The semantics and pragmatics of metadiscourse

Journal of Pragmatics 37 (2005) 1325–1353 www.elsevier.com/locate/pragma

The semantics and pragmatics of metadiscourse Elly Ifantidou Department of Linguistics, Faculty of English Studies, University of Athens, GR 157 84 Athens, Greece Received 4 May 2004; received in revised form 15 October 2004; accepted 25 November 2004

Abstract This paper argues against standard views of academic metadiscourse [Hyland, Ken, 1998. Persuasion and context: the pragmatics of academic metadiscourse. Journal of Pragmatics 30, 437–455; Hyland, Ken, 1999. Talking to students: metadiscourse in introductory coursebooks. English for Specific Purposes 18, 3–26; Vande Kopple, William J., 1985. Some explanatory discourse on metadiscourse. College Composition and Communication 36, 82–93; Vande Kopple, William J., 1988. Metadiscourse and the recall of modality markers. Visible Language 22, 233–272] which treat metadiscourse as essentially linked to non-propositional, rhetorical, stylistic, peripheral, or secondary aspects of interpretation. I redefine metadiscourse on theoretically justified grounds as either inter-textual or intra-textual. In inter-textual cases, other texts (by other authors or by the author herself at another time) are drawn upon within a single text (e.g., ‘There have been reports of . . .’, ‘The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists has recommended that . . .’); in intratextual cases, reference is made to other parts of the same text (or to the author herself) (e.g., ‘the questions that I want to consider are . . .’, ‘I shall presently return to this point in some detail’). Drawing both on authentic (linguistic and medical) examples and on experimental evidence, I argue, using the framework of Relevance Theory [Sperber, Dan, Wilson, Deirdre, 1986/1995. Relevance: Communication and Cognition. Blackwell, Oxford; Wilson, Deirdre, Sperber, Dan, 2004. Relevance theory. In: Ward, G., Horn, L.R. (Eds.), Handbook of Pragmatics. Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 607–632], that (a) at the semantic level, metadiscourse may contribute to the propositional content of utterances and (b) at the pragmatic level, metadiscourse is indispensable to the effective interpretation of academic discourse. # 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. Keywords: Relevance Theory; Metadiscourse; Intra-/inter-textual; Truth-conditional; Explicit/implicit; Descriptive/interpretive; Conceptual/procedural; Optimal relevance

E-mail address: [email protected]. 0378-2166/$ – see front matter # 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.pragma.2004.11.006

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1. Introduction ‘Metadiscourse’ has traditionally been used as a fuzzy term – an umbrella term, which covers a quite disparate range of data. Williams (1981: 211–212) defines metadiscourse as ‘‘writing about writing, whatever [my emphasis] does not refer to the subject matter being addressed’’, and Swales points out that ‘‘although the concept of metadiscourse is easy enough to accept in principle, it is much more difficult to establish its boundaries’’ (Swales, 1990: 188). One problem for Swales is that he has to treat connectives such as therefore, or word glosses (x means y), as less likely to function as metadiscourse elements than do expressions such as ‘we have now discussed . . .’, ‘it is unfortunate that . . .’, ‘readers might wish to . . .’, etc. (ibid.). A possible solution is to treat ‘metadiscourse’ as a fuzzy, or prototypical, term rather than a properly theoretical one. I would like to propose an alternative, more theoretically grounded approach. Most writings on metadiscourse see metadiscourse elements as including a wide variety of lexical items, such as: (1)

Discourse connectives but, therefore, so Adverbs presumably, obviously, interestingly Modals might, possible Speech-act verbs suppose, claim, assume, suggest Mental-state verbs think, consider, believe, doubt Personal pronouns I, we, my, their Text developers namely, for example, in other words, first, next, etc. (see Hyland, 2000: 111; Vergaro, 2002: 1214–1215; Camiciottoli, 2003: 4–6)

Apart from lexical items, metadiscourse has also been seen as linked to punctuation, to typographic markers such as parentheses and underlining (Hyland, 1999), and to visual, nonlinguistic design features such as paragraph indentations, structure layout, consistency of tone (of a text) with format or with quality of paper-printing, among other things (see Kumpf, 2000). Thus, a truly wide-ranging, disparate set of data is included under this heading. Turning to definitions, metadiscourse has been standardly viewed as discourse which goes beyond and above the actual content of the basic propositional information being presented, indicating to readers how they may ‘‘organize, classify, interpret, evaluate, and react’’ (Vande Kopple, 1985: 83) to information presented in the text (see also Halliday, 1973; Vande Kopple, 1988; Mauranen, 1993; Hyland, 1998, 1999; Hyland and Tse, 2004). In Style: Ten Lessons in Clarity and Grace, a work on rhetoric and composition, Williams viewed metadiscourse as a stylistic device which in semantic terms is external to the propositional content of the discourse and in pragmatic terms is an aid to interpretation of the discourse (Williams, 1981; see also Vande Kopple, 1985: 83). In recent years, there has been an upsurge of interest in metadiscourse from a variety of discourse or ESP perspectives, albeit with little concern for standard theoretical assumptions such as those outlined above, or for how a reconsideration of these assumptions might affect the domain of teaching methodology (which much of this research seems to originate from or be directed at). Against such standard assumptions on metadiscourse, this paper aims:

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1. to recast the notion of metadiscourse in theoretically more justified terms; 2. to reconsider the nature of metadiscourse in semantic and pragmatic terms. In Section 1, I reconsider the notion of metadiscourse, and in Section 2, I show how in the framework of relevance theory, the nature of metadiscourse can be re-assessed in both semantic (Section 2.1) and pragmatic terms (Section 2.2).

1.1. Metadiscourse reconsidered With regard to semantics, Vande Kopple has explicitly made the point that metadiscourse items are non-propositional, i.e., non-truth-conditional: ‘‘What is common to all seven kinds of metadiscourse and what justifies considering them all as functioning on a different level from that of the primary discourse is that they do not expand the propositional information of the text. They do not make claims about states of affairs in the world that can be either true or false [my emphasis].’’ (Vande Kopple, 1985: 85) This assumption about the non-truth-conditional status of metadiscourse expressions seems to have slipped into other recent work too: ‘‘One important means by which texts depict the characteristics of an underlying community is through the writer’s use of metadiscourse. All academic disciplines have conventions of rhetorical personality which influence the ways writers intrude into their texts to organize their arguments and represent themselves, their readers, their attitudes. This is largely accomplished through non-propositional material, or metadiscourse [my emphasis].’’ (Hyland, 1999: 5; see also Hyland and Tse, 2004: 159, 167) This distinction between propositional and non-propositional, or truth-conditional and non-truth-conditional elements, along with the more detailed typology standardly cited in the literature (see Hyland, 1998: 442; 1999: 7; Hyland and Tse, 2004: 169), which ultimately derives from Halliday (1985/1994) and Vande Kopple (1985, 1988), seems to have been adopted recently by a number of commentators (Le, 2004: 690; Fuertes-Olivera et al., 2001: 1296; Thompson, 2003: 7; Camiciottoli, 2003: 4, among others). In these typologies, however, the central boundary between ‘textual’ and ‘interpersonal’1 metadiscourse appears to be fuzzy, as a closer reading of the definitions suggests: ‘‘Textual metadiscourse refers to devices which allow the recovery of the writer’s intention by explicitly establishing preferred interpretations of propositional meanings.’’ (Hyland, 1998: 442; author’s emphasis) and ‘‘Interpersonal metadiscourse alerts readers to the author’s perspective towards both the propositional information and the readers themselves, thus 1

Or between ‘interactive’ and ‘interactional’ (resources) (as in Hyland and Tse, 2004).

