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The territorial futures of Europe: ‘Trends’, ‘Competition’ or ‘Cohesion’
Futures 42 (2010) 833–845
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Futures journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/futures
The territorial futures of Europe: ‘Trends’, ‘Competition’ or ‘Cohesion’ Moritz Lennert a,*, Jacques Robert b a b
Institut de Gestion de l’Environnement et d’Ame´nagement du Territoire (IGEAT), Universite´ Libre de Bruxelles, Bvd du Triomphe, CP 246, 1050 Brussels, Belgium TERSYN, 18 rue du Rhoˆne, F 67100 Strasbourg, France
A R T I C L E I N F O
A B S T R A C T
Article history:
The ESPON 2006 scenario project generated three integrated roll-forward scenarios (A roll-forward scenario is a scenario in which the hypotheses define the parameters at the start of the covered time period and the scenario then explores the unfolding of events based on theses hypotheses. This is opposed to a roll-backward scenario in which the situation at the end of the time period is defined and the scenario then explores the path to reach this situation.). In the trend scenario renewed efforts are made for the Lisbon strategy, demanding extra investments in R&D and education. Regional policy will also be continued with vigour. In the Competition Scenario bold decisions are made regarding Europe’s continued prosperity. The Lisbon strategy takes precedence over institutional reform and other sectoral policies. In the Cohesion Scenario Europe is confronted with the challenge of fully integrating the various regions in Europe. The budgets for Regional Policy and Rural Development Policy are enhanced and targeted to the most needy regions. The scenarios are described as stories about the future, supported by model calculations and visualised by various maps. They concentrate on urban and rural development and on territorial developments in different parts of Europe, like North-West Europe, the Alpine Space and Central and Eastern Europe. In addition, a proactive, roll-back scenario explores the possibilities to combine competitiveness, cohesion and sustainability. A message, derived from the scenarios, is that independent of the explored policy options the European territory will be confronted with large challenges like a (rapid) decline of fossil energy resources and increasing impacts of climate change. The scenarios appear particularly helpful in the context of the current paradigm shift in European regional policy from a policy for balance to a policy for aggregate growth. ß 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Available online 29 April 2010
‘‘In order to promote its overall harmonious development, the Community shall develop and pursue its actions leading to the strengthening of its economic and social cohesion. In particular, the Community shall aim at reducing disparities between the various regions and the backwardness of the least-favoured regions.’’ Single European Act, Article 130a [1]
‘‘Cohesion policy is first and foremost an economic development policy aimed at raising aggregate growth in the Union.’’ Danuta Hu¨bner, European Commissioner responsible for Regional Policy, 2008 [2]
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +32 2 650 56 16. E-mail address: [email protected] (M. Lennert). 0016-3287/$ – see front matter ß 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.futures.2010.04.013
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1. Introduction In the history of the European Union cohesion policy has originated as a policy aimed at ‘‘reducing disparities between the various regions and the backwardness of the least-favoured regions’’ [1], thus clearly targeted at the lagging regions with the general aim of internal balance. This approach to cohesion and regional policy has met increasing criticism in the last years, in the context of a fundamental paradigm shift of EU policy. The overarching EU policy guiding this paradigm shift is the Lisbon Strategy defined at the Lisbon Summit of the European Council in 2000. The main argument for this shift was that ‘‘the European Union is confronted with a quantum shift resulting from globalisation and the challenges of a new knowledge-driven economy. These changes are affecting every aspect of people’s lives and require a radical transformation of the European economy’’ [3]. In line with this argument, cohesion policy is more and more defined as a tool to respond to these new, external challenges and, thus, a tool aimed at the external positioning of the EU as a whole, instead of a tool aimed at internal balance. In the second introductory quote, Commissioner Hu¨bner makes this point very clearly. Recent policy documents from the European regional policy makers have clearly integrated this paradigm shift in an attempt at saving the existence of regional policy by arguing that it is an essential element for the attainment of the Lisbon strategy’s goals [5,6]. This seems to be a double-edged sword, however, as first, scientific evidence for most of the arguments is very shaky, thus actually reinforcing the critics of regional policy [7], and second, integrating regional policy in the overarching system of the Lisbon strategy fundamentally alters this policy to a point where its original goals seem forgotten. We will not go any further into the first, but the second can be seen as the underlying discussion that motivated the choice of the scenario hypotheses developed in this article. Effects of such wide reaching paradigm shifts are obviously very difficult to forecast, and even more so concerning territorial impacts. This often limits the scientific evidence available for the policy debate. Scenarios can be one means to compensate, at least partially, for this absence of evidence. Even though they also cannot predict outcomes, they can enable the structuring of some of the current thinking about cause and effect relationships in such a way as to support the discussion by allowing to think through possible impacts in a systematic way. Scenarios can also stimulate the discussion by making some of the aspects more visible through provocative scenario images. The ESPON 2006 integrated scenarios presented in this article play such a role [4]. We will explain how they were constructed and what the major outcomes are to show that such scenarios can be very helpful by making the often abstract discussions more concrete and by focusing attention on some of the major questions. At the same time, the scenarios have also helped to highlight the fact that some fundamental challenges are outside the debate concerning this paradigm shift.
2. Context and methodology As mentioned in the introduction to this special issue, ESPON is an applied, policy-oriented research programme. As such, the scenario project was from the start a collaborative effort between the scientific team and the ESPON Monitoring Committee, the governing body of the programme constituted by representatives of all EU members states, DG Regio as well as some additional partner countries. The scenario project was followed particularly closely as it was seen as a strategic project, with potential influence on future policy making. Its results thus have to be seen as the result of the constant negotiation between both sides, although the scientific team did have significant leeway in its choices of approaches and methods. The fundamental hypotheses defining the scenarios were, however, imposed by the Monitoring Committee (notably the European Commission) which chose to oppose two fundamental elements of EU policy: cohesion and competitiveness. A series of thematic scenarios1 and the information collected in their preparation served as basis to the elaboration of a so-called ‘‘integrated scenario knowledge base’’, a synthesis of the current state of knowledge concerning the different trends, driving forces, projections, policies, etc. relevant to territorial development in the EU. This knowledge based then helped in translating the general hypotheses axes in concrete hypotheses for each of the different thematic sectors, with careful attention to the coherence between the hypotheses. As mentioned in the paper by Dammers in this same issue, the scenarios were then constructed as a combination of qualitative and quantitative elements, resulting in qualitative scenarios with quantitative support, with a time horizon of 2030. As part of the project specification ESPON had clearly indicated that the team was to elaborate prospective roll-forward scenarios as well as proactive, roll-back scenarios. In a further stage, it was decided to also include a trend, or reference, scenario for comparison purposes, which was not to be a simple projection of the past to the future, but rather a scenario based on a more or less unchanged policy package, except for very predictable changes, such as the implementation of the Kyoto agreement and further WTO agreements, especially concerning agricultural products. For each prospective scenario, a storyline, its territorial impacts and a final territorial image were developed, mostly in textual form, but the latter also in the form of schematic, qualitative maps conveying a selection of the many elements
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Of which several are presented in other articles of this special issue.
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characterising the results of three scenarios. These maps should not be seen as precise cartography, but rather as pedagogical, communicative and somewhat extreme images focusing on the main message of the scenarios. In a final step, one roll-back scenario was developed, based on a future defined by policy objectives. These objectives were extracted and synthesised from a series of EU policy documents2 in order to reflect what could be considered as the current official policy consensus in Europe. This was then translated into more concrete elements of a territorial image of 2030, as the expression of the materialisation of the selected policy objectives. In a final step, based on this image and the information gathered in the elaboration of the prospective scenarios, the storyline leading up to this desirable future was elaborated. 3. Hypotheses As already mentioned, the two prospective policy scenarios were built around the opposition of competitiveness versus cohesion. This choice grew out of the thematic scenarios on the economy, presented in the paper by Evers and reflects ongoing discussions at European level concerning the priorities of European policies. The hypotheses for the prospective scenarios were constructed as policy packages, i.e. a coherent set of policies that all aim in the same direction. As EU policies only represent a small part of policies that influence territorial development, these policy packages were considered to be of application at all scales, from EU to national and regional policies, as relying on the EU scale only would have resulted in too limited impacts. As the major objective of the scenarios was the understanding of the territorial differentiation of evolutions and thus the diverse territorial impacts of different drivers, the scenarios, including their hypotheses, focus on EU-internal issues and leave the rest of the world constant. This means that a moderate deepening of globalisation, with no major disruption of the global economic system and power balance disrupts the evolution of the EU. The recent global financial crisis and the changing geopolitical role of some of the emerging countries show that this is not a very realistic assumption, especially for such long-term scenarios, but it seemed necessary in order to maintain a stability enabling the focus on internal issues and policy debates. The scenarios also do not contain any significant disruptions in terms of technological innovation (e.g. nuclear fusion). They are to be understood as policy scenarios which attempt to explore the impacts of policy choices. It is important to underline that the names of the scenarios and the hypotheses reflect the intentions of the policies launched, not necessarily the outcome. In other words, the cohesion-oriented scenario describes a European Union and its member states which decide, in the present, to focus all policy efforts on cohesion. It is not meant as an ideal vision of the most cohesive Europe possible. This is an important distinction, although in practice one which was not always easy to maintain. The following table lists the main hypotheses underlying the three scenarios, translating the general orientation into more concrete policy packages. Unless otherwise stated, the hypotheses of the trend scenario are also valid for the two other scenarios. Overview of hypotheses for the trend and prospective scenarios. Trend scenario
Cohesion-oriented scenario
Competitiveness-oriented scenario
Demography Reduced population ageing as a result of lower fertility and mortality rates
Demography Restrictive external migration policies
Increasing, but globally controlled external migration Unchanged constraints on internal migration
More flexible retirement ages
Demography Increase in selective external in-migration: economic sectors and destination Abolition of constraints to internal migration
Economy Slowly increasing total activity rate
Economy Maintaining the volume of the EU budget
Slowly growing R&D expenditure, but constant technological gap vis-a-vis the USA Decreasing public expenditure
Reinforcement of structural funds and concentration on weakest regions
Energy Steady increase of energy prices Stable or decreasing European consumption Increasing use of renewables
Better balance of population structure through Increase in retirement age encouragement of higher fertility rates More flexible arrangements for child care Encouragement of fertility rate through fiscal incentives Economy Stronger reduction of total public expenditure compared with the trend scenario Further privatisation and liberalization of public services
Further harmonization of taxation and social security systems
‘Flexibilisation’ of labour markets
Energy Realisation of TEN-E Promotion of decentralised energy production, particularly renewables
Energy European consumption increasing Realisation of TEN–E: investment in infrastructure according to market demand
2 Amongst others: the European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP), the Lisbon strategy, the Cohesion Policy Community Strategic Guidelines, Community strategic guidelines for Rural Development, Sixth Environment Action Programme of the European Community, etc.
