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The “Smart” Tool: Impacts on An Airline Operations Control Center
THE "SMART" TOOL: IMPACTS ON AN AIRLINE OPERATIONS...
C:opydght ~, 1999 IFAC ) 4th Triennial \\1orld Congress,
14th World Congress of IFAC
M-6b-03-3 Beijing~
P.R. China
THE "SMART" TOOL: ThfPACTS ON AN AIRLINE OPERATIONS CONTROL CENTER
Emily Beaton, James DeArmon, Shane Miller, Donald Olvey
The MITRE Corporation 1820 Dolley Madison. Blvd.) McLean, VA 22102 USA jdearmon @ nlitre. org
Abstract: SMART (Self-ivfanaged Arrival Resequencing Tool) is an automation capability which allows airspace users to manage their own arri va] flO\NS. Through the interventions of ground delay and airborne speed-control, users may affect the timing and sequencing of arrival flights. NeV\l procedures for coordination with Air Traffic Control are not needed. However, some changes in the procedures in the airline Operations Control Center (OCe) are required. Proper training and coordination among the dispatcher and pilot are needed. This article describes the experience in installing a demonstration version of SMART and the changes in the roles and responsibilities of the Copyright 'G 1999 IFAC
ace.
Keyv./ords: Air traffic control
1. INTRODUCTION The Self-Managed Arrival Resequencing Tool (SMART) is a delnonstration project to test the feasibility of "own company" lnanageruent of arrival flows. The tool allows the airspace user (a flight dispatcher or an AirHne Operations Control Center (aCe) coordinator) to establish flight arrivals into a "hub" airport based on COlnpany needs and priorities. Using a visual display of the relative tilne ordering of arrival aircraft~ SMART alloVo.rs the user to intervene on a flight specific basis. This intervention is acconlplished using one of two nlethods: ground delay or early release of pre-departure flights at origin airports, or speed control for airborne flights. SMART has been installed at field test sites and has been deemed a success by the participating airlines and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). During project development, certain impacts on the ace personnel roles and responsibj]jties were observed, and these are djsc-ussed in the following sections of the paper.
2. BACKGROIJND In October of 1995, a proposal was put forth for Research and Developn1ent funding at The MITRE Corporation's Center for Advanced Aviation SysteITI Deve]opn1ent (CAASD). The proposal was driven by the shared vision of governnlent and industry that infortnation sharing would have tangible benefits for the airspace users. Further lTIotivation canle fronl the RTCA Task Force 3 (RTCA~ 1995). It was conjectured in their vision of Free Flight that the "free flow of infornlation between users and Air Traffic Managelnent (ATM)'~ would benefit users. CAASD decided to test explicitly. via field trials of a demonstration tool, whether dynamic arrival sequence data would improve the operations of oces, \vhile making the airspace management job easier, or at least no more difficult. ~A.
~
6547
Copyright 1999 IFAC
ISBN: 0 08 043248 4
THE "SMART" TOOL: IMPACTS ON AN AIRLINE OPERATIONS...
14th World Congress of IFAC
the software/concept development team to refine the ideas, features~ and the operational use of the tool. lJsing near-reaJ-tinle flight data froIn the FAA and other data, the idea was that SMART would provide the users with a time-oriented visualization of flights' expected times of arrival (ETA). The airline user gains improved awareness of the state of the company fleet, and the expected tilne and sequence of the arrivals into the hub airport. The user is able to influence the course of events by lnanipuJating flights' expected arrival tinle. It \vas deternlincd that nighttiIne package carriers could provide the best chance of success if used as a test bed for SMART. Nighttime flying allows lTIOre flexibility and autonolny with respect to route of flight and departure timing.
status information, e.g., runway capacity and configuration; and (3) dynamic wind predictions, as supplied by the V.S. National Weather Service. Two l11ajor software cOInponents of the tool \\'cre the display and the prediction engine.
The display is a unique (a patent is pending) visual representation of a diagonal tiIne line, with deviations from the line indicating expected arrival "bunching~' and hence delay. Significant effort went into understanding and refining the data rcquirerrlents to support the display. The prediction engine uses the aircraft position data and the latest forecast wind data, to project the estin1ated time of arrival (ETA) for all flights bound for the hub airport. This jnfofrnatlon enables SMART to create a vie",' of the future expected arrival demand.
