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The snap election in Austria, September 2008
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Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 28 (2009) 492–517
The snap election in Austria, September 2008 Wolfgang C. Mu¨ller* ¨ ude A5, D 68131 Mannheim, Germany Faculty of Social Sciences/MZES, University of Mannheim, Seminargeba
a r t i c l e i n f o Article history: Received 15 February 2009 Accepted 23 March 2009
1. Background The snap election, held on 28 September 2008, ended the shortest parliamentary term in post-war Austria. The 2006 election had an unexpected result: the Sozialde¨ sterreichs (Social Democratic Party, mokratische Partei O ¨ ) won more votes and seats than the O ¨ sterreichische SPO ¨ VP). This led, eventually, to the Volkspartei (People’s Party, O formation of another ‘grand coalition’ between the two ¨ –O ¨ VP coalition government replaced the parties. This SPO ¨ VP and the Bu ¨ ndnis Zukunft centre-right coalition of the O ¨ sterreich (Union for the Future of Austria, BZO ¨ ), a breakO ¨ sterreichs away faction from the Freiheitliche Partei O ¨ ) (Mu¨ller, 2008). (Freedom Party, FPO ¨ –O ¨ VP grand coalition was the only The 2006 SPO majority cabinet not excluded by the parties’ pre-election ¨ VP commitments; and it was an unloved result. The O considered the 2006 election result an error by the voters ¨ VP-leaning voters abstained), whilst the SPO ¨ was (many O ¨ VP taking the major portfolios and unhappy with the O protecting its policy gains of the 2000–2006 period. Indeed, ¨ VP prevented the SPO ¨ from honouring some of its the O central campaign promises, such as abolishing student fees and cancelling the purchase of military aeroplanes. With the coalition unable to develop a constructive agenda, the grand coalition failed to resolve most of the problems identified in the coalition’s programme. The governing parties’ ambiguity towards the coalition’s policy stalemates was accompanied by awkwardness ¨ leader and between the parties and their leaders. SPO Chancellor, Alfred Gusenbauer, was soon considered by his ¨ VP for the sake of rank and file to have sold out to the O ¨ VP leader, Wilhelm Molbeing prime minister. The new O terer, who had performed superbly in all his previous offices, turned out to be weak as the party’s front man, especially as he was constrained by the continued presence ¨ VP’s of his predecessor, Wolfgang Schu¨ssel, as the O parliamentary leader. The coalition was unable to benefit from the country’s excellent economic performance, with growth rates of 3.4% in 2007 and 2% in the first half of 2008, leading to a steep decline in unemployment. Nor did social policy largesse
* Tel.: þ49 621 181 2082; fax: þ49 621 181 2080. E-mail address: [email protected]
help, despite measures providing more money for families, care services, those on minimum income aid, and the extension of temporary rules making early retirement easier. The polls soon trended downwards for both government ¨ fell behind the O ¨ VP, it replaced parties. When the SPO Gusenbauer (although he continued as Chancellor) by the more popular Werner Feymann, Minister for Infrastructure, as party leader in June 2008. While Gusenbauer had almost unconditionally favoured the European Union, Feymann advocated a more open debate, criticised the EU’s ‘neo¨ to accept further liberal’ outlook, and committed the SPO changes in the EU’s ‘constitution’ only after holding a national referendum. While this was bad news for their solidly pro-EU partner, the conflict was aggravated ¨ announcing its change of policy in a letter to by the SPO the Neue Kronenzeitung, signed by both Feymann and Gusenbauer.1 Molterer responded by terminating the grand coalition in early July. It was this that triggered the early election, which was consistent with the coalition agreement. The move reflected profound policy disagreements, particularly on the EU issue. But the dissolution of the coalition also aimed to hold the election before Feymann was ¨ ’s new Bundeskanzler candidate, established as the SPO ¨ VP lead in the polls into parliamentary translate the O seats, and to benefit from the termination of an unpopular government. 2. Electoral system The electoral system allocates the 183 seats in the Nationalrat among parties that win a minimum of 4% of the valid vote nationwide or win one seat in any of the 43 multi-member electoral districts. Seats are distributed in three stages: first, in the electoral districts; second, in the nine La¨nder; and, finally, nationwide. The number of votes required for a seat is calculated by the Hare formula at the district and Land levels, and by the d’Hondt formula nationwide. A preference vote systems applies at district and Land levels. Preference votes change the order of the party list if a candidate wins one-sixth of the party vote or 50% of the number of votes required for a seat at the level of
