Timber or carbon? Evaluating forest conservation strategies through a discrete choice experiment

Ecological Economics 171 (2020) 106601

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Analysis

Timber or carbon? Evaluating forest conservation strategies through a discrete choice experiment

T

Corinne Boccia, , Brent Sohngenb, Frank Lupic, Bayron Miliand ⁎

a

Saint Joseph's University, Philadelphia, PA 19131, United States of America Ohio State University, United States of America c Michigan State University, United States of America d University of San Carlos, Petén, Guatemala b

ARTICLE INFO

ABSTRACT

Keywords: Carbon sequestration Community-managed forest concessions PES contracts Willingness to accept

There are growing concerns that timber harvesting in the tropics, even when done sustainably, can increase carbon emissions. Despite these concerns, few studies have addressed whether households that engage in timber harvesting would be willing to forgo property rights to receive payments for carbon sequestration. This study addresses this issue by examining the trade-off between timber production and carbon storage in the context of the Maya Biosphere Reserve forest concessions in Guatemala. We estimate willingness to increase carbon storage at the expense of timber harvesting through a discrete choice experiment administered to 716 households in the Maya Biosphere Reserve. Because many individuals have rights to harvest non-timber forest products and work in the tourism sector, we assess how rights for these activities would influence the willingness to participate in carbon contracts. Contract length and group or individual payment structures are also investigated. The results show that households prefer contracts that focus on carbon storage rather than timber harvesting, but access to forests so individuals can participate in non-timber forest product harvesting and tourism is critically important in this region.

1. Introduction Conserving tropical forests in developing countries is not an easy task because property rights are often insecure, and communities located in the forest may depend on converting forested land to agriculture or extracting forest resources as a source of income. Conversion of forests to agriculture currently accounts for 15 to 20% of the world's annual carbon emissions (IPCC, 2014). Although timber management in the tropics and elsewhere can be done sustainably to reduce emissions (e.g. Roopsind et al., 2018; Tian et al., 2018), there is concern that even sustainable timber production leads to forest degradation, carbon emissions, and biodiversity losses in the tropics (Schulze et al., 2008; Ahrends et al., 2010; Brandt et al., 2016). Forest degradation in the tropics is especially problematic because there is often significant damage done when logging occurs (Putz et al., 2012; Martin et al., 2015). Currently, around 20.5 million hectares of forests in developing countries are managed in FSC certified timber reserves (FSC Global Development, 2019). Shifting these forests to carbon reserves with less or no harvesting could further increase carbon sequestration. This study builds upon several studies that consider whether payments

⁎

for ecosystem services (PES) programs can be deployed in the tropics to conserve resources (e.g., Vorlaufer et al., 2017; Jayachandran et al., 2017; Randrianarison et al., 2017; Duke et al., 2014; Ortega-Pacheco et al., 2009; Wunder et al., 2008; Wunder and Albán, 2008; Kosoy et al., 2007, 2008). The literature suggests that there is the potential to lower carbon emissions in the tropics with sustainable and reduced impact logging (e.g., Pearson et al., 2014), but few studies have considered whether groups with forest tenure rights would be willing to give up timber and non-timber forest product harvesting to sequester carbon. This study addresses this issue by examining the trade-off between timber production and carbon storage in forest concessions where management of forest resources is decentralized such that local community groups and individuals have rights to sustainably harvest timber and non-timber forest products in exchange for preventing forest resources from being overexploited. Specifically, we examine whether individuals with rights to forests in community forest concessions already managed with FSC certification in a developing country would be willing to further reduce timber production in order to gain payments for carbon sequestration. We then determine how much they would be willing to accept to give up timber harvesting, in conjunction with other important attributes.

Corresponding author. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (C. Bocci), [email protected] (B. Sohngen), [email protected] (F. Lupi).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2020.106601 Received 24 July 2019; Received in revised form 6 January 2020; Accepted 20 January 2020 0921-8009/ © 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

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Completely stopping harvesting and reducing emissions is likely costly to foresters. Requiring harvesters to give up an income source on which they have been reliant would likely also require strict monitoring. In contrast, tenure arrangements that provide groups of households with sustainable land use rights link the quality of the resource to household income since profits are earned from the forest products they sell. In the Maya Biosphere Reserve and elsewhere, there is ample evidence that households under such an arrangement not only abide by the sustainable forest management plan to keep their land use rights, but also to maintain the long-term health of the forest stock so income can be generated from the common-pool resource in the longrun (Bocci et al., 2018; Meilby et al., 2014; Fortmann et al., 2017; Scott, 1955; Gordon, 1954). When deciding whether to participate in decentralized forest management, households must consider how forest management affects their access to the resource and income-earning potential. This study puts these household-level decisions into the context of potential PES contracts in the Maya Biosphere Reserve that would restrict land use and other income-earning activities, such as non-timber forest product harvesting and tourism, in exchange for an annual payment. The Maya Biosphere Reserve is protected through the allotment of concession management agreements to individual communities who must maintain forest cover in return for exclusive access to timber and non-timber forest product harvesting. Although this study is conducted in the context of the Maya Biosphere Reserve, the results of this study can be applied to PES contracts elsewhere. Many developing countries have decentralized tropical forest management to local community groups in exchange for exclusive land use rights in a similar way to the Maya Biosphere Reserve (e.g. Primack et al., 1998; Kumar, 2002; Agrawal and Chhatre, 2006; Alix-Garcia, 2007; Miteva et al., 2012; Meilby et al., 2014; Rasolofoson et al., 2015). For example, this study considers the role of property rights by examining the trade-off between carbon storage and timber harvesting. To receive payments for carbon storage by reducing timber harvesting, communities would have to give up a portion of their land-use rights and an external agency would have permission to closely monitor timber flows and carbon in the area. In principle, people should be willing to trade these rights in return for payments, but the payments for carbon typically come from government sources (either nationally or internationally). Although timber harvesting requires more time than

