The tiering of conservation policies
D. Colman, J. Froud and L. O’Carroll
Recent years have seen a proliferation in the number and application of nature conservation designations in the UK. Using a number of case studies, this paper examines the evolution and current pattern both of these designations and of beneficial land ownership which has arisen from the actions of statutory and voluntary bodies. Where these overlap or are nested within each other the relationships between the instruments are examined. It is argued that high-level designations reflect the concentration of lower tiers of protection and in turn stimulate new commitments at lower levels. The authors are at the Department of Agricultural Economics, Faculty of Economic and Social Studies, University of Manchester, Manchester, Ml3 9PL, UK. ‘Details of many of the policy instruments are compared in D.R. Colman, Ft. Crabtree, J. Froud and L. O’Carroll, Comparative Effectiveness of Conservation Mechanisms, Department of Agricultural Economics, University of Manchester, Manchester, 1992, and in MC. Whitby, G. Coggins and C. Saunders, Alternative Payments Systems for Management Agreements, A Report to the NCC, Nature Conservancy Council, Peterborough, UK, 1990. ‘A flavour of the debate on these can be obtained from P. Lowe, G. Cox, M. MacEwen, T. O’Riordan and M. Winter, Countryside Conflicts: The Politics of Farming, Forestry and Conservation, Gower/Maurice Temple Smith, 1987; and in A. MacEwen and M. MacEwen, National Parks: Conservation or Cosmetics?, Allen & Unwin, London, 1982. In addition, a recent debate has highlighted the problems of attempting to compare the relative cost effectiveness of management options such as SSSls and ESAs. Those interested should refer to I. Brotherton, ‘The cost of conservation: a comparison of ESA and SSSI payment rates’, Environcontinued on page 282
0264-8377/93/040281-l
Conservation policies relating to rural land use in the UK have developed as a series of disconnected steps and have involved, in addition to the Ministry and Departments of Agriculture, the Department of the Environment and also the Treasury (through tax relief schemes for conservation and heritage agreements). In addition, public support in the form of tax exemption and grants has assisted charities such as the National Trust and the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB) to develop and pursue their own land use conservation policies. A key piece of legislation was the 1949 National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act. This set up the Council for the National Parks, out of which the Countryside Commissions were subsequently established, and the Nature Conservancy Council (NCC) (now succeeded by English Nature, Scottish Natural Heritage and the Countryside Council for Wales) to oversee the establishment of various protective land use designations. In addition to the setting up of the National Parks, these designations included National Nature Reserves (NNRs) and Sites of Special Scientific Interest (SSSIs), under the authority of the NCC, and Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty (AONBs) under the aegis of local authorities. The latest wave of designations has been the Environmentally Sensitive Areas (ESAs), administered by the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) and the Agriculture Departments, and representing an attempt to combine farming and conservation over large areas designated primarily for their landscape, wildlife and historic importance. Other instruments, such as the Farm Conservation Grants Scheme and Countryside Stewardship, are available countrywide rather than within a fixed boundary. Each land use designation has its own system of regulations, payments and penalties. It is not the objective to discuss these here,’ nor is it the intention to examine fully the properties of these mechanisms.’ Rather the objective is to explore the interaction between the instruments. Has the creation of some designations depended on the prior existence of others? Is there an element of ‘tiering’, to the extent that large-scale designations have arisen and built on a multiplicity of smaller designated areas or where voluntary bodies and private landowners have been effective conservation managers? If the answers to these questions are yes, as they appear to be, is there a degree of redundancy in certain instruments, and does the payment and regulatory regime of key instruments affect the cost of implementing others? In addition,
2 0 1993 Butterworth-Heinemann
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The tiering of co~serva~i~~ policies is the question of whether the array of policy instruments available has a proven capacity to address all aspects of conservation interest in areas where they are applied. Each of the organizations involved in this field has its own remit and objectives, determined either by the interests of its membership (in the case of the voluntary bodies) or by the statutory duties which it is empowered to perform. With the possible exception of public access and habitat conservation, it is not obvious that these objectives will conflict. However, the somewhat fragmented approach to protecting areas of conservation interest may not be the most effective.” Rather than taking a general holistic approach, this paper examines these issues with reference to a number of case-study areas, all of which have been subject to various conservation instruments. The historical background to the current structure of designations and ownership will be examined for each area. The extent to which the conservation features of interest are protected by such instruments will be considered, as well as the degree of overlap and interaction. Some general conclusions wili then be drawn regarding the structure and organization of conservation policies at a local and national level. there
The case-study areas
continued from page 281 ment and Planning A, Vol 23, 1991, pp 1183-1357; I. Hodge, W.M. Adams and N.A.D. Brown, ‘The cost of conse~ation: comparing like with like - a comment on Brotherton’, Environment and /Tanning A, Vol 24, 1992, pp 1051-1054; and D.1. Brotherton, ‘The cost of conservation: where now? A response to Hodge et a/‘, Environment and Planning A, Vol 24, 1992, pp 1355-1357. 31t is acknowledged that there is some interaction (formal and informal) between the various organizations; however, it does not take place in a structured and regular fashion. This point will be returned to in the conclusion. 4The Stour, the Alde, the Deben, Minsmere, the Blythe, the Hundred and Easton Broad. ‘The reference to Tiers I, 2 and 3 within this particular scheme should not be confused with, or interpreted as, reflecting the central notion of ‘tiering’ in this paper. In the latter sense, ‘tiering’ refers to a hierarchy of instruments. Tiers 1, 2 and 3 here refer to policy levels withes one soecific instfume~t, ai ESA. ‘%ince this land is not farmed. it would be ineligible for ESA payments.
