- Email: [email protected]
Theoretical weaknesses: Fundamental flaws in cognitive-behavioral theories are more than a problem of probability
I &ho,, The,. & Exp. Pnchmr. Vol. 71. No. 2. pp IJ.Sl45. Pnnted ,n Great Bnram
I’MI
THEORETICAL WEAKNESSES: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS IN COGNITIVE-BEHAVIORAL THEORIES ARE MORE THAN A PROBLEM OF PROBABILITY CHRISTINA University
of Newcastle
specific models. In this way the models would be strengthened and we would eventually develop better theories. They would need to be probabilistic in nature, rather than completely deterministic, because (I think this is the argument) they are. after all, dealing with selfreports. which are imperfect indicators of what is really going on. Research attempting to refine the nature of the relationships between cognitive variables has, of course, been going on for some time. Much of this research is extremely rigorously conducted and makes use of large samples and complex statistical techniques such as the ones Corrigan mentions (e.g., Feltz & Mugno, 1983; Godding & Glasgow, 1985). I have even conducted some of it myself (e.g., Lee, 1984). But a relatively large proportion of the variance in behavior is left unexplained by cognitive variables (e.g., Baer, Holt, & Lichtenstein, 1986). while observable variables such as behavior are frequently found to be more accurate predictors of outcomes than are sophisticated assessments of self-report (e.g., Feltz & Mugno, 1983; Lee, 1983). Models with a basis in behavior theory and empirical evidence are already providing alternatives to their more baroque cognitive competitors (e.g., Biglan, 1987; Rachlin, Logue, Gibbon, & Frankel, 1986; Tryon, 1982), although they do not have the same popularity. Baer, Wolf, and Risley (1987) argue that psychologists generally find non-cognitive explanations of
Corrigan (this issue) has responded to my recent article (Lee, 1989) with a defence of the status quo, which raises some apparently strong arguments but, in my opinion, misses the fundamental point that I am endeavoring to make. The basic argument raised by Lee (1989) is that many modern theories of psychology suffer from an insurmountable flaw: they rely on undefined and unobservable variables in order to explain behavior. These variables are hypothesized to interact in a complex manner to produce everyday human behavior. The undefined nature of the variables, the lack of consensus concerning subtle differences between differently named variables, and the unspecified and unobservable nature of their interactions, however, in combination with the difficulties of reliance on self-report, produce fundamental problems. These problems mean that the models are useless in understanding or predicting behavior, although they may be seductive ways of talking about that behavior afterwards. Corrigan (this issue) appears to be arguing that this problem is surmountable. It is a problem, he says, of research design. rather than a fundamental weakness in the models themselves. The use of appropriate statistics, he argues, should allow us to make guesses about the relationships of these variables. Armed with these preliminary hypotheses, we could then collect further information and test Address for correspondence: Australia.
Christina
Lee. Ph.D..
LEE
Department
143
of Psychology,
University
of Newcastle,
NSW 2308.
