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The technological choice decision making process: An example from Nigeria—the Kainji hydro-electric technology: A multi-purpose development technolog
Socio-Em. Plan. Sci. Vol 16, No. I, pp. 9-14, 1982 Printed in Great Britain
tM38-0121/82/01CM9W03.00/0 Pergamon Press Ltd
THE TECHNOLOGICAL CHOICE DECISION MAKING PROCESS: AN EXAMPLE FROM NIGERIA-THE KAINJI HYDRO-ELECTRIC TECHNOLOGY: A MULTI-PURPOSE DEVELOPMENT TECHNOLOGY A. ‘SESANAYODE~E Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research, Ibadan, Nigeria (Received 10 June 1981) Abstract-This paper examines the technological-cum-economic/social/political criteria under which technological decisions are made. An example-The Kainji Dam hydro-electric technology-from Nigeria (a buyer of technology) is selected as a case study. The study shows the importance of socio-economic criteria in the process of making any technological choice decision. Nonetheless a close interplay of some political factors may mitigate purely the socio-economic considerations in the technological choice decision making process. This is evident in the choice of the Kainji Dam technology in Nigeria.
INTRODUCTION
There has been a steady stream of technological deployment from the “Developed countries” to the “Third World” countries in order to solve part of the development problems in those recepient countires. In most cases, however, these technologiesare mis-chosen by the recepient countries. This best explains why the impactsof such technologiesin the third world countries have been the unanticipatednegativeeffects which often offset the gainspreviously anticipated. This suggests that, it is not the deployment of any technologyto the developngcountries that matters. What is of prime importance is the deployment of the right type of technologyfor rapid development.However, this deployment hinges critically on the recepients country’s choice of technology. In other words, the success or otherwise of a type of technology, principally,depends on the deficienciesor otherwise of the decision-making process and the subsequent administrativeand evaluation systems which underlie the selection of appropriate technologyfor development. Nonetheless,the decision-makingprocess of any technology involves the technological assessment of the availableoptions for scrutiny.The scrutiny exercise will, however, be based on utility functions with respect to the social net benefit maximi~tion or cost minimization. It is from this analysis that there can be a progressive eliminationof those alternatives which show high unfavpurable benefit ratio. Given the limitedcapital resources, few technologists, scanty infrastructure,inadequateinformation/recordand the low level of development in all of the third world countries, the decision-makingprocess in the countries may not be an easy task. In spite of this difficulty,an optimal tec~ological choice is desirable given the anticipationfor rapid development. In view of the consequences of a mis-chosen technology and the current electricity crisis in Nigeria, we propose to examine the technological decision-making process in Nigeria (a third world country), selecting the Kainji Dam Hydro-electric technologyas the case study. The Kainji Dam technology is selected in view of the following factors which mark it out as crucial to the developmentof Nigeria: 9
(a) It is the corner stone of the Nigeria’s First National Development Plan-representing about 12.9% of the total money estimated for that DevelopmentPlan and thereby constitutingthe largest singleproject in the Plan. (b) Several alternatives-coal, lignite,oil, natural gas, hydro resources-exist in Nigeria for electricity generation. These alternativesare expected to pose formidable decision-making problems at the decision-making process stagein an attemptto avert an imminentelectricity crisis. Given the above, it is the objective of this paper to: (a) Explore the technological-cum-economiccriteria which made the hydro-electricfacility at Kainjifavoured among the existingoptions. (b) Investigatethe interplay of interests and their impacts on the choice of Kainji Dam technology. (c) Assess whether or not every possible potential component in the decision-making process was adequatelyexplored, considered and represented. (d) Discern any correlationswhich exist between perceived discrepanciesbetween expectation and outcomes which involve the Kainji Dam project, and, in what manner these were related to the decision-making process. To attain these objectives, this paper focuses on the analysisof the initiation,planning,execution and expectations of the Kainji Dam technology. RISTORICALBACKGROUNDTOKAINJl DAMCONSTRUCTION
Before the idea to build the Kainji Damwas mooted in 1950,Nigeria depended solely on some isolated thermal plants for her electric power supply. Electricity was generated from these isolated plants independently by the Public Works apartments, Native Autho~ties and one or two large MunicipalAuthorities. The supply of electricity at that initial stage of developmentin Nigeria was scanty. Besides, its price was high particularly; in the then Northern Region. With the expansion of economic activity in Nigeria, the demand for electricity had started to rise. This increase in demand rendered the limited generating capacities of the isolated thermal plants inadequate.
A. ‘SESANAYODELE
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Given the above development, it was apparent that alternative sources of electricity were required to bait Nigeria out of an imminent “electricity crisis” (electricity shortage). Besides, it was obvious that rapid electricity development might not be easily pursued by the proliferated bodies whose duplication of efforts had resulted in over:lapping functions and wastage of scarce electricity resources. That is, it was necessary to establish a central body whose duty it would be to seek an alternative source of electricity which was capable of producing cheap and abundant electricity to consumers. Given this requirement, the “Electricity Coloration of Nigeria” (ECN) was established by Ordinance No. 15 of 19.50.The ECN thus became a national body charged to oversee electricity development in the country. The powers /and functions of this newly established electricity body was laid down in section 21,29, 30 and 50 of this Ordnance. Its functions relate to electricity generation transmission, distribution and sales throughout the federation. Besides, the ECN was granted the power to dispose off land for purposes of adequate and continuous power suppiy, Nonetheless, the Ordinance made provisions for such periods when electric power could be suspended. Such periods include the periods necessary for carrying out inspections, tests, or repairs and making new connections. It is apparent from the above that these wide powers confered on the ECN constituted it into an autonomous commercial enterprise in a monopolistic setting. These powers have been ~ansferred to the “National Electric Power Authority” (NEPA)-a merger of the ECN and the “Niger Dam Authority” (NDA) by Decree No. 24 of April 1972. However, the establishment of the ECN through a legislative procedure only resulted in the consolidation under one organization of the efforts of the former proliferated electricity bodies. It was yet to provide adequate electricity to meet the fast lowing demand which became worse later in the 1950s. THEFEASIMLITY OF KAIh’JIDAM
