The thought of Deng Xiaoping

Pergamon

Communirr ondPos!-Communist Srufies Vol. 29, No. 4, pp. 371-394, 1996 Copyright Q 1996 The Regents of the University of Cahfomia Published by Elwier ScienceLtd. Printedin Great Britain

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The Thought of Deng Xiaoping Maria Hsia Chang Department of Political Science, University of Nevada, Rena, NV 89557-0060, USA

One of the abiding curiosities in the 20th century has been the success of Marxist revolutions in underdeveloped societies. In the case of China, not only did Marxism-Leninism provide little assistance to the communist party on economic development, the problem was compounded by the disastrous ideas of Mao Zedong which, by the time of his death, brought the economy to the brink of ruin. It was Deng Xiaoping who provided the ideological roadmap and legitimation for the reform and modernization of the Chinese economy. By returning to classical Marxism’s emphasis on productive forces, Deng managed to transform Marxism into a developmental nationalist ideology. In so doing, Deng paved the way for the current resurgence of nationalism in the People’s Republic. Copyright 0 1996 The Regents of the University of California

Almost two decades since they began, the economic reforms of Deng Xiaoping have transformed China into the world’s fastest growing economy. Notwithstanding the reforms, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) remains an “ideocracy” -a political system in which government is legitimated by a monistic ideology that claims to be absolute and comprehensive, presuming to know as well as explain all aspects of reality.’ Although the conditions in which China found itself at the time of Mao’s death inspired the urgency of Deng’s reforms, the political character of the regime compels the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to seek doctrinal legitimation. The CCP conceives its ideology to be comprised of two analytically discrete components: “theory” (Zilun)and “thought” (sixiung). Theory consists of the “universal truths” of Marxism-Leninism which provide China with its Weltanschauung. For its part, “thought” is the interpretation and application of “theory” to the prevailing conditions in China. In effect, “thought” enables the translation of “theory” into specific policy.2 The designation by the Chinese communists of a political leader’s ideas as “thought” is thus a momentous decision. Throughout the history of the People’s Republic, only the ideas of Mao Zedong were accorded that status. Although the party has employed Deng’s reformist ideas as its guide and legitimation since 1978, for many years it refrained from identifying those ideas as “thought.” Instead, the Party was careful in 1. Piekalkievicz and Penn (1995) p. 27. 2. Schurmann (1966) pp. 22,23.

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referring to those ideas as the “spirit” (jingsheng), “line” (luxiun), or the “reformist thought” (guige sixiung) of Deng Xiaoping.3 The party’s reservation concerning the status of Deng’s ideas began to change in 1992. In June, in a conversation with Holland’s prime minister, Premier Li Peng was the first PRC official to publicly employ the expression “Deng Xiaoping thought,” calling it “China’s precious treasure.“4 In October, the 14th Party Congress decided to inscribe “Deng Xiaoping thought” into both its work report as well as the revised CCP Constitution. In effect, Deng’s thought had assumed a status equal to that of Mao.5 After that, party and government leaders began giving lavish public accolades to Deng, contrary to his oft-stated admonition against a “cult of personality and placing individuals above the organization.“6 As an example, in his report to the 14th Party Congress, CCP chief Jiang Zemin called Deng “the chief engineer of the reform and modernization of Chinese socialism.“All across China, newspaper editorials trumpeted that “Deng Xiaoping thought is the spiritual foundation of the people.“’ It was announced that an annotated compilation of Deng’s speeches, entitled “The Thought of Deng,” would soon be published. Billboards of Deng appeared throughout Beijing. There were also a documentary, a special portrait, books, and tapes on Deng, all employing the inflated language that was once used to describe Mao during the Cultural Revolution. Deng was a “giant,” a “superman,” “a history-making great man,” and a “warm spring breeze blowing across the great land of China.“8 The next year, in 1993, Deng’s stature appeared to have been elevated to yet a higher level. That May, in a speech at the 13th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Youth League, CCP Standing Committee member Hu Jintao characterized Deng’s collection of ideas on “building socialism with Chinese characteristics” as “lilun” or theory. That “theory,” Hu maintained, was the “newest fruit” produced by the union of Marxism with China’s concrete circumstances. It was the “Marxism of contemporary China,” and the “tool for leading the party to realize its new historic mission.“9 In effect, Deng’s ideas were no longer mere “thought,” they had attained the rarefied status of “theory,” previously accorded to only Marxism and Leninism. lo In August 1993, on the eve of Deng’s 89th birthday, the party called Deng Xiaoping theory the “fountainhead for realizing socialist modernization.” In October, Central Military Affairs Commission Vice Chairmen Liu Huaqing and Zhang Zhen stated that Deng’s “theory on building socialism with Chinese characteristics” was the “successor and developer of Mao Zedong Thought.“*1 At the same time, Shanghai’s Social Science Academy established an Institute for the Study of Deng Xiaoping Theory. l2 The publication, in November 1993, of the third volume of Deng’s Selected Works was the occasion for a nationwide campaign to “conscientiously study” his ideas.‘3 The campaign’s scope and methods were reminiscent of past campaigns that exalted 3. Shijie Ribao (World Journal, hereafter WJ), February 15, 1992, p. A2. 4. WJ June 17, 1992, p. A12; and June 15, 1992, p. A2. 5. WJ, October 21, 1992, p. A12; and Wu (1993) p. A5. 6. Deng (1984b) “On the Reform of the System of Party and State Leadership,” p. 313. 7. Editorial, WJ, October 17, 1992, p. A2. 8. Tefft (1992) p. 1; and Wu (1993) p. A5. 9. WJ, May4, 1993, p. A12. IO. WJAugust 23, 1994, p. AlO. At the height of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, Mao Zedong was briefly credited with having lifted Marxism-Leninism to a new “theoretical” plane. 11. WJ, October 31, 1993, p. A9. 12. WJ, August 22, 1993, p. A9; and August 2, 1993, p. A3. 13. “Deng’s Book a Best-Seller,” in San Francisco Chronicle (hereafter SFC), November 12, 1993, p. A12.