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contributing to the writer-reader relationship and anticipating the subjective negatability of statements.’’ (Hyland, 1998: 443; author’s emphasis; see also Hyland and Tse, 2004: 168) The two definitions seem to overlap, since markers in the former category convey the ‘writer’s . . . preferred interpretations of propositional meanings’ and markers in the latter category express the ‘author’s perspective towards . . . the propositional information’ conveyed (Hyland, 1998: 442–443; Hyland and Tse, 2004: 168). In other words, expressing the writer’s attitude to propositional content seems to be the key metadiscoursal function in both of Hyland’s categories and it is not clear how the textual/interpersonal (or interactive/ interactional) distinction is really being drawn. When it comes to assigning individual lexical items to particular subcategories of these two basic categories, things become even more complicated. For example, in Hyland’s taxonomy, ‘evidentials’ (Z states, according to X), ‘emphatics’/‘boosters’ (in fact, definitely), and ‘hedges’ (might, perhaps) all in fact refer to or express the writer’s/speaker’s degree of commitment to the propositional content; so why multiply categories if just one, e.g., ‘evidentials’, would do? Similarly, how do ‘person markers’/‘self-mentions’ (we, they . . . – ‘‘explicit reference to authors’’) and ‘evidentials’ (according to X, Z states . . . – ‘‘refer to source of information from other texts’’) really differ – or do they need to differ, since both indicate reference to writers or other ‘authors’? Even though my main concern here is to simplify existing classifications of metadiscourse elements, I would still expect to have to deal with two broad metadiscoursal categories, which as will be shown, may be independently justified in theoretical terms. Metadiscourse elements may be either intra-textual, when specific reference is made to other parts of the same text (or to the author herself) (e.g., the questions that I want to consider are. . ., I shall presently return to this point in some detail), or inter-textual, when other texts (or other authors, or the author herself at another time) are referred to within a single text (e.g., There have been reports of. . ., The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists has recommended that. . .). Given this twofold distinction, metadiscourse may indeed be said to include a variety of lexical items (as illustrated by the examples in (1) above) and longer constructions (as illustrated by the examples in (2) below2): (2) a. 1more intriguing, 2to me at least, is the possibility that, (Chomsky, 1975: 4) b. One reason for studying language – and for me personally the most compelling reason – is that it is tempting to regard language, . . ., as ‘‘a mirror of mind.’’ (ibid.) c. I am not going to try to summarize the current state of knowledge in the areas of language study that I know something about, or to discuss ongoing research in any depth (ibid.: 4–5) d. I do not mean by this simply that . . . (ibid.: 4) 2 All examples under (2) have been selected for the purposes of this analysis from academic books on Cognitive Linguistics (examples 2a–h) and on Obstetrics and Gynaecology (examples 2i–x). References appear in Appendix A, Part B.

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e. the questions that I want to consider are . . . (ibid.: 5) f. I shall presently return to this point in some detail. 1For the moment, 2suffice it to suggest that . . . (Fodor, 1975: 66) g. This is all true and well taken, but the present point is that it doesn’t prejudice the notion that . . . (ibid.: 62) h. 1One can get into no end of trouble by confusing this point. 2For example, 3Dreyfus (1972), 4if I understand him correctly, appears to endorse the following argument against the possibility of. . . (ibid.) i. There have been reports of. . . (DeCherney and Nathan, 2003: 267) j. The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists has recommended that . . . (ibid.: 268) k. As previously described, it is possible that after appropriate pretreatment to stain metaphase spreads with special stains . . . (ibid.: 106) l. As has been stated, nondisjunction may give rise to conditions of trisomy (ibid.: 105). m. This section will be devoted to a brief discussion of various autosomal abnormalities (ibid.: 107) n. There are data to suggest that women with infertility, whether treated or untreated, are at high risk of having a perinatal death. (ibid.: 987) o. These findings are consistent with the concept of variability in a woman’s response to the menopause; . . . (ibid.: 1029) p. Reports from community-based cohort studies have refined knowledge in the area of mood, mentation and menopause (ibid.). q. The initial longitudinal report of the U.S. cohort found an increase in overall nonspecific symptoms . . . (ibid.) r. Studies using the opioid antagonist naloxone have demonstrated that . . . (ibid.) s. Of particular importance is enhanced aromatization of androgens. (ibid.: 1030) t. Many practitioners believe that the most effective aspect of hospitalization is actually isolating the patient from the stressors of her life at home (ibid.: 1081) u. The latter (hyperemesis gravidarum) is a severe form of nausea that may occur at any time during pregnancy. (ibid.) v. There is some support for an association with multiple birth and past pregnancy loss. (ibid.) w. 1It is estimated that nearly 50% of eclamptic patients who die have myocardial hemorrhages . . . 2It is obvious that optimal anesthetic management of these patients during the intrapartum period must include a careful preanesthetic evaluation of the cardiovascular and central nervous system. (ibid.: 493) x. Some microorganisms are uniformly susceptible to certain drugs; if such organisms are isolated from the patient, they need not to be tested for drug susceptibility. For example, group A and B streptococci and clostridia respond predictably to penicillin. (ibid.: 751)

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Classifying metadiscourse expressions, whether syntactically simple, as in (1), or more complex, as in (2), under labels such as ‘frame’, ‘endophoric’, ‘relational’, ‘attitude’ markers, etc. (Hyland, 1999: 7; Hyland and Tse, 2004: 169) is theoretically inadequate because of the hazy distinctions and overlapping categories involved; moreover, it fails to explain why metadiscourse is essential in interpreting academic discourse. It should also be noted that analyzing metadiscourse expressions drawn only from one side of the inter-textual/intra-textual dichotomy may have significant theoretical implications of descriptive and explanatory interest, and to these I will turn in the next section. My discussion will focus on linguistic metadiscourse in academic texts. The examples in (2) are representative of the variety and complexity of linguistic metadiscourse in this type of writing. As noted above, I propose to view metadiscourse as either intra-textual (referring to other parts of the same text) or inter-textual (referring to other texts or authors, or the author herself at another time), or a combination of the two. Tables 1 and 2 are meant to illustrate – but neither to exhaust nor to restrict – the type of expressions each broad metadiscoursal category may include. The importance of these examples is that they allow us to reject standard claims in the literature to the effect that metadiscourse is distinct from propositional content, and functions as a commentary upon this content rather than part of it. The pragmatic literature deals only briefly with the problem of metadiscourse, focusing mainly on its role in facilitating the interpretation of the propositional information conveyed. The type of role that metadiscourse has been accorded so far by pragmatics is summed up by Fuertes-Olivera et al., as quoted below: ‘‘As a central pragmatic construct, metadiscourse ‘‘allows us to see how writers seek to influence readers’ understanding of both their attitude towards the content and the audience’’ (Hyland, 1998: 437). . . . In a pragmatic sense, people use language to achieve their specific purposes in accordance with two basic principles: cooperation and least effort. . . . metadiscourse is essential, because it helps to organize word(s) as a coherent text and conveys a writer’s personality, credibility, reader sensitivity and relationship to the message (Crismore et al., 1993). Metadiscourse, then, is not an independent stylistic device which authors can vary at will. It is integral to the contexts in which it occurs and is intimately linked to the norms and expectations of particular cultural and professional communities’’ (Hyland, 1998: 438). In other words, to understand the pragmatics of metadiscourse we must situate it in its appropriate setting and genre.’’ (FuertesOlivera et al., 2001: 1292) Metadiscourse is indeed ‘central’ to the interpretation of texts; as Hyland points out, it is culture – as well as profession-specific; and as Crismore observes, some notion of ‘least effort’ has certainly a key role to play in our efforts to interpret incoming information (written or oral). But unless one provides a proper pragmatic framework for such claims, they merely represent a collection of more or less interesting views on the pragmatics of metadiscourse, while failing to provide a coherent overall account of its essential contribution to the interpretation process.

