- Email: [email protected]
The theory of Rome
EXPLORATIONS
IN ECONOMIC
HISTORY
29, 116-117
(19%)
REJOINDER The Theory of Rome GERALDGUNDERSON Trinity
College
J. L. Anderson and T. Lewit in “A Contract with the Barbarians? Economics and the Fall of Rome” have undertaken an extensive critique of my paper “Economic Change and the Demise of the Roman Empire.” That’s an encouraging step because unless the methodology of Roman economic history is redirected it is headed down an enervating cul-desac. Roman history is necessarily theory intensive. While there is a fair amount of archeological evidence extant, records or other indicators which would inform and, ultimately, discriminate among explanations are sparse. Accordingly, ancient historians spend enormous energy interpreting a single inscription or even a pottery shard. In such an environment the prevailing explanatory framework is critical in selecting a particular interpretation. Most Roman historians employ a zero sum view of economic affairs, which means they place heavy emphasis on how the (fixed) pie is divided during each period. This view is almost always implicit so that there are large sections of ad hoc theorizing which often resort to arguments that economics is not relevant in any case. Consider Anderson and Lewit’s discussion of my use of changes in land prices to test the meaning of labor scarcity. After discussing historical evidence, they* turn to a back up argument which is that land is held for noneconomic reasons anyway. That is a dubious argument I have examined elsewhere (“Economic Behavior in the Ancient World,” in R. Ransom, R. Sutch, and G. Walton, Eds,, Explorations in the New Economic History, Academic Press: New York, 1981). It parallels the argument in American history that slaves were held for noneconomic reasons which we now know was inconsequential because prices were determined at the margin by objective economic characteristics. No doubt land holdings were influenced by desires 116 0014-4983192 $3.00 Copyright 0 1992 by Academic Press, Inc. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.
THE
THEORY
OF
ROME
117
for social status and security, as Anderson and Lewit argue, but Roman land prices obviously changed over time-a phenomenon which challenges their assumptions as well as being something they cannot predict. Another example where outmoded theory leads Anderson and Lewit astray is their discussion of productivity. They associate increases in productivity exclusively with inventions. Thus when they cannot count many of the latter, they infer there was not much of the former. Scholars of technology now recognize that most improvements occur in small, frequent increments. Counting inventions, even if a complete record was available, would miss most of the gains. In addition, Anderson and Lewit mistakenly assume that the absence of enthusiastic adoption of certain inventions shows that the society was not progressive.But that fails to understand the relative price of resources. The neglected inventions were typicahy expensive and their function could be achieved by “less progressive”but cheaper-labor. Anderson and Lewit argue that my central thesis, that the rising cost of imperial defense caused a voluntary decentralization of the Empire, is really the standard explanation. But again, their adherence to the old, incomplete theory of empire misleads them. The traditional view is that the demand for defense was completely price inelastic. Therefore, in order to maintain the same supply progressively larger quantities of resources must be extracted from the economy until it is pushed to the breaking point. That is a good part of the reason that traditional historians have been predisposed to interpret economic changes in the later Empire as symptoms of decline. A scholar employing modern economic theory, in contrast, is more likely to begin with the premise that the Romans were not dumb, that they made appropriate adjustments to changing circumstances even when that involved major social institutions. This is what a demand curve with some price elasticity expresses. It also is consistent with changes in defense tactics occurring when income is rising as well as falling. The story is told that after the village tailor had the greatest moment of his life in a private meeting with the Pope, his reactions were “‘38 short, take in the right shoulder. ” Likewise Roman historians have become mired in a self-perpetuating process. Evidence is interpreted in a particular framework which only reinforces the traditional interpretation. Perhaps Anderson and Lewit’s willingness to confront an alternative view is a hopeful sign for change.
IN ECONOMIC
HISTORY
29, 116-117
(19%)
REJOINDER The Theory of Rome GERALDGUNDERSON Trinity
College
J. L. Anderson and T. Lewit in “A Contract with the Barbarians? Economics and the Fall of Rome” have undertaken an extensive critique of my paper “Economic Change and the Demise of the Roman Empire.” That’s an encouraging step because unless the methodology of Roman economic history is redirected it is headed down an enervating cul-desac. Roman history is necessarily theory intensive. While there is a fair amount of archeological evidence extant, records or other indicators which would inform and, ultimately, discriminate among explanations are sparse. Accordingly, ancient historians spend enormous energy interpreting a single inscription or even a pottery shard. In such an environment the prevailing explanatory framework is critical in selecting a particular interpretation. Most Roman historians employ a zero sum view of economic affairs, which means they place heavy emphasis on how the (fixed) pie is divided during each period. This view is almost always implicit so that there are large sections of ad hoc theorizing which often resort to arguments that economics is not relevant in any case. Consider Anderson and Lewit’s discussion of my use of changes in land prices to test the meaning of labor scarcity. After discussing historical evidence, they* turn to a back up argument which is that land is held for noneconomic reasons anyway. That is a dubious argument I have examined elsewhere (“Economic Behavior in the Ancient World,” in R. Ransom, R. Sutch, and G. Walton, Eds,, Explorations in the New Economic History, Academic Press: New York, 1981). It parallels the argument in American history that slaves were held for noneconomic reasons which we now know was inconsequential because prices were determined at the margin by objective economic characteristics. No doubt land holdings were influenced by desires 116 0014-4983192 $3.00 Copyright 0 1992 by Academic Press, Inc. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.
THE
THEORY
OF
ROME
117
for social status and security, as Anderson and Lewit argue, but Roman land prices obviously changed over time-a phenomenon which challenges their assumptions as well as being something they cannot predict. Another example where outmoded theory leads Anderson and Lewit astray is their discussion of productivity. They associate increases in productivity exclusively with inventions. Thus when they cannot count many of the latter, they infer there was not much of the former. Scholars of technology now recognize that most improvements occur in small, frequent increments. Counting inventions, even if a complete record was available, would miss most of the gains. In addition, Anderson and Lewit mistakenly assume that the absence of enthusiastic adoption of certain inventions shows that the society was not progressive.But that fails to understand the relative price of resources. The neglected inventions were typicahy expensive and their function could be achieved by “less progressive”but cheaper-labor. Anderson and Lewit argue that my central thesis, that the rising cost of imperial defense caused a voluntary decentralization of the Empire, is really the standard explanation. But again, their adherence to the old, incomplete theory of empire misleads them. The traditional view is that the demand for defense was completely price inelastic. Therefore, in order to maintain the same supply progressively larger quantities of resources must be extracted from the economy until it is pushed to the breaking point. That is a good part of the reason that traditional historians have been predisposed to interpret economic changes in the later Empire as symptoms of decline. A scholar employing modern economic theory, in contrast, is more likely to begin with the premise that the Romans were not dumb, that they made appropriate adjustments to changing circumstances even when that involved major social institutions. This is what a demand curve with some price elasticity expresses. It also is consistent with changes in defense tactics occurring when income is rising as well as falling. The story is told that after the village tailor had the greatest moment of his life in a private meeting with the Pope, his reactions were “‘38 short, take in the right shoulder. ” Likewise Roman historians have become mired in a self-perpetuating process. Evidence is interpreted in a particular framework which only reinforces the traditional interpretation. Perhaps Anderson and Lewit’s willingness to confront an alternative view is a hopeful sign for change.