions within those states. Consequently, the EC intervenes indirectly in the economies of its members since it is through the institutions and policy framework of those states that its own policies are implemented. This feature can hamper the realization of the EC’s objectives or necessitate compromise. However, the success of EC policies is heavily dependent on the functioning of such member state institutions and influenced by a multitude of historically based and currently effective factors and by the spectrum of dominant interests in particular regions and in the country itself. Such is the case with regard to EC agricultural policy.’ In 1985 the newly appointed Commission of the EC submitted a green paper on the Perspectives for the Common Agriculturul Policy.2 This outlined a number of options for the future of Community agriculture up to the end of the century. Greater emphasis is to be placed on reducing surpluses, diversifying output and improving the quality of crops. Indeed, the EC has already begun the task of dismantling price support systems to help reduce surplus crop production.3 The impact of such measures is strongly felt in areas where small farms predominate and where farm specialization exists at the vulnerable end of the product range. The low-income Mediterranean regions of the EC involved in the production of olive oil and table wine - products which are relatively strongly supported under the EC’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) _ stand to suffer greatly from reductions in price support. Up to the present time, efforts to overcome the hardships facing Mediterranean farmers have focused on the reorganization of agrarian structures in such localities by reducing the number of small farms and revising the layout of those that remain. Structural policies within the EC have been the responsibility of

0 1989 Butterworth

& Co (Publishers)

Ltd

249

individual member states, with the Community merely providing a framework of directives and partial funding for national and, in turn. regional programmes to promote farm size change.’ In FR Germany, for example, the structural improvement of the farm sector has been the responsibility of land management institutions appointed by regional (Lander) governments. while in France a regional network of institutions known as Societes d’Amenagement Fancier et d’Etablissement Rut-ales (Land management and rural establishment agencies). or SAFERs, has been established in order to manage structural change in farming. The mismatch between structural policies and policies to control agricultural output is an obvious one. since structural improvcments increase both production capacity and the risk of surplus. This has become apparent in the Mediterranean areas of the Community and, as a result, structural policies are increasingly being combined with EC efforts to diversify local agricultural production since larger farms are generally believed to be more flexible in changing the composition of their agricultural output.” These efforts have been embodied in various pieces of Community legislation.” EC endeavours to combine the diversification of local agricultural production with structural change in farming are thus dependent on the functioning of various land management institutions operating in member states, as well as on their ability to execute EC policies. Such institutions may be less than effective in carrying out this role for a number of internal and external reasons. This article aims to develop this theme with reference to an internationally renowned and respected land management institution, the SAFER. This article examines the role of the SAFER in the process of structural change and in the diversification of agricultural production in the Langucdoc-Roussillon region of Mediterranean France.

Previous studies of the SAFER

41.R. Bowler, Agriculture Under the CAP. Manchester University Press, Manchester, UK, 1986. ‘European Commission, Wine in the Eighties, Green Europe 172, Brussels, Belgium, 1980. ‘European Commission, Wine in the European Community, Brussels, Belgium, 1983. 7See, for example, M. Butterwick and E. Neville Rolfe, ‘Structural reform in French agriculture - the work of the SAFE&‘, Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol 16, 1964, pp 548-554; P.J. Perry, ‘The structural revolution in French agriculture: the role of the SAFERs’, Revue de Geographie de Mont&al, Vol 23, 1969, pp 137151; and H.D. Clout, ‘Structural change in French farming: the case of the Puy de Dome’, Tijdschrift Voor Economische en Sock/e Geografie, Vol 66, No 4, 1975, pp 235-245.

250

Several academic studies of SAFER activities have been undertaken in though not in the Languedoc. Previous various regions of France,’ studies have tended to be narrowly focused on such features as the spatial distribution of SAFER land purchases, land allocations and investments. No attempt has been made to relate such outcomes to the objectives, goals and priorities of a overall institutional structure. regional SAFER or to the nature of local agricultural production. Indeed most of these studies have tended to treat each of the SAFER’s activities as being based on the same set of principles with similar spatial outcomes. Furthermore, no discussion has taken place concerning the way in which the SAFER responds to evolving economic, social and political situations. or its capacity to deal effectively with such changing circumstances. It must be stressed that the SAFER does not act in a vacuum but within a complex set of economic, political, social and institutional relations. Over the past 25 years of the SAFER’s existence this set of relations has changed considerably. For example. during the 1960s the rural sector in France was characterized by massive transfers of labour out of agriculture and high levels of land release. Moreover, the rural economy had yet to experience the ravages of strict economic reform. The situation in which SAFER decision makers find themselves today is widely different. Rural areas are encountering severe economic recession with strong attachment to land as a consequence and hence