1 The Neue Kronenzeitung is critical of the EU and has by far the largest distribution, reaching about 40% of Austrians.
Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 28 (2009) 492–517
the electoral district or for the Land (see Mu¨ller, 2005). Also, Austria lowered the voting age to 16 years in 2007, which enfranchised 184,000 youngsters; the 2008 election was the first time they had a chance to vote. 3. Contenders The election was contested by the five parliamentary ¨, O ¨ VP, FPO ¨ , BZO ¨ , and the Greens. It was also parties: SPO contested by 10 new or renewed parties, mushrooming because of the government’s unpopularity. The polls considered two of these as serious contenders for Nationalrat seats: the Liberales Forum (Liberal Forum, LIF) and ¨ ’s FRITZ. The LIF originated in the breakaway of the FPO liberal wing in 1993 under Heide Schmidt, had won parliamentary representation in 1994 and 1995 but dropped out of parliament in 1999. However, its leader, Alex¨ list in ander Zach, was elected as a LIF candidate on the SPO 2006. For the 2008 election, the LIF terminated this interparty cooperation and convinced Heide Schmitt to return as its lead candidate. FRITZ was the list of Fritz Dinkhauser, ¨ VP dissenter and president of the Tyrol Chamber of an O Labour. His campaign was populist in style and traditional Christian workers’ in content.2 The other serious lists were Catholic fundamentalists ¨ ), and the single(Die Christen, DC), the Communists (KPO ¨ (Rettet O ¨ sterreich, Save Austria) fighting issue party RETTO against ratification of the EU Lisbon Treaty. The ballot papers contained five more lists of extreme left groups and some individuals standing for the sake of publicity. 4. Election campaign As the coalition broke up just before summer 2008 – and the parties’ belief that electors do not want to hear about politics during holiday time – the election campaign started only in late summer. An IMAS poll taken in the first half of August identified only 38% of the electorate as already determined to vote for a particular party, 18% leaning towards one party, but fully 38% were undecided (6% no specific answer) (IMAS, 2008). According to GfK’s election day survey, 33% of the voters made their party choice in the last 2 weeks and 21% not earlier than a few days before the election (Plasser and Ulram, 2008). Given the 4 weeks of the campaign,3 the television confrontations between the party leaders were more important than ever. These confrontations brought together each pair of leaders of the parliamentary parties (or their deputies) and two ‘elephant rounds’ with all five major party leaders. Only 26% of electors escaped all the TV events; 45% followed between two and five; and only 20% more than five (Institut fu¨r Strategieanalysen & SORA, 2008). ¨ ’s campaign concentrated on Werner Feymann, The SPO presenting him as handsome and ready to cooperate with
2 Dinkhauser had won a stunning 18.4% of the vote and seven seats in the Tyrol Land diet election in June 2008. 3 For a regularly scheduled election, the official campaign lasts some 6 weeks, preceded by a period when the parties polish-up their public image. In all, the pre-campaign and official campaign would last some 6 months.
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¨ VP under a new, more constructive leadership. He also the O ¨ not to form a coalition with the FPO ¨. committed the SPO Feymann concentrated on the party’s core constituency and made peace with groups alienated under Gusenbauer’s ¨ activists. leadership, such as the trade unions and SPO Feymann’s objective was to hold on to its 2006 supporters rather than to reach out to groups that had stopped voting ¨ long ago or never had done so. The letter to the for the SPO editor of the Neue Kronenzeitung paid-off, as the newspaper – ¨ ’s target population – gave him widely read among the SPO unprecedented support. Other media displayed greater ¨ focused on fighting inflation distance. In issue terms, the SPO and the resulting loss in purchasing power, mainly by cutting taxes and increasing welfare benefits. ¨ VP ran a less focused campaign. It criticised the The O ¨ as no longer fit for government and stressed the need SPO to remain a reliable and responsible partner in the EU. The ¨ VP also stressed fighting crime and the abuse of asylum O rights, capitalising on the tough stands of its consecutive Ministers of the Interior, Platter and Fekter. In addition, the ¨ VP emphasised reducing taxes yet maintaining budget O discipline, and, at the same time, advocated new welfare measures.4 Towards the end of the campaign, responding ¨ VP came forward with to a decline in the polls, the O a ‘contract with the citizens’, which obliged politicians to bridge the gap between them and the electorate. ¨ campaign concentrated on fighting inflation, The FPO and, especially, the need to cut taxes and increase social benefits to make up for the loss of purchasing power. Immigration and asylum, and the EU, were identified as problems costing money that was needed for realising the party’s goals. Although different in detail and less radical ¨ campaign stressed the same issues. Its overall, the BZO main message, however, was its leader, Jo¨rg Haider, who had returned to his old form as a campaigner. The Greens focussed on the environment and climate change, education, and the position of women. The party aimed to achieve a breakthrough to participation in government, so was careful not to demand policies that could be judged too radical or overly straining the budget. The Greens were also defending their position as the third ¨ .5 strongest parliamentary party against the FPO A few days before the election, an extraordinary meeting of the Nationalrat provided the parties with the opportunity to demonstrate they were serious about their offerings to the electorate. Voting on 52 proposals – with coalition discipline suspended and the election ahead – the politics of outbidding experienced a heyday: within a few hours, expansive social policy measures were agreed, university fees abolished, and tax cuts introduced. Even some of the unanimously accepted proposals would hardly have reached this stage under a working government with concerns about the budget.
