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The ‘Star Wars’ initiative
The 'Star Wars' Initiative Problems and prospects
Paul Stares and John Pike This article examines the long-term 'Star Wars' R&D programme initiated by President Reagan - the Strategic Defense Initiative (SOl). The nature of this initiative and the research programme that has been approved are described. There is still considerable uncertainty over where the SDI research will eventually lead - whether it be a limited BMD system designed to protect military targets or a comprehensive shield to protect the USA and its allies. The feselblllty and potential Implications of the SDI are examined with this caveat in mind.
Keywords: US defence policy; ballistic missile defence; international relations Dr Paul Stares is a Research Associate at the Brookings Institution, 1775 Massachusetts Ave, NW, Washington, DC 20036, USA, and is a member of the editorial board of Space Policy. John Pike is Associate Director for Space Policy at the Federation of American Scientists, Washington, DC, USA. This article forms a chapter in the forthcoming book, Michiel Schwarz and Paul Stares, eds, The Exploitation of Space: Policy Trends in the Military and Commercial Uses of Space, Butterworths, Guildford, UK, Spring 1985.
Despite the passage of time since President Reagan's momentous 'Star Wars' speech of 23 March 1983, the storm of controversy that greeted his call for a new ballistic missile defence effort shows little sign of abating. This is not surprising since what many considered to be a temporary aberration in the policy-making process has been transformed into a long-term and extensive R&D programme. Despite widespread scepticism and concern over its technical feasibility, political consequences and economic costs, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), as the Star Wars programme is officially known, seems set to stay. However, there is still considerable uncertainty over where this research will eventually lead - whether it be a limited ballistic missile defence (BMD) system designed to protect military targets, or, as President Reagan originally stated, a comprehensive shield designed to protect the USA and its allies. We here examine the feasibility and potential implications of the Star Wars initiative with this c a v e a t in mind. Before continuing, however, it is useful to provide some background information on the nature of this initiative and of the research programme that has been approved.
Background Two days after the Star Wars speech, President Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive (NSDD)-85, which called for 'an intensive effort to define a long term research and development program aimed at the ultimate goal of eliminating the threat posed by nuclear ballistic missiles'. This was further refined by National Security Study Directive (NSSD) 6-83 signed on 18 April 1983, which initiated two study groups, one to identify the technological requirements to meet the President's goal, and the second to consider the strategic and political implications. The first study group, known officially as the Defence Technologies Study Team, but more commonly as the Fletcher Panel, after its head, James Fletcher (former Administrator of NASA), examined a variety of potential missile defence technologies and tactics. They took a generally optimistic view of the long-term feasibility of BMD, and recommended an ambitious and fast-paced 'technology limited' research programme to advance the state of the art so that a more informed judgment on the desirability of deploying a defence system could be made in the early 1990s. In particular, they recommended that a number of demonstra-
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tions of key components of a missile defence system be conducted prior to 1993. More specifically, the Fletcher Panel focused its attention on the technologies needed to develop a layered defence that would attempt to intercept ballistic missiles during each of the principal stages in their flight from launch to impact. The first, known as the boost phase, lasts for only a few minutes while the rocket motor is still burning. This is potentially the most fruitful period for interception since the missiles are relatively slow and vulnerable. More important, they are more lucrative targets as the multiple warheads have yet to separate from the booster. Additional layers would attempt interception in the post-boost phase when the missile's warheads are released into space, in the rnid-eottrse phase, the roughly 20 minutes period that it takes the warheads to traverse intercontinental distances, and in the terminal phase as the warheads re-enter the Earth's atmosphere. This layered approach builds on the previous US BMD research effort. The Nike Zeus programme which began in the 1950s consisted of just a single layer to intercept warheads in late mid-course, while the Sentinel-Safeguard system of the late 1960s would have added a terminal interception layer. None of the systems was ever deployed. By adding additional layers, the SDI hopes to improve the overall effectiveness of the defence. Thus, while two layers that are each capable of intercepting 50% of incoming warheads would intercept only 75% of the warheads, four such layers would intercept almost 95% of the warheads. Additional layers could further reduce the leakage of warheads through the defence. And since each layer would use different types of sensors and interceptors, the defence as a whole could be less vulnerable to countermeasures. The second study, the Future Security Strategy Study (known as the Hoffman Panel, after its chairman, Fred Hoffman), was also enthusiastic about the potential utility of missile defences. Although the panel concluded that the near-term prospects for achieving a reliable defence of the US population were poor, they did identify a number of less capable 'intermediate' deployment options.~ The three main possibilities identified by the panel were:
•
• •
~Fred S. Hoffman, Ballistic Missile Defenses and US National Security, October 1983, p 2. 21bid.
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Anti-Tactical Missile (A]M) defences, particularly for Europe which could, according to the Panel, be deployed within the constraints of the ABM treaty. Advanced research in this area might also later contribute to the defence of the Continental United States (CONUS). Intermediate CONUS defences. These would include defence of kcv installations such as command and control facilities and ICBM silos. Limited boost-phase intercept options. The objective of such defences would be to reduce substantially the total number of Soviet warheads that would have to be intercepted by the intermediate defence systems. The boost-phase intercept could subsequently be upgraded to more demanding strategic defence missions, such as population protection.
The rationale for these intermediate options as stated in the unclassified summary of the Hoffman Report is 'to deny Soviet planners confidence in their ability to destroy a sufficient set of military targets to satisfy attack objectives, thereby strengthening d e t e r r e n c e . . . a n d also to reduce damage if conflict occurs'. 2
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The Star Wars programme Following the Fletcher and Hoffman Panel recommendations, the President signed NSDD-119 on 6 January 1984, which formally initiated the SDI effort. This authorized the establishment of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) within the Department of Defense, to oversee the development effort. The SDIO is run by Lt Gen James Abrahamson (a former US Air Force astronaut and manager of the Shuttle programme) who will report directly to the Secretary of Defense. NSDD-119 also brought together within the SDI programme a number of existing BMD-related technology programmes. These have been consolidated into the SDI's five principal areas of development: (1) surveillance, acquisition, tracking and kill assessment (SATKA); (2) directed-energy weapons; (3) kinetic energy weapons; (4) systems analysis and battle management; and (5) support programmes. Surveillance sensors
The SDI will use ground-based, air-based and space-based sensors for the surveillance, acquisition, tracking and kill assessment (SATKA) of ballistic missiles in all phases of their flight. Within this programme there are three levels of activity. First are technology base efforts to develop the database and techniques for ABM radar and optical sensors. The second level is the advanced development of technologies for new sensors that may lead to later system demonstrations. The Imaging Radar Technology Project will demonstrate in the early 1990s a space-based imaging radar that can monitor ballistic missiles in the boost and post-boost phase and discriminate warheads from decoys. The Imaging Laser Technology Project will attempt the same thing using an imaging laser radar. Third, system demonstrations call for the realistic testing of actual prototype sensor systems. These include, first, the Booster Surveillance and Tracking Systems (BSTS) which will attempt to track missiles during the boost phase. Although present early warning satellites perform this mission, the ability of MIRVed warheads to vary their impact point in the post-boost phase limits their usefulness for missile defence tracking. A second programme is the Space Surveillance and Tracking System (SSTS) which will use cooled infrared sensors to track warheads and decoys during the mid-course phase. This system's goal is to discriminate warheads from decoys by observing slight differences in the heat they emit. This system was previously under development to track satellites in support of the new air-launched anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon. The Airborne Optical System (AOS), consisting of a modified Boeing 767, will carry two infra-red telescopes for tracking target warheads for mid-course and terminal interception. Finally, the Terminal Imaging Radar (TIR) is a ground-based radar that will be used with the High-altitude Endo-atmospheric Defense System (HEDS) interceptor as part of a terminal defence. The TIR would probably be deployed in a mobile mode to enhance its survivability. Directed-energy weapons
Directed-energy weapons are intended to intercept ballistic missiles in the boost phase and post-boost phase of flight. The four main areas of development are: SPACE POLICY May 1985
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(1) Space-based lasers, which include three components: the ALPHA long-wavelength infra-red chemical laser; LODE, which is the mirror that projects the laser beam onto the target; and TALON GOLD, which is the pointing and tracking telescope and laser target designator (the 'gun sight" for the system). (2) Ground-based lasers, which include lasers operating at visible ~tnd ultraviolet wavelengths. These lasers would use space-based mirrors to direct their beams onto distant targets. Lasers of this type. however, are presently at least five years behind in development compared to long wavelength chemical lasers like ALPHA. (3) Space-based neutral particle beam weapons. Particle beam technology lags by more than a decade that of space-based lasers, and severe technical difficulties may preclude near-term demonstrations. (4) The nuclear-driven directed energy project will develop the Excalibur X-ray laser, which is powered (and destroyed in the process) by a small nuclear explosion. Work on the Excalibur nuclear device itself is conducted by the Department of Energy.
