Theoretical authority in social science

Theoretical Authority in Social Science

E. B. PORTIS

Texas A&M University

Theoretical authority is the evaluation of scientific work by its compatibility with what is accepted as confirmed theoretical knowledge. It is manifested as the application of the criteria of"significance" and "coherence." I argue that the logical "legitimacy" of theoretical authority depends upon one's philosophy ofsoclal science. My purpose is not to discern which philosophy of social science is correct, but to demonstrate that efforts to do so have important implications for the organizational norms appropriate for social science. Disputes within the philosophy of social science are ipso facto disputes over the "constitutional principles" of social scientific disciplines. Authority in scientific organization is a fact of life. Individual scientists are routinely subjected to decisions concerning professional certification or advancement, allocation of research resources, and access to channels of communication. Despite occasional protests on the appropriateness of particular decisions, the right to render these judgments is rarely questioned. Much of this acquiescence can perhaps be attributed to the belief that organizational authority is necessary for purely practical reasons; some mechanism is necessary to distribute scarce resources, and someone must decide when newcomers are sufficiently committed and acknowledgeable to join the scientific dialogue) From this perspective, authority can be justified as long as it serves the advancement of science by enforcing rules that encourage free competition of ideas. Clearly, however, the question is more complex. For in deciding which issues should take priority in the training of prospective scientists, which projects are deserving of funding, and what conclusions are worthy of publication, more than rules of free competition are involved. Standards are being applied. Some of these standards may be The Social Science Journal, Volume 23, Number 4, pages 397-410. Copyright 9 1986 by JAI Press, Inc. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved. ISSN: 0035-7634.

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mere conventions, established by trial and error and accepted as traditional. Insofar as this is the case, they may be perfectly compatible with the legitimation of authority as a means by which science advances through free competition of ideas. Yet there is good reason to believe that these standards are often determined by theoretical perspective, and to the extent that this-is the case organizational authority undermines the free competition of ideas. 2 Organizational authority in science becomes problematic when it is legitimized by the supposed accomplishments of science, by what is accepted as scientific knowledge. I will call this "theoretical authority," which can be defined as the evaluation of scientific work by standards derived from supposedly confirmed scientific knowledge. Theoretical authority is manifested in application of the criteria of significance and coherence in the evaluation of scientific work. Both of these criteria are derived from the theoretical consensus that typically characterizes a well-developed scientific discipline. A topic is usually considered trivial if it does not pertain to a recognized theoretical problem, 3 and a conclusion contradicting a theoretical postulate basic to much of the work in a field is likely to be summarily rejected as implausible. Rare is the scientist who has not suffered the detrimental application of the significance criterion,4 and anyone familiar with the history of natural science can cite examples of genuine discoveries rejected because they were incoherent with the prevailing theoretical consensus, only to be discovered anew at a much later date. 5 In the following pages 1 wish first to consider whether theoretical authority is necessary. This issue has been the implicit subject of a number of recent polemics, most notably between Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn. From a philosophical or epistemologicai perspective, I will argue, Popper is correct: theoretical authority is not necessary for the attainment of scientific knowledge. But I also wish to argue that Kuhn's analysis rests upon neither epistemological assumptions nor empirical analysis of historical or psychological facts, but rather upon the logical requisites of a certain type of organization. In other words, Kuhn has explored the logic of scientific organization rather than the logic of scientific knowledge. While an individual scientist may be free to consider any alternative to his/her own view of reality, a highly "advanced" science is organized in such a manner that requires the a priori acceptance of a general theory of its subject matter. Having established the organizational necessity of theoretical authority in sciences usually considered advanced, 1 will turn to the question of whether it can be logically legitimized by its contribution to scientific "progress." In the social sciences the answer depends upon certain epistemological or ontological assumptions concerning the nature of social reality and social knowledge. For these assumptions determine whether the type of organization necessary in "advanced" sciences is appropriate for the social sciences. In other words, 1 will argue that the logical legitimacy of theoretical authority in social science depends upon one's philosophy of social science. Let me emphasize that my purpose is not to discern which philosophy of social science is correct, but to demonstrate that efforts to do so have important implications for the organizational norms of social science. Disputes within the philosophy of social science are ipso facto disputes over the "constitutional principles" of social scientific disciplines.

