The wellsprings of candidate emergence: Geographic origins of statewide candidacies in the United States

Political Geography 30 (2011) 25e37

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The wellsprings of candidate emergence: Geographic origins of statewide candidacies in the United States James G. Gimpel a, *, Frances E. Lee a, Rebecca U. Thorpe b a b

Department of Government, University of Maryland, 3140 Tydings Hall, College Park, MD 20742, USA Department of Political Science, University of Washington, 101 Gowen Hall, Box 353530, Seattle, WA 98195-3530, USA

a b s t r a c t Keywords: Candidate ambition Electoral politics Voting Political regionalism Urbanerural divide

Candidates and nominees for statewide office in the United States do not emerge from random locations within states. In this paper, we argue that densely populated areas are more likely to both foster political ambition and to afford the resources that enable candidates to wage an effective campaign. Candidates and nominees for major statewide office originate from populous counties in numbers significantly out of proportion to these counties’ share of their state’s population. Meanwhile, aspirants virtually never emerge out of rural areas or small towns. The pattern holds for all candidates and nominees for both Senate and governor and for both major political parties. Regional biases are more pronounced for institutionally strong gubernatorial offices than for weak offices and among high quality nominees for statewide office than among inexperienced candidates. Given the importance of urban/rural cleavages in the American electorate, these findings raise fundamental questions about political representation. Ó 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Americans along with a great many others around the world think of political representation in terms of geography. Unquestionably this is the consequence of using bounded spaces for the election of legislatures in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and many other nations (Taylor, 1973). Certainly at every level of U.S. government, voters are grouped together by geography to elect most government officials (Amy, 1993; Morrill, 1996; Rehfeld, 2005). Indeed, voters often expect representatives to reside in their own electoral district, even when it is not legally required (Davidson, Oleszek, & Lee, 2008, p. 43). Candidates strive to convince voters that they have deep roots in or deep understandings of their geographic constituencies. Candidates routinely question one another’s commitment to the voters, problems, and issues of particular localities. Yet much of the scholarly literature on representation focuses on whether elected officials reflect the sociodemographic diversity of the constituency. Representation in the United States has been examined from the perspective of race and ethnicity (Canon, 1999; Forest, 2001; Hero & Tolbert, 1995; Lublin, 1997), gender (Lawless, 2004; Swers, 2002), religion (Benson & Williams, 1982; Green & Guth, 1991), and class (Hill & Leighley, 1992; Schumaker & Getter, 1977). If one looks up “representation” in an American government

* Corresponding author. Tel.: þ1 301 405 7929; fax: þ1 301 314 9690. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (J.G. Gimpel), fl[email protected] (F.E. Lee), [email protected] (R.U. Thorpe). 0962-6298/$ e see front matter Ó 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2010.12.005

textbook, a discussion of representativeness in this sociological sense is certain to appear. Although scholars tend to analyze representation primarily in terms of aspatial, sociological variables, the U.S. system of representation is grounded in geography, in place.1 Place is more than the sum of its parts; it is not merely clusters of individuals who may (or may not) have certain predominant sociological characteristics. Place creates context, a setting for social interaction that structures the opportunities of individuals (Agnew, 1987; Johnston, 1991). Different types of places give rise to different ways of life, identities, political cultures, community interactions, and economic interests, some of which offer political opportunity while others do not. But in the interdisciplinary literature on political representation, there has been relatively little attention to the types of places political candidates originate from (but see Matthews, 1960, pp. 14e17). Although political institutions in the United States and other nations often put geography at the center of political representation, scholars have rarely inquired into the geographic patterns of political ascension. In this paper, we argue that densely populated areas are more likely both to foster political ambition and to afford the resources that enable candidates to wage an effective campaign. Location is critical for facilitating access to informal networks and for cultivating social and political contacts. In this analysis of the geographic origins of candidates for governor and Senate from 1996 to 2006, we find that candidates and nominees for major statewide office originate from populous counties in numbers significantly

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out of proportion to these counties’ share of the state’s population. Moreover, aspirants virtually never emerge directly out of rural areas or small towns. Serious contenders may have some family ties to out-of-the-way places, but they must commonly move to more urban locations to launch successful careers. Only rarely do serious contenders emerge unswervingly from the nation’s smallest burgs. The pattern holds for all U.S. Senate candidates, among nominees for U.S. state governorships and Senate seats, and for both political parties. These regional biases are even more pronounced among candidates competing for more desirable political opportunities. Moreover, candidates running for institutionally strong gubernatorial offices are less representative of their states geographically than are those vying for weak gubernatorial offices. Similarly, the tilt toward more populous and prosperous areas is greater among high quality nominees for statewide office than among inexperienced candidates. Place and representation Region has been a potent source of political division throughout U.S. history, just as it is within (and between) most countries around the world. In particular, cleavage along the urban/rural divide has been one of the most prominent and enduring features of American politics. As V.O. Key (1964, p. 295) observed, “One of the most common foundations for two-party competition. is that of the metropolis against the countryside.” Key’s, 1964 sketches of urban/rural conflicts in New York, Illinois, Missouri, Michigan, and Connecticut state politics are still recognizable to 21st century readers. National politics is equally affected by urban and rural tensions. In fact, the diverging political and policy preferences of city and country form a major part of any analysis of American parties over time (e.g., Burnham, 1970; Sundquist, 1983). Urban/ rural constituency alignments have been linked to the strength of party leaders in Congress in different eras (Cooper & Brady, 1981). And they are no less relevant for understanding party polarization in Congress today (Brewer, Mariana & Stonecash, 2002, 2003). Given the depth and persistence of urban/rural divisions, one would expect that political leaders from urban and rural backgrounds would develop and maintain different perspectives on a wide range of issues. Metropolitan and rural areas today are often at odds over transportation, economic development, agriculture, gun rights, environmental issues, poverty, and traditional morality. Although urban/rural origins are probably not as central to political identities as race and gender, the geographic backgrounds of elected officials should not be overlooked as a potential source of descriptive representation. For voters, knowing where a candidate is from can serve as a short-cut to judgment, a heuristic (Cutler, 2002). The type of place a candidate comes from can forge bonds of trust with voters who have similar life experiences, common ties to civic or educational institutions, and interlocking networks of friends and acquaintances. In presenting themselves to voters, candidates rarely fail to discuss their geographic origins, in addition to their policy positions, families, and personal qualifications. Place identity is commonly mentioned in campaign advertising to indicate belonging and a background of shared experiences. Apparently it is of great value to candidate success as it is an important element of voter evaluation. A wide range of scholarship has established that social identity matters for representation. The racial, ethnic, and gender identities of elected representatives affect their priorities, positions, and legislative styles, after controlling for other major influences on representative behavior, including constituency pressures and party affiliation (Canon, 1999; Kerr & Miller, 1997; Swers, 2002; Thomas, 1994). Shared identity between representative and represented has also been shown to affect trust, patterns of contact, and other interactions