Kinetic energy weapons Kinetic energy weapons would be capable of intercepting ballistic missiles in all phases of their flight. These weapons would destroy their targets either through the use of explosive warheads, or by direct collision (after the fashion of the new F-15 ASAT). The work conducted under this programme falls into three general areas. First is technology base development of techniques and devices that would be applicable to various types of kinetic energy interceptors. A test rocket, known as SR HIT, developed under one of these projects, is being considered for use as an anti-tactical missile (ATM) against Soviet theatre nuclear forces in Europe. Second, the advanced development of new types of technologies includes two projects. The Hypervelocity Launcher Project will develop a ground-based electromagnetic launcher (a sort of electric-powered pea-shooter) that would be an "anti-missile gatling gun'. The Novel Concepts Project will examine new kinetic energy weapons techniques, like the Jedi project, which would use lasers to propel small rocket projectiles. Third, system demonstrations of prototypes of interceptors include several projects, described below. The High-altitude Endo-atmospheric Defense System (HEDS) is zi rocket interceptor using a heat-seeking explosive warhead to destroy re-entry vehicles in the upper atmosphere. HEDS is intended to defend either missile silos or cities. Intercepting manoeuvering re-entry vehicles would require a nuclear warhead for HEDS. The Exo-atmospheric Re-entry-vehicle Interception System (ERIS) is a heat-seeking rocket that will intercept warheads outside the atmosphere and destroy them on impact. ERIS is a follow-on to the recently tested Homing Overlay Experiment, although it will use a homing kill vehicle that will be smaller than the miniature homing vehicle of the new F-15 ASAT. The SLBM Boost Phase Engagement Project will develop a sea-based or air-based system for intercepting submarine-launched ballistic missiles during the boost phase. This is a new project on which very little previous work has been done. Space-Based Hypervelocity Launcher is a space-based electromagnetic launcher using high-speed miniature kill vehicle proiectiles for boost-phase and mid-course defence. 156
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Space-Based Kinetic Kill Vehicle is a space-based rocket interceptor system of the type proposed by the High Frontier organization for boost phase and mid-course defence. Terminal System Demonstration provides for the integrated demonstration of the HEDS interceptor supported by the Terminal Imaging Radar and Airborne Optical System under development in the Surveillance Programme.
Systems analysis Although much attention on the SDI has focused on hardware such as lasers and particle beams, one of the most critical issues for ballistic missile defence is whether the various sensor and interceptor components of the systems can be effectively integrated into a coherent whole. In response to this the Battle Management/Communications, Command and Control (BM]C3) Technology Project will develop the systems needed to tie all the various BMD weapons and sensors together. Activities under this project include: the development of special communications systems, computer hardware and software, procedures for the automated use of weapons if required, and protection against malfunctions that might cause accidental firing of weapons. Furthermore, the Systems Analysis Project will define the combination of sensors and weapons needed to meet specific SDI missions. Over the next two years, a number of system architecture studies will also address these issues as well as potential Soviet responses to the SDI. These studies could lead to the restructuring of a number of SDI projects.
Support programmes The SDI also includes work on a number of key supporting technologies, eg the issue of whether a space-based system can be made survivable, which is critical to the success of the SDI, will be pursued by the System Survivability Project. This will study the range of potential threats, and work on various countermeasures, such as satellite manoeuvering and shoot-back capabilities. Similarly, the Lethality and Hardening study will evaluate the effectiveness of potential missile defence weapons, as well as the survivability of defence components against direct attack. The effectiveness of laser, particle beam and kinetic energy weapons against Soviet missile and US defences will also be investigated. Other support programmes include the Space-Power Project. This will develop nuclear and other power sources for space-based weapons systems, including lasers, particle beam and kinetic energy weapons, as well as space-based sensors such as radars and imaging lasers. The Space Logistics Project will develop launch vehicles with payloads significantly greater than the Space Shuttle, to place space-based weapons and sensors into orbit.
The Star Wars schedule The exact schedule of the SDI is classified, and, due to the uncertainties of the programme subject to considerable revision. However, there are several distinct periods of activity planned. During the 1984-87 period, a number of defensive system
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architecture and other concept definition studies will be conducted. Testing will also begin with SR HIT, the short-range anti-tactical missile h~r Europe. The 1988-90 period will include the first flight of the Airborne Optical System (AOS) sensor (which is the first SDI demonstration that would pose ABM treaty compliance problems), and the first flight tesl of space-based radar on the Shuttle. Ground tests of directed energy weapons, and space-based kinetic energy weapons will also be conducted. Flight testing of ground-based interceptor rockets is also likely to begin, and possibly the first launches of several types of satellite sensors. From 1991-93 there will be an integrated test of H E D S and ERIS interceptor rockets along with the AOS (optical) and TIR (radar) sensors. The Shuttle will also be used to test prototype space-based directed energy and kinetic energy weapons, including possibly the Talon Gold (space-based laser target tracker). It is possible that deployment of anti-tactical missile in Europe will begin, and a decision to proceed with actual deployment of the full Star Wars system will be made. Limited deployments of systems to defend missile silos could begin by 1994-96, and the full Star Wars system could be deployed by
1997-2005.