141
CHRISTINA
human behavior unreinforcing and that this is why they are not widely accepted. But finding something unpalatable is not sufficient grounds for declaring it wrong. And so far, nobody seems to be coming close to a satisfactory probabilistic explanation of human behavior based on the interaction of cognitive variables. This point has been elegantly and convincingly made. for example, by Coyne and Gotlib (1983. 1986) with reference to depression. Beidel and Turner (1086) and Holt and Lee (1989) have raised similar arguments concerning cognitive-behavioral therapy more generally. While I admire Corrigan’s optimism, I believe that the understanding of human behavior is going to be considerably more difficult than simply doing more of what we have been doing, and doing it better. We need a fundamentally different approach if we are to succeed in understanding behavior. The problems of theories of the type under discussion are insurmountable because they are implicit in the theories themselves, and no amount of stochastic modeling is going to make any difference. Reliance on self-report to infer qualities or quantities of urzohservuhle processes. such as levels of self-efficacy. structures of schemata, and so forth. will only tell us about selfreports. no matter how sophisticated are the statistics we carry out. A fundamental question is whether self-reports of cognitions have any reliable relationship with the actual causes of behavior. A body of evidence from a variety of sources (e.g.. Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Sherman. 19X0) suggests they may be no more than post-hoc rationalizations of what we observe ourselves doing. Skinner (1987) and Eysenck (197X) have pointed out the irrationality of models which propose that observable behavior is caused by epiphenomena. Skinner (198’)) goes further and argues that the future of psychology must remain in studying the relationship between environment and behavior, leaving internal events to be studied scientifically by physiologists, while Eysenck
LEE
(1987) reminds us of the need to remember the genetic and other biological constraints on behavior. Corrigan raises familiar points concerning the role of unobservables such as vicarious learning. schemata. and information processing. Given the vast body of literature in these topics. should we limit ourselves to the observable? I believe that we should. For example, detailed work with animals (Mineka. 1987) as well as humans indicates that vicarious learning may best be explained as a form of classical conditioning. “[human] Observers do not appear to be simply engaging in a social inference process” (Mineka. p. 107). The general argument that human behavior is determined by completely unobservable processes is itself mistaken. because it treats hypothetical structures and processes. which do not exist in any empirical sense. as if they were real (Lee, lYS7). All mer~talprocesses, as Skinner (1977) argued. are metaphors for observable. empirically real, potentially events. and are simply a convenient shorthand for referring to them. The fact that IndoEuropean languages allow us to talk about and so forth does not thoughts. schemata. mean that they exist. The limits of the study of observable behavior have by no means been reached. Human behavior is complex but. like everything else. it is determined by material events. Recent developments in the theory of chaos (Glieck, 1987) are moving towards an understanding of highly complex dynamic systems, such as weather patterns and fluid turbulence. The theory of deterministic chaos (Schuster, 1989) deals with the persistent. ordered. instability which arises in highly complex physical systems. Human behavior. in my view, is no more and no less than a complex physical system, and it may be that similar models, based entirely on observable events, will enable us to move towards a more scientific understanding of human behavior. Corrigan states that my article “is reminding behavior therapists of their empirical roots and
ital Flaws
encouraging them not to be seduced by overtheorising” (p. 141). While it never does any harm to remind people of the value of empiricism, I do not consider theorizing per se to be a bad thing. On the contrary, there is nothing as practical as a good theory, but it is the quality of the theorizing, not the amount, that matters. Understanding the causes of behavior is likely to require a fundamentally different approach from simply asking people what they are thinking, no matter how carefully we word the questions or how complicated the statistics we apply to their answers. We need to rid ourselves of the superstitious belief that conscious thought is all-important and start looking for more scientific ways of understanding behavior. References Baer, D. M.. Wolf. M. M.. & Risley. T. R. (1987). Some still-current dimensions of applied behavior analysis. Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis. 20. 313-327. Beidel, D. C.. & Turner. S. M. (1986). A critique of the theoretical bases of cognitive-behavioral theories and theraov. Clinical Psvcholoav Review. 6. 177-197. Biglan.’ ‘A. (1987). A behavior-analytic critique of Bandura’s self-efficacy theory. Behavfor Analysr. 10. l15. Corrigan. P. (1990). Theoretical weakness in behavior theory is no more than statistical variance: a response to Christina Lee. Journal of Behavrlor Therapy and Experimenraf Psychiatry. -71. 141-142. Coyne, J. C.. & Gotlib. I. (1983). The role of cognition in depression: A critical appraisal. Psychologual Bulletin. 94. 472-505. Coyne. J. C.. Br Gotlih. I. (1986). Studying the role of cognition in depression: Well-trodden paths and cul-desacs. Cognirive Therapy and Research. 10. 695-705. Eysenck. H. J. (1978). Expectations as causal elements in hehaviour change. Advances in Behaviour Research and Therapy. 1. 171-175. Eysenck, H. J. (1987). The role of heredity. environment. and ‘preparedness‘ in the genesis of neurosis. In H. J.
