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The Taliban and opium cultivation in Afghanistan
International Journal of Drug Policy 16 (2005) 79–80
Editorial
The Taliban and opium cultivation in Afghanistan New phenomena, policies or initiatives in the field of drug policy often arouse great global interest and are cited in discussion and debate in common room, committee room and political chamber for many years to come, often as evidence to support opposing viewpoints. We should therefore be grateful to Farrell and Thorne (2005) for taking the trouble to analyse and document the events in Afghanistan in 2000/2001, and to the International Journal of Drug Policy for creating this opportunity for discussion based on their findings. This episode in the history of drug control has been cited at the highest level of drug policy discourse as either a figment of the imagination, proof that eradication approaches can work, proof that eradication approaches can never work, or a useful example of how to work in remote or politically sensitive environments. To help us understand the real lessons from this episode, we need to address four questions—was the eradication real and effective; if so, how was it achieved; what was the immediate impact; and what has happened since?
Was it real? The clear answer from Farrell and Thorne here is yes. They describe a 99% reduction in the area of poppy cultivation in Taliban controlled areas between 1999 and 2001. This is a remarkable figure, that has never been achieved elsewhere in the history of eradication efforts—the world community would love to be able to report such reductions in cultivation of cannabis in Morocco, or coca in the Andes. A few reservations remain about these figures—we have to remember that they are supplied and compiled by informants and organisations that have an interest in maximising the impact of eradication measures. In addition, as Macdonald (2005) points out, seemingly authoritative estimates of poppy cultivation come up with widely diverging figures—the UN and US estimates for hectares under cultivation in Afghanistan during this period paint significantly different pictures. However, there at least seems to be a consensus amongst analysts that what happened in Afghanistan was indeed the single most significant reduction in the cultivation of a controlled substance in history.
0955-3959/$ – see front matter © 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.drugpo.2005.01.004
How was it achieved? Farrell and Thorne postulate that the key factors were the clear statement banning opium cultivation (fatwa) that emerged from the country’s religious leader at the time, the enthusiastic implementation of that decree by the local ‘shuras’ who, significantly, remained relatively free from corruption, and the swift and draconian punishments meted out to those found to be contravening the fatwa. While the exact nature of this period of implementation remains unclear – for example, the extent of the more brutal punishments has not been documented – this combination of religious leadership and ruthless efficiency seems to have been a potent mix. Disagreements emerge, however, when we try to assess the lessons for eradication efforts elsewhere. Adelekan (2005), while acknowledging the unacceptability of many of the methods employed by the shuras, rightly points out that there are some lessons for other times and places—the importance of widespread community acceptance of the policy of eradication, and the need to avoid corruption of those charged with implementation. These seem to be factors that have been notably absent in efforts to tackle cultivation in other areas—for example Colombia. In addition, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the extreme and sometimes arbitrary nature of the punishments under the Taliban regime were the principal factor in gaining the compliance of peasant farmers who were forced to give up their only reliable source of income, and that these conditions could not, and should not, be replicated by governments with any kind of commitment to human rights and judicial standards. There is debate also on the extent to which the UNODC can claim to have contributed to the position taken by the Taliban, and the consequent reductions in cultivation. Thoumi (2005) and Fazey (2005) emphasise the limited influence of the international community on Taliban decision making, particularly as all involved were aware that Pino Arlacchi’s generous promises of aid in return for eradication would not be backed up with hard cash. However, the issuing of the fatwa by Mullah Omar, and its enthusiastic implementation by his followers, have to be regarded as at least a vindication of the UNODC policy of constructive engagement with the Taliban at that time.
