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Threat as a determinant of downward comparison
JOURNAL
OF EXPERIMEKTAL
Threat
SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY
as a Determinant KARL
SUPPLEMENT
of Downward
1, 32-39
(1966)
Comparison1
L. HAKMILLER
The present esperiment examined comparison choice under two condit,ions of threat in which the probable dissimilarity of the available Others from the subjects varied, according to the precomparison information. It was observed that the choices of the subjectas in the High-Threat condition focused upon more dissimilar Others than did the rhoiccs of the subjects in the LowThreat condition. Since the ,precomparison probability that the more dicsimilnr Others would prove to be worse off (i.e., more hostile) than the Pubjccts was greater, this observation was interpreted as evidence of the occurrence of defensive social comparison. Such comparisons, it was suggested, primarily function to reduce the threat of unexpectrdly negative information about oneself rather than providing a basis for an accurate self-assessment.
Social comparison process theory (Festinger, 1954) hypothesizes that the tendency t’o compare oneself with some specific person decreases as the difference between his opinion or ability and one’s own increases. This hypothesis is based on the argument that comparison with others who are too divergent results in inaccurate self-assessment, that such imprecision is less preferred than precision and, hence, that such comparisons are avoided when possible. Thus, this reasoning suggests that the primary instrumental function of the comparison process is to permit accurate self-aesessment~. Even assuming that comparison with similar Others does permit more accurate self-assessment, conditions which lead to comparison with dissimilar Others would suggest that social comparison may, at least, have additional instrumental functions. ConsideraGon of t,his possibility suggests that at least two alternative ‘This report is based upon a dissertation submitted to the University of Minnesota in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Ph.D. degree. The author wishes to express his appreciation for the advice and guidance of the late Benjamin Willerman and for the considerable aid of Dana Bramel at all stages of this investigation. ‘Now at The University of Connecticlll 32
functions of a comparison choice arc plausible. First, an individual might choose to compare with an Other who is quite superior, indicating that’ the Other is to serve as a model of behavior to which the individual aspires. The phenomenon of behavioral contagion (Lippitt,, Polansky, Redl, and Rosen, 1952 1, for example, may be viewed as based upon such a comparison proceed. Or, secondly, an individual might choose to compare with an Other who is quite inferior, indicating an attempt at selfaggrandizement. The middle-class Negroes to whom Dollard (1957) refers as ‘istrainers” may be viewed as individuals seeking such aggrandizement. Of these persons, Dollnrd wrote, “Middle-class people must stress sharply the differences between themselves and the lowerclass whites and Negroes because they arc none too sure that the clifferences are very important or permanent” (11. 77 1. While neither of these altcrnativcs imply :I concern with the accuracy of the resulting self-assessment, both might come to be included within existing comparison l)roccss theory. However, before modification of t,he theory is attempted, it is clearly necearary to demonstrate the occurrence of comparison choices which are distinguishable from those which serve to provide accurate self-assessment,. Such a demonstration would require, initially, evidence of compa’rison with dissimilar Others in preference to similar Others. The present experiment was designed on the a~:humption that one class of conditions which might’ give rise to comparison \vit,h dissimilar Others would be that in which the individual receives unexpectedly negative information about himself. Such threats to the individual’s favorable self-regard might lend to a greater concern lvith reducing threat than with the accuracy of the reuultin g self-assessment. If such a threatenecl individual is provided with a range of possible comparison Others &lo are probably worse off than himself, he might compare wit,11 the Q&i. who lvould most, snrcly be worse off, namely the most rlissimilar inferio: Other available. Thus, the primary hypot’hesis of this investigation was that there would be tendencies to seek comparison with more dissimilar inferiors under conditions of high-threat than under low-threat conditions. The suggestion is that the instrumental function of the more extreme cornparisons is certain reduction of the threat by confirmation of the seeker’s superior position with respect to the chosen inferior.
Subjects Eighty-four University
of
female volunteers Minnesota were
from the introductory scheduled in groups
of
psychology six. Fire
of
courses at the these subjects
34
KARL
L.
were eliminated from the analysis--four and one because of xgr.