Given the urgency to develop alternative electricity sources in the country in the early 195Os, the ECN authorised a hydro-electric investigation of the river Niger upstream of Jebba in 1951. Besides the Federal Government of Nigeria commissioned the “Netherlands En~neering constants” (NEDECO) to carry out a hydroIo~~a1 survey of the rivers Niger and Benue in 1953. By 1958, the demand for electricity in Nigeria had become aggravated by further expansion in economic activities. This critical situation made the ECN become more aware of its earlier committments. .The ECN, therefore, stepped up its strategies of the search for alternative sources of electricity production in the country. The ECN, thus, collaborated with the government of the former Northern Region of Nigeria to commission another investi~tion into the hydro-electric potentials of river Kaduna and Shiroro, by Sir Alexander Gibbs and Partners in collaboration with Messrs Preece, Garden and Ridder. In addition, the ECN singly appointed an investigative commission-Balfour Beatty and Company Limited of Great Britain-with a view to finding a site which would produce 40&%?0MW at a capacity cost which would not
exceed f26m (W52.00m). This study was equally to extend its operation to cover the hydro-electric potentials of the Niger river in the vicinity of Jebba. Thus far, there has been nothing to show the general likeness for the choice of a hydro-electric facility. This implies that the Federal Government, the Government of the Northern Region and the ECN got involved in the commissioning of several studies into the investigation of the electricity potentials of the major rivers in Nigeria, all on the assumption that it was an adequate alternative source. By the end of 1958, all the parties concerned with electricity development in Nigeria became aware that other benefits could be obtained from the construction of a dam across the river Niger in addition to the production of electricity. This awareness emanated from the Jebba Feasibility Reports which were released in December 1958. The report had read in part: “The most beneficial development would be the construction of a dam in the Kurwasa area.. . . A dam there would not only provide su~~ient electric power for many years, but would also control the river by reducing flood discharges thereby improving navigation, and allowing large areas of land downstream of Jebba to be cultivated. A fishing industry would also be established in the reservoir created by the dam.” It is, therefore, apparent from this report that anitcipatory benefits along with cheap and abundant electricity were fishing, navigation and irrigation agriculture in the areas where the dam was scheduled to be built. Given these side benefits, the Federal Government of Nigeria requested the NEDECO in collaboration with Balfour Beatty to undergo another study on the proposal to build a dam across the Niger. This recent study was mandated to consider the benefits associated with the dam in details. Thus far, only the hydro-electric facility has been considered as a possible alternative source of electricity production in Nigeria among several options (coal, gas, oil). Given these alternatives which were not considered, the 1958Report was criticised when it got to the National Economic Council (NEC) for ratification. In view of this criticism, the NEDECO and Balfour Beatty were advised to intensify their investigations. That is, the study was to be more comprehensive by considering along with the Niger hydro-electric potentials all other available alternatives. This study was commissioned late in 1959 with the injection of the United Nations special funds. The reports of this study were released in 1961 in seven volumes. This study considered the ,general economics of the Niger Dam hydro-electric facilities with those of the thermal alternatives, particularly, natural gas. The basis of comparison’ were-the annual cost of these alternatives and the externalities derivable from them. Attention was directed at the effects of the extent and growth of the development and of future financial policy on costs. Two alternatives of electric power resources emerged from the report as feasible for development-water power and natural gas. The consultants, however, favoured the development of hydro-facilities more than the natural gas. This is due to the fact that: “The use of water power, as compared to natural gas, requires a higher initial capital investment but enables running costs of generation to be reduced.”
The technological choice decision making process
That is, the Kainji dam technology would require greater initial investment than a large gas fired plant. Nonetheless, its running cost would be lower. Besides, the larger capital investment in hydro resource technology would make for quite a reasonable rate of return-fishing, navigation and irrigation agriculture. In addition to these advantages, some relative administrative economies were anticipated from generating electricity from a single centre. However, while the studies were in progress the Niger Dam Project Committee (NDPC) was set up to receive, study, and, pass recommendations on the reports to the NEC for ratification on the selected alternatives. The NDPC was composed of representatives of the Federal Government, the government of the Northern Region and the ECN. The NEC was on the other hand composed of responsible politicians, government officials and all regional premiers. The NDPC unanimously recommended the development of an initial hydro-project at Kainji with subsequent ones at Jebba and Shiroro as the most economical and beneficial strategy to Nigeria. This recommendation was, however, ratified by the NEC after a stiff opposition from one of the regional premiers. Following this ratification was the emergence of a decision to: (1) Construct the first dam at Kainji. (2) Build two subsequent dams at Jebba and Shiroro in that order. As a follow up to the endorsement of NEC’s recommendation, the Federal Government established the Niger Dam Authority (NDA) by an act of parliament in 1962. The NDA was charged with the responsibility of overseeing the construction and maintenance of dams and other works on the river. In other words, the NDA was to take care of the development of electricity through the hydro-resources as an ideal alternative among other sources. Given that the Kainji Dam technology is most feasible as reported in the various studies, there are some facts which are worth noting, more so as it met with a stiff opposition from a Regional Premier. These facts include: (1) All studies commissioned between 1951 and 1959 were given the mandate to investigate the hydro-electric potentials of rivers Niger and Kaduna. That is, about 8 years intensive work were given to the hydro-electric facilities with no consideration for other alternatives. (2) Natural gas as a possible alternative was included at the tail end of 1959 after an anticipated opposition. This shows how ad hoc in nature the attention given to other alternatives were at the decision-making process stage. (3) When the natural gas was virtually considered, there is no evidence in the reports to show that a careful consideration was given to the impacts of the smaller initial costs of gas on a smaller burden on the country’s debt servicing capacity. The effect of this last aspect is apparently formidable given the time, resources and attention devoted to hydroelectric resource. While this argument is not suggesting that the choice of Kainji was an error given this apparently narrow balance in relative advantages, an apparent political under-tone cannot be totally ruled out of the choice of Kainji. This is evident in the manner in which several commissions were directed to carry out their investigations. That is, up till 1959 all the consultants were directed to focus their attention at the hydro-electric potentials of some Nigerian rivers.