4_2 Tool installation
3. PROBLEM STATEMEI\Y[ The basic hypothesis to be tested \-vas as foUows. Js it feasible and beneficial for airline operators to
manage their o\vn air traffic arrival naViS using improved information technology? Adjunct questions to be answered are (1) what data is required to support a capability? and (2) v/hat should the computer/human interface look like?
To effect user setf-management of arrival flows, it was necessary for a new tool to be prototyped and introduced into the
acc.
Through persona] contacts with industry representatives, we selected t\\"o sites: United Parcel Service (UPS) used an early version of SMART for its overnight operations at Louisville, Kentucky (designated SDF), and Federal Express (FDX) used a later version for its overnight operations at Me,mphis~ Tennessee (designated MEM). The demonstration system was installed onsite, and computer system administrators were sent to test necessary communications links. A)so~ the staff who \-vouId use the too) were trained.
Of course, introduction of
new concepts of operations at an ace must be handled carefully. The selection, roles, and training of the acc personnel involved in the testing are key factors and influence the success of the project.
It was necessary to inform the dispatchers and pilots
of the intended time of use and intended effect of the automation. These parties needed to understand that there were to be some changes in the normal course of events in the ni ght, but that the intent is improved operating efficiency and profitability for the company_
To ans~~er the posed hypothesis~ an experiment \\las formulated for the introduction of the ne\v tool into the OCC~ as described below.
Note that no change of procedure or role is required on the part of ATe. In accordance with pUblished procedures~ if the adjustment in speed aloft necessary to make a new arrival time is large enough Ca difference of 10 knots, or a 5 percent change). ATe approval would be necessary.
4. EXPERIMENT DESCRIPTION An experiment was. formulated to test the posed research hypothesis. Steps of the experiment v..'ere: building a demonstration too], tool installation and coordination with ace staff, and evaluating the usage of the tool and the economic benefit. Details on these steps are provided belo\v.
4.3 Description of Anticipated
SMf\RI~ Usage
Using the SMART tool, users are afforded additional situational awareness of the fluctuations in arrival demand. As peaks in arrival demand develop, users can intervene by talking \vith the pilots of the aircraft involved (10 adjust arrival time if the flights are airborne), or by temporarily imposing a ground delay for close-in llights. (The tool displays ETA information for all t1ights bound for the arrival airport~ but users can, of course~ only make changes la "own company~' flights.)
4. I Building the Tool
A demonstration version of SMART \vas built for installation in te~t mode. The tool v,.'ou)d rely on several data sources: (1) periodic position reports (for airborne flights) and proposed departure tjrnes (for pre-departure flights) provided by the Enhanced Traffic Management SystemJ Aircraft Situation Display (ETMS/ASD) airline data feed; (2) airport
6548
Copyright 1999 IFAC
ISBN: 0 08 043248 4
THE "SMART" TOOL: IMPACTS ON AN AIRLINE OPERATIONS...
14th World Congress of IFAC
SMART assists the user in choosing which flights are the best candidates for both types of Inanipulation. Airborne and pre-departure flights are easily distinguishable, and cOlnpany airborne flights have a Hspeed-controllability window" associated with each one. This "window" provides a visual depiction of th e range of arrival times, ear Hest to latest, that are possible for the aircraft, using only adjustments in speed. The flight's equipment type, a] titude. and remaining distance to the destination are used in calculating this range. Changes can be submitted in a trial planning, what mode v/hereby SMART lets the user see the results of a planned action prior to that action being implemented.
congested arrival flows. An annual monetary benefit of SMART usage was also computed.
5.1 Shadotv Mode Usage
Before the formal asseSSll1ent of operational mode, SMART was installed and could aid arrival flow management. Some of the air carrier's ~'shado,",' mode~~ experiences with the tool at this point provided a glimpse of how the tool would be used in full operational mode.
H
if~
It was anticipated that most adjustments in speed would take place between 30 minutes and 90 minutes away from the TRACON (Terminal Radar Approach Control) boundary. Further than 90 minutes away from the TRACON~ exposure to random effects in the National Airspace System could potentia))y undo speed control directives~ while 30 minutes or less from the TRACON is likely too late for speed control to have much effect and in addition may interfere with A Th1 actions.