LAND USE POLICY July 1989

The rolr of‘ the SAFER 111c~gric~u//rtr-rrl rcwr~wir~~

high land prices,

little opportunity for off-farm employment, and many types of agricultural production characterized by surplus. The Languedoc-Roussillon region presents such a setting to the SAFER’s decision makers.

Languedoc-Roussillon:

‘J.B. Thompson, Modem France: a Social and Economic Geography, Butterworth, London, UK, 1970. ‘Ft. Ferras et al, At/as et Geographie du Languedoc et du Roussillon, Flammarion, Paris, France, 1979. “Jones, op tit, Ref 1, 1986.

geographical overview

The Languedoc-Roussillon comprises five dCpartemerzts of which four (Aude. Gard. Hkrault, Pyr&ees-Orientales) are truly Mediterranean in character.” The fifth and most northerly dkpartement of the region, Lozi-re, is more similar to the dipurtements of the Massif Central region in terms of its drainage, its relief and the nature of its agricultural production (ie an absence of Mediterranean crops). Indeed, the dkpartement of Lozi-re is excluded from the Languedoc SAFER’s zone of activity. The Languedoc reveals a sharp contrast between upland and lowland regions (see Figure 1). The latter are characterized by an extensive vine monoculture which stretches from the Costikres du Card, through the Narbonnais to the Plaine du Roussillon in the Pyre&es-Orientales.” Urban settlements, such as Montpellier, Nimes and Perpignan. and major lines of communication present the only interruptions to the regional vineyard, except where the irrigation activities of the Compagnie Nationale Bas-Rh6ne Languedoc (CNABRL) have enabled the cultivation of alternative crops to vines. I(’ As elsewhere in southern Europe, in the Languedoc the tourist 1

Mediterranean

Sea

Dbpartement

Boundary

of

~ ../

region

YL_

Motorway / CNABRL

irrigation

0

Figure 1. The SAFER zone of activity in Languedoc-Roussillon.

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SPAIN

,

km

I

area

40

I

$$

..

“A. Jones, ‘Agricultural organisation, reform and the EEC’, in A. Williams, Southern Europe Transformed, Harper and Row, London, UK, 1984, pp 236260. ‘*European Commission, op tit, Fief 6. 13N. Kielstra, ‘The rural Languedoc: periphery to relictual space’, in R. Hudson and. J. -Lewis, Uneven Development in Southern Europe, Methuen. London, 1985, pp 246-262. 14Ferras er al, op tit, Ref 9. 15R. Pech, Entreprise Viticole et Capitalisme en Languedoc-Roussillon du Phyllox&a aux Crises de Mbvente, Presses Universitaire de Toulouse, Toulouse, 1975. “European Commission, op tit, Ref 6. “Jones, op tit, Ref 1, 1986.