Paying for Star Wars Over the past decade the US ABM research programme has been funded at about $1 billion annually in constant dollars. The SDI is expected to break with this trend by spending about $26 billion during the next five years. However, this cost and the timeframe are a product of the Defense Department budget process, which only projects five years into the future. When the next budget is submitted in 1985, Star Wars will be a six-year, $35 billion programme. In fact, the initial R&D phase of the SDI will run through the early 1990s, and could cost about $50 billion. Although most of the SDI is funded through the Defense Department, nuclear warheads and reactors are funded through the Department of Energy. Much of the increase in the SD1 budget is due to a new emphasis of demonstrating prototype weapons, some of which, as noted above, are inconsistent with the provisions of the A B M treaty. The rapid growth of the SDI will result in the SDI consuming an increasing percentage of defence R & D funding, at least one-fifth of the total by 1989, with further growth likely. The cost of deploying Star Wars, as none of the aforementioned investment actually buys a system, would ultimately depend on the technology selected and the mission it is required to perform. Relatively modest deployments, such as those identified by the Hoffman Panel, could cost tens of billions of additional dollars. A recent report of the Council on Economic Priorities estimates that a system designed to provide a comprehensive defence of the USA could cost anywhere between $400-800 billion)
aRobert W. De Grasse, Jr, and Stephen Daggett, An Economic Analysis of the President's Strategic Defense Initiative: Costs and Cost Exchange Ratios, Council on Economic Priorities, October 1984, p 1.
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Feasibility Just as the cost of a BMD system is a function of its goals, so is the feasibility. But whatever the near- or long-term objectives of the SDI, whether it be the comprehensive defence system envisaged by President
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Reagan or the 'intermediate' options outlined by the Hoffman Panel, each will face the same generic challenges only with varying degrees of difficulty. These fall into two basic categories - first, the technical problems associated with building a workable, integrated and efficient system, and second, the countermeasures that a dedicated adversary can be expected to use to penetrate the defence. The two are linked in as much as overcoming the potential countermeasures presents the most difficult technical challenges. Never the less, there are still fundamental engineering obstacles to intercepting even relatively small numbers of missiles without the presence of countermeasures. Targets have to be acquired and tracked at the earliest possible moment, the geometry of the intercept calculated and transmitted in an equally timely fashion to the kill mechanism which in turn has to perform its mission successfully. Depending on the nature of the defensive system and the threat, many hundreds of such engagements have to be coordinated effectively and assessed afterwards for re-targeting to be possible. This is a tremendous task even in a 'benign' environment. With active and passive countermeasures the demands on the defence multiply considerably. The former include preemptive attacks on the early warning sensors to deny target acquisition, and on any other space-based components of the BMD system prior to a launch. In contrast, passive countermeasures are designed to diminish the effectiveness of the defence without directly attacking it, for example by simply saturating the defence with real and decoy targets, by hardening the missiles, and with fast burn boosters to reduce the vulnerable period prior to the separation of the warheads. In addition to these countermeasures, the attacker can choose to evade the defence with air breathing systems such as bombers and cruise missiles. Even the covert deployment of nuclear weapons in an adversary's populated area is a possibility. With such daunting demands, many have concluded t h a t total population defence of the USA is completely unrealistic. As an authoritative report sponsored by the Office of Technology Assessment ( O T A ) stated: The prospect that emerging 'Star Wars' technologies, when further developed, will provide a perfect or near perfect defense system, literally removing from the hands of the Soviet Union the ability to do socially mortal damage to the United States with nuclear weapons is so remote that it should not serve as the basis of public expectation or national policy about ballistic missile defense (BMD). 4
4Ashton B. Carter, Directed Energy Missile Defense in Space, Background Paper prepared under contract for The Office of Technology Assessment, Washington, DC, April 1984, p 81. Slbid. See also Space Based Missile Defense, A Report by the Union of Concerned Scientists, 1984. eSee Department of Defense Comments on OTA's Background Paper on 'Directed Energy Missile Defense in Space', 8 May 1984, in US Congress, Senate Foreign Relation-s, Strategic Defense and AntiSatellite Weapons, Hearings, 98th Congress, 2nd Sess, 1984, pp 350-353, and also OTA's rebuttal, pp 353-355.
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Technical prognosis for such a perfect or near perfect defense is extremely pessimistic because of the concentration and fragility of society; because all the concepts identified as candidates for a future defense of population are known to be susceptible to countermeasures that would permit the Soviet Union to retain a degree of penetration with their future missile arsenal despite costly attempts to improve the US defense; because the Soviet Union would almost certainly make such a determined effort to avoid being disarmed by a US defense; and because missile defense does not address other methods for delivering nuclear weapons to the United States. 5 Predictably, the conclusions of this report have been challenged by the Defense Department. 6 Apart from disputing its underlying technical assumptions, the Pentagon believes that the feasibility of various BMD concepts cannot be assessed until the requisite technology has matured something that may take 20 years. In other words, 'we will never know 159
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whether it is possible until we have tried'. However, just as there cannot be any 'proof that unknown future technologies will not provide near perfect defense protection of US society', as the O T A report acknowledges, there can never be any proof that it will work until it is called upon to perform its mission. Simulations, demonstrations and exercises can never realistically duplicate the quantitative and qualitative conditions of a full-scale attack. In contrast, limited BMD systems do not have to meet such stringent requirements to be effective. Less than perfect defence of military targets such as ICBM silos are both more realistic and obviously more acceptable than a 'leaky' population defence. By reducing the probability that a first strike could be totally effective and thereby guaranteeing the survival of at least some of the land-based retaliatory force, a BMD system of this type would, as its supporters maintain, enhance deterrence. However, while limited BMD systems may be more feasible, they are not necessarily the preferable solution to the problem they address, namely the vulnerability of fixed military targets. To use the example of silo defence again, there are other equally effective ~md arguably less costly ways of maintaining the surviwlbility of a minimunl deterrent force. These range from different basing modes (such as superhardened silos, and mobile systems) to greater reliance on less vulnerable legs of the strategic 'triad' such as submarines. 7 Active defence systems, moreover, have to be ,judged alongside thesu alternative solutions not just for their comparative effectiveness but also for their likely long-term consequences. These are discussed below.