4.4 Pha.\;es of Experimentation The assessrnent of the efficacy of SMART proceeded increlllentaJly. Consistent with the general practice of conservatistn in introduction of autoITlation and ot.her changes in the ATM systcn1~ our evaluation was conducted in phases. The initial phase was a laboratory evaluation~ wherein a mock-up of the tool running a '''canned~' scenario was stepped-through by airline and FAA personnel. Succeeding in that test~ the evaluation went on to a Hshadow mode" asseSSlnent in which the tool was fielded t and proposed changes or "what-ifs" were considered and evaluated. In shadow mode, operational airborne changes were not allowed, but ground delay was not prohibited. As a final phase of evaluation, SMART was used in a full operational mrxle to affect flights in the inbound pushes to the hub.
One example scenario typifies this experience.
On
the night of 9-10 December 1996~ 10\\l ceiling and low visibility reduced the Louisville/Standiford Airport (SDF) to a single-runvllray operation. This lowered the arrival capacity of the airport~ hO""'ever~ the demand on resources remained as though a dualrunway operation Vv~as still in force. In the past such a situation resulted in extensive airborne holding for LTpS. Such holding could resuh in any\V'here from one to three di versions. In December of 1996~ however, SMART \vas stiH in shadov,l mode. This meant that SMART could not be used for adjusting cruise speeds for airborne flights on the night of 9-10. Ho\vever, it did provide its users a depiction of the relationships between arrival deluand and reduced airport capacity. UPS could readily distinguish between prc-dcparturc and airborne flights, and realized several of their predeparture, close-in flights would contribute to the anticipated problem. By delaying the departure of sOlne of these nights, UPS reported that they were able to avoid diversions, and that airborne holding \-vas lo\~'er than expected. Di versions prove costly for cargo t;arriers, who must. employ many snlaller jets to ensure timely delivery of packages.
5.2 Operational Mode Usage Shadow [node's positive experiences were continued The enhanced situational awareness provided by SMART led airlines to use departure management actions for arrival now congestion, i.e., to impose ground-delay on close-in flights, so that their arrival tilne would fall after the congested time period. into operational mode.
The airlines' usage of the tool vI/as evaluated through observations, intervie\vs, and questionnaires, as well as autonlatically-captured logs of their interactions with the tool. These results are described ITIOrC fully in the next section.
Despite the speed controllability \vindoV'll' provided for each COITlpany flight, SMART was not used to help 1110dify the arrival tin1e of airborne flights. Consequently, there was no impact on ATe \vhatever during experilnentation.
5. RESULTS/ANALYSIS Installation of the SMART prototype at the t\VO field sites enabled an assesslnenl of actual usage and benefits. Site vi.sits for observations and interviews, anecdotal data, and questionnaires provided a basis for understanding ho\v the tool was used to 111anage
5.3 Conditions for SA-1ART Usage SMART was used on lxJth bad weather nights and good weather nights. On bad "veather nights,
6549
Copyright 1999 IFAC
ISBN: 0 08 043248 4
THE "SMART" TOOL: IMPACTS ON AN AIRLINE OPERATIONS...
14th World Congress of IFAC
(1) ~'SMART enhanced participant's ability to utilize available ternlinal capacity" (2) ·~SMART enabled an earlier 'sort-down' time", (3) '~SMART enabled the avoidance of diversions·'. (Sort-down tin1e is a key performance measure. It is the time when the last arrival of the night is unloaded.)
SMART helped users to hold-back lower priority flights to nlinirnize arrival congestion. On good weather nights~ SMART was used to (1) confirnl things were running as scheduled, and (2) to plan for bad weather nights~ e.g., by analyzing the ~~big picture~'. The "big picture included a sense of which flights were competing for resources. This helped the airlines plan which specific tlights to manipulate on bad-w"eather nights. H
Thi s survey established in a formal way the efficacy of the SMART tool. ResuJts were reported to the FAA.
