The Single European Sky gridlock: A difficult 10 year reform process

Utilities Policy xxx (2014) 1e13

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The Single European Sky gridlock: A difficult 10 year reform process Marc Baumgartner a, *, Matthias Finger b, c a

IFATCA, Canada Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale Lausanne, Switzerland c Florence School of Regulation e Transport Area, European University Institute, Italy b

a b s t r a c t Keywords: Air transport Liberalization Regulation Single European Sky Performance

This article presents the gradual liberalization of European air transport, especially its most recent problems in the case of the Single European Sky (SES). Indeed, after successfully liberalizing airlines and, to a certain extent, airports, the European Commission has embarked on the process of creating an SES. The article describes the process and the main actors. It focuses in particular on the identification of the various actors’ interests, and explains the current gridlock of the SES as a result of conflicting objectives among the main players, which include, among others, the member states and the European Commission. A way out of this gridlock may reside in a novel approach to unbundling different types of services, and introducing competition in some of these services. Ó 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

The article is grounded in organizational behavior theory and institutional economics, and is written from a political science perspective. Indeed, the EC has been developing a coherent policy on air transport liberalization since 1987. This policy is being implemented across EC member states by way of regulatory means, something (Dumez and Jeunemaître, 2010) call a “regulatory toolbox.” While these liberalization policies have been successful in the case of air transport and less successful in the case of airports, they are encountering a gridlock in the case of airspace. However, airlines, airports and air traffic control are all indispensable elements of the air transport system. Air transport liberalization in Europe will thus only be as successful as its weakest part, which today is clearly airspace and its harmonization. Our paper therefore analyzes how the European policy agenda can progress in the case of airspace as well. The current gridlock of the SES is clearly a matter of actors, whose incentives are not, to say the least, aligned. Our paper thus identifies and analyzes the relevant actors who are simultaneously blocking and promoting the SES.

The Single European Sky (SES) is the latest, and perhaps last, step in the creation of an integrated European aviation market. Once achieved, the European Commission (EC) will have succeeded in harmonizing the airspace, and in creating an efficient, nondiscriminatory European air-transport infrastructure. However, this last step of European aviation liberalization appears to be more complicated than initially anticipated, and, as of recently, has ended in gridlock, despite the fact that arguments for the SES abound, and that objections are difficult to justify. In this article, we will identify the reasons for this gridlock by way of an actor analysis, and sketch out some possible ways to resolve it. The study is structured as follows: in the first section we will recall the history and process leading up to the SES. In the second section we will present the main features of the SES, in particular its performance regime, which not only crystallizes the current weaknesses, but moreover puts significant pressure on its realization. Section three then identifies the various actors that actively participate in, or are directly affected by, the SES process. In section four, we will outline the interests of these actors. Finally, Section five will make recommendations as to how this gridlock can be overcome, namely by taking the various actors’ interests and possible resistances into account.

* Corresponding author. E-mail address: [email protected] (M. Baumgartner).

2. History and context The EC has gradually established itself over the past 25 years as the central player in European aviation liberalization, and notably air transport liberalization. With the creation of an SES, which was originally planned for 2020, the last obstacle on the way to a single European aviation market ought to be removed, meaning that national air spaces, as well as their management by State-owned, monopolistic organizations (such as air traffic controllers

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jup.2014.03.004 0957-1787/Ó 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

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(ATCOs)), should be restructured, and should operate more competitively. This liberalization agenda can be compared to similar initiatives by the EC to create a single European electricity, gas and telecommunications market, as well as a single European railway market. In doing so, the EC continues to proceed in the same way, namely by establishing its competence in the matter, by gradually removing the barriers to competition (for instance via de-regulation) and by clarifying the rules to regulate this European market (such as by reregulation). The definition of these rules will ultimately result in the EC establishing a European regulatory agency. 2.1. History of aviation liberalization Consequently, the EC has sought and obtained more competencies to regulate the area of air traffic control (ATC) and air traffic management (ATM). In turn, this has to be seen in the context of a much broader European liberalization agenda, which has already bestowed the EC with the powers to liberalize air transport and airports. Air transport liberalization was achieved by way of three air transport packages, resulting in the creation of the internal air transport market as of January 1993. The last so-called Freedom of the Air (the ninth Freedom of the Air1) was realized in 1997. A European air-carrier license was introduced, and pricing was liberalized. It was this last step of the air transport liberalization process that led to the emergence of low-cost, or rather low-fare, airlines, notably Ryanair and Easyjet. Today, low-fare airlines account for approximately 25 percent of the traffic (Eurocontrol, 2012) (p. 21). Some analyses foresee up to a 55 percent market share of the intra-European traffic for low-fare airlines in the near future (Wulf et al., 2010). In the 1990s, three main parallel measures were taken by the EC, all of which aimed to support competition in the European air transport sector, namely by facilitating the airlines’ access to key infrastructures and services. In 1993, the EU Council started to regulate airport slot allocation by way of its Regulation 93/95, which, as variously amended, remains the only piece of European legislation on this matter. The aim of this regulation is to offer certain priorities to new entrants when it comes to allocating recently available slots. However, eight years later, the effectiveness of the regulation remains highly contested by new entrants, as well as by experts (Kosenina, 2013). Capacity remains scarce at many European airports at peak hours. There is indeed “a shortage of slots at slot-restricted airports, which seems to be a hurdle particularly for new entrants” (Kosenina, 2013) (p. 4). The consequence of this situation is that “incumbent carriers are protected from effective competition, and that the benefits of the internal market cannot be fully exploited” (Kosenina, 2013) (p. 6). As a result, the Commission is currently proposing new legislation, which focuses in particular on a slot-trading approach. However, this legislation (EC Com 823/ 2011, “Airport policy in the European Union e addressing capacity and quality to promote growth, connectivity and sustainable mobility”) has not yet been adopted. Similarly, the market for ground-handling services was opened by EU Directive 67 (EC 67/1996). The aim of this Directive was to make ground-handling services more cost-efficient, as well as to increase their quality. This Directive is currently being amended by the Commission, but the proposed changes are minor (De Bournonville, 2013). Finally, a code of conduct for computer reservation systems was introduced by Regulation 89 in 1999 (EC 89/ 1999). Its aim is to “ensure that the distribution of airline products