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Mao.14 Party elder Bo Yibo said that Deng “found a way to build socialism with Chinese characteristics which Mao Zedong had sought for but was unable to find.“i5 In July 1994, at a CCP symposium on theory and propaganda in Beijing, Deputy Director of the Propaganda Bureau Zheng Bijian called on the participants to “raise Deng Xiaoping theory to a higher level to become the spiritual pillar of the entire party and nation.” That August 8, an article in China’s Guungming ribao insisted that Deng “had pioneered a new territory within Marxism” and, “in building socialism with Chinese characteristics, accomplished a major contribution of historic importance.“i6 Various commentators have interpreted the ascension of Deng’s ideas to the level of “thought” and “theory” as an effort either by a dying old man to purchase immortality, or by his followers to fortify their position in the imminent struggle for succession.i7 While all of this is probably true, the ideas that make up Deng’s ideology have tended to be neglected at best, and at worst, dismissed as adhoc efforts at resolving the grave problems left by Mao. l* Although Deng’s reformist policies were necessitated by the catastrophic state of the Chinese economy after Mao’s death, that does not mean Deng did not make an independent ideological case for his reforms, or that the case made is empty of theoretical interest. More importantly, through his ideas, Deng Xiaoping managed to transform Marxism-Leninism into what it never was-an ideology of developmental nationalism. Marxism-Leninism

and Developmental Nationalism

One of the abiding curiosities of the 20th century must be the phenomenon of Marxist revolutions in societies where Marx and Engels would never expect a workers’ revolution to occur. In complete contradiction to the precepts of classical Marxism, “proletarian” revolutions succeeded in underdeveloped societies instead of mature industrial economies. Beginning with the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, self-proclaimed Marxist revolutionaries succeeded only in societies where peasants comprised the majority of the population. After the revolutionaries acceded to power, they were confronted everywhere with the vexing paradox of creating socialism in a primitive economy. On this matter, classical Marxism and Leninism could provide neither guidance nor illumination. It was left to each socialist state to improvise a way out of the dilemma. In the case of China, for an initial period after its inauguration, the People’s Republic copied the Soviet economic model. Beginning in the latter half of the 195Os, the economic vision of Mao Zedong increasingly dominated. Mao’s economic strategy was a direct reversal of classical Marxism’s specification on the relationship between base and superstructure. He was convinced that the collective will-power of the masses could transform China’s economy of poverty. If each individual’s consciousness were transformed, their collective enthusiasm and dedication would create an advanced industrial economy. Instead of being the reflection of the economic base, the superstructure would be the engine of socio-economic change. Not only did Mao’s strategy fail in industrializing China, his quest to transform 14. According to the Hong Kong magazine, Jingbao, as reported in WJ, December 4, 1993, p. A14. 15. A statement made by Bo to Dangxiao luntan, a communist party publication, as reported in WJ, November 6, 1993, p, A12; and November 9, 1993, p. A2. 16. Editorial, WJ, August 22, 1994, p. A2. 17. WJ, August 22, 1994, pp. A2, A9. 18. Dittmer (1993) p. 3; and Rozman (1987) pp. 13-14.

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mass consciousness led to ceaseless campaigns against class enemies, real or imagined. Those campaigns took some 35 million lives, almost destroyed the party itself, and brought China to the brink of ruin. After Mao’s death in 1976, not only did the communist party have to repair its tattered legitimacy, it also had to resolve the original problem of making socialism in an underdeveloped economy. Deng Xiaoping, who ultimately succeeded as paramount leader, clearly recognized the problem. Admitting that neither Marx nor Lenin could be expected “to provide ready answers” to questions that arose years after their deaths, Deng maintained that each country must build socialism according to its own conditions. “There are not and cannot be fixed models.“@ Mary Matossian, in a seminal article, noted the prevalence of a certain type of ideology among the less-developed nations. Seemingly disparate ideologies all shared a common mission in an environment of delayed industrialization. Irrespective of its particular contents, Matossian believed that the most effective developmental ideologies employed pragmatic standards “to determine exactly” what elements should be included and what excluded.*O As an example, an appeal to nationalism can be useful for economic development in that it imparts to people a sense of collective identity, pride, and purpose. A developmental ideology may seek to inspire with a vision of a utopian future, spurring heroic efforts of sacrifice and economic construction. The ideology may also urge the importation of sophisticated technology and skills from advanced industrial societies, including the west. What is essential, according to Matossian, is that none of the elements exists “as an axiomatic, self justified good.” Whatever is borrowed from the west, retained from the past, or envisioned for the future, should be employed only as a means towards the advancement of the greater national good. In the final analysis, the ideology’s contents must meet the pragmatic test of that which “will tend to strengthen the nation.“** The reformist ideology fashioned by Deng is just such an ideology of delayed industrialization. For the most part, it employs a pragmatic standard for the selection of its idea contents. More than that, it will be argued that Deng succeeded in transforming Marxism-Leninism into a developmental nationalist ideology by returning to the fundamental precepts of classical Marxism.

Deng’s Ideology of Delayed Industrialization Historic

Mission

To begin with, in contrast to Mao’s fixation on class struggle, Deng identified the historic mission of 20th-century Chinese revolutions, including the communist revolution, as the economic development of China. He stated that the fundamental purpose, “the first thing,” of the Chinese communist revolution was the elimination of poverty through “the emancipation of the productive forces.“** In his judgment, from 1957 until the death of Mao, the party was not able “to figure out what socialism is and how to build it” and thus, “made a lot of mistakes.“*3 The ideas and policies of the “left ” “plagued” China, which hindered economic 19. Deng (1994) “Let Us Put the Past Behind Us and Open Up a New Era,” May 16, 1989, pp. 284,285. 20. Matossian (1971) pp. 113, 118. 21. Ibid., p. 120. 22. Deng (1994) “Excerpts from Talks Given in Wuchang, Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shanghai,” and “We are Undertaking an Entirely New Endeavour,” pp. 358, 250. 23. Deng (1994) “We Shall Draw on Historical Experience and Guard Against Wrong Tendencies,” p. 225.

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development and resulted in a “sluggish” economy. The standard of living of the people was “very low,” with a per capita GNP in 1978 of less than US$250.24 Deng further explained,25 Many strange things happened in those days . . .. [Pleople were told that they should be content with poverty and backwardness and that it was better to be poor under socialism and communism than to be rich under capitalism. That was the sort of rubbish peddled by the Gang of Four. There is no such thing as socialism and communism with poverty . . ., According to Marxism, communist society is a society in which there is overwhelming material abundance. Socialism is the first stage of communism; it means expanding the productive forces . . .. For Deng, the fundamental task that faced the nation was economic development, which required accelerated technological innovation, increased productivity, product quality enhancement, and managerial competence. In making his case, Deng placed primary emphasis on the development of the “forces of production”-an argument that would become his theoretical justification for economic reforms. A Return to Classical Marxism What enabled Deng to identify economic development as the historic mission of the Chinese communist revolution was his understanding of classical Marxism, in contrast to Mao who displayed little grasp of the intellectual complexity of classical Marxism. In Moscow’s Sun Yat-sen University, Deng was enrolled in a course devoted to historical materialism, the philosophy of history of Marx and Engels. He also received instruction on Marxist economic theories from a standard textbook by Karl Kautsky, entitled The Economic Theory of Karl Marx. Although Deng rarely cited references in developing his arguments, he clearly displayed a certain grasp of some of the central theses of Marxist social and economic theory, in particular the classical Marxist conception of the relationship between productive forces and productive relations. This was evident in the following quote from Deng’s 1975 “On the General Program of Work for the Whole Party and the Whole Nation”? Marxism holds that, within the contradictions between the productive forces and the relations of production . . . and between the economic base and the superstructure, the productive forces . . . and the economic base generally play the principal and decisive role. Whoever denies this is not a materialist. The issue of the primacy of productive forces is not an arcane Marxist preoccupation, but involves, instead, some of the most basic problems that have collected around revolutionary Marxist regimes since the Bolshevik revolution. Until V. I. Lenin revised the conceptual schemata of classical Marxism, no informed Marxist believed that socialist revolution could come to economically immature communities. Marx had been clear on the determinant role of the forces of production. In the Poverty of Philosophy, he maintained that “in acquiring new productive forces, men change their mode of production; and in changing their mode of production, in changing the way of earning their living, they change all their social relations.“2* As 24. Deng (1994) “We Shall Expand Political 25. Ibid. 26. See the account in Franz (1988) chap. 5.