conserving the forest to receive payments for carbon sequestration, it is possible that those with tenure rights will not trust government to pay for the carbon, especially when they may have to give up a fairly secure private stream of revenue from timber and non-timber forest products. Communities may also value forest resources for cultural or other economic and non-economic reasons. For instance, Maya Biosphere Reserve concessions currently manage a portfolio of income generating activities that includes timber, non-timber forest products, and tourism. They distribute the economic benefits of their activities to members individually through wages or dividends, and through in-kind benefits that include public goods such as schools, medical facilities, and other benefits. These cultural and economic benefits could have important implications when measuring preferences because a contract for carbon sequestration could alter access to forests for all purposes. Although not all households are able to harvest non-timber forest products, nontimber forest product harvesting is a culturally significant activity in the Maya Biosphere Reserve. It is possible that many households enjoy having the option to harvest them and want to preserve non-timber forest product harvesting traditions for future generations (Nesheim and Stølen, 2012; Taylor, 2010). Similarly, tourism is a growing industry in the Maya Biosphere Reserve, which may provide substantial benefits to residents in the future. In the Maya Biosphere Reserve concessions, some benefits are distributed to concession members via individual payments (wages or dividends) or group payments (e.g., provision of public goods). Carbon sequestration contracts could shift payments either more towards individuals or more towards the provision of public goods, depending on where the proceeds are sent. We specifically test individual preferences for the type of payment in our analysis. We also assess contract length to determine if households prefer to enter a land use contract for a longer period of time. Stable work is scare in the Maya Biosphere Reserve so it is possible that households prefer a contract that guarantees them a longer-term stable income (Radachowsky et al., 2012; Bocci et al., 2018). 2. Maya biosphere reserve context Fig. 1 shows a map of the Maya Biosphere Reserve and the location of nonresident, forest-dwelling, and industrial concessions. Table 1 shows information about the established and canceled concessions. The

Fig. 1. Maya Biosphere Reserve. 2

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Table 1 Concessions in the Maya Biosphere Reserve. Concession classification

Management unit

Organization name

Long-inhabited (forest-dwelling)

Size (ha) Year formed No. of members

Carmelita Cooperativa Carmelita 53,797 Uaxactún Sociedad Civil Organización, Manejo y Conservación Uaxactún (OMYC) 83,558 Recently-inhabited (forest-dwelling) Cruce a la Colorada Asociación Forestal Cruce a la Colorada 20,469 Canceled/suspended San Miguel la Palotada Asociación Forestal San Miguel La Palotada 7039 La Pasadita Asociación de Productores La Pasadita 18,817 La Colorada Asociación Forestal La Colorada 27,067 Nonresident Río Chanchich Sociedad Civil Impulsores Suchitecos 12,117 Chosquitán Sociedad Civil Laborantes del Bosque 19,390 San Andrés Asociación Forestal Integral San Andrés 51,940 Las Ventanas Sociedad Árbol Verde 64,973 La Unión Sociedad Civil Custodios de la Selva (CUSTOSEL) 21,177 Yaloch Sociedad Civil El Esfuerzo 25,386 Industrial Paxbán GIBOR, S.A. 65,755 La Gloria Baren Comercial Ltda. 66,548

1997 2000 2001 1994 1997 2001 1998 2000 2000 2001 2002 2002 1999 1999

170

174 280 65 39 122 48 22 74 309 85 39 N/A N/A

backgrounds in agriculture, cattle ranching and non-timber forest product harvesting. They moved into the MUZ communities around the time the Maya Biosphere Reserve was established. Long-inhabited households have lived within the MUZ for multiple generations. Households within these communities have historically depended on harvesting timber and non-timber forest products for their livelihoods. For this study, we consider long-inhabited and recently-inhabited concessions as one group of “forest-dwelling” communities because both groups reside within the MUZ and depend on non-timber forest product harvesting for their livelihoods. There are also industrial concessions, which are managed by private companies, but still need to abide by the restrictions on timber harvesting set by the forest stewardship council (Radachowsky et al., 2012; Fortmann et al., 2017).

Maya Biosphere Reserve was created in 1990 and covers about 2 million hectares of the Petén department. The reserve provides habitat for numerous important species, such as Macaw (Ara ararauna) and Jaguar (Panthera onca), and it contains significant cultural resources as the region is the ancestral center of Maya civilization. The Maya Biosphere Reserve is divided into three zones: the core zone, buffer zone, and multiple-use zone. The core zone is 36% of the reserve and consists of national parks and biotopes. It is generally reserved only for low impact tourism as well as scientific investigation and receives strict protection. The buffer zone is 24% of the Maya Biosphere Reserve and forms a “buffer” around the southern border. It was created to divert land-use change pressure away from the core zone. The multiple-use zone is 40% of the Maya Biosphere Reserve, but unlike the core zone, it is not strictly protected. Within the multiple-use zone, sustainable timber harvesting is permitted by forest concessions. The forest concessions in this region were developed in the late 1990s to provide property rights to local groups who would use the forest for sustainable, Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) certified, timber harvesting, non-timber forest product harvesting, and ecotourism. In return the groups work to ensure that deforestation does not occur within their boundaries. Forest concessions were encouraged with financial support from USAID after the command-and-control approach by the government failed to adequately protect the Maya Biosphere Reserve. Concessions were granted to organized community groups by the National Council of Protected Areas (CONAP). To apply for a concession, community organizations needed to demonstrate that they could manage the forest resources sustainably. The concession members within the communities partnered with a non-governmental organization of their choice that helped them develop a sustainable forest management plan and obtain FSC certification within three years of being granted the concession. Upon approval by CONAP, the concession members were granted exclusive, renewable land use rights to their forested area for 25 years (Radachowsky et al., 2012; Blackman, 2015). The other activities that are currently permitted within the Maya Biosphere Reserve concessions are ecotourism and non-timber forest product harvesting. These activities require a separate certification. From 1994 to 2002, CONAP granted twelve communities and two private companies forest concessions. However, since 2009, three of these concessions have been canceled or suspended because they did not meet the FSC standards (Radachowsky et al., 2012). In the Maya Biosphere Reserve context, communities that manage the forest concessions fall into three distinct classifications: nonresident, recently-inhabited, and long-inhabited. Households in nonresident concession communities reside outside of the multiple-use zone (MUZ) boundaries in larger towns and cities. Many have jobs outside of forestry and agriculture and use forest concessions as a supplemental source of income. Recently-inhabited households typically have

