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The role of values in the choice shift
JOURNAL
OF
EXPERIMENTAL
The
SOCIAL
Role
PSYCHOLOGY
of Values
11,
in the
301-316 (1975)
Choice
Shift
DEAN G. PRUITT AND CHARLES COSENTINO State
University
of New
York
at Buffalo
In Study I, the self-ideal discrepancy in risk taking was found to be unrelated to the strength of values relevant to the risks under consideration, and the other-self discrepancy was found to be related to these values only by virtue of one of its components, inital preference. Hence the use of these discrepancies as measures of value strength must be questioned. This casts doubt on some of the evidence formerly thought to support the assumption that values provide the force that drives the choice shift. In Study II, two hypotheses derived from this assumption were not supported. In light of this result, and closely related negative findings from two other studies, it would appear that this assumption must either be discarded or revised. Some possible lines of revision are suggested. Some of the results were also prejudicial to two theories about the mechanism through which values or other forces allegedly produce the shift: norm-comparison theory and pluralistic-ignorance theory.
Group discussion often alters the willingness of group members to take risk. The direction of shift depends on the item under discussion, with movement toward risk on items that elicit an initially risky stance and toward caution on items that elicit an initially cautious stance. Comparable shifts have been found in group discussions of many other kinds of material. Hence we can speak of a general phenomenon called the “choice shift” (Pruitt, 1971a) or “group polarization” (Moscovici & Zavalloni, 1969), with shifts in risk taking as a special case. Shifts in risk taking have most commonly been explained by one or another member of a family of “value theories.” These theories assume that socially shared values are the force that drives the shift. Since values also presumably affect initial risk levels, these theories are capable of accounting for the relationship just mentioned between initial risk and the direction of shift. Three positions have been taken with respect to the sort of values that produce the shifts: (a) Some theorists (e.g., Brown, 1965) explain shifts toward risk in terms of a “value for risk,” which is allegedly very common among young Americans of the kind used in experiments. This position has the defect of not adequately explaining shifts toward caution. (b) Other theorists (e.g., Stoner, 1968) stress the importance of socially shared “item-specific values” that differ from issue to issue and The authors contributed equally to all stages of this research except for the write up, which was primarily the work of the first author. 301 Copyright All rights
Q 1975 by Academic Press, Inc. of reproduction in any form reserved.
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enhance the attractiveness of either risk or caution. The distinction between a value for risk and an item-specific value can be illustrated in the case of a choice between a job with a firm that pays a lot but may fail (the risky alternative) and a job with a stable firm that pays less (the cautious alternative). A value for risk would, of course, recommend the risky alternative. So also would an item-specific value for making a lot of money. (c) Still other theorists (e.g., Fraser, 1970) implicate both a value for risk and item-specific values. There are also several theories about the process by which values produce the shift. Three of these involve a social-comparison mechanism: (a) According to norm-comparison theory (Brown, 1965), most people want to behave in accordance with their values at least as fully as other people who are similar to them. Hence, when faced with an initial decision, they try to picture what others are doing and then choose an option that is equally or further in the valued directions than the assumed group norm. Inevitably, during group discussion, many people discover that they are at or below the group norm. In an effort to fulfill their ideal, they shift further in the valued direction. (b) Pluralistic-ignorance theory (Levinger & Schneider, 1969) also postulates that people make assumptions about the group norm. In addition, they are assumed to have an ideal level of risk, which is quite high on issues for which their values favor risk and quite low on issues for which their values favor caution. Decisions involve a compromise between the assumed group norm and the ideal. In groups whose members share values, this means that the actual group norm (the average of the individual decisions) is closer to the ideal than are the members’ assumed group norms. This fact comes out in the discussion, and the assumed group norms move closer to the ideal, permitting decisions to move in the valued direction. (c) According to release theory (Pruitt, 1971a), most people take a moderate level of risk in their initial decisions, because they wish to avoid social embarrassment by adhering to a “norm of moderation.” But when, in the group discussion, they discover that even one person has made a more extreme decision in the direction they value, they feel released to move in that direction also. The fourth theory involves a persuasion mechanism: (d) Relevant-arguments theory (St. Jean, 1970; Silverthorne, 1971) postulates that the dominant value or values elicit persuasive arguments during group discussion that convince group members to move further in the valued direction. It is conceivable that a social-comparison mechanism and a relevant-arguments mechanism are at work simultaneously (Pruitt. 1971a). The basic hypothesis of all value theories, that socially shared values are the driving force behind the choice shift, is supported by several research findings. These can be grouped into three classes:
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(1) Findings involving the other-self discrepancy. In their initial decisions, subjects are often asked to indicate how other people similar to themselves would answer the questions as well as how they themselves would answer. The other-self discrepancy is the difference in risk taking between these two responses, a positive discrepancy indicating that others are seen as more cautious than oneself and a negative discrepancy that others are seen as more risky. This discrepancy has been used as a measure of the extent to which risk is valued because of the assumption made by norm-comparison theory that people try to outdo one another in adhering to socially shared values. Assuming that this discrepancy is a valid measure of value strength, the hypothesis that values underlie the choice shift is supported by correlations that have been found between the other-self discrepancy and the choice shift. Such correlations have been frequently demonstrated across items, with the other-self discrepancy usually positive on items that shift toward risk and negative on items that shift toward caution (Levinger & Schneider, 1969; Pruitt & Teger, 1967; Stoner, 1968; Wallath & Wing, 1968). This finding has been verified in an African culture where the pattern of positive and negative shifts across the items typically used in this research differs from that in Western society (Carlson and Davis, 1971, as discussed by Pruitt, 1971b). There is also one study in which this relationship was demonstrated across people. This was a group-composition study (Clark, Crockett, & Archer, 1971),l in which groups whose members exhibited a positive other-self discrepancy were found to shift farther toward risk than those whose members exhibited a negative discrepancy. However Lamm, Trommsdorff, and RostSchaude (1972) have been unable to replicate the findings of this study. (2) Findings involving the self-ideal discrepancy. A few investigators have asked their subjects to indicate the level of risk they most admire as well as the level they prefer. The self-ideal discrepancy score reflects the extent to which an individual admires a level of risk in excess of the level he chooses. Since people often admire or idealize events that accord with their values, some investigators have viewed this index as a measure of the extent to which an individual’s values attract him toward risk taking. Levinger and Schneider (1969) and Lamm, Trommsdorff, and RostSchaude (1972) have found a positive self-ideal discrepancy on items that shift toward risk. (Items that shift toward caution exhibited a zeroorder discrepancy in the former study.) The relationship between this descrepancy and the choice shift has also been shown across people in a ’ It is necessary to use a group-composition design in studies of the relationship between an individual’s values and his shift propensities. Otherwise, if individuals are followed in uncomposed groups, shift propensities are likely to be obscured by conformity effects.
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group-composition study (Lamm, Schaude & Trommsdorff, 1971) where dyads composed of subjects with a high discrepancy shifted further toward risk than those composed of subjects with a low discrepancy. (3) Findings involving a direct measure of value strength. The otherself and self-ideal discrepancies are indirect measures of value strength. Only one study has been reported that involved a direct measure. Stoner (1968) had his subjects rank the importance of the value objects associated with a number of choice dilemma items. (This list included, for example, “avoiding the risk of failure in your career” and “obtaining the best training available for your particular career,” which were associated with a dilemma in which a hypothetical college senior had to choose between “attending a high-prestige university which may be too rigorous for him to receive his Ph.D. and a lower-prestige university from which he is certain to obtain his degree.“) He found shifts toward risk on items for which these value rankings favored the risky alternative and shifts toward caution on items for which they favored the cautious alternative, a result that supports the assumption that item-specific values underlie the choice shift. Stoner’s study employed an across-items design. No study has been reported in which a direct measure of value strength was employed in an across-people design. The first two classes of evidence cited above are problematical in that there has been no empirical assessment of the validity of the other-self and self-ideal indices as measures of value strength. The first study reported here was designed to remedy this problem by providing such an assessment. The second study was designed to fill a gap in the third class of evidence by employing an across-people design in which groups were composed on the basis of a direct measure of item-specific values. STUDY I In this study, the strengths of the values for freedom and equality were measured by means of the Rokeach Value Scale. Two original choice-dilemma items were employed. In one of these (the “F-item”), successful risk-taking leads to satisfaction of the value of freedom. In the other (the “E-item”), successful risk taking leads to satisfaction of the value of equality. The subjects were asked to give their own decisions on these items (“self-ratings”) and also to indicate the typical decision that other students were likely to make (“other-ratings”) and the decision they most admired (“ideal-ratings”).
Subjects The experiment was run at two different times, in December 1971 and in February 1972. In the December session, 29 male and 39 female undergraduates participated. A11 were volunteers from an introductory psychology course and received subject-pool credit for their participation. In the February session, 55 male and 63 female undergraduates participated. This session was run during a regular class period of a first course in social psychology, and the subjects, were all the students who came to class that day and were willing to participate.