HAKMILLER
because trl srlspicion
of the manipulations
The subjects, ~110 were seated in separate booths along a table, all were secretly assigned the identification letter D and led to b&eve that the let,tcrs E, F, G, fI, and I had been assigned to the remaining five persons in their group. The cover explanation of the experiment was a concern with cross-validating a papcr-andpencil test of a certain personality trait. This test (the MMPI) had supposedly been taken by these subjects durin g registration at the University and, according to the distorted description of the typical use of the test given the subjects, was currently employed to evaluate peoples’ standing on certain personality trait dimensions. After explaining that cross-validation consisted of comparing an individual’s score on the MMPI with his score on a more precise measure of the same trait, the nature of this more precise (criterion test) measure was described. It was also explained that one reason the criterion test was not routinely used in place of the MMPI was that the criterion test was less conveniently administered in field settings. The criterion test consisted of measurement of the galvanic skin response to a series of TAT slides. The accuracy of this measure of the personality trait under study was described as well as the fact that the individual could exercise no conscious control over the response he made on this test. After administration of the criterion test, the subjects in all conditions were informed that the trait being studied was “hostility toward one’s own parents.” High-Threat condition. For these subjects the trait was described in exceedingly negative terms, being defined as expressive of conscious or unconscious anger, dislike, or disgust directed toward one’s own parents. A fictional psychoanalyst was quoted as stating that, at the extreme, this trait leads to such undesirable consequences as a blunted sense of decenc:T and fair play, deterioration of the personality, etc. The attempt here, then, was to increase the negativity Tvith which these female sophomores presumably viewed this trait dimension. Low-Threat condition. These subjects heard the same trait described in positive terms. This description indicated that the trait leads to behaviors which parents themselves judge to reflect maturity and responsibility in their own children. And, the fictional psychoanalyst was quoted as describing the individual and social benefits that follow from the presence of this trait in the individual. Here, then, the attempt was to counter the negativity with which this trait was viewed and to give it at least a degree of negativity less than in the High-Threat condition. The success of this attempt was a;zscssed by ratings of the trait on eight bipolar disturbing-satisfying, etc.) and by estimates of adjective scales (i.p., fair-lmfair. expected scores on the criterion test. After the trait description and seemingly by way of elaboration, the experimenter asserted that two subgroups were represented among the six persons in the group. Each subgroup was supposedly composed of persons similar to one another in their general interests and ambitions (information supposedly derived also from the MMPI). One subgroup (the “Beta” group) was supposedly less hostile, on the average, than the other subgroup (the “Alpha” group). However, in addition, it was asserted that from the MMPI it could be predicted with “better than 50-50 accuracy,” that the hostility R~OL’C‘Yof the indicidnals in the total group would hc rank ordered in a certain fnshion on the criterion test. Thr subjects were then a~!-&
THREAT
ASD
DOWXWARD
SOCIAL
COMPARISON
35
to estimate the scores of the individuals on the prcdictcd boundaries of the Alpha and Beta groups (i.e., II and I for the Alpha group and E and F for the Beta group) to check their understanding of this information. The subgroup instructions were intended to encourage perception of differences between two “clusters” of individuals in the group of six. The rank order predictions which were then lvrittcn on the blackboard ~rrc intended to convey the precomparison information that thr available Otllrrs /~rohably--hut far from certain]! -differed from the subjects in zm or&red manner. This predicted rank ordering of persons on the criterion test was reported a-: H (highest hostility), G, I, E, D, and F (least hostility). Persons H, G, and I were supposedly in the “Alpha” subgroup and persons E, D, and F in the “Beta” subgroup. As indicated earlier, all subjects believed themselves to be person D. The subjects were then privately informed of their own hostility score on thtr criterion test; an assistant had supposedly scored the test during the trait discussion and brought them into the room at this point.’ The subjects in both the High- and Low-Threat conditions received the same scores; a high numerical score (on the O-100 scale) was defined as indexing great hostility toward one’s own parents. Assuming that the two-trait descriptions succeeded in differentially affecting thr negativity with which the trait dimension was viewed, it was anticipated that :I given score would be more disturbing to the High-Threat subjects than the LOWThreat subjects. The scores actually employed were higher (i.e., worse) than thch scores the subjects expected to receive on the critrrion test according to latcl :mnlysis. After receiving their own scores the subjects were asked to rate their rcndions to this information; this request Teas supposedly part of the cross-validation proredurc. They were then asked to indicate which other person’s score they would like to know, assuming they could be shown only one score. This choice completed, tllrl experimenter contrived to show them all the scores of person I with the excuse of saving time. In all instances, person I’s score eras ten points higher than the scorf~5 the subjects had received as thier own. The subjects wcrc then asked to mle t,heir reactions upon learning this person’s score, using the same scale employed earlier after receipt of their own scores. The session concluded, the deceptions were explained and the subjects’ cooperation in maintaining the security of these deceptions XIS soliritcd. RESULTS
After the description of the trait but prior to learning their own scores, the subjects were asked to describe this trait using eight bipolaradjective scales; such evaluative adjectives as “il11proper-I~roper,” “unjust-just,” :md “offeil~ive-inoffensive” anchored the ends of the six category scales. The datn, obtained by summing category weights across scales, inclicntt~(l that the High-Threats subjects c\xluntcd the trait as ‘Mrs. Diana Iiirschner served as the assistant. ‘Actually, two Own Score levels were used in each condition (I.(-., 80 and 60) but this treatment did not prove to have differential effects in terms of rither affert kaxpression or Other Chosen and so will he ignored in this discussion.