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Editorial / International Journal of Drug Policy 16 (2005) 79–80
What was the impact? The most immediate, and significant impact was, as Jelsma (2005) testifies, on the peasant opium growers themselves. Within a year, a traditional and culturally embedded source of income (and, critically, security for credit) was removed from tens of thousands of families with, as one would expect in one of the poorest countries in the world, lasting damage to economic activity and community cohesion. The question that needs to be asked is—was it worth it? Many, I’m sure Martin Jelsma amongst them, would argue that, even if the result of this social upheaval in a poor country created a heroin shortage in rich countries, the price in terms of the suffering in Afghanistan is too high to pay. If we look at the impact of these massive market shifts in Afghanistan on heroin markets around the world, however, this ethical dilemma becomes easier to resolve—nothing changed very much. While prices shot up within Afghanistan, the impact of a year of minimal production was quickly dissipated along the trafficking routes to the main consumer markets. There is conflicting data regarding prices in Iran and Turkey, but very little evidence of an impact on price and availability in Europe. There are some indications that traffickers offset the higher wholesale prices by reducing the purity of the product on sale, but apart from this, the pattern of Heroin use in Europe remained essentially unchanged.
What has happened since? We now know that the reduction in cultivation of opium in Afghanistan in 2000/2001 was not maintained after the fall of the Taliban. All indicators point to a rapid return to bumper harvests from 2002 onwards. This is not due to any lack of effort on the part of the Karzai government or the international community—I recall the strength of commitment amongst governments and the UNODC at the time, based on a feeling that the conditions existed (cultivation concentrated in a small geographical area, an existing disruption of the market, strong military and diplomatic influence) for a successful and sustained eradication effort. It would seem that market factors, and the realities of life in poor agricultural economies, have prevailed. Peasant farmers have taken the first opportunity to return to the only activity that provides them with a reliable income, while the increased profits available in a disrupted market ensure that traffickers are not persuaded to seek an alternative living. The policy lessons from this episode are that it is possible, when a wide range of political, economic and cultural conditions are right, to achieve significant reductions in the cultivation of an illicit crop. However, such ‘successes’ do not have the hoped-for effects on the overall global market, and are only temporary as market factors ensure that demand is
ultimately met. Serious questions have therefore to be asked about the wisdom of pouring so much political and financial resource into a programme that disrupts the livelihood of some of the poorest people on earth, while creating so little benefit to others. Over the past two years, the UK Government has led the international effort to sustain the eradication achievements of the Taliban era. This programme has been well intentioned, and tried to address development issues, but we have to admit that it has failed in its primary objective. There are worrying signs that the US Government has lost patience with this approach, and is now applying pressure for a more aggressive campaign of forced eradication. David Macdonald ends his piece with a wise statement—‘The last thing the Afghan people need is another war. . . in the search for a lasting solution to illicit opium cultivation’. It looks like that is exactly what they are going to get.
References Adelekan, M. (2005). Very effective but draconian and unacceptable: Paradox in the evaluation of a unique drug control effort in a non-western country. International Journal of Drug Policy, 16(2), 110–111. Farrell, G., & Thorne, J. (2005). Where have all the flowers gone? Evaluation of the Taliban crackdown against opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. International Journal of Drug Policy, 16(2), 81–91. Fazey, C. (2005). Where have all the flowers gone? International Journal of Drug Policy, 16(2), 104–107. Jelsma, M. (2005). Learning lessons from the Taliban opium ban. International Journal of Drug Policy, 16(2), 98–103. MacDonald, D. (2005). Blooming flowers and false prophets: the dynamics of opium cultivation and production in Afghanistan under the Taliban. International Journal of Drug Policy, 16(2), 93–97. Thoumi, F. (2005). Why the Taliban poppy ban was very unlikely to have been sustained after a couple of years. International Journal of Drug Policy, 16(2), 108–109.
Mike Trace ∗, 1 Beekley Foundation, Drug Policy Programme Tel.: +44 7771500 219. E-mail address: [email protected] URL: http://www.internationaldrugpolicy.org. 17 December 2004 1 The
Beckley Foundation Drug Policy Programme is an initiative that aims to promote a rigorous and objective review of the effectiveness of global drug policies. Launched in April 2004, we commission reports and briefing papers that aim to cast light on the nature of drug use and our policy responses to it, in an attempt to help policymakers understand these available evidence, and to base their future decisions, as far as is possible, on that evidence. Our publications are downloadable from our website.