252

industry provides the only real employment alternative to agriculture.” Indeed while the percentage of the Languedoc’s working population employed in agriculture has fallen from 37% in I954 to 15% by 1975, the percentage employed in the tertiary sector as a whole has risen from 3X% to 56% over the same period. Industrial employment on the other hand has remained relatively constant at 28% of the working population of the Languedoc.” Since the 1960s government policy has aimed at encouraging the development of the Languedoc as a tourist area.‘3 The Languedoc is graced by numerous beaches. holiday centres and new coastal developments stretching from the Camargue to the Spanish frontier, and as a result some 300 000 tourists arrive each weekend in the Languedoc during the summer season.” While the Languedoc’s coastline has become a haven for summer visitors, the upland areas of the region have become increasingly attractive for second-home construction, with - in both cases - inflated land prices as a consequence. Since the mid-10th century the economy of the Languedoc has been based upon the cultivation of the vine. Viticulture has permeated all aspects of the economy and society of the Languedoc and has shaped the development of the countryside and fashioned farmers’ way of thinking. In IX75 there were some 436 000 ha of vines in the Languedoc’” while 100 years later the agricultural census recorded over 407 000 ha.‘” The Languedoc has continued to maintain its supremacy in table wine production, accounting for over 50% of French output of table wine and roughly 25% of the EC’s (excluding Spain and Portugal). Vine growing in the Languedoc is characterized by a large number of small, highly fragmented holdings often under 5 ha in size and run by elderly or part-time farmers. The cooperative system, installed in the first few decades of this century, has enabled these small farmers to survive in an ever-increasing capital-intensive form of production. The wine cooperatives harbour the majority of the region’s vine growers and are responsible for over 75% of the table wine produced in the Languedoc, as well as acting collectively as a formidable barrier to attempts at agricultural diversification in the region. The Languedoc has suffered its fair share of economic problems and social unrest from its overspecialization in table wine production. Of the 83 741 holdings recorded in the Languedoc in the 19X0 census, some 58 71.3 (70%) were classified as principally vine-growing in their orientation. Since the mid-l%Os, when the French government became more acutely aware of the extent of problem areas within the country. the Langucdoc has been the recipient of much public money directed through the CNABRL, a semi-nationalized irrigation/rural development company with the express aim of reducing the region’s dependence on viticulture.‘7 The CNABRL has met with varying degrees of success. From its inception there was strong opposition in some places to any attempts at change. This resistance came from both vine growers and viticultural institutions dismissive of the economic sustainability of alternative production types. However, the arrival of several thousand French repatriates @iedr-noiv.s) from North Africa who were keen to crops gave a major impetus to the experiment with alternative CNABRL. The dPpartemerzt of Gard, the closest viticultural dkpartemerit of the Languedoc to the River Rhone from which the CNABRL draws its irrigation water, has experienced the greatest reduction in vineyards and the most significant development of alternative produc-

LAND USE POLICY

July 1989

tion (Table 1). The CNABRL has attempted to gear agricultural restructuring in the Languedoc to fit its own purposes, ie the maximum usage by the farming community of the company’s irrigation water. Most of the Company’s activities (including its research and experimentation programme) have been geared towards irrigated crops, since these are seen (at least by the CNABRL) as the best solution to the region’s viticultural problems. However, even in those areas of the Languedoc such as eastern Herault, Gard and Pyrenees-Orientales which have diversified their agricultural production away from vines chiefly into intensive production of fruit and vegetables. there have been difficulties. Overproduction of fruit and vegetables by Languedoc growers has caused sharp falls in farmers’ income, while intense competition from similar Spanish produce in the Languedoc market has resulted in what some observers have called a salad war.‘” Furthermore, the recent accession of both Spain and Portugal to the EC has done little to quell the fears of Languedoc farmers and has added further justification for the demonstrations by the vine-growing community in the region. Moreover, the plight of the Languedoc farmer has been increasingly recognized as important political capital by both the Socialist and Communist parties in France. “I

EC policy initiatives

“Jones, “Jones,

op c;t, Ref 11.

op tit, Ref 1, 1986.

The EC’s concern throughout has been with the mounting costs of supporting the table wine sector in the light of the growing levels of unwanted surplus production. Reducing production potential and stimulating demand for table wine in the Community have been major objectives for the EC. A ban on all new plantings of vines for table wine production and the offer of grants to farmers for the temporary or permanent grubbing up of their vines were the principal means by which the EC intended to reduce wine production. Stimulating demand for table wine in the Community is a difficult task given both the excise duties levied on wine by some member countries and the strength of anti-alcohol campaigns which have been mounted in certain states, especially France. The Community recognized that consumers in the EC as a whole were drinking less wine, though of better quality - a situation which discriminated against the Languedoc with its mediocre table wine image. Improving the quality of table wine was to be achieved by offering premiums to farmers to replant recommended grape varieties on their holdings on the basis of overall viticultural plans drawn up by producer associations. These EC policy initiatives have involved a range of institutions in the Languedoc, including the SAFER. Both policy initiatives have received support from different sets of institutions. The CNABRL has been

Table 1. Percentage of agricultural Languedoc-Roussillon, 1970-80.

land under principal production types in d6partement.s of

Aude

Source: Agricultural Census (RGA) 1970, 1980

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Vines Orchard Cereals Vegetables