1 The carriage of domestic transport passengers in another EU State, without linking to the home state of the carrier.

[is] neutral and non-discriminatory between airlines” (European Commission, 2003). The liberalization of the European Airspace e called the SES e is the most recent element of the EC’s aviation liberalization agenda, and yet is the most decisive. 2.2. Air traffic control: the context In order to understand the nature of ATC liberalization, it is necessary to briefly recall its history and functioning (Baumgartner, 2007). Following the First World War, although large numbers of aircraft were no longer taking to the skies, administrators realized that regulations were required, and that standardization should be applied. This was particularly important in Europe, with its multiple national boundaries and languages. One of the lesser-known decisions emanating from the Versailles Peace Treaty was the International Convention for Air Navigation. Following the world’s first commercial mid-air collision on April 7 1922 over France, measures were taken to ensure such an accident would not happen again. These measures included carriage of radio, and the organization of a defined set of routes for all to visually follow. In the wake of studies initiated by the US and the Allied Forces, in November 1944 the American government invited 55 States to an international civil aviation conference in Chicago. The resulting “Chicago Convention”2 set the foundations for the rules and regulations concerning air navigation in all its aspects, and enabled a common and global air-navigation system to be created. The Chicago Convention also established the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). Today ICAO, headquartered in Montreal, manages all aeronautical spheres and establishes world standards. It currently has 191 member states that all remain sovereign over their national airspace, a principle that still applies today, even to the SES. 2.3. Why a Single European Sky? For the past two decades, all major intergovernmental initiatives in Europe to modernize ATM have been triggered by major crises affecting the traveling public, and thus politicizing the issue. During the late 1980s air traffic increased to double-digit numbers, and the infrastructure on the ground was not ready for such traffic growth. In 1989, member states agreed to create the so-called Central Flow Management Unit (CFMU) in order to manage capacity beyond a national perspective. Prior to this date, there was no central management of the flows in Europe. Furthermore, the member states agreed to designate Eurocontrol3 as the manager, tasked with balancing the capacity offered with the demands requested by the airlines. The CFMU came into operation in 1993. In 2011 it was incorporated into the SES framework (EC Implementation Regulation 677/2011 and Commission Decision C4130/2011), and Eurocontrol’s CFMU has been designated to serve as the network manager. The Balkan War in 1999 was a major crisis for European aviation. Conducting a war in Central Europe whilst maintaining safe and normal operations around the airspace impacted by military

2 The “Convention on International Civil Aviation” was formally signed in Chicago on December 7, 1944. Through amendments and annexes, this remains a dynamic reference for the industry. 3 Eurocontrol is an international organization with full legal personality created by six European member states (Germany, Belgium, France, UK, Luxemburg and the Netherlands) in 1960. It became operational in 1963, and currently has 39 states and the EU as members, along with the EC. Its membership is thus broader than the EU. To achieve its mission, Eurocontrol closely works with member states, ANSPs, civil and military airspace users, airports, the aerospace industry, professional organizations, intergovernmental organizations and the European institutions.

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operations, and represented an unprecedented challenge. Simultaneously, accommodating large movements of military aircraft in parallel with the normal operations of commercial traffic resulted in closures of airspace, rerouting of flows and reduction of capacity. Consequently, airspace users complained because delays in 1999 were 30 percent higher than in normal times. Already in 1988, the EC had proposed community measures to overcome delays (EC COM 577/88, “Consultation and coordination between member states in the field of air traffic services and air traffic flow management”). Yet the Council did not follow the Commission, referring to the multilateral agreement with Eurocontrol and the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) (Ladenbauer, 2005). In 1996, under the title “Freeing up European airspace” (EC COM 57/96), the Commission published a White Book reacting to the increasing delays. Structural weaknesses were identified and possible options for a common European ATM were outlined. The Commission indicated that the fragmentation along national borders was indeed the major obstacle to efficient management of the European airspace. In 1999, the Commission once again commented on the delayed situation (following the Kosovo crisis), and indicated that there was a need to act in order to permit the management of the airspace, regardless of the countries’ borders (EC COM 614/1999, “The creation of a Single European Sky”). Subsequently, the Commission created a High Level Group (HLG), which started its work in January 2000. In 2001, the Commission launched the consultation process of four proposed regulations (framework regulation, service provision, airspace and interoperability), which, in 2004, became part of the SES legislation, known as SES I. 2.4. Other relevant actors and initiatives Since the late 1960s, Eurocontrol has the “monopoly” on the common modernization of ATM. In particular, it undertook a series of modernization projects, such as the European Air Traffic Control Harmonisation and Integration Programme (EATCHIP, 1990), the Airport/Air Traffic System Interface (APATSI, 1992 e a combined initiative with ECAC), the creation of the CFMU (1996), and the Central Office for Delay Analysis (CODA, 1997. EATCHIP and APATSI were merged into the so-called European Air Traffic Management Programme (EATMP), and then re-labeled in 2000 as part of the ATM 2000 þ Strategy. All of these activities aimed to achieve an improvement in the overall ATM performance in Europe. Some states have tried to establish, in a cooperative way, common management of areas that are larger than their national airspaces. However, these initiatives did not surpass the study or common research stage, though many of the SES initiatives did in fact build on the work carried out under the Ministers of Transport Meeting from the ECAC countries framework by Eurocontrol (Ladenbauer, 2005) (p. 49). While the typical ATM suppliers (such as Raytheon, Hughes, Thomson CSF, Thales, and Indra) were trying to sell their hard- and software in the form of radar, flight-data processing systems and humanemachine interfaces, Boeing anticipated that future air navigation would be satellite-based and no longer ground-based (Dumez and Jeunemaître, 2010). Boeing’s engineers worked with a concept of a “seamless space,” which would break down national ATC boundaries. Quite logically, Boeing tried to bring all industry actors together in order to define the requirements of an integrated technological and operational system. The so-called Working Together Team4 included aircraft manufactures, service providers,

4 This form of organization had been used to develop the 777, one of the biggest successes in the history of the commercial aviation. The Working Together Team grouped the customers, Boeing’s engineers and the future suppliers, and mobilized computer aided design (see Benson Allan, 1994; Benson Allan, 1995).