36
KARL
L.
HAKMILLEH
significant,ly more negative than the Low-Threat subjects (F = 17.2, 11< .Ol). Inspection of the mean trait evaluations for the two conditions suggested, however, that the Low-Threat subjects still viewed the trait as slightly negative, albeit less so than the High-Threat subjects. For this reason, it is more appropriate to consider the former group as Low Threat rather than NonThreat In addition, the subject.s were asked to rate their feeling of %pset” upon learning their own criterion t,est score and these data indicate that the High-Threat subjects were significantly more disturbed than the Low-Threat subjects (F = 5.1, p < .05). Thus, the threat manipulation appear& to have had the differential effects anticipated in that the High-Threat subjects evaluated the trait more negatively and expressed more dist,urbance upon receiving their own scores on the criterion hostility test. Other Ch’osen The primary experimental hypothesis was that the High-Threat subjects would tend to choose more ext’remely dissimilar inferiors than would the Low-Threat subjects. Table 1 presents the frequencies with which TABLE PERCESTAGE
OB SUBJJWM T~ARIOIX
1
CHOOSING TO SEE THE SCORES ik3SOcL4'~ED ~:ANXS OF THE PERSONALITY TEST
WITH
Conditions Other Chosen
Probable Rank
High-Threat, (11: = 39)
Low-Threat (.N = 40)
each of the available Others were chosen; the precomparison hostility rank ordering on the criterion test which was supposedly predicted from the MMPI is indicated in the column headed Probable Rank. It is clear that a very large proportion (94.9%) of the total choices were directed toward those Others whom the precomparison information suggested would probably have higher (i.e., worse) hostility scores than the subjects’ own. C)onsickring those subjecats in l)ot.lr coiiclitionl- \VllO ('hO>( 1,) c'cllllpaI"'
with 311 Other of rank one t,hrough four, the experimental hypothcsi5 implied a disproportionate concentration of High-Threat choices on the lower ranks. A chi-square analysis indicated rcject,ion of the hypothesis that the choice distributions among the four ranks were similar (x2 :9.1, (1.f= 3, p < .05)’ in the tlvo conditions. Table 1 indicaies, as tllca conexperimental hypothesis implies, an over-choice in the High-Threat dition of the Uther with rank onr iprohablp most ho&e according to the prcromparison information‘1
If, as has been suggested, threatened individuals seek comparison with an Other who is probably inferior to themselves for need-appropriate reasons, it follows that if this Other indeed proves to he inferior tht threat should be diminished. Shortly after the subjects had been shown the score of person I, ~110 was thereby proven to be more hostile, they were asked to express theil feeling of ‘iupset” upon learning this other person’s score. Since the same measure had been made earlier, after the subjects’ receipt of their OU’U scores, the change in this expression of upset may be used to as~css the effects of confirming that an Other’s score is higher (i.c.! more hostilci than one’s own. By using an analysis for correlated means, the nl~nn decrease in upset among High-Threat subjects was $nificantly different from zero (t = 3.6, p < .OOl) while there was no significant change in mean upset level among the Low-Threat subjects. Moreover, despite the init,ial difference between conditions in level of upset, a differential rcgression effect cannot account for this findin, r since the variance due to regression did not differ significantly in thr High- aud Low-Threat. conditions. Thus, this differential reduction of oxpressed disturbance is consistent with the interpretation that the comparison process was serving a defensive (i.e., threat-rcdllcing) function for the High-Thrclnt suh.iects.
The data were consistent Cth the primary hypothesis that comparison would focus upon more dissimilar inferiors in the High-Threat condition than in the Low-Threat condit,ion. This may be interpreted as reflecting the function of comparison in this situation of sustaining or reasserting the favorability of the individuals self-regard. ‘since person F was the only Other characterized by the precornparison information as probably lower in hostility than the subjects it was difficult to justify collapsing this category with another. Thus, it was decided to exclude subjerk who chose person F from the analysis discuarP~1 in the ~PXI.
the foul.