Gard

HBrault

PyrCnCesOrientales

1970

1980

1970

1980

1970

1980

1970

1980

47.7 1.1 28.7 0.1

45.9 0.5 26.2 0.2

40.0 8.3 158 2.4

41.6 5.9 13.8 3.9

63.2 3.0 29 0.3

60 7 1.6 3.8 0.6

57.0 113 16 1.2

55.2 99 15 2.6

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strongly in favour of the grubbing-up programme since this enables the company to promote the use of its irrigation water on those farms diversifying agricultural production. The wine unions, wine cooperatives and producer associations, on the other hand, are very much opposed to the grubbing-up programme since (1) they perceive it as a threat to their future survival and influence in agricultural politics and (2) it could also lead to increases in wine-making costs per farmer as the volume of wine grapes brought to the cooperatives diminishes. Institutions associated with wine production in the Langucdoc arc. therefore, eager to promote the improvement of table wine quality rather than vineyard removal. The reactions to these EC initiatives amongst the farming community in the Languedoc has varied according to the nature of a holding’s agricultural production, the size of farm, and the age and future intentions of the farmer.“’ Even wine cooperative leaders owning vineyards have taken advantage of the grubbing-up premiums, indicating that self-interest may be stronger than institutional loyalty amongst the wine cooperative leadership - a fact certainly presenting a problem for the FedCration des Caves CoopCratives (Federation of Wine Cooperatives) in terms of the strong line against the grubbing-up policy that it hopes cooperative leaders will instil in their mcmbcrship.” The SAFER finds itself in a poorly defined position with regard to the EC initiatives. As a result of the nature of its decision-making structure, the SAFER is in many respects torn between the two development paths that are offered by these EC table wine policy initiatives. A strong viticultural interest, combated by what can only bc described as a ‘despecialization’ lobby headed by the CNABRL, militates against the SAFER embarking too far along either of these alternative development paths, ie either the active promotion of agricultural despecialization out of vines or the too-enthusiastic support of Langucdoc viticulture as embraced in the EC initiative to improve the quality of table wine. A variety of issues emerge from this particular situation. Of obvious importance to the EC is that an institution empowered (by the French Ministry of Agriculture) with major tasks in the implementation of EC policy measures at regional level should find itself in this particular plight. The EC cannot, of course, either assume or insist (unless the SAFER flagrantly violates EC law) that the SAFER endorse its policies. Institutional structures and relations in particular contexts therefore take on an increased importance, especially for the EC when ‘grafting’ new policy initiatives on to complex institutional relationships in both regional and local situations. This point is elaborated in the following sections which consider the aims of the SAFER, its organizational structure, and its overall impact upon structural change and the diversification of agricultural production in the Languedoc.

The aims of the SAFER The Languedoc type in France. 0 ‘La politique viticole communautaire: analyse et bilan’, fconomie Rurale, Vol 1964, 1984, pp 34-44. 2’Jones, op cif, Ref 1, 1986. *OP. Bartoli,

254

0

SAFER was established in 1961 and was the first of its Tine SAFER then, as now. has four main aims:

in order to to monitor closely the land market in the Languedoc assure control over the destination of land transfers as well as to stabilize land prices; to improve agrarian structures (seen in terms of increasing the size and improving the layout of farms);

LAND USE POLICY July 1989

The role of the SAFER it? agrkulturul

l l

**SAFER, SAFER her, France, 1982.

Languedoc,

Montpel-

LAND USE POLICY July 1989

to participate in rural management schemes; to ensure the rejuvenation of farming populations in the installation of young farmers.