(Gay, 2002; Griffin & Keane, 2006; Tate, 2001; Tyler, 2001). In light of the demonstrated effects of other kinds of social identity on representation, geographic origin deserves greater attention. Nevertheless, scholars concerned with political geography have been more interested in its effects on party politics than on representation. From this line of research we have learned that the geographic distribution of a political party’s supporters affects its electoral prospects (Chen & Rodden, 2010; Jacobson, 2008). Jacobson (2008, p. 14), for example, shows that Republican voters are “distributed more efficiently across House districts than are Democratic voters,” giving Republicans an edge in the number of House seats they can win and hold, relative to their overall proportions of support in the electorate nationally.2 Scholars have generally not investigated how urban/rural cleavages might relate to political representation through any means other than partisanship. In this paper, we examine the potential for biases in urban and rural representation in terms of who runs and who runs successfully for statewide political office. Rural areas are guaranteed some political representation through the use of geographic criteria for state legislative and U.S. House districts, though reapportionment and the increasing population size of House constituencies has reduced the rural presence in the House of Representatives (Frederick, 2008). But rural areas may be significantly disadvantaged in competition for statewide office. In the following sections, we argue that urban areas greatly enable strong candidacies by affording resources that advantage metro-based candidates in electoral competition. For a number of reasons, cities are more likely to foster political ambition in the first place. Place and political ambition Political candidacies and political leaders are products of certain kinds of environments. The willingness to consider running for officedwhat Fox and Lawless (2005) term “nascent ambition”dis not a decision made in isolation of important contextual influences (Fowler & McClure, 1989). Before launching a candidacy one must feel that she is qualified to hold the office: “opportunity alone is insufficient to create ambition” (Maestas et al., 2006, p. 197). The personal efficacy necessary for political ambition is shaped by numerous environmental factors, including school and family, success in elite occupations, and participation in political associations (Lawless & Fox, 2005, pp. 95e117; Mayo, Nohria, & Singleton, 2006). Place location matters because more densely populated areas encompass greater social, political, and economic diversity, more heterogeneous interests, and a more diverse set of organizations in which individuals can develop political skills and inclinations to launch a political career. In their study of the development of interest group communities, Lowery and Gray (1995, 1996) argue that there are “environmental constraints” on the number of groups that can survive in a given environment, especially population. Smaller populations cannot sustain as many interest groups as large ones, just as smaller ecosystems cannot support as many species. Urban areas not only give rise to more diverse and specialized political interests and associations, they are also more likely to have professionalized local politics, with full-time mayors and city councils and more elaborate division of labor in government. Experience in these professionalized settings is more likely than the smaller-scale and part-time opportunities available in less populous areas to foster the skills and self-confidence that fuel ambition for statewide office.3 Even if there is greater civic engagement in small towns (Putnam, 2001), these settings do not easily afford the sort of experiences that prompt people to envision themselves as a future governor or U.S. senator. Consider the position of the rural officeholder in a remote small town. This person has a tiny constituency,

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virtually no statewide visibility, and little by way of contacts with affluent donors residing in distant power centers. In short, these are the geographic circumstances that most inhibit political ambition (Sokolow, 1989). Most small town officeholders are not in their positions because they see them as a stepping-stone to higher office or a political career. Moreover, small town norms may actually check ambition as a means of preserving friendly relations and maintaining consensus (Seligman, 1974; Sokolow, 1989, p. 24). Time and money are also necessary for individuals to develop the political efficacy to consider a political candidacy. Wealthy, highly educated people are clustered together geographically in and around major metropolitan areas (Currid & Connolly, 2008; Florida, 2002, 2008; Gimpel, Lee, & Kaminski, 2006; Massey & Eggers, 1993; Mayo, Nohria, & Singleton, 2006; Shaw, 1997). Geographic segregation along socioeconomic lines has been growing over time, with the “the sorting of low human capital individuals into nonmetro areas” (Bishop, 2008; Fisher, 2007, p. 72). In sum, the people most advantaged in terms of the resources vital to political efficacy are relatively overrepresented among residents of populous areas and relatively underrepresented in sparsely populated areas. Urban areas are likely to be productive of candidacies not merely because they encompass many individuals with political efficacy. The clustering together of the highly efficacious creates a self-reinforcing environment in more densely populated locations, as opportunity begets opportunity (Mayo, Nohria, & Singleton, 2006, Chapter 2). Interactions among the politically interested stimulate competition, create knowledge, and provide opportunities for further learning. A “political atmosphere,” which cannot be transported elsewhere, is created that contains information and provides regular updates (Bathelt, Malberg, & Maskell, 2004). The acquisition of political qualifications is not appreciably different from other types of expertise in this respect. Economic geographers and economists have commonly noted the existence of knowledge communities or ‘clusters’ associated with the production of specialized goods and services (Currid & Connolly, 2008; Gertler, 2003; Maskell, 2001). Distance remains an impediment to information exchange, including finding suppliers and buyers and hiring specialized workers (Sorenson & Audia, 2000; Trapido, 2007). Some locations are also more supportive of entrepreneurial activity because people living there share values and outlooks conducive to innovation and opportunity recognition (Bishop, 2008; Florida, 2008). To summarize, more densely populated areas provide an environment richer in the individual opportunities and personal resources that foster political ambition. The life experiences that generate political predispositions and interest in political activity are tied to residency patterns (Gimpel, Lay, & Schuknecht, 2003). The contextual influences that lead people to contemplate political careers are not evenly or randomly distributed across the population, but instead concentrated in specific types of places. The resource advantages of place Just as geographic context is likely to affect the development of political ambition in the first place, it is also likely to affect a candidate’s ability to bid credibly for high office. Candidates are powerfully advantaged if they are from places richer in financial resources, media attention, and voters. Globalization has greatly favored metropolitan areas as centers of market activity. For purposes of advancing political ambition, this means that the financing necessary to launch a candidacy is confined to certain spaces. Campaign donors are highly concentrated in upper income brackets (Francia et al., 2003; Shields & Goidel, 2000) who disproportionately reside in metropolitan areas and in affluent neighborhoods within those areas (Cho & Gimpel 2007; Gimpel, Lee, & Kaminski, 2006). Furthermore, not just anyone can ply these