Editorial
The Taliban and opium cultivation in Afghanistan New phenomena, policies or initiatives in the field of drug policy often arouse great global interest and are cited in discussion and debate in common room, committee room and political chamber for many years to come, often as evidence to support opposing viewpoints. We should therefore be grateful to Farrell and Thorne (2005) for taking the trouble to analyse and document the events in Afghanistan in 2000/2001, and to the International Journal of Drug Policy for creating this opportunity for discussion based on their findings. This episode in the history of drug control has been cited at the highest level of drug policy discourse as either a figment of the imagination, proof that eradication approaches can work, proof that eradication approaches can never work, or a useful example of how to work in remote or politically sensitive environments. To help us understand the real lessons from this episode, we need to address four questions—was the eradication real and effective; if so, how was it achieved; what was the immediate impact; and what has happened since?
Was it real? The clear answer from Farrell and Thorne here is yes. They describe a 99% reduction in the area of poppy cultivation in Taliban controlled areas between 1999 and 2001. This is a remarkable figure, that has never been achieved elsewhere in the history of eradication efforts—the world community would love to be able to report such reductions in cultivation of cannabis in Morocco, or coca in the Andes. A few reservations remain about these figures—we have to remember that they are supplied and compiled by informants and organisations that have an interest in maximising the impact of eradication measures. In addition, as Macdonald (2005) points out, seemingly authoritative estimates of poppy cultivation come up with widely diverging figures—the UN and US estimates for hectares under cultivation in Afghanistan during this period paint significantly different pictures. However, there at least seems to be a consensus amongst analysts that what happened in Afghanistan was indeed the single most significant reduction in the cultivation of a controlled substance in history.
0955-3959/$ – see front matter © 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.drugpo.2005.01.004
How was it achieved? Farrell and Thorne postulate that the key factors were the clear statement banning opium cultivation (fatwa) that emerged from the country’s religious leader at the time, the enthusiastic implementation of that decree by the local ‘shuras’ who, significantly, remained relatively free from corruption, and the swift and draconian punishments meted out to those found to be contravening the fatwa. While the exact nature of this period of implementation remains unclear – for example, the extent of the more brutal punishments has not been documented – this combination of religious leadership and ruthless efficiency seems to have been a potent mix. Disagreements emerge, however, when we try to assess the lessons for eradication efforts elsewhere. Adelekan (2005), while acknowledging the unacceptability of many of the methods employed by the shuras, rightly points out that there are some lessons for other times and places—the importance of widespread community acceptance of the policy of eradication, and the need to avoid corruption of those charged with implementation. These seem to be factors that have been notably absent in efforts to tackle cultivation in other areas—for example Colombia. In addition, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the extreme and sometimes arbitrary nature of the punishments under the Taliban regime were the principal factor in gaining the compliance of peasant farmers who were forced to give up their only reliable source of income, and that these conditions could not, and should not, be replicated by governments with any kind of commitment to human rights and judicial standards. There is debate also on the extent to which the UNODC can claim to have contributed to the position taken by the Taliban, and the consequent reductions in cultivation. Thoumi (2005) and Fazey (2005) emphasise the limited influence of the international community on Taliban decision making, particularly as all involved were aware that Pino Arlacchi’s generous promises of aid in return for eradication would not be backed up with hard cash. However, the issuing of the fatwa by Mullah Omar, and its enthusiastic implementation by his followers, have to be regarded as at least a vindication of the UNODC policy of constructive engagement with the Taliban at that time.