rrstructwirlji

by participating

With the use of loans supplied by the Credit Agricole bank on the collatoral basis of funds provided by public institutions in the region, the SAFER selectively purchases land coming on to the market and subsequently sells it to the farming community on the basis of an overall set of policy objectives. The ordering of these policy objectives depends on the strength of various sectional interests on the SAFER’s decision-making committees. Monitoring of the land market in the Languedoc is ensured by the fact that all land transactions between individuals or institutions, or a combination of both, have to be reported to the SAFER. Obviously the SAFER’s scope for intervention in the land market depends upon the frequency and the price at which land comes on to the market. Both have fluctuated considerably over the 25 years of the SAFER’s existence, although more recently the land market in the Languedoc has been characterized by high land values as a result of farmers holding on to land as well as through the growing attraction of the region for second homes and tourism development. For example. between 1980 and 19X2 land prices in the Languedoc increased by 8% per hectare per year.” Furthermore, the growing spread of urban areas on to farmland, especially around Montpellier, Nimes and Perpignan. has placed additional pressures on the SAFER. Protecting agricultural land from non-agricultural development is especially important for the SAFER in those lowland areas where the best opportunities for the diversification of agricultural production exist (see Figure 1.). When land does come on the market the SAFER has to determine whether to intervene and for what purpose (see Figure 2). Land which is of high priority for the SAFER is often the subject of pre-emption - a right which enables the SAFER to purchase over other buyers at a price fixed by the SAFER. Obviously the extent to which the SAFER can intervene in the land market depends not only on the finances available to do so, but also on the nature of the land market itself. Some areas of the Languedoc - especially those where agricultural exodus is high may offer many opportunities, though the SAFER may decline to take financial expenditure on land them up in order to concentrate purchasing elsewhere. Choosing what is most important land for SAFER purchase involves a number of sectional interests. Groups associated with wine production have endeavoured to ensure that major institutions like the SAFER not only recognize that the wine-making potential of the Languedoc should be preserved, but also that the SAFER should be actively involved in improving table wine quality by reorganizing and modernizing vineyards. It is generally believed that the higher areas of the region (see Figure 1) provide the most suitable location for these types of operation. Lowland areas, especially the viticultural plain (pluine viticofe), are suitable only where vine growers have expressed a commitment to the operations (through the forum of the wine cooperative) and adequate institutional arrangements have been created to accommodate the operations, ie effective producer associations have been developed amongst wine cooperatives. SAFER involvement in the irrigated area of the CNABRL is enshrined in law. The SAFER is compelled to carry out land

The role

of the SAFER

in crgricul~~trul re.srructuritzg

Conseil SAFER

Assessment market in

d’Administration Languedoc-Roussillon

of

land

Languedoc-Roussillon 1

I

I

Decision

1

t Policy

I

formulation

t Directives to DCpartemental

Comiti

Technique

Size of holdings Age of farmers Farmer indebtedness Availability of finance

t COMITE TECHNIQUE DiPARTEMENTAL

Assessment market in dCpartement

Aude Card HQrault Pyr&Ces

Orientales

of the

land

Situation of viticulture Density of agricultural population Rural/agricultural exodus Construction of second homes Tourist development Progress Capital

Decision

of irrigation intensiveness

of

aqriculture

I t Directives de Petites Land

to Comiti Rigions

consolidation

Non-agricultural

usage

Forestry and woodland Farm enlargement Installation

t COMlTi PETITE

Assessment market in

DE RiGION

petite

I

of the

r6gion

land

F

uects1on

t

L

Land

purchase]

I

Family situation Residence Number of family members working on the holding Method of financing land purchase

Assessment

Figure 2. Land purchasing and allocation in SAFER LanguedocRoussillon.

Nationality Land exchange Exorooriation of land P&vi&s recipient of land from the SAFER Current production types on holding

management operations in those areas of the Languedoc whet-c public works are taking place. The role of the SAFER in the CNABRL irrigation area is to create adequate farm structures cabable of being adapted to intensive irrigated farming. It is also worth noting that the irrigation area is experiencing strong pressure from both urban expansion (Montpellier and Nimes are centrally located within the irrigation perimeter) and from tourism development (Camargue, La Grande Motte, Aigues Mortes). The sale of land purchased by the SAFER to the farming community also involves a number of sectional intcrcsts (young farmers’ unions, groups associated with wine making, CNABRL) and a complexity of individual factors (see Figure 2). Although the SAFER’s main choice is between farm enlargement and farmer installation, satisfying short- or long-term goals adds a further complication. For example, the SAFER may sell a parcel of land to an elderly vine grower with no successor in preference to a young dynamic farmer. because on the vine grower’s retirement or death his entire holding may become available for purchase by the SAFER, thus enabling the organization to install several farmers or carry out considerable land management operations.

256

LAND USE POLICY July 1989

The role

of the

SAFER

in ugricul~urul rrstrwturirlg

Naturally this situation could create (at least initially) particular tensions both between represented sectional interests and within the local farming community. The structural improvement of farming is therefore not only a lengthy process but often an acrimonious one.

The impact of the SAFER

‘%AFER, SAFER Languedoc: Vingt Ann&es au Service de /‘Agriculture Rbgionale, Montpellier, France, 1981.