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One wonders why much premium is placed on hydroelectric facilities even when other alternatives are available in large quantums in Nigeria: observation shows that some politicians were opposed to the use of natural gas as an alternative source. This opposition might not be unconnected with the exhorbitant price of electricity in the North at that time. That is, if gas were selected, the gas fired plant would have been located in the south. The cost of distribution to the north might, probably, aggravate the original high price. These politicians were in firm control of the largest party in both the Federal Parliament and the Northern Regional Assembly. Besides, Kainji, Jebba and Shiroro are located in the North where electriciy prices were highest in the country. Given these critical situations, it does not come as a surprise that these politicians were suspected of exerting their tremendous political influence on the commissions and committees established to advise on the construction of the Kainji Dam. This, therefore, suggests that in spite of the ad hoc consideration given to other alternatives, it might be contended that natural gas or any other alternative did not at that time occupy the attention of all the parties concerned with the development of electricity in Nigeria in the course of the decision-making process. It may, therefore, be suggested that at the request of the Federal Government of Nigeria in collaboration with both Northern Regional Government and the ECN all the reports of the studies commissioned favoured the construction of the Kainji Dam. THEKAINJIDAM-FINANCIALPLANNING ANDTHEDAMSCONSTRUCTION
Up till 1961, the Federal Government of Nigeria had not made any conscious attempt at estimating the total cost of the Kainji project. Similarly, attention had not been given to the sources of generating funds for the project. Given that Nigeria as a developing country was/is (a)Financially backward and poor viz-a-viz the advanced countries, and (b) A country where capital market and other institutions for mobilising savings-large enough for such a complex project as the Kainji-were/are poorly developed; the financial aspect was expected to pose a formidable problem. Thus, as a follow up to the need to generate fund for the project, a Nigerian Consultative Group (NCG) was sponsored by the World Bank. Membership of the NCG included Nigeria and the prospective foreign donors. The formation of this group was predicated on the hope that, in a wide forum, the matching of the project with lenders could take place relatively easily. Some of those countries whose nationals were represented in the NCG were Nigeria, U.S., Italy, Netherlands and Britain. The leadership of the NCG was unanimously passed on to the World Bank. The main function of the NCG was to design appropriate strategies for the provision, internationally or otherwise of adequate finance for the construction of the Kainji Dam. This suggests, therefore, that the formation of the NCG was recognized as an instrument for expanding total aid as well as for its coordination with regard to the Kainji project. In order to play the leading role effectively, the World Bank saw the need for an independent technical and economic feasibility survey of the project. This shows
A. ‘&SAN
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that the World Bank had no faith in the previous studies. The World Bank, thus sponsored a new technical and economic feasibility investigation which took two years to complete. However, the report of this study confirmed the feasibility of the hydro-electric resource. As a follow up, the World Bank approved of the project officially. In addition to this approval, the World Bank and*Nigeria with the assistance of the NCG went into a lot of financial negotiations with foreign countries. This stage proved very difficult. These difficulties could be associated with the determination of: (a) The proportion of the total foreign exchange required that would be covered by the World Bank Loan; (b) The proportion to be covered by loans from other donor countries; (c) The amount of loans from various countries and the conditions associated with them. It was presumed that the solution to the problem depended on which firm would be the successful bidder for the main civil works contract. This suggests, therefore, that the financial aspect of the Kainji Dam might not have been assured until after the main contractor had been determined. Nonetheless, the choice of the contractor could have alternatively depended on the size of the loans expected from the various countries. Given this situation, designing a solution would not have been a simple matter. It is in this realms that the Nigerian Officials and politicians involved, as well as all the members of the NCG deserve special words of praise for a job well done. Table 1 presents the list of donors and grantors with their respective contributions in absolute and percentage terms. About 38% of the total estimate was to come from internal sources while the World Bank was expected to take care of 37% of the total estimate. Italy granted Nigeria a loan of ++18.8m which represented about 12% of the total estimate. This was the largest amount received from any single donor country for this project. It equally represented one of the largest loans ever granted by the Italian Government up till that time. The probably motivation for this generousity cannot be divorced from the intention of Impregilo (an Italian firm) to win the main contract. All of these loans were genuinely negotiated on a long term basis. The NDA had been established by 1962to over-see the development of all hydra-electric projects in the country. The duties of the NDA included the award of the contract, supervision, and, maintenance of the work on the dams. The NDA was given the mandate to speed up all works on the Kainji dam so much so that the main
AV~~ELE
construction would be accomplished by December 1968. In other words, these special functions of the NDA called for the services of highly specialized men of exceptional quality and probably long experience in complex project planning. Preliminary works at the dam site started in mid 1963 while bids for the main contract were opened publicily with their assessment reports prepared by the Board’s Consultants. Thirteen firms put in tenders initially. However, all but five of these tenders were withdrawn. Of these five, Impresit-Girola-Lodigiant (Impregilo)-a partnership of Italian companies-made the lowest bid of #35.7m. The second lowest was that of one U.S. hrm which was put at #37.9m. On the basis of the bids, the NDA Board of Management recommended that the main civil engineering works contract be awarded to Impregilo. This was endorsed by the Federal Government while the contract agreement was signed on 5 September 1964. Apart from Impregilo’s lowest bid, one wonders why in spite of the close ties between Nigeria and Britain or U.S., a firm from these countires could not win the award of the main engineering work. Besides tendering the lowest bid, it had in fact become evident since February 1964, that Impregilio was virtually guaranteed to win the main contract. This was evident in the pressure which this firm had put on the Italian Government to develop a special interest in the dam construction, through the offer of an #18,8m loan at a rate of interest which was below the normal rate charged to the Nigerian government. Both the U.S. and Britain awarded a loan of #lOm each. Thus, the Italian interest certainly exceeded that of the United Kingdom and the United States of America in the dam project. Besides, Impregilo had won the main civil engineering work at Akosombo in Ghana. This suggests that this Italian firm was no more new to the problems of constructing a dam in West Africa. However, the conclusion for the award to Impregilo is virtually inescapable that the heavy loan to Nigeria and the award were organically related. The civil-construction was planned to comprise three main parts-the concrete section, the rock-fill dam on either side of the concrete section, and the saddle dam. The power house was proposed to contain a 12 x 80 MW generating plant when completed. This was, however, planned to follow an integrated programme with an initial 4 x 80 MW generating plant and a 2 x 80 MW subsequent generators at unspecified intervals till the 12~80MW capacity is accomplished. Work on the main project was officially inaugurated at
Table 1.Kainji Dam’sgrant and loan package Counties or donors
Amo~t in million pounds
Naira conversion in millions
Percentage of total
World Bank Italy U.S.A. U.K. Netherlands Nigeria
29.3 9.4 5.0 5.0 1.0 30.0
58.6 18.8 10.0 10.0 2.0 60.0
36.8 11.8 6.3 4.3 1.2 37.6
Total
79.7
159.4
100.0
Source: (a) Niger Authority Annual Report 1964/65.(b) Kainji Dam, 120 Questions Answered by S. 0. Olagunjo, p. 32.