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neighborhoods for the money needed to launch a serious campaign. Investors prefer the familiar over the foreign, favoring locals whom they believe they can trust over strangers who must first prove themselves trustworthy (Heath & Tversky, 1991; Huberman, 2001; Thielmann, 1993). Local candidates from these areas are likely to enjoy an edge over outsiders from peripheral, less affluent locations. Second, familiarity of candidates to large centers of population concentration is cemented through the “mononucleated” clustering of mass media (Currid & Connolly 2008, pp. 420e421). Television newcast studios and newspaper newsrooms are usually found within blocks of each other in central city locations (Currid & Connolly, 2008). In their news coverage, these media outlets naturally privilege the political life and candidacies local to them and their primary audiencedusually those of the large cities in which they are domiciled. Third, candidates from populous areas are advantaged by the simple fact that they are “locals” for a larger share of the state’s voters. The trust of voters is the most valuable asset that a candidate can possess (Bianco, 1994; Fenno, 1978). Trust, in turn, is powerfully enhanced by simple physical proximity. Candidates are greatly advantaged when they originate from locations with larger populations rather than smaller. Physical proximity has been shown to augment trust across a variety of settings (Carney, 1998; Olson & Olson, 2000). Proximity facilitates trust because there is a higher probability of future interaction among individuals who are neighbors (Axelrod, 1984) and because signals about reputation and trustworthiness are easily lost across long distances (Latané, 1981). Geographic distance from a collaborator not only influences one’s willingness to cooperate, but also affects one’s capacity to persuade and deceive (Bradner & Mark, 2002). The upshot is that local candidates, ceteris paribus, will be judged by local voters to be more honest than those from farther away (Faith & Tollison, 1983). Candidates commonly enjoy greater trust and good will in their hometowns than in places where they not well known. A large number of studies have generally confirmed a “favorite-son” effect: electoral support is higher in a candidate’s hometown than elsewhere (Black & Black, 1973; Bowler, Donovan, & Snipp, 1993; Gimpel, Karnes, McTague, & Pearson-Merkowitz, 2008; Kjar & Laband, 2002; Rice & Macht, 1987a; 1987b; Tatalovich, 1975; Van Wingen & Parker, 1979). The hometown advantage can be viewed as a kind of “personal vote” that candidates can cultivate with relative ease (Cain, Ferejohn, & Fiorina, 1987). An important upshot of this research is that candidates are likely to do better or worse in an election based on how many voters and donors trust them based on a familiarity anchored in physical proximity. Candidates emerging from densely populated metropolitan areas will be able to extract more political resources from voters and donors than candidates in rural areas or small towns. Given the relative disadvantages they face, we should expect disproportionately few nominees for major statewide offices to originate straightaway from the more remote reaches of their states. Barriers to political ambition are rooted in the geographic and social milieu of rural areas. Place-based stereotyping Finally, as if urban areas didn’t have enough advantages with respect to networks of political expertise, financial resources, and voters, there are also negative stereotypical attributes ascribed to rural populations that work against candidates who might aspire to high office from a less populous locale. Cultural geographers have pointed out that rural citizens are not only viewed as unsophisticated and provincial, but unintelligent (Ching & Creed, 1997). Familiar media portrayals depict rural Americans as slow-talking

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dimwits, boorish and bigoted. American history textbooks recount predominantly the story of American urban history e primarily because historians consult “elite” sources, and these are nearly always urban (Danbom, 1985). Children are taught that to have the best of anything, they must go to big cities to find it; that rural is a condition that must be escaped. Sophisticated people work in urban occupations, and only the unsophisticated farm or fish for a living (Theobald & Wood, 2010). These anti-rural prejudices go commonly unrecognized, not just because stereotyping is often psychologically unconscious, but because it goes unstudied. Prourban bias has become an objective norm, an invisible preference, which relegates rural dwellers to a second-class status (Bassett, 2003, pp. 277e278, 330; Ching & Creed, 1997). Data collection on hometowns Our analysis focuses on the geographic origins of statewide candidates over the period from 1996 to 2006. We collected data on all U.S. Senate candidates and on major party nominees for both Senate and Governor during this period. Candidates’ geographic origins are identified as the county-ofresidence of the nominee within the state of the election in question. We chose to identify “home counties” not necessarily as the location of birth or childhood residence, as many candidates were born and raised outside their current state of residence, but as the county the candidate resided in and “called home” during their adult life prior to running for statewide office. For example, a candidate may have been born in Indiana, graduated high school in Connecticut, settled after graduating Harvard Law School in Alexandria, Virginia, entered the workforce in Virginia as a venture capitalist, and eventually received a political party’s nomination for governor at age 50. This candidate’s hometown is identified as Alexandria, Virginia, given that this was the candidate’s residence prior to running for office. To be sure, there are candidates who claim more than one home within the same state, sometimes referring to a birthplace, or the place where they spent a few childhood school years, as “home,” as well as referring to their current family’s residence as their hometown. In such cases, we

coded as home the county where they resided longest as adults prior to running for office. Negative binomial regression The dependent variables in this study are counts of gubernatorial and U.S. Senate candidates originating from each of the nation’s 3140 counties between 1996 and 2006. Each county receives a value based on the number of candidates of a given type (Senate candidates, gubernatorial nominees, Democratic Senate nominees, Republican Senate nominees, etc.) originating there. The counts for Senate nominees can range from 0 to 8 (m ¼ .125; s ¼ .60) and for gubernatorial nominees from 0 to 6 (m ¼ .096; s ¼ .45). As count variables, these distributions are highly skewed, with the vast majority of the nation’s counties producing no major party nominees across this decade.4 Ordinary least-squares regression is not appropriate for modeling candidate origin counts because the data are not normally distributed. The small values, the absence of negative values, and the preponderance of zero values mean that OLS would result in inconsistent estimates for the variances of parameter estimates. Instead, negative binomial regression is the most appropriate method for modeling these data (Cameron & Trivedi, 1986, p. 31; Lawless, 1987; Long, 1997, p. 230).5 Models are estimated using maximum likelihood. Geographic biases in candidate emergence An initial look at candidate emergence patterns provides impressive evidence that candidates for statewide office are disproportionately likely to emerge from the most densely populated areas in their states. Fig. 1 displays the percentage of Senate and gubernatorial major party nominees coming from counties of different relative sizes. The horizontal axis in the graph designates the deciles of county population size relative to the state’s total population, with the bottom decile representing the 10% of counties constituting the smallest share of their state’s overall population and the top decile representing the 10% of counties constituting the largest share of

Fig. 1. Count of Senate and Gubernatorial Nominees by Deciles of Relative Population Size.