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THE NECESSITY OF THEORETICAL AUTHORITY IN ADVANCED SCIENCES While the reality of theoretical authority is difficult to deny, its necessity has been the subject of a good deal of debate. At issue is the possibility of engaging in scientific activity without accepting a priori a general theoretical "framework." Those who, in effect, argue for the necessity of theoretical authority believe that empirical analysis necessarily presumes the validity of a general theory, or perhaps "meta-theory," which defines the subject matter. In fact, from this view a scientific discipline could only emerge once a consensus has been forged on such a general theory. Until this consensus has been achieved, scholars will find it impossible to meaningfully communicate with one another because they will differ in their very notions of what they are talking about. Once a theoretical consensus has been achieved, it provides a common set of assumptions that impose, at least indirectly, order and direction upon research activity. Yet it is itself exempt from empirical scrutiny by the very authority it legitimizes. Logically, if observable facts are to be the sole criterion used to decide among contending theories, then it must be presumed that observations are not influenced by theoretical interpretation. There must be an observational language in which terms communicate reference uncontaminated by any prior, agreed-upon "meaning. "6 But obviously such terms could not lead to an exchange of information among communicants without prior agreement upon their referents. This prior agreement is not itself a sensory experience, but by definition a meaning. We may, and certainly do, agree to use certain terms to refer to immediate sensory experiences and feelings, but our prior agreement requires that we interpret the experience before we attempt to communicate it. One must think a bit before deciding whether he/she sees red or orange, feels pain or simple discomfort, is experiencing love or lust. 7 In a different cultural or theoretical context, with different agreed-upon meanings, such interpretive questions about the "empirical" facts of life can also be expected to differ. 8 Empirical testing can only be conclusive within a framework'of accepted theoretical assumptions. Each of these assumptions may itself be subject to test, although this requires yet another set of received assumptions. But the inconclusiveness of empirical testing that follows from this regress does not by itself lead to the necessity of theoretical authority. Indeed, it would seem reasonable for a dedicated scientist to insist on the right to subject any theoretical postulate to empirical scrutiny just because none can be considered conclusively established. That is, he/she could insist upon this if he/she has the conceptual equipment to call his/her own theoretical framework into question. But not only are tests inconclusive, given the impossibility of a purely observational language they are meaningless outside their theoretical context. Without a theory-neutral language, whether observational or otherwise, it may appear to be impossible to take a critical stance toward one's own most basic theoretical assumptions. In attempting to logically demonstrate that this is not necessarily the case, Karl Popper at one point identified the problem as a question of translation: whether one theoretical language can be translated into another. Popper clearly believes that any assertion in one language can be translated into any other. On the other hand, he is willing to grant the possibility that translation may at times be impossible if each

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language incorporates a distinct worldview. But this could only mean, according to Popper, that some languages are inadequate for the expression of some truths. 9 To understand Popper's point, one only has to ask if it is possible to understand two mutually untranslatable languages. Any assertion that they are untranslatable presupposes a positive answer. One could never know they were untranslatable unless both were understood. If, on the one hand, one cannot really understand any language but one's own, then no one could refute the assertion that all languages are intertranslatable. Logically, therefore, we must assume that a dedicated scientist could devote his/her entire life to the unending questioning of his/her suppositions. Consequently, manifestations of theoretical authority must be explained by factors creating inhibitions to theoretical skepticism. In his later writings Kuhn seems to emphasize psychological factors, while others have stressed material incentives. I~ I want to argue, however, that in the advanced sciences discussed by Kuhn and Popper, theoretical authority is an organizational necessity. This is not because it is essential for the individual attainment of scientific knowledge, but because it is a logical imperative of the kind of organization that characterizes this kind of science. Although Kuhn did not explicitly discuss this imperative, 1 believe it is at least implied in his analysis of scientific activity, and is the reason many have found it so compelling. An organization, by definition, requires a degree of coordination which, in turn, can only be achieved by a consensus on what is important. Of course the degree of consensus and coordination can vary, but in sciences considered "advanced" there must be a well-established consensus on what is theoretically important. For such a science is characterized by a high degree of a specific sort of specialization. Although almost all academic fields are specialized, the subfields in an advanced science are defined theoretically rather than by objects of experience or interest. For instance, the difference between organic and inorganic chemistry is defined in terms of molecular theory, while the specialties in political science are defined in terms of specific institutions or "area studies" usually considered important for public policy. Political science could only be considered an advanced science if, at a minimum, its subfields were reorganized as components of a larger theoretical system. In an advanced science almost all scientists are specialists in aspects of an inclusive theory. To accept the meaningfulness of the specialty is ipso facto to affirm the validity of the general theory. Consequently, in a highly specialized, or advanced, science a researcher will typically be engaged in what Kuhn calls "normal science." To describe this activity, as Kuhn has, as "puzzle-solving" may be an unfair aspersion on the personal commitment of the typical scientist. 11 Nevertheless, the likelihood of a serious challenge to the general theory rationalizing the various specialties is exceedingly remote. As Popper and others point out, even at the individual level unexpected results obtained from research in any specialty will not initially lead to questioning of the most general theoretical postulates, but of the secondary assumptions made in applying the general postulates to the particular experiment or subfield, n Now, considered in the abstract, an individual may come to question his/her basic theoretical assumptions rather quickly if he/she can find nothing amiss in the secondary premises. But consider the individual as a specialist, the product of lengthy training presupposing the established truth of a general theoretical framework, a member of an intricate network of interdependent subfields each with its own journals and history of