Consequences Just as the feasibility of the Star Wars initiative can only be assessed in relation to its potential goals, so its likely consequences will vary in the" same way. This can be illustrated by examining the implications of the SDI for arms control, strategic stability, alliance security and space development.S Arms control
The consequences for arms control are discussed first not just because the SDI will have the most immediate impact in this area, but also because they will have a direct bearing on SDI's overall feasibility. Proponents of BMD admit that it is only with drastic reductions in offensive missiles that a comprehensive defence can work. In many respects their argument is circular because they also believe that the USSR will accept such reductions when faced with the prospect of 7See Personal Views of Richard Garwin in effective US missile defence. As George Keyworth, the President's Ashton B. Carter and David N. Schwartz, Science Adviser, has stated: ' . . . i f we demonstrate the capability of a Ballistic Missile Defense, The Brookings defensive deterrent, we would have a persuasive negotiation posture for Institution, Washington, DC, 1984, p 393. For other alternatives see the excellent arms reductions. We could then approach the Soviets with the mutual OTA study, MX Missile Basing, Report of knowledge that ICBMs no longer have the intimidating effect they once the Office of Technology Assessment, had' .9 Washington, DC, September 1981. 8As the long-term costs of a BMD system However, unless the USSR fully embraces the idea of moving towards of any configuration are still vague, the a defence-dominant world, the Soviet inclination will be to do quite the likely economic implications are not disopposite. Rather than facilitate the US goal, the USSR is most likely to cussed here. 9Remarks of George Keyworth II to the do everything to undermine it. Thus, contrary to Keyworth's prediction, Brookings Forum on the Future of Ballistic the USSR will become more resistant to reducing its strategic forces Missile Defense, Washington, DC, 29 and, if anything, will strive to deploy more. The implications for the February 1984, p 16. 160
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strategic arms control talks are obvious. Even if the SDI is limited to the defence of ICBMs, the impact is most likely to be the same. Ironically, it may in the end make the problem of ICBM vulnerability worse, not better. Whatever the eventual configuration of the SDI, it will inevitably undermine confidence in the 1972 ABM treaty, arguably the single most important piece of arms control legislation. While US officials claim that the research programme will observe the terms of the ABM treaty, the planned series of demonstrations will at the very least violate the intended spirit of the treaty if not the word.l° In this sense the ABM treaty will most probably not die in the definitive sense, but just wither away. Either way, the net effect will be to challenge the durability of existing arms control agreements and further erode the incentives to seek new ones. 11 In fact, the SDI has already affected the likelihood of an anti-satellite (ASAT) arms control agreement. Due to the overlap in technologies and capabilities, the USA is clearly reluctant to enter into ASAT negotiations that might restrict its freedom of action to test BMD systems in space. Although this is already largely prohibited by the ABM treaty, the USA does not want this to be augmented by an additional agreement that would eliminate the current loopholes for R&D. 12 Likewise, the current US position towards a comprehensive nuclear test ban also reflects, in part, an unwillingness to close the door on the testing of nuclear devices which might be useful to BMD - the most notable example being nuclear pumped X-ray lasers. Strategic stability
1°See 'A report on the impact of US and Soviet ballistic missile defense programs on the ABM treaty', prepared by Thomas K. Longstreth and John E. Pike, for the National Campaign to Save the ABM Treaty, June 1984. 11Among the existing treaties that BMD development could affect are the Partial Test Ban and Outer Space treaties that prohibit the testing and deployment of nuclear weapons in space. Nuclear explosions are currently being considered to ~2enerate power for X-ray lasers. Ironically, indirectly encouraging the development of anti-satellite systems also by definition increases the threat to spacebased BMD components. The need for some restrictions on ASAT weapons was admitted in the DoD report, Defense Against Ballistic Missiles: An Assessment
of Technologies and Policy Implications, Department of Defense, Washington, DC, March 1984, repdnted in US Congress, Senate Foreign Relations, Strategic Defense and Anti-satellite Weapons, Washington, DC, 1984, p 105. 13See Testimony of Sidney Drell in ibid, p 180. 14Defense Against Ballistic Missiles, Department of Defense, Washington, DC, March 1984.
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Critics of the SDI are particularly concerned with the effect of BMD development on strategic stability. Besides the impetus that it will probably give to the arms race, they also believe that crisis stability could be seriously undermined with even less than perfect defences. Their argument rests on the continued presence of offensive forces that could be used in conjunction with a defensive shield. A less than perfect defence may not be able to repel the full onslaught of a massive first strike but, against a retaliatory force that had already been severely depleted by a preemptive attack, it could prove highly effective. In a crisis, this may create irresistible pressures to 'go first' to avoid the prospect of a completely nullified retaliatory force. As Sidney Drell put it: ' . . . with a partially effective defense, you have to recognize that it will be more effective as an adjunct of a first strike, because the retaliatory force will be at a predictable time, with reduced coordination, [and] reduced in intensity...'.13 Proponents of BMD maintain, however, that a mutual and gradual transition to a defence-dominant strategic relationship would avoid this problem and lead the world to a more stable position. They readily admit that the pace at which the respective defence systems were deployed and the offensive forces were decommissioned would have to be carefully orchestrated and accompanied by a variety of confidence building measures to smooth the changeover. 14 However, it is difficult to conceive how this could be managed when neither side would know how effective its own BMD system would be if attacked. The capabilities of their respective defences would be subject to at least the same degree of speculation and worst case analysis that is currently manifested with offensive forces. This will almost certainly create 161
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pressures to retain some offensive forces. Worse still, it might unleash an arms race in defensive systems in addition to the current offensive competition. More generally, given the period over which such a transition could be expected to last, it will require an unprecedented level of cooperation between the superpowers. Even if it succeeded, provision would have to be made for both to maintain and modernize their BMD systems, otherwise the result will be to trade one form of instability for another.
Alliance security The Reagan administration has been careful to emphasize that it intends to extend the coverage of a BMD shield to its European allies. Quite how this could be achieved given the reduced warning time and the diversity of potential nuclear delivery systems available to the Warsaw Pact, has yet to be explained. Doubts about leakproof defences arc therefore even more pertinent to the European theatre. With this in mind, many Europeans are concerned about the consequences of the SDI for the US security guarantee and for superpower relations generally. In particular, they are worried that this will presage greater US isolationism - a 'fortress America" mentality. Supporters of the programme counter this by arguing that a US BMD system (albeit of the comprehensive kind), would make credible what has always been an incredible guarantee - namely that the USA would risk self-destruction by coming to the aid of the Europeans. The logic of this argument is that a US President would be more likely to take this risk knowing that the homeland would be spared from the consequences of nuclear escalation. Although this is a persuasive argument, it has only fueled the Europeans' darkest fears. At one extreme it might encourage US nuclear 'adventurism' or brinkmanship in Europe, while at the other it might reinforce what are already strong incentives to stay out of a European conflict, especially if at some future date the level of US conventional forces had been severely reduced. Moreover, if both superpowers possessed effective BMD systems, it might actually make Europe 'safe' again for conventional warfare. The U K and France are also certain to feel that the deterrent value of their small nuclear forces would become neutralized by missile defences that they could no longer penetrate. Overall then, considerable uncertainty exists over whether BMD offers any of the putative benefits for European security.
Space development A massive BMD research effort also appears to offer mixed blessings for the exploitation of space. A massive diversion of financial and technical resources could exact enormous opportunity costs on the space programme. In particular, it could stymie the development of space science and exploration which are already beleagured by budget cutbacks. Aerospace companies and engineers may find the promise of BMD research too attractive to expend time and energy on what they consider to be less rewarding space projects. Alternatively, the SDI might be a boon to the commercial exploitation of space. As noted above, there are already preliminary plans for new and larger space launchers which are likely to be made available to the civil/commercial space programme to justify costs. Similarly, newer more efficient power sources may also be available for commercial
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projects. Novel techniques for constructing and deploying large space structures that may be necessary for a BMD system would presumably have the same spinoffs. It is too early to predict how the development of BMD systems in space could affect civil and commercial space operations. Some orbits, for instance, might become overcrowded or 'out of bounds' for security reasons. The general trend in the militarization of space may even lead to higher insurance premiums. Certainly, in the event of war in space, civil/commercial activities are unlikely to remain sacrosanct.
Conclusion In conclusion, the technical and political challenges facing the SDI cast serious doubts on whether President Reagan's goal can ever be achieved. While a limited BMD system would be more feasible and perhaps serve some purpose, it is questionable first whether this is desirable given the alternative options mentioned earlier and, second, worthwhile given the potential negative consequences. In short, by trying to gain a little we could end up losing a lot.