38
KARL
I,.
HAKMILLER
Assuming this defensive interpret&on is correct, there are at least two emphases which arc possible, either or both of which may be justifiable. On the one hand, the choices of person N (and to some extent the choices of the Other persons) might reflect a desire to most certainly rrv~oid receiving information that the chosen Other is less hostile than oneself. On the other hand, these choices might reflect a more positive interest in discovering that at least someone is, indeed, worse off t’han oneself. Either interpretation is simply a matter of emphasis as concerns the present experiment but could give rise to differential predictions in other situations. For example, with the former emphasis, one mode of accommodation t,o threatening information about oneself might be to refuse comparison if the risk is great that the Other will turn out to bc better off than oneself. With the second emphasis, the accommodation to the same risky choice might be to accept the comparison opportrmity, although choosing the Other with the greatest probability of being worse off. In the present situation, of course, the subjects in effect hat1 no choice about comparing and acceptance was, t’hcrefore, t,otal. The fact that the subjects “sought” the comparisons they made only in the sense that they were free to choose among the available Others raises the possibility that motivations rqrite different from needs for self-evaluation determined their choices. For example, it is conceivable that the High-Threat subjects chose person H because they were interested in knowing the score of the most “pathological” person present. Given the fact that the Low-Threat subjects did not view hostility as negatively as did the High-Threat subjects, person H might have been viewed as less “pathological” and therefore, less interesting to the LowThreat subjects, While no direct evidence is available to test this alternative, it will be recalled that at the time the rank order information was given the subject,s were asked to estimate the score they thought persons H, I, D, and F might receive on the criterion test. Comparison of the mean expected scores for person N among the High- and LOWThreat subjects indicates that,, if anything, the Low-Threat subjects expected person H to receive a higher score than did the High-Threat subjects (89.6 and 87.5, respectively). The difference was not significant and the purpose of the threat manipulation wus to attach a more negative meaning to a given score in the High-Threat condition but, at least, expected score extremity alone could not account for the choice differences between High- and Low-Threat conditions. But, unfortunately, there is no other data with which to address the ‘lmaudlin curiosity” alternative. A second alternative explanation of the High-Threat subjects’ focus upon person II turns on t,he fact that the subjects believed thcmstlves to
THREAT
ASD
DO%-SWARD
SOCIllL
COMPARISOS
39
have a relatively low hostility score according to the NMPI and then learned that according to the criterion test their score was relatively high. It might be suggested that this disparity cast doubt upon both the tests and induced an attempt to discover the relationship b’etween the two tests by focusing upon the most extreme scorer according to the MMPI. Without pre-judging the empirical plausibility of this alternative, two considerations are relevant. First, if this were so, is it not as likely that an appreciable number of subjects would have sought to learn the criterion test score of person F, the individual whose score would be the lowest according to the MMPI? And, yet, only four of 79 subjects did so. Secondly, assuming some bias toward the high scorer in this connection, would not the same interest in discovering the relationship betlveen the tests have been present among the Low-Threst subjects? And, if so, there would have been no differences in choice of person H between conditions since the criterion test score was apparently just as discrepant from the implied &IMP1 score in both conditions. On balance, then, an inter& in comparing the tests themselves would seem t,o be inconsist,ent with the data at hand, The issue which was raised in the present investigat,ion implies a distinction between self-assessment motivations which are valuational rather than ezduntiomZ. That is, the results of this investigation indicate that precision of inference about one’s own level of a trait 01 ability (ev:duational self-assessment) is not the sole demand of a social comparison. Rather, what might be termed the comforting, value of the infercnccs which may be drawn , given what comparison information is available (valuational self-assessmentj, appears also to be an empirically plausible demand of the comparison process. REFERENCES J. Caste and class ,L~IL a southern tozcm. New York: I>oubleday A$n&or Books, 1957. FE~TS~CER, L. A theory of social colnparison processes. Human Rehtiofzs, 1954, 7, 117-140. HAKMILLER, Ii. L. Social com;oariso,z processes under diffeTenti& co,lditions ,of egp threat. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1962. IJITITT, R., POLANSKY, N., REDL, I?., AKD ROSEN, S. The dynamics of power. rI?lmclrL Relations, 1952, 5, 37-64. I)OLWIW,
OF EXPERIMEKTAL
Threat
SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY
as a Determinant KARL
SUPPLEMENT
of Downward
1, 32-39
(1966)
Comparison1
L. HAKMILLER
The present esperiment examined comparison choice under two condit,ions of threat in which the probable dissimilarity of the available Others from the subjects varied, according to the precomparison information. It was observed that the choices of the subjectas in the High-Threat condition focused upon more dissimilar Others than did the rhoiccs of the subjects in the LowThreat condition. Since the ,precomparison probability that the more dicsimilnr Others would prove to be worse off (i.e., more hostile) than the Pubjccts was greater, this observation was interpreted as evidence of the occurrence of defensive social comparison. Such comparisons, it was suggested, primarily function to reduce the threat of unexpectrdly negative information about oneself rather than providing a basis for an accurate self-assessment.