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success. Quite apart from any psychological or material considerations, the probability that he/she will seriously challenge the theoretical consensus is low. First, the more specialized the science the more secondary premises there are to buffer the framework from skepticism. Second, even if he/she does come to reject a basic theoretical postulate he/she is unlikely to convince a significant proportion of his/her peers. Given the vast amount of supportive evidence accumulated in diverse specialties, most scientists will quite reasonably assume that there is obviously something wrong with a secondary premise. For the more specialized the science, the smaller the number of"generalists" who might provide a challenger with an audience. The challenger will likely be deprived of the limited resources to develop or communicate alternatives, and this deprivation will be justified by incoherence, if not irrelevance. From an individual perspective this scenario is not an inevitability. It is not derived from epistemological assumptions but is simply the behavioral tendency to be expected from a high degree of theoretical specialization. Because it is quite conceivable that individual scientists or groups of scientists could continually question the validity of a general theory, the extent to which the scenario is descriptive of a particular scientific field is an empirical question. But what is inconceivable is the existence of an organization based upon theoretical specialization if scientists behave in this manner. For such specialization presumes a significant degree of theoretical consensus. If theoretical specialization is indeed a defining characteristic of an "advanced" science, theoretical authority by definition is an organizational imperative for such a science.

THE LEGITIMATION OF THEORETICAL AUTHORITY IN SOCIAL SCIENCE Necessity in itself does. not logically legitimate anything. To be rationally legitimate, theoretical authority would have to contribute in some way to scientific progress. I shall argue that in the type of science for which it is necessary, theoretical authority can be legitimized in terms of the advance of scientific knowledge. However, whether social science can be expected to ever evolve into this type of science is a matter of some dispute. This is, of course, a dispute within the philosophy of social science. The alternative resolutions imply different positions on the legitimacy of theoretical authority and, as will be seen in the final section of this article, radically different perspectives on the proper organizational principles for social scientific disciplines. At first glance, it may appear unlikely that theoretical authority could contribute to a progress in an advanced science. For complete specialization in a science characterized by theoretical differentiation would necessarily mean a complete consensus on the general theory by which the specialties are both differentiated and related to one another, t3 The theory establishes a common set of concepts, criteria of relevance, and perhaps most important, expectations about the best ways by which relevant problems might be solved. These expectations create the criteria for the allocation of scientific resources and guide the exercise of authority in making these decisions. ~4 A theoretical consensus, however, is rarely called into question. Each supposed success in a specialty is taken as an indirect affirmation of the general theory, but a failure is not likely to be attributed to its inadequacy. Unfulfilled expectations can always be accounted for by a variety of plausible explanations compatible with the theory from

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which the expectations were originally derived. ~5 Frustrated expectations are often caused by unforeseen variables, inadequate operational definitions, or faulty procedures and equipment. When such expectations are derived from a theory that rationalizes a scientific organization, efforts to explain their frustration will almost always be in terms of this theory. 16The elaborate instrumentation necessary for empirical work in modern science is developed only through specialization, a specialization that would be impossible without a theoretical consensus. It is only natural that "success" in a specialty be defined in terms of the ability of inquiry to integrate the field into the general theory, t7 In summary, there will be a strong tendency in a highly sl~ecialized science to render perceptions of reality commensurate with the general theory rather than modifying the theory. To justify theoretical authority it must be argued that the theoretical consensus, if incorrect, will inevitably be brought into question by the system of specialization which makes it possible. It must be argued that the scientific consensus is self-corrective, since it is neither directly nor indirectly tested. Such an argument can be formulated for those "advanced" sciences that attempt to explain experience in terms of universal laws.XS All sciences that postulate the existence of universal laws relating natural entities in a determinant manner should advance in a "cumulative" manner. These sciences are not primarily concerned with the explanation of specific situations, but rather strive to formulate theories able to explain a large number of such situations. Scientific "progress" lies in the increasing ability of a general theory to account for an increasingly large number of situations by means of a decreasing number of assumed universal laws. Progress means the progressive systematization of scientific knowledgeJ 9 Cumulative growth can be expected because it is a corollary of the assumption that determinate reltionships, i.e., universal laws, exist. It is entailed, in other words, in the assumption that a degree of universal order or uniformity exists and can be uncovered through systematic analysis. This uniformity, by being universal, should enable a correct theory to predict events under specified conditions. Prediction, therefore, is integral to the increasing systematization of scientific knowledge and serves to affirm a theory. 2~ I have already discussed, however, how a general theory serving as consensus in a scientific organization will not be thrown in doubt whenever expectations in a specialty fail to be fulfilled. Specialists will in effect see their task as the extension of the general theory t o the phenomena of their field, rather than the testing of the theory itself. They will be attempting to elaborate the theory's concepts and laws in such a way as to be able to account for any recalcitrant "facts." Every theory, true or false, faces recalcitrant facts. If we rejected every theory that encountered empirical difficulties we would reject them all. The difference between a correct and an incorrect theory is that a correct theory can eventually be elaborated in such a way as to overcofne its empirical difficulties. Of course this cannot be known in advance, which is exactly the problem. The resolution of this problem is found in the very specialization that an organizational consensus makes possible. Given the assumption of the uniformity of nature and the resulting possibility of prediction, a correct theory will allow the specialties to steadily advance. But specialists attempting to elaborate an incorrect theory will eventually encounter "anomalies" that will resist all efforts to be incorporated into the framework of the general theory. The broad features