14s
Eysenck & I. Martin (Eds.) Theorelical foundarions of behavior therapy. pp. 379-402. New York: Plenum. Feltz. D. L.. & Mugno. D. A. (1983). A replication of the path analvsis of the causal elements of Bandura’s theorv of self-efficacy and the influence of autonomic nercevtion. Journal of Soorr Psvcholopv. 5. 26-3-277. Check. ‘J. (1987). Chaos, London! Heinemann. Godding, P. R.. & Glasgow. R. E. (1985). Self-efftcacy and outcome expectations as predictors of controlled smoking status. Cognitive Therapy and Reseurch. 9. 583-590. Holt. 3.. & Lee, C. (1989). Cognitive hehaviour therapy re-examined: problems and implications. Ausrrahan Psvchologisr. 24. 157-169. C. (1983). Self-efficacy and behaviour as Lee.. predictors of subsequent behaviour in an assertiveness training programme. Beharaiour Research and Therapy. 21. 225-232. Lee. C. (1984). Accuracy of efficacy and outcome expectations in predicting performance in a simulated assertiveness task. Cognirive Therapy and Research. X. 37-48. Lee. C. (1987). Affective behavior modification: A case for empirical investigation. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimenral Psychiatry. 18. 205-213. Lee. C. (1989). Theoretical weaknesses lead to practical problems: The example of self-efficacy theory. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimenral Psychiarry. -70. 115-123. Mineka, S. (1987). A primate model of phobic fears. In H. J. Eysenck & I. Martin (Eds.). Theorem-al foundarions of behavior therapy. pp. 81-111. New York: Plenum. Rachlin, H.. Logue. A. W.. Gibbon. J., & Frankel. M. (1986). Cognition and behavior in studies of choice. Psychological Review, 93, 33-45. Schuster. H. G. (1989). Determinism chaos (2nd ed.). Weinheim, West Germany: VCH Verlagsgesellschaft. Sherman, S. J. (1980). On the self-erasing nature of errors of prediction. Journal of Persona& and Social Psychology. 39. 211-221. Skinner. 9. F. (1977). Whv I am not a cognitive psychologist. Behaviorism. 5, l-10. Skinner. 9. F. (1987). Whatever hannened to osvcholoav as the science of behavior? American Psycho/o@. 42. 78G-786. Skinner, 9. F. (1989). The origins of cognitive thought. American Psychologist, 44. 13-18. Tryon. W. W. (1982). Reinforcement history as possible basis for the relationship between self-percepts of efficacy and responses to treatment. Journal of Behavior Therupy and Experimenral Psychiatry. 13. 201-202. I
.
.
._
L_
I’MI
THEORETICAL WEAKNESSES: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS IN COGNITIVE-BEHAVIORAL THEORIES ARE MORE THAN A PROBLEM OF PROBABILITY CHRISTINA University
of Newcastle
specific models. In this way the models would be strengthened and we would eventually develop better theories. They would need to be probabilistic in nature, rather than completely deterministic, because (I think this is the argument) they are. after all, dealing with selfreports. which are imperfect indicators of what is really going on. Research attempting to refine the nature of the relationships between cognitive variables has, of course, been going on for some time. Much of this research is extremely rigorously conducted and makes use of large samples and complex statistical techniques such as the ones Corrigan mentions (e.g., Feltz & Mugno, 1983; Godding & Glasgow, 1985). I have even conducted some of it myself (e.g., Lee, 1984). But a relatively large proportion of the variance in behavior is left unexplained by cognitive variables (e.g., Baer, Holt, & Lichtenstein, 1986). while observable variables such as behavior are frequently found to be more accurate predictors of outcomes than are sophisticated assessments of self-report (e.g., Feltz & Mugno, 1983; Lee, 1983). Models with a basis in behavior theory and empirical evidence are already providing alternatives to their more baroque cognitive competitors (e.g., Biglan, 1987; Rachlin, Logue, Gibbon, & Frankel, 1986; Tryon, 1982), although they do not have the same popularity. Baer, Wolf, and Risley (1987) argue that psychologists generally find non-cognitive explanations of
Corrigan (this issue) has responded to my recent article (Lee, 1989) with a defence of the status quo, which raises some apparently strong arguments but, in my opinion, misses the fundamental point that I am endeavoring to make. The basic argument raised by Lee (1989) is that many modern theories of psychology suffer from an insurmountable flaw: they rely on undefined and unobservable variables in order to explain behavior. These variables are hypothesized to interact in a complex manner to produce everyday human behavior. The undefined nature of the variables, the lack of consensus concerning subtle differences between differently named variables, and the unspecified and unobservable nature of their interactions, however, in combination with the difficulties of reliance on self-report, produce fundamental problems. These problems mean that the models are useless in understanding or predicting behavior, although they may be seductive ways of talking about that behavior afterwards. Corrigan (this issue) appears to be arguing that this problem is surmountable. It is a problem, he says, of research design. rather than a fundamental weakness in the models themselves. The use of appropriate statistics, he argues, should allow us to make guesses about the relationships of these variables. Armed with these preliminary hypotheses, we could then collect further information and test Address for correspondence: Australia.