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Table 1 Intra-textual metadiscourse categories Intra-textual Sequence markers below, above, following, next, finally, first, second, third Discourse connectives3 A. but, so, after all, therefore, nevertheless, furthermore, although B. in other words, for example, in short, that is, in addition to C. because, and, then Evidential parenthetical verbs I believe, we suggest, I think, I agree, we doubt Evidential main-clause verbs We estimate that . . ., I suppose that . . ., we believe that . . . Evidential adverbials clearly, obviously, evidently Attitudinal adverbials frankly, surprisingly, unfortunately, interestingly Likelihood adverbials necessarily, possibly, probably, presumably Prepositional phrases by means of . . ., in comparison with . . ., in relation to . . ., as for . . ., except for . . . , due to . . . Modals might, perhaps, may, could

My aim here is to show that metadiscourse:  is not merely a matter of style;  is not necessarily distinct from propositional content;  does not merely influence interpretation. As I will try to show, metadiscourse expressions often do contribute to the propositional content communicated and/or facilitate interpretation of the utterance in

3 As Blakemore (2002) suggests, discourse markers have been misleadingly treated as a homogeneous semantic class of expressions. It would do more justice to a range of fine-grained distinctions (in terms of meaning and functions) if discourse markers were analysed as ‘‘clusters of discourse connectives with similar (not identical) meanings’’, which ‘‘make different kinds of contribution to the interpretation of utterances containing them’’. The A, B and C clusters of discourse connectives are formed by superimposing the relevance-theoretic tripartite distinctions between truth-conditional versus non-truth-conditional meaning, conceptual versus procedural meaning and (constraints on) explicit versus implicit content communicated.

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Table 2 Inter-textual metadiscourse categories Inter-textual Parenthetical verbs they claim, X suggests, Z believes Main-clause verbs they claim that . . ., X suggests that . . ., Z believes that . . . Evidential adverbials apparently, supposedly, seemingly, clearly, obviously, evidently Impersonal verb constructions it is estimated/recommended/suggested/assumed that . . ., it appears/seems that . . . Prepositional phrases according to . . ., along with . . ., owing to . . ., away from . . ., in comparison with . . ., in relation to . . ., as for . . ., except for . . . Hearsay adverbials reportedly, allegedly

essential ways. Surprisingly, standard assumptions about the non-truth-conditional status of metadiscourse expressions have been uncritically repeated in the literature (Vande Kopple, 1985; Crismore et al., 1993; Mao, 1993; Longo, 1994; Hyland, 1998), and little is ever done to improve on existing rather vague discussions of the pragmatic functions of these expressions. My aim, using the framework of Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson, 1986/1995; Wilson and Sperber, 2004), is to provide a pragmatic explanation of the function of metadiscourse in the interpretation of academic discourse (see Section 2.2 below).

2. Metadiscourse and relevance theory 2.1. The semantics of metadiscourse A growing interest in metadiscourse from a variety of perspectives has been observable in recent years. There has been a great deal of work originating in students’ coursework in writing and composition (Williams, 1981; Vande Kopple, 1985), with later pedagogic implications for ESL university-student essay writing (Intaraprawat and Steffensen, 1995), informal conversations (Craig, 2000), and ESP reading comprehension (Camiciottoli, 2003). Particular grammatical or lexical features have been isolated and analyzed – it clauses in business journal articles and MBA dissertations (Hewings and Hewings, 2002) or evidently in research articles (Silver, 2003). Similarly, genre-specific analyses of mechanical engineering proposals (Longo, 1994), advertisements (Fuertes-Olivera et al.,

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2001), business letters (Vergaro, 2002), editorials (Le, 2004) have also yielded interesting results. Texts whose main function is to ‘talk about other texts’, such as book blurbs, have been analyzed as yet another type of metadiscourse (Mitsikopoulou, 1999). Finally, academic metadiscourse has been investigated with respect to intercultural variation (Mauranen, 1993; Valero-Garce´ s, 1996), research articles (Swales, 1990; Hyland, 1998), non-native PhD students’ dissertation writing (Bunton, 1999), university textbooks (Hyland, 1999), L2 lecture comprehension (Thompson, 2003), EAP textbooks (Moreno, 2003), EAP presentations (‘monologic speech’) or Spanish academic courses (Pe´ rezLlantada, 2003). However, despite the inter-disciplinary perspective of existing research on metadiscourse, there is a striking unanimity on its semantic role. Researchers seem to agree on the non-propositional, secondary, peripheral role of metadiscourse, as succinctly expressed by Hewings and Hewings: ‘‘It (academic discourse) includes, then, not only propositional content [my emphasis], but also linguistic devices, often referred to as metadiscourse . . . by which readers are helped to organize, interpret and evaluate the propositional content.’’ (Hewings and Hewings, 2002: 368) and by Thompson: ‘‘Metadiscourse refers to language in a text which talks about that text rather than the propositional content.’’ (Thompson, 2003: 6) This collective linking of non-propositional content with metadiscourse features runs through most of the literature on metadiscourse (Vande Kopple, 1985: 83; Mauranen, 1993: 9; Intaraprawat and Steffensen, 1995: 253; Kumpf, 2000: 402; Moreno, 2003: 266–267; Silver, 2003: 361). Commentators have been recycling this assumption without ever questioning its semantic (or pragmatic, see Section 2.2) implications – a misreading of the nature of metadiscourse, in my view. Here, I will explain why I see this as a misreading, and suggest a theoretically grounded alternative to this approach. In the framework of relevance theory, lexical meaning is analyzed in terms of a tripartite distinction between (a) truth-conditional versus non-truth-conditional, (b) explicit versus implicit and (c) conceptual versus procedural meaning. My aim here is to show how an analysis based on these three distinctions can adequately accommodate the variety of fine-grained types of meaning and functions different metadiscourse expressions may communicate. To illustrate the three distinctions, let us consider how different types of lexical items are accounted for in terms of (a), (b) and (c). With respect to distinction (a), it has been argued in the framework of relevance theory that, by the standard test for truth conditionality, hearsay adverbials, e.g., allegedly, reportedly, admittedly, are in fact truth-conditional, i.e., they contribute to the propositions

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expressed by utterances containing them (Ifantidou, 2001: 108–109).4 The question asked in the test is whether the speaker of the condition in (4): (3) (4) (5) (6)

Allegedly, weapons of mass destruction are held by Saddam Hussein. If weapons of mass destruction are allegedly held by Saddam Hussein, U.S. president George Bush should order an investigation into evidence. Weapons of mass destruction are held by Saddam Hussein. It is alleged that weapons of mass destruction are held by Saddam Hussein. (adapted from The Guardian ‘No 10 set to decide on WMD inquiry’, Matthew Tempest and agencies, 2/2/2004)

is claiming that George Bush should order an investigation into evidence if (5) is true, or whether she is claiming that George Bush should order an investigation into evidence if (6) is true. Native speakers agree that the correct answer is the latter, that is, Bush should order an investigation regarding (6). If so, then allegedly is contributing to the truth conditions of the utterance, or the proposition the speaker is taken to express. With respect to distinction (b), it has been argued in the framework of relevance theory, that the explicitly communicated content of an utterance is either the basic proposition expressed by the utterance or any higher-level explicatures obtained by (optionally) embedding the proposition expressed under a speech-act verb or a propositional-attitude description (Wilson and Sperber, 1993: 6; Ifantidou, 2001: 130; Carston, 2002). Consider the exchange in (7): (7) (8)

(9)

a. Peter: Are you going on the college trip to Paris? b. Mary: The semantics exam is on the 1st of March. a. The semantics exam is on the 1st March 2004. b. Mary regrets that the exam is on the 1st March 2004. c. Mary thinks that the exam is on the 1st March 2004. d. Mary says that the exam is on the 1st March 2004. Mary won’t be going on the college trip to Paris.

(8a) is the basic proposition expressed by Mary’s utterance in (7b); (8b–d) are assumptions that may be derived by developing the semantic representation in (7b) into explicatures expressing propositional-attitude or speech-act information. Note that only the basic proposition expressed in (8a) contributes to the truth conditions of (7b), whereas the higher-level explicatures in (8b–d) make no contribution to the truth conditions of Mary’s utterance. (9) is one of the implicatures Peter may derive; for an interpretation of Mary’s utterance that satisfies his expectations of relevance, Peter needs to derive not only (8a) but possibly (8b) and certainly (9) too.