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of a natural uniformity may be explained by a variety of theories, but those not in some way corresponding to its structure will fail to account for some of the details. There is no way that this failure could be anticipated in advance. The m o s t rational procedure, therefore, is to get to the details as quickly as possible, and the most efficient way to do this is a division of labor, i.e., an organization, v Such an organization requires a theoretical consensus, but this consensus can be brought into question by the very specialization it rationalizes, zz Indeed, the only decisive means of rejecting an incorrect scientific theory is, paradoxically, to accept it as an organizational consensus. Sooner or later an incorrect consensus will result in a number of stymied specialties, and the stage is set for theoretical revolts. 23 Sooner or later efforts will be made to change the theory itself, and these efforts will persist as long as its anomalies. Ptolemaic astronomy, philogistic chemistry, and Newtonian physics all make sense in the absence of present knowledge in these fields. Yet today they lack scientific proponents just because they brought themselves into question and prepared scientific opinion for their successors. As Kuhn himself has noted, to have a realistic chance of becoming the new consensus an alternative theory must preserve the accomplishments of its predecessor as well as resolve its most embarrassing anomalies, z4 Although these obsolete theories proved incorrect, the authority exercised in their name must be considered to have been justified since the goal of science, as conceived by this view of scientific knowledge, was advanced. For theoretical authority to be legitimate, universal determinate laws must exist. Only if nature has a uniform structure will an incorrect theory inevitably lead to persistent anomalies. This assumption, however, has been a point of dispute among social scientists and philosophers of social science. 25 On the one side, it is argued that there is a methodological unity among all sciences, and that insofar as the social sciences are science they must presume the existence of universal social laws. 26 The other side believes that social science must be "cultural science" because the explanation of social events ultimately refers to intentionality. The regularities observed in human behavior, for this latter view, are not the direct result of determinate laws, but rather the expression of the shared values of a common culture or the mutual adjustment of individual motives. ~7 It is not my purpose to defend one or the other of these general views of the nature of social scientific knowledge. If it were, a philosophical discussion of the nature of human intentionality would be in order. It suffices merely to note that proponents of the cultural science view deny that intentions can be completely explained by universal laws. They assert that intent results from subjective commitment, which is always to an extent contingent upon particular circumstances. Consequently, even a social scientific explanation of a typical pattern of behavior is ideographic, or "historical" in nature. 28 This is not to say that a cultural science can dispense with "theory," but only that theoretical universals refer only to entities, and not relationships. Without laws, a science may progress by accumulation, but not cumulatively. Knowledge may become increasingly detailed as science "advances," but not necessarily more integrated. Furthermore, in the absence of universal laws, prediction in the strict sense is unattainable. The best that can be achieved is anticipation, but anticipation of future behavior is contingent upon the subject's values, knowledge, and perhaps even his/her nerve. In short, "prediction" in cultural science is no more than extrapolation from previously observed behavioral regularities. If these regularities are not determinate, law-like relationships, this is all it can be.