J.G. Gimpel et al. / Political Geography 30 (2011) 25e37

their state’s population.6 For benchmarking purposes, we also show the average proportion of states’ overall population residing within each decile of relative size, represented as the darkest of the lines. The share of candidates emerging from the most populous locations vastly exceeds the proportion of the population that actually resides in them. Fully 80% of all nominees for Senate (n ¼ 392) and 70% of all nominees for governor (n ¼ 303) during the study period come from counties in the top decile of relative population size, while on average only 56% of each state’s overall population resides in these counties. For every other decile of relative population size, however, candidates emerge at rates lower than one would expect based on the distribution of state population. Only the most populous counties are overrepresented among nominees for governor and senator; all other counties are underrepresented. We have offered good reasons to expect that candidates would be more likely to emerge from populous areas: (1) such areas are more likely to foster political ambition; and (2) they afford financial, media, and political resources that enable candidates to wage better campaigns. Our data allow us to determine whether only the second argument holds true. If geographic context has no effect on the development of political ambition itself, then we would expect to find that unsuccessful candidates (those who fail to win the nomination) would emerge proportionally from all types of locations within the state. If we find that only successful candidates disproportionately hail from populous areas while unsuccessful candidates are more representative of all locations in the state, then we could conclude that geographic location does not affect ambition, only the resources that candidates have available to them. In such a case, the patterns observed in Fig. 1 could only be attributable to the strategic advantages of candidates from populous areas, not to any effects on the development of political ambition itself. To address this question, we collected additional information on the geographic origins of all gubernatorial and U.S. Senate candidates competing in primaries.7 Fig. 2 shows the percentage of all unsuccessful primary candidates coming out of each decile of relative population size. The data clearly show that the patterns of nominee emergence are not

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simply the result of the resource advantages that candidates from populous areas enjoy. Unsuccessful primary candidates for Senate and Governor are very similar to nominees in their geographic origins. Successful and unsuccessful candidates alike disproportionately come from their state’s most populous areas: on average, 56% of states’ overall population resides in the top decile of counties, while 75% of unsuccessful Senate primary candidates (N ¼ 367) emerge from these counties and 66% of all unsuccessful gubernatorial primary candidates come from these counties. The environment of populous areas itself is productive of more political candidacies overall.

Testing for spatial dependency Multiple regression using the negative binomial model permits a more refined analysis of the patterns of candidate emergence. We are able to control for a number of other factors that are also likely to affect candidate emergence and thereby rule out potential causes of spurious correlation. In addition, we can simultaneously employ several variables capturing the resource advantages available to local candidates. Exploratory spatial data analysis revealed that spatial autocorrelation (via Moran’s I test) in the county distribution of candidate origins is very low, using either a weights matrix based on a fixed distance band or one-order of contiguity. Regardless of the particular types of candidates we examine, Moran’s I typically attained a value in the range of I ¼ .02e.04, for Republican and Democratic nominees for U.S. Senate and Governor, and reached as high as I ¼ .09e.11, for the spatial distribution of unsuccessful primary candidates. These low values meant that the spatial autocorrelation was easy to eliminate through the model specification process, and it was unnecessary to resort to either a spatial lag or spatial error model. Moran’s I tests on the residuals utilizing a fixed distance band weights matrix are reported in the tables and in no instance did these tests reach statistical significance, an indication that spatial dependency is not influencing estimates.

Fig. 2. Count of Unsuccessful Primary Candidates by Deciles of Relative Population Size.

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Explanatory variables

Number of counties (per state)

The models include four variables designed to tap into the different levels of political and financial support that candidates can extract from their local populations. Electoral contribution is measured as a county’s percentage of the state’s total population.

The sheer number of counties in a state diminishes the probability that a candidate will emerge from any one of them. All else being equal, states with more counties should have lower candidate counts coming from each individual county. Number of elections (per state)

Rural nonmetro locations We also include a categorical variable capturing the sparse tail of the population distribution. We expect that, even after including a continuous measure of each area’s share of the overall state population, that small, nonmetro locations are especially unlikely locations for candidate emergence. Rural nonmetro identifies all nonmetro counties with fewer than 10,000 people as 1s, and all other counties as 0s. This is a surprisingly large number of counties, 645, according to 2006 population estimates. Percent earning more than $150,000 (relative to state average) gauges the affluence of local populations, relative to the overall state context. There is significant overlap with electoral contribution, in that wealthier locations in a state also tend to be more populous, but the correlation between the two variables is not so high that it poses serious problems for the interpretation of effects (r ¼ .27, p  .01). Self-employed population As a final measure of local economic resources, we include a measure of the self-employed population in unincorporated businesses to gauge the rate of candidate emergence from locations where smaller businesses predominate rather than larger ones. Corporate elites are more likely to possess the economic resources and relationships that form the durable foundation for financing campaigns for both parties. They have the ability to make personal contacts and raise thousands of dollars in contributions for a given candidate (Cho & Gimpel, 2007). We expect that the rate of candidate emergence would be smaller in cities and towns where main street businesses, rather than large corporate enterprises, form the backbone of the local economy. Control variables in the analysis State capital One potential complication in the analysis is that state capitals are likely to be the launching pad for many candidates for statewide office. Long-time state legislators, other statewide officeholders, and political appointees are frequently contenders for Senate and gubernatorial offices, many of whom will have established residences in the state capital. It is not clear whether the omission of this variable would suppress or exaggerate the relationship between population density and candidate emergence. On the one hand, many state capitals are located in moderately populated areas of their states (Pierre, SD; Frankfort, KY; Jefferson City, MO; Springfield, IL), thus amplifying the importance of these less populous areas and weakening the overall relationship between population density and candidate emergence. On the other hand, many other capital cities are located in the state’s most important population centers (Salt Lake, UT; Boston, MA; Denver, CO), augmenting the counts from those areas and strengthening the association between urbanization and candidate emergence. Regardless, it is clear that the model must account for this effect. To that end, we include a dummy variable indicating whether or not a county is home to a state capital.