27. Deng (1977) p. 221. 28. Marx (n.d.) p. 122.

Democracy and Carry Out Economic Reform,” p. 121.

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productive forces change, social relations change; as social relations change, all of life changes. According to Marx, “the multitude of productive forces accessible to men determines the nature of society”29 as well as the “forms of intercourse” between human beings. Even the “phantoms formed in the human brain”-religious convictions, ethics, and law-were “sublimates” of the more fundamental processes of production. “Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life.“30 In the final analysis, the “productive forces . . . are the basis of all . . . history.“31 It follows that socialism could only be the product of a fully-developed economy in that a primitive economic base could hardly support the advanced productive and distributive relations of socialism. As early as the German Ideology of 1845, Marx had insisted that while peripheral, economically less-developed areas might be drawn into revolution, socialist revolution could come only to advanced industrial systems, for only those systems possessed the productive potential to fully satisfy human need without making recourse to invidious class distinctions and oppressive political rule. If an attempt were made to introduce socialism into an economically underdeveloped environment, Engels believed that the only result possible was a “slide back . . . to [the] narrow limits” of the old system. True socialist liberation was a function of “the level of development of the material means of existence.” To build communism on a primitive economic base would be a “chiliastic dream fantasy.“32 It came as no surprise to the orthodox Marxists that Lenin and his followers were faced with the problems created by their premature revolution in Russia. In what were to be the last years of his life, Lenin recognized that contradiction when he attempted to develop the Soviet Union’s retarded economic base with his New Economic Policy. For all the talk of socialism, Lenin reintroduced capitalist modalities, including differential wages. Notwithstanding his theory of capitalism as international imperialism, Lenin courted foreign investors and leased out extractive rights to natural resources. All in an effort to create socialism in a backward economy. The Chinese communist revolution was undertaken in even more primitive economic environs. Mao never seemed to fully grasp the problem of this fundamental disjuncture. Instead, he conceived the superstructure to be instrumental toward economic transformation. He was determined that superstructural elements like revolutionary commitment, ideological zeal, and selfless dedication would shape reality into his utopian vision.33 In effect, Mao seized on the power of his convictions “to change the world arbitrarily,“34 in his quest to create socialism out of thin air. In contrast, Deng recognized that China’s poverty was a consequence of its immature industrial and technological base. He argued that the development of the “forces of production,” not productive relations, was the engine of progressive history. The dream of socialism required the resources of a fully developed industrial system. The Primary Stage of Socialism

The disagreement between Deng and the Maoists on the productive forces centered on a more basic issue of whether China, after 1949, had successfully and securely 29. Marx and Engels (1964) p. 41. 30. Ibid., pp. 37-38. 31. Marx (1955) “Letter to Annenkov,” December 28, 1846, p. 442. 32. Engels (1976) “The Peasant War in Germany,” pp. 469471. 33. Mao insisted that it was change in the “superstructure” of society, instead of the “productive forces,” that generated revolutionary transformation. See Mao (1977) p. 51. 34. Schram (1993) p. 410.

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entered into the period of socialism. The answer to that question would determine the identity of the principal contradiction in Chinese society. After the collapse of the Great Leap and the growing Sino-Soviet dispute, Mao began to seriously doubt whether a socialist system really had come into existence in China. By 1962, he decided that socialism was a sustained and arduous process, in which the abolition of private property was merely a first necessary step. During that long process, socialism would be continuously imperiled by the constant reproduction of “new bourgeois elements.” The principal contradiction in society was the struggle between the “proletariat” and the “bourgeoisie,” between the “people” and its “enemies’‘-a struggle that Mao anticipated to be “a protracted, complex, sometimes even violent affair.” These were the ideas that subtended Mao’s theory of continuing the revolution, which was adopted as official CCP ideology in 1969 and reaffirmed in 1973.35 Deng had always thought otherwise. As early as 1956, in his “Report on the Revision of the Constitution of the Communist Party of China,” Deng was convinced that socialism had taken secure roots in China because of the abolition of private ownership and the socialization of the means of production. The result was “a fundamental change” in China’s class relations: the working class had become “the leading class,” and the bourgeoisie as a class was “on its way to extinction.“36 As a consequence, Deng thought it pointless to speak of classes in a socialist society. As he put it? Casual labourers and farm labourers have disappeared. Poor and middle peasants have all become members of agricultural producers’ co-operatives, and before long the distinction between them will become merely a thing of historical interest. . .. The vast majority of our intellectuals have now come over politically to the side of the working class . . .. The conditions in which the urban poor and the professional people used to exist as independent social strata are virtually no longer present . . .. What is the point, then, of classifying these social strata into two different categories? And even if we were to try and devise a classification, how could we make it neat and clear-cut?

For Deng, class warfare no longer constituted a concern for Chinese socialism. In Deng’s judgment, the principal contradiction in society was the “very low” level of China’s productive forces. Resolving that contradiction through reform must be the party’s “central task” because socialism could be fully consolidated only by modernizing and developing the productive forces.j8 Deng maintained, however, that since China had been building socialism for only a few decades, it was still in the “primary” or “underdeveloped” stage of socialism.39 This notion allowed Deng to explain away mistakes of the past and present, as well as justify the economic reforms. On the one hand, Deng could argue for the continuation of socialism and the dictatorship of the communist party because China had made the transition to socialism. On the other hand, since Chinese socialism was only in a “primary” stage, it was understandable that there would be superstructural detritus from the “feudal” past. In this manner, Deng could explain the seeming anomalies of Mao’s one-man 35. Sullivan (1985) pp. 71-72. 36. Deng (1984a) “Report on the Revision of the Constitution of the Communist Party of China,” p. 2. 37. Ibid., pp. 29-30. 38. Deng (1984b) “Uphold the Four Cardinal Principles,” p. 180; and (1984a) “Speech at the Opening Ceremony of the National Conference on Science,” p. 41. 39. Deng (1994) “Excerpts From Talks Given in Wuchang” and “In Everything We Do We Must Proceed from the Realities of the Primary Stage of Socialism,” pp. 367, 248.