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systems suppliers, controllers, and airlines across the Atlantic. The European industry reacted in 2002 by creating the so-called Air Traffic Alliance (ATA), a joint venture between Thales, EADS and Airbus, which would pursue similar goals. Boeing and the ATA signed a cooperation agreement in 2003 through which they would work together on the subject of ATM modernization. On the US side, with changes in the White House, the Boeing initiative gradually lost political support and momentum, and the Boeing ATM division was eventually dissolved to become part of Boeing’s R&D branch (called Phantom Works). The European ATA, instead, convinced the then European Commissioner for Energy and Transport, Loyola de Palacio, that her flagship initiative, the SES, needed to be accompanied by an ambitious technological deployment roadmap, called DEPLOY, which later became SESAME, and still later SESAR (see Mölders, 2012). 3. Current situation, and problem statement In this section we will present the SES process; that is, the various steps and measures by which the EC is trying to create an SES. The SES implementation is being done in three steps, namely SES I, SES II, and the recent Performance Regime. We will also discuss the most recent developments, namely the Commission’s ambition to present a new, so-called SES IIþ package. This will lead us, at the end of the section, to our problem statement. 3.1. Single European Sky I (2004) As a result of the various pressures above outlined (Kosovo crisis, industry lobbying), the EC launched its (first) SES package in 2004, also called SES I. This package took the form of four regulations, namely (a) EC Regulation 549/2004, which laid down the framework for the creation of the SES (the so-called Framework Regulation), (b) EC Regulation 550/2004 on the provision of air navigation services (ANSs) in the SES (the Service Provision Regulation), (c) EC Regulation 551/2004, on the organization and use of airspace in the SES, including the creation of so-called Functional Airspace Blocks (FABs) (the Airspace Regulation), and (d) EC Regulation 552/2004, on the interoperability of the European Air Traffic Management network (the Interoperability Regulation). SES I pursued a “four-pillar approach,” which focused on areas including (a) performance, (b) technology, (c) safety, and (d) capacity. For technology, a Single European Sky ATM Research (SESAR) master plan was drawn up, whereas for safety the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) was declared responsible.5 As with all other sectors, the EC periodically reviews the application of its actions (EC COM 845/2007 final, “First report on the implementation of the Single Sky Legislation: achievements and the way forward”). Consequently, it requested the newly created Performance Review Commission (PRC) to assist in this evaluation. The PRC delivered its report in December 2006, recommending, among other things, acceleration of the FABs, corresponding technology development (SESAR), as well as empowering Eurocontrol, especially in its pan-European functions and ATM network design. As a result, the Commission proposed, in 2009, an SES II package. This package identified fragmentation as the major bottleneck in improving the performance of the European aviation system.

5 EASA was created in 2002 and came into full functionality in 2008. The responsibilities of EASA include the conduct, analysis and research of safety, the authorization of foreign operators, advice for drafting EU legislation, implementation and monitoring safety rules (including inspections in the member states), certification of aircraft and components, as well as the approval of organizations involved in the design, manufacture and maintenance of aeronautical products.

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3.2. Single European Sky II (2009) The SES II package puts the delivery of the SES under the overarching objective of performance, and is now structured into five pillars, namely (a) technology with SESAR as its key element, (b) a legislative pillar, which sets a target date for the implementation of the FABs and creates the role of the network manager attributed to Eurocontrol, (c) safety attributed to EASA, (d) the airport pillar, and (e) a cross-cutting human factor pillar (see Fig. 1). More precisely, the second SES package (SES II) adopts a total system, gate-to-gate approach for ANSs via the performance scheme, a strengthening of FABs, as well as a central network management function. SES II is based on closely interrelated pillars, all of which converge towards the keystones of aviation performance and sustainability. The safety pillar extends the competence of EASA to ATM and airports. The technological pillar, SESAR, aims to develop state-of-the-art technology, and support member states in their efforts to improve performance, safety and sustainability. The airport pillar is complemented by terminal ANS performance indicators as part of the performance scheme. Moreover, the human factor pillar is considered as the “overarching SES pillar,” as it is acknowledged by all stakeholders that SES cannot be successful without the full buy-in and support of the staff concerned (PRB, 2012a). Several actors are worth highlighting in this context. First of all there is Eurocontrol, which is widely acknowledged as Europe’s principal repository of ATM experience and expertise. As a joint

founding member, together with the EC of SESAR Joint Undertaking, Eurocontrol is making an important contribution to the construction of the SES. It is involved in the development of the rules that fall within its remit, on the basis of mandates from the EC. It also provides technical support to EASA, in the area of ATM safety regulations and supervision activities. In July 2010, Eurocontrol was designated by the EU as the PRB that will assist the EC in establishing and managing the performance scheme for ANSs. In 2011, Eurocontrol was designated as the network manager. When initiating the SES, Mrs Loyola de Palacio, who was at that time vice-president of the EC in charge of Transport, considered that the development of a common foreign and security policy within the EU had provided opportunities for organizing the involvement of the military. Respectful of the military institution and convinced of the need for a strong European and national defense, Mrs De Palacio invited the ministers of defense to participate in the HLG on the same terms as the ministers of transport. The intention was to assess the real impact of military operations on civil air traffic, as well as to better understand the military requirements and needs (Fartek and Rivet, 2011). The involvement of national defense representatives within the EC working structures was an important step forward, yet it was premature. Indeed, the vision was too advanced, and the member states remained reluctant to establish a link between civil and military ATC. Nevertheless, the need for representation of military expertise in all future aviation development remains on the agenda of the EC and the related agencies, as demonstrated by the

High level Transport objectives (White paper)

Other modes

Aviation

SES II package

Airport Package

Long term objectives (Master Plan – EXECUTIVE VIEW) EU-wide performance targets

Slots, ground handling, noise

Declared Capacity

Actual SES performance

SESAR

States/FAB

FABs

Network Mgr.

EASA

Airports

Capability (Validation targets) Deployment scenarios (Master Plan PLANNING VIEW)

National/FAB perf. Plans

(Perf. Enablers)

NM perf. targets, NSP, NOP

EASP

Airport Observatory

ANSP

Civil-military

Business Plans

FUA

SESAR Deployment (DEPLOYMENT PROGRAMME)

Legislative pillar

Technology pillar

Safety pillar

Airport pillar

Human factors pillar Fig. 1. The SES performance contribution to the overall SES framework. Source: PRB, 2012a (p. 5)

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Fig. 2. Key performance indicators for RP1. Source: PRB, 2011 (p. 6)

recruitment of a permanent military adviser by the SESAR Joint Undertaking. More than 10 years after Mrs de Palacio’s comprehensive view, the European Defense Agency, created in 2004, has been tasked by the ministers of defense of its 26 member states with safeguarding the military interests during the implementation of the SES.