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Materials The F-item was worded as follows: A recent law school graduate who is a close friend and whom you know to be similar to you has sought your advice in helping to choose the type of career he should pursue in criminal law. He has a choice between working independently or as a member of a firm. If he works independently, he will be free to choose the type of cases he handles. He can investigate them as he sees fit, affording him an opportunity to utilize all his skills and obtain a great deal of personal satisfaction. On the other hand, there is an element of risk in going out on his own. He might fail to obtain clients. If he failed, he would have no partner or firm to depend on. He could end up without a job or money. However, if he joins an established law firm, he will have guaranteed security and a good salary but less independence. Once he has made a decision, it will be very hard to revise it and choose the other type of job. The E-item was worded as follows: A recent law school graduate who is a close friend and whom you know to be similar to you has sought your advice in helping him to choose between joining law firm X and law firm Y. Both work in the area of equal rights for the politically disadvantaged. Law firm X is interested in going beyond the usual areas of civil rights activities to extend equal rights to such minority groups as Indians, consumers, women, and homosexuals. Some of their tactics are new and untried but offer the promise of greater effectiveness than the usual approaches. Thus, though these new tactics and new areas of interest are more risky to engage in, they involve much more assurance of doing some good in the areas of equality, if they work. If he and the above group and their methods fail, he could end up without a job or money. On the other hand, he could work in law firm Y which supports the usual approach to civil rights and guarantees him security and a good salary. However, the chance of making a difference in the resolution of social inequality in firm Y is considerably reduced. Once he has made a decision, it will be very hard to revise it and choose the other type of job. These two items were included in a booklet with three filler items from the Kogan and Wallach list (Pruitt, 1971a): items 1 (job), 7 (chess) and 12 (marriage). The order of the items in the booklet was as follows: chess, marriage, F, E. job. On a separate answer sheet, the subject had a choice among 11 options for each item. These ranged from accepting the risky course of action even if failure is certain; through accepting this option if the chances of success are 1110. 2110, 3/10, etc.: to rejecting it even if success is assured. As usual, subjects were told to indicate the lowest probability they would recommend to the person facing the dilemma. The Rokeach Value Scale (RVS) was used to measure the degree to which freedom and equality were important values to the subjects. This task requires the subject to rank 18 abstract concepts including freedom and equality. The higher the rank he gives to one of these concepts. the stronger it is assumed to be in his value hierarchy. Evidence supporting the validity of the equality scale has been reported by Rokeach (1968). He found that people who ranked equality higher were more sympathetic to and more likely to have participated in civil rights demonstrations. To our knowledge, no empirical validity evidence is available for the freedom scale, but it has face validity.
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Procedure All of the December subjects were run at the same time in two adjacent rooms. They were randomly assigned to one or the other room as they arrived at the door. Two experimenters were employed, one in each room. The RVS was filled out first. Then the subject answered the choice-dilemma questions in terms of his own preferences (the self-ratings) and as “the majority of students at SUNYAB” would answer them (the other-ratings). Finally he indicated the answer “that you would admire most, regardless of what you or most others might prefer” (the ideal-ratings). These three ratings were made on separate answer sheets. In the S-O order, self-ratings were made first, followed by other-ratings and then ideal-ratings. In the O-S order, other-ratings were made first, followed by self-ratings and then ideal-ratings. Each order was administered in a separate room. All instructions were presented orally. The instructions for the three kinds of ratings were also summarized at the top of the three answer sheets. In the February study, subjects were randomly assigned to the left and right sides of the lecture hall. One male experimenter was employed. Again the RVS was filled out followed by three copies of the answer sheet for the choice-dilemma booklet. The ratings were made in the same two orders as before, with one order assigned to the left and the other to the right side of the hall. Instructions for the three types of ratings were printed on the answer sheets rather than being presented orally.
RESULTS
The mean rank given to freedom in the RVS was 6.60 and to equality 9.24. (A lower number means a stronger value in this scale.) Significant sex differences did not emerge for either scale. A barely significant order effect (p < .OS) was found for the equality scale, with equality being more valued in the S-O order (8.72) than in the O-S order (9.97). This effect can probably be attributed to chance, since the RVS was administered before the order manipulation. A low but statistically significant within-cell correlation was found between the ranks given to freedom and equality (r = .22, p < .Ol). Two deviation scores were formed from the ratings: the other-self discrepancy, consisting of the other-rating minus the self-rating, and the self-ideal discrepancy, consisting of the self-rating minus the idealrating. Means for the three ratings and two deviation scores are shown in Table 1. In the ratings, lower numbers indicate a greater preference for TABLE MEAN
F-item E-item
LEVELS
OF FIVE
INDICES
1 OF RISK-TAKING
Self-rating
Other-rating
Ideal-rating
5.16 4.54
4.56 3.84
3.10 2.58
* Significantly different from zero at .05 level. ** Significantly different from zero at .Ol level.
IN
STUDY
Other-self discrepancy -.60* -.70**
I
Self-ideal discrepancy 2.06** 1.96**
VALUES
IN
CHOICE
TABLE 2 WITHIN-CELL CORRELATIONS BETWEEN VALUE RANKINGS RISK TAKING FOR THE F-ITEM AND E-ITEM S-O order (N = 92)
Self-rating Other-rating Ideal-rating Other-self discrepancy Self-ideal discrepancy
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SHIFT
AND THE IN STUDY
FIVE I
INDICES
OF
O-S order (N = 94)
Freedom value and F-item
Equality value and E-item
Freedom value and F-item
.34** -.12 .30**
.37** -.16 .I7
.23* -.05 .I3
-.31**
- .40**
-.23*
.oo
.19
.ll
Equality value and E-item .28** .03 .I1 -.22* .21*
* Significantly different from zero at the .05 level. ** Significantly different from zero at the .Ol level.
risk. A positive other-self discrepancy indicates that others are seen as more cautious than the self. A positive self-ideal discrepancy indicates that the admired position is riskier than one’s own position. Separate averages are not shown for the two orders because there were no reliable order effects, in contrast to the findings of McCauley, Kogan, and Teger (1971). Others were seen as more risky than the self, and ideal ratings were riskier than both the self- and the other-ratings.2 Coefficients of correlation between the RVS value-rankings and the five indices for the F- and E-items are given in Table 2. These coefficients were calculated on a within-cell basis because significant sex and Dec.-Feb. differences had been found for the self-ratings on the F-item and we did not want variance due to such factors to influence our correlations. Results for the two orders are shown separately, not because there are significant order effects but because some of the trends are interesting. The most striking correlations are those between strength of the value, on the one hand, and the self-rating and other-self discrepancy, on the other. Subjects who placed a higher value on freedom and equality were willing to take more risk on items in which risk taking was instrumental to achieving these values and saw others as taking less risk * Results for the three filler times were similar to those found by Levinger and Schneider (1969), with the exception of the self ratings for the chess and job items both of which were considerably more cautious than in the earlier study (chess, ?? = 4.81; job, x = 6.21). In the case of the job item, the mean other-self discrepancy was negative (-.59) rather than positive as found in most earlier studies. Changes in average response such as these are to be expected over a 6-year period when values and other elements of student culture are in rapid transition.
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in comparison to themselves. The admired level of risk on these items was also positively (though not always significantly) related to value strength, as might be expected from the fact that moderately high correlations were also found between the self-ratings and ideal-ratings (F-item, Y = .48, p < .OOl: E-item, Y = .51, p < .OOl). The extent to which subjects admired a greater level of risk than they were willing to take (the self-ideal discrepancy) on the E-item was a weak inverse function of the value placed on equality. This discrepancy was unrelated to value strength for the F-item. DISCUSSION
The positive correlations that were found between self-ratings and value-rankings for the F- and E-items show that we were successful in writing choice-dilemma items that reflect the values of freedom and equality. They also provide further evidence that the RVS adequately measures the strength of these values. By way of comparison, we did a secondary analysis of Stoner’s (1968) data.3 A value index was composed for each of the 12 items he used by subtracting subject ranking of the value associated with the cautious option from his ranking of the value associated with the risky option. (The lower this index, the more his value structure apparently favored risk taking on the item.) Correlation coefficients were computed across subjects for each item between this value index and the level of risk taken on the item. Ten of the 12 coefficients so computed were positive. They ranged in size from -.Ol to .30, with a median of .12 (p < .lO). These data suggest that Stoner was moderately successful in devising value measurements that were related to his choice dilemma items. But it is clear from the size of the correlations in Table 2 that our own efforts to devise choice dilemma items that matched two of the RVS values were quite a bit more successful. The results shown in Table 2 indicate that the other-self discrepancy is reflective of value strength, as assumed by Clark, Crockett, and Archer (1971), but (in terms of the absolute size of the correlation coefficients) no more so than one of its components, the self-ratings. [Our reanalysis of Stoner’s data suggests the same conclusion. Correlations between the value index and the other-self discrepancy ranged from .03 to -. 19 with a median of -. 13 (p < . lo), the absolute value of which is very close to the correlation of .12 we calculated for the self-rating.] Hence one wonders whether there is any inherent relationship between value strength and the other-self discrepancy. The answer to this questions can be obtained by computing partial correlations between value rankings and self-other discrepancies con3 These