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rule and “patriarchal” cult of personality, as well as the party-state’s bureaucratism and political sinecure. 4o Being in the “primary” stage of socialism also explained China’s backwardness and the need for market reforms to develop the productive forces. According to Deng, China had “wasted 20 years . . . while . . . the world developed rapidly.“41 With Mao dead, China would make up for lost time. The party must “find a way” to develop rapidly. Deng’s Four Modernizations would transform China into “a modern and powerful socialist state.” As he put it, “Pauperism is not socialism, still less communism.“42 World View

The urgency of modernization was informed by Deng’s Weltanschauung. Deng saw the world as dominated by advanced industrial “hegemonist” and “imperialist” nations who used their power to “bully” the less developed nations, “interfering” in the latter’s efforts at economic development and political independence.43 Even more than in the past, the contemporary world was inhospitable for poor countries. Their environment had become more difficult, requiring that they “struggle even harder.“44 In the case of China, quite aside from its poverty, other factors made its circumstances even more challenging. It was surrounded by newly-developed economies that might “move ahead” of China and capture its export markets. The fall of communism in eastern Europe and the Soviet Union made China one of the last bastions of socialism in the world. Deng warned that “There are many people in the world who . . . are out to get us.” China must be particularly wary of capitalist industrialized countries because “Capitalists want to defeat socialists in the long run.” In the past, the capitalist countries employed weapons and atomic bombs. Today, their method was the “peaceful evolution” of China away from socialism. Given the hostile environs surrounding China, if it were to remain underdeveloped, it “would have no future.“45 Nationalism

In a difficult and hostile world, nations remained the basic units that could ensure the collective wellbeing of peoples. Deng believed it imperative for China to “look after [its] own” and safeguard its own interests, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.46 That had not been the case in the past. Stating that “I am a Chinese, and I am familiar with the history of foreign aggression against China,“47 Deng recounted the litany of humiliations the Chinese had endured for over a century since the Opium War at the hands of the imperialist powers. That was a time when Chinese were “looked down upon” by foreigners.48 Deng maintained that it was the founding of the People’s Republic that restored dignity to the Chinese. As he put it, “The modern image of China was not created by the government of the 40. Deng (1984b) “On the Reform of the System,” pp. 317-318.

41. Deng (1994) “We Should Draw on the Experience of Other Countries,” p. 261. 42. Deng (1994) “Building a Socialism with a Specifically Chinese Character,” “Speech at the National Conference on Science” and “We are Undertaking an Entirely New Endeavour,” pp. 40, 73, 250. 43. Deng (1994) “Maintain the Tradition of Hard Struggle,” p. 283. 44. Deng (1994) “We Must Adhere to Socialism and Prevent Peaceful Evolution towards Capitalism,’ p. 333. 45. Deng (1994) “Review Your Experience and Use Professionally Trained People,” “With Stable Policies of Reform and Opening to the Outside World, China can have Great Hopes for the Future,” and “We are Confident that We can Handle China’s Affairs Well,” pp. 357, 309, 316, 310. 46. Deng (1994) “We are Confident” and “No One can Shake Socialist China,” pp. 316,318. 47. Deng (1994) “We are Working to Revitalize the Chinese Nation,” p. 344. 48. Deng (1994) “One Country, Two Systems,” p. 70.

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late Qing Dynasty, nor by the northern warlords, nor by Chiang Kai-shek and his son. It is the People’s Republic of China that has changed China’s image.“49 With its founding, the Chinese people finally “achieved status” and “stood up.“50 No foreign country could expect China to be its “vassal” or submit to anything harmful to China’s interests.sl Although the Chinese had felt inferior for more than a century, they now had confidence in themselves and would no longer be intimidated.52 Notwithstanding their innate intelligence and talents, Deng believed that the Chinese were effective only when united. 53Just as the communist revolution restored self respect to the Chinese people, only the continuation of the People’s Republic could ensure their international independence and dignity. “Only socialism can save China, and only socialism can develop China.” It was China’s unique brand of socialism that gave the nation its autonomy. Without socialism, China would eventually become “a dependency” of other countries, subject to “the will of the Americans, or of people in other developed countries . . ..“5* Deng clearly saw the Chinese nation as being larger than the People’s Republic, encompassing all of the world’s ethnic Chinese. He asserted that, “no matter what clothes they wear or what political stand they take,” all Chinese had a sense of pride in China and wanted to see it become strong and prosperous. But he did draw a distinction between the Chinese nation and the Chinese state on the mainland, insisting that “We don’t demand that . . . [Chinese] be in favour of China’s socialist system; we only ask them to love the motherland . . ..“55 Calling on what he believed to be their innate sense of nationalism, Deng appealed to the “tens of millions” of ethnic Chinese across the world to “love our country and help to develop it” because, in the last analysis, the “image of China depends on the mainland, and the prospects for China’s development also depend on the mainland.“56 The Three Stages of the Economic Development of China But simple nationalism was not enough. For Deng, in order to be genuinely autonomous, a nation must be economically strong and prosperous57 because only economic development could deliver the advanced military capabilities that would enable China “to stand firm forever” in the world.58 As Deng put it,59 If it were not for the atomic bomb, the hydrogen bomb and the satellites we have launched since the 196Os, China would not have its present international standing as a great, influential country. These achievements demonstrate a nation’s abilities and are a sign of its level of prosperity and development. 49. Ibid. 50. Deng (1994) “Maintain the Tradition of Hard Struggle,” p. 282. 51. Ibid.; and Deng (1984a) “Opening Speech at the Twelfth National Congress of the CPC,” p. 86.

52. Deng (1994) “One Country, Two Systems, ” “We are Working to Revitalize,” and “We are Confident,” pp. 70, 345: 316. 53. Deng (1994) “We are Working to Revitalize,” p. 345. 54. Deng (1994) “Urgent Tasks of China’s Third Generation of Collective Leadership,” p. 302. 55. Deng (1994)“We are Working to Revitalize” and “One Country, Two Systems,” pp. 345, 70. 56. Deng (1994) “For the Great Unity of the Entire Chinese Nation, ” “Excerpts from Talks” and “We are Working to Revitalize,” pp. 164, 366, 345. 57. Deng (1994) “We Must Promote Education in the Four Cardinal Principles and Adhere to the Policies of Reform and Opening to the Outside World,” p. 202. 58. Deng (1994) “A Letter to the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China,” p. 313. 59. Deng (1994) “China Must Take Its Place in the Field of High Technology,” p. 273.