3. Methods and data 3.1. Maya biosphere reserve household characteristics We designed the survey with input from focus groups of Maya Biosphere Reserve households conducted in summer of 2016. The final survey was given to 716 households in communities in and around the Maya Biosphere Reserve concessions during the summer of 2017. Using lists of community members obtained from concession leaders, we randomly selected 25% to sample. Local enumerators then visited each selected household and conducted the survey via an in-person interview. If no adult members of the household were present, the enumerator asked when the participant would be returning and set up a time to return. If no adult members of the household were present when the enumerators returned, the enumerators surveyed another concession member household we randomly selected from the list.1 While our original protocol called for providing a small remuneration to the survey participants (around $3), we were asked by the community concession leaders to forgo this remuneration. Instead, we provided participants with cards that contained $3 worth of airtime for their cell phones. Our sample includes both members of the community concessions living in 19 communities, and nonmembers who live in the same set of communities. While non-member households cannot currently receive profits from harvesting timber through a forest concession, they could 1 The overall survey response rate for households asked to take the survey was about 99.6%. There were 2 out of 716 households given the choice experiment that did not want to participate so we selected alternative households in these cases. We also had to select alternative houses from the concession member list in about 10% of the cases because we were unable to find the respondent to ask for their participation. The majority of these cases were in nonresident communities.

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Table 2 Maya Biosphere Reserve household characteristics.

Male household head Female household head Born in the Petén Born outside of the Petén Average age Average education (years in school) Median annual household income Average annual household income from forest harvesting activities Percentage of households with a job in a forest harvesting activity Observations

Concession members

Nonmembers

Forest-dwelling

Non-forest dwelling

All

80% 20% 63% 37% 50.45 6.54 $5493 $1772 41% 360

75% 25% 63% 37% 42.46 7.07 $3933 $595 14% 355

77% 23% 70% 30% 42.33 6.28 $4597 $2075 49% 254

78% 22% 60% 40% 48.69 7.10 $4624 $688 16% 461

77% 23% 63% 37% 46.43 6.81 $4608 $1180 28% 716

One dollar is equal to about 7.5 quetzals. The average annual income from forest activities includes households that earn $0 from forestry.

experience the impact of a carbon program if it alters outputs in timber or non-timber forest products. For example, if non-members work in one of the mills owned by the concession, lower harvests would affect their livelihoods. Additionally, they may be affected if the payments provide public goods from which they can benefit (e.g., better roads, schools, or medical facilities) or if carbon payments are provided to all households within a community. Despite these potential effects, nonmembers do not have land-use rights to the concessions, and thus have less to gain or lose with a change in how they are managed. This means that they will have different values for the potential shift in property rights. To obtain the non-member sample, we selected households neighboring those of the concession members surveyed. We assumed neighboring non-member households have similar spatial and observable characteristics to the concession member sample. The full survey that we administered contained 8 parts with this choice experiment occurring at the end. The first 7 parts of the survey focused on demographic characteristics of the household, income generation, attitudes towards forest resources and the concessions, and migration history. The final section included the choice experiment elicitation and the follow-up questions. We developed and implemented the script for the choice experiment with local enumerators to help respondents better understand the consequences of their choices. The full script in English and Spanish is shown in Appendix A. Most of the head of households in the sample are males (Table 2), with an average age of 46 years and about 7 years of education. Average household income across the groups is around $4608 USD (34,560Q) per year (Table 2). Concession members have higher income than non-concession members by about 48% (Bocci, 2019). Around 41% of concession member households have jobs in forest-related activities.2 The survey contained Likert-scale questions that examined the respondents' attitudes towards environmental issues in the Maya Biosphere Reserve (Table 3). The results suggest a large level of interest in and concern about maintaining the forest resources of the Petén. The respondents seem largely aligned with the current policy that limits access to a large amount of nearby forests in that a large portion disagree or strongly disagree that anyone should be able to access the forests to cut trees or to harvest non-timber forest products. The respondents are also somewhat neutral about whether agriculture threatens forest resources. To assess whether individuals discerned a difference between cattle ranching and other types of farming, we included a question specifically asking if cattle are threatening the forests in the final 242 of the surveys collected. The results suggest that our respondents do distinguish between these two types of production. The results of the Likert scale questions also indicate the importance of non-