4
Such as the introduction of an obligatory year of pre-school education. This had brought cherished offices in the parliament’s presidium and the ombudsman office. 5
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Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 28 (2009) 492–517
5. Election results Turnout in the 2008 general election was 77.2% (based on valid votes). This was a marginal increase compared to 2006, when it reached its lowest-ever level (77.1%). Before 2006, the turnout never had fallen below 80%. Combined with the increase of the vote share of the two ‘protest’ ¨ and BZO ¨ ), the reduced turnout suggests rising parties (FPO voter alienation. The election results revealed a disaster for the two major parties. Having led in the opinion polls and hoping for momentum from the decisive break with the unloved coali¨ VP won a mere 26% of the vote – its worst ever tion, the O electoral result. It even lost 8.3 percentage points of its 2006 ¨ won only 29.3%, losing 6 points on its vote. Similarly, the SPO ¨ ’s worst ever 2006 vote. Although this was, again, the SPO result, it did better than most polls had suggested. Remaining the strongest party and actually increasing its lead over the ¨ VP was considered a kind of success, particularly given the O short time Feymann had to establish himself. ¨ managed to drive home what the polls had The FPO suggested for several months; it won 17.5% of the vote, a gain of 6.5 points. The real surprise, however, was the ¨ . Winning 10.7% of the vote strong performance of the BZO meant more than doubling its 2006 vote, tripling its MPs, and to be stronger than the Greens. With 10.4% of the vote, the Greens’ losses were confined to 0.6 points of its 2006 vote and one seat. Even so, the Greens clearly missed the party’s electoral goals of 15% and remaining the third strongest party. None of the small parties came close to the 4% threshold (see Table 1). ¨ and O ¨ VP no longer At a more aggregated level, the SPO hold the two-thirds majority (required for constitutional amendments and other important legislation) between ¨ and BZO ¨ (Haider’s them. It is also remarkable that the FPO former party and his new party) combined (28.2%) are Table 1 Results of the parliamentary elections in Austria, September 2008 and October 2006. Votes (%)
Social Democratic ¨) Party of Austria (SPO Austrian People’s ¨ VP) Party (O Freedom Party ¨) of Austria (FPO Union for the Future ¨) of Austria (BZO Greens Liberal Form (LIF) FRITZ Communist Party ¨) of Austria (KPO ¨ RETTO Die Christen (DC) Other parties Registered electorate Voters Valid votes Turnout (%) (based on valid votes)
Seats
2008
2006
2008
2006
29.3
35.3
57
68
26.0
34.3
51
66
17.5
11.0
34
21
10.7
4.1
21
7
10.4 2.1 1.8 0.8
11.0 – – 1.0
20 0 0 0
21 0 0 0
0.7 0.6 0.1 6,332,921 4,990,947 4,887,304 77.2
– – 3.3 6,107,892 4,793,780 4,708,281 77.1
0 0 0
0 0 0
Source: Bundesministerium fu¨r Inneres (http://www.bmi.gv.at/wahlen/).
Table 2 Flow of the vote between Austrian parliamentary elections, 2006 and 2008. 2006 vote
¨ SPO ¨ VP O ¨ FPO ¨ BZO Greens Other parties Non-voting
2008 vote ¨ SPO
¨ VP O
¨ FPO
¨ BZO
Greens
Other
Non-voting
73 3 4 4 4 11 2
2 70 1 3 3 2 1
10 5 79 13 2 29 4
4 9 8 72 2 16 5
2 2 1 2 69 9 3
2 4 3 2 12 26 4
6 7 4 5 8 7 81
Source: SORA (http://www.sora.at/de/start.asp?b¼497).
¨ at its peak (26.9% in 1999) and only stronger than the FPO ¨ , the strongest party in the system. 1.1% behind the SPO Analysis of vote flows conducted by the SORA Institute is ¨ lost reproduced in Table 2 below. It appears that the SPO ¨ whereas the O ¨ VP lost votes to the votes mainly to the FPO ¨ . The FPO ¨ managed to keep 79% of its 2006 voters, more BZO than any other party; the Greens retained only 69% of their voters at the 2006 election, less than any other party. Voter ¨ and BZO ¨ (13% and 8% respecexchanges between the FPO tively) reflect their similar ideological profile but poisoned relations between them. ¨ suffered particular losses among blue-collar The SPO workers (22 percentage points) and voters younger than 30 ¨ VP also lost voters in the same age group (8 points); the O (10 points) and among public sector employees (15 ¨ made spectacular gains among those points). The FPO younger than 30 (þ24 points), blue-collar workers (þ16 points), and voters who read the Neue Kronenzeitung exclu¨ gains were particularly strong sively (þ10 points). The BZO among the same groups of voters (Plasser and Ulram, 2008). According to a GfK exit poll among 600 first time voters ¨ was the main beneficiary of (aged 16–19), the FPO ¨ , 25% for the extending voting rights: 44% voted for the FPO ¨ ¨ ¨. OVP, 13% for the Greens, 10% for the SPO, and 3% for the BZO ¨ ’s leader, Heinz Christian Strache, was the youngest of FPO the lead candidates, and known for his campaigning in ¨ ’s discotheques. Nonetheless, surveys suggest that the FPO anti-foreigners image was probably the most important motive among first time voters (Profil, 2008). ¨ VP and the SPO ¨ , voters were largely For both the O motivated by their long-term party affiliation. However, ¨ voters supported its leader Feymann and its whereas SPO ¨ VP voters supported the party’s concern for social justice, O ¨ conventional economic and social policies. By contrast, FPO voters were drawn by the party’s anti-immigration and ¨ voters were almost exclusively motiasylum stands; BZO vated by Haider. Concern for the environment and support for its leader, Alexander Van der Bellen, underlay voters for the Greens (Plasser and Ulram, 2008).6
6 ¨ VP’s Another survey (using closed questions) showed that Molterer, O ¨ VP voters, whereas other lead leader, was important to only 25% of O ¨ ), 49% (Van der Bellen, candidates were mentioned by 47% (Strache, FPO ¨ ), and 59% (Haider, BZO ¨ ). Institut fu¨r StratGreens), 53% (Feymann, SPO egieanalysen & SORA (2008).
Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 28 (2009) 492–517
Interestingly, the EU issue that had brought down the ¨ –O ¨ VP coalition government was hardly relevant to SPO voters. It was mentioned spontaneously by only 1% of ¨ and O ¨ VP; 2% of BZO ¨ and Green voters; voters for the SPO ¨ voters. In response to closed questions, and 4% of FPO ¨ and FPO ¨ voters reported that their roughly one-third of SPO party’s commitment to holding referendums on revisions of the EU Treaty had been important to them (Plasser and Ulram, 2008). 6. Government formation The election result left the parties – and the President, who appoints the government – in a difficult situation. Only one two-party combination commanded a majority: ¨ –O ¨ VP coalition. All other minimal winning the failed SPO coalitions had been ruled out by the pre-election commit¨ ments of at least one of the parties. A minority SPO government was also considered a serious option, yet no one believed it would constitute a durable solution. ¨ was set on forming a fundamentally renewed The SPO ¨ VP. The O ¨ VP, in turn, maintained grand coalition with the O that voters had not honoured its work and promises – ¨ to form a working government by hence, it was for the SPO making proposals acceptable to other parties. To win time, President Fischer did not appoint a formateur until the final result, including absentee votes from abroad, was announced more than a week after the election. Mean¨ VP leader Molterer had resigned, and the party while, O executive had nominated Josef Pro¨ll as his successor. Pro¨ll ¨. had always favoured cooperation with the SPO The President appointed Feymann as formateur on 8 October – following the convention of appointing the leader of the largest Nationalrat party – with orders to form a government that is ‘decisive’ and ‘reliable’; in other words, another grand coalition. Under Pro¨ll’s leadership,
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¨ VP started negotiations with the SPO ¨ .7 By late the O November, the coalition negotiations agreed on a government programme and the division of portfolios, which the ¨ VP executive accepted with a large majority. Pro¨ll’s elecO ¨ VP leader by an overwhelming majority of deletion as O gates (89.6%) sealed the coalition deal; Pro¨ll had tied his ¨ –O ¨ VP coalition was sworn-in on 2 fate to it. The SPO December, 2008. The snap election had resulted in disaster for the two major parties. Rather than changing the unloved government, it changed the party leaderships, with the new leaders – Feymann and Pro¨ll – being more positive about ¨ –O ¨ VP coalition cooperation in a grand coalition. Yet the SPO is no longer that ‘grand’. It lacks command of the constitution-making two-thirds majority, which is a major setback given the hundreds of clauses with constitutional implications in ordinary legislation. The coalition also faces a huge economic challenge; indeed, perhaps the international capital market crisis was the most important factor ¨ –O ¨ VP negotiations. In the past, grand speeding up the SPO coalitions were at their best when faced with major and urgent problems. While it remains to be seen whether the 2008 grand coalition will meet the challenges, this is probably the last chance for ‘grand coalition’ government that has dominated Austria’s post-war history. References IMAS, 2008. IMAS Report No. 11 (August). Institut fu¨r Strategieanalysen & SORA, 2008. Nationalratswahl 2008. Mimeo, Vienna. Mu¨ller, W.C., 2005. Austria: a complex electoral system with subtle effects. In: Gallagher, M., Mitchell, P. (Eds.), The Politics of Electoral Systems. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 397–415. Mu¨ller, W.C., 2008. The surprising election in Austria, October 2006. Electoral Studies 27 (1), 175–179. Plasser, F., Ulram, P.A., 2008. Die Wahlanalyse 2008. Mimeo, Vienna. Profil, 2008. Verru¨ckt nach Rechts. No. 41, 6 October.
doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2009.03.003
7 ¨ VP leader Schu¨ssel engaged in According to some reports, former O ¨ VP–FPO ¨ –BZO ¨ coabehind the scenes attempts at bringing together an O ¨ had ruled out this coalition before the election; after the lition. The FPO ¨ leader Jo¨rg Haider (in a car accident on 11 October), it was death of BZO
considered hopeless.
Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 28 (2009) 492–517
The snap election in Austria, September 2008 Wolfgang C. Mu¨ller* ¨ ude A5, D 68131 Mannheim, Germany Faculty of Social Sciences/MZES, University of Mannheim, Seminargeba
a r t i c l e i n f o Article history: Received 15 February 2009 Accepted 23 March 2009
1. Background The snap election, held on 28 September 2008, ended the shortest parliamentary term in post-war Austria. The 2006 election had an unexpected result: the Sozialde¨ sterreichs (Social Democratic Party, mokratische Partei O ¨ ) won more votes and seats than the O ¨ sterreichische SPO ¨ VP). This led, eventually, to the Volkspartei (People’s Party, O formation of another ‘grand coalition’ between the two ¨ –O ¨ VP coalition government replaced the parties. This SPO ¨ VP and the Bu ¨ ndnis Zukunft centre-right coalition of the O ¨ sterreich (Union for the Future of Austria, BZO ¨ ), a breakO ¨ sterreichs away faction from the Freiheitliche Partei O ¨ ) (Mu¨ller, 2008). (Freedom Party, FPO ¨ –O ¨ VP grand coalition was the only The 2006 SPO majority cabinet not excluded by the parties’ pre-election ¨ VP commitments; and it was an unloved result. The O considered the 2006 election result an error by the voters ¨ VP-leaning voters abstained), whilst the SPO ¨ was (many O ¨ VP taking the major portfolios and unhappy with the O protecting its policy gains of the 2000–2006 period. Indeed, ¨ VP prevented the SPO ¨ from honouring some of its the O central campaign promises, such as abolishing student fees and cancelling the purchase of military aeroplanes. With the coalition unable to develop a constructive agenda, the grand coalition failed to resolve most of the problems identified in the coalition’s programme. The governing parties’ ambiguity towards the coalition’s policy stalemates was accompanied by awkwardness ¨ leader and between the parties and their leaders. SPO Chancellor, Alfred Gusenbauer, was soon considered by his ¨ VP for the sake of rank and file to have sold out to the O ¨ VP leader, Wilhelm Molbeing prime minister. The new O terer, who had performed superbly in all his previous offices, turned out to be weak as the party’s front man, especially as he was constrained by the continued presence ¨ VP’s of his predecessor, Wolfgang Schu¨ssel, as the O parliamentary leader. The coalition was unable to benefit from the country’s excellent economic performance, with growth rates of 3.4% in 2007 and 2% in the first half of 2008, leading to a steep decline in unemployment. Nor did social policy largesse
* Tel.: þ49 621 181 2082; fax: þ49 621 181 2080. E-mail address: [email protected]
help, despite measures providing more money for families, care services, those on minimum income aid, and the extension of temporary rules making early retirement easier. The polls soon trended downwards for both government ¨ fell behind the O ¨ VP, it replaced parties. When the SPO Gusenbauer (although he continued as Chancellor) by the more popular Werner Feymann, Minister for Infrastructure, as party leader in June 2008. While Gusenbauer had almost unconditionally favoured the European Union, Feymann advocated a more open debate, criticised the EU’s ‘neo¨ to accept further liberal’ outlook, and committed the SPO changes in the EU’s ‘constitution’ only after holding a national referendum. While this was bad news for their solidly pro-EU partner, the conflict was aggravated ¨ announcing its change of policy in a letter to by the SPO the Neue Kronenzeitung, signed by both Feymann and Gusenbauer.1 Molterer responded by terminating the grand coalition in early July. It was this that triggered the early election, which was consistent with the coalition agreement. The move reflected profound policy disagreements, particularly on the EU issue. But the dissolution of the coalition also aimed to hold the election before Feymann was ¨ ’s new Bundeskanzler candidate, established as the SPO ¨ VP lead in the polls into parliamentary translate the O seats, and to benefit from the termination of an unpopular government. 2. Electoral system The electoral system allocates the 183 seats in the Nationalrat among parties that win a minimum of 4% of the valid vote nationwide or win one seat in any of the 43 multi-member electoral districts. Seats are distributed in three stages: first, in the electoral districts; second, in the nine La¨nder; and, finally, nationwide. The number of votes required for a seat is calculated by the Hare formula at the district and Land levels, and by the d’Hondt formula nationwide. A preference vote systems applies at district and Land levels. Preference votes change the order of the party list if a candidate wins one-sixth of the party vote or 50% of the number of votes required for a seat at the level of