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According to Deng, since China lagged behind the industrial nations by two to three decades, the “overriding” nationwide task “for a considerable time to come” would be to work “single-mindedly” for economic modernization. The success or failure of that task would determine nothing less than China’s “destiny for generations to come.“6O Deng conceived economic modernization to take three stages. The goal of the first stage was the doubling of China’s per capita gross national product (GNP) from US$250 in 1980 to US$500 by 1990, so as to “ensure that the people have adequate

food and clothing.” That objective was accomplished “ahead of time” by 19@L61 Stage two’s goal was another doubling of the per capita GNP to US$lOOO by the year 2000, at which time China would “have shaken off poverty and achieved comparative prosperity.” Its GNP of US$l trillion would make it “quite powerful” and “in the front ranks of countries.” Even a modest defence allocation of I per cent of the GNP would mean a sum of US$lO billion, with which “a great deal” could be accomplished.62 That US$l trillion would be “a new starting point” from which the third stage of China’s economic modernization would be launched. That last stage would conclude by the year 2030 or 2050. With its industrialization completed, China would achieve parity with moderately developed countries.63 For all that to happen, Deng proposed a number of necessary instrumentalities. The Reform of the Command Economy. Deng clearly identified the command economy as a major obstacle to China’s economic development. He stated that the adoption of the Soviet model in the early 1950s was a mistake because it “hampered” the economy by emphasizing quantity instead of the quality of goods. The management of the command economy was entrusted to a political bureaucracy that was overstaffed, burdened with overlapping organizations, complicated procedures, and “extremely low” efficiency, and “utterly incompatible with large-scale production.“64 In Deng’s judgment, the irrational pricing system was another problem.“[C]ontrary to the law of value,” all prices were set by the state. The absence of a rational pricing policy led to state subsidies of “tens of billions of yuan” a year to make up for the disparity between purchasing and selling prices. The “heavy burden” of price subsidies diverted resources away from economic development and from educational, scientific, and cultural undertakings.65 For Deng, all of this pointed to the need for reform. Market mechanisms would have to be introduced to improve productivity and efficiency. The pricing system would have to be rationalized. State subsidies would have to be reduced, if not eliminated altogether. The economy would have to be freed from the mismanagement of the political bureaucracy by devolving power to local governments and state-owned enterprises. Private businesses would have to be sanctioned. 60. Deng (1984b) “Uphold the Four Cardinal Principles,” p. 171 and (1984a) “Speech Greeting the Fourth Congress of Chinese Writers and Artists,” p. 79. 61. Deng (1994) “We Shall Draw on Historical Experience,” p. 224. 62. Ibid.; and (1994) “Speech at the Third Plenary Session of the Central Advisory Commission of the Communist Party of China,” p. 95. 63. Deng (1994) “Speech at the Third Plenary Session” and “We Should Draw On the Experience of Other Countries,” pp. 96,261. 64. Deng (1994) “We Shall Speed Up Reform,” and “Remarks on the Domestic Economic Situation,” pp. 235, 162; and (1984a) “Emancipate the Mind, Seek Truth from Facts and Unite as One in Looking to the Future,” p. 71. 65. Deng (1994) “We Must Rationalize Prices and Accelerate the Reform,” p. 257.

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Deng justified all of this by insisting that the reforms did not mean that China was going capitalist. He explained? mhe difference between capitalism and socialism is not a market economy as opposed to a planned economy. Socialism has regulation by market forces, and capitalism has control through planning. Do you think capitalism has absolute freedom without any control? . . . Both a planned economy and a market economy are necessary. If we did not have a market economy, we would have to reconcile ourselves to lagging behind.

Opening to the West. In addition to the introduction of market mechanisms, Deng also advocated the opening of China to trade, investment, and other contacts with the outside world. This was in marked contrast to Mao’s autarkic policies. Deng attributed China’s backwardness to the centuries of isolation during the Ming and Qing dynasties, and under the rule of Mao. If China were to develop, it “must persist in opening to the outside world” because “for a country to isolate itself is only to its own disadvantage.” There must not be “blind opposition” to anything that is foreign. China could “catch up and surpass” the advanced industrial countries only by sustaining a long-term policy of learning from them. Even after China has become developed, it must still continue to learn from other countries “in areas where they are particularly strong.“67 Under Deng’s plan, China would trade with other countries and import their capital and technology. Special Economic Zones and open cities would be established, which would attract foreign investment with favorable terms and conditions. International academic exchanges and scientific cooperation would be expanded. In advocating contact with the outside world, Deng reasoned that not “everything developed in capitalist countries is of a capitalist nature.” Science, technology, and advanced management techniques “have no class character” and could be useful for any society. Deng argued that China would ultimately benefit from its open policy to the world as long as Chinese national interests were served. Foreign imports must serve, not threaten, the integrity of “socialist production.” And so long as China interacted with other countries “on the basis of equality and mutual benefit,“68 national sovereignty and dignity would also be preserved. The Enhancement of Science and Technology. Deng’s view of science and technology was yet another example of his departure from Maoism. He maintained that “Marx said that science and technology are part of the productive forces.” More than that, Deng identified science and technology as a “primary” productive force that, when developed, would lead to the “rapid development” of the entire economy.69 Speaking very much like a technological determinist, Deng exulted that “science is a great thing” and urged that “its importance” be recognized through the allocation of more “money and effort.” Scientific research and training should be enhanced.70 66. Deng (1994) “Seize the Opportunity

to Develop the Economy,” p. 351. 67. Deng (1994) “Speech at National Conference on Science,” “ Speech at the Third Plenary Session,” and “We Must Promote Education,” pp. 45, 96, 202. 68. Deng (1984b) “Answers to the Italian Journalist Oriana Fallaci,” p. 333; and (1984a), “Opening Speech at the Twelfth National Congress of the CPC,” p. 87. 69. Deng (1994) “Science and Technology Constitute a Primary Productive Force,” and “Speech at the National Conference on Science,” pp. 269,41. 70. Deng (1994) “Urgent Tasks of China’s Third Generation,” and “Our Work in All Fields Should Contribute to the Building of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics,” pp. 303, 33.