4

For systematic testing of evidential adverbials, see Ifantidou (1993, 2001) and Koizumi (1997).

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The point here is that none of (8b–d) is encoded as part of the semantic representation of Mary’s utterance. They are derived by developing the semantic representation of (7b) using (non-linguistic) contextual information to construct the explicatures in (8b–d). The explicatures themselves provide premises for an inferential process which yields the implicature(s) communicated by (7b), in this case, the implicated conclusion that Mary is not going away on the Paris trip organized by her College (as in 9). With respect to distinction (c), lexical meaning is analyzed in the framework of relevance theory in terms of yet another type of contribution it may make to the interpretation of utterances. The claim is that the role of linguistic meaning in utterance interpretation is not exhausted by encoding concepts, which form constituents of semantic representations. Linguistic meaning may also guide pragmatic inferencing by encoding information about the types of pragmatic procedures different utterances may undergo. Mood indicators act, according to Sperber and Wilson, as constraints on the inferential phase of comprehension by guiding the hearer towards the intended propositional attitude – e.g., the attitude of belief for the declarative, the attitude of desire for the imperative. Mood indicators are, in this respect, similar to intonation or use of question marks in writing, which hardly anyone would be tempted to treat in conceptual terms – given the existence of a distinction between conceptual and procedural encoding (for more examples, see 33–34 below; for detailed exposition, see Wilson and Sperber, 1988). A further distinction that will be central to the arguments in this paper is Sperber and Wilson’s distinction between descriptive and interpretive use of language and thought. In the framework of relevance theory, descriptive use is the use of an utterance or thought to represent a state of affairs in an actual or possible world: that state of affairs, which would make it true. Descriptive representation is therefore a relation between a proposition and a state of affairs, which makes it true, and it has already been extensively discussed in truth-conditional semantics. The notion of interpretive use is more original to relevance theory: it is the use of an utterance or thought to represent some other utterance or thought which it resembles in content – i.e., with which it shares logical or contextual implications. For example, direct quotation involves resemblance in linguistic properties and indirect quotation, metaphor, hyperbole, loose talk involve resemblance in content (for more examples, see 18–19 below; for detailed exposition, see Sperber and Wilson, 1986/1995: 224–231; Ifantidou, 2001: 90–95; Carston, 2002). Turning to metadiscourse examples, the question is: how does the relevance-theoretic machinery help, first, to describe the varieties of metadiscourse expressions, and second, to explain their function in pragmatic/cognitive terms? There are at least three arguments, which suggest that there has been a widespread misinterpretation of the semantic nature of lexical metadiscourse. First, it is not as obvious as has been assumed so far that all types of linguistic metadiscourse are non-propositional in nature, i.e., that they do not contribute to the truthconditional content of utterances. As noted above, by the standard test for truth conditionality, it has been shown that evidential adverbials, e.g., obviously, evidently, clearly, and hearsay adverbials, e.g., allegedly, reportedly, admittedly, are propositional,

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i.e., they contribute to the truth conditions of utterances containing them (Ifantidou, 2001: 108–109).4 The evidential adverbial obviously yields similar results to allegedly (examples 3–6 above). For (10), the central question in the embedding test is whether the speaker of the conditional in (11): (10) (11) (12) (13)

The treatments* are obviously going to take many years to develop. If the treatments* are obviously going to take many years to develop, patients should now turn to alternative therapies. Treatments* are going to take many years to develop. It is obvious that treatments* are going to take many years to develop. (* through therapeutic cloning) (adapted from The Guardian ‘Embryo cloning hailed as major step forward?’, George Wright and agencies, 12/2/2004)

is claiming that the truth of (13) is a sufficient condition to justify turning to alternative therapies. On Ifantidou’s account, she is, and it follows that obviously, like allegedly, is making a difference to the truth-conditions of the utterance in which it occurs. However, applying the standard truth-conditionality test to attitudinal adverbials yields different results. Consider (14): (14) (15) (16) (17)

Not surprisingly, most men* responded well. If it is unsurprising that most men* responded well, they may be granted temporary release. Most men* responded well. It is unsurprising that most men* responded well. (*inmates in a resettlement prison, participating in a readjustment programme). (adapted from The Guardian, ‘Bad screws are all it takes to make a bad nick’ Eric Allison, 15/11/2003)

Here, the speaker of (15) will be understood to be claiming that most inmates may be granted temporary release in the state of affairs described by (16), rather than by (17). Attitudinal adverbials are clear-cut cases of non-truth-conditional meaning, and hence, of non-propositional metadiscourse markers. As Blakemore has shown, certain types of discourse connectives (Table 1, sub-categories A and B) are also clear-cut cases of nontruth conditional meaning (see examples 21–23 below; for more detailed analysis, see Blakemore, 1996: 331, 333, 341; 2002: 32–34). However, other types of discourse markers (Table 1, sub-category C) contribute to the truth conditional content of the utterances in which they occur (Blakemore, 2002: 149, 177). As already shown, sentence adverbials may affect the truth-conditions of an utterance in at least two ways. In the first place, they may mark the ground-floor assertion (i.e., the basic proposition expressed) as reflecting the views of someone other than the speaker, thus removing the speaker’s commitment to its truth (and hence altering the truth-conditional status of the ground-floor proposition); this is the case with hearsay adverbials

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(Ifantidou, 2001: 148). In the second place, they may affect the strength of the claim being made (and hence the recommended degree of commitment to the basic proposition expressed) (ibid.: 147); this is the case with evidential adverbials. Ifantidou distinguishes between weak evidentials, e.g., apparently, seemingly, which reduce the range of falsifying evidence, and strong evidentials, e.g., obviously, clearly, which increase the range of falsifying evidence. A parallel is drawn with non-evidential items such as necessarily, certainly, possibly, probably, which are clearly truth-conditional (Ifantidou, 2001: 155). Note, moreover, that in parallel with hearsay adverbials, hearsay parentheticals (e.g., Chomsky says) also make an essential contribution to truth conditions: they indicate that the views being interpreted are not the speaker’s own (ibid.). In relevance-theoretic terms, any lexical item which marks a certain part of an utterance as an interpretation of an utterance or thought attributed to someone other than the speaker marks this part of the utterance as interpretively used. A lexical item, which marks part of an utterance as an interpretation of the speaker’s own thought is descriptively used. By definition, then, when lexical items mark part of an utterance as interpretively, rather than descriptively used, they alter the truth-conditional status of the ground-floor proposition to which they are attached. Compare (18) and (19): (18) (19)

Language is a mirror of the mind, I think. Language is a mirror of the mind, Chomsky says.

The parenthetical in (18) is a descriptive-use marker: it marks the ground-floor assertion as an interpretation of a thought of the speaker (or writer) herself and as such, it does not make any contribution to the truth conditions of the utterance to which it is attached. The parenthetical in (19) is an interpretive-use marker: it marks the ground-floor assertion as an interpretation of a thought of someone other than the speaker (or writer) and as such, it makes a contribution to the truth conditions of the utterance to which it is attached by removing the speaker’s commitment to its truth. Interestingly, the relevance-theoretic descriptive/interpretive distinction partially cross-cuts the intra-textual/inter-textual metadiscourse distinction: any inter-textual metadiscourse expression is interpretively used because it marks an utterance as an interpretation of an utterance or thought attributed to someone other than the speaker (or the speaker herself at another time). As such, any inter-textual metadiscourse expression makes a contribution to the truth conditions of the utterance to which it is attached by removing the speaker’s commitment to its truth (and hence altering the truth-conditional status of the ground-floor proposition). Inter-textual metadiscourse (see Table 2), then, is a category of metadiscoursal lexical markers that has been constructed on theoretically justified grounds, and as a category, it empirically contradicts standard claims about the non-propositional nature of metadiscourse. A similar type of correlation cannot be set up between intra-textual metadiscourse and descriptive use: certain types of intra-textual expressions are truth-conditional (e.g., evidential adverbials, likelihood adverbials)

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whereas others are not (e.g., discourse connectives – Table 2, sub-categories A, B – and attitudinal adverbials). Even so, intra-textual metadiscourse categories are further determined by so far undetected fine-grained distinctions – distinctions which expose empirically justified differences in terms of meaning and function, as will be argued below. A second argument suggesting that there has been a semantic misreading of metadiscourse is based on syntax. Note that only genuinely parenthetical metadiscourse comments can be non-propositional. Ifantidou (2001: 125–127) draws a distinction between genuine parentheticals and their main-clause counterparts, as illustrated in (20): (20) a. b. c. d.