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Paul Stares and John Pike This article examines the long-term 'Star Wars' R&D programme initiated by President Reagan - the Strategic Defense Initiative (SOl). The nature of this initiative and the research programme that has been approved are described. There is still considerable uncertainty over where the SDI research will eventually lead - whether it be a limited BMD system designed to protect military targets or a comprehensive shield to protect the USA and its allies. The feselblllty and potential Implications of the SDI are examined with this caveat in mind.
Keywords: US defence policy; ballistic missile defence; international relations Dr Paul Stares is a Research Associate at the Brookings Institution, 1775 Massachusetts Ave, NW, Washington, DC 20036, USA, and is a member of the editorial board of Space Policy. John Pike is Associate Director for Space Policy at the Federation of American Scientists, Washington, DC, USA. This article forms a chapter in the forthcoming book, Michiel Schwarz and Paul Stares, eds, The Exploitation of Space: Policy Trends in the Military and Commercial Uses of Space, Butterworths, Guildford, UK, Spring 1985.
Despite the passage of time since President Reagan's momentous 'Star Wars' speech of 23 March 1983, the storm of controversy that greeted his call for a new ballistic missile defence effort shows little sign of abating. This is not surprising since what many considered to be a temporary aberration in the policy-making process has been transformed into a long-term and extensive R&D programme. Despite widespread scepticism and concern over its technical feasibility, political consequences and economic costs, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), as the Star Wars programme is officially known, seems set to stay. However, there is still considerable uncertainty over where this research will eventually lead - whether it be a limited ballistic missile defence (BMD) system designed to protect military targets, or, as President Reagan originally stated, a comprehensive shield designed to protect the USA and its allies. We here examine the feasibility and potential implications of the Star Wars initiative with this c a v e a t in mind. Before continuing, however, it is useful to provide some background information on the nature of this initiative and of the research programme that has been approved.
Background Two days after the Star Wars speech, President Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive (NSDD)-85, which called for 'an intensive effort to define a long term research and development program aimed at the ultimate goal of eliminating the threat posed by nuclear ballistic missiles'. This was further refined by National Security Study Directive (NSSD) 6-83 signed on 18 April 1983, which initiated two study groups, one to identify the technological requirements to meet the President's goal, and the second to consider the strategic and political implications. The first study group, known officially as the Defence Technologies Study Team, but more commonly as the Fletcher Panel, after its head, James Fletcher (former Administrator of NASA), examined a variety of potential missile defence technologies and tactics. They took a generally optimistic view of the long-term feasibility of BMD, and recommended an ambitious and fast-paced 'technology limited' research programme to advance the state of the art so that a more informed judgment on the desirability of deploying a defence system could be made in the early 1990s. In particular, they recommended that a number of demonstra-
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tions of key components of a missile defence system be conducted prior to 1993. More specifically, the Fletcher Panel focused its attention on the technologies needed to develop a layered defence that would attempt to intercept ballistic missiles during each of the principal stages in their flight from launch to impact. The first, known as the boost phase, lasts for only a few minutes while the rocket motor is still burning. This is potentially the most fruitful period for interception since the missiles are relatively slow and vulnerable. More important, they are more lucrative targets as the multiple warheads have yet to separate from the booster. Additional layers would attempt interception in the post-boost phase when the missile's warheads are released into space, in the rnid-eottrse phase, the roughly 20 minutes period that it takes the warheads to traverse intercontinental distances, and in the terminal phase as the warheads re-enter the Earth's atmosphere. This layered approach builds on the previous US BMD research effort. The Nike Zeus programme which began in the 1950s consisted of just a single layer to intercept warheads in late mid-course, while the Sentinel-Safeguard system of the late 1960s would have added a terminal interception layer. None of the systems was ever deployed. By adding additional layers, the SDI hopes to improve the overall effectiveness of the defence. Thus, while two layers that are each capable of intercepting 50% of incoming warheads would intercept only 75% of the warheads, four such layers would intercept almost 95% of the warheads. Additional layers could further reduce the leakage of warheads through the defence. And since each layer would use different types of sensors and interceptors, the defence as a whole could be less vulnerable to countermeasures. The second study, the Future Security Strategy Study (known as the Hoffman Panel, after its chairman, Fred Hoffman), was also enthusiastic about the potential utility of missile defences. Although the panel concluded that the near-term prospects for achieving a reliable defence of the US population were poor, they did identify a number of less capable 'intermediate' deployment options.~ The three main possibilities identified by the panel were:
•
• •
~Fred S. Hoffman, Ballistic Missile Defenses and US National Security, October 1983, p 2. 21bid.
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Anti-Tactical Missile (A]M) defences, particularly for Europe which could, according to the Panel, be deployed within the constraints of the ABM treaty. Advanced research in this area might also later contribute to the defence of the Continental United States (CONUS). Intermediate CONUS defences. These would include defence of kcv installations such as command and control facilities and ICBM silos. Limited boost-phase intercept options. The objective of such defences would be to reduce substantially the total number of Soviet warheads that would have to be intercepted by the intermediate defence systems. The boost-phase intercept could subsequently be upgraded to more demanding strategic defence missions, such as population protection.
The rationale for these intermediate options as stated in the unclassified summary of the Hoffman Report is 'to deny Soviet planners confidence in their ability to destroy a sufficient set of military targets to satisfy attack objectives, thereby strengthening d e t e r r e n c e . . . a n d also to reduce damage if conflict occurs'. 2
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The Star Wars programme Following the Fletcher and Hoffman Panel recommendations, the President signed NSDD-119 on 6 January 1984, which formally initiated the SDI effort. This authorized the establishment of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) within the Department of Defense, to oversee the development effort. The SDIO is run by Lt Gen James Abrahamson (a former US Air Force astronaut and manager of the Shuttle programme) who will report directly to the Secretary of Defense. NSDD-119 also brought together within the SDI programme a number of existing BMD-related technology programmes. These have been consolidated into the SDI's five principal areas of development: (1) surveillance, acquisition, tracking and kill assessment (SATKA); (2) directed-energy weapons; (3) kinetic energy weapons; (4) systems analysis and battle management; and (5) support programmes. Surveillance sensors
The SDI will use ground-based, air-based and space-based sensors for the surveillance, acquisition, tracking and kill assessment (SATKA) of ballistic missiles in all phases of their flight. Within this programme there are three levels of activity. First are technology base efforts to develop the database and techniques for ABM radar and optical sensors. The second level is the advanced development of technologies for new sensors that may lead to later system demonstrations. The Imaging Radar Technology Project will demonstrate in the early 1990s a space-based imaging radar that can monitor ballistic missiles in the boost and post-boost phase and discriminate warheads from decoys. The Imaging Laser Technology Project will attempt the same thing using an imaging laser radar. Third, system demonstrations call for the realistic testing of actual prototype sensor systems. These include, first, the Booster Surveillance and Tracking Systems (BSTS) which will attempt to track missiles during the boost phase. Although present early warning satellites perform this mission, the ability of MIRVed warheads to vary their impact point in the post-boost phase limits their usefulness for missile defence tracking. A second programme is the Space Surveillance and Tracking System (SSTS) which will use cooled infrared sensors to track warheads and decoys during the mid-course phase. This system's goal is to discriminate warheads from decoys by observing slight differences in the heat they emit. This system was previously under development to track satellites in support of the new air-launched anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon. The Airborne Optical System (AOS), consisting of a modified Boeing 767, will carry two infra-red telescopes for tracking target warheads for mid-course and terminal interception. Finally, the Terminal Imaging Radar (TIR) is a ground-based radar that will be used with the High-altitude Endo-atmospheric Defense System (HEDS) interceptor as part of a terminal defence. The TIR would probably be deployed in a mobile mode to enhance its survivability. Directed-energy weapons
Directed-energy weapons are intended to intercept ballistic missiles in the boost phase and post-boost phase of flight. The four main areas of development are: SPACE POLICY May 1985
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(1) Space-based lasers, which include three components: the ALPHA long-wavelength infra-red chemical laser; LODE, which is the mirror that projects the laser beam onto the target; and TALON GOLD, which is the pointing and tracking telescope and laser target designator (the 'gun sight" for the system). (2) Ground-based lasers, which include lasers operating at visible ~tnd ultraviolet wavelengths. These lasers would use space-based mirrors to direct their beams onto distant targets. Lasers of this type. however, are presently at least five years behind in development compared to long wavelength chemical lasers like ALPHA. (3) Space-based neutral particle beam weapons. Particle beam technology lags by more than a decade that of space-based lasers, and severe technical difficulties may preclude near-term demonstrations. (4) The nuclear-driven directed energy project will develop the Excalibur X-ray laser, which is powered (and destroyed in the process) by a small nuclear explosion. Work on the Excalibur nuclear device itself is conducted by the Department of Energy.