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(Continued ) Trend scenario
Cohesion-oriented scenario
Competitiveness-oriented scenario
Transport Continued growth of traffic
Transport Development of TEN-T with priority given to peripheral regions at different scales Support to transport services in rural and less developed areas
Transport Realisation of TEN-T: investment in infrastructure according to market demand
Constant increase of infrastructure endowment, but below demand needs Partial application of the Kyoto Agreement Rural development Further liberalisation of international trade
Prioritisation of links between metropolitan areas
Rural development Minor CAP reforms, but shift from pillar 1 to pillar 2. Priority given to less developed regions Progressive reduction of CAP budget Priority given to environmental and animal health criteria Rapid industrialisation of agricultural production Active policy for economic diversification in rural areas, including SMEs, tourism, residential functions, etc.
Rural development Rapid and radical liberalisation of CAP (reduction of tariffs, of budget and of export subsidies) Reduction of support to rural development policy
Socio-cultural sector Heterogeneous and insufficient policies related to integration Growing ethnic, religious and social tensions
Socio-cultural sector Promotion of regional and European identities Proactive socio-cultural integration policies, in particular in cities Increased fiscal and/or social investment in quality of life issues
Socio-cultural sector Reactive management of social problems in large cities Increase of surveillance and security systems
Governance Increasing cooperation between cross-border regions
Governance Active multi-level territorial governance, particularly in areas supported by structural funds Strong role of public actors in territorial governance
Governance Abolishment of barriers to cross-border cooperation
Stronger role for the European Commission
Wider application of the Open Method of Coordination Increased role of private sector in decision making
Climate change Constant emission levels
Climate change Constant to increasing emission levels
Strict mitigation measures (taxes, road pricing as far as non detrimental to peripheral regions) Wide range of adaptation measures (EU hazard funds, large investments)
Mitigation measures based on flexible schemes and stimulation of alternative technologies. Adaptation measures only where cost efficient
Enlargement Deepening preferred to widening Break on further enlargement (except Bulgaria and Romania) Only lip service to neighbourhood policy
Enlargement Continuing enlargement to widen the market Romania, Bulgaria in 2007
Increase in multi-level and cross-sectoral approaches, but limited to specific programmes (rural development);
Climate change Moderate overall climate change until 2030 (+18) Increase in extreme local events
Moderate emission levels due to new technologies Few (too few) structural adaptation measures Enlargement Bulgaria and Romania by 2007 Western Balkans (with Croatia acceding first) By 2020 Turkey by 2030 Continued combination of deepening and widening
Less public intervention
Western Balkan, EFTA/EEA countries in 2015 Turkey in 2020 Strengthening of the neighbourhood policy (Maghreb, Ukraine, Russia, etc.)
All scenarios have the time horizon of 2030 and are told from the point of view of the observer situated in that year and looking back at the evolution from 2005 onwards. 4. Trend scenarios 4.1. Storyline By the latter half of the 2000s, it was clear that the multiplicity of problems the Community was facing required a comprehensive approach at the European level. In order to deal with problems on several fronts, most EU sectoral policies were largely continued. Renewed efforts were required for the Lisbon strategy, demanding extra investments in R&D and education. Meanwhile the socio-economic rift between the old and new member states demanded that regional policy also be continued with vigour. To this end, investments were made in new infrastructure to improve the accessibility of these
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regions. Finally, after the accession of Bulgaria and Romania, the focus was on integration rather than further expansion, at least in the following decade. No major changes were made to European immigration policy either: the EU continued to facilitate movement between member states, but was more circumspect regarding immigration from abroad. One policy area which did undergo major reform was the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Partly under pressure of international organisations such as the WTO, this was subjected to extensive budgetary cutbacks and saw a substantive shift towards rural development. By 2015 new spatial developments were becoming perceptible. Over the past ten years, Europe had enjoyed moderate economic growth as a whole, generally keeping pace with the US and Asia. Economic performance was strongly diversified within the EU however. Metropolitan regions were the main engines of growth, and it is here that the change in land use was the most pronounced. As agricultural land transformed into (sub)urban development, more remote natural areas transformed into farmland. A clear catching-up process of the new member states was evident: many regions in East Europe were exhibiting growth rates twice that of the EU15. The infrastructure investments had widened the radius of highaccessibility areas in Europe, particularly the connections between major cities. As time wore on, a greater emphasis was placed on mass transit, due to escalating energy prices. At any rate, the pentagon3 was expanding. Still, given the low starting point of the new member states, there was still much more catching up to do. Unemployment, for example, continued to be higher than in the EU15, and life expectancy lower. It was nevertheless clear that the overall standard of living and life expectancy in Europe continued to be amongst the highest in the world. The number of Europeans remained stable, due to relatively low fertility rates and immigration levels. Consequently, the composition of the population grew markedly older, especially in relation to the rest of the world. This ageing process was most pronounced in East Germany and Northern Italy. By 2030, other territorial developments began to emerge. Climate change was making some areas in Europe increasingly inhospitable, particularly rural Spain, which struggled with perennial water shortages. Meanwhile, at the epicentre of continental Europe (e.g. Germany, France, Switzerland and Austria), melting glaciers and increased precipitation increased the frequency and destructive power of floods. The chequered implementation of Natura2000 resulted in checking, but not reversing, the decline in biodiversity. By 2030, population ageing had produced some strains on the labour market, particularly in East Europe, but also in Italy and parts of the Iberian Peninsula. Despite this, the new member states had continued their catching-up process, but progress tapered off as wage levels approached that of the EU15, and most growth was concentrated in metropolitan areas. New labour markets became available with the accession of the Balkan states in 2020 and Turkey in 2030. All in all, socio-economic disparities in Europe had decreased somewhat at the macro level (East versus West Europe), but had grown even more acute between metropolitan regions and peripheral rural regions. Finally, the gap between rich and poor within cities had widened, producing social strife and sometimes erupting into violence. 4.2. The final image Fig. 1 illustrates the attraction and polarisation of metropolitan areas in 2030. From this figure, we can see a remarkable concentration of strong metropolitan areas in the former pentagon, but also in less central regions (mainly capital cities and other European engines). The former pentagon of the early 2000s, grouping the areas of concentration of flows and activities has expanded, mainly along the main transport corridors, in the direction of important metropolitan regions like Barcelona and Madrid, Rome, Glasgow, Copenhagen, Stockholm and Oslo, Berlin and Warsaw, Prague, Vienna and Budapest. The basic characteristics of settlement systems in terms of polycentricity have not fundamentally changed. Various types of areas have run significant risks of economic decline in relation with progressing globalisation and European integration. The trend towards marginalisation of various rural areas, already observed in the early 2000s, has generally continued, but with regional variation. In some areas, the number of available jobs declined significantly. In others, population ageing and even depopulation reached a critical level. Accelerating globalisation has affected a significant number of industrial regions with low or intermediate technologies, exposing the risk of declining activities. The most severely affected areas lie in central and eastern Europe. External immigration (legal and illegal) has continued, with immigrants settling mainly in metropolitan areas, including central and eastern European cities. The areas with a high potential for tourism and retirement have specific geographical attributes (coastal, lake and mountain regions), while other ageing areas are mainly found in remote rural regions without specific appeal. Various regions are subject to the impacts of natural hazards of various nature. The least affected regions lie in northern Europe. 5. Cohesion-oriented scenarios 5.1. Storyline With the 2004 enlargement, the EU placed the final nail in the coffin of Cold War Europe, welcoming ten new member states into the EU, a majority of which had been under communist control for decades. At the same time, it inherited the most considerable socio-economic disparities in its history. If Europe was to maintain its integrity as a coherent whole, it had to address this issue head-on. This constituted the main territorial challenge but also the main opportunity of the new century:
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The central population and economic activity zone of the EU between London, Hamburg, Munich, Milano and Paris.
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Fig. 1. The final image of the trend scenario.