5.4 Personnel dynarnics
5.6 Benefits frorn using SMARI'
When the experiment was envisioned, it was anticipated that each dispatcher would have hislher own SMART \vorkstation. How"ever, in both the FDX and UPS experiments~ it was determined by the
ace
Through some foJlow-on analysis and the help of the airlines and local Traffic Management Units} an annual benefit of SMART usage was estitnated to be at least $2 million per airline/airport installation. The National Airspace System also benefited: reduced holding and avoided diversions reduces controller workload and requires fe\ver restrictions be put in place.
point of contact that there was to be only one
individual trained on how to use this ne,,,, auton1ated tool. This individual fOftTIulated an over-all strategy for dealing with the arrival congestion problenl, and coordinated with the dispatchers responsible for the flights to be manipulated. The tool resulted in this coordin ator' s set of tasks changing somewh at in Ii ght of the extra information provided by this decision support system. A key observation was that in order for the coordinator role to be effective. shelhe needed to have buy-in vvith the dispatchers making requests of the· pilots.
6. DISCUSSION
The previous section described the assessment of operational use of SlVIART at two field sites. At UPSJSDF~ results were mixed: an initial informal assessment showed promise, but the formal assessment \vas overtaken by events (truck drivers~ labor strike, and pilots threat of strike, in the summer
As mentioned previously, the only actions taken with SMART involved adjusting the release times of some flights. There were no adjustments made to the cruise speed of flights. Feedback from the two user
of 1997) and could not be completed. At FDXJMEM the formal assessment was completed~ and demonstrated quantitative benefits.
airlines indicated that they thought effective strategies to deal with congestion were possible by altering ajrboroe aircraft's arrival times, but that their dispatchers were not accustomed to making such requests of pilots. The dispatchers were not inclined to start asking for this kind of flight change.
The initjal hypothesis of this \vork should be restated: "'Is it feasible and beneficial for airline operators to participate in the management of air
traffic arrjval flo\vs; Le., using near-real-time flight information provided by the FAA. can users manipulate their arrival fleet to the betterment of airline operations, without negative impact on the FAA's air traffic management function?'~
5.5 Fie Id results Experiment participants filled out debrief questionnaires on both good and bad weather nights, at the end of the shift. Questionnaires were collected and tallied. During those nights with good weather conditions, all users indicated that they experienced enhanced awareness of arrival bunching/sequencing attributable to SMART.
This hypothesis is confirmed through our field experimentation~ with an important proviso. Airline operators call benefit from the SMART technology, but only if the human side of the process is v..·orked effecti vel y.
The airline ace is essentially a Hcommand and control'~ system. It has well-defined tasks~ roles, and procedures. The insertion of a nev·,l technology, especially one that requires some changes in tasking, must be handled carefully_
Bad weather nights yielded richer survey results. Four of the nights surveyed in November 1997 experienced bad weather conditions. All participants indicated ~'Strongly Agree'· or "Agree" (the highest two of five possible rankings) \vith the following two assertions: (J ) ~"SMART enhanced participanCs
An important observation was that if the ace staff was not already using the practice of speed control, then our tool did not encourage them to take up the practice. Rather, using the improved inforrnation
awareness of arrival bunching/sequencing·'. and (2) ~'SMART enhanced participant's ability to manage ground delays and early relcases~'. All participants indicated HAgree·' for the following three assertions:
6550
Copyright 1999 IFAC
ISBN: 0 08 043248 4
14th World Congress of IFAC
THE "SMART" TOOL: IMPACTS ON AN AIRLINE OPERATIONS...
from the tool~ ace staff could make better decisions of the kind they were already accustolned to. A second~ perhaps obvious? observation \vas that the promoter of a ne\\.~ tool or technology needs to have bu y- in from the actual users of the tool. As tool developers from outside the airline operation~ the success of the project \vas very sensitive to v/ha our contacts were at the subject airlines. We discovered that good credibility and long-term relationships with the dispatchers were critical for our tool to be adequately utilized and show its potentiaL
7. ACKNOWLEDGEIVIENTS
The SMART project was a collaboration of FAA, airline, and MITRE/CAASD people. Authors gratefully acknowledge the participation of Bill Cook (VPS)~ Vie Fisher (CAASD), left Griffith (FAA)~ Jack Kies (FAA). Dan Kirk (CAASD), Bill Leber (NWA), Karen Lee (UPS)~ Dave Lusk (FDX), Bill Schocke (UPS), Rod Sirnmons (CAASD), Steve Vail (FDX) , Roger Wall (FAA) , and NeJson WhitJow (lIPS).
REFERENCES
RTCA (1995). Task Force 3 Interim Repurt on FreeFlight RTCA, Inc., Washington D.e.