The technological choice decisionn making process
a colourful ceremony on 31 August 1964, by the late Prime Minister of Nigeria (Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa) with all of the former Regional Premiers in attendence. The work progressed according to schedule, however, with some unanticipated disturbances. There were: (1) The 1965 general country-wide political upheaval which resulted in workers’ strike; (2) The incident of the Blondin cableway disruption which caused an accident unprecedented in the history of the dam. (3) The October 1966massacre in the Northern Region of Ibos residing in that part of the country and the Nigerian civil war-1967 to 1970. All of these disturbances had some temporary effects on the paces at which work on the dam progressed. In spite of the delay caused by the above disturbances, the target date of completion was not revised. This was, in fact, not necessary because the project had progressed several months ahead of schedule before the disturbances broke out. Besides the above political crisis, the financial situation presented several bottlenecks. For example, the rough estimate of about &55mmade at the planning stage became quite inadequate by 1967.Granted that this figure was extremely crude, inflation had started to take its toll in the country given the political crisis. When the estimate was revised, it had gone to f72.lm and &83.4mby January and December 1965 respectively. This figure stood at f85.2m in 1967. It may be recalled that f79.7m was negotiated for from both domestic and foreign financial sources. Apart from the political and financial problems, there were other problems which were linked with the resettlement programmes of the NDA. In spite of the careful planning, the Kainji Dam construction created some problems which were called for prompt and carefully worked-out regional development planning. Some of these problems touched upon the dislocation of the original district emirates, and the difficulty is resettling effectively the displaced inhabitants in new environments. In spite of the above social, economic and political problems which stood in the way, the Kainji Dam was constructed on schedule. There was electricity generation from the 4 x 80 MW generator in December 1968 as planned. The initial phase of the project was officially commissioned in February 1969at a ceremony performed by Major General Yakubu Gowon-the then Military Head of State. FACTORSWHICHAIDEDTHEEXECUTIONOF THEKAINJIDAM
It may be recalled that ten years-1951 to 1961-were devoted to the feasibility assessment of the Kainji Project before work actually started at the site. These were ten years of solid constructive preparation based on investigations and studies. This type of preparation explains why the project proceeded fairly smoothly despite some social, economic and political problems. In other words, the fact that the Kainji complex was completed on schedule might not be unconnected with the fact that several years of careful study and planning preceeded the attempt to embark on the project. Apart from the above factor, some other factors distinguished the Kainji project from other projects in the country, making way for its quick execution. Among these factors are: SEPS Vol. 16, No. I-C
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(i) The political situation in the country The success of any complex project in most developing countries depend critically on the posture of the central Government. In Nigeria at the time when Kainji was built, the Northern People’s Congress (NPC) was in firm control of both the Northern House Assembly and the Federal House of Representatives in Lagos. Besides, the project was to be located in the North where electricity prices were highest in the country. It is, therefore, not surprising that this project received the blessings of the Federal Government which was controlled by the NPC. Given this, only unavoidable delays were expected throughout in view of the interests of the Federal and the Northern Regional Governments and the Management of the ECN. (ii) The economic situation Despite the opposition from one member of the NEC, almost everybody felt that there was the economic need for the expansion of the electricity generating capacity of Nigeria if an imminent electricity crisis was to be averted. This need arose from the electricity demand explosion which was mainly due to the expansion of all economic activities in the country. Thus, the advantages of a substantial expansion in generating capacity were obvious to all the parties involved in the project. (iii) The importance of the project The size of the project and the amount it would cost-almost 12.9% of the 1962/68 Development Planthe largest single project ever in Nigeria) made it a veritable “cornerstone” of the first-ever Nigerian National Development Plan. It thus became the “flag ship” for the whole plan, enjoying the goodwill from all angles of the country. (iv) The role of the World Bank There was the special incentive created by the involvement of the World Bank, particularly, after the release of the report of the study which it commissioned on the project. The role of the World Bank in the formation of the NCG saw the project through its financial bottle-necks. In other words, the attention which the World Bank gave to this project was quite noteworthy. This might have contributed significantly to the speed with which the project proceeded. (v) In adequate attention to competing alternative energy resources There was clearly inadequate attention given to the possibility of generating electricity with natural gas. Had a feasibility study on gas as an alternative source been awarded to a different group of consultants other than those handling that of hydro potentials of the Niger, it could have been possible that the competition provided by gas as an ideal alternative source could have been uncovered. This could have, in turn, slowed down the speed with which the Kainji project was accomplished. It is apparent from the foregoing that the Kainji complex required a tremendous investment of human efforts in terms of research, decision-making body, administration and negotiation to make its decision processes worth its salt. It is equally clear from the sectors that the project enjoyed all the needed reinforcements (social, economic and politics) which yielded a positive result in the end. If the decision had been held up by inadequate or
14
A. 'SESAN AYODELE
non-existent feasibility studies, absence of political commitment for the objectives of the plan, or insufficient consultation between the Nigerian Government and the foreign donors, the Kainji Project would have suffered disabling reverses. In other words, as the first major nation-wide project in Nigeria, the economic, social and political ingredients of a decision-making process all combined admirably to see the Kainji hydro-electric complex executed in a timely fashion. CONCLUSIONANDPRESCRIIWVENOTE
An attempt has been made in this paper at the assessment of the technological choice decision-making process in Nigeria with regard to the Kainji Dam technological choice among other options. Although there were some economic and social criteria in favour of the choice of the Kainji Dam technology; nonetheless, a close interplay of some political factors mitigated purely economic considerations in the process of the technological choice decision making. Given the economic social and political situations in Nigeria in the 1950s and 60s all factors combined to see the Kainji dam construction through its complex problems-finance, politics, and socials. It is not certain if any similar technology can have this kind of support in the present day Nigeria, given the current complexities in the Nigerian political set up. It is pertinent therefore, to give some prescriptive notes in order to create a consistent socio-political environment for similar technologies.in future, so that the problems encountered after the commissioning of the Kainji Dam (electricity crisis) may be averted. These notes include: (1) The feasibility of technologies The feasibility of any technology is better left in the care of the consultants incharge. Rather than allow political factor to mitigate purely economic factors, consultants should be given the free hand to suggest the best option on the basis of net benefit maximization or cost minimization principles. (2) Heavy reliance on a particular technology It is obvious that the heavy reliance on the Kainji Dam technology for electricity supply has failed the nation given the frequency of the Nigerian electricity supply disruptions. If the idea of relying on hydro facility had not been bought from the interested politicians, the consultants would, probably, have come up with a plant mix technology. That is given the unreliability which is associated with hydrological situations it will be necessary to concentrate more on hydro resource developments which will be mixed with thermal plants for balance.
(3) The implication of Nigeria as a buyer of technology The choice of Kainji Dam technology is also the choice of a capital intensive technique of electricity production, Thus, all equipments and materials required are usually imported. This has increased the gestation period. It would have been necessary at the initiation stage to have planned for a department within the Electricity Supply Industry which would have taken care of the manufacture of some of these materials. Or in the interim the ECN would have been made to collaborate with any foreign firm to establish a factory for purposes of manufacturing part of the materials required locally. The above prescriptive notes do not imply that the Kainji Dam technology is a failure. In spite of the controversy which surrounds the general performance of the Kainji Dam, particularly with regard to the objectives for which it was established, the subject is anticipated for examination in one of our forth coming papers.
REFERENCES 1. E. 0. Adenyi, The Kainji Dam: an exercise in regional development planning. Reg. Studies 10 (1976). 2. E. 0. Adeniyi, The impact of the change in river regime on the economic activities below Kainji Dam. J. Geograph. Assoc. Nigeria 13(2)(1970). 3. A. L. Baylis, Niger Dam project, Kainji development. The construction of Kainji Dam: A Paper Presented to the West African Group of Professional Engineers (1968). 4. ECN. Preliminary report on hydro-electric development of the Shiroro George. Sir Alexander Gribb and Partners Preece, Gardew and Rider, London (1954). ECN, Annual Reports and Accounts. Netherlands Engineering Consultants (NEDECO), Niger Dams Project, Vols. l-7. Report on the multi-purpose developments of the Niger River (1961). 7. N.D.A., Annual Reports and Accounts. 8. Nigeria, Federal Ministry of Economic Development. Proposals for Dams on the Niger and Kaduna Rivers. Lagos Government Press (1959). 9. E. R. Dean, Factors impeding the implementation of Nigeria’s six-year plan. Nigerian ian J. Economic and Social Studies 8(l), 113-128(1966). 10. S. 0. Olagunju, Kainji Dam 126Questions Answered (1972). 11 S. A. Visser, Kainji: A Nigerian man-made lake, Kanji Lake Studies; Vol. (Ecology) (1970). 12. A. L. Mabogunje, Kainji: A Nigerian man-made lake; Kainji Lake Studies: (Socio-Economic Conditions), Vol. 2 (1973). 13. Federal Government of Nigeria, Ordinance No. 15 (1950). 14. Federal Government of Nigeria. Decree NO. 24 of April 1972. 15. Federal Military Government. Niger Dams (Amendment) Decree (1970). 16. Federal Government of Nigeria, The Niger Dams Act (1’962). I
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tM38-0121/82/01CM9W03.00/0 Pergamon Press Ltd
THE TECHNOLOGICAL CHOICE DECISION MAKING PROCESS: AN EXAMPLE FROM NIGERIA-THE KAINJI HYDRO-ELECTRIC TECHNOLOGY: A MULTI-PURPOSE DEVELOPMENT TECHNOLOGY A. ‘SESANAYODE~E Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research, Ibadan, Nigeria (Received 10 June 1981) Abstract-This paper examines the technological-cum-economic/social/political criteria under which technological decisions are made. An example-The Kainji Dam hydro-electric technology-from Nigeria (a buyer of technology) is selected as a case study. The study shows the importance of socio-economic criteria in the process of making any technological choice decision. Nonetheless a close interplay of some political factors may mitigate purely the socio-economic considerations in the technological choice decision making process. This is evident in the choice of the Kainji Dam technology in Nigeria.