282
This case study is defined by the boundary of the ESA, which was part of the second round of English ESAs initiated in 1988. However, the designation of the seven valleys4 in this way was by no means the first interest taken in the area; this part of East Anglia had long been of interest to both statutory and voluntary bodies. The Suffolk River Valleys (SRV) comprise a discontinuous area of natural and semi-natural grassland and adjoining arable land along parts of seven river valleys and, in addition, some areas of coastal grazing marshes. Because of the continuous encroachment of arable farming these remaining fragments of grassland have a unique significance within the broader arable landscape of East Anglia. The area is also important for wildlife, particularly birds. The objective of the ESA has been primarily to safeguard this grassland (Tier l),’ but also, using higher payments, where possible to enhance the conservation value of the more ecologically interesting grazing land (Tier 2), and in some cases to encourage farmers to revert arable land to grass (Tier 3). Table 1 shows that a significant proportion of the designated ESA is covered by SSSIs. These cover a wider range of conservation interests than the three tiers of ESA, including heath, woodland, reedbeds, mudflats and geological formations as well as grassland; by providing for such specific interests they complement the remit of the ESA. There is only one Management Agreement (Section 15) to date, covering 200 hectares of intertidal land.6 This suggests either that there have been no threats, from ploughing or other forms of site ‘improvement’, to the conservation interest of the remaining 4350 hectares of SSSI land (possibly because of ownership by the National Trust or another conservation body), or, less probably, that it has not been possible to negotiate Management Agreements in the area. In the former case (that there have been no threats to the land), this implies that ESA Tier 1 provisions may be redundant on SSSI land. However, since Management Agreements tend to respond to threats rather than
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The tiering
of co~ervat~on
policies
Table1. The natureof conservationpolicy in the Suffolk River Valleys.
Note: In some cases there is not a complete correspondence of boundaries, for instance some of the land designated as an SSSI will lie outside of the ESA. * Other landowners in the Suffolk River Valleys include the Suffolk Wildlife Trust and the Ministry of Defence. Of course, the distinctions between public bodies (such as English Nature) and the voluntary organizations (such as the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds and the National Trust) should be recognized.