data were
generously
provided
by James
F. Stoner.
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SHIFT
trolling for self-ratings. These partials were as follows: Freedom in the self-other order, Y = .07 (ns); equality in the self-other order, Y = .24 (p < .05); freedom in the other-self order, Y - .13 (ns); equality in the other-self order, Y = .08 (ns). Three out of four of these correlations are nonsignificant, and the fourth, while significant, is low. Hence there is little support for the assertion, implicit in social-comparison theory, that people with stronger values favoring risk place themselves at a greater distance in the risky direction from where they think others stand. If the discrepancy between other-rating and self-rating is not inherently related to value, how can we explain the fact that the mean other-self discrepancy is usually positive on items that shift toward risk and negative on items that shift toward caution? One possible answer, supported by the findings of Burnstein, Vinokur, and Pichevin (1974), is that on the items ordinarily used in this research people are usually less certain about where others stand than about where they themselves stand. Hence they are likely either (a) to place other-ratings closer than self-ratings to some psychological midpoint’ of the risk scale or (b) to respond more randomly when making other-ratings than when making self-ratings. In either case, the average other-rating will be closer to the midpoint than the average self-rating. Since relatively risky self-ratings are typically given on items that subsequently shift toward risk (.40 in Stoner’s study), average other-ratings will ipso facto be more cautious than average self-ratings. Likewise average other-ratings will be more risky than average self-ratings on items that shift toward caution, since the self-ratings tend to be relatively cautious (.74 in Stoner’s study). Our findings suggest that the self-ideal discrepancy is quite unreflective of item-specific values. How then can we explain the relationship found by Lamm, Schaude, and Trommsdorff (1971) between this discrepancy and shift? Conceivably this discrepancy reflects a “value of risk” that underlies the shifts in their study. Yet such a position would require one to explain why a value of risk should affect the self-ideal discrepancy while item-specific values do not. Another possibility is that these authors were inadvertently composing their groups on the basis of self-esteem, which is often measured by means of such a discrepancy (Wylie, 1968). However other evidence in their study suggests that low self esteem is not predictive of shifts toward risk. One peculiarity of the Lamm et al. study is that dyads were employed, unlike all other studies in this field. Before serious efforts are made to interpret the Lamm results, it seems wise to ascertain whether they can be replicated in groups of a more conventional size. J To be consistent have to lie between
with the data from Stoner probabilities of .6 and .7.
(1968).
this psychological
midpoint
would
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PRUITT
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COSENTINO
II
The purpose of this study was to evaluate the assumptions that item-specific values underlie the choice shift, with an across-people (group-composition) design. Two hypotheses based on this assumption were tested: (I) On an issue in which risk taking is instrumental to achieving individual freedom, groups whose members place a relatively high value on freedom will shift more toward risk than groups whose members place a relatively low value on freedom. (2) On an issue in which risk taking is instrumental to achieving equality, groups whose members place a relatively high value on equality will shift more toward risk than groups whose members place a relatively low value on equality. Direct measures of value strength were employed-scores on the freedom and equality scales of the Rokeach Value Scale (RVS).
Subjects One hundred female undergraduates participated. All were volunteers from an introductory psychology course and received subject-pool credit for their participation. They were selected from a larger group of 151 on the basis of scores on the RVS, which were obtained in a mass-testing session about a month before the experiment began.
Design Two 2 x 2 designs were employed, one pertaining to the value of freedom and the other to the value of equality. Both employed the following two variables: (a) Value strengrh, with high value of freedom (HiF) or equality (HiE) consisting of scores from 1 to 7 on the RVS and low value of freedom (LoF) or equality (LoE) consisting of scores from 11 to 18. (b) Group vs individual. In the group condition 4 subjects, homogeneous in value, interacted with one another. In the individual condition, subjects were run as individuals. Twenty groups and 20 matched individuals were run. All but one group and one individual were used in both designs. Ten groups and individuals were HiE and a like number were LoE. Ten groups and individuals were HiF and nine groups and individuals LoF. It was impossible to find more LoF subjects, so the extra group and individual (both of which had HiE) had a moderate level of the freedom value and were not used in the freedom design. Because of the moderate correlation that exists between rankings of freedom and equality on the RVS. there were more HiF-HiE (6) and LoF-LoE (6) groups and individuals than LoF-HiE (3) and HiF-LoE (4) groups and individuals.
Materials The same booklet of choice-dilemma items was used as in the first study, consisting of the F-item, the E-item, and three filler items. These items were used because the results of study f had indicated that answers to the F-item and E-item reflect the strength of the corresponding values as measured by the RVS.
Procedure Five subjects with the same value outlook reported simultaneously to the laboratory. Four of these were randomly assigned to the group condition and one to the individual condition. The subjects in the group conditions were instructed to indicate their risk preferences on the five dilemma items. They were then asked to discuss each item for 5 min and attempt to arrive at a group consensus, which was to be recorded in a second item booklet. If they did not reach consensus within the 5 min, they were to record their individual risk preferences in this booklet. The discussions were taped. The subjects in the individual condition went to a room adjacent to the group room prior
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to instructing subjects in the group condition. There they were asked to indicate their risk preferences on the five dilemma items. They were then asked to record all the reasons they could think of for and against each alternative and rerate each item. Five minutes were allotted to reconsidering each item. In contrast to Study I, other-ratings and ideal-ratings were not solicited because of a fear that they would influence the choice shift.
RESULTS AND
DISCUSSION
Table 3 shows the mean level of risk initially taken on the two critical items. Scores for the F-item are shown as a function of the value of freedom and scores for the E-item as a function of the value of equality. Subjects were treated as individuals for the statistical analyses of these data inasmuch as they had not interacted in the groups up to the point at which these data were collected. The results of these analyses are shown in Table 4. As in Study I, subjects who placed a higher value on freedom took greater risk on the F-item and those who valued equality more highly took greater risk on the E-item. Unlike Study I, the relationship between value and risk taking was stronger for freedom than for equality.5 Unexpected interactions were found between value strength and the group-individual variable for both items, with statistical significance in the case of the F-item. In both cases, the effect of values on risk taking was greater in the individual than the group condition. It should be noted that these risk-taking measurements were made before the onset of discussion in the group condition when subjects were only coacting with one another. These results can be seen as providing support for those aspects of pluralistic ignorance and release theories which hold that perTABLE MEAN
INITIAL
LEVEL
OF RISK
ON THE
3 F-ITEM
Ranking of freedom value
Group condition Individual condition
AND
E-ITEM
IN
STUDY
IIn
Ranking of equality value
HiF
LoF
HiE
LoE
4.53 3.50
6.80 9.00
4.43 4.10
5.20 6.70
a Scores in the left side of the table are based on the F-item. Those in the tight side. on the E-item. Lower scores indicate a preference for higher risk. 5 In the group condition, the chess item shifted toward risk as usual (D = .70, p i .05) and the marriage item toward caution as usual (fi = -.69, p < .05). But the job item, which has traditionally produced a sizeable shift toward risk, shifted somewhat toward caution (6 = -.30, ns). This provides further evidence of a cultural drift toward caution on this item.
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AND
TABLE ANALYSES
OF VARIANCE
FOR
Freedom
vs. individual value
I 1 1
LEVEL
value F-item
4 A: Group B: Hi-Lo AxB Error
4
INITIAL
OF RISK
and
STUDY
Equality
F
P
.51
ns
II
value E-item
df
1 1 1
27.42 .OOOl 5.32 .OS (MS = 7.3859)
91
IN
and
F
P
.s7
ns
3.38 .07 1.38 .25 (MS = 9.6164)
96
ceived group norms deter an individual from the full expression of his values-making him less extreme than he would really like to be. Presumably group norms are more salient in a coacting situation, such as obtained under the group condition, than in a socially isolated situation, such as was found in the individual condition. For the choice shift data, groups were the unit of analysis in the group condition and individuals in the individual condition. Shift scores were calculated as follows: Final risk preference was subtracted from initial preference for all subjects. In the individual condition, the shift score was the discrepancy resulting from this operation. In the group condition, the shift score was the mean discrepancy for the members of a group. A positive score on this index can be interpreted as showing a shift toward risk. Comparisons between the group and individual conditions could not be made with parametric statistics because of highly skewed distributions in the individual condition. Hence nonparametric statistics were employed. Median shift scores are given in Table 5. Significant differences were found between groups and individuals for the HiF (U = 23, p < .05) and the HiE (U < 17, p < .05) conditions. The difference that can be seen in the LoF condition did not reach signihcancy (U = 34). All of these differences were in the direction of a greater shift TABLE MEDIAN
SHIFTS
IN RISK
FOR
THE
5 F-ITEM
AND
n Same footnote
applies
as in Table
IN
II”
STUDY
Ranking of equality value
Ranking of freedom value
Group condition Individual condition
E-ITEM
HiF
LoF
1 .oo .oo
1.25
.68
.oo
.oo
.oo
.oo
3.