6551
Copyright 1999 IFAC
ISBN: 0 08 043248 4
C:opydght ~, 1999 IFAC ) 4th Triennial \\1orld Congress,
14th World Congress of IFAC
M-6b-03-3 Beijing~
P.R. China
THE "SMART" TOOL: ThfPACTS ON AN AIRLINE OPERATIONS CONTROL CENTER
Emily Beaton, James DeArmon, Shane Miller, Donald Olvey
The MITRE Corporation 1820 Dolley Madison. Blvd.) McLean, VA 22102 USA jdearmon @ nlitre. org
Abstract: SMART (Self-ivfanaged Arrival Resequencing Tool) is an automation capability which allows airspace users to manage their own arri va] flO\NS. Through the interventions of ground delay and airborne speed-control, users may affect the timing and sequencing of arrival flights. NeV\l procedures for coordination with Air Traffic Control are not needed. However, some changes in the procedures in the airline Operations Control Center (OCe) are required. Proper training and coordination among the dispatcher and pilot are needed. This article describes the experience in installing a demonstration version of SMART and the changes in the roles and responsibilities of the Copyright 'G 1999 IFAC
ace.
Keyv./ords: Air traffic control
1. INTRODUCTION The Self-Managed Arrival Resequencing Tool (SMART) is a delnonstration project to test the feasibility of "own company" lnanageruent of arrival flows. The tool allows the airspace user (a flight dispatcher or an AirHne Operations Control Center (aCe) coordinator) to establish flight arrivals into a "hub" airport based on COlnpany needs and priorities. Using a visual display of the relative tilne ordering of arrival aircraft~ SMART alloVo.rs the user to intervene on a flight specific basis. This intervention is acconlplished using one of two nlethods: ground delay or early release of pre-departure flights at origin airports, or speed control for airborne flights. SMART has been installed at field test sites and has been deemed a success by the participating airlines and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). During project development, certain impacts on the ace personnel roles and responsibj]jties were observed, and these are djsc-ussed in the following sections of the paper.
2. BACKGROIJND In October of 1995, a proposal was put forth for Research and Developn1ent funding at The MITRE Corporation's Center for Advanced Aviation SysteITI Deve]opn1ent (CAASD). The proposal was driven by the shared vision of governnlent and industry that infortnation sharing would have tangible benefits for the airspace users. Further lTIotivation canle fronl the RTCA Task Force 3 (RTCA~ 1995). It was conjectured in their vision of Free Flight that the "free flow of infornlation between users and Air Traffic Managelnent (ATM)'~ would benefit users. CAASD decided to test explicitly. via field trials of a demonstration tool, whether dynamic arrival sequence data would improve the operations of oces, \vhile making the airspace management job easier, or at least no more difficult. ~A.
~
6547
Copyright 1999 IFAC
ISBN: 0 08 043248 4
THE "SMART" TOOL: IMPACTS ON AN AIRLINE OPERATIONS...
14th World Congress of IFAC
the software/concept development team to refine the ideas, features~ and the operational use of the tool. lJsing near-reaJ-tinle flight data froIn the FAA and other data, the idea was that SMART would provide the users with a time-oriented visualization of flights' expected times of arrival (ETA). The airline user gains improved awareness of the state of the company fleet, and the expected tilne and sequence of the arrivals into the hub airport. The user is able to influence the course of events by lnanipuJating flights' expected arrival tinle. It \vas deternlincd that nighttiIne package carriers could provide the best chance of success if used as a test bed for SMART. Nighttime flying allows lTIOre flexibility and autonolny with respect to route of flight and departure timing.
status information, e.g., runway capacity and configuration; and (3) dynamic wind predictions, as supplied by the V.S. National Weather Service. Two l11ajor software cOInponents of the tool \\'cre the display and the prediction engine.
The display is a unique (a patent is pending) visual representation of a diagonal tiIne line, with deviations from the line indicating expected arrival "bunching~' and hence delay. Significant effort went into understanding and refining the data rcquirerrlents to support the display. The prediction engine uses the aircraft position data and the latest forecast wind data, to project the estin1ated time of arrival (ETA) for all flights bound for the hub airport. This jnfofrnatlon enables SMART to create a vie",' of the future expected arrival demand.