Social comparison process theory (Festinger, 1954) hypothesizes that the tendency t’o compare oneself with some specific person decreases as the difference between his opinion or ability and one’s own increases. This hypothesis is based on the argument that comparison with others who are too divergent results in inaccurate self-assessment, that such imprecision is less preferred than precision and, hence, that such comparisons are avoided when possible. Thus, this reasoning suggests that the primary instrumental function of the comparison process is to permit accurate self-aesessment~. Even assuming that comparison with similar Others does permit more accurate self-assessment, conditions which lead to comparison with dissimilar Others would suggest that social comparison may, at least, have additional instrumental functions. ConsideraGon of t,his possibility suggests that at least two alternative ‘This report is based upon a dissertation submitted to the University of Minnesota in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Ph.D. degree. The author wishes to express his appreciation for the advice and guidance of the late Benjamin Willerman and for the considerable aid of Dana Bramel at all stages of this investigation. ‘Now at The University of Connecticlll 32
functions of a comparison choice arc plausible. First, an individual might choose to compare with an Other who is quite superior, indicating that’ the Other is to serve as a model of behavior to which the individual aspires. The phenomenon of behavioral contagion (Lippitt,, Polansky, Redl, and Rosen, 1952 1, for example, may be viewed as based upon such a comparison proceed. Or, secondly, an individual might choose to compare with an Other who is quite inferior, indicating an attempt at selfaggrandizement. The middle-class Negroes to whom Dollard (1957) refers as ‘istrainers” may be viewed as individuals seeking such aggrandizement. Of these persons, Dollnrd wrote, “Middle-class people must stress sharply the differences between themselves and the lowerclass whites and Negroes because they arc none too sure that the clifferences are very important or permanent” (11. 77 1. While neither of these altcrnativcs imply :I concern with the accuracy of the resulting self-assessment, both might come to be included within existing comparison l)roccss theory. However, before modification of t,he theory is attempted, it is clearly necearary to demonstrate the occurrence of comparison choices which are distinguishable from those which serve to provide accurate self-assessment,. Such a demonstration would require, initially, evidence of compa’rison with dissimilar Others in preference to similar Others. The present experiment was designed on the a~:humption that one class of conditions which might’ give rise to comparison \vit,h dissimilar Others would be that in which the individual receives unexpectedly negative information about himself. Such threats to the individual’s favorable self-regard might lend to a greater concern lvith reducing threat than with the accuracy of the reuultin g self-assessment. If such a threatenecl individual is provided with a range of possible comparison Others &lo are probably worse off than himself, he might compare wit,11 the Q&i. who lvould most, snrcly be worse off, namely the most rlissimilar inferio: Other available. Thus, the primary hypot’hesis of this investigation was that there would be tendencies to seek comparison with more dissimilar inferiors under conditions of high-threat than under low-threat conditions. The suggestion is that the instrumental function of the more extreme cornparisons is certain reduction of the threat by confirmation of the seeker’s superior position with respect to the chosen inferior.
Subjects Eighty-four University
of
female volunteers Minnesota were
from the introductory scheduled in groups
of
psychology six. Fire
of
courses at the these subjects
34
KARL
L.
were eliminated from the analysis--four and one because of xgr.