INTRODUCTION
There has been a steady stream of technological deployment from the “Developed countries” to the “Third World” countries in order to solve part of the development problems in those recepient countires. In most cases, however, these technologiesare mis-chosen by the recepient countries. This best explains why the impactsof such technologiesin the third world countries have been the unanticipatednegativeeffects which often offset the gainspreviously anticipated. This suggests that, it is not the deployment of any technologyto the developngcountries that matters. What is of prime importance is the deployment of the right type of technologyfor rapid development.However, this deployment hinges critically on the recepients country’s choice of technology. In other words, the success or otherwise of a type of technology, principally,depends on the deficienciesor otherwise of the decision-making process and the subsequent administrativeand evaluation systems which underlie the selection of appropriate technologyfor development. Nonetheless,the decision-makingprocess of any technology involves the technological assessment of the availableoptions for scrutiny.The scrutiny exercise will, however, be based on utility functions with respect to the social net benefit maximi~tion or cost minimization. It is from this analysis that there can be a progressive eliminationof those alternatives which show high unfavpurable benefit ratio. Given the limitedcapital resources, few technologists, scanty infrastructure,inadequateinformation/recordand the low level of development in all of the third world countries, the decision-makingprocess in the countries may not be an easy task. In spite of this difficulty,an optimal tec~ological choice is desirable given the anticipationfor rapid development. In view of the consequences of a mis-chosen technology and the current electricity crisis in Nigeria, we propose to examine the technological decision-making process in Nigeria (a third world country), selecting the Kainji Dam Hydro-electric technologyas the case study. The Kainji Dam technology is selected in view of the following factors which mark it out as crucial to the developmentof Nigeria: 9
(a) It is the corner stone of the Nigeria’s First National Development Plan-representing about 12.9% of the total money estimated for that DevelopmentPlan and thereby constitutingthe largest singleproject in the Plan. (b) Several alternatives-coal, lignite,oil, natural gas, hydro resources-exist in Nigeria for electricity generation. These alternativesare expected to pose formidable decision-making problems at the decision-making process stagein an attemptto avert an imminentelectricity crisis. Given the above, it is the objective of this paper to: (a) Explore the technological-cum-economiccriteria which made the hydro-electricfacility at Kainjifavoured among the existingoptions. (b) Investigatethe interplay of interests and their impacts on the choice of Kainji Dam technology. (c) Assess whether or not every possible potential component in the decision-making process was adequatelyexplored, considered and represented. (d) Discern any correlationswhich exist between perceived discrepanciesbetween expectation and outcomes which involve the Kainji Dam project, and, in what manner these were related to the decision-making process. To attain these objectives, this paper focuses on the analysisof the initiation,planning,execution and expectations of the Kainji Dam technology. RISTORICALBACKGROUNDTOKAINJl DAMCONSTRUCTION
Before the idea to build the Kainji Damwas mooted in 1950,Nigeria depended solely on some isolated thermal plants for her electric power supply. Electricity was generated from these isolated plants independently by the Public Works apartments, Native Autho~ties and one or two large MunicipalAuthorities. The supply of electricity at that initial stage of developmentin Nigeria was scanty. Besides, its price was high particularly; in the then Northern Region. With the expansion of economic activity in Nigeria, the demand for electricity had started to rise. This increase in demand rendered the limited generating capacities of the isolated thermal plants inadequate.
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Given the above development, it was apparent that alternative sources of electricity were required to bait Nigeria out of an imminent “electricity crisis” (electricity shortage). Besides, it was obvious that rapid electricity development might not be easily pursued by the proliferated bodies whose duplication of efforts had resulted in over:lapping functions and wastage of scarce electricity resources. That is, it was necessary to establish a central body whose duty it would be to seek an alternative source of electricity which was capable of producing cheap and abundant electricity to consumers. Given this requirement, the “Electricity Coloration of Nigeria” (ECN) was established by Ordinance No. 15 of 19.50.The ECN thus became a national body charged to oversee electricity development in the country. The powers /and functions of this newly established electricity body was laid down in section 21,29, 30 and 50 of this Ordnance. Its functions relate to electricity generation transmission, distribution and sales throughout the federation. Besides, the ECN was granted the power to dispose off land for purposes of adequate and continuous power suppiy, Nonetheless, the Ordinance made provisions for such periods when electric power could be suspended. Such periods include the periods necessary for carrying out inspections, tests, or repairs and making new connections. It is apparent from the above that these wide powers confered on the ECN constituted it into an autonomous commercial enterprise in a monopolistic setting. These powers have been ~ansferred to the “National Electric Power Authority” (NEPA)-a merger of the ECN and the “Niger Dam Authority” (NDA) by Decree No. 24 of April 1972. However, the establishment of the ECN through a legislative procedure only resulted in the consolidation under one organization of the efforts of the former proliferated electricity bodies. It was yet to provide adequate electricity to meet the fast lowing demand which became worse later in the 1950s. THEFEASIMLITY OF KAIh’JIDAM
Given the urgency to develop alternative electricity sources in the country in the early 195Os, the ECN authorised a hydro-electric investigation of the river Niger upstream of Jebba in 1951. Besides the Federal Government of Nigeria commissioned the “Netherlands En~neering constants” (NEDECO) to carry out a hydroIo~~a1 survey of the rivers Niger and Benue in 1953. By 1958, the demand for electricity in Nigeria had become aggravated by further expansion in economic activities. This critical situation made the ECN become more aware of its earlier committments. .The ECN, therefore, stepped up its strategies of the search for alternative sources of electricity production in the country. The ECN, thus, collaborated with the government of the former Northern Region of Nigeria to commission another investi~tion into the hydro-electric potentials of river Kaduna and Shiroro, by Sir Alexander Gibbs and Partners in collaboration with Messrs Preece, Garden and Ridder. In addition, the ECN singly appointed an investigative commission-Balfour Beatty and Company Limited of Great Britain-with a view to finding a site which would produce 40&%?0MW at a capacity cost which would not