Designation/instrument
Area covered (ha)
ESA
32 149 designated 21 900 eligible 4 380 1454 2 124 4 550 970
Tier I grassland maintenance Tier 2 grassland enhancement Tier 3 arable reversion SSSls (18 designated) Including 3 National Nature Resetves Public ownershipa Royal Society for the Protection of Birds English Nature National Trust Convenants to National Trust Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty Suffolk Coast and Heaths (1970) Dedham Vale (1970 and 1978) Countryside Premium Scheme
703 212 160 1 477 39 100 7200 Eligible on set-aside land (original 5-year scheme)
provide
payments for positive works, the enhancement and recreation options of the ESA scheme can potentially build on the existing conservation interest. This point will be returned to in the subsequent case studies. Examining other approaches to protecting the SRV, nearly 1500 hectares of grassland are covenanted to the National Trust. This land is mostly freehold land in Dedham Vale, and is covered by restrictive covenants preventing operations which would alter the nature and appearance of the area, such as new buildings, removal of trees and hedgerows and the ploughing up of pasture. Much of this covenantprotected area is eligible for the ESA and has indeed been entered into the scheme. Thus there does appear to be an element of redundancy insofar as the Tier 1 prescriptions were not needed on all land covered by covenant. However, since it is difficult to include positive management prescriptions in covenants, Tiers 2 and 3 of the ESA do represent a distinct contribution in terms of the level of protection offered as they entail significant changes in certain farming practices (extensification of grazing in Tier 2 and conversion to grassland in Tier 3). In terms of much broader landscape protection, AONB designation (which covers around three-quarters of the ESA) should prevent changes in land use as a result of non-agricultural developments. This is essentially a planning device, the effective powers of which are weak. In any case, these powers do not extend over agricultural practices; they are not the equivalent of a Landscape Conservation Order, which might forbid the conversion of grassland to arable. Thus it cannot be said that there is any overlap between the AONB and ESA instruments. What can be hypothesized, however, is that an enabling process has been occurring with the SRV. The remaining fragments of grassland were given initial protection from actions such as ploughing and drainage by SSSI designation. Land has also been protected by being in the hands of, or covenanted to, public or voluntary bodies concerned with conservation. Thus there was still sufficient grazing land to justify ESA status in the late 198Os, and it is in this sense that we argue that the ESA is a higher tier or layer of protection built on other tiers of designation and on the stewardship of farmers and landowners acting in a private capacity. Furthermore, the fact that SSSI designation or a restrictive convenant applies to a farmer’s land suggests that participation in Tier 1 of the ESA scheme (with its similar prescriptions) is more likely. It is
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The tiering of conservarion policies
inevitable that the Tier 1 guidelines may appear ‘redundant’ for some sites, since the scheme provides standard payments and is open to all, including those already farming within the ESA guidelines and with no intention of breaching them; ESA agreements are not, therefore, restricted to areas that are specifically threatened. However, it should also be borne in mind that additional conservation benefits to those provided on land that is simply SSSI-designated or convenanted may be secured by some part of this land being subject to more specific management under Tiers 2 and 3 of the ESA. The revision of the Suffolk River Valleys ESA and its re-launch in 1993 goes a considerable way towards strengthening conservation policies as a whole in the area. The introduction of a conservation plan with capital items receiving grants of up to 80%, in common with the other new ESAs, allows for more positive works to be carried out. This is to some extent a duplication of existing grants schemes such as the MAFF Farm Conservation Grants Scheme (FCGS), and there is still no requirement for farmers to take into account their whole farm, so that while farmers may have an ESA agreement on part of their holding, there is nothing to stop them from intensifying operations on another part. The revised ESA does, however, tighten up some of the prescriptions in the least restrictive tier, Tier 1, such as the wooding of pastures in winter to attract wading birds. As the ESA concept evolves into a more comprehensive policy instrument, individual ESAs inevitably lose their initial simplicity. The ~~rby.~h~re Dales
The area considered in this case study is defined by nine SSSIS,~ covering approximately 2500 hectares of limestone dales in the southern part of the Peak District National Park. Most of the designated land is enclosed valley sides, comprising limestone grassland, woodland, scrub and geological formations. There are two main threats to these dales. On the one hand, there is the possibility of agricultural improvement (which diminishes conservation values) through slurry and fertilizer application and overgrazing on the lower, flatter areas. On the other hand, undergrazing on the steeper valley sides may lead to scrub and bracken encroachment. Public access is also a potential danger through over-use; there is an extremely high population density within a 50 mile radius, and footpaths are used intensively. Many of the more valuable habitats, however, are not open to the public. The SSSIs were initially notified between 1951 and 196s under the 1949 National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act, and were subsequently renotified between 1984 and 1990, following the 1981 Wildlife and Countryside Act. Eight of the nine dales have National Conservati~)n Review (NCR) status with respect to their woodland and/or grassland, and five contain NNR sites. The activities which are considered to be threatening are virtually identical for each site, and relate mostly to agricultural practices. To date, six Management Agreements (Section 16) have been signed, covering 128 hectares. A further four, accounting for 13 hectares, are under negotiation. Of the ten existing or proposed agreements, six were initiated in response to a ‘TheSt? are Coombs Dale, Cressbrook threat to improve the grassland for agriculture and the remaining four Dale, Dove Dale, LathkiltDale, Long Dale/ are essentially positive in nature, associated with improving grazing Gratton Dale, Monks Dale, Wyedafe/ practices to reduce poaching and eliminate bracken, and to ahow Monsal Dale, Topley PikelDeepdale and the Hamps and ManifoldValleys. positive woodland management. Thus, of the totai SSSI area: less than 284
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Table 2. Land ownership
by public and voluntary bodies in the Derbyshire
Dales.