HAKMILLER
because trl srlspicion
of the manipulations
The subjects, ~110 were seated in separate booths along a table, all were secretly assigned the identification letter D and led to b&eve that the let,tcrs E, F, G, fI, and I had been assigned to the remaining five persons in their group. The cover explanation of the experiment was a concern with cross-validating a papcr-andpencil test of a certain personality trait. This test (the MMPI) had supposedly been taken by these subjects durin g registration at the University and, according to the distorted description of the typical use of the test given the subjects, was currently employed to evaluate peoples’ standing on certain personality trait dimensions. After explaining that cross-validation consisted of comparing an individual’s score on the MMPI with his score on a more precise measure of the same trait, the nature of this more precise (criterion test) measure was described. It was also explained that one reason the criterion test was not routinely used in place of the MMPI was that the criterion test was less conveniently administered in field settings. The criterion test consisted of measurement of the galvanic skin response to a series of TAT slides. The accuracy of this measure of the personality trait under study was described as well as the fact that the individual could exercise no conscious control over the response he made on this test. After administration of the criterion test, the subjects in all conditions were informed that the trait being studied was “hostility toward one’s own parents.” High-Threat condition. For these subjects the trait was described in exceedingly negative terms, being defined as expressive of conscious or unconscious anger, dislike, or disgust directed toward one’s own parents. A fictional psychoanalyst was quoted as stating that, at the extreme, this trait leads to such undesirable consequences as a blunted sense of decenc:T and fair play, deterioration of the personality, etc. The attempt here, then, was to increase the negativity Tvith which these female sophomores presumably viewed this trait dimension. Low-Threat condition. These subjects heard the same trait described in positive terms. This description indicated that the trait leads to behaviors which parents themselves judge to reflect maturity and responsibility in their own children. And, the fictional psychoanalyst was quoted as describing the individual and social benefits that follow from the presence of this trait in the individual. Here, then, the attempt was to counter the negativity with which this trait was viewed and to give it at least a degree of negativity less than in the High-Threat condition. The success of this attempt was a;zscssed by ratings of the trait on eight bipolar disturbing-satisfying, etc.) and by estimates of adjective scales (i.p., fair-lmfair. expected scores on the criterion test. After the trait description and seemingly by way of elaboration, the experimenter asserted that two subgroups were represented among the six persons in the group. Each subgroup was supposedly composed of persons similar to one another in their general interests and ambitions (information supposedly derived also from the MMPI). One subgroup (the “Beta” group) was supposedly less hostile, on the average, than the other subgroup (the “Alpha” group). However, in addition, it was asserted that from the MMPI it could be predicted with “better than 50-50 accuracy,” that the hostility R~OL’C‘Yof the indicidnals in the total group would hc rank ordered in a certain fnshion on the criterion test. Thr subjects were then a~!-&
THREAT
ASD
DOWXWARD
SOCIAL
COMPARISON
35
to estimate the scores of the individuals on the prcdictcd boundaries of the Alpha and Beta groups (i.e., II and I for the Alpha group and E and F for the Beta group) to check their understanding of this information. The subgroup instructions were intended to encourage perception of differences between two “clusters” of individuals in the group of six. The rank order predictions which were then lvrittcn on the blackboard ~rrc intended to convey the precomparison information that thr available Otllrrs /~rohably--hut far from certain]! -differed from the subjects in zm or&red manner. This predicted rank ordering of persons on the criterion test was reported a-: H (highest hostility), G, I, E, D, and F (least hostility). Persons H, G, and I were supposedly in the “Alpha” subgroup and persons E, D, and F in the “Beta” subgroup. As indicated earlier, all subjects believed themselves to be person D. The subjects were then privately informed of their own hostility score on thtr criterion test; an assistant had supposedly scored the test during the trait discussion and brought them into the room at this point.’ The subjects in both the High- and Low-Threat conditions received the same scores; a high numerical score (on the O-100 scale) was defined as indexing great hostility toward one’s own parents. Assuming that the two-trait descriptions succeeded in differentially affecting thr negativity with which the trait dimension was viewed, it was anticipated that :I given score would be more disturbing to the High-Threat subjects than the LOWThreat subjects. The scores actually employed were higher (i.e., worse) than thch scores the subjects expected to receive on the critrrion test according to latcl :mnlysis. After receiving their own scores the subjects were asked to rate their rcndions to this information; this request Teas supposedly part of the cross-validation proredurc. They were then asked to indicate which other person’s score they would like to know, assuming they could be shown only one score. This choice completed, tllrl experimenter contrived to show them all the scores of person I with the excuse of saving time. In all instances, person I’s score eras ten points higher than the scorf~5 the subjects had received as thier own. The subjects wcrc then asked to mle t,heir reactions upon learning this person’s score, using the same scale employed earlier after receipt of their own scores. The session concluded, the deceptions were explained and the subjects’ cooperation in maintaining the security of these deceptions XIS soliritcd. RESULTS
After the description of the trait but prior to learning their own scores, the subjects were asked to describe this trait using eight bipolaradjective scales; such evaluative adjectives as “il11proper-I~roper,” “unjust-just,” :md “offeil~ive-inoffensive” anchored the ends of the six category scales. The datn, obtained by summing category weights across scales, inclicntt~(l that the High-Threats subjects c\xluntcd the trait as ‘Mrs. Diana Iiirschner served as the assistant. ‘Actually, two Own Score levels were used in each condition (I.(-., 80 and 60) but this treatment did not prove to have differential effects in terms of rither affert kaxpression or Other Chosen and so will he ignored in this discussion.