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to fully integrate the various parts of Europe, north and south, east and west, core and periphery. History, particularly the example of EuroTiger Ireland, demonstrated that, with sufficient EU support, it was possible to achieve high regional growth rates. Cohesion was also important as a matter of principle: Europeans should have the right to live and work in their own region, and not be forced by the caprices of market forces to migrate to some other area, where they would have to adapt to other language and customs. Regional policy was the main vehicle of change. Structural funds were targeted to the most needy regions in order to produce the highest rates of growth in these regions. Considerable investments were made to connect peripheral areas with transport infrastructure, particularly rail, due to the rising price of fuel. Since these less-affluent areas were more dependent on agriculture, only minor reforms were made to the CAP budget. As in the trend scenario however, the emphasis shifted from production to rural development, sustainability and diversification. Strengthening the spatial structure of Europe also entailed investing in measures to mitigate and adapt to the effects of climate change. No new enlargements were foreseen after the accession of Bulgaria and Romania; the emphasis was on a full integration of the new member states. To support this aim, a proactive social policy was put into place at the EU level, including the stimulation of domestic fertility rates via measures such as childcare support and tax incentives, introducing stricter immigration controls for non-EU countries, and promoting the integration of minorities into mainstream European society. By 2015 some slight changes to the territorial structure of Europe began to make themselves felt. Economic growth in Europe progressed, albeit more gradually than in the trend scenario. The high growth rates of the new member states were not altered significantly in this scenario, but the dominance of metropolitan areas as growth centres was less pronounced. In relative terms, more remote regions such as rural France, Austria and Northern Scandinavia improved their position at the expense of regions like Paris, the Randstad and the Cote d’Azur. Finally, despite the restraints on external migration, fertility has been on the rise and population ageing has been less acute than in the trend scenario, with the exception of Italy and Ireland. By 2030 more long-term territorial effects became apparent. The magnitude of climate change, despite the environmental legislation to counteract it, was the same as in the trend scenario. Due to the implementation of adaptation measures, however, the effects were much less severe. Floods were just as frequent, but displaced fewer families, drought just as common, but destroyed fewer crops. In addition the depopulation of rural areas was also less marked, these areas benefiting from rural development activities that had helped to reinvigorate their economy with sectors such as recreation and tourism. In all, disparities between East and West and cities and countryside had decreased as compared with the trend scenario. The lack of any significant enlargement, however, has intensified disparities between the EU and its neighbours. 5.2. The final image Fig. 2 reveals a less concentrated, but more widespread pattern regarding the attraction and polarisation potential of metropolitan areas in 2030. Urban settlements are characterized by more polycentricity, stretching over larger parts of the territory than in the trend scenario. The number of areas at risk of marginalisation and of declining activities is comparable to that prevailing in the trend scenario, but their size is reduced and intensity lower. The areas with high potential for tourism and retirement as well as those with severe population ageing remain similar to the trend scenario. The resulting impacts of natural hazards (drought, fires, floods) are much lower than in the trend scenario. Another basic difference with the trend scenario is the emergence of several peripheral integrated zones. The area of concentration of flows and activities, the successor of the former pentagon of the early 2000s, has a wider reach than in the trend scenario and includes a larger number of cities in the close peripheries. 6. Competitiveness-oriented scenario 6.1. Storyline The combination of the sobering mid-term review of the Lisbon strategy, coupled with the 2005 constitutional crisis served as a wake-up call for the EU. It was considered imperative to make bold decisions regarding Europe’s continued prosperity: the Lisbon strategy would have to take precedence over institutional reform and other sectoral policies. The emphasis, it was thought, should be on expanding and improving the common market rather than deepening cooperation between the member states. In order to attain superiority in the bourgeoning knowledge economy, funds would need to be diverted from regional policy and CAP towards improving R&D, education and training and ICT infrastructure. Since the strongest regions had the best chance for competing at a global scale, they were supported accordingly. Regarding accessibility, it was generally felt that the market should dictate where links were most needed, but that priority should be given to linking together economically strong metropolitan areas as this would produce the most added value. To further enhance competitiveness, a selective immigration policy was pursued to attract the best minds to the EU, and negotiations with neighbouring countries commenced to expand the common market further. In addition, government expenditures were slashed (particularly CAP), public services privatised, and policies to stimulate venture capital implemented. Other policy areas, such as environmental protection, social cohesion and integration were considered secondary. By 2015 Europe had already witnessed some territorial changes. There was strong aggregate growth in the total economy, more so than in the trend scenario, which directly affected flows of traffic. Not all regions profited equally however. In fact,
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Fig. 2. The final image of the cohesion-oriented scenario.
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the growth was remarkably concentrated in the central ‘pentagon’ area of Europe in general and in metropolitan areas in particular—many nations had a national ‘champion’ city which acted as their economic motor. Higher transport costs, due to higher energy prices, reinforced this trend towards consolidation. Regions which performed less favourably than in the trend scenario were almost invariably located in the periphery. There was a rapid increase in immigration following the relaxation of controls, at first by highly skilled workers, but given the high growth levels in major urban centres, a steady influx of (illegal) immigration followed suit. This had a clear impact on the composition of the European population; it became younger than in the trend scenario, more urban, and more racially diverse. This trend was most pronounced in Britain, France, Scandinavia and the Baltic states. A side effect of this was mounting social and spatial polarisation. Insufficient integration programmes coupled with a lack of affordable housing and eroded public services resulted in an increasingly disadvantaged, disaffected and vocal underclass. Social friction fuelled suburbanisation and the construction of secure (gated) communities, resulting in the origin of dualised cities where socio-economic exclusion is exacerbated by physical exclusion. By 2030 more structural changes had become apparent. The main European metropolises had coalesced both functionally (business and personal networks) as well as physically (via transport links and urban convergence). Fifteen years on, not just metropolitan regions in West Europe, but also those in East Europe were attracting migrants, particularly after 2015 with the accession of the Balkan countries and the increased cooperation with Russia and the Ukraine. Existing kinship ties directed the flow of migrants from Turkey (joining the EU in 2020) and the Maghreb region mostly to west European cities. Rural regions across Europe saw a population decline, save for those areas being urbanised due to proximity to cities or popular tourist destinations. Employment in agriculture, in particular, was a small fraction of what it had been 30 years before. Some of these areas reverted to nature, while others were rationalised further by agribusiness or cultivated for energy production. The disappearance of agriculture was most prevalent in areas most acutely affected by climate change. This does not necessarily imply that nature flourished in the spaces left behind. The decline in biodiversity had only been slowed but not stopped; in the absence of a meaningful Natura2000 network nature was literally marginalised and species forced to move to less habitable areas, if they could. 6.2. The final image As Fig. 3 shows, by 2030 the attraction and polarisation potential of metropolitan areas is powerfully concentrated in the traditional pentagon. Very few metropolitan areas outside of this area generate significant attraction and polarisation effects. The area of concentration of flows and activities is much more limited than in the trend scenario. These areas cover only parts of the traditional pentagon, although it too extends outwards along a few major corridors, reaching Vienna and Copenhagen. The risk of rural marginalisation is much more intense than in the trend scenario. The areas at risk of declining industrial activity are more extended than under the trend scenario and the intensity of risk is also higher. External migration flows are particularly intense. The areas with high potential for tourism and retirement are similar to the trend scenario, but the areas with severe population ageing, generally in remote rural regions, are more expansive. The resulting impacts of natural hazards (drought, fires, floods) are more intense than under trend assumptions. 7. Roll-back scenario 7.1. Introduction An often heard criticism of the ESPON scenarios is the insistence on an opposition between competitiveness and cohesion. Every since Gidden’s ‘‘Third Way’’ [8], political discourse, non the least at the level of the EU, considers modern economic development thinking to be a fusion of these two concepts, instead of the balance between two opposites. The roll-back scenario developed in the ESPON project reflects this view, as requested by the ESPON Monitoring Committee. As a roll-back scenario begins with the creation of a final image, which is then followed by the elaboration of a possible path towards this image, we first present extracts of the final image of this scenario and then of the storyline leading up to this image. 7.2. Final image The European territory is shaped by 2030 by a very different economy than that which prevailed in the early 2000s. Knowledge based and highly innovative activities have generalized. In addition to the European major multinational companies which are more numerous than in the early 2000s as a result of a less fragmented European economy, a large number of service and technology enterprises are competing on world markets in the form of small, highly flexible units, collaborating, also at transnational level, on project-based activities. Their location is more widespread than in the case of very large units, but accessibility and the proximity of knowledge have remained important prerequisites. Although the external competition of emerging economies takes place, by 2030, increasingly through innovation, know-how and technologies, the European economy has reached a sufficient level of competitiveness to increase its share in the strongly growing external markets. The achievements of an improved productivity and competitiveness have allowed a cohesion policy to be put into practice, which itself is backing the competitiveness-oriented policy strategy. Prosperity and growth are not limited to the
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Fig. 3. The final image of the competitiveness-oriented scenario.