80
Editorial / International Journal of Drug Policy 16 (2005) 79–80
What was the impact? The most immediate, and significant impact was, as Jelsma (2005) testifies, on the peasant opium growers themselves. Within a year, a traditional and culturally embedded source of income (and, critically, security for credit) was removed from tens of thousands of families with, as one would expect in one of the poorest countries in the world, lasting damage to economic activity and community cohesion. The question that needs to be asked is—was it worth it? Many, I’m sure Martin Jelsma amongst them, would argue that, even if the result of this social upheaval in a poor country created a heroin shortage in rich countries, the price in terms of the suffering in Afghanistan is too high to pay. If we look at the impact of these massive market shifts in Afghanistan on heroin markets around the world, however, this ethical dilemma becomes easier to resolve—nothing changed very much. While prices shot up within Afghanistan, the impact of a year of minimal production was quickly dissipated along the trafficking routes to the main consumer markets. There is conflicting data regarding prices in Iran and Turkey, but very little evidence of an impact on price and availability in Europe. There are some indications that traffickers offset the higher wholesale prices by reducing the purity of the product on sale, but apart from this, the pattern of Heroin use in Europe remained essentially unchanged.
What has happened since? We now know that the reduction in cultivation of opium in Afghanistan in 2000/2001 was not maintained after the fall of the Taliban. All indicators point to a rapid return to bumper harvests from 2002 onwards. This is not due to any lack of effort on the part of the Karzai government or the international community—I recall the strength of commitment amongst governments and the UNODC at the time, based on a feeling that the conditions existed (cultivation concentrated in a small geographical area, an existing disruption of the market, strong military and diplomatic influence) for a successful and sustained eradication effort. It would seem that market factors, and the realities of life in poor agricultural economies, have prevailed. Peasant farmers have taken the first opportunity to return to the only activity that provides them with a reliable income, while the increased profits available in a disrupted market ensure that traffickers are not persuaded to seek an alternative living. The policy lessons from this episode are that it is possible, when a wide range of political, economic and cultural conditions are right, to achieve significant reductions in the cultivation of an illicit crop. However, such ‘successes’ do not have the hoped-for effects on the overall global market, and are only temporary as market factors ensure that demand is
ultimately met. Serious questions have therefore to be asked about the wisdom of pouring so much political and financial resource into a programme that disrupts the livelihood of some of the poorest people on earth, while creating so little benefit to others. Over the past two years, the UK Government has led the international effort to sustain the eradication achievements of the Taliban era. This programme has been well intentioned, and tried to address development issues, but we have to admit that it has failed in its primary objective. There are worrying signs that the US Government has lost patience with this approach, and is now applying pressure for a more aggressive campaign of forced eradication. David Macdonald ends his piece with a wise statement—‘The last thing the Afghan people need is another war. . . in the search for a lasting solution to illicit opium cultivation’. It looks like that is exactly what they are going to get.
References Adelekan, M. (2005). Very effective but draconian and unacceptable: Paradox in the evaluation of a unique drug control effort in a non-western country. International Journal of Drug Policy, 16(2), 110–111. Farrell, G., & Thorne, J. (2005). Where have all the flowers gone? Evaluation of the Taliban crackdown against opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. International Journal of Drug Policy, 16(2), 81–91. Fazey, C. (2005). Where have all the flowers gone? International Journal of Drug Policy, 16(2), 104–107. Jelsma, M. (2005). Learning lessons from the Taliban opium ban. International Journal of Drug Policy, 16(2), 98–103. MacDonald, D. (2005). Blooming flowers and false prophets: the dynamics of opium cultivation and production in Afghanistan under the Taliban. International Journal of Drug Policy, 16(2), 93–97. Thoumi, F. (2005). Why the Taliban poppy ban was very unlikely to have been sustained after a couple of years. International Journal of Drug Policy, 16(2), 108–109.
Mike Trace ∗, 1 Beekley Foundation, Drug Policy Programme Tel.: +44 7771500 219. E-mail address: [email protected] URL: http://www.internationaldrugpolicy.org. 17 December 2004 1 The
Beckley Foundation Drug Policy Programme is an initiative that aims to promote a rigorous and objective review of the effectiveness of global drug policies. Launched in April 2004, we commission reports and briefing papers that aim to cast light on the nature of drug use and our policy responses to it, in an attempt to help policymakers understand these available evidence, and to base their future decisions, as far as is possible, on that evidence. Our publications are downloadable from our website.