Genuine parentheticals As previously claimed, . . . As has been stated, . . . Obviously, . . . For example, . . .

vs. vs. vs. vs.

Main-clause counterparts It has been previously claimed that . . . It has been stated that . . . It is obvious that . . . Examples such as . . .

and shows that main-clause constructions contribute to the propositional content of the utterance in the regular way (e.g., ‘I think that John is a spy’) whereas genuine parentheticals may (e.g., ‘John is a spy, the newspaper reported yesterday’) or may not contribute to the truth conditions of utterances (e.g., ‘John is, I think, a spy’) (ibid.: chapter 6). It is therefore misleading to treat all metadiscourse expressions as equally nonpropositional: (2 – a1, c, d, e, f1, g, h1, h3, i, j, m, n, o, p, q, r, s, t, u, v, w) are main clause-construction metadiscourse expressions, and as such they clearly contribute to the propositional content of the utterances in the regular way, whereas (2 – a2, b, f2, h2, h4, k, l, x) are genuine parenthetical metadiscourse expressions which, as shown above, may or may not be perceived as making an essential contribution to the proposition expressed by the host-clause. My argument so far, then, is that certain types of metadiscourse markers do not, as standardly claimed, affect the propositional content of the assertion to which they are attached, e.g., attitudinal adverbials, discourse connectives (Table 1, sub-categories A, B) but a wide range of metadiscourse expressions do so, e.g., all intertextual expressions, and certain types of intra-textual expressions, such as likelihood adverbials, evidential main-clause verbs and discourse connectives (Table 1, subcategory C). The third argument supporting the view that there has been a misreading of the semantic nature of metadiscourse is that not all metadiscourse markers make the same type of semantic contribution to the interpretation of the utterances that contain them. It has been argued (Blakemore, 1996: 340) that items such as so, but, and after all must be distinguished from items such as in short, in other words/that is, and for example – the former contributing to the implicit content of an utterance, the latter contributing to the explicit content of an utterance. More specifically, Blakemore argues that after all does not contribute to the proposition expressed by the utterance it prefaces, but constrains its interpretation so that this proposition is understood as a premise. For example, as Blakemore observes (ibid.: 78–79, 95), in (21), after all indicates that (b) is a premise for

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drawing the conclusion in (a) with a stronger degree of commitment than it would have had in the absence of (b) – in other words, (b) is interpreted as evidence for the proposition expressed by (a): (21)

(a)

Tim needs an aspirin, (b) after all, he’s got a headache.

Similarly, so does not contribute to the proposition expressed by the utterance (or clause) it prefaces, but constrains its interpretation so that this proposition is understood as a contextual implication (ibid.: 333). For example, in (22), so indicates that (a) is a premise and (b) a conclusion – in other words, (b) is interpreted as a conclusion derived from (a): (22)

(a)

Tim needs an aspirin, (b) so he’s got a headache.

In the same group of connectives as so, but makes no contribution to the proposition expressed by (23); instead it constrains the interpretation of the utterance by activating the contextual assumption in (24), which combines with the first part of (23) to yield the conclusion in (25), which – as is indicated by the use of but – is contradicted and eliminated by the second part of (23) (Blakemore, 2002: 94). (23) (24) (25)

Sheila is rich but unhappy. All rich people are happy. Sheila is happy. (as in Blakemore, 2002: 92–93)

The non-truth-conditional meaning encoded by so, after all and but makes it possible to derive implicitly communicated information or implicatures. These items thus contribute to the implicatures of an utterance rather than to its explicit propositional content. After all, so and but are linguistic expressions which encode information about which inferential processes will yield the intended interpretation. This becomes even clearer if we consider the same example (as in 21), devoid of any linguistic markers encoding the type of inferential computation the hearer (or reader) is meant to perform so as to derive the intended contextual assumptions and implications. (26)

Tim needs an aspirin. He’s got a headache.

Of course there are two ways to interpret (26) – as shown by (21) and (22) above – but which one is the intended interpretation will be decided, in the case of (26), on purely inferential grounds, with no linguistically encoded guidance whatsoever. On the other hand, that is/in other words, in short, and for example are nontruth-conditional metadiscourse markers encoding information that contributes to explicitly communicated content or explicatures. More specifically, that is/in other words

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are separate discourse units communicating speech-act information along the lines of (27): (27)

The speaker is rephrasing.

Similarly, in short is a separate discourse unit communicating speech-act information along the lines of (28): (28)

The speaker is summarizing.

As Blakemore points out (1996: 330), for example can be similarly analyzed as a separate discourse unit communicating speech-act information along the lines of (29): (29)

The writer provides evidence for his claim that . . .

In relevance theory, the speech-act information in (27), (28) and (29) is part of the explicit content of the utterances containing that is/in other words, in short, and for example, respectively. Recall that the explicitly communicated content is either the basic proposition expressed by the utterance or any higher-level explicatures obtained by (optionally) embedding the proposition expressed under a speech-act or propositionalattitude description (Wilson and Sperber, 1993: 6; Ifantidou, 2001: 130; Carston, 2002). To illustrate, consider (2x) from our initial list of authentic examples, repeated below as (30): (30)

For example, group A and B streptococci and clostridia respond predictably to penicillin.

(31)

a. Group A and B streptococci and clostridia respond predictably to penicillin. b. The writer provides (a) as evidence for his previous claim that some microorganisms are uniformly susceptible to certain drugs. (31a) is the basic proposition expressed by (30) and this determines the truth-conditional content of (30). (31b) is a higher-level explicature communicated by (30), but does not make any contribution to the truth conditions of (30). In this way, the claim that that is/in other words, in short and for example are non-truth-conditional, but contribute to the explicit content of the utterances containing them is nicely accommodated within relevance-theory. Note here that metadiscourse markers along the lines of that is/in other words, in short and for example are similar to genuinely parenthetical comments. Consider (2b) again: (2b)

One reason for studying language – and for me personally the most compelling reason – is that it is tempting to regard language, . . . as ‘‘a mirror of mind.’’

The parenthetical metadiscourse comment in (2b) is analyzed in relevance-theoretic terms as a separate discourse unit communicating the propositional-attitude information in (32):

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Chomsky regards the idea that language is ‘‘a mirror of the mind’’ as the most compelling reason for studying language.

On Ifantidou’s account (2001), parenthetical comments, as in (2b) above, are perceived as making an essential contribution to the propositional content of the utterance (and hence, as falling within the scope of embedding connectives) in two ways: first, by marking the ground-floor assertion as interpretively used, i.e., as communicating the thoughts/views of someone other than the speaker (ibid.: 157) – which is the case for (2 – h3, i, j, n, p, q, r, t, v, w1) and second, by affecting the strength of the assumption communicated (and hence the recommended degree of commitment to the proposition it expresses) (ibid.: 147) – which is the case for (2 – a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h1, h2, h4, k, l, m, s, u, w4, x) – with that is/in other words, in short, for example falling into the latter category. In the former cases, the speaker herself may or may not be committed to the truth of the proposition expressed; in the latter cases, the speaker is committed to the proposition expressed and merely expresses an attitude or degree of commitment to the fact that it is true. The parenthetical comment in (2b), of course, belongs in this latter category. So far, I have shown that metadiscourse connectives may differ in the types of contribution they make to the interpretation of the utterance in which they occur: (a) they may contribute to the truth-conditional content of the utterance or not, and (b) they may contribute to explicit or implicit communication. In the framework of relevance theory, metadiscourse connectives are also analyzed in terms of whether they encode concepts (conceptual meaning) or indicate to the hearer what type of inference process he is in (procedural meaning). For example, but, nevertheless and however, prime a so-called ‘contrastive’ (weakening-effect) procedure whereas moreover, in addition, and for example, prime an ‘accumulative’ (strengtheningeffect) procedure; and clearly, the processing of the two types of metadiscourse markers will yield the respective (opposite) cognitive effects. In relevance-theoretic terms, apparently similar linguistic items may differ as to whether they encode concepts, which directly figure in logical forms, or procedures, which constrain the inferential phase of utterance interpretation. To illustrate the relevancetheoretic distinction between conceptual and procedural meaning as applied to metadiscourse markers, let us compare (33a) with (33b): (33)

a. b.