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large metropolitan areas of European and global importance. Instead, a greater number of urban areas of national or of subnational importance, benefiting from the improved global position, have high standards of living. In addition to the concentration of metropolitan areas in the pentagon, other clusters of metropolitan areas have consolidated in various parts of Europe. Some areas, however, have become less populated and have either gained more natural land cover, or have provided spaces for more autonomous living situations with small-scale subsistence and experience farming, including a high level of energy-autonomy. These areas have lower growth rates than others, but their local populations accept this in exchange for less stressful lifestyles. Europe in 2030 is well-connected by a clean and efficient multimodal system, the envy of the world. Even though the transport system is dominated by the main links between metropolitan areas, strong secondary networks link the intermediate spaces. Energy is produced in large quantities from renewable sources. Much of this production is decentralised to individual homes or small settlement areas, although some large-scale installations also exist. Europe has strongly incorporated its neighbourhood into its functional area through cooperation and assistance, such as large education and infrastructure programs, but also through the abolition of international trade barriers, notably in agriculture. 7.3. Storyline After the rejection of the constitutional treaties and the ensuing crisis in European institutional politics, a wide public debate was opened to engage the population about how best to tackle the current problems facing Europe. Three values emerged as indispensable and non-negotiable: a high standard of living for all areas in the EU, safety and the opportunity to contribute to society. Translating these values into policy measures required a coordinated effort to enhance competitiveness, cohesion and sustainability simultaneously. Taking a territorial approach allowed these three dimensions to be addressed not as trade-offs but as complementary. It was finally accepted that this strategy would require substantial public spending, and a ‘Scandinavian model’ was advocated where high levels of public intervention went hand-in-hand with economic growth. This could only be achieved through significant increases in productivity. Two elements proved indispensable for raising productivity in a sustainable way: education and innovation. The 2011 Siofok treaty integrated new criteria into the old Maastricht budgetary criteria: R&D, education and public services such as health and child care. In order to allow for regional specificities, the criteria could be nuanced and prioritised according to regional realities, leaving a certain degree of autonomy to each region on how to reach the goals. Productivity grew significantly. These gains in productivity were shared between profits, salaries and taxes in such a way as to allow continued investment into research and innovation. Overall growth was supported by internal consumption and not only by exports, with solid social coverage compensating for the pitfalls created by the high flexibility of the economy. In a compromise between the competitiveness and the cohesion approach, it was decided to strengthen the productive capacities of all regions, but it was accepted that economic activities concentrate in more productive regions, thus supporting agglomeration effects and face-to-face contacts, while other regions could benefit from higher levels of public support, if they contributed in one way or another to the European priorities, such as the maintenance of biodiversity reserves or certain forms of landscapes. From 2012 onwards, levels of education and R&D spending rose rapidly in many countries, with a higher proportion of the population going through tertiary education and more European research centres reaching the highest global standards. European R&D policy focused on several lines of research in which Europe could find the highest added value for itself and occupy niche positions in world markets: environmental technologies, transport technologies, IT technologies facilitating home working, teleconferencing, distance learning, decentralised service provisions; decentralised fabrication, and biotechnologies. In the light of the combination of increasing climate change induced catastrophes and the energy crisis, it was decided to integrate a series of environmental and energy norms into the policy objectives. The Valetta treaty of 2017 introduced new criteria such as the percentage of renewables in energy use, the percentage of collective versus private vehicle usage, and the percentage of buildings complying with insulation standards. For declining regions not too far from a metropolitan area, attempts were made to integrate them into the functional areas of the more dynamic cores, by increasing commuting speed and by positioning them as attractive residential areas, with old industrialised sites sanitized and reused as loft housing or cultural centres. For more remote regions suffering from inevitable depopulation, mechanisms of ‘‘intelligent shrinking’’ had to be found such as mobile health and other services and special transport systems combining individual and collective forms of transport, etc. At the same time the use of land for energy crops and wind farms was encouraged, thus making many of these regions energy exporters. In other regions, it was decided that nature would be allowed to reassert itself. 8. Comparing scenarios Before analysing the scenarios comparatively, it is important to highlight that they obviously are not in any way predictive and can be considered as flawed in many aspects: they are unrealistic in keeping the global context constant. They focus mostly on one specific policy debate (i.e. competitiveness versus cohesion). They are in large parts the result of
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subjective, expert opinion, even though this opinion is informed by the current state of scientific knowledge. They exaggerate some of the effects in a pedagogical attempt to raise awareness. The main didactic value of scenarios lies in their comparison. Even though the two maps, and the underlying storylines, representing the cohesion-oriented and the competitiveness-oriented scenarios might appear rather extreme, and probably overly optimistic concerning the impact of policies on spatial structures, they have the merit of highlighting the main issues that underlie the policy debate. So, when Commissioner Hu¨bner affirms that cohesion policy’s primary goal is to increase aggregate European GDP growth rates, the scenarios can help visualise what such a policy choice might imply. As such, they assist in focusing discussions on what is really at hand and force participants to take a clear stand. The roll-back scenario makes this especially clear, also highlighting the contradictions between current policy goals and the important public means necessary to resolve these contradictions. The trend scenario shows that basically unchanged policies are not an appropriate response to emerging challenges. Shortcomings relate to the inefficiency of the Lisbon Strategy, the weakness and heterogeneity of family and integration policies, the absence of responses to the fragmentation of the European economy, the support given to all types of infrastructures, including those with low profitability and those less appropriate with regard to the new energy paradigm. The competitiveness-oriented scenario generates stronger economic growth and higher competitiveness, with a more substantial emergence of new technologies. It also produces higher social costs related to growing disparities at various scales likely to result in economic and social problems. Economic activities and dynamic population development will be concentrated in central areas. On a meso-scale, capital cities will reinforce their polarisation. The cohesion-oriented scenario has produced significant added value in terms of territorial cohesion and balance, of demographic revival, of socio-cultural integration, of less damage caused by natural hazards, of fewer negative impacts in rural regions, but its economic and technological performance has been lower than that of the two other scenarios. The pentagon will extend significantly in all directions and several new areas of economic integration will emerge. On the meso-scale, polarisation potentials are distributed amongst a greater number of urban areas with mid-sized cities playing an important role. Even though the scenarios have been conceived in a non-academic approach, more oriented towards policy makers and the wider public, the contrasts observed between the scenarios reflect some elements of ongoing debates in the literature in relation to regional development and policy. The scenarios do not give any ‘‘answers’’ to the questions raised, but put these questions into concrete images. All aspects in the scenarios are subject to academic debate (from regional impacts of climate change to the role of transport in regional development and polycentricity as a spatial development model), but some seem more prominent. Probably most obviously, the scenarios can be linked to different strands of literature on regional development economic geography, due to the overwhelming nature of the economic parts of the Lisbon strategy in EU policy making. Within that, an important issue is the notion of path dependency and the question of how much policy can actually influence a region’s development path, an issue studied in particular in evolutionary economic geography [10], but also, in a more limited manner in the so-called ‘‘new economic geography’’ [11]. As the scenarios are policy scenarios, they put a strong emphasis on policy influences (although they do stress the need for a coherent scale transcending application of the respective policy packages in order to have any effects). A second question, raised by the scenarios, is the importance of agglomeration economies, notably based on a large and diversified (generally urban) economy providing qualified labour force, suppliers and networking potentials in different economic sectors [12]. The scenarios assume a quite important role for this driving force and its corollary of concentration, going as far as suggesting that certain areas could actually be abandoned, a notion echoed by some of the current academic and policy debate [13]. A third strain of academic discussion which can be linked to the scenarios, and which is somewhere between questions of economic development and governance, is that concerning place-based versus people-based policies [14–16]. What the scenarios seem to highlight is that it is not a question of right or wrong per se, but a question which leads to more fundamental moral issues concerning how much value we place into the preservation of places and spatial structures compared to the value we give Europe-wide economic growth and competitiveness. Again, in this context the scenarios can be seen as tools making these fundamental value questions explicit. 9. Conclusion Davoudi and Dammers made in the introduction to this special issue some remarks on the use of the scenarios for territorial governance. We will, therefore, not go into that question here except to mention that the uptake of the scenarios into the policy debate has been surprisingly good.4 However, two elements seem important to highlight as results of this exercise. First of all, the scenarios have highlighted that there are a series of challenges which Europe’s regions face which are only very indirectly linked to the cohesion versus competitiveness debate. Issues around climate change, ageing and energy prices will have to be dealt with, irrespective of the choice of general political paradigm. Obviously, the means chosen will vary and
4 This can be witnessed, for example, in the presence of the main challenges identified in the project both in the Territorial Agenda [5] and in Commission Documents such as the Fourth Cohesion Report [9] and, most recently, the Green Paper on Territorial Cohesion [6].
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specific regions will have different resources to react according to the chosen scenario, especially the most vulnerable such as the remote regions or the poorest regions. Overall, however, the main drivers of these challenges are outside the policy intervention field, at least for a considerable period of time. Any action against climate change or for the tapping of new energy sources will almost inevitably create effects only after 2030, the time horizon set for the scenarios. Second, the scenarios can be used as a tool in making policy and academic debates more explicit by painting vivid images and by creating storylines out of the theoretical arguments. Amongst others, the ESPON scenarios play through the possible territorial effects of the paradigm shift mentioned in the introduction, thus making the implicit, often moral, choices more explicit. The ESPON 2006 scenarios are definitely not academic in nature, but rather an attempt to combine academic knowledge and policy questions in order to provide images. They can be considered as flawed in many ways, but in spite, or sometimes even because, of these weaknesses, they raise and make explicit a series of debates, both political and academic and thus provide a (provocative) base for discussion. Acknowledgement The writing of this paper has been made possible by the ESPON programme. The authors thank the referees for their constructive comments. References [1] Single European Act (1986), Official Journal L 169 of 29 June (1987). [2] D. Hu¨bner, Equity and Efficiency: two missions and one policy, speech delivered at the international conference ‘‘Regional policy around the world’’ Porto, vol. 29, September, 2008. [3] Presidency Conclusions, Lisbon European Council, 23 and 24 march 2000, paragraph 1. [4] IGEAT, et al. ESPON project 3.2 Spatial Scenarios and Orientations in relation to the ESDP and Cohesion Policy, European Spatial Planning Observation Network Luxembourg, 2006. [5] Territorial Agenda of the European Union, Towards a More Competitive and Sustainable Europe of Diverse Regions. Agreed on the occasion of the Informal Ministerial Meeting on Urban Development and Territorial Cohesion in Leipzig on 24/25 May, 2007. [6] European Commission, Green Paper on Territorial Cohesion. Turning territorial diversity into strength, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Committee of the Regions and the European Economic and Social Committee, COM (2008) 616 final. [7] M. Lennert, Places or people: territorial cohesion in the future, in: Presentation to the Polish Ministry of Regional Development’s Think Tank on post-2013 Cohesion Policy, Warsaw, October 27, 2008. [8] A. Giddens, The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1998. [9] European Commission, Growing Regions, Growing Europe. Fourth report on economic and social cohesion, COM (2007) 273 final, 2007. [10] R. Martin, M. Kitson, Peter Tyler, Regional Competitiveness, Routledge, London, New York, 2006. [11] P. Krugman, Geography and Trade, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1991. [12] J. Jacobs, The economy of cities, Random House, New York, 1969. [13] E. Glaeser, Can buffalo ever come back? City Journal (Autumn) (2007). [14] E. Glaeser, J.D. Gottlieb, The Economics of Place-Making Policies, Harvard Institute of Economic Research, Discussion Paper Number 2166, 2008. [15] R. Crane, M. Manville, People or Place—Revisiting the Who Versus the Where of Urban Development, Land Lines, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 2008, July, pp.2–7. [16] D. Kraybill, M. Kilkenny, Economic Rationales For and Against Place-Based Policies, Paper prepared for the Organized Symposium, ‘‘Rural Development, Place-based Policy: Sociologists Critique Economists AAEA-RSS Annual Meeting, ‘‘Spatial Inequality: Continuity and Change in Territorial Stratification, Montreal, Canada, July 27–30, 2003.