4_2 Tool installation
3. PROBLEM STATEMEI\Y[ The basic hypothesis to be tested \-vas as foUows. Js it feasible and beneficial for airline operators to
manage their o\vn air traffic arrival naViS using improved information technology? Adjunct questions to be answered are (1) what data is required to support a capability? and (2) v/hat should the computer/human interface look like?
To effect user setf-management of arrival flows, it was necessary for a new tool to be prototyped and introduced into the
acc.
Through persona] contacts with industry representatives, we selected t\\"o sites: United Parcel Service (UPS) used an early version of SMART for its overnight operations at Louisville, Kentucky (designated SDF), and Federal Express (FDX) used a later version for its overnight operations at Me,mphis~ Tennessee (designated MEM). The demonstration system was installed onsite, and computer system administrators were sent to test necessary communications links. A)so~ the staff who \-vouId use the too) were trained.
Of course, introduction of
new concepts of operations at an ace must be handled carefully. The selection, roles, and training of the acc personnel involved in the testing are key factors and influence the success of the project.
It was necessary to inform the dispatchers and pilots
of the intended time of use and intended effect of the automation. These parties needed to understand that there were to be some changes in the normal course of events in the ni ght, but that the intent is improved operating efficiency and profitability for the company_
To ans~~er the posed hypothesis~ an experiment \\las formulated for the introduction of the ne\v tool into the OCC~ as described below.
Note that no change of procedure or role is required on the part of ATe. In accordance with pUblished procedures~ if the adjustment in speed aloft necessary to make a new arrival time is large enough Ca difference of 10 knots, or a 5 percent change). ATe approval would be necessary.
4. EXPERIMENT DESCRIPTION An experiment was. formulated to test the posed research hypothesis. Steps of the experiment v..'ere: building a demonstration too], tool installation and coordination with ace staff, and evaluating the usage of the tool and the economic benefit. Details on these steps are provided belo\v.
4.3 Description of Anticipated
SMf\RI~ Usage
Using the SMART tool, users are afforded additional situational awareness of the fluctuations in arrival demand. As peaks in arrival demand develop, users can intervene by talking \vith the pilots of the aircraft involved (10 adjust arrival time if the flights are airborne), or by temporarily imposing a ground delay for close-in llights. (The tool displays ETA information for all t1ights bound for the arrival airport~ but users can, of course~ only make changes la "own company~' flights.)
4. I Building the Tool
A demonstration version of SMART \vas built for installation in te~t mode. The tool v,.'ou)d rely on several data sources: (1) periodic position reports (for airborne flights) and proposed departure tjrnes (for pre-departure flights) provided by the Enhanced Traffic Management SystemJ Aircraft Situation Display (ETMS/ASD) airline data feed; (2) airport
6548
Copyright 1999 IFAC
ISBN: 0 08 043248 4
THE "SMART" TOOL: IMPACTS ON AN AIRLINE OPERATIONS...
14th World Congress of IFAC
SMART assists the user in choosing which flights are the best candidates for both types of Inanipulation. Airborne and pre-departure flights are easily distinguishable, and cOlnpany airborne flights have a Hspeed-controllability window" associated with each one. This "window" provides a visual depiction of th e range of arrival times, ear Hest to latest, that are possible for the aircraft, using only adjustments in speed. The flight's equipment type, a] titude. and remaining distance to the destination are used in calculating this range. Changes can be submitted in a trial planning, what mode v/hereby SMART lets the user see the results of a planned action prior to that action being implemented.
congested arrival flows. An annual monetary benefit of SMART usage was also computed.
5.1 Shadotv Mode Usage
Before the formal asseSSll1ent of operational mode, SMART was installed and could aid arrival flow management. Some of the air carrier's ~'shado,",' mode~~ experiences with the tool at this point provided a glimpse of how the tool would be used in full operational mode.
H
if~
It was anticipated that most adjustments in speed would take place between 30 minutes and 90 minutes away from the TRACON (Terminal Radar Approach Control) boundary. Further than 90 minutes away from the TRACON~ exposure to random effects in the National Airspace System could potentia))y undo speed control directives~ while 30 minutes or less from the TRACON is likely too late for speed control to have much effect and in addition may interfere with A Th1 actions.