exceed f26m (W52.00m). This study was equally to extend its operation to cover the hydro-electric potentials of the Niger river in the vicinity of Jebba. Thus far, there has been nothing to show the general likeness for the choice of a hydro-electric facility. This implies that the Federal Government, the Government of the Northern Region and the ECN got involved in the commissioning of several studies into the investigation of the electricity potentials of the major rivers in Nigeria, all on the assumption that it was an adequate alternative source. By the end of 1958, all the parties concerned with electricity development in Nigeria became aware that other benefits could be obtained from the construction of a dam across the river Niger in addition to the production of electricity. This awareness emanated from the Jebba Feasibility Reports which were released in December 1958. The report had read in part: “The most beneficial development would be the construction of a dam in the Kurwasa area.. . . A dam there would not only provide su~~ient electric power for many years, but would also control the river by reducing flood discharges thereby improving navigation, and allowing large areas of land downstream of Jebba to be cultivated. A fishing industry would also be established in the reservoir created by the dam.” It is, therefore, apparent from this report that anitcipatory benefits along with cheap and abundant electricity were fishing, navigation and irrigation agriculture in the areas where the dam was scheduled to be built. Given these side benefits, the Federal Government of Nigeria requested the NEDECO in collaboration with Balfour Beatty to undergo another study on the proposal to build a dam across the Niger. This recent study was mandated to consider the benefits associated with the dam in details. Thus far, only the hydro-electric facility has been considered as a possible alternative source of electricity production in Nigeria among several options (coal, gas, oil). Given these alternatives which were not considered, the 1958Report was criticised when it got to the National Economic Council (NEC) for ratification. In view of this criticism, the NEDECO and Balfour Beatty were advised to intensify their investigations. That is, the study was to be more comprehensive by considering along with the Niger hydro-electric potentials all other available alternatives. This study was commissioned late in 1959 with the injection of the United Nations special funds. The reports of this study were released in 1961 in seven volumes. This study considered the ,general economics of the Niger Dam hydro-electric facilities with those of the thermal alternatives, particularly, natural gas. The basis of comparison’ were-the annual cost of these alternatives and the externalities derivable from them. Attention was directed at the effects of the extent and growth of the development and of future financial policy on costs. Two alternatives of electric power resources emerged from the report as feasible for development-water power and natural gas. The consultants, however, favoured the development of hydro-facilities more than the natural gas. This is due to the fact that: “The use of water power, as compared to natural gas, requires a higher initial capital investment but enables running costs of generation to be reduced.”
The technological choice decision making process
That is, the Kainji dam technology would require greater initial investment than a large gas fired plant. Nonetheless, its running cost would be lower. Besides, the larger capital investment in hydro resource technology would make for quite a reasonable rate of return-fishing, navigation and irrigation agriculture. In addition to these advantages, some relative administrative economies were anticipated from generating electricity from a single centre. However, while the studies were in progress the Niger Dam Project Committee (NDPC) was set up to receive, study, and, pass recommendations on the reports to the NEC for ratification on the selected alternatives. The NDPC was composed of representatives of the Federal Government, the government of the Northern Region and the ECN. The NEC was on the other hand composed of responsible politicians, government officials and all regional premiers. The NDPC unanimously recommended the development of an initial hydro-project at Kainji with subsequent ones at Jebba and Shiroro as the most economical and beneficial strategy to Nigeria. This recommendation was, however, ratified by the NEC after a stiff opposition from one of the regional premiers. Following this ratification was the emergence of a decision to: (1) Construct the first dam at Kainji. (2) Build two subsequent dams at Jebba and Shiroro in that order. As a follow up to the endorsement of NEC’s recommendation, the Federal Government established the Niger Dam Authority (NDA) by an act of parliament in 1962. The NDA was charged with the responsibility of overseeing the construction and maintenance of dams and other works on the river. In other words, the NDA was to take care of the development of electricity through the hydro-resources as an ideal alternative among other sources. Given that the Kainji Dam technology is most feasible as reported in the various studies, there are some facts which are worth noting, more so as it met with a stiff opposition from a Regional Premier. These facts include: (1) All studies commissioned between 1951 and 1959 were given the mandate to investigate the hydro-electric potentials of rivers Niger and Kaduna. That is, about 8 years intensive work were given to the hydro-electric facilities with no consideration for other alternatives. (2) Natural gas as a possible alternative was included at the tail end of 1959 after an anticipated opposition. This shows how ad hoc in nature the attention given to other alternatives were at the decision-making process stage. (3) When the natural gas was virtually considered, there is no evidence in the reports to show that a careful consideration was given to the impacts of the smaller initial costs of gas on a smaller burden on the country’s debt servicing capacity. The effect of this last aspect is apparently formidable given the time, resources and attention devoted to hydroelectric resource. While this argument is not suggesting that the choice of Kainji was an error given this apparently narrow balance in relative advantages, an apparent political under-tone cannot be totally ruled out of the choice of Kainji. This is evident in the manner in which several commissions were directed to carry out their investigations. That is, up till 1959 all the consultants were directed to focus their attention at the hydro-electric potentials of some Nigerian rivers.