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If social reality does not conform to universal laws, then a theoretical consensus in social science will not be self-corrective. General theory can be no more than conceptualization, and a particular theory can only be used to describe social phenomena. It cannot predict a certain configuration of events. A general social theory is merely a code by which social reality is ordered and sensory experiences classified, which cannot be discredited by empirical test because it does not entail empirical predictions. As long as the theory is logically consistent its terms will be adequate for the description of any situation. Consequently, it cannot encounter anomalies that might call it into question. To repeat, it is not my intention to argue for or against the existence of universal laws of social reality. Not only does this question involve philosophical debates on the nature of intentionality, it also concerns the nomological status of the statistical regularities that are the nearest social science has yet to come to the discovery of positive law. What is relevant in the present context is the implication of each view for the legitimacy of theoretical authority, and it is readily apparent that it is illegitimate in cultural science. A theoretical consensus is not self-corrective in such a science. Given the impossibility of discriminating among general conceptualizations on empirical grounds, the very existence of a theoretical consensus is unjustifiable. It could only have been the result of nonscientific factors, such as the influence of the cultural or political context. Any effort to protect such a consensus, which is exactly the purpose and effect of theoretical authority, cannot be justified on scientific grounds. Whatever authority is exercised in cultural science, such as decisions concerning adequacy of evidence or citation of relevant literature in the evaluation of manuscripts, can only be legitimized as conventional rules that promote the free competition of ideas. 29 Most, if not all, of the various philosophical approaches to social knowledge can be categorized as versions of one or the other of these two general views of social reality. There is another general outlook, however, which 1 believe has definite implications for authority in social science. I will label this outlook "instrumentalism" because it is defined by the view that the purpose of science is the control of reality rather than its apprehension. To be more exact, the two are equated; "knowledge" is defined in terms of control. In John Dewey's sophisticated rendition of this position, science does not seek to discover relationships among objects, but replaces "static" ideas of stationary objects with data that can be manipulated in such a manner as to help fulfill our needs. 3~ It is not my intent to give either a detailed exposition or critique of instrumentalism. I am solely concerned with its logical implications for the function of authority in social scientific organizations. In this connection, the determination of the needs that are to be served by inquiry is of primary importance. It would appear that the individual scientist could define those as he/she wishes. But a scientific organization, supported by social resources, must justify itself in terms of its contribution to the resolution of social problems. Consequently, the most pressing social problems will contribute the criteria for the exercise of authority, for the determination of relevance. JI How are the most pressing social problems to be isolated? Important as this question is for a scientific organization based upon the instrumentalist assumptions, it is not just a scientific question. It is also a political question. Social priorities, insofar as they are deliberately set, are established through a political process. Theoretical authority, given instrumentalist assumptions on the nature and purpose of science, must be an extension

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of political or communal authority. This is certainly not to say that the function of science is to legitimate the authority of the state. Nor does it imply that governmental officals are competent to certify scientific achievement. 32 Either circumstance would mean the end of real inquiry. J3 But those research topics financed by the scientific community, the certified resolutions of which are rewarded as significant advances, should be ultimately determined by the larger society which supports the scientific community.34 S O C I A L SCIENTIFIC O R G A N I Z A T I O N A N D THE PHILOSOPHY OF S C I E N C E Many social scientists are skeptical of the relevance of the philosophy of science to actual inquiry. It has even been cogently argued that the imposition of logically derived standards of explanation upon science is procrustean, leading inevitably to a sterile scholasticism. 35 Most social scientists are relatively ignorant of such issues, and it might be difficult to demonstrate that their work has suffered as a result. I have argued that a general view of the nature of social knowledge logically implies a specific role for theoretical authority in social scientific organization. I now want to suggest that the role foreseen for authority has implications for the organizational norms of social science. Irrespective of the relevance of the philosophy of science to the "success" of inquiry, it is of practical importance to the politics of social science. Organizational structure is to a great extent dictated by the particular features of the specific situation. To some degree, however, it will be determined by norms derived from the functions or goals of the organization. Each of the three broad approaches to the nature of social knowledge discussed in previous pages prescribes a different institutional function for scientific authority, and each differs in its implied prescriptions for the organizational structure of its exercise. In the remaining pages I will be discussing what in a different context might be called "constitutional principles." The alternatives are not utopian descriptions of ideal social scientific organizations, but broad guidelines which, ignoring specific circumstances, are logically compatible with the type of authority to be exercised. For instrumentalism theoretical authority is an extension of political authority. Its function is to integrate scientific effort and social needs. Although the criteria of significance are socially defined, it is imperative that scientists themselves apply these criteria. In other words, there must be indigenous authority in scientific organization. There are two reasons for this. First, it gives the best assurance of protecting the integrity of empirical inquiry, of assuring that its conclusions are not dictated by partisanship or dogma. 36 Second, by giving science organizational representation, it helps assure that science will have some influence on the formulation of social needs. For although this process is political it is not simply emotional struggle. Knowledge of possibilities can be an important element in deciding what is socially desirable. These considerations raise important questions concerning the interaction of scientific organization and public authority that are clearly beyond the scope of this article. For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that the instrumental view of science implies a relatively high degree of organizational centralization. All things being equal, a more centralized organization will more effectively focus scientific resources upon those