Gubernatorial elections are held in off-years, on-years, and in the case of New Hampshire and Vermont, both. Elections for a state’s U.S. Senate seats are not scheduled concurrently, except in cases of a special election. The number of elections across the study period (1996e2006) for the two offices does vary by state, and this must be accounted for in the results because locations within states holding more elections are likely to have more candidates emerging from them as a simple function of election frequency. Results of estimation Results for our estimation of negative binomial regression models predicting the geography of candidate emergence for Senate and Gubernatorial offices appear in Tables 1 and 2. To interpret the coefficients, we provide the incident rate ratio (IRR) in square brackets for only the statistically significant coefficients. The incident rate ratio indicates the increase in the expected count of nominees for a unit increase in the explanatory variable, controlling for all other independent variables. As Figs. 1 and 2 indicated, the impact of electoral contribution (a county’s population size relative to the state) is dramatic. For all Senate nominees, a one percent increase in local population as a percent of state population increases the count of nominees by a factor of 1.355, or 36 percent. A one percent increase in relative size is associated with a 29 percent rise in the count of major party gubernatorial nominees. The effect of relative population size is equally pronounced for unsuccessful Senate and gubernatorial primary candidates. Indeed, the pattern is consistent across every kind of candidate for statewide office analyzed: all Senate and gubernatorial candidates, Republican Senate and gubernatorial nominees, and Democratic Senate and gubernatorial nominees. These effects are far larger than one would expect simply on the basis of random chance. Indisputably, a state’s most populous areas are home to considerably more statewide candidates and nominees than one would expect simply on the basis of their larger numbers of residents. Non-metro rural areas seriously depress Senate candidate emergence, even after controlling for relative population size. Major party nominees and candidates for the U.S. Senate almost never emerge from the nation’s most rural locales. Surprisingly, this relationship is stronger among Republicans than Democrats. The odds of becoming a Republican U.S. Senate nominee by living one’s adult life in a small town are extremely unfavorable. For all Senate nominees, candidate emergence is about 87 percent lower in these rural locations than it is in all other locales. For Republicans it is 100 percent lower, and for Democrats, it is 80 percent lower. As far as running for Senate is concerned, small town boys and girls generally do not make good e unless they first resettle in a big city to launch their political bids. The availability of local financial resources also influences the emergence of candidates for statewide office. Contenders from highincome counties are greatly favored. Every category of candidate analyzed is more likely to come from the wealthier counties in their state, even after controlling for the area’s share of the statewide population. The effect is always strong, positive, and statistically significant. A one percent rise in the relative wealth measure is associated with a 27 percent increase in the count for U.S. Senate

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Table 1 Geographic origin characteristics and the emergence of U.S. Senate candidates & nominees, 1996e2006. Variable name Electoral contribution (% of State) Percent high income (Relative to state average) Percent self employment

Non-metro rural

State capital

Number of counties (per state) Number of Elections (per election period)

a N Moran’s I; significance Log pseudo-likelihood c2; significance

All nominees .3043*** (.0424) [1.355] .2391*** (.0223) [1.270] .0821** (.0338) [.9211] 2.031** (.6756) [.1312] 1.5921*** (.2109) [4.914] .0068** (.0025) [.9932] .0081*** (.0787) [1.008] 1.869 3137 .0006 p  .802 744.273 p  .001

Republicans .2428*** (.0448) [1.274] .2283*** (.0240) [1.257] .1594* (.0599) [.8527] 15.816*** (.3271) [.0000001] .9455*** (.3328) [2.574] .0073** (.0026) [.9928] .0019** (.0797) [.9981] 2.186 3137 .0006 p  .837 432.593 p  .001

Democrats .2754*** (.0517) [1.317] .2303*** (.0309) [1.259] .0632 (.0396) 1.616* (.7103) [.1987] 1.942*** (.2239) [6.972] .0060* (.0027) [.9941] .0022 (.0768) 2.031 3137 .0005 p  .790 521.579 p  .001

Experienced .3172*** (.0455) [1.373] .2420*** (.0278) [1.274] .1007 (.0406) 1.605* (.6755) [.2009] 1.697*** (.2485) [5.458] .0071** (.0022) [.9929] .0552 (.1040) 2.488 3137 .0005 p  .724 619.178 p  .001

Inexperienced .1468*** (.0378) [1.125] .2310*** (.0299) [1.360] .0661 (.0583)

Unsuccessful candidates

16.052*** (.4760) [.0000001] 1.327* (.4013) [2.657] .0058 (.0037)

.3207*** (.0617) [1.378] .2032*** (.0400) [1.225] .0910* (.0356) [.9131] 1.704** (.5656) [.1819] 1.233*** (.1874) [3.433] .0049 (.0039)

.3449 (.2004)

.0021 (.0846)

1.182 3137 .0003 p  .999 285.919 p  .001

2.305 3134 .0006 p  .802 779.561 p  .001

Note: All entries are negative binomial regression coefficients, with robust standard errors in parentheses. Incident rate ratios are in square brackets for statistically significant coefficients. The dependent variable indicates the total count of nominees at counties of origin from 1996 to 2006 in those states with U.S. Senate elections in each cycle. The model also controls for the impact of the number of counties per state and the number of elections that took place across the study period. ***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05 (two-tailed test).

nominees, all else being equal. A one percent increase in relative wealth augments the count of gubernatorial candidates by 16 percent. The size of the effect is not appreciably different for Republicans, Democrats, or unsuccessful Senate and gubernatorial candidates.8 Wealth advantages have a somewhat smaller effect on the emergence of gubernatorial nominees, but local affluence certainly increases the number of major party nominees for governor from a place. In this respect, the gubernatorial election is not quite as elite as the U.S. Senate election. Locations populated with smaller rather than larger businesses also prove to be a flimsy launching-pad for U.S. Senate and gubernatorial candidacies. Given that a high proportion of these locations are small and mid-sized towns,9 it is again remarkable that this variable is statistically significant once we have controlled for other indicators of population size. A one percent increase in the percentage of self-employed businesses drops the expected count of Senate candidates by 8 percent; and a one standard deviation rise drops this count by 33 percent. Republican Senate nominees are even more unlikely to emerge from locations anchored to small business than Democrats. Gubernatorial candidates are no more likely to emerge from locations with main street economies than Senate hopefuls. While this does not necessarily prove that candidates must have the backing of large corporations in order to run for high office, it does suggest that major party politicians rarely emerge out of an environment of small main street enterprise. We hypothesized that state capitals would be vital wellsprings of candidates for major statewide office. The results certainly bear out this expectation. The count of total Senate nominees increases by a factor of 4.91, or 391 percent, over all other locations. State capitals are slightly less important as foundations for gubernatorial candidacies, but are nevertheless very important. All types of candidates for both parties are more likely to emerge from locales housing state capitals, but the effect is stronger for Democrats than

for Republicans. State capital locations increase the count of Democratic Senate nominees by an estimated 597 percent, compared with 157 percent for Republicans (see Table 1). Across the board, these results paint a remarkably consistent picture of a candidate emergence process tilted toward the most populous areas within states. The same patterns are repeated for Republicans and Democrats and for both Senate and gubernatorial nominees. Furthermore, they strongly reinforce the inference that major metropolitan contexts are more likely to spark and enable political ambition in the first place. We want to emphasize that the story here is not one of big city candidates systematically beating out small town candidates in primary contests for party nominations. Remarkably, unsuccessful primary candidates do not come from a more representative set of locations within their states than do major party nominees. Instead, we find that even unsuccessful primary candidates disproportionately come from populous and wealthy areas within their states. Strategic opportunity and geographic biases in candidate emergence The preceding analysis has demonstrated an unquestionable tilt toward urban areas in candidate emergence overall. An important follow-up question is whether the desirability of the office affects these biases. The scholarly literature on candidate emergence has shown that stronger candidates tend to self-select into the best political opportunities (Carson, 2005; Jacobson & Kernell, 1983; Maestas et al., 2006; Maisel & Stone, 1997; Stone & Maisel, 2003). “Better” political opportunities are defined both by the likelihood of winning and by the power or influence that the office confers (Black, 1972; Rohde, 1979; Schlesinger, 1966). Our research provides some new insight on these questions.