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Futures journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/futures
The territorial futures of Europe: ‘Trends’, ‘Competition’ or ‘Cohesion’ Moritz Lennert a,*, Jacques Robert b a b
Institut de Gestion de l’Environnement et d’Ame´nagement du Territoire (IGEAT), Universite´ Libre de Bruxelles, Bvd du Triomphe, CP 246, 1050 Brussels, Belgium TERSYN, 18 rue du Rhoˆne, F 67100 Strasbourg, France
A R T I C L E I N F O
A B S T R A C T
Article history:
The ESPON 2006 scenario project generated three integrated roll-forward scenarios (A roll-forward scenario is a scenario in which the hypotheses define the parameters at the start of the covered time period and the scenario then explores the unfolding of events based on theses hypotheses. This is opposed to a roll-backward scenario in which the situation at the end of the time period is defined and the scenario then explores the path to reach this situation.). In the trend scenario renewed efforts are made for the Lisbon strategy, demanding extra investments in R&D and education. Regional policy will also be continued with vigour. In the Competition Scenario bold decisions are made regarding Europe’s continued prosperity. The Lisbon strategy takes precedence over institutional reform and other sectoral policies. In the Cohesion Scenario Europe is confronted with the challenge of fully integrating the various regions in Europe. The budgets for Regional Policy and Rural Development Policy are enhanced and targeted to the most needy regions. The scenarios are described as stories about the future, supported by model calculations and visualised by various maps. They concentrate on urban and rural development and on territorial developments in different parts of Europe, like North-West Europe, the Alpine Space and Central and Eastern Europe. In addition, a proactive, roll-back scenario explores the possibilities to combine competitiveness, cohesion and sustainability. A message, derived from the scenarios, is that independent of the explored policy options the European territory will be confronted with large challenges like a (rapid) decline of fossil energy resources and increasing impacts of climate change. The scenarios appear particularly helpful in the context of the current paradigm shift in European regional policy from a policy for balance to a policy for aggregate growth. ß 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Available online 29 April 2010
‘‘In order to promote its overall harmonious development, the Community shall develop and pursue its actions leading to the strengthening of its economic and social cohesion. In particular, the Community shall aim at reducing disparities between the various regions and the backwardness of the least-favoured regions.’’ Single European Act, Article 130a [1]
‘‘Cohesion policy is first and foremost an economic development policy aimed at raising aggregate growth in the Union.’’ Danuta Hu¨bner, European Commissioner responsible for Regional Policy, 2008 [2]
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +32 2 650 56 16. E-mail address: [email protected] (M. Lennert). 0016-3287/$ – see front matter ß 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.futures.2010.04.013
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1. Introduction In the history of the European Union cohesion policy has originated as a policy aimed at ‘‘reducing disparities between the various regions and the backwardness of the least-favoured regions’’ [1], thus clearly targeted at the lagging regions with the general aim of internal balance. This approach to cohesion and regional policy has met increasing criticism in the last years, in the context of a fundamental paradigm shift of EU policy. The overarching EU policy guiding this paradigm shift is the Lisbon Strategy defined at the Lisbon Summit of the European Council in 2000. The main argument for this shift was that ‘‘the European Union is confronted with a quantum shift resulting from globalisation and the challenges of a new knowledge-driven economy. These changes are affecting every aspect of people’s lives and require a radical transformation of the European economy’’ [3]. In line with this argument, cohesion policy is more and more defined as a tool to respond to these new, external challenges and, thus, a tool aimed at the external positioning of the EU as a whole, instead of a tool aimed at internal balance. In the second introductory quote, Commissioner Hu¨bner makes this point very clearly. Recent policy documents from the European regional policy makers have clearly integrated this paradigm shift in an attempt at saving the existence of regional policy by arguing that it is an essential element for the attainment of the Lisbon strategy’s goals [5,6]. This seems to be a double-edged sword, however, as first, scientific evidence for most of the arguments is very shaky, thus actually reinforcing the critics of regional policy [7], and second, integrating regional policy in the overarching system of the Lisbon strategy fundamentally alters this policy to a point where its original goals seem forgotten. We will not go any further into the first, but the second can be seen as the underlying discussion that motivated the choice of the scenario hypotheses developed in this article. Effects of such wide reaching paradigm shifts are obviously very difficult to forecast, and even more so concerning territorial impacts. This often limits the scientific evidence available for the policy debate. Scenarios can be one means to compensate, at least partially, for this absence of evidence. Even though they also cannot predict outcomes, they can enable the structuring of some of the current thinking about cause and effect relationships in such a way as to support the discussion by allowing to think through possible impacts in a systematic way. Scenarios can also stimulate the discussion by making some of the aspects more visible through provocative scenario images. The ESPON 2006 integrated scenarios presented in this article play such a role [4]. We will explain how they were constructed and what the major outcomes are to show that such scenarios can be very helpful by making the often abstract discussions more concrete and by focusing attention on some of the major questions. At the same time, the scenarios have also helped to highlight the fact that some fundamental challenges are outside the debate concerning this paradigm shift.
2. Context and methodology As mentioned in the introduction to this special issue, ESPON is an applied, policy-oriented research programme. As such, the scenario project was from the start a collaborative effort between the scientific team and the ESPON Monitoring Committee, the governing body of the programme constituted by representatives of all EU members states, DG Regio as well as some additional partner countries. The scenario project was followed particularly closely as it was seen as a strategic project, with potential influence on future policy making. Its results thus have to be seen as the result of the constant negotiation between both sides, although the scientific team did have significant leeway in its choices of approaches and methods. The fundamental hypotheses defining the scenarios were, however, imposed by the Monitoring Committee (notably the European Commission) which chose to oppose two fundamental elements of EU policy: cohesion and competitiveness. A series of thematic scenarios1 and the information collected in their preparation served as basis to the elaboration of a so-called ‘‘integrated scenario knowledge base’’, a synthesis of the current state of knowledge concerning the different trends, driving forces, projections, policies, etc. relevant to territorial development in the EU. This knowledge based then helped in translating the general hypotheses axes in concrete hypotheses for each of the different thematic sectors, with careful attention to the coherence between the hypotheses. As mentioned in the paper by Dammers in this same issue, the scenarios were then constructed as a combination of qualitative and quantitative elements, resulting in qualitative scenarios with quantitative support, with a time horizon of 2030. As part of the project specification ESPON had clearly indicated that the team was to elaborate prospective roll-forward scenarios as well as proactive, roll-back scenarios. In a further stage, it was decided to also include a trend, or reference, scenario for comparison purposes, which was not to be a simple projection of the past to the future, but rather a scenario based on a more or less unchanged policy package, except for very predictable changes, such as the implementation of the Kyoto agreement and further WTO agreements, especially concerning agricultural products. For each prospective scenario, a storyline, its territorial impacts and a final territorial image were developed, mostly in textual form, but the latter also in the form of schematic, qualitative maps conveying a selection of the many elements
1
Of which several are presented in other articles of this special issue.
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characterising the results of three scenarios. These maps should not be seen as precise cartography, but rather as pedagogical, communicative and somewhat extreme images focusing on the main message of the scenarios. In a final step, one roll-back scenario was developed, based on a future defined by policy objectives. These objectives were extracted and synthesised from a series of EU policy documents2 in order to reflect what could be considered as the current official policy consensus in Europe. This was then translated into more concrete elements of a territorial image of 2030, as the expression of the materialisation of the selected policy objectives. In a final step, based on this image and the information gathered in the elaboration of the prospective scenarios, the storyline leading up to this desirable future was elaborated. 3. Hypotheses As already mentioned, the two prospective policy scenarios were built around the opposition of competitiveness versus cohesion. This choice grew out of the thematic scenarios on the economy, presented in the paper by Evers and reflects ongoing discussions at European level concerning the priorities of European policies. The hypotheses for the prospective scenarios were constructed as policy packages, i.e. a coherent set of policies that all aim in the same direction. As EU policies only represent a small part of policies that influence territorial development, these policy packages were considered to be of application at all scales, from EU to national and regional policies, as relying on the EU scale only would have resulted in too limited impacts. As the major objective of the scenarios was the understanding of the territorial differentiation of evolutions and thus the diverse territorial impacts of different drivers, the scenarios, including their hypotheses, focus on EU-internal issues and leave the rest of the world constant. This means that a moderate deepening of globalisation, with no major disruption of the global economic system and power balance disrupts the evolution of the EU. The recent global financial crisis and the changing geopolitical role of some of the emerging countries show that this is not a very realistic assumption, especially for such long-term scenarios, but it seemed necessary in order to maintain a stability enabling the focus on internal issues and policy debates. The scenarios also do not contain any significant disruptions in terms of technological innovation (e.g. nuclear fusion). They are to be understood as policy scenarios which attempt to explore the impacts of policy choices. It is important to underline that the names of the scenarios and the hypotheses reflect the intentions of the policies launched, not necessarily the outcome. In other words, the cohesion-oriented scenario describes a European Union and its member states which decide, in the present, to focus all policy efforts on cohesion. It is not meant as an ideal vision of the most cohesive Europe possible. This is an important distinction, although in practice one which was not always easy to maintain. The following table lists the main hypotheses underlying the three scenarios, translating the general orientation into more concrete policy packages. Unless otherwise stated, the hypotheses of the trend scenario are also valid for the two other scenarios. Overview of hypotheses for the trend and prospective scenarios. Trend scenario
Cohesion-oriented scenario
Competitiveness-oriented scenario
Demography Reduced population ageing as a result of lower fertility and mortality rates
Demography Restrictive external migration policies
Increasing, but globally controlled external migration Unchanged constraints on internal migration
More flexible retirement ages
Demography Increase in selective external in-migration: economic sectors and destination Abolition of constraints to internal migration
Economy Slowly increasing total activity rate
Economy Maintaining the volume of the EU budget
Slowly growing R&D expenditure, but constant technological gap vis-a-vis the USA Decreasing public expenditure
Reinforcement of structural funds and concentration on weakest regions
Energy Steady increase of energy prices Stable or decreasing European consumption Increasing use of renewables
Better balance of population structure through Increase in retirement age encouragement of higher fertility rates More flexible arrangements for child care Encouragement of fertility rate through fiscal incentives Economy Stronger reduction of total public expenditure compared with the trend scenario Further privatisation and liberalization of public services
Further harmonization of taxation and social security systems
‘Flexibilisation’ of labour markets
Energy Realisation of TEN-E Promotion of decentralised energy production, particularly renewables
Energy European consumption increasing Realisation of TEN–E: investment in infrastructure according to market demand
2 Amongst others: the European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP), the Lisbon strategy, the Cohesion Policy Community Strategic Guidelines, Community strategic guidelines for Rural Development, Sixth Environment Action Programme of the European Community, etc.