LAND USE POLICY July 1989

The SAFER’s activities in the land market of the Languedoc have varied over time and space according to changing policy objectives, eg the installation of young farmers v farm enlargements, many small v a few large land purchases, and the concentration v the dispersion of land purchases. Between 1973 and 1981 the SAFER purchased 5510 ha of land (17%) in the Languedoc out of the total of 31 724 ha coming on to the market. These purchases varied between &partemerzt.s in the Languedoc, with Gard accounting for 22% of total SAFER land purchases in the region, PyrCnCes-Orientales 21%, Herault IS’%, and Aude 14%.23 As Figure 2 indicates, there is a complex array of factors influencing SAFER activities. Like all institutions, the extent of SAFER’s activities is strongly governed by how much money is available. While SAFER has not experienced too many difficulties in raising loans from the Credit Agricole bank in order to undertake land management operations (the Credit Agricole has a representative on the SAFER’s decision-making committees), the cost of these operations has increased as land prices have risen. Moreover, loans from the Credit Agricole are usually offered at quite high rates of interest. Consequently and quite contradictory to the nature of structural improvement in agriculture, the SAFER cannot afford to hold on to land for too long before selling it to the farming community. This presents a major problem for the SAFER in the use of its resources and in particular in the types of land management operation that can be undertaken. In addition to these financial strictures the SAFER is constrained by the fact that it can only legally hold on to land for a maximum period of five years. It is not difficult to appreciate therefore that the SAFER’s impact upon the structural improvement of Languedoc agriculture can only be a piecemeal one. On top of these legal and financial constraints are various interest group pressures from within the SAFER, whose satisfaction only adds further to the piecemeal nature of the SAFER’s activity. The setting for agricultural change in the Languedoc has been sculpted by the EC, with a series of policy measures emanating from Brussels towards the table wine sector. In keeping with this, the SAFER has become more aware of the types of agricultural production that its involvement in farm structural change enables, although the final choice of agricultural production type continues to remain solely with the farming community. The EC-funded schemes for the reorganization and modernization of vineyards have involved the SAFER in two ways. First, the SAFER was responsible for drawing up the new vineyard arrangement plans (schhas directears) on behalf of wine producer associations, normally a collection of wine cooperatives. Second, the SAFER was encouraged especially by viticultural interest groups represented on its dccisionmaking committees - to purchase land when it became available in such areas in order to enable the aims of the plans to be realized. The EC proposed some 66 000 ha of vineyards suitable for modernization in the

257

24European Commission, op tit, Ref 2.

four vine-growing dkpartements of the Languedoc over the period lY7X to 1982. By 1982 only 9000 ha of vineyards has been modernized, while sche’mas directeurs had been drawn up by the SAFER for some SO 000 ha. There are several reasons for the modest result of the policy measure. In general terms the EC initiative was badly suited to both the economic and social structure of farming and to the nature of institutions in the Languedoc. With the average age of farmers being 60 years. encouraging farmers to modernize their vineyards by planting new grape varieties and exchanging parcels of land with neighbouring farms would always be a difficult task. The situation was not helped by the fact that newly planted vines require four years before bearing wine grapes. In effect, then, farmers were being asked to take a significant proportion of their vineyard out of production for a relatively lengthy time. The initiative also required considerable cooperation bctwccn wine cooperatives in particular localities, and required the cooperatives to change from being reception centren for grapes intended for low-quality table wine production to centres of higher quality production. Such a decision would have to be taken by each coopcrativc’s membership, but while some cooperatives might approve, others might be less keen or even opposed to the idea. There was frequently opposition from cooperatives with many part-time or elderly farmers. The SAFER’s success in the reorganization and modernization of Languedoc vineyards has been constrained by these particular factors. The programme has, however, consumed valuable resources of the SAFER; resources which CNABRL representatives on the SAFER’s decision-making committees believe could have been better spent on land-management operations in the irrigation perimeter. where the possibility of reducing the production potential of the wine sector exists. The majority of the SAFER’s decision makers have lost patience with the vineyard modernization programme. and the message is sure to have been relayed to officials in the Ministry of Agriculture in Paris. On ;I wider front the EC is itself also debating the programme’s future. The SAFER’s activities in the land market of the Languedoc tend to be determined by its desire for legitimation by both the farming community and various sectional interests. There is strong pressure upon the SAFER to purchase land in the irrigation perimeter of the CNABRL. This pressure stems from the law by which the SAFER was created and from CNABRL representatives on the SAFER’s committees who envisage an increased use of the company’s irrigation water. Figure 3 shows the level of intervention by the SAFER in the land market in the Languedoc over the period 1973-83, which confirms the importance to the SAFER of Card and eastern HCrault where X0’% of the CNABRL’s irrigation perimeter is located. It is within the irrigation perimeter that the SAFER most exercises its right to pre-emption, and it is in this region that the prospect of reducing the production potential of the wine sector is greatest. To understand the role of the SAFER in reducing the production potential of Languedoc viticulture one must first consider the nature of the EC’s vineyard grubbing-up programme. Since 1976 grants have been given by the EC to those vine growers agreeing to grub up all or part of their vineyard either on a temporary or a permanent basis. Since lY80 the level of grant - especially for those farmers grubbing up their vineyards on a permanent basis - has been increased substantially.” Grubbing up itself may be seen as the first stage in the cultivation of