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Table 2 Geographic origin characteristics and the emergence of gubernatorial nominees, 1996e2006. Variable name Electoral contribution (% of state) Percent high income (Relative to state average) Percent self employment

Non-metro rural State capital

Number of counties (per state) Number of elections (per election period)

a N Moran’s I; significance Log pseudo-likelihood

c2; significance

All nominees .2358*** (.0399) [1.289] .1506*** (.0247) [1.163] .0844** (.0258) [.9190] .5709 (.4339) 1.364*** (.2407) [3.911] .0031** (.0009) [.9969] .1751*** (.0420) [1.191] 1.976 3138 .0006 p  .820 720.191 p  .001

Republicans .2145*** (.0496) [1.239] .1782*** (.0295) [1.195] .0790* (.0314) [.9241] .5532 (.5656) 1.339*** (.3041) [3.817] .0039** (.0013) [.9961] .2244** (.0747) [1.252] 2.634 3137 .0006 p  .840 453.610 p  .001

Democrats .2329*** (.0480) [1.262] .1229** (.0439) [1.131] .1065* (.0415) [.8990] .6550 (.5711) 1.425*** (.3455) [4.156] .0026** (.0007) [.9974] .1285** (.0399) [1.137] 2.664 3138 .0005 p  .846 443.364 p  .001

Variable name Electoral contribution (% of State) Percent high income (Relative to state average) Percent self employment Non-metro rural State capital Number of counties (per state) Number of elections (per election period)

a N Moran’s I; significance Log pseudo-likelihood c2; significance

Experienced .2394*** (.0438) [1.271] .1364*** (.0286) [1.146] .0993** (.0310) [.9055] .8135 (.4332) 1.343*** (.2494) [3.829] .0034*** (.0007) [.9967] .1953*** (.0407) [1.216] 2.029 3138 .0006 p  .835 653.178 p  .001

Strong governor states .2848*** (.0443) [1.330] .1740** (.0342) [1.190] .0662* (.0336) [.9360] .2010 (.5190) 1.659*** (.2862) [5.255] .0067*** (.0018) [.9933] .1876 (.2007) 3.578 3138 .0155 p  .086 476.809 p  .001

Inexperienced .1617* (.0752) [1.176] .2537** (.0432) [1.289] .0398 (.0450) .0802 (.9100) 1.721** (.4733) [5.590] .0025 (.0025) .0898 (.0900) 2.828 3138 .0005 p  .972 172.192 p  .001

Unsuccessful candidates .2632*** (.0453) [1.301] .1441*** (.0363) [1.155] .0648* (.0320) [.937] .2188 (.2419) 1.608 (.2695) [4.994] .0047*** (.0011) [.9954] .1107 (.0673) 3.032 3138 .0006 p  .803 836.915 p  .001 Weak governor states .2368*** (.0506) [1.267] .1123** (.0404) [1.119] .1241* (.0575) [.8833] 1.175 (.8506) .9193** (.3670) [2.507] .0002 (.0011) .3635** (.1180) [1.438] 7.858 3138 .0007 p  .851 369.691 p  .001

Note: All entries are negative binomial regression coefficients, with robust standard errors in parentheses. Incident rate ratios are in square brackets for statistically significant coefficients. The dependent variable indicates the total count of nominees at counties of origin from 1996 to 2006 in those states with gubernatorial elections in each cycle. The model also controls for the impact of the number of counties per state and the number of elections that took place across the study period. ***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05 (two-tailed test).

First, not all political offices are equally desirable in terms of power and prestige. There are few meaningful distinctions among senators; the Senate is a highly collegial body where senators from every state enjoy a nearly equal voice (Baker, 2001). However, the powers available to governors vary widely. Some governors enjoy broad powers of appointment, executive reorganization, and budget, including the line item veto. Others possess more limited powers. Some governors do not monopolize executive power in their states and must compete with separately elected secretaries of state, attorneys general, and other statewide elected officials. Is there a greater bias toward populous areas in candidate emergence for states with strong rather than weak governors? Second, better chances of winning tend to draw out stronger candidates. Chances of winning are enhanced when national political or economic conditions are more favorable to a candidate’s party, when a seat is open, and when an incumbent is endangered because of scandal or missteps in office. Under such conditions, “quality” candidates with prior elected experience are more likely to risk their current political standing by running for the office. In the absence of such conditions, the field is often left open for inexperienced candidates to contest the seat and to gain a party nomination, often by default. Are there systematic differences in the geographic origins of quality candidates? Are quality candidates

more likely than inexperienced candidates to come from advantageous locations? To gauge whether institutional power affects the geographic origins of gubernatorial aspirants, we used Thad Beyle’s (2008) institutional power ratings to divide governors into two groups, those below the mean power rating and those above it. The results in Fig. 3 attest to some important differences in candidate emergence for strong and weak gubernatorial offices. Fig. 3 displays separately the percentage of nominees for strong and weak gubernatorial offices by deciles of relative population size. Interestingly, nominees for weaker gubernatorial offices tend to come from a more representative set of locations in their states than nominees for stronger gubernatorial offices. Fully 75.9% of all nominees for strong gubernatorial offices (n ¼ 174) come from areas in the top decile of population density in their states and 66% of nominees for weak gubernatorial offices (n ¼ 121) come from areas in that top decile, as compared to 56.8% of all residents of the state. The geographic origins of nominees for strong governorships are more out-of-step with their state contexts than are nominees for weak governorships. Because experienced candidates choose to contest offices under more favorable conditions than inexperienced candidates, we can compare the geographic origins of experienced and inexperienced candidates as an indirect test of whether the probability of winning