HiE
LoE
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IN CHOICE
SHIFT
313
toward risk in the group condition, except for the LoE condition where the median shift was zero. These data suggest that both the F-item and the E-item will ordinarily shift toward risk in randomly composed groups. It will be seen that, in the group condition, HiF and LoF exhibited nearly the same degree of shift-contrary to Hypothesis I. HiE exhibited somewhat greater shift than LoE, in the direction postulated by Hypothesis II, but this trend did not reach statistical significance (t(18) = 1.45, p < .20>. Hence Hypothesis II cannot be said to have received support. In summary, no evidence was found of a relationship between value strength and the extent of shift. These results are reminiscent of negative findings from two other studies, whose bearing on our hypotheses was not recognized at the inception of our investigation. In both of these studies (Teger & Pruitt, 1967; Vidmar, 1970), no relationship was found between the initiul risk of the members of a group and the direction or extent of their subsequent shift.6 Since, as was shown in Study I initial risk reflects the strength of relevant values, these results support ours.7 CONCLUSIONS
The apparent tendency of the F-item and E-item to shift toward risk in Study II is an unexpected result in light of the finding in Study I that others are viewed as more risky than the self on both items. Most research to date has shown the contrary, that people typically view others as more cautious than themselves on items that shift toward risk. This result would cast doubt on the basic postulate of value theory that values are the driving force behind the choice shift, if we were to assume that the other-self discrepancy is a valid measure of value strength. But the partial correlation analysis of Study I suggests that we cannot make this assumption. Rather this result calls into question two theories about the mechanisms by which values produce the shift, norm-comparison 6 Vidmar’s study was marred by absence of controls for regression to the mean, but his data are such that it is hard to believe that a relationship would have appeared between initial risk and the extent of shift if proper controls had been included. The Teger-Pruitt study controlled for regression by including a no discussion condition. The correlation between initial risk and shift toward risk was -.322 for this condition compared to .022 for the discussion condition. Since the difference between these coefficients was nonsignificant (z = .79), it seems reasonable to conclude that the regression effect was not obscuring a positive correlation between initial risk and the extent of shift in the discussion condition. ’ One group composition study has been reported (Myers & Bishop, 1970) in which initial decisions were predictive of the direction of shift. But the decisions concerned white attitudes toward blacks rather than risk taking and hence are not relevant to the issues raised in this article.
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theory (Brown, 1965) and pluralistic-ignorance theory (Levinger & Schneider, 1969), both of which clearly imply that others will initially be seen as more cautious than oneself on all items that shift toward risk. Other evidence against these theories is summarized by Pruitt (1971b). The unusual feature of our findings on the F-item and E-item is that other people are seen as taking so much risk. The means of 4.56 and 3.84 on these items are lower than ordinarily found on any of the choice dilemmas in the Kogan and WaIlach list. (This statement is based on national norms computed by Pruitt and Teger, 1967.) A possible explanation for this finding can be given as follows: Unlike the typical choice-dilemma item where, as was postulated earlier, people are rather uncertain about the probable response of others, the F-item and E-item may have evoked certain myths about ideology on university campuses, at least during the school year 1971-1972 when this study was run. At this time, university students had a reputation for being quite radical in the realms of freedom and equality, assiduously embracing both values, which were often publicly endorsed on campus. Our data can be interpreted as indicating that students viewed one another in terms of this reputation, producing a condition of pluralistic ignorance8 in which others were seen as more oriented toward freedom and equality than oneself and hence more willing to take risk in the pursuit of these values. By casting doubt on methods previously used to measure value strength, the results from Study I call into question some of the evidence that has been cited to support the assumption that values underlie the choice shift. This assumption is further weakened by our failure to find support for the two hypotheses in Study II and by the findings on initial risk in the studies by Vidmar and Teger and Pruitt that were discussed earlier. In the light of all this negative evidence, it may be best to abandon this assumption. Viable alternatives to value theory include (a) leader-conJ&nce theory (Burnstein, 1969), which assumes that groups shift in the direction of their most confident member, (b) persuasivearguments theory (Burnstein & Vinokur, 1973). which assumes that group members shift when they hear compelling arguments that have not been previously encountered and (c) commitment theory Moscovici & Zavalloni, 1969), which assumes that group members shift further in the direction toward which they are initially attracted because of the commitments they make during the discussion. s In addition, the four theories about the mechanisms that produce the shift, which were described at in this context does not refer to Levinger 8 The use of the term “pluralistic ignorance” and Schneider’s pluralistic-ignorance theory. Similar examples of pluralistic ignorance on a college campus have been reported by Korte (1972). 9 There are some problems of empirical support for commitment theory (Pruitt, 1971a).
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the beginning of this article, can be recast to explain the impact of driving forces other than values.1o However, it should be noted that one solid piece of evidence remains to support the assumption that values drive the shift. This is Stoner’s (1968) finding of shifts toward risk on items for which the values favoring risk are more fully endorsed than the values favoring caution and shifts toward caution on items for which the opposite is true. Hence, rather than discarding value theory, it may be possible to refine it in such a way as to embrace both Stoner’s positive across-items findings and the negative across-groups findings of Vidmar, Teger-Pruitt, and Study II. One might, for example, assume high value CO~WZSUS among college students such that, on items that shift toward risk, almost everyone endorses the values favoring risk more fully than the values favoring caution, though some do so more fully than others. Hence the values press toward risk taking (and hence toward a shift in the risky direction) even in the case of people whose initial risk level and endorsement of values favoring risk are not very high. Such an assumption seems reasonable for the F-item and E-item, which tap into values (freedom and equality) that are widely shared on campuses, and not unreasonably for risk-oriented items in the standard list. A similar assumption of high value consensus in the cautious direction could plausibly be made for the items that shift toward caution. In line with release theory, one might then postulate that people move a standard distance toward the position of the group member who best exemplifies the culturally dominant value position, regardless of how much risk is initially taken by the group. Or in line with relevant-arguments theory, one might postulate that arguments supporting the culturally dominant values are generated equally in groups of initially high or low risk takers and are equally persuasive to both kinds of group. REFERENCES Brown, R. So&/ psychology. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1965. Burnstein, E. An analysis of group decisions involving risk (“the risky shift”). Human Relations. 1969, 22, 381-395. Bumstein, E., & Vinokur, A. Testing two classes of theories about group induced shifts in individual choice. Jouvnul of Persondity and Social Psychology. 1973, 9, 123-137. Burnstein, E., Vinokur, A., & Pichevin, M. F. What do differences between own, admired and attributed choices have to do with group induced shifts in choice? Journnl of E.uperimental Social Psychology. 1974. 10. 428443. lo Such a revision is essential under any circumstances if any of these four theories is to be employed in explaining other manifestations of the choice shift, such as changes in attitude strength.
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Carlson, Julia A., & Davis, C. M. Cultural values and the risky shift: A cross-cultural test in Uganda and the United States. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1971. 3, 392-399. Clark, R. D., III Crockett, W. H., & Archer. R. L. Risk-as-value hypothesis: The relationship between perception of self, others, and the risky shift. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology,
1971, 3, 425429.
Fraser, C. Group risk-taking and group polarization. Paper presented at the European Association of Social Psychology Conference. Konstanz, 1970. Korte, C. Pluralistic ignorance about student radicalism. Sociometry, 1972, 35, 576-587. Lamm, H., Schaude, E., & Trommsdorlf, G. Risky shift as a function of group members’ value of risk and need for approval. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 197 1, 3,430-435. Lamm, H.. Trommsdorff. G., & Rost-Schaude. E. Self-image, perception of peers’ risk acceptance and risky shift. European Journal of Social Psychology. 1972. 2-3, 255-272. Levinger. G., & Schneider, D. J. Test of the “risk is a value” hypothesis. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1969, 11, 165-170. McCauley, C., Kogan, N., & Teger, A. I. Order effects in answering risk dilemmas for self and others. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1971, 3, 423-424. Moscovici, S., & Zavalloni. M. The group as a polarizer of attitudes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1969, 12, 125-135. Myers, D. G., & Bishop, G. D. Discussion effects on racial attitudes. Science, 1970. 169, 77&779. Pruitt, D. G. Choice shifts in group discussion: An introductory review. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1971a. 3, 339-360. Pruitt, D. G. Conclusions: Toward an understanding of choice shifts in group discussion. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 197lb, 3, 495-510. Pruitt, D. G., & Teger, A. I. Is there a shift toward risk in group discussion? Zf so, is it a group phenomenon? If so, what causes it? Paper presented at the meeting of the American Psychological Association, Washington, D. C. September 1967. Rokeach. M. Beliefs, Attitudes and Values. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1968. Silverthorne. C. P. Information input and the group shift phenomenon in risk taking. Journal
of Personality
and Social
Psychology,
1971, 3, 45W61.
St. Jean, R. Reformulation of the value hypothesis in group risk taking. Proceedings 78th Annual
Convention
of the American
Psychological
Association,
1970,5,
oj.the 339-340.