Ben needs an aspirin. I gather/suppose he’s got a headache. Ben needs an aspirin. So, he’s got a headache.

and (34a) with (34b): (34)

a. b.

Ben needs an aspirin. I know he’s got a headache. Ben needs an aspirin. After all, he’s got a headache.

In (33a), the information that the second part of the utterance is a conclusion is conceptually encoded by means of I gather/I suppose, but it is procedurally activated in (33b) by means of so. Similarly, in (34a), the information that the second part of the utterance is a premise is conceptually encoded by means of I know, but it is

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procedurally activated in (34b) by use of after all. As Blakemore (2002: 85–87) shrewdly points out, the conceptual/procedural distinction is better illustrated by looking at fragmentary utterances and the way these are interpreted by the hearer. For example, on getting her class started, a university lecturer might address her crowdy noisy student audience with (35): (35)

So.

and in a casual chat on the Greek elections, the following dialogue might take place: (36)

a. b.

The conservative party will win. I suppose.

According to Blakemore, for (35), the question is whether there is a single concept encoded by so which hearers are expected to develop into specific assumptions such as: (37)

a. b. c. d.

(looking at students standing at the door) Please close the door and have a seat. So much for the cheerful bustle and the chit-chat. I would like to get the class started. (ostentatiously holding the handouts) There is a handout available.

or whether so, rather than pointing to specific assumptions, simply guides the hearer towards the (unspecified) range and type of assumptions he is expected to recover. On the other hand, for (36b), the question is whether there is a concept encoded by I suppose which the hearer is expected to enrich by contextual assumptions and pragmatic inferencing into explicatures such as: (38)

a. b. c.

The speaker is not certain that conservatives will win. The speaker is disappointed with the prospect of conservatives winning (falling intonation). The speaker is excited at the prospect of conservatives winning (rising intonation).

Notice that what is important in the case of (35) is that the hearer recovers the right general type of cognitive effects, which are constrained by the meaning of so – in this context, constrained along the lines of ‘opening (the floor for) today’s class’. Notice moreover, that for (35), hearers need not recover any of the assumptions in (37); merely getting the right line of cognitive effects activated – e.g., ‘the lecturer is calling for our attention’ – would do the trick for so. Finally, notice that the assumptions in (37) could not be possibly considered as developments of a conceptual representation encoded by so: so encodes a constraint which merely shapes the interpretation procedure, but in no way fully determines its end product.

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In contrast, the assumptions in (38) are all developments of the (incomplete) conceptual representation encoded by I suppose, which directly figures as part of the semantic representation of (36b) and gives access to a range of more specific explicatures, as in (38). The range of explicatures conveyed by (36b), or by any utterance, largely depends on the range of concepts the utterance encodes. The range of implicatures that can be triggered by the use of so in (35) are simply arrived at by following a certain inferential route and constrained by the meaning of so. In relevance-theoretic terms, generally speaking, so triggers the inferential route of ‘drawing a conclusion’, but triggers the inferential route of ‘contradicting and eliminating an existing assumption’, nevertheless triggers the inferential route of ‘contradicting and eliminating an existing assumption in a rhetorical context’, and so on (for an account of discourse markers along these lines, see Blakemore, 2002). Overall, a number of fine-grained and independently motivated distinctions such as those drawn above seem to strongly suggest that metadiscourse expressions cannot be treated as a semantically homogeneous whole. Different metadiscourse expressions should be seen as encoding different kinds of information and making different kinds of contribution to the interpretation of the utterances (or texts) in which they occur. Relevance theory provides the machinery to throw light on the theoretically and empirically justified inter-/intra-textual distinction and produce a unitary descriptive and explanatory account of metadiscourse. The semantic misreading of metadiscourse expressions discussed in this section is one aspect of a more general approach to linguistic metadiscourse. Commentators have also largely underestimated the pragmatics of metadiscourse by typically relating it to a blend of socio-cultural norms and disciplinary conventions. I will argue that within relevance theory, it is possible to provide a unitary account of metadiscourse in both semantic and pragmatic terms, and it is to the pragmatics of metadiscourse that I will turn next. 2.2. The pragmatics of metadiscourse As noted above, metadiscourse has been standardly treated either as a tool helping readers to ‘‘organize content as they read’’ (Crismore and Farnsworth, 1990; Crismore, 1989 in Camiciottoli, 2003: 2) or as a rhetorical, stylistic device helping writers to ‘‘produce a desired effect, depending on their underlying purposes and perception of readers’ expectations’’ (Camiciottoli, 2003: 2; see also Intaraprawat and Steffensen, 1995: 254; Hyland, 1999: 5; Thompson, 2003: 7). The ‘‘pragmatics of academic metadiscourse’’ is summed up by Hyland (1998: 440–441) as follows: ‘‘In sum, metadiscourse can be seen as reflecting writers’ attempts to negotiate academic knowledge in ways that are meaningful and appropriate to a particular disciplinary community. It indicates the writer’s assessment of the cognitive demands the text makes on the reader and an acknowledgement of the community’s interpersonal conventions. . . . the significance of metadiscourse lies in its role in explicating a context for interpretation, and suggesting one way in [sic] which acts of communication define and maintain social groups.’’

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I agree with Hyland that metadiscourse is linked to disciplinary practices and that it differs significantly from discipline to discipline. But what are ‘‘the cognitive demands the text makes on the reader’’? and how can a writer assess them effectively? How does metadiscourse explicate ‘‘a context for interpretation’’ – and what exactly does such a context amount to? Hyland’s claims, as they stand, are too general and vague to account for the pragmatic role of metadiscourse in utterance interpretation; in fact, to regard metadiscourse merely as a tool to aid the comprehension process is to underestimate the contribution it makes. But let me next turn to how relevance theory might account for metadiscourse (Sperber and Wilson, 1986/1995, 2004) in pragmatic/cognitive terms. On the relevance-theoretic approach to pragmatics, an utterance is: ‘‘relevant to an individual when it connects with background information he has available to yield conclusions that matter to him; say, by answering a question he had in mind, improving his knowledge on a certain topic, settling a doubt, confirming a suspicion, or correcting a mistaken impression.’’ (Wilson and Sperber, 2004) According to Wilson and Sperber, the processing of an utterance5 in a context of available assumptions achieves relevance when it yields a positive cognitive effect, making a worthwhile difference to the individual’s representation of the world – e.g., by yielding true conclusions, by providing evidence in support of assumptions which were only weakly evidenced, or by providing decisive evidence against some previously held assumptions. Other things being equal, the greater the positive cognitive affects achieved, the greater the relevance. The relevance of an utterance depends not only on the positive cognitive effects achieved but also on the amount of mental (or ‘processing’) effort required to achieve them. Different utterances may be more or less easy to process linguistically; different contextual assumptions may be more or less accessible; different cognitive effects may be more or less easy to infer. In relevance theory, other things being equal, the smaller the processing effort required (i.e., the smaller the effort of perception, memory and inference required), the greater will be the relevance of the utterance. Relevance, then, is assessed in terms of cognitive effects and processing effort: (39)

Relevance of an input to an individual a. Other things being equal, the greater the positive cognitive effects achieved by processing an input, the greater the relevance of the input to the individual at that time. b. Other things being equal, the smaller the processing effort expended, the greater the relevance of the input to the individual at that time. (Wilson and Sperber, 2004)

To illustrate, consider an artificial example, based on Wilson and Sperber’s example (2004), of a student who is anxious to meet her supervisor. Upon ringing his office to fix an

5 In fact, Wilson and Sperber (2004) talk more generally about the relevance of an ‘input’ to cognitive processes – which may be a sight, a sound, a memory, a conclusion or an utterance.