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(Continued ) Trend scenario
Cohesion-oriented scenario
Competitiveness-oriented scenario
Transport Continued growth of traffic
Transport Development of TEN-T with priority given to peripheral regions at different scales Support to transport services in rural and less developed areas
Transport Realisation of TEN-T: investment in infrastructure according to market demand
Constant increase of infrastructure endowment, but below demand needs Partial application of the Kyoto Agreement Rural development Further liberalisation of international trade
Prioritisation of links between metropolitan areas
Rural development Minor CAP reforms, but shift from pillar 1 to pillar 2. Priority given to less developed regions Progressive reduction of CAP budget Priority given to environmental and animal health criteria Rapid industrialisation of agricultural production Active policy for economic diversification in rural areas, including SMEs, tourism, residential functions, etc.
Rural development Rapid and radical liberalisation of CAP (reduction of tariffs, of budget and of export subsidies) Reduction of support to rural development policy
Socio-cultural sector Heterogeneous and insufficient policies related to integration Growing ethnic, religious and social tensions
Socio-cultural sector Promotion of regional and European identities Proactive socio-cultural integration policies, in particular in cities Increased fiscal and/or social investment in quality of life issues
Socio-cultural sector Reactive management of social problems in large cities Increase of surveillance and security systems
Governance Increasing cooperation between cross-border regions
Governance Active multi-level territorial governance, particularly in areas supported by structural funds Strong role of public actors in territorial governance
Governance Abolishment of barriers to cross-border cooperation
Stronger role for the European Commission
Wider application of the Open Method of Coordination Increased role of private sector in decision making
Climate change Constant emission levels
Climate change Constant to increasing emission levels
Strict mitigation measures (taxes, road pricing as far as non detrimental to peripheral regions) Wide range of adaptation measures (EU hazard funds, large investments)
Mitigation measures based on flexible schemes and stimulation of alternative technologies. Adaptation measures only where cost efficient
Enlargement Deepening preferred to widening Break on further enlargement (except Bulgaria and Romania) Only lip service to neighbourhood policy
Enlargement Continuing enlargement to widen the market Romania, Bulgaria in 2007
Increase in multi-level and cross-sectoral approaches, but limited to specific programmes (rural development);
Climate change Moderate overall climate change until 2030 (+18) Increase in extreme local events
Moderate emission levels due to new technologies Few (too few) structural adaptation measures Enlargement Bulgaria and Romania by 2007 Western Balkans (with Croatia acceding first) By 2020 Turkey by 2030 Continued combination of deepening and widening
Less public intervention
Western Balkan, EFTA/EEA countries in 2015 Turkey in 2020 Strengthening of the neighbourhood policy (Maghreb, Ukraine, Russia, etc.)
All scenarios have the time horizon of 2030 and are told from the point of view of the observer situated in that year and looking back at the evolution from 2005 onwards. 4. Trend scenarios 4.1. Storyline By the latter half of the 2000s, it was clear that the multiplicity of problems the Community was facing required a comprehensive approach at the European level. In order to deal with problems on several fronts, most EU sectoral policies were largely continued. Renewed efforts were required for the Lisbon strategy, demanding extra investments in R&D and education. Meanwhile the socio-economic rift between the old and new member states demanded that regional policy also be continued with vigour. To this end, investments were made in new infrastructure to improve the accessibility of these
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regions. Finally, after the accession of Bulgaria and Romania, the focus was on integration rather than further expansion, at least in the following decade. No major changes were made to European immigration policy either: the EU continued to facilitate movement between member states, but was more circumspect regarding immigration from abroad. One policy area which did undergo major reform was the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Partly under pressure of international organisations such as the WTO, this was subjected to extensive budgetary cutbacks and saw a substantive shift towards rural development. By 2015 new spatial developments were becoming perceptible. Over the past ten years, Europe had enjoyed moderate economic growth as a whole, generally keeping pace with the US and Asia. Economic performance was strongly diversified within the EU however. Metropolitan regions were the main engines of growth, and it is here that the change in land use was the most pronounced. As agricultural land transformed into (sub)urban development, more remote natural areas transformed into farmland. A clear catching-up process of the new member states was evident: many regions in East Europe were exhibiting growth rates twice that of the EU15. The infrastructure investments had widened the radius of highaccessibility areas in Europe, particularly the connections between major cities. As time wore on, a greater emphasis was placed on mass transit, due to escalating energy prices. At any rate, the pentagon3 was expanding. Still, given the low starting point of the new member states, there was still much more catching up to do. Unemployment, for example, continued to be higher than in the EU15, and life expectancy lower. It was nevertheless clear that the overall standard of living and life expectancy in Europe continued to be amongst the highest in the world. The number of Europeans remained stable, due to relatively low fertility rates and immigration levels. Consequently, the composition of the population grew markedly older, especially in relation to the rest of the world. This ageing process was most pronounced in East Germany and Northern Italy. By 2030, other territorial developments began to emerge. Climate change was making some areas in Europe increasingly inhospitable, particularly rural Spain, which struggled with perennial water shortages. Meanwhile, at the epicentre of continental Europe (e.g. Germany, France, Switzerland and Austria), melting glaciers and increased precipitation increased the frequency and destructive power of floods. The chequered implementation of Natura2000 resulted in checking, but not reversing, the decline in biodiversity. By 2030, population ageing had produced some strains on the labour market, particularly in East Europe, but also in Italy and parts of the Iberian Peninsula. Despite this, the new member states had continued their catching-up process, but progress tapered off as wage levels approached that of the EU15, and most growth was concentrated in metropolitan areas. New labour markets became available with the accession of the Balkan states in 2020 and Turkey in 2030. All in all, socio-economic disparities in Europe had decreased somewhat at the macro level (East versus West Europe), but had grown even more acute between metropolitan regions and peripheral rural regions. Finally, the gap between rich and poor within cities had widened, producing social strife and sometimes erupting into violence. 4.2. The final image Fig. 1 illustrates the attraction and polarisation of metropolitan areas in 2030. From this figure, we can see a remarkable concentration of strong metropolitan areas in the former pentagon, but also in less central regions (mainly capital cities and other European engines). The former pentagon of the early 2000s, grouping the areas of concentration of flows and activities has expanded, mainly along the main transport corridors, in the direction of important metropolitan regions like Barcelona and Madrid, Rome, Glasgow, Copenhagen, Stockholm and Oslo, Berlin and Warsaw, Prague, Vienna and Budapest. The basic characteristics of settlement systems in terms of polycentricity have not fundamentally changed. Various types of areas have run significant risks of economic decline in relation with progressing globalisation and European integration. The trend towards marginalisation of various rural areas, already observed in the early 2000s, has generally continued, but with regional variation. In some areas, the number of available jobs declined significantly. In others, population ageing and even depopulation reached a critical level. Accelerating globalisation has affected a significant number of industrial regions with low or intermediate technologies, exposing the risk of declining activities. The most severely affected areas lie in central and eastern Europe. External immigration (legal and illegal) has continued, with immigrants settling mainly in metropolitan areas, including central and eastern European cities. The areas with a high potential for tourism and retirement have specific geographical attributes (coastal, lake and mountain regions), while other ageing areas are mainly found in remote rural regions without specific appeal. Various regions are subject to the impacts of natural hazards of various nature. The least affected regions lie in northern Europe. 5. Cohesion-oriented scenarios 5.1. Storyline With the 2004 enlargement, the EU placed the final nail in the coffin of Cold War Europe, welcoming ten new member states into the EU, a majority of which had been under communist control for decades. At the same time, it inherited the most considerable socio-economic disparities in its history. If Europe was to maintain its integrity as a coherent whole, it had to address this issue head-on. This constituted the main territorial challenge but also the main opportunity of the new century:
3
The central population and economic activity zone of the EU between London, Hamburg, Munich, Milano and Paris.
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Fig. 1. The final image of the trend scenario.