36
KARL
L.
HAKMILLEH
significant,ly more negative than the Low-Threat subjects (F = 17.2, 11< .Ol). Inspection of the mean trait evaluations for the two conditions suggested, however, that the Low-Threat subjects still viewed the trait as slightly negative, albeit less so than the High-Threat subjects. For this reason, it is more appropriate to consider the former group as Low Threat rather than NonThreat In addition, the subject.s were asked to rate their feeling of %pset” upon learning their own criterion t,est score and these data indicate that the High-Threat subjects were significantly more disturbed than the Low-Threat subjects (F = 5.1, p < .05). Thus, the threat manipulation appear& to have had the differential effects anticipated in that the High-Threat subjects evaluated the trait more negatively and expressed more dist,urbance upon receiving their own scores on the criterion hostility test. Other Ch’osen The primary experimental hypothesis was that the High-Threat subjects would tend to choose more ext’remely dissimilar inferiors than would the Low-Threat subjects. Table 1 presents the frequencies with which TABLE PERCESTAGE
OB SUBJJWM T~ARIOIX
1
CHOOSING TO SEE THE SCORES ik3SOcL4'~ED ~:ANXS OF THE PERSONALITY TEST
WITH
Conditions Other Chosen
Probable Rank
High-Threat, (11: = 39)
Low-Threat (.N = 40)
each of the available Others were chosen; the precomparison hostility rank ordering on the criterion test which was supposedly predicted from the MMPI is indicated in the column headed Probable Rank. It is clear that a very large proportion (94.9%) of the total choices were directed toward those Others whom the precomparison information suggested would probably have higher (i.e., worse) hostility scores than the subjects’ own. C)onsickring those subjecats in l)ot.lr coiiclitionl- \VllO ('hO>( 1,) c'cllllpaI"'
with 311 Other of rank one t,hrough four, the experimental hypothcsi5 implied a disproportionate concentration of High-Threat choices on the lower ranks. A chi-square analysis indicated rcject,ion of the hypothesis that the choice distributions among the four ranks were similar (x2 :9.1, (1.f= 3, p < .05)’ in the tlvo conditions. Table 1 indicaies, as tllca conexperimental hypothesis implies, an over-choice in the High-Threat dition of the Uther with rank onr iprohablp most ho&e according to the prcromparison information‘1
If, as has been suggested, threatened individuals seek comparison with an Other who is probably inferior to themselves for need-appropriate reasons, it follows that if this Other indeed proves to he inferior tht threat should be diminished. Shortly after the subjects had been shown the score of person I, ~110 was thereby proven to be more hostile, they were asked to express theil feeling of ‘iupset” upon learning this other person’s score. Since the same measure had been made earlier, after the subjects’ receipt of their OU’U scores, the change in this expression of upset may be used to as~css the effects of confirming that an Other’s score is higher (i.c.! more hostilci than one’s own. By using an analysis for correlated means, the nl~nn decrease in upset among High-Threat subjects was $nificantly different from zero (t = 3.6, p < .OOl) while there was no significant change in mean upset level among the Low-Threat subjects. Moreover, despite the init,ial difference between conditions in level of upset, a differential rcgression effect cannot account for this findin, r since the variance due to regression did not differ significantly in thr High- aud Low-Threat. conditions. Thus, this differential reduction of oxpressed disturbance is consistent with the interpretation that the comparison process was serving a defensive (i.e., threat-rcdllcing) function for the High-Thrclnt suh.iects.
The data were consistent Cth the primary hypothesis that comparison would focus upon more dissimilar inferiors in the High-Threat condition than in the Low-Threat condit,ion. This may be interpreted as reflecting the function of comparison in this situation of sustaining or reasserting the favorability of the individuals self-regard. ‘since person F was the only Other characterized by the precornparison information as probably lower in hostility than the subjects it was difficult to justify collapsing this category with another. Thus, it was decided to exclude subjerk who chose person F from the analysis discuarP~1 in the ~PXI.
the foul.