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appointment, consider how she might react to each of the following true replies: (40) (41) (42)

I’ll see you one day next week at 11:30. I’ll see you next Monday the 12th at 11:30. Either I’ll see you next Monday the 12th at 11:30 or 122 is not 144.

According to the definition of relevance in (39), which utterance would be the most relevant to the student, and why? All three utterances would be relevant to some degree in the circumstances described, because regardless of which one she processes, she would be able to derive the information that she can meet her supervisor the following week. But (41) would be more relevant than either (40) or (42), in the first case for reasons of cognitive effect, and in the second case for reasons of processing effort. In the first place, (41) yields more cognitive effects than (40), because it specifies not only the time but also the date of the meeting; assuming that it is roughly as easy to process, it will therefore be more relevant that (40). In the second place, although (41) and (42) have exactly the same cognitive effects in the situation described, the effects are easier to derive from (41) than from (42), which involves substantially more parsing and inference (in order to reject the second disjunct as false and consequently accept the first as true). On this approach, then, relevance is a matter of degree, depending on the size of effect achieved and the amount of effort required to derive this effect. Relevance theory claims that humans have the natural tendency to maximize relevance – in Wilson and Sperber’s words: ‘‘. . . the human cognitive system has developed in such a way that our perceptual mechanisms tend automatically to pick out potentially relevant stimuli, our memory retrieval mechanisms tend automatically to activate potentially relevant assumptions, and our inferential mechanisms tend spontaneously to process them in the most productive way.’’ (Wilson and Sperber, 2004) For example, on hearing the sound of a car alarm in the neighborhood, we will most likely attend to it involuntarily, but we will find it most relevant, and draw the most rewarding consequences, when our memory and inference mechanisms identify it as the sound of our car alarm. A parallel can be drawn between academic metadiscourse and the car alarm in that both indicate the potential relevance of incoming information. The extent to which academic metadiscourse contributes to interpretation in this way can be shown by testing the reaction of readers to academic texts with any authentic metadiscourse elements removed, and comparing them with readers’ reactions to the original text (i.e., with all metadiscourse elements restored). I conducted an experiment based on the relevance-theoretic assumption that: ‘‘the actual or expected relevance of two inputs can quite often be compared. These possibilities of comparison help individuals to allocate their cognitive resources, and communicators to predict and influence the cognitive resources of others. They also make it possible for researchers to manipulate the effect and effort factors in experimental situations.’’ (Wilson and Sperber, 2004)

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The experiment aims to test the intuitions of non-native undergraduate students of English language and literature about texts, which preserve the original academic metadiscourse, and are therefore longer in terms of word-count, and texts from which metadiscourse items have been removed, and which are therefore shorter in terms of wordcount. Students were asked, first, to compare the two texts, and second, to select the one that facilitates (their) comprehension in the most effective way. The experiment attempts to test the sensitivity of readers to the effectiveness of apparently more economical texts (with fewer words, less time or mental effort required to read the linguistic material) compared to apparently costlier texts (with a greater number of words, and more time or mental effort required to read the linguistic material). Our hypothesis is that readers will opt for the latter type of text, as the more effective in yielding positive cognitive effects for less processing effort, and hence for maximizing the overall relevance of the text. 2.2.1. Experimental evidence An extract from Hyland (1998) ‘Persuasion and context: The pragmatics of academic metadiscourse’ Journal of Pragmatics 30 (4): 437–455 was selected for its variety of 21 metadiscourse occurrences (word length or phrase length) in a total of 239 words (196 after all metadiscourse items were removed). The two texts were juxtaposed by presenting first the shorter version (with all metadiscourse items removed) as TEXT A and second, the original and lengthier text (with all its metadiscourse elements restored) as TEXT B (see below). The two texts were followed by eight open-ended questions (see Appendix A, Part A), which subjects answered after reading the two texts and timing themselves while doing so. The core experimental layout was as follows:

TEXT A: ‘‘On variations in the use of person markers, the suppression of personal agency is often a means of concealing the constructedness of accounts. Astrophysics articles contained the highest frequency of person markers and there was a large intra-discipline variability in its use. A writer’s use of first person to intrude into an argument is an area where a degree of freedom to manipulate conventions is permitted, allowing authors to mix ‘private intentions’ with socially recognized communicative purposes. In all four disciplines this explicit intrusion often co-occurs with verbs conveying reasons or possibility, and performs text-internal functions. Writers intervene to help organize the argument or to justify decisions or interpretations. The author signals text frames, introduces research activities or indicates their attitude to methods or findings. The first person is used to construct the text and present decisions, rarely is it used to question the object studied, which is independent of personal perception. While the use of first person is variable in how writers decide to indicate intellectual activities, references to real-world phenomena are impersonal. The use of metadiscourse in these texts reflects an intimate connection between discourse particles and the social organization of disciplinary communities.’’

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TEXT B: ‘‘Turning to variations in the use of person markers, the suppression of personal agency is often considered to be a means of concealing the constructedness of accounts. However, the data revealed that astrophysics articles contained the highest frequency of person markers and that there was a large intra-discipline variability in its use. This suggests that a writer’s use of first person to intrude into an argument may be an area where a degree of freedom to manipulate conventions is permitted, allowing authors to mix ‘private intentions’ with socially recognized communicative purposes (Bhatia, 1993). It is worth noting that in all four disciplines this explicit intrusion often co-occurs with verbs conveying reasons or possibility, and largely performs text-internal functions. Thus writers tend to intervene to help organize the argument or to justify decisions or interpretations. Most commonly the author appears to signal text frames, introduce research activities or indicate their attitude to methods or findings. Thus the first person is mainly used to construct the text and present decisions, rarely is it used to question the object studied, which is taken to be independent of personal perception. So while the use of first person appears to be variable in how writers decide to indicate intellectual activities, references to real-world phenomena are generally impersonal. To summarize this discussion, the use of metadiscourse in these texts appears to reflect an intimate connection between discourse particles and the social organization of disciplinary communities.’’

75 subjects, native speakers of Modern Greek, 2nd- and 3rd-year students of the university’s English Department, aged 19–23 years old, participated in the experiment. Student-subjects were specifically chosen as they had already been exposed to academic discourse (for the previous 3 and 5 semesters respectively) and consequently, were sensitized to its language, structure, coherence, style/tone. The rationale of the questionnaire revolves around one central idea: which text should an academic reader prefer? In relevance-theoretic terms, given that the two texts have comparable cognitive effects, which text would enable the reader to recover these effects with the least amount of processing effort? Questions were purposely phrased (and rephrased) both in ‘lay’ and more ‘technical’ terms, in an attempt to cross-check subjects’ reactions. 2.3. Results–discussion Subjects’ reactions clearly agreed with the predictions made in Section 2.2. This is what subjects’ answers/comments revealed in percentage terms. As shown in Table 3, there is a clear preference for the ‘+metadiscourse’ text from both standpoints, writer’s (93.3%) or reader’s (94.6%) (Questions 1 and 2). Ease of reading was tested in general terms with Question 3 and more specifically with Question 4, where the ‘less effort’ factor was mentioned and further specified in terms of less time and less mental

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Table 3 Subjects’ reaction to metadiscourse in text comprehension

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

Preference as a writer Preference as a reader Easy reading Less effort to read Less effort to write Effective communication Role of metadiscourse items

8. Actual or expected relevance

TEXT A ( metadiscourse)

TEXT B (+metadiscourse)