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Education must be expanded, “even if it means slowing down in other fields.” As Deng put it, “We have already wasted 20 years . . .. If we paid no attention to education, science and technology, we would waste another 20 years, and the consequences would be dreadful to contemplate.“7* The Treatment of Intellectuals. The promotion of science and technology required attendant changes in the relations of production pertaining to intellectuals. Here, Deng’s views once again departed significantly from those of Mao. Mao was suspicious of, and antipathetic to, intellectuals, identifying them as members of the “black” capitalist class who were more “expert” than “red.” To Mao, the very things that made them intellectuals-their knowledge, training, and critical disposition-made them politically suspect. As a consequence, under Mao, intellectuals were repeatedly subjected to special abuse. Deng could not have taken a more different position on this matter. He derided the Maoists for their anti-intellectualism-their elevation of “an ignorant reactionary clown” who handed in a blank examination paper as a model of “redness.“72 Deng refused to categorize intellectuals as bourgeois. Instead, he believed that “Everyone who works, whether with his hands or with his brain, is part of the working people in a socialist society.” Intellectuals in a socialist society differed from other workers “only insofar as they perform different roles in the social division of labour.” Having identified intellectuals as members of the working class, Deng also dismissed the Maoist dichotomy of “red” versus “expert.” He redefined “red” to mean anyone who “loves our socialist motherland and is serving socialism . . ..” In effect, according to Deng, any “expert” was also “red” provided that his work contributed to the motherland and he refrained from taking “a reactionary political stand” against the party and socialism. As Deng explained, “So long as they keep to the socialist political of their socialist stand . . . their devoted work is a concrete manifestation consciousness.“74 In Deng’s view, intellectuals should no longer be vilified for being intellectuals. On the contrary, he urged that they be raised “to first place,” given more respect, and rewarded with higher salaries. Knowledge and its pursuit must be valued; teachers must be better remunerated, no matter “how many difficulties we have.” Everything must be done to encourage the return of the tens of thousands of Chinese students studying abroad, “regardless of their previous political attitudes.” Deng proposed the creation of a comprehensive scientific research center to increase employment opportunities. “Otherwise, these people will not come back, and it will be a great loss to the country.“75 Material Incentives. It was not just intellectuals who should be provided with material incentives. Deng apparently believed that human beings in general would work harder and better if they benefitted directly from their labor. He maintained that “revolution takes place on the basis of the need for material benefit.” Not only was it “idealism” to ask people to work in selfless sacrifice, “it won’t work in the long run.“76 7 1. Deng (1994) “Science and Technology,” pp. 270,269. 72. Deng (1994) “Speech at National Conference on Science,” pp. 45-46. 73. Ibid., p. 43. 74. Ibid., pp. 46,48. 75. Deng (1994) “Science and Technology, ” “Excerpts from Talks,” and “Speech at the Ceremony Celebrating the 35th Anniversary of the Founding of the People’s Republic of China,” pp. 270, 366, 79. 76. Deng (1984a) “Emancipate the Mind,” p. 67.

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The Promotion of Achievement. Deng proposed that individuals who were high achievers and talented be given special treatment and tangible rewards because they were essential to economic development. The rewards included promotion “without hesitation,” pay raises of “more than one step at a time,” and “free rein” in their work.77 Let Some Get Rich. Deng clearly recognized that the principle of “more pay for more work” would result in differential income and wealth, but thought it “only fair that people who work hard should prosper.” He was convinced that egalitarianism would not work and saw the rich as being “an impressive example” that would motivate others to achieve. In this manner, the whole economy would “advance wave upon wave.“78 To avoid a permanent “polarization” between the rich and poor, Deng imagined that when the time was “right,” the government would use taxation to enforce a redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor, and from the prosperous coastal to the economically backward inland regions. But Deng was rather vague as to when that time would be, suggesting instead that the party “study when to raise this question and how to settle it.” He cautioned against “overhastiness” because it would “only cause damage to economic development.” Deng did mention the year 2000 as possibly “the right time” for reducing the wealth gap spawned by his reforms. By that time, he expected that the Chinese people would be living “a fairly comfortable life” with a per capita GNP of US$lOOO, and could afford to share their wealth.79 Necessary Conditions for Economic Modernization.

For the economic modernization he envisioned, Deng had in mind certain necessary conditions that must accompany the process. Of these, order and stability seemed to be paramount. Order and Stability. Deng was convinced that the successful development of China was entirely dependent on the maintenance of order and stability, which he believed to be also in the world’s interest. Deng was convinced that if China were to descend into “turmoil,” its fate would be far worse than in the days of the Cultural Revolution when China had “prestigious leaders” like Mao and Zhou Enlai to hold itself together. Without that glue, China would fragment into separate regions and deteriorate into civil war, “with blood flowing like water.” The economic and transportation systems would be devastated, leading “hundreds of millions" of refugees to flee into neighboring countries, resulting in a “disaster on a world scale.“*0 Party Dictatorship. China’s “overriding

interest” therefore must be stability, and anything that could help maintain stability was “good.“*i According to Deng, the “democratic dictatorship” of the Chinese Communist Party was one of those “good” things. Despite his admission that the CCP had made many mistakes, Deng still insisted that it was “the centre” that ensured political stability and unity.82 77. Deng (1994) “In the First Decade, Prepare for the Second,” p. 27. 78. Deng (1994) “Our Work in All Fields” and “Make a Success of Special Economic Zones and Open More Cities to the Outside World,” pp. 33, 62; and (1984a) “Emancipate the Mind,” p. 73. 79. Deng (1994) “Excerpts from Talks,” p. 362; and (1984a), “Interview of Deng Xiaoping by Robert Maxwell on Current Affairs,” p. 97. 80. Deng (1994) “China Will Never Allow Other Countries to Interfere in its Internal Affairs,” p. 347. 81. Deng (1994) “Urgent Tasks of China’s Third Generation,” p. 304. 82. Deng (1994) “Take a Clear-cut Stand,” pp. 196, 195.

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In order to perform its critical role, the party must be internally cohesive. It must not degenerate into factional rivalries. Deng was particularly wary of the “leftists” who opposed his reforms and “would like nothing better than nationwide confusion.” He feared their resurgence and warned darkly that “Don’t think that there can be no more chaos in China . . ..“*3 Much depended on the ability of the party’s leaders to stay united on major policy goals and directives. As long as the leaders “remain stable and firm, nobody will be able to do anything against China.“84 Ideological Solidarity. Party unity was conceived by Deng to depend on its members’

ideological solidarity “based on Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought.“85 For that reason, Deng refrained from the total denunciation of Mao, although he held Mao and his policies to be responsible for untold human suffering and economic devastation. Instead, he implored his party against being “too critical of the mistakes Mao made in his later years.” Mao was the founding father and charismatic leader nonpareil of Chinese communism. If Mao were rejected, there would be “ideological confusion and political instability” because the legitimacy of the CCP would be jeopardized. As Deng put it, “To negate the contributions of such a great historical figure would mean to deny all our achievements during an important period of the country’s history.“86 Bourgeois Liberalization. According to Deng, political and social stability also required

a continuous effort to combat “bourgeois liberalization.” By bourgeois liberalization, Deng meant the rejection of socialism and communist party rule, and especially the “wholesale westernization of China.“*7 Deng identified the exponents of bourgeois liberalization to be those who “worship” western notions of “democracy,” “human rights,” and “freedom.” He clearly equated those notions with the anarchic “mass democracy” of the Cultural Revolution, and was convinced that the “evil trend” of unchecked bourgeois liberalization “would plunge the country into turmoil once more.“** Deng expected that the struggle to combat bourgeois liberalization would be protracted for 50 to 70 years until China became economically developed. But in that struggle, he rejected the Maoist method of “launching political movements” and argued instead for “education and persuasion,” because Mao’s campaigns of mass mobilization had been enormously destructive of both the party and the economy.89 The Rejection of Western Democracy. The priority Deng placed on stability also accounted for his rejection of western democracy, although he did not seem to object to it in principle, maintaining that “We have no objection to the western countries doing it that way.“gODeng simply thought that western democracy was unsuitable for China because it valued the individual over the group. He also found the western 83. Deng (1984b) “The Organizational Line Guarantees the Implementation of the Ideological and Political