LAND USE POLICY July 1989

Figure 3. Level of SAFER penetration in the land market of LanguedocRoussillon (%),” Note: “Calculated by (number of ha purchased by the SAFER LanguedocRoussillon) + (number of ha coming up for sale) x 100. Source: SAFER Languedoc-Roussil~on.

25Bartoli,op cif, Ref 20. 26P Bartoli, ‘Recherches sur la politique vitidole’, paper presented at the Colloquium of ORCES, ~ontpeilier, France, 1986. “SAFER, op tit, Ref 23. “Jones, op cif, Ref 1, 1986.

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July 1989

non-vine crops, or the use of the land for non-agricultural purposes. or perhaps the farmer’s eventual departure from agriculture. Bartoli reported that over the first six years of the programme the grubbing-up grant had a disappointing impact in the Langucdoc, with no significant reduction in vineyard area.‘5 Only 23 000 ha of vines were grubbed up in the Languedoc between 1976 and 1982 out of a total regional vineyard of over 420 000 ha. Most of this removal occurred near large urban centres, in localities where alternative crops were being cultivated. or in marginal upland areas. Languedoc viticulture remained largely unchalenged by the grubbing-up pr~~gr~~rnrne. It has only been more recently that observers have reported some grubbing up taking place in hitherto unaffected areas, though the reasons for this phenomenon have not been fully investigated.‘” Arguably the gr~lbbing-up grants provide farmers with some incentive to reduce the extent of their vineyard area, which in turn may lead to the cultivation of other crops or may result in the land being sold. It is in this latter context that the SAFER operates. Land released from vine cultivation may not, however, be in areas of greatest priority for the SAFER. Although the irrigation area of the CNABRL is of high priority for land market intervention by the SAFER, it experiences comparatively fewer agricultural land transactions than other areas of the Languedoc, largely due to the productive nature of the area.27Thus, despite the high level of the SAFER’s penetration of the land market of the irrigation area, the total amount of land for purchase by the SAFER in any one year is often extremely low (see Figure 3). For example, between 1981 and 1984 the average area of land sold by the SAFER to the farming community in the irrigated area of eastern Herault was only 0.9 ha.2” While the grubbing-up programme has released some land in the irrigation area for SAFER purchase, cspeciaily near Montpellicr and Nimes, this does not always result in the cultivatkn of ncm-vine crops by those farmers purchasing the SAFER-owned land, nor in the use of CNABRL irrigation water on their acquired parcels. The SAFER has no control over the agricultural uses to which the land it sells is put. There is seldom a clause in the sale contract binding the farmer to use CNABRL water, even if the SAFER-purchased parcels have been

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installed with irrigation equipment by the CNABRL. In fact farmers are able to use non-CNABRL irrigation water from underground sources on their holdings, and this practice may even occur on parcels of land purchased from the SAFER. It is also possible that land sold by the SAFER could be used for the rejuvenation of vineyards rather than for the cultivation of non-vine crops. Since 1980 the EC has banned the new planting of vines intended for table wine production, although it is possible for those farmers who grub up vines (provided that they do not receive a grubbing-up grant from the EC for doing so) to replant an equivalent area of vines on the same or a different parcel (perhaps one which has been purchased from the SAFER). thus not increasing their total vineyard area. Thus it can be seen that the SAFER’s effectiveness in reducing the production potential of Languedoc viticulture, in conjunction with the EC’s policy measures for vineyard grubbing up. has been disappointing.