3.3. Performance-based approach (2010e?) As mentioned above, SES II puts the entire SES endeavor under the banner of “performance,” though this aspect was already prominently mentioned in the so-called “Performance Report” dated 2006 (Performance Review Commission, 2006), which clearly stated that an SES could only be achieved if a performance scheme was introduced. By doing so, the Commission would acquire a significant amount of power vis-à-vis member states. Indeed, by agreeing that the EC has the competence to set targets, the member states have, de facto, accepted the main governance of the political agenda, as well as its timing. Through EC Regulation 1070/2009, the foundation for an increased performance in ATM was laid, and Regulation 1108/2009 extended the remit of EASA to ATM and Communication Navigation Surveillance (CNS). In particular, Implementing Rule (EU) 691/2010 established a performance scheme for ANSs and network functions under the responsibility of the PRB. The performance targets set under the so-called “SES performance scheme” should reflect and foster improvements from all five SES pillars, as well as from individual FABs, member states, air navigation service providers (ANSPs), airports and airspace users. There are three specific targets, namely (a) the environmental target, which will ensure the carbon-neutrality of aviation growth, insofar as en-route ANS is concerned, (b) the capacity target, which is designed to avoid major disruptions and indirect costs for airspace users and their passengers from ANS delays, and (c) the cost-efficiency target, which will secure progressive improvement in unit rates and maintain nearly constant route charges over the period. Fig. 2 summarizes the three key performance indicators of the performance scheme for Reference Period 1 (RP1).

In other words, for the performance reference period starting 1 January 2012 and ending 31 December 2014, the EU-wide performance targets are as follows6: - Environment target: an improvement by 0.75 of a percentage point of the average horizontal en-route flight efficiency indicator in 2014, as compared to the situation in 2009; - Capacity target: an improvement of the average en-route ATFM delay so as to reach a maximum of 0.5 min per flight in 2014; - Cost-efficiency target: a reduction of the average EU-wide determined unit rate for en-route ANSs from 59.97 EUR in 2011 to 53.92 EUR in 2014 (expressed in real terms, EUR 2009), with intermediate annual values of 57.88 EUR in 2012 and 55.87 EUR in 2013. There will be a second reference period (RP2), starting January 2015 and lasting until the end of 2019 (EC COM 390/2013 article 8). The PRB has published a comprehensive (http:// www.eurocontrol.in) advice to the Commission on the setting of EU-wide performance targets for RP2. The EC has proposed to the Single European Sky Committee (SSC) the draft decision on RP2 targets (SSC51 Item 3 2 Annex 2 to WP 4 5 draft Decision on RP2 targets). The performance target of this second reference period should have been adopted through comitology at the end of 2013. Following tense negotiation between the member states and the EC at the SSC, the decision on the targets for RP2 was postponed to an ad-hoc SSC meeting scheduled to take place at the beginning of February 2014. 3.4. Towards SES IIþ The plan for SES IIþ was explicitly stated by Commissioner Siim Kallas in his speech in Limassol in October 2012, entitled “10 years and still not delivering” (http://europa.eu/rapid/pr). He noted that

6 Commission Decision of 21 February 2011, setting the European Union-wide performance targets and alert thresholds for the provision of air navigation services for the years 2012e2014 (OJ L 48, February 23 2011, p. 16).

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Fig. 3. Summary of the SES process. Source: Authors

the targets, especially in matters of costs and delays, have not been reached and that five billion euros are wasted annually due to inefficiency. He announced that new ambitious and evidence-based performance targets would be set for RP2. Finally, he threatened infringement proceedings against FABs and member states, which will be held accountable for not meeting their performance targets. Furthermore, ANSPs were explicitly labeled as an impediment to progress, as was the confusion between regulatory and oversight tasks and operational and service provision activities. Ultimately, Kallas stated that the SES “would lead to a single aviation authority and an industry-led European infrastructure manager, with centralized functions and services.” Likewise, “the European Aviation Safety Agency should progressively cover all aspects of technical rules and oversight in ATM, not just safety” (http://europa.eu/ rapid/pr). This, in turn, would allow Eurocontrol to focus on running the network, taking on infrastructure management and rolling out SESAR deployment. On 11 June, 2013 the EC published COM 408/2013, “Accelerating the implementation Single European Sky” (18. EC COM 408/ 2013. Accelerating the implementation Single European Sky), or SES IIþ. The declared intention of the EC is to reaffirm the objectives of the SES and work on the performance of ANSs, by enforcing and improving the existing rules. This should lead to enhancing the efficiency of the SES by orienting the focus of the ANSPs on customer needs, in particular performance delivery, increasing the efficiency of support services, and strengthening of the national supervisory authorities (NSA). The proposed regulation (EC COM 2013/410 e COD 213/186) further aims to remove the fragmentation of the European ATM system by enabling industrial partnerships (namely in FABs) and reinforcing the role of the network manager. On the institutional side, the

Commission proposes to build a more consistent institutional framework by allocating a new role to EASA and focusing Eurocontrol on the management and operations of the European ATM. Fig. 3 summarizes the above-presented SES process in a graphic manner. 3.5. Problem statement The problem this paper seeks to answer comes logically at the end of the description of this entire SES process. Indeed, while the Commission has been quite successful in liberalizing air transport, and somewhat successful in regulating access to airports, it is now facing a gridlock when it comes to realizing the SES, though the SES is a centerpiece in overall air transport liberalization. How can this gridlock be overcome so as to achieve the SES? Indeed, and despite some improvements in overall performance (such as delays and costs according to Reference Period 1 (RP1) Monitoring), the institutional reforms have not made a lot of progress. Furthermore, delays have reduced to less than 30 s per aircraft because of traffic downturns, while costs have mainly decreased due to a reduction in planning capital expenditure (PRB, 2012b). However, it is too early to establish whether such performance can be maintained in the future, in particular if traffic recovers. Our approach to this problem is grounded in an analysis of the relevant actors, their strategies, as well as the incentives under which they operate. As a next step, we will therefore identify the actors who must participate to overcome this gridlock. More precisely, we will identify their dominant strategies along with their likely behavior. In the last section, we can then outline ways and means by which to transcend these obstacles.