Lines,” July 29, 1979, p. 199. 84. Deng (1994) “With Stable Policies of Reform,” p. 307. 85. Deng (1994) “Emancipate the Mind,” p. 69. 86. Deng (1994) “The Overriding Need is for Stability,” p. 277. 87. Deng (1994) “Reform and Opening to the Outside World can Truly Invigorate China,” p. 233. 88. Deng (1994) “We have to Clear Away Obstacles and Continue to Advance,” “Take a Clear-cut Stand” and “Bourgeois Liberalization Means Taking the Capitalist Road,” pp. 200, 196, 130. 89. Deng (1994) “China can Only Take the Socialist Road,” p. 208. 90. Deng (1994) “Speech at a Meeting with the Members of the Committee for Drafting the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,” p. 219.

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system of governing to be wasteful and inefficient. According to Deng, instead of the theoretical separation of powers into three branches of government, the American system was actually “three governments,” each pulling the country “in different directions.“9i In effect, western democracy appeared to Deng to be unbridled individualism and effective anarchy. Such a system was totally inappropriate for China. It “would only make a mess of everything.” China would not become economically developed; nor would it achieve any of the “substance” of democracy. As Deng put it, “China has a huge population; if some people demonstrated today and others tomorrow, there would be a demonstration 365 days a year . . .. [we would have no time to develop our economy.“92 Socialist Democracy. Rather than copying the West, Deng wanted China to have its

own brand of “socialist democracy.” He was not particularly clear as to what “socialist democracy” was, but a sketch can be drawn from his various pronouncements on the subject. To begin with, Deng seemed to regard “socialist democracy” as a society where the interests of the individual, “the part,” and the immediate were subordinated to those of the collective, the whole, and the long term. 93It would be a political system where power is monopolized by a single party, the communist, who would determine the superordinate collective and long term interests. Having said all that, Deng’s “socialist democracy” of defacto one-party dictatorship was not the totalitarianism of Mao Zedong. Deng’s “socialist democracy” allowed for more personal space. Deng seemed to have abandoned Mao’s ambition to transform the consciousness of each and every individual because Deng had greater confidence in the judgment of the common man. That confidence allowed for the devolution of authority to the lower levels, including the peasants, which Deng characterized as “the height of democracy.” He urged his party to have “faith that the overwhelming majority of the people are able to use their own judgment” and conceded that “The masses should have the full right and opportunity to express responsible criticisms to their leaders and to make constructive suggestions . . ..“94 While all of this is extremely vague, Deng seemed to draw a clear distinction between thought and behavior which Mao never did. Deng appeared ready to allow individuals the privacy of their opinions, as long as they refrained from directly challenging and attacking communist party rule. As he put it. “You can reserve your opinions, so long as you don’t take part in activities against the party or socialism.“95 More intriguing still, Deng seemed to conceive “socialist democracy” to be a work-in-progress, rather than an actual reality. According to Deng, “Democracy is our goal,” but it must be developed “only gradually” and not “in haste” because the country must be kept stable. He seemed to think that democracy was dependent on the educational level of the people, and seemed prepared to allow a greater measure of popular political participation when the Chinese people’s educational level had increased.96 If this analysis is correct, Deng could be granting the possibility that, as 91. Deng (1994) “Take a Clear-cut Stand,” p. 195.

92. Deng (1994) “The Overriding Need” and “Take a Clear-cut Stand,” pp. 277, 196. 93. Deng (1984b) “Uphold the Four Cardinal Principles,” p. 183. 94. Deng (1994) “Everything We Do,” “ Emancipate the Mind,” and “The Present Situation,” pp. 248,66, 242. 95. Deng (1994) “Take a Clear-cut Stand,” p. 194. 96. Deng (1994) “The Overriding Need,” “Take a Clear-cut Stand,” and “We Shall Speed up Reform,” pp. 278, 196, 240.

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China modernized and the people’s income and educational levels increased, they might begin to exercise greater independence of judgment and decision-making.

Conclusion By returning to classical Marxism’s emphasis on the productive forces, Deng Xiaoping managed to transform Marxism into a developmental nationalist ideology. The central task and focus of Deng’s ideology is the economic modernization of China. Whatever his Marxist persuasion, Deng’s ideas, for the most part, are informed by an overriding pragmatism. In order to develop China’s retarded economic base, Deng proposed such instrumentalities as privately owned businesses, differential wages, an increasingly unequal wealth distribution, as well as the importation of foreign capital and technology-all of which was anathema to the Maoist. In conformance with Matossian’s specifications, Deng refrained from regarding his instrumentalities as “axiomatic, self justified” goods. 97 Even his insistence on the retention of the socialist system and the dictatorship of the communist party were instrumental in nature. Both were justified as the means to some greater good. In the case of the socialist system, Deng argued that socialism could provide for a faster development of the productive forces than capitalism,98 although the superiority of socialism could not be proven “at the moment,” but instead must await the fulfillment of the third stage of China’s economic development when the per capita GNP had risen to US$4000. Only then could the superiority of socialism over capitalism be “better” demonstrated, and the “correctness” of Marxism be proven.99 Deng also maintained that only socialism could eliminate the greed, corruption, and injustice “inherent in capitalism and other systems of exploitation.“ioO He was also convinced that only socialism could provide for “common prosperity”-the absence of a “polarization” between rich and poor-and “eradicate” poverty for the many. Deng insisted that if China were to take “the capitalist road,” some would become rich, including a few who might become millionaires, but the “overwhelming majority” of the people would still be poor, “scarcely able to feed and clothe themselves.” He concluded that if his economic reforms should result in polarization, he would consider those reforms to have been “a failure.“1o1 Pragmatic considerations also inform Deng’s reasons for advocating a system of “socialist democracy” for China in that he believed it to be more efficient than “bourgeois” democracies. The latter, according to Deng, dissipated their energies in constant internal squabbles. That having been said, Deng clearly specified that the greater efficiency of “socialist democracy” was entirely dependent on the party’s ability to pursue “the right policies and direction . . ..“102 That ability, in turn, was dependent on the party’s continued possession of certain essential attributes. According to Deng, “If any problem arises in China, it will arise from inside the communist party.“iOJ 97. Matossian (1971) p. 120.