Dale
Extent of ownership
Coombs Dales
8.2% Peak Park NPA 7.6 ha 97.7% English Nature 115.5 ha 88.9% National Trust 558 ha Lichfield Diocese 4.5 ha English Nature 32.9 ha 43.1% Peak Park NPA 58.9 ha Severn Trent Water 0.1 ha English Nature 58.5 ha 86.4% English Nature 7.1 ha 88.0% English Nature 61.7 ha 60.6% Peak Park 48.3 ha National Trust 17.6 ha Derbyshire Wildlife Trust 50.1 ha 70.2% British Rail 39.8 ha 70% Peak Park NPA 0.9 ha National Trust 591.5 ha Staffordshire Conservation Trust 20.4 ha Lichfield Diocese 1.5 ha Severn Trent Water 0.4 ha 67.3% 1 674.8 ha
Cressbrook Dale Dove Dale
Lathkill Dale
Long DalelGratton Dale Monks Dale Wyedale/Monsal Dale
Topley Pike/Deep Dale Hamps and Manifold Valleys
Total
6% required payment under a Management Agreement to provide protection. Of the total area covered by the SSSIs, 67% is owned by the public and statutory bodies, mostly the National Trust. This implies that over 17% of ‘privately’ owned land is accounted for by an existing or proposed Management Agreement. The breakdown of ownership per dale is shown in Table 2. The National Trust began acquiring land within the Dales in the 193Os, and the fact that this organization has long taken an interest in the area has no doubt contributed to the subsequent designation of the SSSI. In addition, the wide scale of such ownership may mean that Management Agreements are less likely to be triggered because there are fewer threats to damage the conservation interest. There is also some interaction between the bodies. The Peak Park Authority, for example, leases to English Nature in Lathkill Dale and to the Derbyshire Wildlife Trust in Wyedale/Monsal Dale. However, such ‘benign’ ownership will not always guarantee the safeguarding of these habitats since most of the National Trust land, for instance, is let out to agricultural tenants. Originally, there would have been little in the way of conservation clauses in tenancy agreements, though these are now a standard feature of the Trust’s new and renegotiated tenancies. Even now, there are limits on the extent to which positive management can be embodied in such tenancy agreements. In addition, if the purchasing organization ‘inherits’ a tenant it may prove difficult to make any alterations to their tenancy agreement. Because the Dales lie within the Peak Park they are under the jurisdiction of the National Park Authority (NPA) in terms of preservation of the landscape interest and the genera1 integration of farming, recreation and wildlife. In landscape terms, National Park status carries strict requirements for the proposed siting and construction of roads, buildings and other man-made features. The Peak Park also has its own
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The tiering of conservation policies
standard payment scheme for farmers (the Farm Conservation Scheme), as well as powers to top up MAFF Farm and Conservation Grants Scheme (FCGS) grants to 80% of costs for certain conservationoriented activities. In practice these have not been used by the NPA within SSSIs. English Nature itself has stated that the designation of a SSSI alone will not ensure that a site of conservation interest is maintained and pr0tected.s Certainly in the Dales, SSSI designation has been used to indicate the sites of primary nature conservation value but, within this, those sites of key importance have been listed in the Nature Conservation Review.’ Certain areas have been incorporated into NNRs, whereby their management is secured by English Nature ownership, long lease or agreement. In the remaining areas of the Dales without this additional protection, there does seem to be the need for a means of negotiating incentive payments for farmers who agree to undertake positive works to enhance conservation interest. Basing these on standard payments would also substantially reduce the negotiation costs, and they could be operated in a proactive manner.“’ Unlike the other case studies, the Derbyshire Dales are not within an ESA, yet they also demonstrate elements of the tiering of conservation instruments. Pockets of land have been purchased by organizations concerned for the environment over a long period, thus helping to preserve the conservation interest. Their subsequent designation as SSSIs and parts of them as NNRs have added layers to the protection of the Dales. The continued actions of the voluntary bodies, especially the National Trust, in consolidating their land holdings helps support the SSSI designation. (The circular nature of this whole process of the tiering of instruments is returned to in the third section.) Meanwhile, the Peak Park Authority (which has its own conservation scheme and top-up grants), oversees land use as a whole within the National Park and hence adds another tier to the protection of the Dales. The North Peak
8Nature
Conservancy
Council,
National
Nature Reserves: A Provisional Report on National Nature Reserves - Their Role Within a Nature Conservation Strategy, Nature Conservancy Council, Peterborough, UK, 1990. gD. Ratcliffe, ed, A Nature Conservation Review, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1977. “English Nature has recently introduced a new policy instrument, the Wildlife Enhancement Scheme, on an expe~mental basis in the Culm Grasslands and Pevensey Levels, to try to encourage positive management on SSSls using standard payments. If successful this will clearly help overcome some of the problems of the existing SSSI system discussed here in relation to the Derbyshire Dales.