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problems of high priority. 37 Of course safeguards would be necessary to forestall the possibility that the organization itself would pose a serious threat to the integrity of inquiry, tenure and selection of officers by election perhaps being examples. If one believes that determinate laws of social behavior exist and can be discovered, the organizational question is more complex. Then the role of scientific authority is to protect a scientific consensus, since the elaboration of the consensus through specialization is the means by which science advances, through which mistakes are corrected. But this authority must not be so effective as to preclude a successful challenge to the consensus if it encounters persistent anomalies. The alternative to the consensus must have time to prove itself superior to a theory that has guided research in a number of specialties for perhaps a lengthy period. The new theory must be able not only to resolve the anomalies that led to the challenge, but also to account for the supposedly defective theory's previous successes. 3s It must also be protected from possible efforts to deny it a hearing by those whose reputations and careers are closely associated with the prevailing consensus. A balance between protection of the consensus, on the one hand, and the possibility of challenge, on the other, can best be attained by insuring that authority is inefficient, decisive only after a relatively long period. To insure this, the exercise of authority must be largely decentralized, and the remaining centralized positions of authority largely informal. The most efficient authority should be decentralized to the institutions responsible for scientific education, where the price of admission into the scientific community is the assimilation of its consensus. 39 These autonomous training centers potentially provide challengers with institutional sanctuaries from which they can consolidate and publicize their work. 4~ Once the scientist has been accredited and accepted into the scientific community, the authority he/she encounters should be largely informal. 41 Authority should be exercised by scientists who are influential because of their reputation for research, rather than by election or appointment to formal offices. Challenges to the consensus will also be challenges to these influentials, and it can be expected that their relative lack of formal sanctions, combined with their obvious partiality, will render their power inefficient in the short run. 4z The organizational question is more ambiguous for cultural science. Theoretical frameworks can be no more than general conceptualizations, and as such are not selfcorrective. Since a logically consistent conceptualization of one's subject matter cannot be disconfirmed by collective empirical endeavor, its acceptance must be dependent upon individual efforts to subject beliefs to empirical test. Considered in the abstract the logical expectation might seem to be a sort of anarchy, where a large number of "schools" would concentrate on explaining events in terms of their particular world view. But such anarchy is not to be expected because social science exists in a cultural context. From a cultural science perspective, all societies propagate beliefs about the necessity of certain institutional functions. To the extent that social science exists in the Soviet Union, for example, there is a high probability that it proceeds upon a Marxian conception of social reality, just as social science in the United States tends to be "Liberal. ''43 Just because of this difference, however, social science in the United States inevitably displays more diversity than its Soviet counterpart, and is undoubtedly less centralized organizationally. For the Liberal assumptions prevalent within American

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social science allow a degree of toleration and even encouragement of alternative viewpoints. Since such fundamental conceptualizations as Marxism or Liberalism are what may be called "prescientific," it might be argued that the Soviet example would be just as legitimate as the American if specific hypotheses framed within the theoretical context are accepted or rejected on empirical grounds. 44 In other words, it might be argued that theoretical authority may be legitimately imposed upon a cultural science by an external authority, just as it is for instrumentalism. There is, however, a crucial difference between theoretical authority in cultural science and instrumentalism. For the former, a theoretical framework is a conceptualization of the elemental components of social reality. Such a conceptualization is cognitive; it claims to be knowledge even if it cannot claim to be scientific knowledge. 45 Hypotheses that can be empirically tested presuppose the truth of the framework within which they are meaningful. Consequently, theoretical authority is illegitimate on scientific grounds. The truth of scientific knowledge is inescapably intertwined with that of the prescientific theoretical framework. The external imposition of a framework upon a scientific community undermines scientific endeavor as conceived through the cultural science perspective. Authority in cultural science must be justified in terms of the free competition of ideas. Given the dependence of scientific knowledge upon prescientific conceptual assumptions, this authority must insure a hearing to any consistent conceptualization of social reality that has gained a foothold in the social scientific community. Quite clearly a centralized organization is inappropriate. The cultural context in which inquiry occurs would create a natural tendency toward theoretical consensus, and such an organization would almost inevitably come to be controlled by the dominant orientation. The answer to this threat would seem to be a sufficient number of educational and professional organizations to allow a diversity of theoretical schools to coexist, perhaps in some sort o f federal organization. The only function of this organization would be to provide a forum for mutual criticism among the various theoretical orientations. In effect, this function would be an effort to undermine consensus in social science. While this may seem a strange goal for an endeavor devoted to confirmed knowledge, it is to some extent already the practice in social science, as indicated by"readers"aimed at all levels of students, as well as frequent proclamations in journals of their receptivity to all viewpoints. 46 Clearly, the degree of centralization of scientific organization that is deemed necessary or at least optimal to encourage scientific progress depends upon one's perspective on the nature of social scientific knowledge. Moreover, each such philosophical perspective would seem to entail a distinct "ethic" to guide the exercise of whatever organizational authority it legitimizes. From a cultural science perspective, only the requisites of free competition of ideas can serve as a logical basis for authority. Great tolerance of conceptual diversity would be expected. Those who believe that social science must be based upon the discovery of universal laws can afford to be less tolerant in the evaluation of the scientific work of their peers. Indeed, they must be so if science is to progress. The ethic appropriate from an instrumental perspective would appear to differ little from whatever is appropriate to statesmen generally. Of course, just as a true statesman respects the institutional structure that makes civilized politics possible, so too will the social scientific statesman resist undermining the integrity of social scientific peer review, even while attempting to impose standards derived from perceptions of social needs.