98. Deng (1994) “Excerpts from Talks” and “Speech at the National Conference of the Communist Party of China,” pp. 361, 146. 99. Deng (1994) “Reform is the Only Way,” “We Shall Draw on Historical Experience,” and “Take a Clear-cut Stand,” pp. 141,224, 195. 100. Deng (1994) “Speech at the National Conference of the Communist Party,” “Unity Depends on Ideals and Discipline,” and “Speech at the Third Plenary Session,” pp. 146, 117, 97. 101. Deng (1994) “China Can Only Take the Socialist Road” and “Reform is the Only Way,” pp. 207, 142. 102. Deng (1994) “Speech at a Meeting,” p. 219. 103. Deng (1994) “Excerpts from Talks,” p. 368.

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Deng justified communist party rule by reinvoking the old theme of the “vanguard” party whose members were endowed with special moral virtues, wisdom, and competence. They were selfless beings who only worked “for the good of the people” and did “not exploit the labour of others.” They always kept in close contact with the masses and represented their will and interests. ‘04They dared “speak the truth and oppose falsehood,” always making “a clear distinction” between public and private interests. They did not seek personal favors “at the expense of principle,” appointing people only because of merit. They were truthful and honest, efficient and quick in their work, and produced quality results instead of “empty talk.“‘05 Beside these moral virtues, Deng also expected communist party members to be technocrats who could supervise the reformed economy of market socialism and undertake forward planning of the society. They must not “be content to remain laymen in science and technology.” They must, instead, “dig in and . . . learn the trade” by acquiring scientific knowledge, studying “the objective laws” governing scientific and technical work, and lead the people in “conquering the heights of world science.“lo6 To conclude, the pragmatism of Deng Xiaoping’s developmental nationalist ideology makes it the ideology of delayed industrialization described by Matossian. Even Deng’s commitment to communism as an end goal is not inconsistent with Matossian’s criteria. According to Matossian, a utopian goal can be instrumental for development by providing inspiration that spurs hard work and selfless sacrifices. Speaking for both himself and his party, Deng declared that “We believe in communism, and our ideal is to bring it into being.” It was the “ultimate goal,” for which “countless . . . people laid down their lives.” It was the dream that sustained him and the party even in their “darkest days.“io7 Deng’s developmental nationalist ideology has served to legitimate and guide the economic transformation of China since 1979. Whether this ideology is sufficient to guide China in the future is another matter. As the People’s Republic becomes more involved in international exchanges, the Chinese people will be increasingly influenced by ideas from without. As the people become economically more prosperous, their independence and political efficacy will correspondingly increase. They will begin to demand an accounting from their government which goes beyond ideological cant. There will be increasing demands for the aggregation and articulation of interest. The communist party increasingly will have to demonstrate concrete performance in continued economic growth, as well as competence and incorruptibility. Whether Deng’s ideology can sustain the party through the test of real demands that are sure to increase in the future remains to be seen. References Deng, Xiaoping (1977) On the general program of work for the whole party and the whole nation. In The Case of the Gang of Four: With First Translation of Teng Hsiao-ping’s “Three Poisonous Weeds,” ed. Chi Hsin. Cosmos, Hong Kong. Deng Xiaoping (1984a) Deng Xiaoping: Speeches and Writings. Pergamon, New York. 104. Deng (1994) “Speech at National Conference on Science,” p. 52; and (1984a) “Report on the Revision of the Constitution,” pp. 27, 33, 6, 5. 105. Deng (1994) “Speech at the National Conference of the Communist Party” a;d “Speech at the National Conference on Science,” pp. 149, 53; and (1984a) “Report on the Revision of the Constitution,” p. 28. 106. Deng (1984a) “Speech at the National Conference on Education,” p. 58; and (1994) “Speech at the National Conference on Science,” p. 52. 107. Deng (1994) “Unity Depends on Ideals and Discipline” and “Reform is the Only Way for China to Develop its Productive Forces,” pp. 116, 141.

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Deng Xiaoping (1984b) Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (1975-I 982). Foreign Languages, Beijing. Deng Xiaoping (1994) Selected Work of Deng Xiaoping (1982-1992), III. Foreign Languages, Beijing. Dittmer, Lowell (1993) Chinese reform socialism under Deng Xiaoping: theory and practice. In China in rhe Em of Deng Xiaoping: A Decade of Reform, eds Michael Ying-mao Kao and Susan H. Marsh. M.E. Sharpe, Armonk. Engels, Friedrich (1976) The peasant war in Germany. In Collected Works, 10. International, New York. Franz, Uli (1988) Deng Xiaoping. Harcourt, Brace, Janovich, New York. Mao Zedong (1977) A Critique of Sovier Economics. Monthly Review, New York. Marx, Karl (n.d.) Poverty of Philosophy. Foreign Languages, Moscow. Marx, Karl (1955) Selected Works, 2. Foreign Languages, Moscow. Marx, Karl and Engels, Friedrich (1964) The German Ideology. Progress, Moscow. Matossian, Mary (1971) Ideologies of delayed industrialization. In Polirical Developmenr and Social Change, eds Jason L. Finkle and Richard W. Gable. John Wiley and Sons, New York. Piekalkiewiez, Jaroslaw and Penn, Alfred Wayne (1995) Polirics of Ideocracy. State University of New York, Albany. Rozman, Gilbert (1987) The Chinese Debate Abour Soviet Socialism 1978-1985. Princeton University, Princeton. S&ram, Stuart R. (1993) Deng Xiaoping’s “Quest for modernization with Chinese characteristics” and the future of Marxism-Leninism. In China in the Era of Deng Xiaoping: A Decade of Reform, eds Michael Ying-Mao Kao and Susan Marsh. M.E. Sharpe, Armonk. Schurmann, Franz (1966) ideology and Organization in Communist China. University of California, Berkeley. Sullivan, Michael (1985) The ideology of the communist party since the third plenum. In Chinese Marxism in Flux 1978-84: Essays on Epistemology, Ideology and Political Economy, ed. Bill Bmgger. M.E. Sharpe, Armonk. Tefft, Sheila (1992) From “Little Red Book” to “Thought of Deng’-China’s new persona1 cult. In The Christian Science Monitor. October 22, 1992. Wu Yifu (1993) Guard against the indiscriminate use of “Deng Xiaoping Thought.” In Shijie ribao (World Journal or WJ) January 17, 1993.