286
The northern part of the Peak District National Park was designated as the North Peak ESA in 1988. The area comprises an upland block of heather moorland and includes the enclosed meadows and pastures on the moorland edges. The main threat to the moorland was the deterioration of the extent and quality of the heather cover caused by, among other factors, localized overgrazing of sheep, and by bracken encroachment. On the enclosed or inbye land, traditional grass habitats were threatened by (continued) draining, levelling, reseeding and fertilizing to improve the carrying capacity and to facilitate silage production. The purpose of the ESA, therefore, is to enhance the quality of the moorland vegetation through restricting stocking rates, epecialfy in winter, and to promote improved shepherding and burning practices. On the inbye the aim is to prevent increases in intensification, to improve the value of the grass for both flora and fauna, and to encourage the rebuilding of dry stone walls. Of the six SSSIs in the North Peak, two are wholly or largely in public or voluntary ownership (the National Trust on Kinder-Bleaklow and Sheffield City Council and the Peak Park Authority on Hallam Moors), and Mill Cfough and part of Allport Castles were purchased by Severn Trent Water when it was still a public body. The total SSSI area under such ownership amounts to approximately one-quarter of the entire
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The tiering of conservation policies Table 3. The structure of land ownership and ~na~ment within the North Peak ESA, Ownership/ management
Ares (ha)
ESA
49 607 designated
NationalTrust Water companiesa Local authorities Peak Park NPA Total public and voluntary ownership
45 692 eligible 39 130 under agreement (86% of eligible area) 14 325 7414 706 520 22 965
a Of which 229 hectares are owned by Savem Trent Water and are leased to the Forestry Commission.
“SSSI land with a Management Agreement on it is not eligible for ESA payments, but where there is no Management
Agree-
ment, ESA payments may be received.
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October 1993
Peak ESA (around 12 300 hectares).” The largest of these SSSIs is Kinder-Bleaklow, composing 11 750 hectares in total. At present there is no Management Agreement within this SSSI; this may in part be as a result of delays in its renotification following the 1981 Act, but may also reflect public and voluntary body land ownership. Much of the remaining (non-SSSI) ESA land is also in the hands of public and voluntary organizations. A breakdown of ownership over the ESA as a whole is provided in Table 3. A significant proportion of the ESA is also owned by large private estates which let out the grazing on annual licences. Grazing licences stipulate the total number of sheep to be grazed on a piece of moorland, but will not prevent localized overgrazing, especially in winter. The sporting rights attached to the land owned by the National Trust and some of the other estates are also let out separately. The presence of actively used shooting rights implies that heather management will be undertaken. Indeed, sporting estates are now being rewarded explicitly under the ESA scheme for what might be considered ‘good stewardship’. Ownership by the National Trust has had an unquestionable effect on take-up of the ESA scheme. Because grazing licences are granted annually, the Trust’s decision to enter the land puts its grazier tenants in a position where they are hardly able to opt out. The fact that the stocking rates implicit in the number of gaits or licences given were already set lower than those required for Tier 2 of the ESA means that the impact of this instrument on the farming operation is limited. Similar conclusions may be drawn with regard to the land owned by the NPA. Thus ESA designation is clearly of benefit to conservationally minded owners like the National Trust and NPA, since payments are received with little change to existing farming practices. In the case of the National Trust there is clear evidence that ESA payments (including those for Tier 1) have been used to fund a programme of conservation enhancement. Areas under the control of the newly privatized water utilities would previously have been managed under tenancy agreements which had some regard for conservation. On the lower land near the reservoirs, for instance, there are restrictions on the use of fertilizers. North West Water has also encouraged its licence holders to join the ESA, the organization taking a share of the annual payment. Tier 2 does make provision for the regeneration of the moorland, including a large-scale bracken removal programme. The ESA instrument does, therefore, appear to be facilitating an enhancement of the conservation interest over and above what would have resulted simply from the existing pattern of management. The Peak Park Authority’s Farm Conservation Scheme (mentioned with regard to the Derbyshire Dales) was implemented to allow positive works on areas of the Park which lay outside the ESA boundary. This scheme is a mixture of standard area payments with an additional comprehensive menu. One of the weaknesses of the original ESA scheme, not compensated for by any of the other instruments, is the provisions for the inbye land. This enclosed land was originally added as a subsidiary part of the ESA package. The payments are identical to those for the moorland, even though the capacity of this land is obviously much greater. The inbye is the most intensively used part of the farm; in some cases inbye stocking rates may have increased to absorb animals which have been removed North
207
The tiering of conservation policies Table 4. The composition of public and vokmtary land ownership in the Breckland. Organization ForestryCommission Ministry of Defence County Wildlife Trusts English Nature Local authorities Water companies English Heritage National Trust Total
Approximate area (ha) 20 000 11 cl00 607 438 246 125 65 32 488
‘“Ratcliffe, op cil, Ref 9. ‘%recks Study Group, Norfolkand Brecks, Brecks Study Group, 199
288
Suffolk
1.