J.G. Gimpel et al. / Political Geography 30 (2011) 25e37

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Fig. 3. Count of Gubernatorial Nominees in States with Institutionally Weak and Powerful Governors by Deciles of Relative Population Size.

the office exacerbates biases in the geographic origins of candidates. If favorable conditions for winning elicit more candidates from advantaged areas in the state, then experienced candidates for Senate and governor will come from a wealthier and more populous set of locations than inexperienced candidates. Fig. 4 compares the percentages of experienced and inexperienced Senate and gubernatorial nominees by deciles of relative population size.10 Fig. 4 reveals that the probability of winning intensifies geographic origin biases in both Senate and gubernatorial elections. Experienced candidates tend to come from more densely populated locations than inexperienced candidates: 82% of experienced Senate nominees (n ¼ 303) come from the top decile of population density in their states, while 76.4% (n ¼ 89) of inexperienced nominees come from these locations. Similarly, 75% of experienced nominees for gubernatorial office (n ¼ 262) emerged from the top decile of relative population density in their states, as compared to 66.1% of inexperienced nominees for gubernatorial office (n ¼ 41). The regression results shown in Table 2 above afford a more refined analysis of how the desirability of the political opportunity affects the geography of candidate emergence. Candidate emergence among nominees for strong and weak gubernatorial offices is modeled separately, as is candidate emergence among experienced and inexperienced nominees for Senate and governor. The results for candidates for strong and weak governorships shown in Table 2 confirm the effects visible in Fig. 3. Desirable gubernatorial offices attract more candidates from wealthy and populous areas than do less desirable gubernatorial offices. Contestants for weak governorships are somewhat more likely than those for strong governorships to emerge from locations other than major central cities. A one percent increase in the relative size of a county heightens the count of nominees for powerful governorships by 33 percent, compared with only 27 percent for governorships on the weak end of the spectrum. Aspirants seeking strong gubernatorial offices are also more likely than those seeking weak offices to come from wealthy areas in their states. A one percent increase in the percentage of high-income earners increases the count of nominees for strong governorships by 19 percent, compared with a 12 percent increase for weak governorships. Finally, bids emerging out of capital

cities are less than half as common for weak governorships as they are for offices with strong institutional power.11 With respect to population size, the centrality of the state capital, and the affluence of local populations, nominees for strong gubernatorial offices more closely resemble nominees for the U.S. Senate in terms of their geographic origins than do nominees for weak gubernatorial offices. The results for experienced and inexperienced nominees for governor and Senate suggest that, as with the power of the gubernatorial office, more desirable political opportunities attract more candidates from areas that are advantaged in terms of political resources. Both gubernatorial and Senate nominees with prior political experience are far more likely to emerge out of a state’s largest counties than those with no experience. The impact of relative size is nearly twice as large for the experienced politician compared to the novice. Interpreted in terms of the percentage change in the count of nominees, each standard deviation increase in relative size boosts the count of experienced Senate nominees by 77 percent, all else being equal. By comparison, a standard deviation increase in relative size enlarges the count of inexperienced Senate nominees by only 26 percent. The impact of local financial resources, however, is not completely consistent with the general pattern. The effect of relative wealth on candidate emergence is somewhat greater among inexperienced than among experienced nominees for governor, probably because many of the politically inexperienced candidates are affluent selffunders. Without question, however, the results underscore that all gubernatorial and Senate nominees, regardless of prior elective experience, are more likely to emerge from the most affluent locales within their states. Consistent with the expectation that residence in the capital city area would be associated with prior political experience, the count of experienced Senate and gubernatorial nominees is, respectively, 446 and 283 percent greater in capital cities compared with all other locations. However, even those with no prior experience in elected office are commonly tied to state capitals. The number of inexperienced candidates coming from state capitals stands at 2.7 times that of other locations for Senate candidates and at 5.6 times that of other locations for inexperienced gubernatorial candidates.

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Fig. 4. Count of Experienced and Inexperienced Senate and Gubernatorial Nominees, by Deciles of Relative Population Size.

Inexperienced candidates are usually not complete strangers to politics. Instead, many have settled in the state capital area in order to work in nonelective politics, as political appointees, lobbyists, political activists, and chiefs-of-staff or other top advisors to elected officials, such as Mitch Daniels (R-Ind.) and Ed Garvey (unsuccessful Democratic candidate for Wisconsin governor). Some, such as Mary Landrieu (D-La.) and Ted Celeste (D-Ohio), are people from prominent political families who have not held elected office themselves. Life in the state capital affords many opportunities to develop political skills and networks, even for those who are not elected. To be sure, place of residence is not solely the determinant of candidate ambition or success. Certainly there are odd instances when a candidate settles in a location with considerable political

capital they have brought along with them from elsewhere. Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton comes to mind as a candidate who would have been a serious contender for U.S. Senate independently of where she decided to settle upon moving to the state of New York. But it is only the rare candidate who could choose to run from anywhere and secure a major party nomination. Considered as a whole, the findings here suggest that the desirability of the political opportunity tends to intensify geographic biases in candidate emergence. The effect is especially visible with respect to differences between the geographic origins of candidates for strong and weak gubernatorial offices. However, differences among experienced and inexperienced nominees for Senate and governor generally reinforce the picture, as well. As evident as these

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geographic biases are across the board, they become even more pronounced in contests for the most powerful political positions. Conclusion Neither political ambition nor candidate quality is independent of place location. Instead, geographic context conditions both the willingness of individuals to put themselves forward as candidates and the financial and political resources that enable them to run effective campaigns. These basic realities mean that, even in a political system generally designed to ensure representation for all geographic areas, candidates for statewide office are more likely to emerge from particular types of geographic areas rather than others. The findings presented here clearly demonstrate that aspirants for statewide political office disproportionately come from the cultural and economic power centers in their statesdnot from smaller cities and towns populated by middle class citizens, farmers, and main street entrepreneurs. The effect is pervasive, evident among all candidates and nominees for both Senate and gubernatorial office and for both parties. These geographic biases are even more prominent among contestants for more desirable political opportunities. Candidates for institutionally powerful governorships are more likely than candidates for weak gubernatorial offices to emerge from populous locations in their states. Similarly, quality candidates for Senate and governordwho typically wait for the most propitious opportunities to rundare also more likely than candidates without prior elective office experience to come from advantaged parts of their states. Our results raise important new questions for descriptive representation in the United States, and perhaps elsewhere. A wide range of research has demonstrated the relevance of elected officials’ social identity for representational relationships and behavior. Like race, ethnicity, religion, and gender, geographic origin is also a kind of social identity, one that has so far been overlooked in the literature on representation. As with these other kinds of social identities, the data point to advantages for some types of candidates over others. Biases in candidate emergence have the potential to shape political debate within states, not just the outcomes of elections. Even unsuccessful candidates exercise important influence on the policy priorities of elected officials (Sulkin, 2005). The field of candidates running for U.S. Senate contains disproportionately few aspirants from rural and less affluent areas. The absence or underrepresentation of these voices from political debates and campaigns means that issues and concerns of greater importance to disadvantaged places receive less attention than they deserve. While a system in which candidates and government officials tend to be drawn from similar locations may succeed in dampening disagreement and promoting consensus, it unquestionably undermines representativeness. When geographic districts are not drawn to guarantee representation for rural or less wealthy areas, aspirants from affluent and urban areas are systematically favored. Indeed, political ambition may not be widely distributed enough to ensure appropriate levels of representation for all types of geographic areas. It is not merely that candidates from less wealthy or rural areas tend to lose their bids for office to candidates able to draw on more financial and voter support from their hometown areas. Instead, all statewide candidatesdeven unsuccessful aspirants for primary nominationddisproportionately come from advantaged areas. These findings point toward biases in political ambition mirroring many of the same processes that disadvantage minority and female candidates. A stubborn obstacle to greater representation of women and minorities in government is that too few such candidates run for office (Fox & Lawless, 2005; Gaddie & Bullock, 1997). These data on candidate emergence show that candidacy rates in rural areas are lower than they should be on the basis of democratic equality. Our data do not rule out the possibility that people who are born in rural