Stoner, J. A. F. Risky and cautious shifts in group decisions: The influence of widely held values. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1968, 4, 442-459. Teger. A. I., & Pruitt, D. G. Components of group risk taking. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1967, 3, 189-205. Vidmar, N. Group composition and the risky shift. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1970, 6, 153-166. Wallach. M. A., & Wing, C. W., Jr. Is risk a value? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1968, 9, 101-106. Wylie, R. C. The present status of self theory. In E. F. Borgatta and W. W. Lambert (Eds.), Chapter II. Handbook of Personality Theory and Research. Chicago: Rand, McNally, l%S. (Received April 11, 1973)
OF
EXPERIMENTAL
The
SOCIAL
Role
PSYCHOLOGY
of Values
11,
in the
301-316 (1975)
Choice
Shift
DEAN G. PRUITT AND CHARLES COSENTINO State
University
of New
York
at Buffalo
In Study I, the self-ideal discrepancy in risk taking was found to be unrelated to the strength of values relevant to the risks under consideration, and the other-self discrepancy was found to be related to these values only by virtue of one of its components, inital preference. Hence the use of these discrepancies as measures of value strength must be questioned. This casts doubt on some of the evidence formerly thought to support the assumption that values provide the force that drives the choice shift. In Study II, two hypotheses derived from this assumption were not supported. In light of this result, and closely related negative findings from two other studies, it would appear that this assumption must either be discarded or revised. Some possible lines of revision are suggested. Some of the results were also prejudicial to two theories about the mechanism through which values or other forces allegedly produce the shift: norm-comparison theory and pluralistic-ignorance theory.
Group discussion often alters the willingness of group members to take risk. The direction of shift depends on the item under discussion, with movement toward risk on items that elicit an initially risky stance and toward caution on items that elicit an initially cautious stance. Comparable shifts have been found in group discussions of many other kinds of material. Hence we can speak of a general phenomenon called the “choice shift” (Pruitt, 1971a) or “group polarization” (Moscovici & Zavalloni, 1969), with shifts in risk taking as a special case. Shifts in risk taking have most commonly been explained by one or another member of a family of “value theories.” These theories assume that socially shared values are the force that drives the shift. Since values also presumably affect initial risk levels, these theories are capable of accounting for the relationship just mentioned between initial risk and the direction of shift. Three positions have been taken with respect to the sort of values that produce the shifts: (a) Some theorists (e.g., Brown, 1965) explain shifts toward risk in terms of a “value for risk,” which is allegedly very common among young Americans of the kind used in experiments. This position has the defect of not adequately explaining shifts toward caution. (b) Other theorists (e.g., Stoner, 1968) stress the importance of socially shared “item-specific values” that differ from issue to issue and The authors contributed equally to all stages of this research except for the write up, which was primarily the work of the first author. 301 Copyright All rights
Q 1975 by Academic Press, Inc. of reproduction in any form reserved.
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enhance the attractiveness of either risk or caution. The distinction between a value for risk and an item-specific value can be illustrated in the case of a choice between a job with a firm that pays a lot but may fail (the risky alternative) and a job with a stable firm that pays less (the cautious alternative). A value for risk would, of course, recommend the risky alternative. So also would an item-specific value for making a lot of money. (c) Still other theorists (e.g., Fraser, 1970) implicate both a value for risk and item-specific values. There are also several theories about the process by which values produce the shift. Three of these involve a social-comparison mechanism: (a) According to norm-comparison theory (Brown, 1965), most people want to behave in accordance with their values at least as fully as other people who are similar to them. Hence, when faced with an initial decision, they try to picture what others are doing and then choose an option that is equally or further in the valued directions than the assumed group norm. Inevitably, during group discussion, many people discover that they are at or below the group norm. In an effort to fulfill their ideal, they shift further in the valued direction. (b) Pluralistic-ignorance theory (Levinger & Schneider, 1969) also postulates that people make assumptions about the group norm. In addition, they are assumed to have an ideal level of risk, which is quite high on issues for which their values favor risk and quite low on issues for which their values favor caution. Decisions involve a compromise between the assumed group norm and the ideal. In groups whose members share values, this means that the actual group norm (the average of the individual decisions) is closer to the ideal than are the members’ assumed group norms. This fact comes out in the discussion, and the assumed group norms move closer to the ideal, permitting decisions to move in the valued direction. (c) According to release theory (Pruitt, 1971a), most people take a moderate level of risk in their initial decisions, because they wish to avoid social embarrassment by adhering to a “norm of moderation.” But when, in the group discussion, they discover that even one person has made a more extreme decision in the direction they value, they feel released to move in that direction also. The fourth theory involves a persuasion mechanism: (d) Relevant-arguments theory (St. Jean, 1970; Silverthorne, 1971) postulates that the dominant value or values elicit persuasive arguments during group discussion that convince group members to move further in the valued direction. It is conceivable that a social-comparison mechanism and a relevant-arguments mechanism are at work simultaneously (Pruitt. 1971a). The basic hypothesis of all value theories, that socially shared values are the driving force behind the choice shift, is supported by several research findings. These can be grouped into three classes:
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(1) Findings involving the other-self discrepancy. In their initial decisions, subjects are often asked to indicate how other people similar to themselves would answer the questions as well as how they themselves would answer. The other-self discrepancy is the difference in risk taking between these two responses, a positive discrepancy indicating that others are seen as more cautious than oneself and a negative discrepancy that others are seen as more risky. This discrepancy has been used as a measure of the extent to which risk is valued because of the assumption made by norm-comparison theory that people try to outdo one another in adhering to socially shared values. Assuming that this discrepancy is a valid measure of value strength, the hypothesis that values underlie the choice shift is supported by correlations that have been found between the other-self discrepancy and the choice shift. Such correlations have been frequently demonstrated across items, with the other-self discrepancy usually positive on items that shift toward risk and negative on items that shift toward caution (Levinger & Schneider, 1969; Pruitt & Teger, 1967; Stoner, 1968; Wallath & Wing, 1968). This finding has been verified in an African culture where the pattern of positive and negative shifts across the items typically used in this research differs from that in Western society (Carlson and Davis, 1971, as discussed by Pruitt, 1971b). There is also one study in which this relationship was demonstrated across people. This was a group-composition study (Clark, Crockett, & Archer, 1971),l in which groups whose members exhibited a positive other-self discrepancy were found to shift farther toward risk than those whose members exhibited a negative discrepancy. However Lamm, Trommsdorff, and RostSchaude (1972) have been unable to replicate the findings of this study. (2) Findings involving the self-ideal discrepancy. A few investigators have asked their subjects to indicate the level of risk they most admire as well as the level they prefer. The self-ideal discrepancy score reflects the extent to which an individual admires a level of risk in excess of the level he chooses. Since people often admire or idealize events that accord with their values, some investigators have viewed this index as a measure of the extent to which an individual’s values attract him toward risk taking. Levinger and Schneider (1969) and Lamm, Trommsdorff, and RostSchaude (1972) have found a positive self-ideal discrepancy on items that shift toward risk. (Items that shift toward caution exhibited a zeroorder discrepancy in the former study.) The relationship between this descrepancy and the choice shift has also been shown across people in a ’ It is necessary to use a group-composition design in studies of the relationship between an individual’s values and his shift propensities. Otherwise, if individuals are followed in uncomposed groups, shift propensities are likely to be obscured by conformity effects.
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group-composition study (Lamm, Schaude & Trommsdorff, 1971) where dyads composed of subjects with a high discrepancy shifted further toward risk than those composed of subjects with a low discrepancy. (3) Findings involving a direct measure of value strength. The otherself and self-ideal discrepancies are indirect measures of value strength. Only one study has been reported that involved a direct measure. Stoner (1968) had his subjects rank the importance of the value objects associated with a number of choice dilemma items. (This list included, for example, “avoiding the risk of failure in your career” and “obtaining the best training available for your particular career,” which were associated with a dilemma in which a hypothetical college senior had to choose between “attending a high-prestige university which may be too rigorous for him to receive his Ph.D. and a lower-prestige university from which he is certain to obtain his degree.“) He found shifts toward risk on items for which these value rankings favored the risky alternative and shifts toward caution on items for which they favored the cautious alternative, a result that supports the assumption that item-specific values underlie the choice shift. Stoner’s study employed an across-items design. No study has been reported in which a direct measure of value strength was employed in an across-people design. The first two classes of evidence cited above are problematical in that there has been no empirical assessment of the validity of the other-self and self-ideal indices as measures of value strength. The first study reported here was designed to remedy this problem by providing such an assessment. The second study was designed to fill a gap in the third class of evidence by employing an across-people design in which groups were composed on the basis of a direct measure of item-specific values. STUDY I In this study, the strengths of the values for freedom and equality were measured by means of the Rokeach Value Scale. Two original choice-dilemma items were employed. In one of these (the “F-item”), successful risk-taking leads to satisfaction of the value of freedom. In the other (the “E-item”), successful risk taking leads to satisfaction of the value of equality. The subjects were asked to give their own decisions on these items (“self-ratings”) and also to indicate the typical decision that other students were likely to make (“other-ratings”) and the decision they most admired (“ideal-ratings”).
Subjects The experiment was run at two different times, in December 1971 and in February 1972. In the December session, 29 male and 39 female undergraduates participated. A11 were volunteers from an introductory psychology course and received subject-pool credit for their participation. In the February session, 55 male and 63 female undergraduates participated. This session was run during a regular class period of a first course in social psychology, and the subjects, were all the students who came to class that day and were willing to participate.