Kinetic energy weapons Kinetic energy weapons would be capable of intercepting ballistic missiles in all phases of their flight. These weapons would destroy their targets either through the use of explosive warheads, or by direct collision (after the fashion of the new F-15 ASAT). The work conducted under this programme falls into three general areas. First is technology base development of techniques and devices that would be applicable to various types of kinetic energy interceptors. A test rocket, known as SR HIT, developed under one of these projects, is being considered for use as an anti-tactical missile (ATM) against Soviet theatre nuclear forces in Europe. Second, the advanced development of new types of technologies includes two projects. The Hypervelocity Launcher Project will develop a ground-based electromagnetic launcher (a sort of electric-powered pea-shooter) that would be an "anti-missile gatling gun'. The Novel Concepts Project will examine new kinetic energy weapons techniques, like the Jedi project, which would use lasers to propel small rocket projectiles. Third, system demonstrations of prototypes of interceptors include several projects, described below. The High-altitude Endo-atmospheric Defense System (HEDS) is zi rocket interceptor using a heat-seeking explosive warhead to destroy re-entry vehicles in the upper atmosphere. HEDS is intended to defend either missile silos or cities. Intercepting manoeuvering re-entry vehicles would require a nuclear warhead for HEDS. The Exo-atmospheric Re-entry-vehicle Interception System (ERIS) is a heat-seeking rocket that will intercept warheads outside the atmosphere and destroy them on impact. ERIS is a follow-on to the recently tested Homing Overlay Experiment, although it will use a homing kill vehicle that will be smaller than the miniature homing vehicle of the new F-15 ASAT. The SLBM Boost Phase Engagement Project will develop a sea-based or air-based system for intercepting submarine-launched ballistic missiles during the boost phase. This is a new project on which very little previous work has been done. Space-Based Hypervelocity Launcher is a space-based electromagnetic launcher using high-speed miniature kill vehicle proiectiles for boost-phase and mid-course defence. 156
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Space-Based Kinetic Kill Vehicle is a space-based rocket interceptor system of the type proposed by the High Frontier organization for boost phase and mid-course defence. Terminal System Demonstration provides for the integrated demonstration of the HEDS interceptor supported by the Terminal Imaging Radar and Airborne Optical System under development in the Surveillance Programme.
Systems analysis Although much attention on the SDI has focused on hardware such as lasers and particle beams, one of the most critical issues for ballistic missile defence is whether the various sensor and interceptor components of the systems can be effectively integrated into a coherent whole. In response to this the Battle Management/Communications, Command and Control (BM]C3) Technology Project will develop the systems needed to tie all the various BMD weapons and sensors together. Activities under this project include: the development of special communications systems, computer hardware and software, procedures for the automated use of weapons if required, and protection against malfunctions that might cause accidental firing of weapons. Furthermore, the Systems Analysis Project will define the combination of sensors and weapons needed to meet specific SDI missions. Over the next two years, a number of system architecture studies will also address these issues as well as potential Soviet responses to the SDI. These studies could lead to the restructuring of a number of SDI projects.
Support programmes The SDI also includes work on a number of key supporting technologies, eg the issue of whether a space-based system can be made survivable, which is critical to the success of the SDI, will be pursued by the System Survivability Project. This will study the range of potential threats, and work on various countermeasures, such as satellite manoeuvering and shoot-back capabilities. Similarly, the Lethality and Hardening study will evaluate the effectiveness of potential missile defence weapons, as well as the survivability of defence components against direct attack. The effectiveness of laser, particle beam and kinetic energy weapons against Soviet missile and US defences will also be investigated. Other support programmes include the Space-Power Project. This will develop nuclear and other power sources for space-based weapons systems, including lasers, particle beam and kinetic energy weapons, as well as space-based sensors such as radars and imaging lasers. The Space Logistics Project will develop launch vehicles with payloads significantly greater than the Space Shuttle, to place space-based weapons and sensors into orbit.
The Star Wars schedule The exact schedule of the SDI is classified, and, due to the uncertainties of the programme subject to considerable revision. However, there are several distinct periods of activity planned. During the 1984-87 period, a number of defensive system
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architecture and other concept definition studies will be conducted. Testing will also begin with SR HIT, the short-range anti-tactical missile h~r Europe. The 1988-90 period will include the first flight of the Airborne Optical System (AOS) sensor (which is the first SDI demonstration that would pose ABM treaty compliance problems), and the first flight tesl of space-based radar on the Shuttle. Ground tests of directed energy weapons, and space-based kinetic energy weapons will also be conducted. Flight testing of ground-based interceptor rockets is also likely to begin, and possibly the first launches of several types of satellite sensors. From 1991-93 there will be an integrated test of H E D S and ERIS interceptor rockets along with the AOS (optical) and TIR (radar) sensors. The Shuttle will also be used to test prototype space-based directed energy and kinetic energy weapons, including possibly the Talon Gold (space-based laser target tracker). It is possible that deployment of anti-tactical missile in Europe will begin, and a decision to proceed with actual deployment of the full Star Wars system will be made. Limited deployments of systems to defend missile silos could begin by 1994-96, and the full Star Wars system could be deployed by
1997-2005.