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One wonders why much premium is placed on hydroelectric facilities even when other alternatives are available in large quantums in Nigeria: observation shows that some politicians were opposed to the use of natural gas as an alternative source. This opposition might not be unconnected with the exhorbitant price of electricity in the North at that time. That is, if gas were selected, the gas fired plant would have been located in the south. The cost of distribution to the north might, probably, aggravate the original high price. These politicians were in firm control of the largest party in both the Federal Parliament and the Northern Regional Assembly. Besides, Kainji, Jebba and Shiroro are located in the North where electriciy prices were highest in the country. Given these critical situations, it does not come as a surprise that these politicians were suspected of exerting their tremendous political influence on the commissions and committees established to advise on the construction of the Kainji Dam. This, therefore, suggests that in spite of the ad hoc consideration given to other alternatives, it might be contended that natural gas or any other alternative did not at that time occupy the attention of all the parties concerned with the development of electricity in Nigeria in the course of the decision-making process. It may, therefore, be suggested that at the request of the Federal Government of Nigeria in collaboration with both Northern Regional Government and the ECN all the reports of the studies commissioned favoured the construction of the Kainji Dam. THEKAINJIDAM-FINANCIALPLANNING ANDTHEDAMSCONSTRUCTION
Up till 1961, the Federal Government of Nigeria had not made any conscious attempt at estimating the total cost of the Kainji project. Similarly, attention had not been given to the sources of generating funds for the project. Given that Nigeria as a developing country was/is (a)Financially backward and poor viz-a-viz the advanced countries, and (b) A country where capital market and other institutions for mobilising savings-large enough for such a complex project as the Kainji-were/are poorly developed; the financial aspect was expected to pose a formidable problem. Thus, as a follow up to the need to generate fund for the project, a Nigerian Consultative Group (NCG) was sponsored by the World Bank. Membership of the NCG included Nigeria and the prospective foreign donors. The formation of this group was predicated on the hope that, in a wide forum, the matching of the project with lenders could take place relatively easily. Some of those countries whose nationals were represented in the NCG were Nigeria, U.S., Italy, Netherlands and Britain. The leadership of the NCG was unanimously passed on to the World Bank. The main function of the NCG was to design appropriate strategies for the provision, internationally or otherwise of adequate finance for the construction of the Kainji Dam. This suggests, therefore, that the formation of the NCG was recognized as an instrument for expanding total aid as well as for its coordination with regard to the Kainji project. In order to play the leading role effectively, the World Bank saw the need for an independent technical and economic feasibility survey of the project. This shows
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that the World Bank had no faith in the previous studies. The World Bank, thus sponsored a new technical and economic feasibility investigation which took two years to complete. However, the report of this study confirmed the feasibility of the hydro-electric resource. As a follow up, the World Bank approved of the project officially. In addition to this approval, the World Bank and*Nigeria with the assistance of the NCG went into a lot of financial negotiations with foreign countries. This stage proved very difficult. These difficulties could be associated with the determination of: (a) The proportion of the total foreign exchange required that would be covered by the World Bank Loan; (b) The proportion to be covered by loans from other donor countries; (c) The amount of loans from various countries and the conditions associated with them. It was presumed that the solution to the problem depended on which firm would be the successful bidder for the main civil works contract. This suggests, therefore, that the financial aspect of the Kainji Dam might not have been assured until after the main contractor had been determined. Nonetheless, the choice of the contractor could have alternatively depended on the size of the loans expected from the various countries. Given this situation, designing a solution would not have been a simple matter. It is in this realms that the Nigerian Officials and politicians involved, as well as all the members of the NCG deserve special words of praise for a job well done. Table 1 presents the list of donors and grantors with their respective contributions in absolute and percentage terms. About 38% of the total estimate was to come from internal sources while the World Bank was expected to take care of 37% of the total estimate. Italy granted Nigeria a loan of ++18.8m which represented about 12% of the total estimate. This was the largest amount received from any single donor country for this project. It equally represented one of the largest loans ever granted by the Italian Government up till that time. The probably motivation for this generousity cannot be divorced from the intention of Impregilo (an Italian firm) to win the main contract. All of these loans were genuinely negotiated on a long term basis. The NDA had been established by 1962to over-see the development of all hydra-electric projects in the country. The duties of the NDA included the award of the contract, supervision, and, maintenance of the work on the dams. The NDA was given the mandate to speed up all works on the Kainji dam so much so that the main
AV~~ELE
construction would be accomplished by December 1968. In other words, these special functions of the NDA called for the services of highly specialized men of exceptional quality and probably long experience in complex project planning. Preliminary works at the dam site started in mid 1963 while bids for the main contract were opened publicily with their assessment reports prepared by the Board’s Consultants. Thirteen firms put in tenders initially. However, all but five of these tenders were withdrawn. Of these five, Impresit-Girola-Lodigiant (Impregilo)-a partnership of Italian companies-made the lowest bid of #35.7m. The second lowest was that of one U.S. hrm which was put at #37.9m. On the basis of the bids, the NDA Board of Management recommended that the main civil engineering works contract be awarded to Impregilo. This was endorsed by the Federal Government while the contract agreement was signed on 5 September 1964. Apart from Impregilo’s lowest bid, one wonders why in spite of the close ties between Nigeria and Britain or U.S., a firm from these countires could not win the award of the main engineering work. Besides tendering the lowest bid, it had in fact become evident since February 1964, that Impregilio was virtually guaranteed to win the main contract. This was evident in the pressure which this firm had put on the Italian Government to develop a special interest in the dam construction, through the offer of an #18,8m loan at a rate of interest which was below the normal rate charged to the Nigerian government. Both the U.S. and Britain awarded a loan of #lOm each. Thus, the Italian interest certainly exceeded that of the United Kingdom and the United States of America in the dam project. Besides, Impregilo had won the main civil engineering work at Akosombo in Ghana. This suggests that this Italian firm was no more new to the problems of constructing a dam in West Africa. However, the conclusion for the award to Impregilo is virtually inescapable that the heavy loan to Nigeria and the award were organically related. The civil-construction was planned to comprise three main parts-the concrete section, the rock-fill dam on either side of the concrete section, and the saddle dam. The power house was proposed to contain a 12 x 80 MW generating plant when completed. This was, however, planned to follow an integrated programme with an initial 4 x 80 MW generating plant and a 2 x 80 MW subsequent generators at unspecified intervals till the 12~80MW capacity is accomplished. Work on the main project was officially inaugurated at
Table 1.Kainji Dam’sgrant and loan package Counties or donors
Amo~t in million pounds
Naira conversion in millions
Percentage of total
World Bank Italy U.S.A. U.K. Netherlands Nigeria
29.3 9.4 5.0 5.0 1.0 30.0
58.6 18.8 10.0 10.0 2.0 60.0
36.8 11.8 6.3 4.3 1.2 37.6
Total
79.7
159.4
100.0
Source: (a) Niger Authority Annual Report 1964/65.(b) Kainji Dam, 120 Questions Answered by S. 0. Olagunjo, p. 32.