1 The Neue Kronenzeitung is critical of the EU and has by far the largest distribution, reaching about 40% of Austrians.
Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 28 (2009) 492–517
the electoral district or for the Land (see Mu¨ller, 2005). Also, Austria lowered the voting age to 16 years in 2007, which enfranchised 184,000 youngsters; the 2008 election was the first time they had a chance to vote. 3. Contenders The election was contested by the five parliamentary ¨, O ¨ VP, FPO ¨ , BZO ¨ , and the Greens. It was also parties: SPO contested by 10 new or renewed parties, mushrooming because of the government’s unpopularity. The polls considered two of these as serious contenders for Nationalrat seats: the Liberales Forum (Liberal Forum, LIF) and ¨ ’s FRITZ. The LIF originated in the breakaway of the FPO liberal wing in 1993 under Heide Schmidt, had won parliamentary representation in 1994 and 1995 but dropped out of parliament in 1999. However, its leader, Alex¨ list in ander Zach, was elected as a LIF candidate on the SPO 2006. For the 2008 election, the LIF terminated this interparty cooperation and convinced Heide Schmitt to return as its lead candidate. FRITZ was the list of Fritz Dinkhauser, ¨ VP dissenter and president of the Tyrol Chamber of an O Labour. His campaign was populist in style and traditional Christian workers’ in content.2 The other serious lists were Catholic fundamentalists ¨ ), and the single(Die Christen, DC), the Communists (KPO ¨ (Rettet O ¨ sterreich, Save Austria) fighting issue party RETTO against ratification of the EU Lisbon Treaty. The ballot papers contained five more lists of extreme left groups and some individuals standing for the sake of publicity. 4. Election campaign As the coalition broke up just before summer 2008 – and the parties’ belief that electors do not want to hear about politics during holiday time – the election campaign started only in late summer. An IMAS poll taken in the first half of August identified only 38% of the electorate as already determined to vote for a particular party, 18% leaning towards one party, but fully 38% were undecided (6% no specific answer) (IMAS, 2008). According to GfK’s election day survey, 33% of the voters made their party choice in the last 2 weeks and 21% not earlier than a few days before the election (Plasser and Ulram, 2008). Given the 4 weeks of the campaign,3 the television confrontations between the party leaders were more important than ever. These confrontations brought together each pair of leaders of the parliamentary parties (or their deputies) and two ‘elephant rounds’ with all five major party leaders. Only 26% of electors escaped all the TV events; 45% followed between two and five; and only 20% more than five (Institut fu¨r Strategieanalysen & SORA, 2008). ¨ ’s campaign concentrated on Werner Feymann, The SPO presenting him as handsome and ready to cooperate with
2 Dinkhauser had won a stunning 18.4% of the vote and seven seats in the Tyrol Land diet election in June 2008. 3 For a regularly scheduled election, the official campaign lasts some 6 weeks, preceded by a period when the parties polish-up their public image. In all, the pre-campaign and official campaign would last some 6 months.
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¨ VP under a new, more constructive leadership. He also the O ¨ not to form a coalition with the FPO ¨. committed the SPO Feymann concentrated on the party’s core constituency and made peace with groups alienated under Gusenbauer’s ¨ activists. leadership, such as the trade unions and SPO Feymann’s objective was to hold on to its 2006 supporters rather than to reach out to groups that had stopped voting ¨ long ago or never had done so. The letter to the for the SPO editor of the Neue Kronenzeitung paid-off, as the newspaper – ¨ ’s target population – gave him widely read among the SPO unprecedented support. Other media displayed greater ¨ focused on fighting inflation distance. In issue terms, the SPO and the resulting loss in purchasing power, mainly by cutting taxes and increasing welfare benefits. ¨ VP ran a less focused campaign. It criticised the The O ¨ as no longer fit for government and stressed the need SPO to remain a reliable and responsible partner in the EU. The ¨ VP also stressed fighting crime and the abuse of asylum O rights, capitalising on the tough stands of its consecutive Ministers of the Interior, Platter and Fekter. In addition, the ¨ VP emphasised reducing taxes yet maintaining budget O discipline, and, at the same time, advocated new welfare measures.4 Towards the end of the campaign, responding ¨ VP came forward with to a decline in the polls, the O a ‘contract with the citizens’, which obliged politicians to bridge the gap between them and the electorate. ¨ campaign concentrated on fighting inflation, The FPO and, especially, the need to cut taxes and increase social benefits to make up for the loss of purchasing power. Immigration and asylum, and the EU, were identified as problems costing money that was needed for realising the party’s goals. Although different in detail and less radical ¨ campaign stressed the same issues. Its overall, the BZO main message, however, was its leader, Jo¨rg Haider, who had returned to his old form as a campaigner. The Greens focussed on the environment and climate change, education, and the position of women. The party aimed to achieve a breakthrough to participation in government, so was careful not to demand policies that could be judged too radical or overly straining the budget. The Greens were also defending their position as the third ¨ .5 strongest parliamentary party against the FPO A few days before the election, an extraordinary meeting of the Nationalrat provided the parties with the opportunity to demonstrate they were serious about their offerings to the electorate. Voting on 52 proposals – with coalition discipline suspended and the election ahead – the politics of outbidding experienced a heyday: within a few hours, expansive social policy measures were agreed, university fees abolished, and tax cuts introduced. Even some of the unanimously accepted proposals would hardly have reached this stage under a working government with concerns about the budget.