Paying for Star Wars Over the past decade the US ABM research programme has been funded at about $1 billion annually in constant dollars. The SDI is expected to break with this trend by spending about $26 billion during the next five years. However, this cost and the timeframe are a product of the Defense Department budget process, which only projects five years into the future. When the next budget is submitted in 1985, Star Wars will be a six-year, $35 billion programme. In fact, the initial R&D phase of the SDI will run through the early 1990s, and could cost about $50 billion. Although most of the SDI is funded through the Defense Department, nuclear warheads and reactors are funded through the Department of Energy. Much of the increase in the SD1 budget is due to a new emphasis of demonstrating prototype weapons, some of which, as noted above, are inconsistent with the provisions of the A B M treaty. The rapid growth of the SDI will result in the SDI consuming an increasing percentage of defence R & D funding, at least one-fifth of the total by 1989, with further growth likely. The cost of deploying Star Wars, as none of the aforementioned investment actually buys a system, would ultimately depend on the technology selected and the mission it is required to perform. Relatively modest deployments, such as those identified by the Hoffman Panel, could cost tens of billions of additional dollars. A recent report of the Council on Economic Priorities estimates that a system designed to provide a comprehensive defence of the USA could cost anywhere between $400-800 billion)
aRobert W. De Grasse, Jr, and Stephen Daggett, An Economic Analysis of the President's Strategic Defense Initiative: Costs and Cost Exchange Ratios, Council on Economic Priorities, October 1984, p 1.
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Feasibility Just as the cost of a BMD system is a function of its goals, so is the feasibility. But whatever the near- or long-term objectives of the SDI, whether it be the comprehensive defence system envisaged by President
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Reagan or the 'intermediate' options outlined by the Hoffman Panel, each will face the same generic challenges only with varying degrees of difficulty. These fall into two basic categories - first, the technical problems associated with building a workable, integrated and efficient system, and second, the countermeasures that a dedicated adversary can be expected to use to penetrate the defence. The two are linked in as much as overcoming the potential countermeasures presents the most difficult technical challenges. Never the less, there are still fundamental engineering obstacles to intercepting even relatively small numbers of missiles without the presence of countermeasures. Targets have to be acquired and tracked at the earliest possible moment, the geometry of the intercept calculated and transmitted in an equally timely fashion to the kill mechanism which in turn has to perform its mission successfully. Depending on the nature of the defensive system and the threat, many hundreds of such engagements have to be coordinated effectively and assessed afterwards for re-targeting to be possible. This is a tremendous task even in a 'benign' environment. With active and passive countermeasures the demands on the defence multiply considerably. The former include preemptive attacks on the early warning sensors to deny target acquisition, and on any other space-based components of the BMD system prior to a launch. In contrast, passive countermeasures are designed to diminish the effectiveness of the defence without directly attacking it, for example by simply saturating the defence with real and decoy targets, by hardening the missiles, and with fast burn boosters to reduce the vulnerable period prior to the separation of the warheads. In addition to these countermeasures, the attacker can choose to evade the defence with air breathing systems such as bombers and cruise missiles. Even the covert deployment of nuclear weapons in an adversary's populated area is a possibility. With such daunting demands, many have concluded t h a t total population defence of the USA is completely unrealistic. As an authoritative report sponsored by the Office of Technology Assessment ( O T A ) stated: The prospect that emerging 'Star Wars' technologies, when further developed, will provide a perfect or near perfect defense system, literally removing from the hands of the Soviet Union the ability to do socially mortal damage to the United States with nuclear weapons is so remote that it should not serve as the basis of public expectation or national policy about ballistic missile defense (BMD). 4
4Ashton B. Carter, Directed Energy Missile Defense in Space, Background Paper prepared under contract for The Office of Technology Assessment, Washington, DC, April 1984, p 81. Slbid. See also Space Based Missile Defense, A Report by the Union of Concerned Scientists, 1984. eSee Department of Defense Comments on OTA's Background Paper on 'Directed Energy Missile Defense in Space', 8 May 1984, in US Congress, Senate Foreign Relation-s, Strategic Defense and AntiSatellite Weapons, Hearings, 98th Congress, 2nd Sess, 1984, pp 350-353, and also OTA's rebuttal, pp 353-355.
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Technical prognosis for such a perfect or near perfect defense is extremely pessimistic because of the concentration and fragility of society; because all the concepts identified as candidates for a future defense of population are known to be susceptible to countermeasures that would permit the Soviet Union to retain a degree of penetration with their future missile arsenal despite costly attempts to improve the US defense; because the Soviet Union would almost certainly make such a determined effort to avoid being disarmed by a US defense; and because missile defense does not address other methods for delivering nuclear weapons to the United States. 5 Predictably, the conclusions of this report have been challenged by the Defense Department. 6 Apart from disputing its underlying technical assumptions, the Pentagon believes that the feasibility of various BMD concepts cannot be assessed until the requisite technology has matured something that may take 20 years. In other words, 'we will never know 159
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whether it is possible until we have tried'. However, just as there cannot be any 'proof that unknown future technologies will not provide near perfect defense protection of US society', as the O T A report acknowledges, there can never be any proof that it will work until it is called upon to perform its mission. Simulations, demonstrations and exercises can never realistically duplicate the quantitative and qualitative conditions of a full-scale attack. In contrast, limited BMD systems do not have to meet such stringent requirements to be effective. Less than perfect defence of military targets such as ICBM silos are both more realistic and obviously more acceptable than a 'leaky' population defence. By reducing the probability that a first strike could be totally effective and thereby guaranteeing the survival of at least some of the land-based retaliatory force, a BMD system of this type would, as its supporters maintain, enhance deterrence. However, while limited BMD systems may be more feasible, they are not necessarily the preferable solution to the problem they address, namely the vulnerability of fixed military targets. To use the example of silo defence again, there are other equally effective ~md arguably less costly ways of maintaining the surviwlbility of a minimunl deterrent force. These range from different basing modes (such as superhardened silos, and mobile systems) to greater reliance on less vulnerable legs of the strategic 'triad' such as submarines. 7 Active defence systems, moreover, have to be ,judged alongside thesu alternative solutions not just for their comparative effectiveness but also for their likely long-term consequences. These are discussed below.