timber forest products locally. There is stronger support for harvesting non-timber forest products and engaging in tourism than harvesting timber among all the individuals and among the subgroups of individuals. 3.2. The choice experiment instrument Following recommendations outlined in Johnston et al. (2017), we used our findings from several focus groups conducted in summer 2016 to identify important attributes of the decision to enter a carbon contract. The focus groups consisted of concession members and nonmembers invited from Maya Biosphere Reserve communities. We invited the non-members to complete the survey to help ensure that the results reflect an accurate valuation for all households in the area, not just those directly involved in current concession activities (Wilson and Howarth, 2002). During the focus groups, we presented participants with lists of attributes they would like included in a concession contract under the assumption that similar attributes would be valued in a contract to store carbon. We chose to present this in the context of the concessions because member and non-member households were already familiar with the concession contract structure and the strengths and weaknesses of the current concession contracts. The important attributes we identified were payment size, whether non-timber and tourism activities could continue, and contract length. Using these attributes, we developed an initial design that asked participants to choose between one of two contracts to store carbon or the status quo (no contract option). The two carbon storage contracts contained different levels of the attributes that we identified as important in the focus groups. After developing an initial design, we had it reviewed by several individuals working at NGOs in the region who are familiar with the concession activities. To select the pictures used for the choice experiment, we intercepted individuals in Petén communities, presented several pictures to them, asked them what they thought the picture described, and then selected pictures based on these perceptions. We developed a design to minimize D-error and began testing the instrument in the field, following the recommendation in Johnston et al. (2017). The instrument was blocked into 6 blocks of 6 choice occasions. After obtaining the first 25 responses in a test community, we estimated a Random Utility Model (RUM), used the resulting parameter estimates to rerun the design to further minimize Derror, and implemented the new design. We updated the design for approximately one week with new data from responses obtained each day. Based on the findings from the focus groups and the results from the test community, we used five attributes in the final instrument for this analysis: level of carbon storage, contract length, payment per year of the contract, whether non-timber forest product harvesting or ecotourism is permitted, and whether the payment is at the community or individual level (Table 4). Following Johnston et al. (2017), the enumerators were instructed to clearly describe to households how the Maya Biosphere Reserve was formed, what Maya Biosphere Reserve residents are currently doing to

2 The proportion of income earned from forest-related activities is derived from a 2017 household survey of concession members and non-members. Table 2 shows the average income earned from forest-related activities for the combined sample of concession members and non-members.

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14 observations were dropped because they did not answer every Likert scale question. Only 242 respondents were asked whether cattle ranching is threatening the forests in the Petén so all 242 respondents were included in the average calculation.

451 Avg 3.42 4.57 1.69 1.78 4.52 3.31 1.86 1.77 3.54 4.7 3.57 3.33 4.18 4.27 4.51 2.48 251 Avg 4.28 4.59 1.75 1.83 N/A 2.98 1.78 1.69 3.19 4.71 4.07 3.04 4.56 4.24 4.53 3.13 351 Avg 3.46 4.55 1.74 1.83 4.55 3.22 1.88 1.82 3.69 4.73 3.49 3.58 4.13 4.2 4.5 2.47 351 Avg 3.99 4.6 1.7 1.77 4.5 3.16 1.79 1.67 3.14 4.68 4 2.87 4.5 4.32 4.54 2.95 702 Avg 3.72 4.58 1.72 1.8 4.52 3.19 1.83 1.74 3.42 4.7 3.75 3.23 4.31 4.26 4.52 2.71 Observations Statement I depend on the forest resources for my livelihood I am very worried about the future of the forests in the Petén Anyone should be able to cut wood from the Maya Biosphere Reserve Anyone should be able to harvest non-timber forest products from the Maya Biosphere Reserve Cattle ranching is threatening the forests in the Petén Agriculture is threatening the forests in the Petén Ecotourism harms the forests in the Petén Ecotourism harms the cultural resources in the Maya Biosphere Reserve The forests should receive strict protection without being exploited by concessions or other uses Protecting the historical and cultural resources such as Tikal and el Mirador is important Extracting wood from the Maya Biosphere Reserve is an important source of income for the region Extracting wood from the Maya Biosphere Reserve, even if done sustainably, harms the environment Extracting non-timber forest products from the forest (such as chicle and xate) is an important source of income for the region Ecotourism is an important source of income in the region It is necessary that the government spend more money on protecting the forest in the Maya Biosphere Reserve against illegal activities In 20 years, there will be the same amount of forest in the Maya Biosphere Reserve

Nonmembers Concession members All communities

Table 3 Likert scale questions on attitudes towards various environmental and concession related issues in the Maya Biosphere Reserve (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree).

Forest-dwelling

Non-forest dwelling

C. Bocci, et al.

help sequester carbon in the reserve, and to ask the respondents several questions while describing the scenario to help ensure that the respondent stayed focused and understood the scenarios. To enhance policy consequentiality, the enumerators told respondents to think carefully about their choices because their choices would be considered when policy makers offered a price for carbon in future carbon sequestration programs in the Maya Biosphere Reserve. Enumerators also described the status quo option as the household being permitted to participate in ecotourism and non-timber forest product harvesting, not receiving a payment to store carbon, and not receiving an additional payment. The choice experiment script that was administered to Maya Biosphere Reserve households in 2017 is in Appendix A. The three levels of the carbon storage attribute represent the range of decisions that individuals can plausibly undertake. First, as shown in Fortmann et al. (2017) the concessions have already reduced carbon emissions because they are measurably reducing deforestation, however, the concessions have not been explicitly remunerated for the carbon they have stored to date (Guzman, 2019). Thus, one option would be for the communities to receive payment for the carbon benefit they are already providing. Second, the concessions can reduce their timber harvesting activities, which would further increase carbon storage in the region (see Pearson et al., 2014). This would reduce their timber revenues, but they would be compensated via carbon payments. Alternatively, the concessions could increase their timber harvesting activities, which would also increase their revenues, but reduce the carbon stored in the concession. The contract length attribute describes the number of years the household would have to agree to abide by the restrictions in the contract. Participants were told they would receive the payment shown for each year of the contract and be subjected to strict enforcement and monitoring of the carbon program. We conveyed that the monitoring that would occur as part of the carbon program would be significantly more intensive than current monitoring activities on the current set of programs. We also conveyed that the concessions could lose the carbon payments if they do not abide by the restrictions. The payment attribute shows how much the household would be compensated for each year of the contract. Households were instructed in the survey script that the payment is the net effect of all of the possible changes to their salaries, dividend payments, and direct or inkind carbon payments that result from making the adjustments described within the contract. For example, if a household selected a contract that required them to increase carbon storage by 30% by decreasing timber harvesting for 10,000 quetzals per year, the household should expect their net income to change by 10,000 quetzals per year after taking into account the payment and all possible changes to their annual income. 4. Model specification To analyze the choice experiment data, we start with the typical expression of indirect utility Vj for individual i represented by Eq. (1),