4
Such as the introduction of an obligatory year of pre-school education. This had brought cherished offices in the parliament’s presidium and the ombudsman office. 5
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Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 28 (2009) 492–517
5. Election results Turnout in the 2008 general election was 77.2% (based on valid votes). This was a marginal increase compared to 2006, when it reached its lowest-ever level (77.1%). Before 2006, the turnout never had fallen below 80%. Combined with the increase of the vote share of the two ‘protest’ ¨ and BZO ¨ ), the reduced turnout suggests rising parties (FPO voter alienation. The election results revealed a disaster for the two major parties. Having led in the opinion polls and hoping for momentum from the decisive break with the unloved coali¨ VP won a mere 26% of the vote – its worst ever tion, the O electoral result. It even lost 8.3 percentage points of its 2006 ¨ won only 29.3%, losing 6 points on its vote. Similarly, the SPO ¨ ’s worst ever 2006 vote. Although this was, again, the SPO result, it did better than most polls had suggested. Remaining the strongest party and actually increasing its lead over the ¨ VP was considered a kind of success, particularly given the O short time Feymann had to establish himself. ¨ managed to drive home what the polls had The FPO suggested for several months; it won 17.5% of the vote, a gain of 6.5 points. The real surprise, however, was the ¨ . Winning 10.7% of the vote strong performance of the BZO meant more than doubling its 2006 vote, tripling its MPs, and to be stronger than the Greens. With 10.4% of the vote, the Greens’ losses were confined to 0.6 points of its 2006 vote and one seat. Even so, the Greens clearly missed the party’s electoral goals of 15% and remaining the third strongest party. None of the small parties came close to the 4% threshold (see Table 1). ¨ and O ¨ VP no longer At a more aggregated level, the SPO hold the two-thirds majority (required for constitutional amendments and other important legislation) between ¨ and BZO ¨ (Haider’s them. It is also remarkable that the FPO former party and his new party) combined (28.2%) are Table 1 Results of the parliamentary elections in Austria, September 2008 and October 2006. Votes (%)
Social Democratic ¨) Party of Austria (SPO Austrian People’s ¨ VP) Party (O Freedom Party ¨) of Austria (FPO Union for the Future ¨) of Austria (BZO Greens Liberal Form (LIF) FRITZ Communist Party ¨) of Austria (KPO ¨ RETTO Die Christen (DC) Other parties Registered electorate Voters Valid votes Turnout (%) (based on valid votes)
Seats
2008
2006
2008
2006
29.3
35.3
57
68
26.0
34.3
51
66
17.5
11.0
34
21
10.7
4.1
21
7
10.4 2.1 1.8 0.8
11.0 – – 1.0
20 0 0 0
21 0 0 0
0.7 0.6 0.1 6,332,921 4,990,947 4,887,304 77.2
– – 3.3 6,107,892 4,793,780 4,708,281 77.1
0 0 0
0 0 0
Source: Bundesministerium fu¨r Inneres (http://www.bmi.gv.at/wahlen/).
Table 2 Flow of the vote between Austrian parliamentary elections, 2006 and 2008. 2006 vote
¨ SPO ¨ VP O ¨ FPO ¨ BZO Greens Other parties Non-voting
2008 vote ¨ SPO
¨ VP O
¨ FPO
¨ BZO
Greens
Other
Non-voting
73 3 4 4 4 11 2
2 70 1 3 3 2 1
10 5 79 13 2 29 4
4 9 8 72 2 16 5
2 2 1 2 69 9 3
2 4 3 2 12 26 4
6 7 4 5 8 7 81
Source: SORA (http://www.sora.at/de/start.asp?b¼497).
¨ at its peak (26.9% in 1999) and only stronger than the FPO ¨ , the strongest party in the system. 1.1% behind the SPO Analysis of vote flows conducted by the SORA Institute is ¨ lost reproduced in Table 2 below. It appears that the SPO ¨ whereas the O ¨ VP lost votes to the votes mainly to the FPO ¨ . The FPO ¨ managed to keep 79% of its 2006 voters, more BZO than any other party; the Greens retained only 69% of their voters at the 2006 election, less than any other party. Voter ¨ and BZO ¨ (13% and 8% respecexchanges between the FPO tively) reflect their similar ideological profile but poisoned relations between them. ¨ suffered particular losses among blue-collar The SPO workers (22 percentage points) and voters younger than 30 ¨ VP also lost voters in the same age group (8 points); the O (10 points) and among public sector employees (15 ¨ made spectacular gains among those points). The FPO younger than 30 (þ24 points), blue-collar workers (þ16 points), and voters who read the Neue Kronenzeitung exclu¨ gains were particularly strong sively (þ10 points). The BZO among the same groups of voters (Plasser and Ulram, 2008). According to a GfK exit poll among 600 first time voters ¨ was the main beneficiary of (aged 16–19), the FPO ¨ , 25% for the extending voting rights: 44% voted for the FPO ¨ ¨ ¨. OVP, 13% for the Greens, 10% for the SPO, and 3% for the BZO ¨ ’s leader, Heinz Christian Strache, was the youngest of FPO the lead candidates, and known for his campaigning in ¨ ’s discotheques. Nonetheless, surveys suggest that the FPO anti-foreigners image was probably the most important motive among first time voters (Profil, 2008). ¨ VP and the SPO ¨ , voters were largely For both the O motivated by their long-term party affiliation. However, ¨ voters supported its leader Feymann and its whereas SPO ¨ VP voters supported the party’s concern for social justice, O ¨ conventional economic and social policies. By contrast, FPO voters were drawn by the party’s anti-immigration and ¨ voters were almost exclusively motiasylum stands; BZO vated by Haider. Concern for the environment and support for its leader, Alexander Van der Bellen, underlay voters for the Greens (Plasser and Ulram, 2008).6
6 ¨ VP’s Another survey (using closed questions) showed that Molterer, O ¨ VP voters, whereas other lead leader, was important to only 25% of O ¨ ), 49% (Van der Bellen, candidates were mentioned by 47% (Strache, FPO ¨ ), and 59% (Haider, BZO ¨ ). Institut fu¨r StratGreens), 53% (Feymann, SPO egieanalysen & SORA (2008).
Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 28 (2009) 492–517
Interestingly, the EU issue that had brought down the ¨ –O ¨ VP coalition government was hardly relevant to SPO voters. It was mentioned spontaneously by only 1% of ¨ and O ¨ VP; 2% of BZO ¨ and Green voters; voters for the SPO ¨ voters. In response to closed questions, and 4% of FPO ¨ and FPO ¨ voters reported that their roughly one-third of SPO party’s commitment to holding referendums on revisions of the EU Treaty had been important to them (Plasser and Ulram, 2008). 6. Government formation The election result left the parties – and the President, who appoints the government – in a difficult situation. Only one two-party combination commanded a majority: ¨ –O ¨ VP coalition. All other minimal winning the failed SPO coalitions had been ruled out by the pre-election commit¨ ments of at least one of the parties. A minority SPO government was also considered a serious option, yet no one believed it would constitute a durable solution. ¨ was set on forming a fundamentally renewed The SPO ¨ VP. The O ¨ VP, in turn, maintained grand coalition with the O that voters had not honoured its work and promises – ¨ to form a working government by hence, it was for the SPO making proposals acceptable to other parties. To win time, President Fischer did not appoint a formateur until the final result, including absentee votes from abroad, was announced more than a week after the election. Mean¨ VP leader Molterer had resigned, and the party while, O executive had nominated Josef Pro¨ll as his successor. Pro¨ll ¨. had always favoured cooperation with the SPO The President appointed Feymann as formateur on 8 October – following the convention of appointing the leader of the largest Nationalrat party – with orders to form a government that is ‘decisive’ and ‘reliable’; in other words, another grand coalition. Under Pro¨ll’s leadership,
517
¨ VP started negotiations with the SPO ¨ .7 By late the O November, the coalition negotiations agreed on a government programme and the division of portfolios, which the ¨ VP executive accepted with a large majority. Pro¨ll’s elecO ¨ VP leader by an overwhelming majority of deletion as O gates (89.6%) sealed the coalition deal; Pro¨ll had tied his ¨ –O ¨ VP coalition was sworn-in on 2 fate to it. The SPO December, 2008. The snap election had resulted in disaster for the two major parties. Rather than changing the unloved government, it changed the party leaderships, with the new leaders – Feymann and Pro¨ll – being more positive about ¨ –O ¨ VP coalition cooperation in a grand coalition. Yet the SPO is no longer that ‘grand’. It lacks command of the constitution-making two-thirds majority, which is a major setback given the hundreds of clauses with constitutional implications in ordinary legislation. The coalition also faces a huge economic challenge; indeed, perhaps the international capital market crisis was the most important factor ¨ –O ¨ VP negotiations. In the past, grand speeding up the SPO coalitions were at their best when faced with major and urgent problems. While it remains to be seen whether the 2008 grand coalition will meet the challenges, this is probably the last chance for ‘grand coalition’ government that has dominated Austria’s post-war history. References IMAS, 2008. IMAS Report No. 11 (August). Institut fu¨r Strategieanalysen & SORA, 2008. Nationalratswahl 2008. Mimeo, Vienna. Mu¨ller, W.C., 2005. Austria: a complex electoral system with subtle effects. In: Gallagher, M., Mitchell, P. (Eds.), The Politics of Electoral Systems. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 397–415. Mu¨ller, W.C., 2008. The surprising election in Austria, October 2006. Electoral Studies 27 (1), 175–179. Plasser, F., Ulram, P.A., 2008. Die Wahlanalyse 2008. Mimeo, Vienna. Profil, 2008. Verru¨ckt nach Rechts. No. 41, 6 October.
doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2009.03.003
7 ¨ VP leader Schu¨ssel engaged in According to some reports, former O ¨ VP–FPO ¨ –BZO ¨ coabehind the scenes attempts at bringing together an O ¨ had ruled out this coalition before the election; after the lition. The FPO ¨ leader Jo¨rg Haider (in a car accident on 11 October), it was death of BZO
considered hopeless.