4.4 Pha.\;es of Experimentation The assessrnent of the efficacy of SMART proceeded increlllentaJly. Consistent with the general practice of conservatistn in introduction of autoITlation and ot.her changes in the ATM systcn1~ our evaluation was conducted in phases. The initial phase was a laboratory evaluation~ wherein a mock-up of the tool running a '''canned~' scenario was stepped-through by airline and FAA personnel. Succeeding in that test~ the evaluation went on to a Hshadow mode" asseSSlnent in which the tool was fielded t and proposed changes or "what-ifs" were considered and evaluated. In shadow mode, operational airborne changes were not allowed, but ground delay was not prohibited. As a final phase of evaluation, SMART was used in a full operational mrxle to affect flights in the inbound pushes to the hub.
One example scenario typifies this experience.
On
the night of 9-10 December 1996~ 10\\l ceiling and low visibility reduced the Louisville/Standiford Airport (SDF) to a single-runvllray operation. This lowered the arrival capacity of the airport~ hO""'ever~ the demand on resources remained as though a dualrunway operation Vv~as still in force. In the past such a situation resulted in extensive airborne holding for LTpS. Such holding could resuh in any\V'here from one to three di versions. In December of 1996~ however, SMART \vas stiH in shadov,l mode. This meant that SMART could not be used for adjusting cruise speeds for airborne flights on the night of 9-10. Ho\vever, it did provide its users a depiction of the relationships between arrival deluand and reduced airport capacity. UPS could readily distinguish between prc-dcparturc and airborne flights, and realized several of their predeparture, close-in flights would contribute to the anticipated problem. By delaying the departure of sOlne of these nights, UPS reported that they were able to avoid diversions, and that airborne holding \-vas lo\~'er than expected. Di versions prove costly for cargo t;arriers, who must. employ many snlaller jets to ensure timely delivery of packages.
5.2 Operational Mode Usage Shadow [node's positive experiences were continued The enhanced situational awareness provided by SMART led airlines to use departure management actions for arrival now congestion, i.e., to impose ground-delay on close-in flights, so that their arrival tilne would fall after the congested time period. into operational mode.
The airlines' usage of the tool vI/as evaluated through observations, intervie\vs, and questionnaires, as well as autonlatically-captured logs of their interactions with the tool. These results are described ITIOrC fully in the next section.
Despite the speed controllability \vindoV'll' provided for each COITlpany flight, SMART was not used to help 1110dify the arrival tin1e of airborne flights. Consequently, there was no impact on ATe \vhatever during experilnentation.
5. RESULTS/ANALYSIS Installation of the SMART prototype at the t\VO field sites enabled an assesslnenl of actual usage and benefits. Site vi.sits for observations and interviews, anecdotal data, and questionnaires provided a basis for understanding ho\v the tool was used to 111anage
5.3 Conditions for SA-1ART Usage SMART was used on lxJth bad weather nights and good weather nights. On bad "veather nights,
6549
Copyright 1999 IFAC
ISBN: 0 08 043248 4
THE "SMART" TOOL: IMPACTS ON AN AIRLINE OPERATIONS...
14th World Congress of IFAC
(1) ~'SMART enhanced participant's ability to utilize available ternlinal capacity" (2) ·~SMART enabled an earlier 'sort-down' time", (3) '~SMART enabled the avoidance of diversions·'. (Sort-down tin1e is a key performance measure. It is the time when the last arrival of the night is unloaded.)
SMART helped users to hold-back lower priority flights to nlinirnize arrival congestion. On good weather nights~ SMART was used to (1) confirnl things were running as scheduled, and (2) to plan for bad weather nights~ e.g., by analyzing the ~~big picture~'. The "big picture included a sense of which flights were competing for resources. This helped the airlines plan which specific tlights to manipulate on bad-w"eather nights. H
Thi s survey established in a formal way the efficacy of the SMART tool. ResuJts were reported to the FAA.