Consequences Just as the feasibility of the Star Wars initiative can only be assessed in relation to its potential goals, so its likely consequences will vary in the" same way. This can be illustrated by examining the implications of the SDI for arms control, strategic stability, alliance security and space development.S Arms control
The consequences for arms control are discussed first not just because the SDI will have the most immediate impact in this area, but also because they will have a direct bearing on SDI's overall feasibility. Proponents of BMD admit that it is only with drastic reductions in offensive missiles that a comprehensive defence can work. In many respects their argument is circular because they also believe that the USSR will accept such reductions when faced with the prospect of 7See Personal Views of Richard Garwin in effective US missile defence. As George Keyworth, the President's Ashton B. Carter and David N. Schwartz, Science Adviser, has stated: ' . . . i f we demonstrate the capability of a Ballistic Missile Defense, The Brookings defensive deterrent, we would have a persuasive negotiation posture for Institution, Washington, DC, 1984, p 393. For other alternatives see the excellent arms reductions. We could then approach the Soviets with the mutual OTA study, MX Missile Basing, Report of knowledge that ICBMs no longer have the intimidating effect they once the Office of Technology Assessment, had' .9 Washington, DC, September 1981. 8As the long-term costs of a BMD system However, unless the USSR fully embraces the idea of moving towards of any configuration are still vague, the a defence-dominant world, the Soviet inclination will be to do quite the likely economic implications are not disopposite. Rather than facilitate the US goal, the USSR is most likely to cussed here. 9Remarks of George Keyworth II to the do everything to undermine it. Thus, contrary to Keyworth's prediction, Brookings Forum on the Future of Ballistic the USSR will become more resistant to reducing its strategic forces Missile Defense, Washington, DC, 29 and, if anything, will strive to deploy more. The implications for the February 1984, p 16. 160
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strategic arms control talks are obvious. Even if the SDI is limited to the defence of ICBMs, the impact is most likely to be the same. Ironically, it may in the end make the problem of ICBM vulnerability worse, not better. Whatever the eventual configuration of the SDI, it will inevitably undermine confidence in the 1972 ABM treaty, arguably the single most important piece of arms control legislation. While US officials claim that the research programme will observe the terms of the ABM treaty, the planned series of demonstrations will at the very least violate the intended spirit of the treaty if not the word.l° In this sense the ABM treaty will most probably not die in the definitive sense, but just wither away. Either way, the net effect will be to challenge the durability of existing arms control agreements and further erode the incentives to seek new ones. 11 In fact, the SDI has already affected the likelihood of an anti-satellite (ASAT) arms control agreement. Due to the overlap in technologies and capabilities, the USA is clearly reluctant to enter into ASAT negotiations that might restrict its freedom of action to test BMD systems in space. Although this is already largely prohibited by the ABM treaty, the USA does not want this to be augmented by an additional agreement that would eliminate the current loopholes for R&D. 12 Likewise, the current US position towards a comprehensive nuclear test ban also reflects, in part, an unwillingness to close the door on the testing of nuclear devices which might be useful to BMD - the most notable example being nuclear pumped X-ray lasers. Strategic stability
1°See 'A report on the impact of US and Soviet ballistic missile defense programs on the ABM treaty', prepared by Thomas K. Longstreth and John E. Pike, for the National Campaign to Save the ABM Treaty, June 1984. 11Among the existing treaties that BMD development could affect are the Partial Test Ban and Outer Space treaties that prohibit the testing and deployment of nuclear weapons in space. Nuclear explosions are currently being considered to ~2enerate power for X-ray lasers. Ironically, indirectly encouraging the development of anti-satellite systems also by definition increases the threat to spacebased BMD components. The need for some restrictions on ASAT weapons was admitted in the DoD report, Defense Against Ballistic Missiles: An Assessment
of Technologies and Policy Implications, Department of Defense, Washington, DC, March 1984, repdnted in US Congress, Senate Foreign Relations, Strategic Defense and Anti-satellite Weapons, Washington, DC, 1984, p 105. 13See Testimony of Sidney Drell in ibid, p 180. 14Defense Against Ballistic Missiles, Department of Defense, Washington, DC, March 1984.
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Critics of the SDI are particularly concerned with the effect of BMD development on strategic stability. Besides the impetus that it will probably give to the arms race, they also believe that crisis stability could be seriously undermined with even less than perfect defences. Their argument rests on the continued presence of offensive forces that could be used in conjunction with a defensive shield. A less than perfect defence may not be able to repel the full onslaught of a massive first strike but, against a retaliatory force that had already been severely depleted by a preemptive attack, it could prove highly effective. In a crisis, this may create irresistible pressures to 'go first' to avoid the prospect of a completely nullified retaliatory force. As Sidney Drell put it: ' . . . with a partially effective defense, you have to recognize that it will be more effective as an adjunct of a first strike, because the retaliatory force will be at a predictable time, with reduced coordination, [and] reduced in intensity...'.13 Proponents of BMD maintain, however, that a mutual and gradual transition to a defence-dominant strategic relationship would avoid this problem and lead the world to a more stable position. They readily admit that the pace at which the respective defence systems were deployed and the offensive forces were decommissioned would have to be carefully orchestrated and accompanied by a variety of confidence building measures to smooth the changeover. 14 However, it is difficult to conceive how this could be managed when neither side would know how effective its own BMD system would be if attacked. The capabilities of their respective defences would be subject to at least the same degree of speculation and worst case analysis that is currently manifested with offensive forces. This will almost certainly create 161
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pressures to retain some offensive forces. Worse still, it might unleash an arms race in defensive systems in addition to the current offensive competition. More generally, given the period over which such a transition could be expected to last, it will require an unprecedented level of cooperation between the superpowers. Even if it succeeded, provision would have to be made for both to maintain and modernize their BMD systems, otherwise the result will be to trade one form of instability for another.
Alliance security The Reagan administration has been careful to emphasize that it intends to extend the coverage of a BMD shield to its European allies. Quite how this could be achieved given the reduced warning time and the diversity of potential nuclear delivery systems available to the Warsaw Pact, has yet to be explained. Doubts about leakproof defences arc therefore even more pertinent to the European theatre. With this in mind, many Europeans are concerned about the consequences of the SDI for the US security guarantee and for superpower relations generally. In particular, they are worried that this will presage greater US isolationism - a 'fortress America" mentality. Supporters of the programme counter this by arguing that a US BMD system (albeit of the comprehensive kind), would make credible what has always been an incredible guarantee - namely that the USA would risk self-destruction by coming to the aid of the Europeans. The logic of this argument is that a US President would be more likely to take this risk knowing that the homeland would be spared from the consequences of nuclear escalation. Although this is a persuasive argument, it has only fueled the Europeans' darkest fears. At one extreme it might encourage US nuclear 'adventurism' or brinkmanship in Europe, while at the other it might reinforce what are already strong incentives to stay out of a European conflict, especially if at some future date the level of US conventional forces had been severely reduced. Moreover, if both superpowers possessed effective BMD systems, it might actually make Europe 'safe' again for conventional warfare. The U K and France are also certain to feel that the deterrent value of their small nuclear forces would become neutralized by missile defences that they could no longer penetrate. Overall then, considerable uncertainty exists over whether BMD offers any of the putative benefits for European security.
Space development A massive BMD research effort also appears to offer mixed blessings for the exploitation of space. A massive diversion of financial and technical resources could exact enormous opportunity costs on the space programme. In particular, it could stymie the development of space science and exploration which are already beleagured by budget cutbacks. Aerospace companies and engineers may find the promise of BMD research too attractive to expend time and energy on what they consider to be less rewarding space projects. Alternatively, the SDI might be a boon to the commercial exploitation of space. As noted above, there are already preliminary plans for new and larger space launchers which are likely to be made available to the civil/commercial space programme to justify costs. Similarly, newer more efficient power sources may also be available for commercial
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projects. Novel techniques for constructing and deploying large space structures that may be necessary for a BMD system would presumably have the same spinoffs. It is too early to predict how the development of BMD systems in space could affect civil and commercial space operations. Some orbits, for instance, might become overcrowded or 'out of bounds' for security reasons. The general trend in the militarization of space may even lead to higher insurance premiums. Certainly, in the event of war in space, civil/commercial activities are unlikely to remain sacrosanct.
Conclusion In conclusion, the technical and political challenges facing the SDI cast serious doubts on whether President Reagan's goal can ever be achieved. While a limited BMD system would be more feasible and perhaps serve some purpose, it is questionable first whether this is desirable given the alternative options mentioned earlier and, second, worthwhile given the potential negative consequences. In short, by trying to gain a little we could end up losing a lot.
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