temporarily or permanently from the moorland. MAFF’s Farm Conservation Grant Scheme (with the possibility of a top-up from the Peak Park Authority) represents a degree of complementarity with the ESA inbye provisions by targeting specific landscape features. Hence walls can be maintained and rebuilt, hedges laid and trees planted. In addition, the option of a farm plan which has been introduced into the revised North Peak ESA will go some way towards removing one of the deficiencies of the current system. The new scheme is also more oriented towards securing positive benefits with payments in the higher tier now being directed explicitly at moorland which is being regenerated or extensified.
The Breckland area of East Anglia, covering approximately 94 000 hectares, contains three main landscape types of conservation interest: heathland, woodlands and wetlands. The importance of heathland in Breckland was recognized by Ratcliffe,‘* who listed 19 sites in the area considered to be of Nature Conservation Review status. In terms of wildlife interest, the heaths support a rich variety of flower species, and also rare heathland birds. The area incorporates a range of wetland features (meres, fens and pingoes) which are of great ecological value. The combination of such factors led to the Breckland being designated an ESA in 1988. The first of 42 SSSIs was notified in 1952, at Cavenham Heath. The total area covered by this designation amounts to 8361 hectares, or 8.6% of the Breckland as a whole. Four of these sites are also NNRs. Thus the system of SSSIs has played a significant role in protecting the co~se~atio~ interest of the area. For a number of reasons, however, it has not been considered fully effective in providing protection. The serious problem of heathland fragmentation could in part be dealt with by positive payments to encourage arable reversion; however, since the emphasis of the use of Management Agreements has been on responding to threats, this has left little opportunity for such positive agreements. Also, in an analysis of 34 of the Breckland SSSIs, the Brecks Study Group listed lack of management or undergrazing as the main threat on 16 of the sites, and yet neglect or undergrazing cannot be specified as a ‘threatening’ activity under the procedures for notifying potentially damaging operations.” Finally, the SSSI system provides no protection for areas which fall below the quality required for notification, but which make an important contribution to the overall conservation interest. In the Breckland such areas act as ‘buffers’ for high-quality, fragmented sites, under threat from woodland encroachment or arable reversion, and hence have a valuable role to play in protecting the conservation interest of the area. Thus the ESA scheme, which encourages positive management of heathland and dry grassland (Tier l), wet grassland (Tier 2) and arable reversion (Tier 3), provides an invaluable additional layer of protection for the area. One striking feature of the Breckland area is the profound influence that public and voluntary body land ownership has had in protecting and shaping the conservation interest. Of the total area, 32 488 hectares (approximately 35%) is currently in public or voluntary hands (see Table 4). Furthermore, 22 out of its 42 SSSIs are wholly or partly owned or leased by public or voluntary organizations. These 22 sites cover 6203.2 hectares, almost 80% of the total SSSI area. From a sample of
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The tiering of c~~er~a~~on policies
?bld. ‘“A. Hobhouse, Repot? of the ~af;onal Parks Committee (England and Wales), HMSO, London, 1947.