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It has not been my purpose to argue for any particular set of organizational norms, any more than to decide which of the three conceptions of social knowledge is correct. I have only tried to demonstrate that a social scientist's personal resolution, whether implicit or explicit, of these inescapable philosophic issues has important practical implications. Authority will exist in s'ocial scientific organization, and there will be conflict over its proper place. If it is to be exercised reasonably, in accordance with its appropriate ethic, those who exercise it and those who are subject to it must be clear in this own minds as to the purpose it legitimately serves.

NOTES AND REFERENCES I. Authority is also necessary to protect the ~intellectual property" of authors through the enforcement of proper citation and the establishment of "title" to scientific accomplishments. Otherwise the incentive structure of science would be significantly impaired. Jerome R. Ravetz, Scientific Knowledge and Its Social Problems (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 245-246; Warren O. Hagstrom, The Scientific Community (New York: Basic Books. 1965), p. 13; Robert K. Merton. The Sociology of Science, edited by Norman W. Storer (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1973), pp. 286--324. 2. For extreme instances of the exercise of theoretical authority, see the essays on the Velikovsky affair in the American Behavioral Scientist (1963); Arthur Koestler, The Case of the Midwife Toad (New York: Random House, 1971); Frank E. Manuel, "Newton as Autocrat of Science," in Philosophers and Kings: Studies in Leadership, edited by Dankwart A. Rustow (New York: George Braziller. 1970). pp. 398--430. 3. See llarriet Zuckerman, "Theory Choice and Problem Choice in Science," Sociological Inquiry. 48(no. 3&4, 1978):65--95. 4. See Diana Crane. Invisible Colleges (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1972). p. 53; Itagstrom, op. cir., p. 18. 5. For example, see Gunther S. Stent, "Prematurity and Uniqueness in Scientific Discovery," Scientific American ( 1972):84-93. 6. See Carl G. Hempel, Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), pp. 8-9; Rudolf Carnap. Meaning and Necessity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1957), pp. 233-247. 7. See the similar but more elegant argument by Mary llesse. "Is There an Independent Observational Language?" in The Nature and Function of Scientific Theories, edited by Robert C. Colochy (Pinsburg, PA: University of Pittsburg Press. 1970), pp. 39-40. 8. Compare Michael Scriven, "Definitions, Explanations, and Theories," in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, I/ol. 2. edited by tlerbert Feigl, Scriven Maxwell, and Grover Maxwell (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 1958), pp. 187. 192; Paul K. Feyerabend, "Explanation, Reduction, and Empiricism." in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science. VoL 3, edited by Herbert Feigl and Grover Maxwell (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1962), p. 37; Paul K. Feyerabend. ~Rcalism and lnstrumentalism: Comments on the Logic of Factual Support," in The Critical Approach to Science and Philosophy, edited by Mario Bunge (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1964), p. 304. 9. Karl R. Popper, "The Myth of the Framework," in The Abdication of Philosophy, edited by Eugene Freeman (LaSalle, IL: Open Court. 1976), pp. 36--37. 10. For examples, see Thomas S. Kuhn, The Essential Tension (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), pp. 293-314; Karl R. Popper, "Replies to My Critics." in The Philosophy of Karl Popper, edited by Paul Arthur Schlipp (LaSalle, IL: Open Court, 1974), p. 1146; M.D. King. "Reason, Tradition. and the Progressiveness of Science," in Paradigms and Revolutions, edited by Gary Gutting (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1980). I 1. Popper, "Replies to My Critics." p. 1147; John Watkins, "Against Normal Science," in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, edited by Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (London: Cambridge University Press, 1970). p. 27. 12. J.O. Wisdom,'The Natureof Normal Scienee,'in The Philosophy of Karl Popper, pp. 825-827. 13. See Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutioru (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1962. pp. 19-20; Michael Polanyi, Science, Faith andSocieO' (Chicago: University of Chlcago Press, 1964). p. 56.