The technological choice decisionn making process
a colourful ceremony on 31 August 1964, by the late Prime Minister of Nigeria (Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa) with all of the former Regional Premiers in attendence. The work progressed according to schedule, however, with some unanticipated disturbances. There were: (1) The 1965 general country-wide political upheaval which resulted in workers’ strike; (2) The incident of the Blondin cableway disruption which caused an accident unprecedented in the history of the dam. (3) The October 1966massacre in the Northern Region of Ibos residing in that part of the country and the Nigerian civil war-1967 to 1970. All of these disturbances had some temporary effects on the paces at which work on the dam progressed. In spite of the delay caused by the above disturbances, the target date of completion was not revised. This was, in fact, not necessary because the project had progressed several months ahead of schedule before the disturbances broke out. Besides the above political crisis, the financial situation presented several bottlenecks. For example, the rough estimate of about &55mmade at the planning stage became quite inadequate by 1967.Granted that this figure was extremely crude, inflation had started to take its toll in the country given the political crisis. When the estimate was revised, it had gone to f72.lm and &83.4mby January and December 1965 respectively. This figure stood at f85.2m in 1967. It may be recalled that f79.7m was negotiated for from both domestic and foreign financial sources. Apart from the political and financial problems, there were other problems which were linked with the resettlement programmes of the NDA. In spite of the careful planning, the Kainji Dam construction created some problems which were called for prompt and carefully worked-out regional development planning. Some of these problems touched upon the dislocation of the original district emirates, and the difficulty is resettling effectively the displaced inhabitants in new environments. In spite of the above social, economic and political problems which stood in the way, the Kainji Dam was constructed on schedule. There was electricity generation from the 4 x 80 MW generator in December 1968 as planned. The initial phase of the project was officially commissioned in February 1969at a ceremony performed by Major General Yakubu Gowon-the then Military Head of State. FACTORSWHICHAIDEDTHEEXECUTIONOF THEKAINJIDAM
It may be recalled that ten years-1951 to 1961-were devoted to the feasibility assessment of the Kainji Project before work actually started at the site. These were ten years of solid constructive preparation based on investigations and studies. This type of preparation explains why the project proceeded fairly smoothly despite some social, economic and political problems. In other words, the fact that the Kainji complex was completed on schedule might not be unconnected with the fact that several years of careful study and planning preceeded the attempt to embark on the project. Apart from the above factor, some other factors distinguished the Kainji project from other projects in the country, making way for its quick execution. Among these factors are: SEPS Vol. 16, No. I-C
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(i) The political situation in the country The success of any complex project in most developing countries depend critically on the posture of the central Government. In Nigeria at the time when Kainji was built, the Northern People’s Congress (NPC) was in firm control of both the Northern House Assembly and the Federal House of Representatives in Lagos. Besides, the project was to be located in the North where electricity prices were highest in the country. It is, therefore, not surprising that this project received the blessings of the Federal Government which was controlled by the NPC. Given this, only unavoidable delays were expected throughout in view of the interests of the Federal and the Northern Regional Governments and the Management of the ECN. (ii) The economic situation Despite the opposition from one member of the NEC, almost everybody felt that there was the economic need for the expansion of the electricity generating capacity of Nigeria if an imminent electricity crisis was to be averted. This need arose from the electricity demand explosion which was mainly due to the expansion of all economic activities in the country. Thus, the advantages of a substantial expansion in generating capacity were obvious to all the parties involved in the project. (iii) The importance of the project The size of the project and the amount it would cost-almost 12.9% of the 1962/68 Development Planthe largest single project ever in Nigeria) made it a veritable “cornerstone” of the first-ever Nigerian National Development Plan. It thus became the “flag ship” for the whole plan, enjoying the goodwill from all angles of the country. (iv) The role of the World Bank There was the special incentive created by the involvement of the World Bank, particularly, after the release of the report of the study which it commissioned on the project. The role of the World Bank in the formation of the NCG saw the project through its financial bottle-necks. In other words, the attention which the World Bank gave to this project was quite noteworthy. This might have contributed significantly to the speed with which the project proceeded. (v) In adequate attention to competing alternative energy resources There was clearly inadequate attention given to the possibility of generating electricity with natural gas. Had a feasibility study on gas as an alternative source been awarded to a different group of consultants other than those handling that of hydro potentials of the Niger, it could have been possible that the competition provided by gas as an ideal alternative source could have been uncovered. This could have, in turn, slowed down the speed with which the Kainji project was accomplished. It is apparent from the foregoing that the Kainji complex required a tremendous investment of human efforts in terms of research, decision-making body, administration and negotiation to make its decision processes worth its salt. It is equally clear from the sectors that the project enjoyed all the needed reinforcements (social, economic and politics) which yielded a positive result in the end. If the decision had been held up by inadequate or
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A. 'SESAN AYODELE
non-existent feasibility studies, absence of political commitment for the objectives of the plan, or insufficient consultation between the Nigerian Government and the foreign donors, the Kainji Project would have suffered disabling reverses. In other words, as the first major nation-wide project in Nigeria, the economic, social and political ingredients of a decision-making process all combined admirably to see the Kainji hydro-electric complex executed in a timely fashion. CONCLUSIONANDPRESCRIIWVENOTE
An attempt has been made in this paper at the assessment of the technological choice decision-making process in Nigeria with regard to the Kainji Dam technological choice among other options. Although there were some economic and social criteria in favour of the choice of the Kainji Dam technology; nonetheless, a close interplay of some political factors mitigated purely economic considerations in the process of the technological choice decision making. Given the economic social and political situations in Nigeria in the 1950s and 60s all factors combined to see the Kainji dam construction through its complex problems-finance, politics, and socials. It is not certain if any similar technology can have this kind of support in the present day Nigeria, given the current complexities in the Nigerian political set up. It is pertinent therefore, to give some prescriptive notes in order to create a consistent socio-political environment for similar technologies.in future, so that the problems encountered after the commissioning of the Kainji Dam (electricity crisis) may be averted. These notes include: (1) The feasibility of technologies The feasibility of any technology is better left in the care of the consultants incharge. Rather than allow political factor to mitigate purely economic factors, consultants should be given the free hand to suggest the best option on the basis of net benefit maximization or cost minimization principles. (2) Heavy reliance on a particular technology It is obvious that the heavy reliance on the Kainji Dam technology for electricity supply has failed the nation given the frequency of the Nigerian electricity supply disruptions. If the idea of relying on hydro facility had not been bought from the interested politicians, the consultants would, probably, have come up with a plant mix technology. That is given the unreliability which is associated with hydrological situations it will be necessary to concentrate more on hydro resource developments which will be mixed with thermal plants for balance.
(3) The implication of Nigeria as a buyer of technology The choice of Kainji Dam technology is also the choice of a capital intensive technique of electricity production, Thus, all equipments and materials required are usually imported. This has increased the gestation period. It would have been necessary at the initiation stage to have planned for a department within the Electricity Supply Industry which would have taken care of the manufacture of some of these materials. Or in the interim the ECN would have been made to collaborate with any foreign firm to establish a factory for purposes of manufacturing part of the materials required locally. The above prescriptive notes do not imply that the Kainji Dam technology is a failure. In spite of the controversy which surrounds the general performance of the Kainji Dam, particularly with regard to the objectives for which it was established, the subject is anticipated for examination in one of our forth coming papers.
REFERENCES 1. E. 0. Adenyi, The Kainji Dam: an exercise in regional development planning. Reg. Studies 10 (1976). 2. E. 0. Adeniyi, The impact of the change in river regime on the economic activities below Kainji Dam. J. Geograph. Assoc. Nigeria 13(2)(1970). 3. A. L. Baylis, Niger Dam project, Kainji development. The construction of Kainji Dam: A Paper Presented to the West African Group of Professional Engineers (1968). 4. ECN. Preliminary report on hydro-electric development of the Shiroro George. Sir Alexander Gribb and Partners Preece, Gardew and Rider, London (1954). ECN, Annual Reports and Accounts. Netherlands Engineering Consultants (NEDECO), Niger Dams Project, Vols. l-7. Report on the multi-purpose developments of the Niger River (1961). 7. N.D.A., Annual Reports and Accounts. 8. Nigeria, Federal Ministry of Economic Development. Proposals for Dams on the Niger and Kaduna Rivers. Lagos Government Press (1959). 9. E. R. Dean, Factors impeding the implementation of Nigeria’s six-year plan. Nigerian ian J. Economic and Social Studies 8(l), 113-128(1966). 10. S. 0. Olagunju, Kainji Dam 126Questions Answered (1972). 11 S. A. Visser, Kainji: A Nigerian man-made lake, Kanji Lake Studies; Vol. (Ecology) (1970). 12. A. L. Mabogunje, Kainji: A Nigerian man-made lake; Kainji Lake Studies: (Socio-Economic Conditions), Vol. 2 (1973). 13. Federal Government of Nigeria, Ordinance No. 15 (1950). 14. Federal Government of Nigeria. Decree NO. 24 of April 1972. 15. Federal Military Government. Niger Dams (Amendment) Decree (1970). 16. Federal Government of Nigeria, The Niger Dams Act (1’962). I
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