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to fully integrate the various parts of Europe, north and south, east and west, core and periphery. History, particularly the example of EuroTiger Ireland, demonstrated that, with sufficient EU support, it was possible to achieve high regional growth rates. Cohesion was also important as a matter of principle: Europeans should have the right to live and work in their own region, and not be forced by the caprices of market forces to migrate to some other area, where they would have to adapt to other language and customs. Regional policy was the main vehicle of change. Structural funds were targeted to the most needy regions in order to produce the highest rates of growth in these regions. Considerable investments were made to connect peripheral areas with transport infrastructure, particularly rail, due to the rising price of fuel. Since these less-affluent areas were more dependent on agriculture, only minor reforms were made to the CAP budget. As in the trend scenario however, the emphasis shifted from production to rural development, sustainability and diversification. Strengthening the spatial structure of Europe also entailed investing in measures to mitigate and adapt to the effects of climate change. No new enlargements were foreseen after the accession of Bulgaria and Romania; the emphasis was on a full integration of the new member states. To support this aim, a proactive social policy was put into place at the EU level, including the stimulation of domestic fertility rates via measures such as childcare support and tax incentives, introducing stricter immigration controls for non-EU countries, and promoting the integration of minorities into mainstream European society. By 2015 some slight changes to the territorial structure of Europe began to make themselves felt. Economic growth in Europe progressed, albeit more gradually than in the trend scenario. The high growth rates of the new member states were not altered significantly in this scenario, but the dominance of metropolitan areas as growth centres was less pronounced. In relative terms, more remote regions such as rural France, Austria and Northern Scandinavia improved their position at the expense of regions like Paris, the Randstad and the Cote d’Azur. Finally, despite the restraints on external migration, fertility has been on the rise and population ageing has been less acute than in the trend scenario, with the exception of Italy and Ireland. By 2030 more long-term territorial effects became apparent. The magnitude of climate change, despite the environmental legislation to counteract it, was the same as in the trend scenario. Due to the implementation of adaptation measures, however, the effects were much less severe. Floods were just as frequent, but displaced fewer families, drought just as common, but destroyed fewer crops. In addition the depopulation of rural areas was also less marked, these areas benefiting from rural development activities that had helped to reinvigorate their economy with sectors such as recreation and tourism. In all, disparities between East and West and cities and countryside had decreased as compared with the trend scenario. The lack of any significant enlargement, however, has intensified disparities between the EU and its neighbours. 5.2. The final image Fig. 2 reveals a less concentrated, but more widespread pattern regarding the attraction and polarisation potential of metropolitan areas in 2030. Urban settlements are characterized by more polycentricity, stretching over larger parts of the territory than in the trend scenario. The number of areas at risk of marginalisation and of declining activities is comparable to that prevailing in the trend scenario, but their size is reduced and intensity lower. The areas with high potential for tourism and retirement as well as those with severe population ageing remain similar to the trend scenario. The resulting impacts of natural hazards (drought, fires, floods) are much lower than in the trend scenario. Another basic difference with the trend scenario is the emergence of several peripheral integrated zones. The area of concentration of flows and activities, the successor of the former pentagon of the early 2000s, has a wider reach than in the trend scenario and includes a larger number of cities in the close peripheries. 6. Competitiveness-oriented scenario 6.1. Storyline The combination of the sobering mid-term review of the Lisbon strategy, coupled with the 2005 constitutional crisis served as a wake-up call for the EU. It was considered imperative to make bold decisions regarding Europe’s continued prosperity: the Lisbon strategy would have to take precedence over institutional reform and other sectoral policies. The emphasis, it was thought, should be on expanding and improving the common market rather than deepening cooperation between the member states. In order to attain superiority in the bourgeoning knowledge economy, funds would need to be diverted from regional policy and CAP towards improving R&D, education and training and ICT infrastructure. Since the strongest regions had the best chance for competing at a global scale, they were supported accordingly. Regarding accessibility, it was generally felt that the market should dictate where links were most needed, but that priority should be given to linking together economically strong metropolitan areas as this would produce the most added value. To further enhance competitiveness, a selective immigration policy was pursued to attract the best minds to the EU, and negotiations with neighbouring countries commenced to expand the common market further. In addition, government expenditures were slashed (particularly CAP), public services privatised, and policies to stimulate venture capital implemented. Other policy areas, such as environmental protection, social cohesion and integration were considered secondary. By 2015 Europe had already witnessed some territorial changes. There was strong aggregate growth in the total economy, more so than in the trend scenario, which directly affected flows of traffic. Not all regions profited equally however. In fact,
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Fig. 2. The final image of the cohesion-oriented scenario.
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the growth was remarkably concentrated in the central ‘pentagon’ area of Europe in general and in metropolitan areas in particular—many nations had a national ‘champion’ city which acted as their economic motor. Higher transport costs, due to higher energy prices, reinforced this trend towards consolidation. Regions which performed less favourably than in the trend scenario were almost invariably located in the periphery. There was a rapid increase in immigration following the relaxation of controls, at first by highly skilled workers, but given the high growth levels in major urban centres, a steady influx of (illegal) immigration followed suit. This had a clear impact on the composition of the European population; it became younger than in the trend scenario, more urban, and more racially diverse. This trend was most pronounced in Britain, France, Scandinavia and the Baltic states. A side effect of this was mounting social and spatial polarisation. Insufficient integration programmes coupled with a lack of affordable housing and eroded public services resulted in an increasingly disadvantaged, disaffected and vocal underclass. Social friction fuelled suburbanisation and the construction of secure (gated) communities, resulting in the origin of dualised cities where socio-economic exclusion is exacerbated by physical exclusion. By 2030 more structural changes had become apparent. The main European metropolises had coalesced both functionally (business and personal networks) as well as physically (via transport links and urban convergence). Fifteen years on, not just metropolitan regions in West Europe, but also those in East Europe were attracting migrants, particularly after 2015 with the accession of the Balkan countries and the increased cooperation with Russia and the Ukraine. Existing kinship ties directed the flow of migrants from Turkey (joining the EU in 2020) and the Maghreb region mostly to west European cities. Rural regions across Europe saw a population decline, save for those areas being urbanised due to proximity to cities or popular tourist destinations. Employment in agriculture, in particular, was a small fraction of what it had been 30 years before. Some of these areas reverted to nature, while others were rationalised further by agribusiness or cultivated for energy production. The disappearance of agriculture was most prevalent in areas most acutely affected by climate change. This does not necessarily imply that nature flourished in the spaces left behind. The decline in biodiversity had only been slowed but not stopped; in the absence of a meaningful Natura2000 network nature was literally marginalised and species forced to move to less habitable areas, if they could. 6.2. The final image As Fig. 3 shows, by 2030 the attraction and polarisation potential of metropolitan areas is powerfully concentrated in the traditional pentagon. Very few metropolitan areas outside of this area generate significant attraction and polarisation effects. The area of concentration of flows and activities is much more limited than in the trend scenario. These areas cover only parts of the traditional pentagon, although it too extends outwards along a few major corridors, reaching Vienna and Copenhagen. The risk of rural marginalisation is much more intense than in the trend scenario. The areas at risk of declining industrial activity are more extended than under the trend scenario and the intensity of risk is also higher. External migration flows are particularly intense. The areas with high potential for tourism and retirement are similar to the trend scenario, but the areas with severe population ageing, generally in remote rural regions, are more expansive. The resulting impacts of natural hazards (drought, fires, floods) are more intense than under trend assumptions. 7. Roll-back scenario 7.1. Introduction An often heard criticism of the ESPON scenarios is the insistence on an opposition between competitiveness and cohesion. Every since Gidden’s ‘‘Third Way’’ [8], political discourse, non the least at the level of the EU, considers modern economic development thinking to be a fusion of these two concepts, instead of the balance between two opposites. The roll-back scenario developed in the ESPON project reflects this view, as requested by the ESPON Monitoring Committee. As a roll-back scenario begins with the creation of a final image, which is then followed by the elaboration of a possible path towards this image, we first present extracts of the final image of this scenario and then of the storyline leading up to this image. 7.2. Final image The European territory is shaped by 2030 by a very different economy than that which prevailed in the early 2000s. Knowledge based and highly innovative activities have generalized. In addition to the European major multinational companies which are more numerous than in the early 2000s as a result of a less fragmented European economy, a large number of service and technology enterprises are competing on world markets in the form of small, highly flexible units, collaborating, also at transnational level, on project-based activities. Their location is more widespread than in the case of very large units, but accessibility and the proximity of knowledge have remained important prerequisites. Although the external competition of emerging economies takes place, by 2030, increasingly through innovation, know-how and technologies, the European economy has reached a sufficient level of competitiveness to increase its share in the strongly growing external markets. The achievements of an improved productivity and competitiveness have allowed a cohesion policy to be put into practice, which itself is backing the competitiveness-oriented policy strategy. Prosperity and growth are not limited to the
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Fig. 3. The final image of the competitiveness-oriented scenario.