38
KARL
I,.
HAKMILLER
Assuming this defensive interpret&on is correct, there are at least two emphases which arc possible, either or both of which may be justifiable. On the one hand, the choices of person N (and to some extent the choices of the Other persons) might reflect a desire to most certainly rrv~oid receiving information that the chosen Other is less hostile than oneself. On the other hand, these choices might reflect a more positive interest in discovering that at least someone is, indeed, worse off t’han oneself. Either interpretation is simply a matter of emphasis as concerns the present experiment but could give rise to differential predictions in other situations. For example, with the former emphasis, one mode of accommodation t,o threatening information about oneself might be to refuse comparison if the risk is great that the Other will turn out to bc better off than oneself. With the second emphasis, the accommodation to the same risky choice might be to accept the comparison opportrmity, although choosing the Other with the greatest probability of being worse off. In the present situation, of course, the subjects in effect hat1 no choice about comparing and acceptance was, t’hcrefore, t,otal. The fact that the subjects “sought” the comparisons they made only in the sense that they were free to choose among the available Others raises the possibility that motivations rqrite different from needs for self-evaluation determined their choices. For example, it is conceivable that the High-Threat subjects chose person H because they were interested in knowing the score of the most “pathological” person present. Given the fact that the Low-Threat subjects did not view hostility as negatively as did the High-Threat subjects, person H might have been viewed as less “pathological” and therefore, less interesting to the LowThreat subjects, While no direct evidence is available to test this alternative, it will be recalled that at the time the rank order information was given the subject,s were asked to estimate the score they thought persons H, I, D, and F might receive on the criterion test. Comparison of the mean expected scores for person N among the High- and LOWThreat subjects indicates that,, if anything, the Low-Threat subjects expected person H to receive a higher score than did the High-Threat subjects (89.6 and 87.5, respectively). The difference was not significant and the purpose of the threat manipulation wus to attach a more negative meaning to a given score in the High-Threat condition but, at least, expected score extremity alone could not account for the choice differences between High- and Low-Threat conditions. But, unfortunately, there is no other data with which to address the ‘lmaudlin curiosity” alternative. A second alternative explanation of the High-Threat subjects’ focus upon person II turns on t,he fact that the subjects believed thcmstlves to
THREAT
ASD
DO%-SWARD
SOCIllL
COMPARISOS
39
have a relatively low hostility score according to the NMPI and then learned that according to the criterion test their score was relatively high. It might be suggested that this disparity cast doubt upon both the tests and induced an attempt to discover the relationship b’etween the two tests by focusing upon the most extreme scorer according to the MMPI. Without pre-judging the empirical plausibility of this alternative, two considerations are relevant. First, if this were so, is it not as likely that an appreciable number of subjects would have sought to learn the criterion test score of person F, the individual whose score would be the lowest according to the MMPI? And, yet, only four of 79 subjects did so. Secondly, assuming some bias toward the high scorer in this connection, would not the same interest in discovering the relationship betlveen the tests have been present among the Low-Threst subjects? And, if so, there would have been no differences in choice of person H between conditions since the criterion test score was apparently just as discrepant from the implied &IMP1 score in both conditions. On balance, then, an inter& in comparing the tests themselves would seem t,o be inconsist,ent with the data at hand, The issue which was raised in the present investigat,ion implies a distinction between self-assessment motivations which are valuational rather than ezduntiomZ. That is, the results of this investigation indicate that precision of inference about one’s own level of a trait 01 ability (ev:duational self-assessment) is not the sole demand of a social comparison. Rather, what might be termed the comforting, value of the infercnccs which may be drawn , given what comparison information is available (valuational self-assessmentj, appears also to be an empirically plausible demand of the comparison process. REFERENCES J. Caste and class ,L~IL a southern tozcm. New York: I>oubleday A$n&or Books, 1957. FE~TS~CER, L. A theory of social colnparison processes. Human Rehtiofzs, 1954, 7, 117-140. HAKMILLER, Ii. L. Social com;oariso,z processes under diffeTenti& co,lditions ,of egp threat. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1962. IJITITT, R., POLANSKY, N., REDL, I?., AKD ROSEN, S. The dynamics of power. rI?lmclrL Relations, 1952, 5, 37-64. I)OLWIW,