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Fig. 4. Actors in network industries. Source: Crettenand and Finger, 2013 (p. 110)

4. Current institutional gridlock and the relevant actors This section will identify the main actors of the SES. This is an important step because, according to our conceptual framework, the actors are responsible for the current gridlock, yet also have the means to find a solution. The actors are, again according to our framework, bounded by technology on the one hand, and by institutions on the other (Crettenand and Finger, 2013); technology determines the limits and the possibilities of the actors, whereas institutions define the incentive structures according to which the actors behave. In turn, the coordination among the relevant actors shapes the performance of the socio-technical system. Fig. 4 summarizes this broad conceptual framework: In the SES, we are typically in a situation where we have numerous actors with diverging interests and insufficient power to impose a way out of the gridlock onto the other actors. This is even true for the EC. As a first step, let us identify the relevant types of actors, followed by a short description of each of the actors’ main strategic interests and corresponding incentive structure. Many of the actors who, today, play a key role in the SES, were already present before the SES process. It is therefore also important to identify how their role(s) and behavior(s) have changed under the new context of the SES. The creation of the SES has substantially modified the broad regulatory landscape, parallel to the technological developments among the users (airlines, aircraft manufacturers), whereas the ground infrastructure has not seen too many developments. Indeed, the biggest changes have taken place on the institutional, and not on the technological, side. We distinguish between four types of actors, namely (a) intergovernmental actors, (b) actors created by the EC, (c) governmental actors, and (d) stakeholders. Inter-governmental actors are the most interesting ones, as they have been most affected by the SES reform process. These actors include the EU, Eurocontrol, and part of the regional activities of ICAO. Furthermore, nine FABs have been created during the SES process so far. Indeed, the creation of the FABs7 de facto led to nine new organizations, none of which existed at the start of the SES. The following actors are creations of the EC: SESAR (EC 219/2007), the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) (EC 1592/2002 repealed by EC 516/2008 and amended by EC 1108/2009), the PRB (EC Decision C (2010) 5134 final) and the network manager (EC Decision C (2011) 4130 final) (designated as Eurocontrol). Fig. 5 illustrates the relationship between some of these inter-governmental and EC-created actors, and their respective national member states.

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To be established by December 21 2012 (http://ec.europa.eu/trans).

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One of the interesting elements of the SES is indeed its geographical scope, as it has evolved, over time, from 15 to 28 countries, plus Switzerland and Norway. Each of the so-called “new-ins” ensured compliance with regard to the SES through the negotiation of the accession protocols. Of course, each state chose the solution that was best adapted to its policies and particularities. As a result, the transposition of the SES is very disparate, leading to a further increase in the overall fragmentation of the regulatory framework. At the same time, the states had to accept the creation of FABs. Based on the Chicago Convention (Art. 28), the nation-states are responsible for ATC within their territory and the airspace allocated to them. However, the Chicago Convention and its annexes do not constrain the states as to how they should provide ANSs. Although the State may embrace a privatized or corporatized model in the provision of ANS, “arrangement through legislation or regulations should be made to ensure that the provisions of the Convention and other international obligations of the State are fully complied with by the operator of [.] air navigation services” (Dempsey et al., 2005) (p. 225), and, irrespective of the organizational form of the entity providing ANS, the State retains ultimate responsibility for safety and security, and established compliance with the Chicago Convention, and related aviation treaties and conventions. A lot of focus has recently been placed on the organizational form of the ANSPs (see Dempsey et al., 2005; Schubert, 1997; Button and McDougall, 2006; McDougall and Roberts, 2006). As noted above, ANSPs are the key actors of the SES. During the process of the SES, their organizational form has somewhat changed: from being administrative entities, they have evolved into independent government agencies, or event joint-stock companies owned by the respective governments. It appears that the majority of the European ANSPs are today commercialized (McDougall and Roberts, 2006). The main reason for this evolution is the need to have greater managerial autonomy, which is generally accompanied, on the governments’ side, by growing supervision and regulation. Indeed, parallel to the creation of the European SES and the gradual autonomization of the ANSPs, member states were asked to put into place regulatory bodies to oversee these ANSPs. The basic regulation, dated 2004, has called for a functional separation (549/ 2004 x 3), whereby member states were required to create a National Supervisory Authority (NSA) (1070/2009 x 4) with sufficient resources and expertise. The extension of the authority of EASA in 2008 to the field of ATM/CNS has created the obligation of the member states to adapt their NSA to the EASA oversight functions. The member states have had to adapt to the FAB regulation (to be ready by 4 December, 2012), by creating a “council” of member states and by organizing the representation at State level, as well as National Supervisory Authority level, in a different way. The states’ supervisory role has become more complex (National Aviation Authority, NSA, Member of the FAB “Council”). The recently proposed SES IIþ regulation is going a step further, and requires full independence between the regulatory bodies (national or FAB level) and the ANSP (EC COM 410/2013 Article 3). Furthermore, the EC has clearly defined the relevant stakeholders, and has given them a role and/or a forum to be part of the change process in the form of the Industrial Consultation Body (ICB). The ICB was established by Article 6 of EC 549/2004 (framework regulation) to advise the Commission on the implementation of the SES. It comprises representatives of stakeholders not represented by States (Tytgat et al., 2011). While the initial text of the framework regulation limited the advice by the ICB to technical matters only, the amendment made by EC 1070/2009 ended this restriction, and today the ICB provides advice of a strategic nature on all aspects related to the implementation of the SES, including institutional and regulatory matters. Article 6

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ICAO EUR/NAT Office accreditation (56 States) ICAO EUR Region (52 States) ECAC (44) – Iceland (1) = 43 States EUROCONTROL (39) + Estonia (1) = 40 States SES Performance Scheme (29 States) EU (27 States) Iceland

Austria

Latvia

Norway

Albania

Azerbaijan

Andorra

Belgium

Lithuania

Switzerland

Armenia

Georgia

Belarus

Algeria

Bulgaria

Luxembourg

Bosnia and Herzegovina

San Marino

Israel

Morocco

Cyprus

Malta

Croatia

Kazakhstan

Tunisia

Czech Republic

Netherlands

Macedonia

Kyrgyzstan

Denmark

Poland

Moldova

Russian Federation

Estonia

Portugal

Monaco

Tajikistan

Finland

Romania

Montenegro

Turkmenistan

France

Slovakia

Serbia

Uzbekistan

Germany

Slovenia

Turkey Ukraine

Greece

Spain

Hungary

Sweden

Ireland

United Kingdom

Italy

ECAA Member

Fig. 5. Geographical scope of some of the relevant inter-governmental organizations. Source: https://www.eurocontrol.i