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large metropolitan areas of European and global importance. Instead, a greater number of urban areas of national or of subnational importance, benefiting from the improved global position, have high standards of living. In addition to the concentration of metropolitan areas in the pentagon, other clusters of metropolitan areas have consolidated in various parts of Europe. Some areas, however, have become less populated and have either gained more natural land cover, or have provided spaces for more autonomous living situations with small-scale subsistence and experience farming, including a high level of energy-autonomy. These areas have lower growth rates than others, but their local populations accept this in exchange for less stressful lifestyles. Europe in 2030 is well-connected by a clean and efficient multimodal system, the envy of the world. Even though the transport system is dominated by the main links between metropolitan areas, strong secondary networks link the intermediate spaces. Energy is produced in large quantities from renewable sources. Much of this production is decentralised to individual homes or small settlement areas, although some large-scale installations also exist. Europe has strongly incorporated its neighbourhood into its functional area through cooperation and assistance, such as large education and infrastructure programs, but also through the abolition of international trade barriers, notably in agriculture. 7.3. Storyline After the rejection of the constitutional treaties and the ensuing crisis in European institutional politics, a wide public debate was opened to engage the population about how best to tackle the current problems facing Europe. Three values emerged as indispensable and non-negotiable: a high standard of living for all areas in the EU, safety and the opportunity to contribute to society. Translating these values into policy measures required a coordinated effort to enhance competitiveness, cohesion and sustainability simultaneously. Taking a territorial approach allowed these three dimensions to be addressed not as trade-offs but as complementary. It was finally accepted that this strategy would require substantial public spending, and a ‘Scandinavian model’ was advocated where high levels of public intervention went hand-in-hand with economic growth. This could only be achieved through significant increases in productivity. Two elements proved indispensable for raising productivity in a sustainable way: education and innovation. The 2011 Siofok treaty integrated new criteria into the old Maastricht budgetary criteria: R&D, education and public services such as health and child care. In order to allow for regional specificities, the criteria could be nuanced and prioritised according to regional realities, leaving a certain degree of autonomy to each region on how to reach the goals. Productivity grew significantly. These gains in productivity were shared between profits, salaries and taxes in such a way as to allow continued investment into research and innovation. Overall growth was supported by internal consumption and not only by exports, with solid social coverage compensating for the pitfalls created by the high flexibility of the economy. In a compromise between the competitiveness and the cohesion approach, it was decided to strengthen the productive capacities of all regions, but it was accepted that economic activities concentrate in more productive regions, thus supporting agglomeration effects and face-to-face contacts, while other regions could benefit from higher levels of public support, if they contributed in one way or another to the European priorities, such as the maintenance of biodiversity reserves or certain forms of landscapes. From 2012 onwards, levels of education and R&D spending rose rapidly in many countries, with a higher proportion of the population going through tertiary education and more European research centres reaching the highest global standards. European R&D policy focused on several lines of research in which Europe could find the highest added value for itself and occupy niche positions in world markets: environmental technologies, transport technologies, IT technologies facilitating home working, teleconferencing, distance learning, decentralised service provisions; decentralised fabrication, and biotechnologies. In the light of the combination of increasing climate change induced catastrophes and the energy crisis, it was decided to integrate a series of environmental and energy norms into the policy objectives. The Valetta treaty of 2017 introduced new criteria such as the percentage of renewables in energy use, the percentage of collective versus private vehicle usage, and the percentage of buildings complying with insulation standards. For declining regions not too far from a metropolitan area, attempts were made to integrate them into the functional areas of the more dynamic cores, by increasing commuting speed and by positioning them as attractive residential areas, with old industrialised sites sanitized and reused as loft housing or cultural centres. For more remote regions suffering from inevitable depopulation, mechanisms of ‘‘intelligent shrinking’’ had to be found such as mobile health and other services and special transport systems combining individual and collective forms of transport, etc. At the same time the use of land for energy crops and wind farms was encouraged, thus making many of these regions energy exporters. In other regions, it was decided that nature would be allowed to reassert itself. 8. Comparing scenarios Before analysing the scenarios comparatively, it is important to highlight that they obviously are not in any way predictive and can be considered as flawed in many aspects: they are unrealistic in keeping the global context constant. They focus mostly on one specific policy debate (i.e. competitiveness versus cohesion). They are in large parts the result of
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subjective, expert opinion, even though this opinion is informed by the current state of scientific knowledge. They exaggerate some of the effects in a pedagogical attempt to raise awareness. The main didactic value of scenarios lies in their comparison. Even though the two maps, and the underlying storylines, representing the cohesion-oriented and the competitiveness-oriented scenarios might appear rather extreme, and probably overly optimistic concerning the impact of policies on spatial structures, they have the merit of highlighting the main issues that underlie the policy debate. So, when Commissioner Hu¨bner affirms that cohesion policy’s primary goal is to increase aggregate European GDP growth rates, the scenarios can help visualise what such a policy choice might imply. As such, they assist in focusing discussions on what is really at hand and force participants to take a clear stand. The roll-back scenario makes this especially clear, also highlighting the contradictions between current policy goals and the important public means necessary to resolve these contradictions. The trend scenario shows that basically unchanged policies are not an appropriate response to emerging challenges. Shortcomings relate to the inefficiency of the Lisbon Strategy, the weakness and heterogeneity of family and integration policies, the absence of responses to the fragmentation of the European economy, the support given to all types of infrastructures, including those with low profitability and those less appropriate with regard to the new energy paradigm. The competitiveness-oriented scenario generates stronger economic growth and higher competitiveness, with a more substantial emergence of new technologies. It also produces higher social costs related to growing disparities at various scales likely to result in economic and social problems. Economic activities and dynamic population development will be concentrated in central areas. On a meso-scale, capital cities will reinforce their polarisation. The cohesion-oriented scenario has produced significant added value in terms of territorial cohesion and balance, of demographic revival, of socio-cultural integration, of less damage caused by natural hazards, of fewer negative impacts in rural regions, but its economic and technological performance has been lower than that of the two other scenarios. The pentagon will extend significantly in all directions and several new areas of economic integration will emerge. On the meso-scale, polarisation potentials are distributed amongst a greater number of urban areas with mid-sized cities playing an important role. Even though the scenarios have been conceived in a non-academic approach, more oriented towards policy makers and the wider public, the contrasts observed between the scenarios reflect some elements of ongoing debates in the literature in relation to regional development and policy. The scenarios do not give any ‘‘answers’’ to the questions raised, but put these questions into concrete images. All aspects in the scenarios are subject to academic debate (from regional impacts of climate change to the role of transport in regional development and polycentricity as a spatial development model), but some seem more prominent. Probably most obviously, the scenarios can be linked to different strands of literature on regional development economic geography, due to the overwhelming nature of the economic parts of the Lisbon strategy in EU policy making. Within that, an important issue is the notion of path dependency and the question of how much policy can actually influence a region’s development path, an issue studied in particular in evolutionary economic geography [10], but also, in a more limited manner in the so-called ‘‘new economic geography’’ [11]. As the scenarios are policy scenarios, they put a strong emphasis on policy influences (although they do stress the need for a coherent scale transcending application of the respective policy packages in order to have any effects). A second question, raised by the scenarios, is the importance of agglomeration economies, notably based on a large and diversified (generally urban) economy providing qualified labour force, suppliers and networking potentials in different economic sectors [12]. The scenarios assume a quite important role for this driving force and its corollary of concentration, going as far as suggesting that certain areas could actually be abandoned, a notion echoed by some of the current academic and policy debate [13]. A third strain of academic discussion which can be linked to the scenarios, and which is somewhere between questions of economic development and governance, is that concerning place-based versus people-based policies [14–16]. What the scenarios seem to highlight is that it is not a question of right or wrong per se, but a question which leads to more fundamental moral issues concerning how much value we place into the preservation of places and spatial structures compared to the value we give Europe-wide economic growth and competitiveness. Again, in this context the scenarios can be seen as tools making these fundamental value questions explicit. 9. Conclusion Davoudi and Dammers made in the introduction to this special issue some remarks on the use of the scenarios for territorial governance. We will, therefore, not go into that question here except to mention that the uptake of the scenarios into the policy debate has been surprisingly good.4 However, two elements seem important to highlight as results of this exercise. First of all, the scenarios have highlighted that there are a series of challenges which Europe’s regions face which are only very indirectly linked to the cohesion versus competitiveness debate. Issues around climate change, ageing and energy prices will have to be dealt with, irrespective of the choice of general political paradigm. Obviously, the means chosen will vary and
4 This can be witnessed, for example, in the presence of the main challenges identified in the project both in the Territorial Agenda [5] and in Commission Documents such as the Fourth Cohesion Report [9] and, most recently, the Green Paper on Territorial Cohesion [6].
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specific regions will have different resources to react according to the chosen scenario, especially the most vulnerable such as the remote regions or the poorest regions. Overall, however, the main drivers of these challenges are outside the policy intervention field, at least for a considerable period of time. Any action against climate change or for the tapping of new energy sources will almost inevitably create effects only after 2030, the time horizon set for the scenarios. Second, the scenarios can be used as a tool in making policy and academic debates more explicit by painting vivid images and by creating storylines out of the theoretical arguments. Amongst others, the ESPON scenarios play through the possible territorial effects of the paradigm shift mentioned in the introduction, thus making the implicit, often moral, choices more explicit. The ESPON 2006 scenarios are definitely not academic in nature, but rather an attempt to combine academic knowledge and policy questions in order to provide images. They can be considered as flawed in many ways, but in spite, or sometimes even because, of these weaknesses, they raise and make explicit a series of debates, both political and academic and thus provide a (provocative) base for discussion. Acknowledgement The writing of this paper has been made possible by the ESPON programme. The authors thank the referees for their constructive comments. References [1] Single European Act (1986), Official Journal L 169 of 29 June (1987). [2] D. Hu¨bner, Equity and Efficiency: two missions and one policy, speech delivered at the international conference ‘‘Regional policy around the world’’ Porto, vol. 29, September, 2008. [3] Presidency Conclusions, Lisbon European Council, 23 and 24 march 2000, paragraph 1. [4] IGEAT, et al. ESPON project 3.2 Spatial Scenarios and Orientations in relation to the ESDP and Cohesion Policy, European Spatial Planning Observation Network Luxembourg, 2006. [5] Territorial Agenda of the European Union, Towards a More Competitive and Sustainable Europe of Diverse Regions. Agreed on the occasion of the Informal Ministerial Meeting on Urban Development and Territorial Cohesion in Leipzig on 24/25 May, 2007. [6] European Commission, Green Paper on Territorial Cohesion. Turning territorial diversity into strength, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Committee of the Regions and the European Economic and Social Committee, COM (2008) 616 final. [7] M. Lennert, Places or people: territorial cohesion in the future, in: Presentation to the Polish Ministry of Regional Development’s Think Tank on post-2013 Cohesion Policy, Warsaw, October 27, 2008. [8] A. Giddens, The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1998. [9] European Commission, Growing Regions, Growing Europe. Fourth report on economic and social cohesion, COM (2007) 273 final, 2007. [10] R. Martin, M. Kitson, Peter Tyler, Regional Competitiveness, Routledge, London, New York, 2006. [11] P. Krugman, Geography and Trade, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1991. [12] J. Jacobs, The economy of cities, Random House, New York, 1969. [13] E. Glaeser, Can buffalo ever come back? City Journal (Autumn) (2007). [14] E. Glaeser, J.D. Gottlieb, The Economics of Place-Making Policies, Harvard Institute of Economic Research, Discussion Paper Number 2166, 2008. [15] R. Crane, M. Manville, People or Place—Revisiting the Who Versus the Where of Urban Development, Land Lines, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 2008, July, pp.2–7. [16] D. Kraybill, M. Kilkenny, Economic Rationales For and Against Place-Based Policies, Paper prepared for the Organized Symposium, ‘‘Rural Development, Place-based Policy: Sociologists Critique Economists AAEA-RSS Annual Meeting, ‘‘Spatial Inequality: Continuity and Change in Territorial Stratification, Montreal, Canada, July 27–30, 2003.