6.6% 5.3% 4% 10.6% 70.6% 2.6% Non-essential, decorative, stylistic 2.6%

93.3% 94.6% 96% 89.3% 29.3% 97.3% Essential to communication of ideas 94.6% Other 2.6% 93.3%

6.6%

effort. Again, 96% and 89.3% of the subjects considered the ‘+metadiscourse’ text faster to read and easier to understand, despite the greater number of words involved. Question 5 raised the particularly interesting issue of academic metadiscourse from the writer’s perspective. 70.6% of the subjects agreed that they would have to spend less time and effort to produce the ‘ metadiscourse’ text because, as they admitted, it would save them time and effort in working out appropriate metadiscourse items. This, from the nonnative speaker’s perspective, seems to be the expected type of reaction: the painstaking exercises on how to interpret and produce metadiscourse expressions we present to students in our Academic Discourse classes6 simply strengthen the students’ point. Almost 30% considered the ‘+metadiscourse’ text easier to write and justified their answer by claiming that metadiscourse expressions help the author organize his writing. This may suggest that on the issue of ‘writing effort’, results might be different for native speakers, who may be using metadiscourse expressions to save ‘writing’ effort, rather than adding to it, as non-native subjects of this experiment have reckoned. Finally, there was a striking unanimity in subjects’ reactions to Questions 6–8. A total of 97.3% stated that the ‘+metadiscourse’ text is more effective in communicating its message and a total of 94.6% considered the metadiscourse expressions as essential to effective and effortless comprehension of ideas. Only 2.6% thought that such expressions are a matter of style, and hence non-essential to comprehension of the ideas communicated. Another 2.6% opted for neither (a) nor (b); instead they viewed metadiscourse as (a) a ‘cohesion device’ or (b) a way to ‘increase accuracy’ and ‘easy understanding’. Lastly, a scenario based on the idea of ‘students conducting research’ was considered and students/‘academic researchers’ were asked to choose the text that would satisfy their expectations in terms of ‘actual or expected relevance’. Again, 93.3% opted for the ‘+metadiscourse’ text.7 6 The Faculty of English Studies, University of Athens, has been offering an Academic Discourse course for all 1st semester students since 2000 and the author, with two colleagues, has been running it since 2003. 7 On the experimental side, let me stress the importance of testing native-speakers’ reactions too, since the fact of anchoring the current conclusions in a sample of non-native-speakers may have led to certain limitations in the findings themselves. Specifically for Question 5, the speculation has been expressed (Section 2.2) that reactions of native and non-native speakers are expected to vary. Native speakers’ similar reactions to the remaining issues tested would, naturally, add to the validity of the present findings, but for the purposes of this work, the question of whether any expected or unexpected deviations from non-native speakers’ responses occur remains to be answered.

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Overall, the experiment revealed an impressive appreciation of metadiscourse from both the readers’ and the writers’ perspective. As already shown, relevance theory provides a way of explaining our findings. Relevance theory can offer an explanation for why academic writers/speakers employ metadiscourse expressions, and for why readers/ listeners particularly value them. Writers are interested in producing an optimally attractive text, one that will communicate the intended meanings and intended interpretations with the minimum mental effort required. Readers are interested in productive and economical readings of texts, i.e., texts that yield as many cognitive effects as possible with the minimum possible mental effort required to achieve those effects. Writers’ and readers’ best interests are spelled out by the presumption of optimal relevance: (43) a. b.

Optimal relevance An ostensive stimulus is optimally relevant to an audience if and only if: It is relevant enough to be worth the audience’s processing effort; It is the most relevant one compatible with communicator’s abilities and preferences. (Sperber and Wilson, 1986/1995: 164; Wilson and Sperber, 2004)

Clauses (a) and (b) predict the subjects’ (readers’ perspective) preference for TEXT B (Questions 2–4), i.e., their expectation that the text will be relevant enough to be worthy of attention and will achieve the desired effects with no wasted effort. Clauses (a) and (b) also explain the writers’ motivation for choosing TEXT B, on the assumption that it is not only relevant enough to their readers, but also yields the intended cognitive effects as economically as possible (Question 1). Clause (b) also predicts various restrictions imposed by the writer’s own abilities or preferences – hence the subjects’ appreciation (non-native writer’s perspective) of TEXT B as more effortful for someone with their abilities to produce (Question 5). In this framework, metadiscourse expressions can be seen as implementing the presumption of optimal relevance by saving the hearer/reader gratuitous effort in attempting to identify the intended interpretation of a text (a single utterance, a paragraph or longer constructions). As already argued (Section 2.1), explicit metadiscourse expressions such as that is/in other ways, in short, and for example communicate essential pragmatic information along the lines of ‘this is a reformulation of . . .’, ‘this is a summary of . . .’, ‘this is evidence in support of . . .’. The speech-act information in (27), (28) or (29) above does not merely convey speaker’s attitude to the proposition expressed or merely add to the stylistic merit of the text; instead, it leads to a reassessment of the intended overall relevance of the utterance (or text). Recall that in (2b): (2b)

One reason for studying language – and for me personally the most compelling reason – is that it is tempting to regard language, . . . as ‘‘a mirror of mind.’’

the parenthetical metadiscourse comment is analyzed in relevance-theoretic terms as a separate discourse unit communicating the propositional-attitude information in (32), repeated below as (44):

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Chomsky regards the idea that language is a ‘‘mirror of the mind’’ as the most compelling reason for studying language.

where the relevance of (2b) as a whole will be understood to lie in the fact that Chomsky vouches for the truth of this proposition and that he does so with a strengthened degree of commitment. And this is certainly neither a matter of style, nor a matter of helping, supporting, peripheral information aiding the comprehension process – it is explicitly communicated information that would be highly valued by most linguists. By processing such metadiscourse expressions, the reader/listener can derive relevant conclusions and can form (i) explicatures or relevant contextual implications with less processing effort than in the absence of metadiscourse expressions (e.g., I know, I suppose, so, after all, nevertheless) or (ii) explicatures that could have not been derived in the absence of metadiscourse expressions (e.g., Chomsky claims, The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists has recommended that . . .,). In relevance-theoretic terms, linguistic metadiscourse yields more positive cognitive effects than a text lacking in metadiscourse elements and it does so for less processing effort. Especially for academic texts, which typically aim at conveying highly specific, strictly technical and unequivocally relevant information, metadiscourse items contribute to utterance interpretation in significant ways, by creating the linguistic infrastructure for maximally effective communication of ideas. 3. Conclusion In this paper, I have argued against the standard assumption that linguistic metadiscourse is a non-propositional, stylistic, rhetorical aspect of language, and that it affects utterance interpretation in a facilitating, supporting, peripheral way. Drawing (i) on authentic examples from linguistics and medical books, and (ii) on experimental evidence, I hope to have shown that metadiscourse linguistic features have been misinterpreted from both semantic and pragmatic points of view. Relevance-theory provides a theoretical and descriptive framework where the semantic and pragmatic value of metadiscourse can be satisfactorily accounted for. My discussion was designed to shed new light on the intricate semantics of metadiscourse, as finely determined by the relevance-theoretic tripartite distinction between (a) truth-conditional versus nontruth-conditional, (b) explicit versus implicit and (c) conceptual versus procedural meaning. It also explains the fundamental pragmatic role of metadiscourse, which is seen in the framework of relevance-theory as critically contributing to the effective interpretation of academic discourse.

Acknowledgements This work has developed out of ideas the author originally sketched in Ifantidou and Mitsikopoulou (2005). I wish to thank Deirdre Wilson, Jacob Mey and two Journal of Pragmatics anonymous referees for detailed comments and suggestions.

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Appendix A A.1. PART A

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A.2. PART B Linguistics examples are selected from: Chomsky, N., 1975. Reflections on Language. The New Press, New York. Fodor, J., 1975. The Language of Thought. Harvard University Press, Cambridge. Medical examples are selected from: DeCherney, A., Nathan, L. (Eds.), 2003. Current Obstetric and Gynecologic Diagnosis and Treatment. Lange Medical Books/McGraw-Hill, New York.

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