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Materials The F-item was worded as follows: A recent law school graduate who is a close friend and whom you know to be similar to you has sought your advice in helping to choose the type of career he should pursue in criminal law. He has a choice between working independently or as a member of a firm. If he works independently, he will be free to choose the type of cases he handles. He can investigate them as he sees fit, affording him an opportunity to utilize all his skills and obtain a great deal of personal satisfaction. On the other hand, there is an element of risk in going out on his own. He might fail to obtain clients. If he failed, he would have no partner or firm to depend on. He could end up without a job or money. However, if he joins an established law firm, he will have guaranteed security and a good salary but less independence. Once he has made a decision, it will be very hard to revise it and choose the other type of job. The E-item was worded as follows: A recent law school graduate who is a close friend and whom you know to be similar to you has sought your advice in helping him to choose between joining law firm X and law firm Y. Both work in the area of equal rights for the politically disadvantaged. Law firm X is interested in going beyond the usual areas of civil rights activities to extend equal rights to such minority groups as Indians, consumers, women, and homosexuals. Some of their tactics are new and untried but offer the promise of greater effectiveness than the usual approaches. Thus, though these new tactics and new areas of interest are more risky to engage in, they involve much more assurance of doing some good in the areas of equality, if they work. If he and the above group and their methods fail, he could end up without a job or money. On the other hand, he could work in law firm Y which supports the usual approach to civil rights and guarantees him security and a good salary. However, the chance of making a difference in the resolution of social inequality in firm Y is considerably reduced. Once he has made a decision, it will be very hard to revise it and choose the other type of job. These two items were included in a booklet with three filler items from the Kogan and Wallach list (Pruitt, 1971a): items 1 (job), 7 (chess) and 12 (marriage). The order of the items in the booklet was as follows: chess, marriage, F, E. job. On a separate answer sheet, the subject had a choice among 11 options for each item. These ranged from accepting the risky course of action even if failure is certain; through accepting this option if the chances of success are 1110. 2110, 3/10, etc.: to rejecting it even if success is assured. As usual, subjects were told to indicate the lowest probability they would recommend to the person facing the dilemma. The Rokeach Value Scale (RVS) was used to measure the degree to which freedom and equality were important values to the subjects. This task requires the subject to rank 18 abstract concepts including freedom and equality. The higher the rank he gives to one of these concepts. the stronger it is assumed to be in his value hierarchy. Evidence supporting the validity of the equality scale has been reported by Rokeach (1968). He found that people who ranked equality higher were more sympathetic to and more likely to have participated in civil rights demonstrations. To our knowledge, no empirical validity evidence is available for the freedom scale, but it has face validity.
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Procedure All of the December subjects were run at the same time in two adjacent rooms. They were randomly assigned to one or the other room as they arrived at the door. Two experimenters were employed, one in each room. The RVS was filled out first. Then the subject answered the choice-dilemma questions in terms of his own preferences (the self-ratings) and as “the majority of students at SUNYAB” would answer them (the other-ratings). Finally he indicated the answer “that you would admire most, regardless of what you or most others might prefer” (the ideal-ratings). These three ratings were made on separate answer sheets. In the S-O order, self-ratings were made first, followed by other-ratings and then ideal-ratings. In the O-S order, other-ratings were made first, followed by self-ratings and then ideal-ratings. Each order was administered in a separate room. All instructions were presented orally. The instructions for the three kinds of ratings were also summarized at the top of the three answer sheets. In the February study, subjects were randomly assigned to the left and right sides of the lecture hall. One male experimenter was employed. Again the RVS was filled out followed by three copies of the answer sheet for the choice-dilemma booklet. The ratings were made in the same two orders as before, with one order assigned to the left and the other to the right side of the hall. Instructions for the three types of ratings were printed on the answer sheets rather than being presented orally.
RESULTS
The mean rank given to freedom in the RVS was 6.60 and to equality 9.24. (A lower number means a stronger value in this scale.) Significant sex differences did not emerge for either scale. A barely significant order effect (p < .OS) was found for the equality scale, with equality being more valued in the S-O order (8.72) than in the O-S order (9.97). This effect can probably be attributed to chance, since the RVS was administered before the order manipulation. A low but statistically significant within-cell correlation was found between the ranks given to freedom and equality (r = .22, p < .Ol). Two deviation scores were formed from the ratings: the other-self discrepancy, consisting of the other-rating minus the self-rating, and the self-ideal discrepancy, consisting of the self-rating minus the idealrating. Means for the three ratings and two deviation scores are shown in Table 1. In the ratings, lower numbers indicate a greater preference for TABLE MEAN
F-item E-item
LEVELS
OF FIVE
INDICES
1 OF RISK-TAKING
Self-rating
Other-rating
Ideal-rating
5.16 4.54
4.56 3.84
3.10 2.58
* Significantly different from zero at .05 level. ** Significantly different from zero at .Ol level.
IN
STUDY
Other-self discrepancy -.60* -.70**
I
Self-ideal discrepancy 2.06** 1.96**
VALUES
IN
CHOICE
TABLE 2 WITHIN-CELL CORRELATIONS BETWEEN VALUE RANKINGS RISK TAKING FOR THE F-ITEM AND E-ITEM S-O order (N = 92)
Self-rating Other-rating Ideal-rating Other-self discrepancy Self-ideal discrepancy
307
SHIFT
AND THE IN STUDY
FIVE I
INDICES
OF
O-S order (N = 94)
Freedom value and F-item
Equality value and E-item
Freedom value and F-item
.34** -.12 .30**
.37** -.16 .I7
.23* -.05 .I3
-.31**
- .40**
-.23*
.oo
.19
.ll
Equality value and E-item .28** .03 .I1 -.22* .21*
* Significantly different from zero at the .05 level. ** Significantly different from zero at the .Ol level.
risk. A positive other-self discrepancy indicates that others are seen as more cautious than the self. A positive self-ideal discrepancy indicates that the admired position is riskier than one’s own position. Separate averages are not shown for the two orders because there were no reliable order effects, in contrast to the findings of McCauley, Kogan, and Teger (1971). Others were seen as more risky than the self, and ideal ratings were riskier than both the self- and the other-ratings.2 Coefficients of correlation between the RVS value-rankings and the five indices for the F- and E-items are given in Table 2. These coefficients were calculated on a within-cell basis because significant sex and Dec.-Feb. differences had been found for the self-ratings on the F-item and we did not want variance due to such factors to influence our correlations. Results for the two orders are shown separately, not because there are significant order effects but because some of the trends are interesting. The most striking correlations are those between strength of the value, on the one hand, and the self-rating and other-self discrepancy, on the other. Subjects who placed a higher value on freedom and equality were willing to take more risk on items in which risk taking was instrumental to achieving these values and saw others as taking less risk * Results for the three filler times were similar to those found by Levinger and Schneider (1969), with the exception of the self ratings for the chess and job items both of which were considerably more cautious than in the earlier study (chess, ?? = 4.81; job, x = 6.21). In the case of the job item, the mean other-self discrepancy was negative (-.59) rather than positive as found in most earlier studies. Changes in average response such as these are to be expected over a 6-year period when values and other elements of student culture are in rapid transition.
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in comparison to themselves. The admired level of risk on these items was also positively (though not always significantly) related to value strength, as might be expected from the fact that moderately high correlations were also found between the self-ratings and ideal-ratings (F-item, Y = .48, p < .OOl: E-item, Y = .51, p < .OOl). The extent to which subjects admired a greater level of risk than they were willing to take (the self-ideal discrepancy) on the E-item was a weak inverse function of the value placed on equality. This discrepancy was unrelated to value strength for the F-item. DISCUSSION
The positive correlations that were found between self-ratings and value-rankings for the F- and E-items show that we were successful in writing choice-dilemma items that reflect the values of freedom and equality. They also provide further evidence that the RVS adequately measures the strength of these values. By way of comparison, we did a secondary analysis of Stoner’s (1968) data.3 A value index was composed for each of the 12 items he used by subtracting subject ranking of the value associated with the cautious option from his ranking of the value associated with the risky option. (The lower this index, the more his value structure apparently favored risk taking on the item.) Correlation coefficients were computed across subjects for each item between this value index and the level of risk taken on the item. Ten of the 12 coefficients so computed were positive. They ranged in size from -.Ol to .30, with a median of .12 (p < .lO). These data suggest that Stoner was moderately successful in devising value measurements that were related to his choice dilemma items. But it is clear from the size of the correlations in Table 2 that our own efforts to devise choice dilemma items that matched two of the RVS values were quite a bit more successful. The results shown in Table 2 indicate that the other-self discrepancy is reflective of value strength, as assumed by Clark, Crockett, and Archer (1971), but (in terms of the absolute size of the correlation coefficients) no more so than one of its components, the self-ratings. [Our reanalysis of Stoner’s data suggests the same conclusion. Correlations between the value index and the other-self discrepancy ranged from .03 to -. 19 with a median of -. 13 (p < . lo), the absolute value of which is very close to the correlation of .12 we calculated for the self-rating.] Hence one wonders whether there is any inherent relationship between value strength and the other-self discrepancy. The answer to this questions can be obtained by computing partial correlations between value rankings and self-other discrepancies con3 These