35

locations launch political careers by relocating to metropolitan areas and establishing political networks there, as former president Bill Clinton did. Although born in Hope, Arkansas, former President Clinton lived there but a brief time until age 4, launching his initially unsuccessful political bid from his adult residence in Fayetteville, and later running from a home base in Little Rock. If rural-origin candidates must relocate in order to launch credible campaigns, though, it surely represents an additional hurdle to small town political ambition. Obviously, not everyone is able to uproot, move, and gain entrée into political life in a major city. Additional research could usefully investigate whether the early life backgrounds of candidates also underrepresent small town and rural experiences; this research certainly establishes that such locations are very poor launching pads for political candidacies. Most obviously, the enduring importance of urban/rural cleavages in American political life means that these contemporary biases are likely to have far-reaching political implications. It is manifestly clear that the interests and preferences of urban and rural residents diverge in important ways across a wide variety of issues. Because nonmetro areas tend also to experience different and often more severe economic problems than metro areas, political inequalities among places likely reinforce or exacerbate economic inequality. It is possible that elected officials’ geographic origins have no effect on their activities in office, but the findings from other investigations into the substantive effects of descriptive representation strongly suggest that this matter merits further investigation.

Appendix Table 1. Table of means and standard deviations. Mean Dependent variables All senate nominees Democratic senate nominees Republican senate nominees Senate nominees no experience Senate nominees with experience Unsuccessful senate primary candidates All gubernatorial nominees Democratic gubernatorial nominees Republican gubernatorial nominees Gubernatorial nominees no experience Gubernatorial nominees with experience Gubernatorial nominees strong gov’ships Gubernatorial nominees weak gov’ships

.12 .07 .05 .03 .10 .12 .10 .05 .05 .01 .08 .06 .04

Independent variables (Continuous) % High income relative to mean (Senate) Population as % of state total (Senate) Percent professional (Senate) Percent self-employed (Senate) N of counties (Senate) N of elections (Senate) % High income relative to mean (Gov) Population as % of state total (Gov) Percent professional (Gov) Percent self-employed (Gov) N of counties (Gov) N of elections (Gov)

.0003 .80 29.17 9.61 96.65 8.28 .0006 .80 29.80 9.60 193.26 5.88

Independent variables (Categorical) Non-metro rural (Senate) State capital county (Senate) Non-metro rural (Governor) State capital county (Governor)

.21 .02 .21 .02

SD .60 .38 .31 .21 .50 .59 .45 .29 .27 .12 .40 .34 .29

1.54 2.04 6.89 4.91 57.12 .94 1.57 2.08 7.20 4.90 114.24 .78

.41 .12 .40 .12

N ¼ 3138 corresponding to the number of possible origin counties in the United States over the study period. Independent variables in the separate Senate and Gubernatorial datasets have different means and standard deviations due to the varying numbers of elections occurring within states over the study period.

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Endnotes 1 For an extended discussion of the distinction between research that is placesensitive and research that employs aspatial sociological variables, see Gieryn (2000). 2 For an earlier analysis of similar issues in state politics, see Key (1956, pp. 242e246). 3 Maestas et al. (2006) find that professionalized state legislatures are far more likely to cultivate the progressive ambition necessary to make a bid for a U.S. House seat. 4 Appendix Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on each independent and dependent variable for both the Senate and Gubernatorial origins data. 5 The Poisson regression model is inappropriate because it requires that the conditional mean and variance are equal, an overly restrictive assumption. In our case, the conditional mean is considerably smaller than the conditional variance for these dependent variables, a condition called overdispersion. Given the overdispersion of these data, estimation of the Poisson regression model can result in Type I error, resulting from underestimating the standard errors and p-values, thereby biasing inference (Morrison & Schmittlein, 1988). The negative binomial model allows the conditional variance to differ from its conditional mean through the addition of an error term that introduces randomness in the mean event rate. 6 Gauging size relative to the state total is important because the most populous counties in some states are not large counties relative to all counties nationally. For example, Ada County, Idaho (Boise), for example, contains an estimated 11 percent of Idaho’s total population. Even though Ada County is not a national population center, its share of Idaho’s total population is comparable to Los Angeles County’s share of California (14 percent) and Wayne County’s share of Michigan’s population (10 percent). 7 This measure captures the county residence of candidates that received more than 10% of the primary vote. 8 Whether wealth is indicated by income or by the pervasiveness of professional employment across locations, the same patterns are repeated for Republicans and Democrats and for both Senate and gubernatorial nominees in the county level data. 9 Statistics from the 2000 census indicate a steady decrease in the percentage of self-employed individuals as an area’s population increases (U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census 2000, Summary File 3; Sample Data; Table DP-3. Profile of Selected Economic Characteristics). The self-employed proportion is more than 50% higher in rural areas than in big cities, even when farm employment is excluded. Self-employment among places classed as “farm” is huge, more than a quarter of the working population. For purposes of the analysis, we use the non-farm selfemployment figures. 10 “Experienced” nominees are classified on the basis a previously held position in an elected office (e.g., Congress, state legislature, governor, state judge, city mayor). 11 The differences we report here between the coefficients for strong and weak gubernatorial offices proved to be statistically significant at p  .05 or less.

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