identifies the following stakeholders: ANSPs, associations of airspace users (that is, airlines), airport operators, the manufacturing industry and professional-staff representative bodies. In addition, SES II has created a fifth pillar, leading to the creation of a separate body: SES Expert Group on the Social Dimension. Nearly all organized aviation stakeholders are represented in the Industry Consulting Body (ICB), and have followed the development of the SES since its creation with SES I (2004). The diverging interests within the ICB are particularly noteworthy, ranging from the airspace users, via airports, the manufacturing industry (including the main aircraft manufacturers), the professional staff association, and even some military representatives. Interestingly, the membership of the ICB has not changed over the time. Some of the stakeholders currently represented in the ICB were part of HLG II (2007), while others, such as staff, have been given particular forums (for example, “Social Dialogue,” the SES Expert Group on the “social dimension of SES”) to articulate their

positions. Due to the different interests represented in the ICB, it has rarely managed to come up with a strong common position. Thus, the positions of the various stakeholders are more interesting and relevant than the position of the ICB. Nevertheless, the composition of the ICB offers a good and representative overview of the various stakeholders and interests within the SES process, as illustrated by Fig. 6. 5. Actors’ interests After having identified the main actors of the SES process, this section will now try to crystallize their respective interests. In doing so, we will aggregate the actors into groups, namely the user community; the ANSPs; the communication, navigation and service providers; the meteorological service providers; the manufacturing industry; the professional staff organizations; the airports; and the military. 5.1. The user community

Fig. 6. ICB membership. Source: Authors

The SES was most probably launched thanks to the lobbying activities of the user community, in particular the Association of European Airlines (see Ladenbauer, 2005; Schulte-Strathaus et al., 2011). During the SES consultation process, the European Low Fares Airline Association was created (2003), and their exponential increase in movement made them become a very powerful player. Further, the International Association of Charter Airline, the European Regional Airlines Association, the European Business Aviation Association and the International Aircraft Owner and Pilot Association represent the full spectrum and interests of the user community within the ICB. In this context, it is important to recall that, in the air-transport industry, the infrastructure (the ANS provision) was entirely financed by the user community e that is, the airlines e until January 1 2012 (start of the performance scheme 691/2010) (EC 1794/2006 and 1191/2010 will be repealed on January 1, 2015 by EC 391/2013). The position of the user community is relatively straightforward, namely in terms of costs, efficiency and of course also safety e all indicators that can be found in the performance scheme.

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5.2. Air navigation service providers Nearly all ANSPs (particularly the major ones) affected by the SES are represented by their trade association; that is, the Civil Air Navigation Services Organization (CANSO).8 Created in the late 1990s, CANSO evolved in parallel to the SES as the employers’ trade organization with regard to providing ATM. CANSO had to adapt to the changing regulatory environment imposed on the member states as part of the reform process. CANSO is represented in the ICB, and has been accepted as the official EU Social Partner in all social forums dealing with ATM. ANSPs are caught between the often contradictory demands of the users (airlines), their employees (see below), and their owners (member states). As the SES processes evolves, ANSPs must increasingly also respond to the demands of the EC; for example, in the case of the performance scheme, either directly, or via the FABs to which they belong. In addition to these conflicting demands on ANSPs, and from a purely operational point of view, two other factors prevent a more efficient air traffic service provision; namely national defense, and current route-charging. Indeed, national defense interests restrict the available airspace at certain times and to a certain extent, and can best be compared to mountains (even if only temporary) in ground transportation (see below) (RP2 target setting Chapter 3, published September 2013). Furthermore, the route-charging formula used in Europe is based on a km/ton calculation that actually incentivizes ANSPs to attract overflying airlines, and by doing so inhibits the overall efficiency of the network. ANSs can be divided up into ATM, ground infrastructures and CNS provision. With the exception of Sweden, where these two functions have been separated (that is, unbundled into infrastructure provision and CNS), all other ANSPs integrate both functions. Global CNS services are currently being offered by two companies: Aeronautical Radio Incorporated (founded 1929) and Société Internationale de Télécommunications Aéronautiques (founded in 1949). As part of SES IIþ, it is proposed that the autonomy of the CNS function will be increased, and also that the possibility will be introduced for ANSPs to unbundle the CNS function from the rest. Each member state has the possibility to designate which meteorological service provider is responsible for the aviation meteorological service (Eurocontrol, 2004). Such a designation will force the ANSP to purchase its meteorological services from an independent provider. The corresponding costs are borne by the airspace users. Aviation meteorological services are of particular importance for safety reasons. ICAO and SES regulate aeronautical meteorological services and are part of the ANS. However, the use of independent meteorological data by ANSPs is limited, as sufficient precision, update and granularity cannot currently be provided by the existing independent meteorological service providers (Hello, 2010). As a matter of fact, the best-in-class ANSP providers (such as Maastricht, Hungarocontrol and Skyguide) still reconfigure meteorological data for their own needs.

5.3. The manufacturing industry Due to the monopolistic nature of ATM, there has been little competition and innovation in the respective national markets. As a result, ATM uses a relatively antiquated technology (on the ground), compared to the more innovative technological developments on

8 CANSO is the global voice of ANSPs worldwide. CANSO members support over 85 percent of world air traffic. Members share information and develop new policies, with the ultimate aim of improving ANS on the ground and in the air. CANSO represents its members’ views in major regulatory and industry forums, including at ICAO, where it has official Observer status (http://www.canso.org/abou).

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the airborne side (IFATCA, 2007). One of the main arguments for why the Commission had become active in the field of ATM was the so-called fragmentation of the airspace. This political message has caused, and is still causing, significant misunderstandings, even inside of informed ATM circles (Baumgartner, 2010). However, in reality, the airspace within the respective national borders is quite fluid; moreover, the European air navigation network is providing flows that are close to ideal. However, the provision of ATC is fragmented due to the fact that the different national ATC systems are not interoperable without a special “adapter” interfacing between the various centers. The backbone of the ATM infrastructure (which is comparable to a flight management system in an aircraft) of the ATM infrastructure is constituted by the Flight Data Processing System. As the manufacturing industry has only one market per country, its business logic has led to a tailor-made approach for each of the countries, and even multiple versions of operational systems inside each country. These interoperability problems result in significant additional costs for the ANSPs, especially when buying the ground infrastructure. Obviously, most of the suppliers have no interest in the harmonization of the ATM infrastructure, for should the harmonization take place these suppliers would most likely disappear. Fig. 7 illustrates this fragmentation by indicating the different suppliers of ATM. Recent initiatives, such as the centralized services initiative or the virtual centers initiative (see below), specifically address this fragmentation. As noted above, SESAR was created especially to harmonize ATM research, with great expectations that it would provide a standardized conceptual method for developing ATM technology, leading again to a more defragmented service provision.