data were
generously
provided
by James
F. Stoner.
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trolling for self-ratings. These partials were as follows: Freedom in the self-other order, Y = .07 (ns); equality in the self-other order, Y = .24 (p < .05); freedom in the other-self order, Y - .13 (ns); equality in the other-self order, Y = .08 (ns). Three out of four of these correlations are nonsignificant, and the fourth, while significant, is low. Hence there is little support for the assertion, implicit in social-comparison theory, that people with stronger values favoring risk place themselves at a greater distance in the risky direction from where they think others stand. If the discrepancy between other-rating and self-rating is not inherently related to value, how can we explain the fact that the mean other-self discrepancy is usually positive on items that shift toward risk and negative on items that shift toward caution? One possible answer, supported by the findings of Burnstein, Vinokur, and Pichevin (1974), is that on the items ordinarily used in this research people are usually less certain about where others stand than about where they themselves stand. Hence they are likely either (a) to place other-ratings closer than self-ratings to some psychological midpoint’ of the risk scale or (b) to respond more randomly when making other-ratings than when making self-ratings. In either case, the average other-rating will be closer to the midpoint than the average self-rating. Since relatively risky self-ratings are typically given on items that subsequently shift toward risk (.40 in Stoner’s study), average other-ratings will ipso facto be more cautious than average self-ratings. Likewise average other-ratings will be more risky than average self-ratings on items that shift toward caution, since the self-ratings tend to be relatively cautious (.74 in Stoner’s study). Our findings suggest that the self-ideal discrepancy is quite unreflective of item-specific values. How then can we explain the relationship found by Lamm, Schaude, and Trommsdorff (1971) between this discrepancy and shift? Conceivably this discrepancy reflects a “value of risk” that underlies the shifts in their study. Yet such a position would require one to explain why a value of risk should affect the self-ideal discrepancy while item-specific values do not. Another possibility is that these authors were inadvertently composing their groups on the basis of self-esteem, which is often measured by means of such a discrepancy (Wylie, 1968). However other evidence in their study suggests that low self esteem is not predictive of shifts toward risk. One peculiarity of the Lamm et al. study is that dyads were employed, unlike all other studies in this field. Before serious efforts are made to interpret the Lamm results, it seems wise to ascertain whether they can be replicated in groups of a more conventional size. J To be consistent have to lie between
with the data from Stoner probabilities of .6 and .7.
(1968).
this psychological
midpoint
would
310
PRUITT
AND
STUDY
COSENTINO
II
The purpose of this study was to evaluate the assumptions that item-specific values underlie the choice shift, with an across-people (group-composition) design. Two hypotheses based on this assumption were tested: (I) On an issue in which risk taking is instrumental to achieving individual freedom, groups whose members place a relatively high value on freedom will shift more toward risk than groups whose members place a relatively low value on freedom. (2) On an issue in which risk taking is instrumental to achieving equality, groups whose members place a relatively high value on equality will shift more toward risk than groups whose members place a relatively low value on equality. Direct measures of value strength were employed-scores on the freedom and equality scales of the Rokeach Value Scale (RVS).
Subjects One hundred female undergraduates participated. All were volunteers from an introductory psychology course and received subject-pool credit for their participation. They were selected from a larger group of 151 on the basis of scores on the RVS, which were obtained in a mass-testing session about a month before the experiment began.
Design Two 2 x 2 designs were employed, one pertaining to the value of freedom and the other to the value of equality. Both employed the following two variables: (a) Value strengrh, with high value of freedom (HiF) or equality (HiE) consisting of scores from 1 to 7 on the RVS and low value of freedom (LoF) or equality (LoE) consisting of scores from 11 to 18. (b) Group vs individual. In the group condition 4 subjects, homogeneous in value, interacted with one another. In the individual condition, subjects were run as individuals. Twenty groups and 20 matched individuals were run. All but one group and one individual were used in both designs. Ten groups and individuals were HiE and a like number were LoE. Ten groups and individuals were HiF and nine groups and individuals LoF. It was impossible to find more LoF subjects, so the extra group and individual (both of which had HiE) had a moderate level of the freedom value and were not used in the freedom design. Because of the moderate correlation that exists between rankings of freedom and equality on the RVS. there were more HiF-HiE (6) and LoF-LoE (6) groups and individuals than LoF-HiE (3) and HiF-LoE (4) groups and individuals.
Materials The same booklet of choice-dilemma items was used as in the first study, consisting of the F-item, the E-item, and three filler items. These items were used because the results of study f had indicated that answers to the F-item and E-item reflect the strength of the corresponding values as measured by the RVS.
Procedure Five subjects with the same value outlook reported simultaneously to the laboratory. Four of these were randomly assigned to the group condition and one to the individual condition. The subjects in the group conditions were instructed to indicate their risk preferences on the five dilemma items. They were then asked to discuss each item for 5 min and attempt to arrive at a group consensus, which was to be recorded in a second item booklet. If they did not reach consensus within the 5 min, they were to record their individual risk preferences in this booklet. The discussions were taped. The subjects in the individual condition went to a room adjacent to the group room prior
VALUES
IN
CHOICE
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SHIFT
to instructing subjects in the group condition. There they were asked to indicate their risk preferences on the five dilemma items. They were then asked to record all the reasons they could think of for and against each alternative and rerate each item. Five minutes were allotted to reconsidering each item. In contrast to Study I, other-ratings and ideal-ratings were not solicited because of a fear that they would influence the choice shift.
RESULTS AND
DISCUSSION
Table 3 shows the mean level of risk initially taken on the two critical items. Scores for the F-item are shown as a function of the value of freedom and scores for the E-item as a function of the value of equality. Subjects were treated as individuals for the statistical analyses of these data inasmuch as they had not interacted in the groups up to the point at which these data were collected. The results of these analyses are shown in Table 4. As in Study I, subjects who placed a higher value on freedom took greater risk on the F-item and those who valued equality more highly took greater risk on the E-item. Unlike Study I, the relationship between value and risk taking was stronger for freedom than for equality.5 Unexpected interactions were found between value strength and the group-individual variable for both items, with statistical significance in the case of the F-item. In both cases, the effect of values on risk taking was greater in the individual than the group condition. It should be noted that these risk-taking measurements were made before the onset of discussion in the group condition when subjects were only coacting with one another. These results can be seen as providing support for those aspects of pluralistic ignorance and release theories which hold that perTABLE MEAN
INITIAL
LEVEL
OF RISK
ON THE
3 F-ITEM
Ranking of freedom value
Group condition Individual condition
AND
E-ITEM
IN
STUDY
IIn
Ranking of equality value
HiF
LoF
HiE
LoE
4.53 3.50
6.80 9.00
4.43 4.10
5.20 6.70
a Scores in the left side of the table are based on the F-item. Those in the tight side. on the E-item. Lower scores indicate a preference for higher risk. 5 In the group condition, the chess item shifted toward risk as usual (D = .70, p i .05) and the marriage item toward caution as usual (fi = -.69, p < .05). But the job item, which has traditionally produced a sizeable shift toward risk, shifted somewhat toward caution (6 = -.30, ns). This provides further evidence of a cultural drift toward caution on this item.
312
PRUITT
COSENTINO
AND
TABLE ANALYSES
OF VARIANCE
FOR
Freedom
vs. individual value
I 1 1
LEVEL
value F-item
4 A: Group B: Hi-Lo AxB Error
4
INITIAL
OF RISK
and
STUDY
Equality
F
P
.51
ns
II
value E-item
df
1 1 1
27.42 .OOOl 5.32 .OS (MS = 7.3859)
91
IN
and
F
P
.s7
ns
3.38 .07 1.38 .25 (MS = 9.6164)
96
ceived group norms deter an individual from the full expression of his values-making him less extreme than he would really like to be. Presumably group norms are more salient in a coacting situation, such as obtained under the group condition, than in a socially isolated situation, such as was found in the individual condition. For the choice shift data, groups were the unit of analysis in the group condition and individuals in the individual condition. Shift scores were calculated as follows: Final risk preference was subtracted from initial preference for all subjects. In the individual condition, the shift score was the discrepancy resulting from this operation. In the group condition, the shift score was the mean discrepancy for the members of a group. A positive score on this index can be interpreted as showing a shift toward risk. Comparisons between the group and individual conditions could not be made with parametric statistics because of highly skewed distributions in the individual condition. Hence nonparametric statistics were employed. Median shift scores are given in Table 5. Significant differences were found between groups and individuals for the HiF (U = 23, p < .05) and the HiE (U < 17, p < .05) conditions. The difference that can be seen in the LoF condition did not reach signihcancy (U = 34). All of these differences were in the direction of a greater shift TABLE MEDIAN
SHIFTS
IN RISK
FOR
THE
5 F-ITEM
AND
n Same footnote
applies
as in Table
IN
II”
STUDY
Ranking of equality value
Ranking of freedom value
Group condition Individual condition
E-ITEM
HiF
LoF
1 .oo .oo
1.25
.68
.oo
.oo
.oo
.oo
3.