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1993
ten of the relevant sites, six were purchased a significant period before SSSI notification took place, and one in the same year as designation; thus it appears that this form of land ownership has played a role in protecting the conservation interest sufficiently to allow subsequent SSSI notification. The role of this type of ownership is also of importance because it has helped both to create and to enhance new conservation interest. One of the best illustrations of this is at Stanford Practical Training Area. Under Ministry of Defence ownership, areas of long-established heath have been preserved and, more importantly, land has been allowed to revert back from arable cropping to heath. The latter development is of particular significance, given the failure not only of Management Agreements in this regard, but also of ESA Tier 3 payments. Only around 10 hectares of arable land have been entered into Tier 3 of the scheme, though it is hoped that this record will improve with the introduction of the revised ESA. Thus is may be argued that the ownership of land by public and voluntary organizations has protected and enhanced sites so as to justify subsequent SSSI notification, while the designation of the ESA can in turn be traced to the importance of the SSSI presence. The existence of a significant amount of land in public and voluntary body hands that is not of SSSI standard, but is of sufficient interest to be included within the ESA boundary (indicated in Table 4), may be taken to infer that the case for ESA designation of the Breckland was made stronger by the consequences of such ownership, and that there has been a ‘tiering’ of conservation instruments of this type. Public and voluntary land ownership may also be viewed as having a useful supplementary role to the other designations in that Management Agreements and the ESA (since it applies only to certain categories of land) may not be effective in preventing loss of valuable wetland. Certainly at Stanford, the many wetlands, springs, streams and areas of standing water benefit from the fact that such a large area of land is under public ownership. Because they are virtually unaffected by problems of drainage, pollution, eutrophication or water abstraction, they therefore tend to be species-rich. However, while the existing layers of instruments may be viewed as playing a successful complementary role to each other, there is some feeling that they do not adequately protect all aspects of the conservation interest of the Breckland. In particular, the Brecks Study Group, a consultation body made up of local authorities, statutory conservation bodies and various voluntary organizations, has felt strongly that designation of the Brecklands as an AONB is required.14 While this would increase the ability of the local authorities to control unsuitable development, the main benefit from this additional form of protection would be to facilitate better coordination of conservation strategy in this area. Although the existing approaches to addressing the conservation interest work in a CompIementary fashion, lack of coordination is felt to be one reason for the continuing loss of conservation interest. Perhaps ironically, given its largely positive role, the roots of this lack of coordination may to some extent be traced to the extensive public ownership of land in the area, in particular by the Forestry Commission. The Hobhouse Report did not recommend Breckland for designation as a National Park for the specific reason that its intensive land use (forestry) would not allow sufficient public access to justify it.”
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The tiering of conservation policies
Discussion of issues raised by the case studies
16D. Baldock, G. Cox, P. Lowe and M. Winter, ‘Environmentally sensitive areas: incrementalism or reform?‘. Journal of Rural Studies, Vol 6, 1990, pi 143-162.
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Several points emerge from the case-study analysis which have relevance for the nature conservation strategy of the UK as a whole. The most striking feature for all the areas discussed is the ad hoc way in which policies directed towards the protection of conservation values have been applied. Different levels of government, statutory authorities and voluntary conservation organizations have played different roles which have in some cases exhibited a degree of interdependence over time in purchasing sites, in designating them, and in giving grants towards positive conservation management. Instruments have inevitably become ‘concentrated’ on areas considered to be of particular environmental value, as a result of budgetary constraints. The pattern which emerges is one of public and voluntary body ownership which has protected (and in some cases enhanced or re-created) conservation interest sufficiently to justify subsequent designations. Where these have displayed shortcomings or have failed to address certain aspects of the interest of areas, additional tiers of instruments have been added. Since resources are inevitably scarce for all the organizations involved, targeting of policy instruments only on those areas which are considered to be of particular conservation value has a logic of its own. However, targeting may lead to a situation where the presence of one instrument has an inflationary effect on the payments given by another. ESA payments, for example, may set a floor for subsequent negotiation of Management Agreements within designated areas; although this effect was not found in any of the case-study areas, Baldock et al noted its presence in the Somerset Levels ESA.16 A related issue is the possibility that the numerous different sources of grants and forms of protection may lead to double-funding of conservation activities. There appears to be little evidence of this from the case-study areas; where funds have come from different organizations, they have generally been given for different purposes. Land which the Suffolk Wildlife Trust, for example, has brought under its protection by purchase may still be eligible for funds from the Ministry of Agriculture as