Vij = vij +

(1)

ij

where Vij represents the observable utility component respondent i receives by choosing alternative j and ɛij represents the random error component. We assume the respondent maximizes their utility when making a choice among the alternatives presented to them. Hence, if respondent i chooses alternative j over another alternative (k), we assume Vij > Vik. The probability of respondent i choosing alternative j over alternative k in choice set c is shown in Eq. (2).

pi

j = p (Vij > Vik ) = p [(vij + c

ij )

> (vik +

ik )],

j

k

(2)

We estimate the probability of individual i choosing an alternative in the choice set c (Eq. (2)) with a mixed logit. A mixed logit is more flexible than a standard logit because it allows for random taste 5

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Table 4 Choice experiment levels and attributes. Attribute

Levels

Carbon storage

Increase carbon storage by 30% and decrease timber harvesting by 30% Decrease carbon storage by 30% and increase timber harvesting by 30% Keep timber harvesting levels the same and get paid for carbon storage 5, 10, or 20 years Only permit non-timber forest product harvesting Only permit tourism Permit both non-timber forest product harvesting and tourism Prohibit non-timber forest product harvesting and tourism Individual Group 800, 2000, 3200, 4800, 10,000, or 20,000 quetzals

Contract length Other permitted activities

Payment level Annual Payment amount

One U.S. dollar equals about 7.50 quetzals. The average annual income for Maya Biosphere Reserve households is about 28,000 quetzals so the annual payment amounts ranged from 2.86% to 71.43% of the average income. Each level of carbon storage is represented by a binary variable that equals 1 if the contract has that attribute and 0 if it does not.

variation, unrestricted substitution patterns, and correlation in unobserved factors over time (McFadden and Train, 2000). Eq. (3) shows the estimation of pij based on observable covariates of the individual (Zi) and observable characteristics of the choice set from which individual i chooses alternative j (Xij).

exp( i Xij + K exp( i Xij k=1

pij =

Zi ) + Zi )

f ( | )d

5. Results and discussion The results for the mixed logit model for all communities combined, communities within the forest, communities outside of the forest, concession members, and nonmembers are shown in Table 5.3 The results across the full sample show that households prefer to sign a PES contract that sells carbon rather than remain in the status quo. Households also prefer contracts that are longer, allow for non-timber forest product harvesting, allow for ecotourism, and provide householdlevel payments instead of community-level or group payments. There are also several household characteristics that affect the likelihood that a household selects the status quo. The results for the full sample and nonmembers show that residing within a forest-dwelling community and having a female household head makes the respondent less likely to select the status quo. For non-forest dwelling households, having an older household head makes the respondent less likely to select the status quo. For forest-dwelling communities, the results for households preferring carbon or timber harvesting are insignificant, suggesting that households living in forest communities do not strictly prefer carbon or timber payments. Forest-dwelling households, however, have strong preferences for non-timber forest product harvesting and ecotourism. We suspect that households residing within forested areas selected contracts heavily based on having access to the forest and non-timber forest product harvesting because harvesting non-timber forest products like xate is a culturally important activity in the Maya Biosphere Reserve (Radachowsky et al., 2012; Plotkin and Famolare, 1992). In long-inhabited communities, for instance, households have traditionally depended on harvesting non-timber forest products for their livelihoods. Although income from xate is lower on average than income earned from timber harvesting activities,4 harvesting non-timber forest products such as xate provides a stable source of income for the region, requires almost no initial time or capital investment since it grows naturally in the Maya Biosphere Reserve, and does not require expensive equipment to harvest the leaves. Additionally, xate harvesting gives women and children the opportunity to participate in the labor force with flexible schedules since harvesters are typically paid per

(3)

From Eq. (3), we estimate the respondent's willingness to accept for each attribute described in Table 6. This value represents the amount of money that must be given to a person for them to be just as well off as they were before changing their behavior (Haab and McConnell, 2002; Casey et al., 2008). If the respondent, for example, engages in 1% more sustainable timber harvesting, they are changing their behavior by exerting additional effort to harvest more timber and must be compensated accordingly. Assuming Vij is linear and additive, we estimate the indirect utility function for the entire sample of concession communities with Eq. (4).

VAij =

A XAij

+

A ZAi

+

(4)

Aij

where the subscript A refers to “all” the sample. Due to the different backgrounds of individuals in the sample, the attributes that maximize utility are likely not the same across groups. For example, groups that reside within the forest would likely receive more utility from being allowed to harvest non-timber forest products because households have used nontimber forest product harvesting as a stable source of income for multiple generations and harvesting these products is culturally important to forestdwelling communities (Radachowsky et al., 2012; Plotkin and Famolare, 1992). Also, households that are concession members will likely receive less utility from a carbon contract since they have grown accustomed to earning a stable income from sustainable timber harvesting. Because of these differences, we estimate separate indirect utility models for concession members (Eq. (5)), nonmembers (Eq. (6)), forest-dwelling households (Eq. (7)), and non-forest dwelling households (Eq. (8)) using the respective subscripts C, NC, F and NF. The willingness to accept is then represented as the ratio of each β for each attribute over the β for the payment attribute (Eq. (9)).