HiE
LoE
VALUES
IN CHOICE
SHIFT
313
toward risk in the group condition, except for the LoE condition where the median shift was zero. These data suggest that both the F-item and the E-item will ordinarily shift toward risk in randomly composed groups. It will be seen that, in the group condition, HiF and LoF exhibited nearly the same degree of shift-contrary to Hypothesis I. HiE exhibited somewhat greater shift than LoE, in the direction postulated by Hypothesis II, but this trend did not reach statistical significance (t(18) = 1.45, p < .20>. Hence Hypothesis II cannot be said to have received support. In summary, no evidence was found of a relationship between value strength and the extent of shift. These results are reminiscent of negative findings from two other studies, whose bearing on our hypotheses was not recognized at the inception of our investigation. In both of these studies (Teger & Pruitt, 1967; Vidmar, 1970), no relationship was found between the initiul risk of the members of a group and the direction or extent of their subsequent shift.6 Since, as was shown in Study I initial risk reflects the strength of relevant values, these results support ours.7 CONCLUSIONS
The apparent tendency of the F-item and E-item to shift toward risk in Study II is an unexpected result in light of the finding in Study I that others are viewed as more risky than the self on both items. Most research to date has shown the contrary, that people typically view others as more cautious than themselves on items that shift toward risk. This result would cast doubt on the basic postulate of value theory that values are the driving force behind the choice shift, if we were to assume that the other-self discrepancy is a valid measure of value strength. But the partial correlation analysis of Study I suggests that we cannot make this assumption. Rather this result calls into question two theories about the mechanisms by which values produce the shift, norm-comparison 6 Vidmar’s study was marred by absence of controls for regression to the mean, but his data are such that it is hard to believe that a relationship would have appeared between initial risk and the extent of shift if proper controls had been included. The Teger-Pruitt study controlled for regression by including a no discussion condition. The correlation between initial risk and shift toward risk was -.322 for this condition compared to .022 for the discussion condition. Since the difference between these coefficients was nonsignificant (z = .79), it seems reasonable to conclude that the regression effect was not obscuring a positive correlation between initial risk and the extent of shift in the discussion condition. ’ One group composition study has been reported (Myers & Bishop, 1970) in which initial decisions were predictive of the direction of shift. But the decisions concerned white attitudes toward blacks rather than risk taking and hence are not relevant to the issues raised in this article.
314
PRUITT
AND
COSENTINO
theory (Brown, 1965) and pluralistic-ignorance theory (Levinger & Schneider, 1969), both of which clearly imply that others will initially be seen as more cautious than oneself on all items that shift toward risk. Other evidence against these theories is summarized by Pruitt (1971b). The unusual feature of our findings on the F-item and E-item is that other people are seen as taking so much risk. The means of 4.56 and 3.84 on these items are lower than ordinarily found on any of the choice dilemmas in the Kogan and WaIlach list. (This statement is based on national norms computed by Pruitt and Teger, 1967.) A possible explanation for this finding can be given as follows: Unlike the typical choice-dilemma item where, as was postulated earlier, people are rather uncertain about the probable response of others, the F-item and E-item may have evoked certain myths about ideology on university campuses, at least during the school year 1971-1972 when this study was run. At this time, university students had a reputation for being quite radical in the realms of freedom and equality, assiduously embracing both values, which were often publicly endorsed on campus. Our data can be interpreted as indicating that students viewed one another in terms of this reputation, producing a condition of pluralistic ignorance8 in which others were seen as more oriented toward freedom and equality than oneself and hence more willing to take risk in the pursuit of these values. By casting doubt on methods previously used to measure value strength, the results from Study I call into question some of the evidence that has been cited to support the assumption that values underlie the choice shift. This assumption is further weakened by our failure to find support for the two hypotheses in Study II and by the findings on initial risk in the studies by Vidmar and Teger and Pruitt that were discussed earlier. In the light of all this negative evidence, it may be best to abandon this assumption. Viable alternatives to value theory include (a) leader-conJ&nce theory (Burnstein, 1969), which assumes that groups shift in the direction of their most confident member, (b) persuasivearguments theory (Burnstein & Vinokur, 1973). which assumes that group members shift when they hear compelling arguments that have not been previously encountered and (c) commitment theory Moscovici & Zavalloni, 1969), which assumes that group members shift further in the direction toward which they are initially attracted because of the commitments they make during the discussion. s In addition, the four theories about the mechanisms that produce the shift, which were described at in this context does not refer to Levinger 8 The use of the term “pluralistic ignorance” and Schneider’s pluralistic-ignorance theory. Similar examples of pluralistic ignorance on a college campus have been reported by Korte (1972). 9 There are some problems of empirical support for commitment theory (Pruitt, 1971a).
VALUES
IN CHOICE
SHIFT
315
the beginning of this article, can be recast to explain the impact of driving forces other than values.1o However, it should be noted that one solid piece of evidence remains to support the assumption that values drive the shift. This is Stoner’s (1968) finding of shifts toward risk on items for which the values favoring risk are more fully endorsed than the values favoring caution and shifts toward caution on items for which the opposite is true. Hence, rather than discarding value theory, it may be possible to refine it in such a way as to embrace both Stoner’s positive across-items findings and the negative across-groups findings of Vidmar, Teger-Pruitt, and Study II. One might, for example, assume high value CO~WZSUS among college students such that, on items that shift toward risk, almost everyone endorses the values favoring risk more fully than the values favoring caution, though some do so more fully than others. Hence the values press toward risk taking (and hence toward a shift in the risky direction) even in the case of people whose initial risk level and endorsement of values favoring risk are not very high. Such an assumption seems reasonable for the F-item and E-item, which tap into values (freedom and equality) that are widely shared on campuses, and not unreasonably for risk-oriented items in the standard list. A similar assumption of high value consensus in the cautious direction could plausibly be made for the items that shift toward caution. In line with release theory, one might then postulate that people move a standard distance toward the position of the group member who best exemplifies the culturally dominant value position, regardless of how much risk is initially taken by the group. Or in line with relevant-arguments theory, one might postulate that arguments supporting the culturally dominant values are generated equally in groups of initially high or low risk takers and are equally persuasive to both kinds of group. REFERENCES Brown, R. So&/ psychology. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1965. Burnstein, E. An analysis of group decisions involving risk (“the risky shift”). Human Relations. 1969, 22, 381-395. Bumstein, E., & Vinokur, A. Testing two classes of theories about group induced shifts in individual choice. Jouvnul of Persondity and Social Psychology. 1973, 9, 123-137. Burnstein, E., Vinokur, A., & Pichevin, M. F. What do differences between own, admired and attributed choices have to do with group induced shifts in choice? Journnl of E.uperimental Social Psychology. 1974. 10. 428443. lo Such a revision is essential under any circumstances if any of these four theories is to be employed in explaining other manifestations of the choice shift, such as changes in attitude strength.
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Carlson, Julia A., & Davis, C. M. Cultural values and the risky shift: A cross-cultural test in Uganda and the United States. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1971. 3, 392-399. Clark, R. D., III Crockett, W. H., & Archer. R. L. Risk-as-value hypothesis: The relationship between perception of self, others, and the risky shift. Journal of Personality and Social
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Fraser, C. Group risk-taking and group polarization. Paper presented at the European Association of Social Psychology Conference. Konstanz, 1970. Korte, C. Pluralistic ignorance about student radicalism. Sociometry, 1972, 35, 576-587. Lamm, H., Schaude, E., & Trommsdorlf, G. Risky shift as a function of group members’ value of risk and need for approval. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 197 1, 3,430-435. Lamm, H.. Trommsdorff. G., & Rost-Schaude. E. Self-image, perception of peers’ risk acceptance and risky shift. European Journal of Social Psychology. 1972. 2-3, 255-272. Levinger. G., & Schneider, D. J. Test of the “risk is a value” hypothesis. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1969, 11, 165-170. McCauley, C., Kogan, N., & Teger, A. I. Order effects in answering risk dilemmas for self and others. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1971, 3, 423-424. Moscovici, S., & Zavalloni. M. The group as a polarizer of attitudes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1969, 12, 125-135. Myers, D. G., & Bishop, G. D. Discussion effects on racial attitudes. Science, 1970. 169, 77&779. Pruitt, D. G. Choice shifts in group discussion: An introductory review. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1971a. 3, 339-360. Pruitt, D. G. Conclusions: Toward an understanding of choice shifts in group discussion. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 197lb, 3, 495-510. Pruitt, D. G., & Teger, A. I. Is there a shift toward risk in group discussion? Zf so, is it a group phenomenon? If so, what causes it? Paper presented at the meeting of the American Psychological Association, Washington, D. C. September 1967. Rokeach. M. Beliefs, Attitudes and Values. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1968. Silverthorne. C. P. Information input and the group shift phenomenon in risk taking. Journal
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St. Jean, R. Reformulation of the value hypothesis in group risk taking. Proceedings 78th Annual
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Stoner, J. A. F. Risky and cautious shifts in group decisions: The influence of widely held values. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1968, 4, 442-459. Teger. A. I., & Pruitt, D. G. Components of group risk taking. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1967, 3, 189-205. Vidmar, N. Group composition and the risky shift. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1970, 6, 153-166. Wallach. M. A., & Wing, C. W., Jr. Is risk a value? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1968, 9, 101-106. Wylie, R. C. The present status of self theory. In E. F. Borgatta and W. W. Lambert (Eds.), Chapter II. Handbook of Personality Theory and Research. Chicago: Rand, McNally, l%S. (Received April 11, 1973)