part of the Suffolk River Valleys or Breckland ESA. In such cases, however, voluntary body ownership may be viewed as giving long-term ‘baseline’ protection, while the purpose of additional ESA payments is to ensure that there is the appropriate detailed, short-term management of such sites. The Suffolk Wildlife Trust acknowledges that, without ESA payments, management tasks such as fencing and wet grassland grazing of certain sites would not have been possible. This suggests that the existence of an ESA may encourage organizations to purchase sites which they would not have considered worth adding to their portfolio had this form of recognition not occurred and which previously they would have attempted to lease or to obtain some kind of agreement with the existing owner. Voluntary bodies have acknowledged that the possibility of receiving ESA payments is counted as a positive factor in purchase decisions. At the same time, the involvement of such organizations in these areas may itself increase the success of schemes. In the North Peak, for example, National Trust ownership has unquestionably had a positive impact on ESA uptake. Thus there appears to be an important, and ongoing, positive interaction between the mechanisms. Although ownership and management by public and voluntary orga-
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The tiering of conservation policies
17’Green route pointers’, Farmers’ Week/y, 26 February 1993. “Countryside Commission, MAFF Review of Second Round Environmentally Sensitive Areas: Response by the Countryside Commission, Cheltenham, UK, 1992; and Royal Society for the Protection of Birds, A future for Environmentally Sensitive Farming: RSPB Submission to the UK Review of Environmentally Sensitive Areas, RSPB, Sandy, UK, 1991.
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nizations has been focused on as an important ‘tier’ of conservation policy, the invaluable contribution of private landowners in protecting sites and hence in helping to provide justification for subsequent designations must be acknowledged. Prior to National Trust purchase in 1982, the Hayfield Estate in the North Peak protected and maintained the Kinder-Bleaklow SSSI. In the Breckland, the Elveden Estate owns 17% of the remaining heathland, including some of the most valuable areas, which it manages in a manner sympathetic to the conservation interest. There are also many instances of smaller-scale landowners who take pride in the ‘stewardship’ of their land, rather than simply viewing it as an exploitable capital asset. Private individuals also contribute to the ‘tiering’ process by bequesting land, and by making financial contributions towards the purchase of particular pieces of land; the National Trust and the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds, for example, do not have to raise funds for all land acquisitions. Covenants are also frequently donated freely by landowners who are concerned to provide long-term protection of the conservation value or access to sites. Thus there appears to be no real evidence of significant conflict between the different mechanisms. Having said this, problems have been identified. There may be a danger of ‘designation fatigue’. A minority of those farming land subject to several designations may become hostile towards the whole notion of conservation, regarding the ever-increasing tiering of such policies and designations as unwarranted and unsympathetic interference with their farming autonomy. Another concern is that the sheer range of grants and sources of funding, addressing different aspects of conservation interest, may be confusing for those who wish to protect the land that they hold. Farmers’ Weekly has listed 22 main sources of grants available for conservation works, with numerous local and specialist organizations also providing funds.17 This situation has led both the Countryside Commission and the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds, among others, to call for consolidation of the existing system.‘s At the same time, there are still features of conservation interest which are not being adequately protected by this tiering of mechanisms. In the Derbyshire Dales there is some feeling that the SSSI system does not provide sufficient incentives for farmers to undertake positive works, while in the North Peak the original ESA system has failed to provide adequately for inbye land, though improvements have been incorporated into the revised scheme. If there was better coordination between the organizations involved within any given area, it would potentially be easier to highlight and deal with these gaps, and to help private landowners willing to protect their land but confused by the plethora of instruments available. In the National Parks, the Park Authorities are in a position to oversee the effective implementation of mechanisms; the Peak Park Authority, for example, attempts to do this in the North Peak. However, there is no overall body coordinating such activities, and they are obviously limited to distinct geographical areas. It should be noted that there is undoubtedly some coordination, both formal and informal, between the statutory and voluntary organizations. This has been amply illustrated by the ESA process of consultation, designation and administration. However, this has tended to be rather ad hoc or specific to the setting up of a new policy ‘tier’.
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Certainly in the Breckland, improving coordination is viewed as a priority by the groups working in the area. It is perhaps unfortunate that the means suggested for achieving this is to place yet another designation (AONB status) on the land. It is not clear whether this would actually solve the inherent problem, or simply add to confusion. Formal coordinated discussions between different organizations involved in protecting the conservation interests of sites at regional and national level throughout the country, both to define their individual roles and to produce a coherent strategy for specific areas in the future, could prove to be a more timely and effective approach.
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