Christina
Lee. Ph.D..
LEE
Department
143
of Psychology,
University
of Newcastle,
NSW 2308.
141
CHRISTINA
human behavior unreinforcing and that this is why they are not widely accepted. But finding something unpalatable is not sufficient grounds for declaring it wrong. And so far, nobody seems to be coming close to a satisfactory probabilistic explanation of human behavior based on the interaction of cognitive variables. This point has been elegantly and convincingly made. for example, by Coyne and Gotlib (1983. 1986) with reference to depression. Beidel and Turner (1086) and Holt and Lee (1989) have raised similar arguments concerning cognitive-behavioral therapy more generally. While I admire Corrigan’s optimism, I believe that the understanding of human behavior is going to be considerably more difficult than simply doing more of what we have been doing, and doing it better. We need a fundamentally different approach if we are to succeed in understanding behavior. The problems of theories of the type under discussion are insurmountable because they are implicit in the theories themselves, and no amount of stochastic modeling is going to make any difference. Reliance on self-report to infer qualities or quantities of urzohservuhle processes. such as levels of self-efficacy. structures of schemata, and so forth. will only tell us about selfreports. no matter how sophisticated are the statistics we carry out. A fundamental question is whether self-reports of cognitions have any reliable relationship with the actual causes of behavior. A body of evidence from a variety of sources (e.g.. Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Sherman. 19X0) suggests they may be no more than post-hoc rationalizations of what we observe ourselves doing. Skinner (1987) and Eysenck (197X) have pointed out the irrationality of models which propose that observable behavior is caused by epiphenomena. Skinner (198’)) goes further and argues that the future of psychology must remain in studying the relationship between environment and behavior, leaving internal events to be studied scientifically by physiologists, while Eysenck
LEE
(1987) reminds us of the need to remember the genetic and other biological constraints on behavior. Corrigan raises familiar points concerning the role of unobservables such as vicarious learning. schemata. and information processing. Given the vast body of literature in these topics. should we limit ourselves to the observable? I believe that we should. For example, detailed work with animals (Mineka. 1987) as well as humans indicates that vicarious learning may best be explained as a form of classical conditioning. “[human] Observers do not appear to be simply engaging in a social inference process” (Mineka. p. 107). The general argument that human behavior is determined by completely unobservable processes is itself mistaken. because it treats hypothetical structures and processes. which do not exist in any empirical sense. as if they were real (Lee, lYS7). All mer~talprocesses, as Skinner (1977) argued. are metaphors for observable. empirically real, potentially events. and are simply a convenient shorthand for referring to them. The fact that IndoEuropean languages allow us to talk about and so forth does not thoughts. schemata. mean that they exist. The limits of the study of observable behavior have by no means been reached. Human behavior is complex but. like everything else. it is determined by material events. Recent developments in the theory of chaos (Glieck, 1987) are moving towards an understanding of highly complex dynamic systems, such as weather patterns and fluid turbulence. The theory of deterministic chaos (Schuster, 1989) deals with the persistent. ordered. instability which arises in highly complex physical systems. Human behavior. in my view, is no more and no less than a complex physical system, and it may be that similar models, based entirely on observable events, will enable us to move towards a more scientific understanding of human behavior. Corrigan states that my article “is reminding behavior therapists of their empirical roots and
ital Flaws