5.4. Professional staff organizations Five organizations represent the staff of the ANSPs: one European Trade Union organization (European Transport Workers’ Federation (ETF)); two global professional organizations (International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers’ Associations (IFATCA) and International Federation of Air Traffic Safety Electronics Associations), which represent the ATCOs and the Air Traffic Safety Electronics Personnel; the European affiliate of the global professional pilot association (European Cockpit Association); and a coordination platform of the ATCO union (Air Traffic Controllers European Unions Coordination (ATCEUC)). These account for the 58,000 workers on the ground, along with the majority of the organized European pilots e and thus almost 100 percent of the SES-affected professionals. Due to historical, political and social reasons, the landscape of the staff representatives is heterogeneous and has given rise to tensions during the entire SES process. Until recently, ETF, defending the interests over 250,000 workers in the transport area, was practically the sole social partner in the field of ATM. Later, other organizations, in particular ATCOs (ATCEUC and IFATCA), asked to be included in the social dialogue (Mölders, 2012). Following the Madrid (2010) Declaration (Declaration of Madrid, 2010), a new body was created called SEG, which serves as a consultative expert group on the social dimension of the SES (EC COM 9016/2010), and is composed of all the organizations representing staff, along with CANSO. Social movements were organized in 2004 at a European level. ETF called for several actions days, which had a limited impact on traffic. The workers’ representatives requested to be part of the change. The recent publication of the SES IIþ legislative proposal has evoked several reactions from staff representative organizations: in particular, some oppose staff reductions due to restructuring, and some oppose corporatization of the ANSPs (ETF, 2013). Two European-wide movements

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M. Baumgartner, M. Finger / Utilities Policy xxx (2014) 1e13

Fig. 7. Current suppliers of ATM. Source: Performance Review Commission, 2011

(Action Days) were organized, on January 29, 2014 (ATCEUC) and on the January 30, 2014 (ETF), against SES 2þ and RP2, respectively. 5.5. Airports Airports are represented by the Airport Council International Europe. During SES I, the airports had already created an “observatory on airports.” As part of SES II, the EC elaborated the “Airport Package,” which links part of the performance scheme of the SES to the airports. The gate-to-gate approach (that is, from the closing of the aircraft doors to the opening of the doors at the gate) has subsequently been chosen as a relevant performance indicator, and RP2 will see the first indicators to monitor the efficiency of airport handling. As each of the European airports is a type of its own with a number of specificities, airports will be particularly challenged by RP2. Indeed, airports may not necessarily be interested in a gate-togate approach, and might rather stick to management of the gate slots. Gate slots have economic value, and are being acquired by users according to grandfather rights and other means of allocation, or, in some cases, by trading (http://www.iata.org/publi). Currently, the airport regulation package is being discussed in Comitology at the European level. However, one of the major discussion points is not necessarily the gate-to-gate approach, but rather the gate coordination regulation. 5.6. The military The military is a central, yet often neglected, actor in the SES process. As mentioned above, Vice-President de Palacio was fully aware that, without adequate integration from the military, the SES process would suffer from institutional problems at national levels, with the potential to block the entire process. This is mainly because of national sovereignty interests, whereby the military protects the national airspace. However, the military is also an

airspace user; more precisely, it can be distinguished into two types of users: the military as a user of its reserved airspace (fighter or mission control) completing its mission in segregated airspace (reserved from civilian use); and the military using civilian airspace, routes and airports. In the latter case, the ANSs are provided by the civilian controller, and the military users do not pay for the service provided to them (Performance Review Commission, 2007). In addition, and in some European countries, the military is an ANS provider for civilian and commercial traffic. For example, the US Department of Defense has approximately 7000 ATCOs, whereas the Federal Aviation Administration has approximately 14,000. When the military provides air traffic services to civilian users, governments may decide to apply certain civilian regulations (such as requirements for an ICAO or EU ATCO license). Currently, a significant portion of European airspace is reserved for the military, which creates significant inefficiencies as aircraft have to fly around these reserved areas. Fig. 8 illustrates these reserved areas. Military airspace is expressed in terms of reservation, and covers a 24-h reservation period with different types of release from civil aviation to ad-hoc, needs-based restrictions and reservations. It is therefore difficult to quantify the impact of military reservations on civil air traffic. Initiatives such as Advanced Flexible Use of Airspace, planned in RP2, will provide better insights into these mechanisms. Yet, it is easily understandable why the military plays a crucial role in the SES, even though this role has not been properly acknowledged so far and the military is not really included in the process, other than via the member states. Obviously, the military will have to play its part towards the realization of the SES, notably by providing more flexible use of its reserved airspace. Of course, the main interest of the military is to preserve its reserved airspace as much as possible, and to be allowed to use civilian airspace whenever needed.

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Fig. 8. Reserved military (special use) airspace in Europe and America. Source: Eurocontrol/FAA, 2012

5.7. Member states We have already mentioned above that nation-states are among the relevant actors of the SES. This is not only because nation-states directly relate to the international bodies (such as the ICAO), and especially to the EU Council (at least for the 28 member states), but also because nation-states have a certain number of functions and integrate several of the actors discussed so far. Obviously, the military falls entirely under national control, as does the ANSP, which is, with the exception of NATS (UK), always owned by the national government. This is also the case of the National Safety Authority (NSA), which is, in most countries (28 out of 30), an independent regulator of air transport safety, and sometimes even of the economic aspects of air transport. In some countries, the NSA is part of the Ministry, and as such is confused with the policy advice function of the national civil aviation administration. Airports generally also fall under the authority of national governments, even though they are generally locally owned, yet often nationally regulated. This is also the case for the users (airlines), which again may be privately owned, yet remain nationally regulated. Fig. 9 summarizes the actors and their relationships at a purely national level.