VCij =

c XCij

VNCij =

VFij =

+

NC XNCij

F XF ij

VNFij =

WTA =

+

NF XNF ij

1

C ZCi

+

+

(5)

Cij

NC ZNCi

F ZF i

+

+

+

NCij

3 As a robustness check, we include the regression and willingness to pay results from a standard logistic regression in Appendix B. The results are generally consistent with the mixed logit regression results (Table 5) and willingness to accept estimates (Table 6). 4 The results from a 2017 survey of Maya Biosphere Reserve communities show that the average income for a non-timber forest product harvester is between 50 and 100 quetzals ($6.67 to $13.33) per day while the average income for a timber harvester or tourism worker is between 200 and 300 quetzals ($26.67 to $40) per day.

(7)

F ij

NF ZNF i

(6)

+

NF ij

(8)

attribute payment

(9) 6

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Table 5 Mixed logit results for contract attributes. All communities Payment amount (in 1000)

0.0420 (0.004) 449.57⁎⁎⁎ (76.97) 300.76 (202.27) 20.05⁎⁎⁎ (4.100) 1252.72⁎⁎⁎ (89.55) 830.56⁎⁎⁎ (71.80) −225.93⁎⁎⁎ (70.82) −2694.18⁎⁎⁎ (852.66) −1076.00⁎⁎ (500.39) 12.94 (16.43) −11.60 (8.500) −606.81 (476.06) −1275.00⁎⁎ (606.53) 716 12,912 ⁎⁎⁎

Store more carbon Keep the same carbon storage Contract length Non-timber forest product harvesting Tourism Group payment Status quo Gender*status quo Age*status quo Education*status quo Concession member*status quo Forest-dwelling*status quo Number of households Observations

Concession members

Nonmembers

Forest-dwelling

Non-forest dwelling

0.0521 (0.007) 307.42⁎⁎ (123.72) 648.76⁎⁎ (333.87) 23.32⁎⁎⁎ (6.860) 1711.97⁎⁎⁎ (163.09) 1142.67⁎⁎⁎ (124.12) −119.11 (114.80) −2430.03⁎ (1288.10) −1004.14 (985.83) −32.38 (17.93) 2.86 (10.990) – – −951.17 (861.06) 355 6399

0.0339 (0.006) 593.57⁎⁎⁎ (98.22) 6.79 (246.80) 17.53⁎⁎⁎ (5.140) 946.37⁎⁎⁎ (102.99) 633.70⁎⁎⁎ (87.31) −289.57⁎⁎⁎ (89.62) −2721.36⁎⁎⁎ (1015.30) −1133.51⁎⁎ (564.87) 17.27 (18.47) −8.00 (11.080) – – −1599.09⁎⁎ (716.45) 361 6513

0.0368 (0.008) 44.54 (121.88) 586.51 (375.21) 17.05⁎⁎ (7.140) 1928.81⁎⁎⁎ (174.49) 1211.49⁎⁎⁎ (128.80) −345.30⁎⁎⁎ (122.25) −3939.65⁎⁎⁎ (1311.40) −690.70 (760.07) −29.19 (20.48) 0.21 (12.700) 695.04 (676.11) – – 254 4620

0.0478⁎⁎⁎ (0.006) 715.58⁎⁎⁎ (99.44) 372.07 (232.74) 20.98⁎⁎⁎ (5.090) 919.15⁎⁎⁎ (97.32) 648.56⁎⁎⁎ (86.70) −163.88⁎ (87.74) −971.53 (710.50) −744.55 (621.46) −31.63⁎⁎ (15.49) −15.80 (12.290) −823.53 (661.21) – – 462 8292

⁎⁎⁎

⁎⁎⁎

⁎⁎⁎

Standard errors are in parenthesis. The results represent the full sample of participants, even if they did not complete the other sections of the survey. The results were divided by 1000 to report the coefficient values more concisely. ⁎⁎⁎ p < 0.01. ⁎⁎ p < 0.05. ⁎ p < 0.1.

bundle of leaves and can harvest xate after doing household chores or attending school (Nesheim and Stølen, 2012). In contrast, households that reside outside of the forest within the Maya Biosphere Reserve buffer zone show strong preferences for storing carbon over increasing timber harvesting. Although these households also prefer to have access to the forest for non-timber forest product harvesting and ecotourism, the parameter estimates on these attributes are smaller than the same parameters for the forest-dwelling communities that reside within the multiple use zone. One possible reason why non-forest dwelling households would like to store carbon is that many households within these communities are not concession members, but

still would like to receive compensation for protecting the forest. The willingness to accept estimates calculated using Eq. (9) are shown in Table 6. The attributes with positive coefficients in Table 6 are those for which households would need to be compensated while the attributes with negative coefficients are those for which households would be willing to give up money. If an attribute with a positive coefficient were to exist in a contract offered to the average household, that household would need compensation for that attribute and would be willing to accept a value no less than the coefficient value. On average, households are likely to choose a contract over the status quo and these contracts are worth about $8548 to households.

Table 6 Willingness to accept estimates (U.S. dollars).