encouraging them not to be seduced by overtheorising” (p. 141). While it never does any harm to remind people of the value of empiricism, I do not consider theorizing per se to be a bad thing. On the contrary, there is nothing as practical as a good theory, but it is the quality of the theorizing, not the amount, that matters. Understanding the causes of behavior is likely to require a fundamentally different approach from simply asking people what they are thinking, no matter how carefully we word the questions or how complicated the statistics we apply to their answers. We need to rid ourselves of the superstitious belief that conscious thought is all-important and start looking for more scientific ways of understanding behavior. References Baer, D. M.. Wolf. M. M.. & Risley. T. R. (1987). Some still-current dimensions of applied behavior analysis. Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis. 20. 313-327. Beidel, D. C.. & Turner. S. M. (1986). A critique of the theoretical bases of cognitive-behavioral theories and theraov. Clinical Psvcholoav Review. 6. 177-197. Biglan.’ ‘A. (1987). A behavior-analytic critique of Bandura’s self-efficacy theory. Behavfor Analysr. 10. l15. Corrigan. P. (1990). Theoretical weakness in behavior theory is no more than statistical variance: a response to Christina Lee. Journal of Behavrlor Therapy and Experimenraf Psychiatry. -71. 141-142. Coyne, J. C.. & Gotlib. I. (1983). The role of cognition in depression: A critical appraisal. Psychologual Bulletin. 94. 472-505. Coyne. J. C.. Br Gotlih. I. (1986). Studying the role of cognition in depression: Well-trodden paths and cul-desacs. Cognirive Therapy and Research. 10. 695-705. Eysenck. H. J. (1978). Expectations as causal elements in hehaviour change. Advances in Behaviour Research and Therapy. 1. 171-175. Eysenck, H. J. (1987). The role of heredity. environment. and ‘preparedness‘ in the genesis of neurosis. In H. J.
14s
Eysenck & I. Martin (Eds.) Theorelical foundarions of behavior therapy. pp. 379-402. New York: Plenum. Feltz. D. L.. & Mugno. D. A. (1983). A replication of the path analvsis of the causal elements of Bandura’s theorv of self-efficacy and the influence of autonomic nercevtion. Journal of Soorr Psvcholopv. 5. 26-3-277. Check. ‘J. (1987). Chaos, London! Heinemann. Godding, P. R.. & Glasgow. R. E. (1985). Self-efftcacy and outcome expectations as predictors of controlled smoking status. Cognitive Therapy and Reseurch. 9. 583-590. Holt. 3.. & Lee, C. (1989). Cognitive hehaviour therapy re-examined: problems and implications. Ausrrahan Psvchologisr. 24. 157-169. C. (1983). Self-efficacy and behaviour as Lee.. predictors of subsequent behaviour in an assertiveness training programme. Beharaiour Research and Therapy. 21. 225-232. Lee. C. (1984). Accuracy of efficacy and outcome expectations in predicting performance in a simulated assertiveness task. Cognirive Therapy and Research. X. 37-48. Lee. C. (1987). Affective behavior modification: A case for empirical investigation. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimenral Psychiatry. 18. 205-213. Lee. C. (1989). Theoretical weaknesses lead to practical problems: The example of self-efficacy theory. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimenral Psychiarry. -70. 115-123. Mineka, S. (1987). A primate model of phobic fears. In H. J. Eysenck & I. Martin (Eds.). Theorem-al foundarions of behavior therapy. pp. 81-111. New York: Plenum. Rachlin, H.. Logue. A. W.. Gibbon. J., & Frankel. M. (1986). Cognition and behavior in studies of choice. Psychological Review, 93, 33-45. Schuster. H. G. (1989). Determinism chaos (2nd ed.). Weinheim, West Germany: VCH Verlagsgesellschaft. Sherman, S. J. (1980). On the self-erasing nature of errors of prediction. Journal of Persona& and Social Psychology. 39. 211-221. Skinner. 9. F. (1977). Whv I am not a cognitive psychologist. Behaviorism. 5, l-10. Skinner. 9. F. (1987). Whatever hannened to osvcholoav as the science of behavior? American Psycho/o@. 42. 78G-786. Skinner, 9. F. (1989). The origins of cognitive thought. American Psychologist, 44. 13-18. Tryon. W. W. (1982). Reinforcement history as possible basis for the relationship between self-percepts of efficacy and responses to treatment. Journal of Behavior Therupy and Experimenral Psychiatry. 13. 201-202. I
.
.
._
L_