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14. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. p. 37. 15. See Polanyi, op. cit.. pp. 28-29; Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 292. 16. See Imre Lakatos, "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programs,'in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, pp. 100-10 I. 17. See Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, pp. 24-25, 38-39. 18. See R.B. Braithwaite, Scientific Explanation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953), pp. I-2; Carl G. Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation (New York: The Free Press, 1965). p. 173; Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science (New York: Ilarcourt, Brace and World, 1961), chapt. I. 19. See Nagel, op. cit., p. 42; Albert Einstein, "The Method of Science," in The Structure of Scientific Thought, edited by Edward Madden (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1960). p. 83. 20. See Polanyi, Science. Faith and Socieo', p. 10. 2 I. In J.N. |iattiangadi's terminology, the more detailed the theoretical development, the more likely the generation of facts that ~discriminate" bet~veen alternatives. "Rationality and the Problem of Scientific Traditions." Dialectica, 32( 1978):3-22. 22. See Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, p. 65; also relevant is Jerry Gaston, Originality and Competition in Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1973), pp. 17 I-I 72. 23. See Crane. op. tit., p. 39. 24. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, p. 128; Karl R. Popper, "The Rationality of Scientific Revolutions," in Problems of Scientific Revolution, edited by Rom Harre (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 83. 25. See the essays in Murice Natanson (ed.), Philosophj" of the Social Sciences (New York: Random tlouse, 1963), and David Braybrook (ed.), Philosophical Problems of the Social Sciences (New York: Macmillan, 1965). 26. For examples, see Karl R. Popper, The Poverty oftlistoricisnt (New York: Harper and Row, 1961); Nagel, op. cit. 27. See Max Weber, The Methodology of the Social Sciences, translated by Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch (New York: The Free Press, 1949); Alfred Schutz, Collected Papers, Vol. !: The Problem of Social Reality (The Hague: Martinus Nihhoff, 1971); Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality (New York: Doubleday. 1966). 28. Weber. op. cit., p. I I I; E.B. Portis, "Max Weber and the Unity of Normative and Empirical Theory," Political Studies, 31 (March 1983):25"-42. 29. An example might be the widespread acceptance of.05 as the appropriate probability to reject a null hypothesis in the social sciences. Generally. however, lack of a consensus on the important problems of inquiry will result in less agreement on methods, sufficiency of evidence, and relevancy of literature. In this connection see Merton. op cit., pp. 470--472. Clifford Geertz epitomized the cultural science view of scientific progress when characterizinganthropology as "a science whose progress is marked less by a perfection of consensus than by a refinement of debate. What gets better is the precision with which we vex each other." Tire Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973), p. 29. 30. John Dewey, The Questfor CertahrO'(New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1929), p. 99. 31. See Eugene J. Meehan, ~What Should Political Scientists Be Doing?" in The Post-Behavioral Era: Perspectives of Political Science, edited by George J. Graham and George W. Carey (New York: David McKay, 1972), p. 59. 32. The Lysenko episode in Soviet science is perhaps the most notorious example. See David Joravsky, Tire Lysenko Affair (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970). 33. See John Dewey, "Common Sense and Science," in Knowh~g and the Known, edited by John DewEy and Arthur F. Bentley (Boston. MA: Beacon Press, 1949), pp. 283-284. 34. In this connection see llarold Orlans, "Criteria of Choice in Social Science Research," Minerva, (1972), 600-602. 35. John Gunnell, Philosophy. Science. and Political Inquiry (Morristown. N J: General Learning Press, 1975); Paul K. Feyerabend, Against Method (London: Verso, 1978); Barry Hindess, Philosophy and Methodology in the Social Sciences (Atlantic tlighlands, NJ: HumanitiEs Press, 1977). 36. See Dewey. "Common Sense and Science." pp. 282-283. 37. See Mehan, op. cir. pp. 65--67. 38. Kuhn. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, pp. 94--95. 158; Ravets, op. cit., pp. 266-267.

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39. See Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, p. 53; Polanyi, Science, Faith and SocieO', pp. 15-16, 45--46; Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, p. 53. 40. Ravetz, op. cir., pp. 269-270. This institutional autonomy has an additional advantage in that institutional competition can be a factor in scientific achievement. See Joseph Ben-David, =Scientific Productivity and Academic Organization in Nineteenth Century Medicine," in Science and Socieo', edited by Norman Kaplan (Chicago: Rand MeNally, 1965). 4 I. Polanyi, Science, Faith and Society, p. 59. 42. J.M. Ziman, Public Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), p. 136; Polanyi, Science, Faith and Society~ pp. 48--49; Ravetz, op. cit., p. 267; Daniel S. Greenberg, The Politics of Pure Science(New York: The New American Library, 1967), p. 14. 43. See Robert Booth Fowler, Believing Skeptics (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1978). 44. This is a somewhat ambiguous example since "orthodox" Marxism postulates a number of law-like generalizations and is not really compatible with the cultural science perspective. 45. SeeWeber, op. cit.,pp. 111-112. 46. Kuhn, The Essential Tension, pp. 228-229. For Weber's organizational prescriptions for social science, see E.B. Portis, ~Social Theory and Policy Evaluation," Public Administration Quarterly, 10 (1987), third section.