Store more carbon Keep the same carbon storage Contract length NTFP harvesting Tourism Group payment Status quo Gender*status quo Age*status quo Education*status quo Concession member*status quo Forest-dwelling*status quo

All communities

Concession members

Nonmembers

Forest-dwelling

Non-forest dwelling

−1426 −954 −64⁎⁎⁎ −3975⁎⁎⁎ −2635⁎⁎⁎ 717⁎⁎⁎ 8548⁎⁎⁎ 3414⁎⁎ −41 37 1925 4047⁎⁎⁎

−787 −1660⁎⁎ −60⁎⁎⁎ −4380⁎⁎⁎ −2924⁎⁎⁎ 305 6217⁎ 2569 83 −7 – 2434

−2337 −27 −69⁎⁎⁎ −3727⁎⁎⁎ −2495⁎⁎⁎ 1140⁎⁎⁎ 10,716⁎⁎⁎ 4464⁎⁎ −68 31 – 6297⁎⁎

−161 −2124 −62⁎⁎ −6985⁎⁎⁎ −4387⁎⁎⁎ 1250⁎⁎⁎ 14,267⁎⁎⁎ 2501 106 −1 −2517 –

−1998⁎⁎⁎ −1039 −59⁎⁎⁎ −2566⁎⁎⁎ −1811⁎⁎⁎ 458⁎ 2712 2079 88⁎⁎ 44 2299 –

⁎⁎⁎

⁎⁎⁎

⁎⁎⁎

Statistical significance is from the results in Table 5. The exchange rate used is 7.5 quetzals to 1 U.S. Dollar. ⁎⁎⁎ p < 0.01. ⁎⁎ p < 0.05. ⁎ p < 0.1.

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This large value is consistent across the models, suggesting strong preferences for the combined elements of the contracts. This value illustrates strong local values associated with maintaining forest cover, a result that is consistent with other results in our survey. For instance, a majority of the respondents indicated that they depend on the forest resources (see Table 3), with 233 out of 254 respondents in forestdwelling communities indicating that they either “agree” or “strongly agree” that they depend on the forest resources for their livelihoods. A majority of households also indicated that they are worried about the future of the forests in the Petén, and a large majority prefer to maintain strict controls on who can cut wood from the Maya Biosphere Reserve (Table 3). Although Maya Biosphere Reserve households prefer access to the forest, the majority prefer that access is restricted via a contract. For the entire sample, households place a $1426 per year value on having the option to receive a payment for increasing carbon storage by 30% and decreasing timber revenues by 30%. Households that are not members of a concession place more value, $2337 per year, on increasing carbon storage by 30% by decreasing timber harvesting by 30%, while households that are members of a concession place a $787 value per year on this option. Concession members typically earn a living from harvesting timber, so they are less willing to give up 30% of their timber harvesting for carbon payments. However, we estimate that reducing timber harvesting by 30% would decrease timber income for concession members by about $532 per person per year on average.5 The results show that concession members on average are willing to take a pay cut of up to $787 per year to receive payments for storing 30% more carbon instead of harvesting 30% more timber. Then, after being compensated for a $532 reduction in timber harvesting income, households would be willing to accept $2556 less per year to earn income from 30% more carbon storage instead of 30% more timber harvesting. This implies that a payment for a carbon storage program could result in significant household welfare gains if implemented with minimal restrictions on non-timber forest product harvesting and tourism. Households in the Maya Biosphere Reserve prefer longer contracts. For the entire sample, households value each additional year of the carbon contract at $64 per year. This value is highest for nonmembers ($69). One explanation for this difference is that nonmembers do not have a long-term contract for land-use rights through a forest concession and want to experience the benefits of a long-term contract. Interestingly, the value that forest-dwelling communities place on longer contracts is similar to that of non-forest dwelling communities. One potential reason is that stable work is scarce in both areas. Although some temporary work opportunities provide an aboveaverage income for households, there is a high degree of risk associated with these activities since employees are not guaranteed a salary for the entire year. Thus, households in this region may be willing to accept a lower salary if they were given a contract for a stable income for a longer time period.7 Households have high value for the ability to access forests for ecotourism and non-timber forest product harvesting (Table 6). In forest-dwelling communities in particular, access to the forest for tourism and non-timber forest product harvesting is worth $4387 and $6985 respectively. These results confirm the importance of non-timber forest product harvesting and tourism to the region. Additionally, the amount that the entire sample is willing to accept to take a group

payment over an individual-level payment is about $717 per year. This suggests that each household would need an additional payment of about $3.26 per ton of CO2 per year if they are compensated for CO2 as a group instead of at the household level.8 However, for concession members, the group payment coefficient is insignificant. It is possible that, since they are required to collectively manage the forests and share the benefits under the current system, concession members are more accustomed to making decisions for the group, which often yields preferences that differ from individual-level decisions in ecosystem services valuation (Murphy et al., 2017). We included several statements to encourage respondents to truthfully state their preferences, and we include questions to assess their responses. First, respondents were told that their response would be used to influence future forest management and conservation policies. Second, respondents were asked why they chose a particular contract to determine whether individuals were making choices based on their actual preferences (Table 7). The responses in Table 7 confirm that households value contract length, carbon storage, and non-timber forest product harvesting since these attributes were most frequently reported as one of the top three attributes households considered when choosing a contract. The responses for the least important contract attributes also reaffirm the findings in Tables 5 and 6 since whether the payment is at the group level was frequently reported as the least important attribute for households to consider when selecting a contract and the group payment coefficient is insignificant for the concession member results. Importantly, the most frequent response to which attributes are least important was “none are least important.” This suggests that many households considered every attribute when making their contract selection choice. The results shown in Tables 5 and 6 demonstrate that most attributes are highly valued by households since the coefficients are positive and significant. To identify why participants who only chose the status quo did not want to choose a contract, the enumerators asked participants why they only selected the status quo. The responses in Table 8 show that one of the most frequent reasons reported was that households did not like the restrictions on harvesting non-timber forest products. This sentiment is reaffirmed by the results in Tables 5 and 6 that show households highly value being able to harvest non-timber forest products. Some households also indicated that they did not believe they would receive an additional payment or they did not want to work for a government. One possible explanation for this response is that many households in the area have been promised payments for conservation, but have not yet received them because carbon programs have not yet been fully implemented (Hodgdon et al., 2012; GuateCarbon, 2014; Guzman, 2019). 6. Conclusion This paper examines the potential for carbon payments to displace timber harvests in community forest concessions in Guatemala. Since the 1990s, significant resources have been extended to protect the forests, culture, and biodiversity in this region. This protection has occurred in the form of national parks, community-based forest concessions, industrial concessions, and other zones that are afforded less protection. Evidence suggests that the community-based concessions have reduced deforestation and encouraged additional carbon storage (Blackman, 2015; Fortmann et al., 2017). The results indicate that