Fig. 9 shows that the position of a national government vis-à-vis the SES is far from coherent, torn as it is between its conflicting roles as policy maker (as such defending the national interest), regulator (having to respect international and European regulations) and owner (of the ANSP, and sometimes partial owner of an airline). Especially in big countries with big ANSPs (such as Germany, France, Spain, Italy), the national government has an interest in securing and protecting its own ANSP so as to keep the jobs in the country. Furthermore, national governments often take an active interest in the development of airports of “national importance,” as such airports play a crucial role for regional, and even national, competitiveness and economic development. As mentioned above, through the comitology process applied to the SES, member states are also decision-makers and have significant powers over the Commission. For certain regulatory texts, the European Parliament has a co-legislator (for example, the Accident investigation implementation regulation 996/2010). It is also worth mentioning that, in the overall aviation context, States are the contracting members of ICAO, whereby they have clear international obligations to respect the ICAO recommendations and standards. These obligations even apply in the case of the EC and the SES. This is not only limited to air traffic control, but also includes, among others, the negotiation of traffic rights for the flagship carrier on behalf of them, safety, and, to a certain extent, the economic supervision of the main users. 5.8. Supra-national European actors

Fig. 9. Actors and their relationships at the national level. Source: Authors

As noted above, the most significant supra-national European actors are EASA (created in 2002, with competence extended to ATM/CNS in 2008) and the inter-governmental body Eurocontrol (created in 1960). In the case of Eurocontrol, member states are part of the governing structure, which includes membership of the state to Eurocontrol, as well membership to the Permanent Commission and the Provisional Council. A State’s membership in Eurocontrol will automatically involve its NSA in the various bodies, such as the Network Manager Board, as well as the Safety and Performance Regulation. The list of the bodies in which a state is supposed to

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participate includes: (a) the enlarged route-charging committee, (b) the safety regulation commission, and (c) the permanent commission. Further to this task, new tasks have become important during the establishment of the SES; such as, for example, the establishment of FABs and the creation of the network manager based on the Eurocontrol Central Flow Management Unit. It should also be borne in mind that membership to Eurocontrol exceeds the 28 EU member states, and also includes countries in Eastern and Southern Europe, in addition to Switzerland and Iceland (39 countries altogether), which further complicates clear articulation of a coherent Eurocontrol interest. A basic principle underlying the aviation policy of the EU has been that a high and uniform level of safety can best be achieved through common action at the European level. This is the role of EASA, created in 2002. As a first step, the functions of EASA include monitoring the airworthiness and environmental compatibility of aircraft, including personnel and organization involved in their design, production and maintenance. Further work was later undertaken to properly address all other fields of aviation safety, including ATM and ANSs. The EASA management board is composed of the member states and the EC. Fig. 10 summarizes the actors and their relationships when including the supra-nationalEuropean level. 6. Conclusion: is there a way out of the SES gridlock? In this paper we have systematically identified the main actors of the SES, along with their interests. This identification of the relevant actors makes it easy to understand why the SES is currently in gridlock. Basically, there are too many actors involved, with too diverging interests to find common ground for agreement. The airspace users (airlines) and the EC are the only actors who have a clear interest in the SES. However, the airlines have diverging interests and the Commission appears to be too weak to impose its vision, given in particular the power and the interests of the manufacturers and the member states. Indeed, the aggregate interest of these member states is not in favor of the creation of an SES (Aviation Civile magazine hors-série_Mars, 2013), considering the interests of their ANSPs, the unions, the airports and the military. In addition to the actors’ interests, one must also consider the following two underlying factors, which, to a certain extent, are preventing speedy realization of the SES: - Ownership of the ANSPs: ANSPs are either fully or partly owned by nation states, which have few incentives to change this state of affairs, given that they benefit from the ANSPs’ revenues.

- The issue of interoperability: as ATM is highly regulated from an interoperability point of view at the global level by ICAO, it is difficult to drive changes solely at a European level (Baumgartner and Wipf, 2008). While the current Commission, nearing the end of its mandate, is trying to force SES IIþ upon its member states, this has only triggered their resistance, to the point that the situation appears to be currently blocked. However, two interesting proposals have recently been made, which may constitute a way out of the gridlock: Eurocontrol has proposed to centralize some services, thus unbundling the current air navigation services into those delivered at the air space block (FAB) level, and those provided at the central (network manager) level. Such unbundling could serve as a first step towards the gradual centralization of all air navigation services. Even if the centralized services could offer a possible way out of the gridlock, it is too early to assess whether they would be a real “game changer.” Some of the operational solutions are too attractive to be discarded, though others bear a real risk that an even larger (operational) monopoly is being created, which is certainly not in line with the EC’s liberalization agenda. On the other hand, Skyguide, the Swiss ANSP, has proposed to create an intermediary and shared platform of data exchange, located in between the services and the operations. Such a common platform would without doubt reduce infrastructure costs for the different ANSPs, and create an SES, at least at the data-management level. Both proposals are certainly possible ways out of the current gridlock. Their strength is that they do not in themselves create losers, except perhaps among suppliers who will no longer be able to play ANSPs (and their governments for that matter) against each other. A single infrastructure (data-exchange) platform could indeed be desirable for these ANSPs whose infrastructure technologies are up for renewal, and by doing so could substantially reduce investment costs. Sharing infrastructures and their costs is furthermore a process that many ANSPs have often already experienced within their national boundaries. Consequently, this will not be perceived as threatening and thus will smooth consolidation and restructuring. Also, it could be phased in by way of a two-tier approach, within which ANSPs could choose between the (incentivized) benefits of opting in, and the (disincentivized) costs of opting out. For example, ANSPs that opt in later could be made to pay a disproportionate cost share of the common infrastructure system. In addition, regulation at the Commission level could be much lighter (and thus much more acceptable) than the currently threatened infringement procedures; that is, being subject to regulation about interconnection, interoperability, as well as data protection and data sharing. Finally, additional pressure could be created by way of the already existing performance scheme, perhaps even by recognizing investment into a shared infrastructure as being eligible for reimbursement by the airspace users, whereas opting-out ANSPs would have to meet tougher (cost) performance objectives (Europen Transport Regulation Observer, 2013). Though too early to be assessed in this paper, the full pressure of the SES performance scheme on the actors and the costs needs to be monitored. Whereas one could certainly accept that the pressure put on the states has already shown some impact, it might be too early to attribute this impact to the SES performance scheme alone. As a matter of fact, the downturn in traffic has certainly had a much greater impact on the current performance of the system. References

Fig. 10. Evolving role of actors and their relationship in SES context. Source: Authors

Aviation Civile magazine hors-série_Mars 2013. Baumgartner, M., 2007. Air Traffic Management. The Organization and Operation of European Airspace. Ashgate, London. Baumgartner, M., 2010. Vision 2035. Presentation. ASDA Conference. Naples (I).

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Please cite this article in press as: Baumgartner, M., Finger, M., The Single European Sky gridlock: A difficult 10 year reform process, Utilities Policy (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jup.2014.03.004