Conclusion

29European Commission,

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op dt,

Ref 2.

The previous comments have illuminated some important criticisms of the role of the SAFER in structural change and agricultural divcrsification in the Languedoc. However, there are ways in which the SAFER might play a more active role in agricultural change in the Languedoc though changes (particularly of an institutional kind) would bc required to enable it to do so. First it can be assumed that the role of the SAFER is to bc more closely linked to the structural improvement of farming and the reorientation of agricultural production, ie improving farm size structure and adapting farm production to overall market situations for particular agricultural commodities. All indicators suggest that this is likely to be the case, especially with the EC increasingly seeing the management of the land market (set-aside of agricultural land, for example) as a possible mans of curbing levels of agricultural surplus. In the case of the Languedoc it has become clear that mcasurcs to improve the quality of table wine production have not been successful, with the EC now seriously questioning the policy’s future.“’ It stems that reducing production potential will be the principal focus for EC policy initatives towards the table wine sector in the Languedoc. The SAFER could potentially play a crucial role in this new policy focus. An active and indeed effective role for the SAFER in this new policy focus would primarily require putting more financial resources at the organization’s disposal and greater time periods over their use. This would allow more scope for the SAFER to hold on to land and could avoid less piecemeal action on the part of the SAFER in the land market. The specific targeting of resources towards the purchase of land in well-defined SAFER ‘action zones’ where the right of pre-emption could be executed freely might be part of this programme to reduce the potential of the table wine sector. Such a programme would have to bc combined with the adoption of a discriminatory policy against the table wine sector by the SAFER and other institutions. There are several ways in which the SAFER might discriminate against the table wine sector. (1) Greater control over the uscs to which the SAFER-sold land was put would be essential. The SAFER might refuse to sell land to farmers proposing to USC the land for table wine production or for vineyard rejuvenation. (2) The SAFER might refuse to sell land to farms of a particular size or to those farms having

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particular social or economic characteristics rendering them unable to cultivate non-vine crops. This would particularly discriminate against small vine growers. Such discriminatory land management policies might be further strengthened by similar actions on the part of other institutions in the Languedoc, eg the Credit Agricole bank might refuse to make loans for certain types of production (ie table wine) and to particular types of farmer; or the CNABRL might ban the USC of its water for the irrigation of vines and reduce irrigation tariffs to encourage the wider use of the company’s water. Naturally there would be far-reaching social implications from such discriminatory activities. With price support levels for table wine already being lowered by the EC, direct income supplements to farmers might be a means of maintaining farm income levels under these circumstances. The EC has already contemplated this option for those vine growers likely to be affected by changes in EC table wine policy? Discriminatory activities like those outlined above would of course require substantial changes in institutional structures (especially that of the SAFER) and institutional power relations. This would in turn require considerable compensation to both vine growers and those institutions (especially those associated with wine production) most affected by these changes. For the SAFER it would mean reducing or possibly eliminating wine sector representation on its decision-making committees. Such a significant development would require authorization from the Ministry of Agriculture in Paris. No French politician with an instinct for survival would be likely to campaign for such reforms, especially with the Languedoc vine growers’ vote so important to both the Communist and Socialist parties. Even if reform did occur, the tradition of the Languedoc is that it would be heavily resisted by vine growers. Reform would also require a sizeable injection of either EC or French funds (or both) to deal not only with the new roles performed by institutions like SAFER, but also to compensate those institutions that lose out. The wine cooperatives, for example. so heavily laden with capital overheads. would be seeking such compensation. Pre-emption and the uses to which the SAFER could put land after its sale would also be major areas of contention. Pre-emption by the SAFER has proved an unpopular weapon with the farming communities, and would probably be even more so if it was more freely used by the SAFER in particular arcas. Similarly, intervening in the decision making of farmers over the crops that they could grow would be even less acceptable in Western Europe. Nonetheless, such radical measures appear to be essential if major agricultural restructuring is to occur. They are, of course, major departures and ones which would require a considerable reorganization of the relationship between institutions involved in agricultural production in the Languedoc. Whether they would ever be implemented in the form above - given both the history and reality of Languedoc and also French politics - is indeed an entirely different question.

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