5 The average annual timber income is derived from concession financial records. A 30% reduction in timber harvesting leads to a gain in 10.2 tons of CO2 per year per concession member. 6 −$255 is the net value of the pay cut concession members are willing to take to store carbon over timber (−$787) and the amount they would be giving up in timber harvesting income ($532). 7 About 53% of the respondents in a 2017 Maya Biosphere Reserve household survey felt that having access to stable work opportunities was more important than receiving annual dividends or in-kind benefits from a forest concession.

8 Table 6 shows that the average Maya Biosphere Reserve household is willing to accept $717 per year to take a group payment over a household-level payment. Currently, concession members reduce deforestation in their concessions relative to similar areas within the Maya Biosphere Reserve multiple-use zone by an amount that sequesters approximately 220 tons of CO2 per person per year (Bocci, 2019). Then, providing payments to the community rather than households would cost $717/220, or about $3.26 per ton of CO2.

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significant cultural value associated with harvesting non-timber forest products (e.g., Nesheim and Stølen, 2012; Taylor, 2010). If government or NGOs pursue carbon contracts, it would be important to make sure that these two activities can continue to occur. The survey results indicate that a large proportion of the group we sampled is worried about the future of forests in the region, and nearly everyone was interested in limiting access to the Maya Biosphere Reserve. While individuals in our sample were interested in protecting the cultural and ecological resources in the region, they were more divided on the extent of protection that should be provided, with nonmembers advocating for modestly more protections of the forests than members. This is understandable given that members are more likely to exploit and use the forests for commercial purposes. Nonetheless, members and non-members alike were interested in seeing non-timber forest product extraction and tourism continue. Individuals have preferences for longer contracts, with values from $59 to $69 per year. On average, households prefer individual contracts over group contracts, but the results for concession members are insignificant. Concessions already provide some benefits to concession members through group payments, so it is likely that individuals who are members have less resistance to the idea of group payments. The results of this study have several important policy implications. First, since households prefer to receive payments for increasing carbon storage rather than timber harvesting, conservation programs should focus on providing households with carbon payments rather than paying households to harvest timber sustainably. Second, most households in our sample prefer to receive individual payments to group payments and providing a direct payment to households could result in significant welfare gains. Providing households with longer contracts could also benefit households in this area since households would be guaranteed a stable source of income for a longer time. Finally, allowing groups to harvest non-timber forest products and to conduct tourism operations in the region is highly valuable to households. These two activities appear to have important cultural significance in the region. If carbon contracts are to be implemented it would be important to make sure that these two activities can continue to occur.

Table 7 Most and least important contract attributes. In top 3

1st

Top 3 “Most important when choosing a contract” The length of the contract 53% 23% The carbon stored 50% 24% The level of timber extraction 40% 10% If the payment is at the individual level 25% 11% If the payment is at the group level 9% 2% The payment amount 30% 8% If you can harvest non-timber forest products 50% 14% If you can participate in ecotourism 41% 9% All are important 4% None are important 1% Total responses 479 479 Top 3 “Least important when choosing a contract” The length of the contract 34% 17% The carbon stored 19% 9% The level of timber extraction 30% 13% If the payment is at the individual level 40% 16% If the payment is at the group level 40% 14% The payment amount 35% 12% If you can harvest non-timber forest products 30% 8% If you can participate in ecotourism 32% 11% None are least important 74% All are least important 0% Total responses 275 275

2nd

3rd

13% 13% 18% 8% 31% 11% 21% 13%

18% 13% 12% 6% 4% 11% 16% 20%

478

475

8% 6% 10% 16% 22% 10% 15% 12%

13% 7% 11% 14% 11% 18% 13% 14%

230

206

Table 8 Reasons for only choosing status quo option. Response Household does not want to sell carbon The payment is not sufficient Household does not like the restrictions on ecotourism Household does not like the restrictions on harvesting non-timber forest products Household does not like the restrictions on timber extraction The contract is too long The contract is too short Household does not believe they would receive an additional payment Household does not want to work for national or foreign governments Household does not want to answer or is not interested Household is loyal to the community or current concession system Total households only choosing the status quo

Total indicated (%) 9% 14% 21% 44% 28% 2% 0% 26% 9% 9% 9% 43

Declaration of competing interest The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.

Households were able to select multiple responses. About 6% of survey respondents only selected the status quo. The “Household does not want to work for national or foreign governments,” “Household does not want to answer or is not interested,” and “Household is loyal to the community or current concession system” responses were compiled from the “other” response category (Appendix A).

Appendices. Supplementary data Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https:// doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2020.106601. References

households prefer to receive payments for carbon storage over timber harvesting. By choosing to get paid for carbon storage, communities must consider a number of additional factors or attributes including whether the communities have forest access for harvesting non-timber forest products and tourism, whether they are willing to undergo intensive monitoring of carbon outcomes, how long the contract will last, and whether the payments should come to them individually or to a group. To date, however, the communities have not been compensated for this storage of carbon (Guzman, 2019), and they have continued to harvest trees to generate income, which likely leads to carbon emissions. The choice experiment reveals that allowing groups to harvest nontimber forest products and to conduct tourism operations in the region is extremely valuable to households. The magnitudes of the willingness to accept coefficients for these two attributes are large for all of the regressions over different groups. Our results confirm that there is

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