5.4 Personnel dynarnics
5.6 Benefits frorn using SMARI'
When the experiment was envisioned, it was anticipated that each dispatcher would have hislher own SMART \vorkstation. How"ever, in both the FDX and UPS experiments~ it was determined by the
ace
Through some foJlow-on analysis and the help of the airlines and local Traffic Management Units} an annual benefit of SMART usage was estitnated to be at least $2 million per airline/airport installation. The National Airspace System also benefited: reduced holding and avoided diversions reduces controller workload and requires fe\ver restrictions be put in place.
point of contact that there was to be only one
individual trained on how to use this ne,,,, auton1ated tool. This individual fOftTIulated an over-all strategy for dealing with the arrival congestion problenl, and coordinated with the dispatchers responsible for the flights to be manipulated. The tool resulted in this coordin ator' s set of tasks changing somewh at in Ii ght of the extra information provided by this decision support system. A key observation was that in order for the coordinator role to be effective. shelhe needed to have buy-in vvith the dispatchers making requests of the· pilots.
6. DISCUSSION
The previous section described the assessment of operational use of SlVIART at two field sites. At UPSJSDF~ results were mixed: an initial informal assessment showed promise, but the formal assessment \vas overtaken by events (truck drivers~ labor strike, and pilots threat of strike, in the summer
As mentioned previously, the only actions taken with SMART involved adjusting the release times of some flights. There were no adjustments made to the cruise speed of flights. Feedback from the two user
of 1997) and could not be completed. At FDXJMEM the formal assessment was completed~ and demonstrated quantitative benefits.
airlines indicated that they thought effective strategies to deal with congestion were possible by altering ajrboroe aircraft's arrival times, but that their dispatchers were not accustomed to making such requests of pilots. The dispatchers were not inclined to start asking for this kind of flight change.
The initjal hypothesis of this \vork should be restated: "'Is it feasible and beneficial for airline operators to participate in the management of air
traffic arrjval flo\vs; Le., using near-real-time flight information provided by the FAA. can users manipulate their arrival fleet to the betterment of airline operations, without negative impact on the FAA's air traffic management function?'~
5.5 Fie Id results Experiment participants filled out debrief questionnaires on both good and bad weather nights, at the end of the shift. Questionnaires were collected and tallied. During those nights with good weather conditions, all users indicated that they experienced enhanced awareness of arrival bunching/sequencing attributable to SMART.
This hypothesis is confirmed through our field experimentation~ with an important proviso. Airline operators call benefit from the SMART technology, but only if the human side of the process is v..·orked effecti vel y.
The airline ace is essentially a Hcommand and control'~ system. It has well-defined tasks~ roles, and procedures. The insertion of a nev·,l technology, especially one that requires some changes in tasking, must be handled carefully_
Bad weather nights yielded richer survey results. Four of the nights surveyed in November 1997 experienced bad weather conditions. All participants indicated ~'Strongly Agree'· or "Agree" (the highest two of five possible rankings) \vith the following two assertions: (J ) ~"SMART enhanced participanCs
An important observation was that if the ace staff was not already using the practice of speed control, then our tool did not encourage them to take up the practice. Rather, using the improved inforrnation
awareness of arrival bunching/sequencing·'. and (2) ~'SMART enhanced participant's ability to manage ground delays and early relcases~'. All participants indicated HAgree·' for the following three assertions:
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Copyright 1999 IFAC
ISBN: 0 08 043248 4
14th World Congress of IFAC
THE "SMART" TOOL: IMPACTS ON AN AIRLINE OPERATIONS...
from the tool~ ace staff could make better decisions of the kind they were already accustolned to. A second~ perhaps obvious? observation \vas that the promoter of a ne\\.~ tool or technology needs to have bu y- in from the actual users of the tool. As tool developers from outside the airline operation~ the success of the project \vas very sensitive to v/ha our contacts were at the subject airlines. We discovered that good credibility and long-term relationships with the dispatchers were critical for our tool to be adequately utilized and show its potentiaL
7. ACKNOWLEDGEIVIENTS
The SMART project was a collaboration of FAA, airline, and MITRE/CAASD people. Authors gratefully acknowledge the participation of Bill Cook (VPS)~ Vie Fisher (CAASD), left Griffith (FAA)~ Jack Kies (FAA). Dan Kirk (CAASD), Bill Leber (NWA), Karen Lee (UPS)~ Dave Lusk (FDX), Bill Schocke (UPS), Rod Sirnmons (CAASD), Steve Vail (FDX) , Roger Wall (FAA) , and NeJson WhitJow (lIPS).
REFERENCES
RTCA (1995). Task Force 3 Interim Repurt on FreeFlight RTCA, Inc., Washington D.e.
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